090511ED

Page 7832

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We'll take this

2 into consideration, knowing that we thought that that would be right at

3 the time of the cross-examination by the Prosecution. Thank you for this

4 information, Mr. Kovacic.

5 So Ms. Laura Morris, legal intern, let me greet you. Welcome to

6 this courtroom.

7 We're now going to continue with the examination-in-chief of

8 Mr. Praljak by Mr. Kovacic.

9 Mr. Kovacic, I think you have used, so far, seven hours and

10 nineteen minutes, so the seconds are a present I give you.

11 WITNESS: SLOBODAN PRALJAK [Resumed]

12 [The witness answered through interpreter]

13 Examination by Mr. Kovacic: [Continued]

14 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General. Did you have a good

15 rest?

16 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Kovacic. Good afternoon to everyone in the

17 courtroom.

18 Q. I suggest we move on and go through a few documents from the

19 Ministry of Defence that would enable you to confirm and additionally

20 clarify many points that you have spoken about, especially the positions

21 of Croatia and its representatives during those days in 1992 and 1993.

22 We left off on Thursday on 3D00482. Will you choose the third

23 document yourself?

24 A. 3D00641 is a document of no great import, except that it says

25 that Mato Kukuljica had an interview with me on the 23rd of July, 1993,

Page 7833

1 when I was still in Zagreb, about the turnover of some video material to

2 the Cinema Documentation Centre in Croatia, and there is nothing more to

3 say about that.

4 00642 will be the next document. As I said a couple of times

5 already from the very outset, when I became assistant minister for IPD,

6 that is to say, immediately within the first 15 days that it takes a

7 person to find his way around, we started working, and we continued to

8 work all the time, on the education of the Croatian Army, Croatian

9 troops, about the standards of international humanitarian law and

10 international law on warfare, with the ICRC. We had regular workshops on

11 all levels of the Croatian Army, and I remember that at the very

12 beginning, in 1962, as soon as we established relations with them, we

13 printed a brochure with a circulation of about 100.000, with the

14 standards of international law. These brochures were distributed to

15 soldiers so that they know how to conduct themselves in war.

16 I gave you a completely wrong document, by the way. Let's move

17 on to the next document.

18 Q. Look at 3D00683. This is a good document for certain points. It

19 does not have a date. In fact, it has a date only on the reception

20 stamp.

21 A. 6th June 1992 is the date. At that time, there was a

22 considerable demobilisation in the Croatian Army. The number of troops

23 was significantly reduced because, on the 3rd of January, 1992, the

24 Croatian Army signed a kind of cease-fire in Sarajevo and agreed to the

25 arrival of the UNPROFOR to Croatia, and the UNPROFOR was to handle the

Page 7834

1 introduction of peace and restoring order, and deal with the Serbian

2 paramilitary troops in Croatia and the functioning of the cease-fire in

3 certain areas. However, certain problems did occur. It was time, at

4 that time, to designate and attribute ranks, and since the Personnel

5 Administration had only been established -- I have to tell you,

6 Your Honours, that all this started functioning really only in

7 March 1992, when the war stopped and it was evident that the UNPROFOR had

8 taken over the moderation between the Croatian Army and the insurgent

9 Serbs. In order to find out how many troops and volunteers there were in

10 the Croatian Army, lists had to be made, and the first two computers and

11 the first few staff members were found by me. That's how the

12 establishment of the Personnel Administration began.

13 This document speaks of certain problems that occurred; that some

14 data are inaccurate, incomplete; that teams had gone out into the field

15 to harmonise all this; that liability will be investigated; why some

16 information is incorrect or incomplete; that certain omissions had to be

17 addressed because the attribution of ranks, unless done by the rules,

18 could cause great dissatisfaction, and the standards were experience, the

19 conduct of command duties, training, and the behaviour -- the conduct of

20 the person to whom the rank is given. That was one of the major problems

21 at that time, and we invested great efforts to solve it in such a way as

22 to avoid dissatisfaction among the troops.

23 Q. 3D00897 would be the next document.

24 A. No, 3D00685. This is very important, not because of the

25 propaganda action, where I ask the army General Janko Bobetko to enable

Page 7835

1 my Officer Dosen. We are talking here about the area of the south of

2 Dubrovnik, and Mr. Jevrem Brkovic was one of the best known and best

3 Montenegrin poets, and he was supposed to go with Dosen to tell the

4 Croatian troops that it was not the Montenegrins who were to blame, as a

5 nation, for the attack on Dubrovnik; that it was done, this attack, by

6 some people who had been mobilised or who volunteered, and that we cannot

7 blame the people en masse. And Mr. Dosen was to say this in Croatia;

8 namely, that he wasn't defending this action, that it was a matter of

9 politics.

10 By the way, I knew Mr. Dosen long before -- Mr. Brkovic long

11 before the war. He created an association in Croatia called

12 Croatian-Montenegrin Friendship.

13 Q. 3D00897 is very interesting on this point.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, General Praljak.

15 Since we have the document, I have a technical question on the stamp. We

16 can see your signature and a stamp. Major General Praljak, assistant

17 minister of defence, and I see number 25 on the stamp or seal. I'm

18 somewhat surprised. Why number 25?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no clue about

20 stamps and numbers. I never paid attention to that. This was probably

21 affixed by Dosen, who led one of the sections of the IPD; not the whole

22 IPD. The IPD probably has a higher or a lower number. But you have to

23 believe me when I say that in all my tenure, I never looked at a number

24 or a stamp. Any answer I could give you would be completely uninformed.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And you would sign -- of

Page 7836

1 course, it's difficult to remember what did you 15 years ago. I couldn't

2 do it, personally, but maybe you have a better memory than I do. When

3 you would sign, was the stamp put in before or after the signature? Was

4 it possibly put after by your secretary or your deputy? When you were

5 given a document to be signed, was it already stamped or was the stamp

6 put on later on?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was stamped certainly after. I

8 would read the document, glance through it just to know what it was

9 about. We've discussed this before. I would sign it, and I would no

10 longer care about who puts the stamp on it, and I was really not

11 interested in formalities before or after the war. I would certainly not

12 be a good clerk or a good civil servant.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Please proceed, Mr. Kovacic.

15 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. This document that I indicated before, 00897, 11th June 1993,

17 also points out certain typical features in that procedure?

