

VLADO JURIĆ

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vlajuric

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Our dictaphone is turned on. Could I please ask you to introduce yourself in the beginning of the tape and to state your name and surname, date and place of birth, as well as your residence and occupation?

My name is Vlado Jurić, I was born on 05/02/1959 in Travnik. I live in Mostar now, it's my resident address. I received my degree from the Air Force Academy.

How did the war begin for you, where were you in the beginning of war events?

I was... my war experience is related to the Central Bosnia, for starters, I was there in the HVO (Croatian defence council) district headquarters in Novi Travnik. My duties were related to the anti air defence, and later on I took command of the District headquarters. Approximately in the end of '92 I went to the Central Bosnia Operational zone where I was head of anti air defence, and then in the middle of '93 I was the commanding officer of the Travnik brigade. In the end of the same year, 1993, I became commanding officer of the Vitez brigade... then in '94, sometime around August I was transferred to the HVO's main headquarters. There I was head of the Operational directorate. This is about it, regarding my war experience.

And when did you meet general Praljak?

I saw general Praljak for the first time, let's say met in person, in Medugorje, sometime during the summer, maybe in August '92. This was a meeting of the commanding officers of the HVO districts headquarters from the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina, a very short, successful gathering, but without much influence on, on... so, a gathering of commanders, briefing on the situation and so on. And what's even more relevant is that I met general Praljak for the first time sometime around the end of October '92 or in the beginning of November of the same year,

'92. This was related to the recent developments, just after Jajce was seized. I believe Jajce was seized sometime in the end of October '92, on the 27th and 28th of October and so general Praljak arrived, I don't know how and with what, but he arrived...

Where did he arrive?

... to Travnik. He was probably more involved in the Central Bosnia Operational zone, but he was also involved in the organisation of defence of Travnik, the town and the district, from the Bosnian Serbs, what was it called, the Republic Srpska army. After Jajce was seized, general Praljak was there in order to avoid the seizure of another big centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because this would in no way bring any good. He was involved in the joint operations with the BiH Army and the HVO, so, everyone was included there, as far as I can tell... as I'm familiar with, the Central Bosnia Operational zone and the then BiH Army command force from Zenica... I can't really say right now was it the 3rd corps or did it have another name, but they were of that rank, let's say against... the same rank as Military... Operational zone of Central Bosnia. Was it a corps, I can't really say now, they were renaming things then. So, since it was a very difficult situation... a lot of people and a lot of units... a lot of soldiers were demoralized and were leaving the Jajce and Dobretići area in enormous lines, civilians as well as soldiers, like, it was a bad situation, the units from Jajce were demoralized... Croatian as well as HVO's... and the BiH Army's... and they were passing by all of our defence lines, those civilians and soldiers, and off course that there was agitation, so that in battle we lost two Croatian villages. These were... let me just... two Croatian villages near Travnik, that's Potkraj and the other one is Đelilovac. These two villages were lost when the Serbian forces arrived and it was after this that general Praljak, together with other commanders of the Central Bosnia Operational

zone and that 3rd corps, especially units from Travnik of the HVO and the BiH Army, participated in... I can even say lead, were leading the organisation of this defence... I wasn't present many times, maybe at just one meeting that took place on a daily basis, every evening, practically... I attended one of these meetings in the restaurant „Plava voda“, a command centre. I think these were regular meetings. Since I was from another district, from Novi Travnik, I didn't attend very often, but we had this need, so, I attended once, under whose order I'm not sure, maybe it was my idea and maybe I was called from the Operational zone, in order to coordinate our activities, because we from Novi Travnik also wanted to join this defence line and the Travnik defence line, even though we weren't the first line of attack, but still we constantly controlled our defence line, somewhere in the area from Kamenjaš to Mravinjac, now... so, in the area let's say from the Vilenice mountain towards Kamenjaš. We controlled this line and we wanted to join the defence lines from Travnik to Turbe, across the village Priče, so called... it's called the area of Mesčema. So, now we... this is why it was in my interest, being a commander, to join this and I got the feeling that general Praljak, when I attended this... let's say when I was the leader of this joint project of defending Travnik, because in a way with his behaviour, his work, his, let's say, authority, or his style of guidance he managed to, in a situation that was as critical as this one was, to turn over the situation a little so that people would become more serious and in order to take all possible defence measures for the Travnik area, that is, the then defence line coordinates so that the Serbia forces couldn't breach further into Travnik and that we wouldn't lose that part of the territory. And this was achieved, I mean, a lot, thanks to general Praljak. I can't talk now about all of the details, but I witnessed the fact that during the organisation of these defence moves – everything that needed to be done, I know once they demanded to involve the dedicated industry from Novi Travnik, „Bratstvo“ Novi Travnik and „Vitezit“ from Vitez ...