18 A. 897, you say?

19 Q. Yes. It's three or four documents after the one we discussed.

20 A. Perhaps, Mr. Kovacic, I would choose which documents to skip.

21 Q. That's fine with me. We just want to show the characteristic or

22 interesting problems you dealt with on your job.

23 A. 3D00875. This document -- oh, you are going to do that?

24 Q. We set that aside. My colleague will question you on that.

25 A. 3D00897. Let's go to this one, then. The Croatian Military

Page 7837

1 Academy, in order to create a TV studio, made this request. And I say

2 that I don't agree with this because the TV studio already exists for the

3 Croatian Army. They can't have two because we don't have enough money,

4 and they can use the one we already have.

5 Q. And then the next document right after that one is 3D00903. This

6 is quite a different topic now. Now, why would you deal with something

7 like this?

8 A. Well, psychological and information activities, or political

9 activities, as they were called later on, and some people referred to it

10 that way before, this was a place where people from the government would

11 come to, embassies, to discuss political issues, to see what Croatia

12 thought. And whenever somebody from the government would have a problem

13 that they couldn't solve, all that would come to us, to my team, and it

14 would be put on the table before us. And this is a case in point. I was

15 to discuss a matter with Mr. Kirin and help him solve a problem, and

16 Vladimir Seks, the vice-premier, was asking for something. Well, that's

17 a good illustration, and so is the next document, 3D00904, the next

18 document in order. The Croatian Emigrant Society is inviting you to

19 attend the meeting --

20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me, please, Mr. Praljak.

21 This previous document, which is, at least in what I have in my

22 folder, an accompanying letter, a cover letter, but does not include the

23 letter itself, what is the informative content of this? I fail to detect

24 any relevance at all.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, it isn't really

Page 7838

1 very relevant. It just shows how many different things and subjects came

2 to that ministry, and if I were to bring in all the documents, they would

3 be mounds and mounds of paper, a whole truckload of documents. So it's

4 just a piece of information as an illustration to show you the kinds of

5 problems that cropped up and the fact that the system wasn't very well

6 organised, because Mr. Kirin went to the vice-premier and then he asked

7 for information from the government minister, and the secretary of

8 Minister Susak asked me to look into the matter. So that's what that is

9 about, and it shows that the system was highly disorganized and that

10 better links and cooperation were needed.

11 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have abridged my

12 introductory question. I wanted to save time, but now it's costing us

13 time; three minutes, in fact. The idea is this: to show that

14 General Praljak at that time, while he was in Zagreb as the assistant

15 minister, he was dealing, as he himself said, with all sorts of problems

16 and issues, but what is essential is that at the time in Zagreb, he

17 wasn't actually placed in charge of anything, as it says in the

18 indictment, that he was a constant link between the HVO and MORH, and

19 that he was in Herzegovina on a number of occasions; and this is what is

20 claimed in the indictment. Now, when he was sitting in Zagreb, it would

21 appear that he coordinated matters over there between Croatia and

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is what is alleged in the indictment, and we

23 want to show that that is not the case.

24 Now, in passing through these documents, we can see two things;

25 first of all, that General Praljak did spend some days in Zagreb, that is

Page 7839

1 to say, that he wasn't in the field, but did spend some time in Zagreb,

2 and we'll address that in due course; and secondly, that certain affairs

3 and duties within the IPD was performed as part of the institution's

4 tasks and had nothing to do with the Main Staff of the army or the army

5 at all. So this model was not applied because it did not exist in the

6 first place.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, could you confirm

8 that this document bears the date of the 23rd of June, 1993?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Praljak, when I

11 will ask some further questions, I have to say that you're quite a

12 mystery for that period before the month of July. We know that you've

13 taken over the responsibilities of HVO commanders around that date, but

14 who are you before, before the months of July? I see this document,

15 24th of June, 1993. This document is sent to the assistant minister of

16 defence. The 24th of June, 1993, you are, legally speaking, deputy

17 minister for defence, but we know, because you told us, that you were

18 also in the field, in the battle-field, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See,

19 we are trying to understand this document. We're trying to understand

20 what you were doing when you were executing one of the functions or the

21 other.

22 We have this letter sent by Professor Zoric to you, and this

23 letter says that you have the -- an official function within the

24 Ministry of Defence in Croatia. And then in June we also know that you

25 were on the battle-field in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This

Page 7840

1 is some mystery here. This is a mystery that we will need to unravel,

2 and these documents give me the opportunity to question you about this.

3 I'm not asking for an answer right away. We'll have ample time,

4 of course, to be more specific on those various issues in the future.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we'll have ample time

6 to go into that, but let me tell you, quite simply, we're dealing with

7 June and I took up my duties on the 24th of July, although immediately

8 after the 23rd, perhaps on the same day or the very next day, because I

9 remember that it was at the end of that particular month that I was at

10 Boksevica -- anyway, I never had any duties, except on two occasions when

11 Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic asked me to go down there and to

12 try and calm tensions.

13 There is no mystery. Quite simply, this is what was afoot. I

14 would get into my car, I would drive for ten hours, I would go down there

15 to help out in whatever way I could, and you will see what I actually did

16 and where I was. I would stay for five days or seven days, and please

17 believe me when I say that I didn't really ask much about this. The

18 minister would know that I was going, but in a way I would try and

19 escape. I would just get going and go down there.

20 Now, why was I able to do this? Well, because the people working

21 in the IPD, the employees, were very highly-educated people, it was an

22 excellent team, it was a very well-organised setup, a very well-organised

23 department, and as I say, mostly the employees had titles, they were

24 well-educated people, and I always adhered to the maxim that if you want

25 something to function properly, then you should take on board

Page 7841

1 well-qualified individuals, individuals who had better capabilities than

2 yourself, and then you'll be able to let them get on with your work. You

3 won't have to do all the work yourself, because they knew -- would know

4 how to do the job.

5 So I'm not denying -- and you can see how many times I did go to

6 Herceg-Bosna and to the battle-front there, but I might have gone one

7 day, driven for ten days, spent one -- for ten hours, spent one day

8 there, driven back ten hours, signed some documents, held some meetings,

9 and then got into my car again and drove down there again. I would do

10 this umpteen times.

11 So that's the answer to this mystery here, which really isn't a

12 mystery. And through the documents that we're going to look at, I'm

13 going to show you this to show you how I tried to find ways of avoiding a

14 conflict and having the HVO and BH Army cooperate, and I would get

15 involved myself, along with General Petkovic -- the agreement from

16 General Petkovic, who was down there. So I would go to the fighters and

17 go up the ranks and see that anybody who was able to solve problems would

18 do so and get involved.