The episode itself was, kind of like this: general Praljak demanded these two factories, that is, demanded the persons in charge of them to make a directional bursting mine, a so called «television»... television mine which they would put in front of the entire defence line so they could completely protect this line and he practically succeeded, with his authority and involvement, in a very short, record time, in these two factories, let's say, in redirecting the production of or placing these factories in complete function of the defence, so that those mines were practically set up the next day, within 24 hours and later this production was continued. And he managed to change this, let's say, people's way of thinking that it was a peaceful situation, that there was no danger, like, that... he managed to secure that all potentials available were involved in the defence. So, he made this with his authority, because, there were, you know, commanders of two units, practically, of efficient armies – the HVO and the BiH Army from different districts, etc., and in the end it mostly worked well. I believe he played a very positive role in the mutual defence from this... in the defence of the town and district of Travnik. Because of this, later on they were able to... and one positive thing, districts that even weren't threatened at that moment also sent help to the Travnik area, as for instance: Kiseljak, Fojnica, Kreševo, Vareš, Kakanj, meaning, units were also sent from these areas, like we sent our units to Jajce, in a similar way to hold certain defence lines and it was all coordinated. This way I really believe general Praljak played a very positive role. This was the very important moment that I... think was very, very significant and that general Praljak played here a very significant, significant part in the protection.

Mister Jurić, all of this was very nicely put, but I would like to ask you now to try and go back to the practical, concrete details from life. So, this was the situation in Travnik with all these events, with all these people pulling back and escaping... What was the situation like regarding order and discipline, in the sense of the organisation of life before Praljak arrived and at the time Praljak arrived – and what was it like afterwards? What did Praljak try to do in the

first place? What was his starting point?

Well, look, I've already mentioned this to you, so, the arrival of a large number of soldiers and civilians and different units to the area of the town of Travnik created a certain disorientation, I wouldn't say chaos, but still, the situation was in no way clear, because... there wasn't much panic there and so on... general Praljak was...

Specifically: did all of these people have a place to sleep?, did they have anything to eat?, how was it organised...?

Well, I'd like to tell you... it was all somewhat, as they entered, they entered the depth of the area, and for example, they entered Novi Travnik, then Vitez and so on... The army was settling in, for example, certain facilities, as schools... the civilians were entering certain empty facilities, houses, etc.

They entered free willingly or did someone...?

Well, I would say something in between an arrangement and... because they have to... people needed a place to sleep, they needed a place to eat. They wanted to leave that area. They wanted to leave far away, to Croatia, Herzegovina... those soldiers, and the people, however, what happened... so this... was no organised situation. General Praljak was, like, in this unorganised situation, when he arrived, managed to, by using his authority, by using his way of guidance, that was like... wasn't purely military, but instead he, let's say, acted in another way... knew how to communicate with people, and he also knew how to react in a crisis somewhat harsher and I think that after his arrival, as well as later on, he managed to restore order, the defence line was established, territory wasn't further lost, different military components were able to work together in this, like, mutual defence, to work out an agreement and both commanders appreciated him. So, the BiH Army commanders from the district of Travnik, I can't say the names and the details

because I don't know them... as well as our commanders of the HVO, meaning, from different districts. Because then there were no brigades but district headquarters. So, this was one lower level of organisation than this classic military organisation... more rural, let's say, territorial principle of organisation. So that he, with his authority, his way of guidance, his leadership managed to... significantly improve the situation, unify the defence, organise the defence and... when you have the defence organised, the situation in the territory improves.

When you say he led this a bit atypically, so, not by the book – what do you actually mean ..?

Well, it has more to do with his style of doing business, with his behaviour. He focused more on motivating people, in a sense that he wasn't, so to speak, a classical soldier, but he had war and life experience, and his style, manner, temperament, and all of this showed him as a man with the authority, the power and the strength to motivate men and to bring certain matters to an end. And the, let's say, practical part of military activities, this was done by the commanders on, let's say, on his incentive... and with his... I think that all happened because he appointed himself for leadership... now... this is my opinion.

There were no conflicts at that time between the Muslims and the Croats in that area?

No, these conflicts were before... before, they were quite recent... there wasn't... maybe ten, fifteen days, luckily, they were very short-lived and, let's say, didn't turn into something bigger... these were sporadic conflicts in Vitez, Novi Travnik, so I've heard, Kiseljak, Rama, but they were able to eliminate and put an end to these conflicts. So, this is also an important fact, after these conflicts, the situation managed to change a bit during this joint

battle, so a favourable situation was restored.

But the fact that these conflicts did happen probably worsened the attempt to consolidate defence and to make joint...?

You know that after some conflicts occur, there instantly appears distrust, and that trust is very easily lost, and hard to gain, so that even though these conflicts lasted shortly, there still were some problems... this deep in the territory. With the arrival of general Praljak the situation changed a bit, let's say, in a sense that we no longer thought about our misfortunate conflicts, but rather about something more significant, the fight to survive, so to speak.

Anyway, what I wanted to know is: when general Praljak was there – regardless of these previous conflicts that existed – the defence acted together? The Muslims equally accepted Praljak, they equally cooperated?

Yes, they did, the BiH Army, most definitely accepted at that time, meaning, in October, November of 1992, accepted him correctly.

They accepted him as a man who can help, who does help and who is to be accepted, even listened to.

They trusted him?

They trusted him, how wouldn't they when he helped to... Because, he was not fighting only for the Croats, he was fighting for all of us who lived in that area. He wasn't defending only Croats and Croatian villages, but this defence line functioned in a mutual and unique fashion.

Operation „Komar”, the attempt of operation “Komar”? What did actually happen, do you remember this event?

Well, I remember this event since it was directly linked to the HVO district headquarters in Novi Travnik where I was stationed. Unfortunately, I don't know the details, meaning, dates, I can't say for sure, there is probably documentation on this; however operation “Komar” stuck in my mind as a good example of when general Praljak personally engaged in... So, the situation was stable, there was no real danger of Serbian forces breaching further into the Travnik district or further in depth. The lines were stable, there was no problem in maintaining them, the problems that were present in depth of the territory were also stabilised and... I think it had something to do with some agreements on the highest level that happened around, maybe in the beginning of November '92 when on a wider scale we tried to, like... let's say, this joint struggle against the Serbian forces, in the sense of our protection and survival, that the Bosniaks and Croats try together and do more for this joint battle, and in that sense this action was planned – operation "Komar",

We can call it whatever we want, because it wasn't some operation of large forces, but it was determined, let's say, tactically... We could call it an operation... better, better if we called it an operation... like... it's no problem. Because, an action implies a small number of men. So, I'll tell you now...

What was its' objective?

Look, it's like this... the objective of this operation was to... Let me go back a moment... So, general Praljak arrived, like, it was somewhere in November, I can't say when... so, it wasn't directly linked to Jajce... so, he came to us, the HVO district headquarters in Novi Travnik and said there existed, like, the Central Bosnia operational zone... we can't exclude it, not that general Praljak was our commander, our commander was general Blaškić, who at the time was the commander of the

Operational zone, but general Praljak arrived with this special intention to organise an attack – operation, this is how we will call it... we can call it operation „Komar“ meaning that the forces of the HVO Novi Travnik district headquarters and the BiH Army from Novi Travnik and Bugojno were jointly involved. To make a small movement – move forward, with the possibility of taking control over the famous notch Komar, or even to only endanger transportation through that road that was leading from Bugojno... from Donji Vakuf to Travnik, that was a really important road and a significant notch, in order to reverse the activities of Serbian forces so that they start to defend themselves, and we start to move forward and that by the success of this action we experience some sort of collectiveness, meaning, so that we could fight together, and in the end, achieve our goals, and be free. This actually was the primary objective... general Praljak came to us, to the HVO Novi Travnik district headquarters and told us this.