19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 Q. Now, General, unless you want us to look at a special document,

21 I'd like you to look at 3D00907 now, please.

22 A. Well, have we -- are we done with 904? We haven't finished

23 dealing with 904, which is the World Association of the Croatian

24 Diaspora, and the Croatian Diaspora is just as large as is the Polish

25 Diaspora, or the Macedonian one, or the Irish Diaspora or whatever, and

Page 7842

1 that the Croats of the first and second generation, living in countries

2 throughout the world, joined together and organised themselves into this

3 Congress, and they wanted to assist the homeland in -- by investing

4 financial means or whatever other type of assistance and to spread the

5 word about us. So this was an important task, and I wanted to attend.

6 Q. General, now 3D60904 is, in fact, an invitation for you to attend

7 the meeting, to attend that congress. Do you remember if you went?

8 A. I don't think I did, no.

9 Q. According to this, the meeting was to be held on the 2nd to the

10 4th of July, 1993?

11 A. I really don't remember whether I attended and went.

12 Q. Very well. Now turn the page, please -- or, rather, skip a

13 document which I don't think is important and look at 3D00907 that I

14 asked you to look at a moment ago, and turn to page 2. And we're dealing

15 with the 12th of June, 1993. It is a public announcement signed by you,

16 and just briefly tell us what this is about, tell the Trial Chamber what

17 this is about.

18 A. Well, I used the information media and the television network and

19 the radio to put out a piece of information. I made a public

20 announcement that based on information we had received from the secret

21 services, the intelligence services, about a particular organisation,

22 rather an attempt under the name of Stit, meaning "shield," to set up

23 some volunteer units from the Serb Army. And as regards Croatia, the

24 particular piece of information that was important was that in Benkovac,

25 led by -- the unit there led by Captain Dragan, that according to

Page 7843

1 intelligence, they would launch terrorist actions against Croatia, and

2 I can testify that such operations did, in fact, take place.

3 Q. Thank you. Now take a look at the next document, which is

4 3D001222 [as interpreted], 3D01222. This document isn't dated, but

5 judging by the number at the top and the stamp from the Ministry of

6 Defence, it would appear that it was June or July of 1992. What is this

7 about? What problems are raised in this document?

8 A. Well, as you say, I can't see the date, but it might have been

9 sometime in July 1992, and one of the things that I worked with was --

10 well, the Croatian Army was strictly prohibited to politicise the army.

11 We wanted to have the kind of model that exists in many Western

12 countries, and we considered a soldier to be a citizen in uniform,

13 somebody who goes about his duties according to the law and pursuant to

14 the law and regulations. And the officers and soldiers were not supposed

15 to appear in army uniforms at certain meetings, but they did come to

16 meetings wearing uniforms. And so in point 1, I say that this is a

17 violation of the regulations and that proceeds would be taken against

18 such persons. And in paragraph B, I address the matter of volunteers

19 going to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the problems that occur in that regard.

20 Of course, we wanted a large number of Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina,

21 and I underline "Croats," and quite a significant number of Muslims

22 fighting in the Croatian Army once Bosnia-Herzegovina was jeopardised and

23 had come under threat and had lost its statehood, because of course

24 Sarajevo was under siege, 60 to 70 per cent of the territory was under

25 Serb control, so there was the very real danger of not being able to

Page 7844

1 defend the rest of the country. And here I'm trying to explain that

2 these people did indeed protect Croatia and that it is our duty to help

3 them out in every way possible, especially as --

4 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Praljak, I'm sorry to disturb you and to

5 interrupt you. I would only like to refer to one of your statements

6 here. You said a few minutes ago that "once Bosnia-Herzegovina was

7 jeopardised and had come under threat and had lost its statehood," end of

8 quotation. I would like only to mention that probably it is a bit of an

9 exaggeration to say that it had lost its statehood, because in my view,

10 of course, although within the well-known circumstances and the

11 confinements, the very state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was -- anyway, had

12 been continued to be recognised as a state under the United Nations

13 Charter by the international community. It is what I just wanted to say,

14 but of course your statement otherwise has an important point to make.

15 Thank you.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Prandler, that's

17 not what I said. You can ask the interpreters. I said when

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina almost lost its statehood, because Sarajevo was under

19 siege and 70 per cent of the territory was already under somebody else's

20 control. I didn't say that Bosnia-Herzegovina lost its statehood. I

21 know full well that Bosnia-Herzegovina did not lose its statehood and

22 that it prevailed. And I said that because the forces over there were

23 weak and not organised, and in what happened in 1992, there was a very

24 realistic danger of having the Serbs take control of the whole territory.

25 So it was Croatia's desire to help out in this way, by sending volunteers

Page 7845

1 there, and with all the material means at their disposal it was -- well,

2 there weren't any rebellions as to volunteers, but it was the families

3 that disagreed, because at that time during this period Minister

4 Gojko Susak, for example --

5 JUDGE PRANDLER: Your answer satisfies me. Thank you. The rest

6 is already your time. Thank you.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, this is still

8 a mystery to me.

9 I've taken a look at this document, this document where

10 volunteers are mentioned, and I have the following question, and I'm sure

11 you'll be able to provide an answer.

12 At the time when this letter was prepared, undoubtedly the

13 Republic of Croatia is facing an enemy, namely, the Republic of Serbia

14 and its actions. There is quite an important conflict, and last week, on

15 the basis of a map, you showed us all the movements of troops. It was

16 quite an impressive demonstration, and I believe we understood really

17 well the situation on the ground.

18 Without taking a specific example - I could do that, of course,

19 but I'd rather make a general remark - let's assume that in a particular

20 area we have the Croatian forces that are faced with the Serbian forces,

21 and there is a front-line. It may be a moving front-line, but there is

22 one. And among the Croatian forces, some volunteers decide, on the basis

23 of the document currently in front of us, decide to go and help their

24 Croatian brothers in Herzegovina. They decide to volunteer to go and

25 help the HVO.

Page 7846

1 In military terms, how would the Ministry of Defence solve a

2 situation in which part of the fighting troops would go overnight, to

3 leave the places where they were to go to Herzegovina? Was it a problem

4 for you, in terms of logistics, in terms of defence? It would have been

5 chaos, otherwise. Everybody could have decided to go and fight wherever

6 they wanted, and overnight they could very well decide that the front

7 post, where they had been assigned, to go and meet up with another group

8 of fighters. How did you solve that situation, how did you solve that

9 problem?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, you should bear in

11 mind one particular fact which is very important. On the

12 3rd of January, 1992, Croatia signed a truce, a cease-fire, and UNPROFOR

13 arrived, and UNPROFOR took up its positions along the separation lines

14 between the Croatian Army and what was left of the JNA. And at that

15 point in time, there were -- there was an over-abundance of Croatian

16 soldiers, there was a reduced need for them to be up at the front-line.

17 And the third very important thing is that with the arrival of UNPROFOR,

18 and around the 15th of January, all the countries of Europe recognised

19 Croatia within its existing borders, thereby letting Croatia enter at the

20 second stage, because the problem of the Serbs achieving their end was

21 not -- well, the Serbs did not achieve their objective. There were still

22 political games going on, of course. But, anyway, Croatia had been

23 recognised within its national borders, according to the Badinter

24 Commission, so there were a lot of soldiers. But if Bosnia and

25 Herzegovina were to fall into Serb hands, we didn't know where this would

Page 7847

1 lead. So it was in Croatia's interest to allow anybody who wanted to go

2 to go, and there were Muslims and Croats alike. They continued to

3 receive salaries as working in the Croatian Army, but they went to save

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 So these were Croatia's political goals, but they were very

6 reasonable military goals, too because -- yes, I will try and slow down,

7 thank you. I've been told to slow down. Anyway, if Bosnia-Herzegovina,

8 the remaining 30 per cent that was not taken by the Serbs, if that were

9 to be taken, well, that would have been a great problem. Of course, if

10 NATO were to intervene, that would have been something else again, but we

11 had no guarantees that the international community would resolve the

12 problem. So it was in Croatia's interest to have Croats, and there are

13 about 13.000 of them from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Croatian Army, and I

14 showed you a document to that effect, and that the Muslims should go back

15 to the battle-front. So that would be an answer to your question.

16 However, there were many logistical problems of the kind you

17 raised that we resolved by supplying weapons, uniforms, money, and

18 everything else that we had at our disposal.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for this long answer,

20 which throws some light on some parts of the problem.

21 Mr. Kovacic, please proceed.

22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I just add something, please.

24 And who knows what would have happened to the refugees. If the

25 Serbs had taken control of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the 500.000 or

Page 7848

1 600.000 refugees that we had would have been added on to, so we would

2 have had a great deal more.

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Now, the next document that perhaps contains some interesting

5 matters is 3D01676 that I'd like us to look at. 1676 is the document

6 number. It's a public announcement signed by you on the

7 1st of April, 1992, a statement.

8 A. No, no, that's not my signature. Somebody signed for me, but

9 obviously they would have communicated with me about that. Well, a

10 country that wasn't ready for war and a country in which people quite

11 simply wanted to have democracy, but the reverse happened, and this is

12 what happened: Some young guys from the front-line went to the radio,

13 whether it was Radio Zagreb or whatever, and then they would broadcast

14 songs for them, and they would say their wishes. They would say, Soldier

15 such and such in such and such unit, up at such and such position, would

16 like to greet his parents with the following song. So if you listened to

17 Radio Zagreb, you could learn about the disposition and deployment of all

18 the Croatian units. So I told them to beware because, of course, we

19 didn't want to institute some strict control about what was written and

20 broadcast, but this was a problem, because these soldiers would uncover

21 some information, and this information could harm the others who were in

22 that region. So I just asked them to be wary of this and understand what

23 information of that kind might mean for people who were still in camps,

24 in detention centres, or wherever, so that they should take care not to

25 inflict harm upon those people and place them in jeopardy.

Page 7849

1 Q. All right, thank you. Now we come to the next document. 01699

2 is the number, and it is a letter --

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Another mystery we must

4 unravel. Maybe it's mystery day.

5 This document that wasn't signed by you, you've just told us, is

6 sent to the minister for information, and it is also indicated to be sent

7 to the media. Who is the minister of information in April 1992?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that, I know that, but it

9 eludes me for the moment. Salaj, is it Salaj? Right. It's Salaj.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Salaj. This is your military

11 issue. Why did you make the effort to send this document to the minister

12 of information so that he, in turn, convey your position to the media?

13 Couldn't you direct the media's attention to this directly? Why did you

14 have to go through the minister for information?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In every normal country, I

16 shouldn't have to go through the Ministry of Information, but as I say,

17 you have to know the mentality that arises for certain historical

18 reasons. It was a cooperation outside of politics. They had their own

19 executive committee, and the army was very much hated, the JNA, within

20 the former Yugoslavia. We tried not to resemble that army. Of course, I

21 could have called the editors wherever and I could have told them, Here

22 are the examples that are wrong; look at possible ways to change this,

23 but the JNA had militarised the society in the former Yugoslavia so much

24 that I wanted to avoid resembling them, and I didn't want this person,

25 Mr. Salaj to tell me, You are now doing the same thing that the JNA had

Page 7850

1 done for years and years. Of course, in the French Army it would be a

2 criminal act to reveal the positions of units.

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Praljak, take 3D01699. The date is 30th October 1992. This

5 was written by Army General Anton Tus to the president, the head of

6 state. He attaches a note relating to certain events in

7 Bosanska Posavina. Once again, the date is 29 October 1992, when the

8 attached document was received. He confirms the same things you just

9 discussed. Can you tell the Trial Chamber why General Tus considered

10 this so important that he thought he should send it to the head of state?

11 A. At that time, General Tus was chief of the Main Staff of the

12 Croatian Army, and he had a vital interest in the fate of

13 Bosanska Posavina, Derventa, Odzak, and the other places we mentioned.

14 They were about to fall, and efforts were being made to save what could

15 be saved, because the Serbs were about to emerge on the Sava River. We

16 had already lost 500 or 600 people in Djakovo and I don't know how many

17 children.

18 Problems are presented in this document the way he sees them. He

19 asks that the role of the Slavonija battle-field be defined, that all the

20 procedures and responsibilities be agreed at the level of the Main Staff

21 of the HVO of Herceg-Bosna. And of course this is contrary to the theory

22 that the HVO was commanding, because why would he be asking for an

23 agreement in that case? He's asking for a clarification of

24 responsibilities and how the HVO could be helped. He asks that

25 logistical support be defined and what exactly should go through the

Page 7851

1 Ministry of Defence of Croatia and what should go through the

2 representatives of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and there were

3 many of those representatives and we helped them a lot. But when you

4 have two, three, or five organisations dealing with the same thing, and

5 when it came to the supply of arms, there were up to 70 such

6 organisations, then chaos starts to reign.