Regarding this question of trust you've mentioned earlier, and since not much time had passed from these conflicts, that lasted two, three days, we all thought in that district headquarters: “oh my God, how is this possible, could it be that“... we believed the BiH Army might not want to get involved much, because we had the experience, because we were controlling these lines against the army of the Republic Srpska, and the BiH Army in Novi Travnik wasn't. They got involved after the order came from their superior officers on the lines leading to Visoko etc., and not in Novi Travnik. And we were sceptic a bit: was this possible, however his... He was very determent, he decided this needed to be done, that is was, let's say, imperative... That simply this needed to happen and that we needed to perform this attack. In a way, he arrived sceptical a bit, meaning that maybe we weren't ready enough. However, we from the Command had a very clear attitude: we obey, we have to obey... and we need to and this was our mutual goal. And the following agreements were made: to go to the BiH Army Command, to see commander Refik Lendo in Novi Travnik, and so we left together, him and me, sat there and talked.

I can't remember now if the BiH Army commanders from Bugojno were also there, I can't tell you this right now, but there were definitely at least... the three of us sat down so we could work up a way, and talk. The BiH Army commander Lendo Refik was also prepared to... probably somebody also said something to him about this topic and so we started some serious talks.

How did these talks go? How long did they last?

They lasted a day. So, general Praljak said the same... like, there has to be a joint attack, the objectives were to achieve this mutual defence, to make certain military successes that could result in the development of the entire situation. They too did, let's say, admit they wished the same; the BiH Army did, that this could be done. We agreed the following: this plan of attack... since this attack would be implemented mostly from the Bugojno district, this plan should be done by the BiH Army in Bugojno, and that we would join to make a mutual agreement. So, the core of the... I, since I don't have a map here, basically, this attack, this operation would be directed from Bugojno by liberating certain villages that were on the way to this notch Komar, meaning from that line, approximately Bugojno, Donji Vakuf, Novi Travnik, meaning, heading for this notch Komar, and that the BiH Army forces from Novi Travnik and the HVO forces from Novi Travnik would attack on this auxiliary route and head for the same notch Komar. And bear in mind that we, with about 150 soldiers, had to make sure there weren't any attacks from the side or counteractions, to protect the right side of our forces and to go a few kilometres in depth in order to protect this main course of attack.

This was HVO's principal obligation?

HVO Novi Travnik, while the BiH Army forces were, let's say, further west. We were further east, so the BiH Army forces from Novi Travnik were at

Ravno Rostov, that's, well, a bit more to the west and those BiH Army forces from Bugojno were even further to the west so we had those three. HVO Bugojno wasn't directly involved in this action because there was a line dividing Bugojno. HVO was south, towards Kupres, whereas the BiH Army was north towards Donji Vakuf. The line was made in such a way that they weren't directly linked to it.

This plan was done concretely enough; actions were done according to some military rules. This mutual action was set up, we agreed there should be one remote command post on the defence line itself, so to speak, in one trench at the defence line and that this will be organised by the BiH Army from Bugojno, and mister Refik Lendo, mister Praljak and I would come to Bugojno and then we would all be there. Each got his assignment, and that was to, within his, this military organisation, like, organise his units to perform these actions. And everyone had to do what we agreed. Naturally, I tried, did everything possible together with our district headquarters in order to make the necessary preparations, to ensure an adequate and moral preparation, and that psychological preparation for that. We had to explain all of this to our people and also to organise, practically all logistics that was needed, as well as to mark it with predetermined marks and to start during the night. And, practically, when everything was finished the next day, we had to move the next night, and to my opinion we have prepared our 150 soldiers well, we brought units to our defence line, to the area of Kamenjaš and they were ready there. The commander of our attack unit was Ilija Marin and we set up this connection... we also had radio connection, so there were no problems. Concerning the BiH Army, everyone, under their competence, I wasn't instructed well on the preparations that were supposed to happen, but this was the responsibility of commander Lendo, and there was also Dautović in Bugojno, as to my knowledge.

Senad?

Senad Dautović, I think it was him. And so we set out, I was with Mister General Praljak in the car during the whole time, ever since the preparations started. He was monitoring the course of our preparations, observing us. We were a bit sceptical during these preparations. We were still thinking: will they want to, will it actually succeed? – but we really tried to do it right. We set out for Bugojno on the second night, sometime at 2, 3 o'clock in the morning we arrived to the headquarters in Bugojno, mister Dautović was there, and so was mister Lendo. We all sat down and talked for a while, preparing and all... because we practically didn't even know what this place was. We set out with a line of vehicles early in the morning, arrived to that place where this attack was happening when it was already dark, and then we had to move on. We even, during this planning, fighting, even accepted to go first, like, in order to make this, let's say, protection on the right side so those 150 soldiers we had, headed by mister Marin, started to go. Also, there was his deputy commander Josip Skopljaković, I think... yes. We started to pass these two, three kilometres straight ahead to this area controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, but... we stopped there, at some two, three kilometres. Like, we did this, made the connection and now we needed to realise the main attack. However, this attack never happened, no way.