7 General Tus was well versed in the procedures of the Yugoslav

8 People's Army, so he understood these things very well, but he hated

9 that, and he wanted clear instructions and definitions. He says that the

10 status of Bosanska Posavina should not be changed and that the

11 coordination of combat actions should be resolved at the level of the

12 Inter-State Coordination Group which states "Bosnia-Herzegovina and

13 Croatia," not through local military or any other representatives of the

14 HVO and the Army of BH. He kept insisting that within the framework of

15 the agreement signed between Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, a joint

16 command be created, wherever required, and the joint representatives be

17 present in the Republic of Croatia because it's a joint struggle against

18 a common enemy and it should be conducted the way that suits the army.

19 Of course, there were a lot of wrong connections in Bosanska Posavina,

20 many self-styled military messiahs. There were many, many problems, and

21 they eventually caused the fall of Bosanska Posavina.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, this is an important

23 document because it really takes us right into the heart of the

24 international armed conflict. You can read it in two ways.

25 The first reading of this document is as follows: The Republic

Page 7852

1 of Croatia acts directly at the level of the Republic of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina in the area of Posavina, in which, as is stated by the

3 document, the 101, 102, 103, and 105th Brigades of the HVO are to be

4 found, and this is perfectly in line with the logics of the international

5 armed conflict.

6 But there is a second possible reading of the document. We

7 discover here that there is a coordinator. You can find his name in the

8 document. He's named Ivan Kovic. He's the president of the Assembly of

9 the Odzak Municipality, and he's the go-between, so it seems, between

10 everybody. So based on the second reading, the support that could be

11 provided by the Republic of Croatia to the HVO forces in Posavina, would

12 that amount to cooperation or would that be logistical support that has

13 nothing to do with the international armed conflict, or is it some kind

14 of partnership between two armies, two friendly armies; on the one hand,

15 the Republic of Croatia, with General Tus, and on the other hand, the HVO

16 in Posavina? What is your reading of this document? I hope understood

17 my question.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand completely,

19 Your Honour Judge Antonetti. Of course, you will correct me if I'm

20 wrong, but in all that I have read, trying to find these documents that

21 we sent to the army about international law, there was always the term

22 "theatre of war, battle-field." If somebody is attacking you and when

23 Serbs attack, they don't attack Bosnia-Herzegovina separately and Croatia

24 separately. First of all, they wanted to create a unified territory for

25 themselves. If a different policy had existed, a joint command of the

Page 7853

1 armed forces of Croatia and the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina

2 should have been formed at the outset. However, President

3 Alija Izetbegovic did not have the courage to do it immediately, and he

4 thought that Serbs would see the light eventually, so he only signed the

5 agreement on limited cooperation. This agreement between Franjo Tudjman

6 and Alija Izetbegovic from June 1992 says that the Croatian Army is

7 allowed, in the border areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to intervene as

8 required, although the Croatian Army never did that.

9 There's another point here. If somebody's artillery is targeting

10 civilians in border towns, then according to what I know, you have the

11 right to intervene in the so-called tactical depth, and that is the area

12 behind the lines, and you have the right to repel the artillery so that

13 they don't kill civilians, but that's not the case here. In this case,

14 the Croatian Army, via the coordinator elected in Bosanska Posavina, was

15 to provide logistical and every other support, including volunteers, and

16 thus assist the HVO to hold up. When I say "the HVO ," you have seen how

17 many Muslims there were in HVO units. So that was the joint army of

18 Croats and Muslims, and artillery support was to be provided. If the

19 Army of Republika Srpska is on the offensive and support is required from

20 the Republic of Croatia to repel that attack, we were allowed to provide

21 artillery support. It was nothing more than that, and this was very

22 clear from the definition of the battle-field, from the Serbian

23 objectives, from the tactical depth, when the artillery was shelling

24 civilians, and it was all very clear from the agreement between Tudjman

25 and Izetbegovic about the right to intervene in the border areas of the

Page 7854

1 Republic of Croatia. And the Republic of Croatia was simply under attack

2 in that area.

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the first time when

4 Mr. Praljak mentioned the document, he mentioned this, and in line 3 --

5 or, rather, 4 in the Croatian version, and we believe it's the same in

6 English, this first section of 3D30-0190. That's the e-court number. It

7 says explicitly that this meeting was attended by the representatives of

8 the Supreme Command of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with

9 the HVO and that newly-formed body.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I want to make one more point.

11 Just after that territory of Bosanska Posavina was lost, with the

12 exception of one small part, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic visited Slavonski Brod

13 with all his entourage. He met with the commanders and certain other

14 people from Bosanska Posavina. He asked them how long they can continue

15 to hold up under Serb attacks, and he promised to ask Sefer Halilovic to

16 send assistance in the form of one brigade. To be honest, it was very

17 difficult to understand, to put it mildly. If ABiH brigades had the

18 strength, they could have relieved Bosanska Posavina by launching attacks

19 from Tuzla, and they did not do that, and I don't know how

20 Alija Izetbegovic thought that some brigades from Tuzla or Zenica could

21 be transferred from Tuzla to Bosanska Posavina. I failed to understand

22 then, and I fail to understand today.

23 However, the fact stands that Alija Izetbegovic was there just

24 before the fall of that area, and he spoke to the troops, and he also

25 mentions the representative of the main command of the BH Army. I don't

Page 7855

1 know what he meant.

2 Q. To understand this more easily, can you tell us, when exactly did

3 Alija Izetbegovic visit Slavonski Brod?

4 A. I think it was four days before its fall, and that was close to

5 this time. I can't give you the exact date. It was the beginning of the

6 month of November 1992.

7 Q. Thank you. Now, General, let's move on to another document,

8 3D02593. This is a good document on which to explain a completely

9 different situation to the Judges, a situation where weapons arrived to

10 the Republic of Croatia from Bosnia and Herzegovina. It's a meeting --

11 in fact, it's a document from the 15th of April, 1993, speaking of a

12 meeting at your office of the 13th of April, and it's signed by you,

13 although we don't see your signature. Can you explain this?

14 A. There were two factories of weapons in Central Bosnia, one in

15 Novi Travnik. They were able to produce certain types of weapons, such

16 as mortars. It was not producing them any longer, but it had certain

17 stocks that had already been distributed between the ABiH and the HVO,

18 some 130-millimetre cannons, some Oganj rocket systems, et cetera. And

19 when I visited them a couple of times, I tried to agree upon a form of

20 payment or a barter so that they give some of what they have to the

21 Croatian Army, in exchange for wood pulp or nitro celluloses. I know

22 nothing about chemistry, I wouldn't like to go into this, but I know that

23 in Novi Travnik, they had a very expensive device for calibrating

24 cannons. With wear and tear, the cannons needed calibration, and this

25 device provided that. There was Zagorec, Mr. Zagorec. Gambiroza was a

Page 7856

1 specialist in chemistry, and this Gambiroza was the director of another

2 factory.

3 Q. That's what we're interested in.

4 A. Yes, I brought these people together, and I know that some of

5 these things were agreed. But when I brought them together, I withdrew

6 because my participation was not valuable anymore at that point. I had

7 no professional knowledge. I didn't know anything about nitroglycerine,

8 or the prices, or whatever.

9 Q. In this document of April 1993, I'd like to ask you this: We all

10 know very well that the situation was completely different in 1992

11 because the war situation was completely different in Croatia and in

12 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do you know that Croatia was getting explosives

13 from this factory in Vitez back in 1992?

14 A. No, I don't know that.

15 But let us just go back to one document, 3D02505. Again, no

16 date, but that doesn't matter. This shows the intention of the

17 Croatian Army; that certain important dates have to be marked in a strict

18 military fashion, officially and modestly, without any tasteless shows or

19 toasts; and, second, it is prohibited to sponsor or donate support or

20 finance to such celebrations. It was a very common occurrence at that

21 time. Some people had their heads turned by all the glory. They went

22 around using big words and celebrating the end of the war, although the

23 end of the war was still far ahead of us. Anyway, I prohibited this.

24 MR. STRINGER: I apologise for the interruption.

25 Since the document's not dated, could the general please give us

Page 7857

1 a rough time-frame for the -- if he's able, what would be roughly the

2 time-frame applicable to this document?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is quite certainly 1992, the

4 autumn of 1992, when these celebrations were in full swing because the

5 war had apparently stopped, and everybody was in a celebratory mood. But

6 it must have been August/September 1992.

7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. While we're on this topic, let's look at 3D02860.

9 A. This one is dated 23rd March 1992. At that time -- well, I

10 arrived on the 10th of December. It was not long after I was appointed

11 assistant, and within the first ten days I summoned Professor Jurcevic

12 and Knezevic and said that they should be provided with detailed

13 information about any inappropriate conduct by Croatian soldiers and

14 commanders. We requested a report on the scale of such incidents, and I

15 was to take any further measures necessary.

16 Q. Does that mean because you had arrived and taken up that post

17 very recently, you were still sizing up the situation and the level of

18 discipline; is that the case?

19 A. No. I was very familiar with the situation by that time. I

20 wanted a detailed report. I had already taken certain steps, and I was

21 about to take more steps once I received this information.

22 Q. Now look at 3D0288 --

23 A. And how about 878?

24 Q. Well, if you like. Which one is it now?

25 A. 3D02878. We had a witness here, and documentation presented, in

Page 7858

1 which General Petkovic, Bruno Stojic and I supplied a full truck-load of

2 weapons for Sarajevo, which was a lot. It was never enough, of course,

3 but we did what we could. And here, at a similar time, because we had

4 again restored contact with Mr. Vikic, and that's Mr. Dragan Vikic,

5 commander of the Special Forces of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in

6 Sarajevo -- I wrote "HVO" here because it was easier for me, but it was

7 in fact Mr. Vikic, commander of Special Police Forces of the Army of

8 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I was asking the then chief of logistics,

9 General Cermak, to place this at my disposal and we would find a way to

10 get it to Sarajevo, if he manages to send a man from Sarajevo to bring

11 that all in.

12 Q. Thank you. I think before the break we can look at one more

13 document. Look at the one I gave you a moment ago, 3D02 --

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is an important document,

15 General, so I have to ask a question about it. It shows formally that

16 you turned to Dragan Vikic, who is within the -- in charge of a specific

17 sector of military activity in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

18 and you provide RPGs, shells, nitroglycerine, et cetera.

19 When you send all this to the Muslim party, did you have in mind

20 that the RPGs, the nitroglycerine, might one day be used against you or

21 did that never, ever cross your mind?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With the great certainty that I had

23 in my thinking about how events would develop, I knew that part of that

24 weaponry would be used against us. In matters that are not mathematics,

25 matters that concern people, you can't say I knew 100 per cent, but I

Page 7859

1 knew, as much as I was able to know, that those weapons we were

2 delivering to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be, to some

3 extent, eventually used against us. But we were at that time aware that

4 those weapons would be used to defend Sarajevo, Tuzla, and the Tuzla

5 area, Gorazde, Foca, Srebrenica, and as I said before, it was a very,

6 very hard decision, one of many hard decisions, but our commitment was to

7 help, in the hope that those people would realise that those who are

8 providing them with arms cannot be their enemy.

9 And one more thing, Your Honours. It's not true that the Army of

10 Bosnia and Herzegovina -- that we were enemies, it's not true, as one

11 witness from Tuzla said. We did not fight each other throughout the

12 territory. Wherever we were able to calm things down, such as in

13 Posavina, in Tuzla, we took the opportunity. We were attacked by one

14 limited part of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that happened

15 mainly on the part of the Zenica Corps and in the part of Konjic that

16 later spread to Mostar, and it lasted for a limited time, with huge

17 efforts invested all the time to prevent it. We did not take any

18 offensive action in all that. We just defended ourselves with enormous

19 efforts invested by me and all of us, beginning with 1992. And I always

20 said to Izetbegovic, Let us form a joint command because our troops will

21 not be able to hold out on their own.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I will have the opportunity of