Who was supposed to realise this main attack?

The BiH Army from Bugojno. They reported, like, to us – we were at one command centre, we had our connections, we kept track of what was going on – that they entered the abandoned villages, I don't know their names, however, we didn't hear not one shot. We didn't hear anything... we didn't... we didn't have the information... OK, we couldn't see anything, but this was reported... but there wasn't anything, nothing... it was really interesting like that, nothing happened. We also heard that the BiH Army

from Novi Travnik... but again nothing. And it was like that for about four, five hours. Then mister Refik Lendo fell ill, his stomach ached, we later found out that he really... that he needed to leave, that there were some complications with his appendix, in that moment...

What? Did he have surgery?

I believe he had surgery. But during those four, five hours he stayed with us, he complained but he stayed, only to leave at some later phase when there was no need, he left... And general Praljak was still with us and then he... he was wondering: „What’s going on, why is there no action, why isn't anybody moving?” – there was nothing. After standing for some five to six hours, he suddenly decided, got angry and on this little piece of paper he said something like: „From this moment on, I bear no more consequences for the further course of this action“, he signed it: Slobodan Praljak – and then he wanted to go into the car. I begged him: „Mister General, please don't!“, like, „You go, but I can't, not until I pull back the army, I won't...“ ... „All right, you just do what you need to do, but I am no longer, like, a part of this!“, he was very angry. So, this attempt failed. We brought back the army. Since the connection on the other side was used a bit more, from the Serbian forces, there was already this feeling like something is happening, but there were no, let's say, combat operations. We returned to our positions for those three kilometres without any losses, without gunfire, without anything. That was actually an empty space, apparently it was so.

OK, but what was the explanation for this? Why didn't they move, that is, what happened and why didn't the action go according to plan?

I don't know. There is no explanation for me, I can't say. I can't say why it never happened. I can't say if it was on purpose or not, but the fact is that this course of

action wasn't working or the operation wasn't going the way we thought it would.

So where did this part of the BiH Army end, these forces that were supposed to go? Did they really enter this part of the territory?

Look, we received a report claiming that they did enter one or two abandoned villages, but only to return later. They came back ... this was the report, and we couldn't see nor do anything from this command post since everyone had his responsibility, like... so, I don't know... I don't know why, but the fact is that this operation never had the wanted effect, this joint action never got through. But I still claim that the HVO of Novi Travnik did nothing negative, but, as a matter of fact – we did everything we could in order for it to succeed. Now, I can't say if they were instructed not to go, from the BiH Army, or maybe the soldiers didn't... Anyway, the action itself didn't go as it should...

And the anger of mister Praljak, it was...?

He was angry because they didn't go. He even said: „Look, these are the HVO in Novi Travnik... they are... why isn't anybody moving?", he was very angry. He was angry because he invested a lot of effort and energy to bring us all together first, and when he did get us all together, he had to make us work out everything together, and when we did work everything out together, then we had to organise, involve forces, so we would, let's say, get involved one more time but with more effort, it's just that everything didn't work out. In the end, after so much effort and trouble, nothing happened. There, that's why, I think, he was angry. That's it.

Were there any other mutual actions later on, or some mutual agreements?

Let me tell you... concerning mister Praljak, I can't remember... there was

another agreement, and, I don't know, I'm not sure if he participated... on forging another coordinated attack, commando style, to infiltrate a couple of groups through the defence line, but I can't remember now if he participated. I don't think so, but I can't, hmm...

So, there were a lot of attempts in November to have this mutual involvement, so we could jointly... I even know that somewhere, maybe in January '93, the Travnik brigade, it was the Travnik brigade then, already tried to forge an attack at Potkraj etc. So, up until January 1993 there were such attempts. But mister Praljak was, in my, like, as I can determine the timeline now, about a month – from the end of October to the end of November. I can't... maybe you know better.