23 revisiting this issue, based on the presidential transcripts of all the

24 meetings you attended together with the late Tudjman on these issues, but

25 you might be able to answer this question right now: You were the

Page 7860

1 assistant minister for defence, so you were at a very high level within

2 the Defence of the Republic of Croatia. Within the Defence Ministry, did

3 you have meetings? We might not have the documents related to them, but

4 did you have meetings dedicated to assessing the risks involved in

5 supplying the ABiH with weaponry, with the possibility that they might

6 turn the weapons against you at some later stage, and you said via Zenica

7 and the 3rd Corps? Did you assess the situation with all the necessary

8 seriousness, was everything thought through, because we are under the

9 impression that you were faced with a triple choice; you might have to

10 face the Serb offensive that encircled Sarajevo; second possibility, you

11 had to defend your Croatian citizens, co-citizens, who were in Sarajevo,

12 we know there were quite a few of them there; and, thirdly, there was the

13 more complicated issue of relationships within the Republic of

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Serbs, the Muslims and the Croats? But at

15 the military level, was everything assessed in, let's say, a scientific

16 fashion or was it done in a hurry, sort of improvising as one went along?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I really don't know

18 exactly -- well, I wasn't there much, I didn't attend the meetings of the

19 Main Staff of the Croatian Army, but what I do know for sure is this:

20 The president of the country, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and the government, and

21 the ministers that I had contact with, the minister of the interior and

22 the defence minister, Gojko Susak -- well, I and especially President

23 Franjo Tudjman and Minister Susak knew of all the weapons -- well, they

24 knew where the weapons were going, where they were being loaded up, where

25 they were being taken to, and I took part in giving permission -- well,

Page 7861

1 you'll see documents signed by Praljak or Susak for the passage of

2 convoys. General Zagorec had the right to sign documents of that kind

3 later on and so on. But we did discuss the problem very seriously, and

4 we were very well aware of all the consequences.

5 It was a difficult decision to make, and you'll see in one of the

6 presidential transcripts where Gojko says to President Alija [Realtime

7 transcript read in error "Albania"] or the president of the Presidency,

8 Tus, We have the weapons and the planes, and Praljak is having a very

9 hard time down there and it was a very frustrating situation. There were

10 moments when I said, You're not going to kill me with those weapons. But

11 we'd get emotional for 20 minutes or half an hour, and then you'd have to

12 go back to a rational assessment of the situation. But it was very

13 difficult to see your soldiers being killed by the weapons that you, by

14 the decision you had taken, had allowed to go through. So that was very

15 difficult, and of course I was sweating blood down there.

16 MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, but we have an

17 important correction to make in the transcript, page 34, lines 24 to 25.

18 It says that Gojko Susak addressed the president of Albania. That's a

19 mistake in the typing and it should read "President Alija Izetbegovic,"

20 not the president of Albania. So that's a technical mistake, and it's on

21 page 34, lines 24 and 25.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. I noted that, too, but

23 it's time for the break, so let's have a 20-minute recess. Indeed, I had

24 noticed it as well. We will take a 20-minute break.

25 --- Recess taken at 3.49 p.m.

Page 7862

1 --- On resuming at 4.11 p.m.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

3 Mr. Kovacic, please proceed.

4 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. General Praljak, could you please open the following document,

6 which is 3D02884. It's a document dated 12 April. What we are looking

7 at is not the first page, but your letter, dated 5th of April, attached

8 to the document.

9 A. I have already started talking about that, but I said something

10 wrong. The department that I headed from my very arrival started

11 educating the Croatian Army in international law, and this document is

12 dated 5 April 1993 and speaks about an agreement that we had struck with

13 the International Red Cross for the Croatian Army to be continuously

14 educated, and it says here where seminars will be organised, in Osijek,

15 Zagreb, Gospic, Split. Those were the centres of operation zone. The

16 next place will be the Croatian School for the Army on the 3rd and on the

17 4th of May, and then there will be another seminar on the 25th and 26th

18 of May, and here I'm requesting the minister to approve the seminars

19 taking place.

20 As some witnesses have already said, I tried -- and this is what

21 we did. I tried to provide some of the materials that we printed to the

22 HVO through Mr. Bruno Stojic and Mr. Milivoj Petkovic; more through

23 Mr. Stojic because he was in charge of the IPD. I wanted them to be

24 familiar, as much as possible, with the matter. I would allocate

25 10.000 copies and I would send them down there in order to -- for him to

Page 7863

1 inform his men. I did what I could. I sent leaflets, materials.

2 Q. Just for the record, I would refer the Trial Chamber to the

3 booklets that General Praljak has just mentioned. It is 3D00840.

4 3D00840 is the exhibit number, and a similar one is under IC00473. We

5 don't have to go back to them, but I would like to point out that these

6 are the booklets that the general has mentioned by way of example. They

7 have already been admitted. If you want, we can produce them in e-court,

8 but I don't see the need to do that at the moment.

9 General, could you please look at the following document, which

10 is 3D02886. It's a document dated 14 January, signed by you. Can you

11 please tell me -- this is an example of some of the tasks you had with

12 regard to international contacts. Could you please explain in a bit more

13 detail?

14 A. There were quite a number of such conversations with

15 international organisations and states that had their military

16 representatives in Croatia and embassies. They all wanted to receive

17 information. They all wanted to learn about the developments. Many of

18 them were misinformed or poorly informed, which is absolutely

19 understandable, given the circumstances in Yugoslavia. They wanted to

20 learn about the war and what the war was all about. Here, in this

21 document, I'm informing the minister of Defence Gojko Susak and the head

22 of SIS at the time, Mr. Miroslav Medjimorec, about my conversation with

23 the Swedish Transnational Foundation. I am saying to them what they

24 wanted to know about events of plans and implementation. They were

25 looking at prospects of further intervention by UNPROFOR. They wanted to

Page 7864

1 learn how the Croatian authorities looked at a possible solution to the

2 military and political situation, and they also asked me about the

3 engagement of the Croatian military units in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

4 so on and so forth. And I tried, as best as I could, to inform them and

5 to provide answers to the questions about the nature of the conflict, and

6 so on and so forth. The conversation was long and lasted a long time,

7 and I provided just a summary of everything that was said.

8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. My friends

9 are informing me that there is a problem with e-court on LiveNote.

10 Mr. Chuka is signalling to me.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, we have a technical

12 problem. Maybe we could see the document on the ELMO.

13 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Yes. The problem is that the

14 accused can't see the documents being shown, and I don't think you can

15 see them either.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. But if the document is

17 put on the ELMO, everybody will be able to see it.

18 MR. KOVACIC: We don't have more copies than we need.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I'll put my own copy on the

20 overhead projector.

21 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]...

22 his on ELMO.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, for clarification purposes, the

24 entire system is down at the moment.