What happened after he left? Could you compare the field status, relations between the men, the situation, the organisation, and everything else when he was present there and after he left?

Look here, he did a lot during the that month or so while he was there, not just because he was working with us, now this was, like, our episode, from Novi Travnik, but he did a lot. After he left we felt a certain... help in the sense that the army was better organised, that he, let's say, helped a lot by bringing in, so it seemed, some experts who would help in the organisation and the army and all. In that sense, from our part, he definitely helped the HVO, but he also helped the BiH Army at that time, that is, he helped all of us to stay together.

Did general Praljak return there ever again?

I can't remember anymore... to tell you the truth, I can't remember now, I can't say if he did or if he didn't, I'm not sure... maybe he returned one more time, but I think this was... that it was during that month that he stayed there. His departures and his arrivals, I can't say... how many times he arrived, this...

Did you make any more contacts later on with the general? Did you get the chance to meet him afterwards...?

Besides that time, I don't believe I had any direct... this was a distinct, I will always remember this... very special, like... pragmatic.

Did we forget to mention anything? Do we need to say anything else?

Well, I don't think we have to right now... Maybe, while we were preparing, when you mentioned some support coming from our artillery etc... this all actually happened, like, this was a coordinated, mutual effort to...

Let's be precise, so, you are referring to the conversation we had a few days ago and you are referring to the HVO artillery support to the Muslim forces, that is, to the BiH Army forces, that lost some positions, so they asked for help...

Yes. so, things like that did happen, I can't specifically determine the object etc, but things like that did happen in that period.

This was during that month?

In that period, especially when Jajce was endangered and after that, like, these things definitely did happen and it was made this way. But I don't know the details.

Since we are talking about a period during which there were a lot of tensions, and there were also some conflicts emerging before – I assume there were some people on both sides who were inclined to provoke incidents. What I would like to know is, for example, in what way did

**general Praljak participate, like, how did he try to avoid them – if he tried?
How did he handle these kinds of situations?**

Well, he was in a time in which he was. We even wanted; we wished he would stay longer.

Why is that so?

Because he showed us a lot during that month. Like, if someone wanted to provoke incidents – he couldn't, not during that month.

What did Praljak do, that is, what did happen when Praljak was...?

He was simply like... You know, a closed area, a difficult situation – and suddenly there was someone who showed us he could be a real authority to all of us: me, the military district commander, and the commander of that other district headquarters, to that BiH Army commander. He simply rose above us – maybe it was because he came on his own and because he showed us he was the one who could motivate us in that moment. What could have happened next, if he stayed for a year or so, I don't know - but we all loved him, at least the HVO did, so why wouldn't he stay with us longer to help.

What is actually, under those circumstances, when we take a look at the bigger picture, what would be that thing based on what a person can show up and prove and gain trust from men? Is it rank? Is it literacy? Is it strength? Under these circumstances what it is about?

Look, whenever there's a crisis, it's always good for a person to show up that has a solid character, who doesn't act only formally because of his rank: I am this and that commander... There were a hundred commanders there! but the

person who can combine his rank and the position he's holding with his personality, with his authority, with that something that's inside a man who can... And general Praljak was that man, I've already described that a bit. So: great people skills, a skilled spokesman, who will shout at people when needed, who can deal with difficult things when needed, like, who can give an example of what can't be done, but I'm not talking about being rough, but like, very, very.... he knew how to react wisely in difficult situations. That's my opinion.

So, after Praljak left, what happened next in that area? Let's roundup...

Well, we... so we could... finish, so, personally, I went to the Central Bosnia operational zone, there was this, let's say, stabilization of the situation. Everyone had left, there was no one, I mean, mister Praljak wasn't there, and so on. However, in general there was... we always have to take a look at the big picture, because the situation in the BiH territory started to worsen between the Croats and the Bosniaks, there were some other conflicts, I believe they started in Konjic, Neretvica, Uskoplje, and later it started in Busovača, then in Kiseljak. Regarding the situation in Novi Travnik and Travnik, it was all quiet until Easter in Travnik, and up to June of '93 there were none of these conflicts with the BiH Army. So, it happened more in this area where those conflicts generated, arose, were, they happened more in these areas, until somewhere in June there was this complete general conflict. Yes, it was like that.

All right, mister Jurić, thank you very much! Can we turn the recording off?

You can.