25 Okay, it's back up right now. Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 7865

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, it's here now. Another

2 mystery. Okay, it's working now.

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] If we had not inquired, it would

4 have started working sooner maybe.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Do you want me to read this

6 document?

7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] The Judges have the document.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well, then.

9 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. The following document is 3D02888. This is something that was

11 sent to you, and you returned it. Can you provide some details of the

12 contents of this document?

13 A. Of course. HINA, the Croatian reporting agency or news agency,

14 similar to TASS or some other such agencies, state agencies for news and

15 information. I report that I received Minister Grudzinski from Poland.

16 Questions were more or less the same, and I say here that I had informed

17 them about the situation in Croatia and the establishment of the Croatian

18 authorities in the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia, and I

19 also emphasised that there will be no peace in the area for as long as

20 Serbia harbours illusions about the establishment of the Greater Serbia

21 in the territories of its neighbouring states. All the time, everywhere,

22 Bosnia and Herzegovina is a separate state and Croatia is a separate

23 state. I am talking about two different states. Mr. Grudzinski showed

24 understanding. He says that he understands the sensitivity of Croatia

25 with regard to the establishment of integrity in the entire territory of

Page 7866

1 Croatia, but this is exclusively about the Republic of Croatia.

2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Just for the record, this document

3 was 3D02888.

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I have a question, if I may.

5 It is reported in the middle of this paragraph that you,

6 Mr. Praljak, informed Przemyslaw Grudzinski about, I quote: "The role of

7 UN protection forces in implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan." Did you

8 inform Mr. Grudzinski and did you talk about the fact that this was a

9 plan that was not ratified and had no legal force?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, listen, everybody knew that.

11 Everybody knew that there was a process going on, and nothing was

12 completed because nothing was completed, but the fact remains, the one

13 that I mentioned at the beginning of this trial, Croatian -- the Croatian

14 side, either in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Croatia, was the first to sign

15 any proposal by the international community.

16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Well, that we have heard before. Thank you.

17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Thank you. General Praljak --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the microphones please be switched off if

20 they are not in use. Thank you.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The document that we have

22 before us shows that at the date indicated, you met with a personality in

23 Zagreb. A moment ago, we saw a document showing a programme of meetings

24 within the training from the 13th until the 15th of April. It means that

25 at mid-April, you were in Zagreb, and you had various commitments due to

Page 7867

1 your function of assistant minister. I was therefore wondering the

2 following regarding the alleged Sovici and Doljani operations. I was

3 wondering whether the HVO had carried out a wide-scale military

4 operation, and if so, if Mr. Praljak should not have been there, how come

5 you were in Zagreb at the time? What can you tell us? What was your

6 main task or where was your main task? Was it in Zagreb or was it in

7 Bosnia and Herzegovina?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Antonetti, my

9 main activity in Herzegovina was from 10 April 1992 until -- officially,

10 I'm talking about the official discharge of my duty, from 10 April 1992

11 until maybe 15 May 1992. That was my first tour of duty down there. And

12 my second tour of duty in Herceg-Bosna was from 24 July 1993 until

13 9 November, in the morning, 1993. Those were my two official tours of

14 duty in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15 Everything else, every time I arrived, I was there as an

16 assistant, somebody providing assistance, somebody who from their own

17 goodwill and the desire of the Croatian government to prevent a possible

18 conflict between the HVO and the BiH Army. That's why I went there. And

19 immediately after this date, on the following day or the day after the

20 14th, I rushed to Mostar, and I believe that Sefko Omerbasic also came

21 there to calm things down. That was the time that we already looked at

22 here, when I crossed the left bank and my photo was taken together with

23 Arif Pasalic. There was an occasion before that when the BH Army came to

24 the roundabout, I rushed in. But I'll come to that when the time for

25 that comes. I would rush down there when they cried for assistance or

Page 7868

1 when I felt that I could provide something or help in that sense.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Are we to understand that as of

3 January 1993, this so-called ultimatum period until April -- March, an

4 offensive by whom we don't really know until May, until June, that is,

5 the end of June, you were not personally involved in military operations?

6 Please think carefully before you answer, because my question is very

7 specific and it requires a specific answer.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand your question,

9 Your Honour Judge Antonetti, and I know exactly what you're asking me.

10 At the time, the time in question, I did not participate in those

11 operations in any shape or form. I did participate towards the end of

12 June 1993. In Uskoplje, I was assisting there when I found myself there,

13 and in some way I was an assistant. And then for 10 or 11 days, I was a

14 soldier, as it were, although I wasn't, because General Petkovic

15 authorised me to hold Boksevica, and there were people in Kostajnica and

16 they came here and testified here; namely, some 250 people had to be

17 pulled out from Kostajnica near Konjic. Those were children, women, and

18 men, and the only way to do it was to hold one small part of a mountain.

19 I kept guard, I fought as a foot-soldier, and finally we managed to pull

20 out all those people out of there. And towards the very end, I was

21 carrying two infants, six days old. I spent about 10 or 11 days on the

22 hill, and then I returned to Zagreb until the moment I was appointed the

23 head of the Main Staff on the 24th of July, 1993. So I have absolutely

24 nothing whatsoever to do with Sovici.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

Page 7869

1 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. Now, General Praljak, stay with that document, 02888, for a

3 moment longer. And when I look at the contents, let me ask you: In that

4 conversation here, are they in fact referring to the protective forces of

5 the UN in implementing the Vance-Owen Plan? And if so, what

6 Vance-Owen Plan in Croatia, the plan relating to Croatia or to

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

8 A. To Croatia.

9 Q. Thank you. I suggest we skip over the next document because it's

10 part of your regular duties, your regular work. If you think you need to

11 say something about it, please go ahead.

12 A. 3D02889 is the document I'm looking at, where I directly refer to

13 the editors-in-chief. I invite them, because it was completely

14 unsuitable information, and I said that we would discuss future

15 cooperation and our future tasks, and that I ask them that they or their

16 representative come to a meeting, and I said that it would be

17 cooperation, that nobody would ban them from doing anything, they

18 wouldn't be censored, their news from the battle-front wouldn't be

19 censored, and that's actually not what happened ever.

20 Q. All right, thank you. Now let's look at 3D02890, the next

21 document, please. And what was the purpose of that meeting, tell us?

22 It's the 13th of April, 1993.

23 A. Well, it was the task of my IPD assistants -- well, they had a

24 very important task, in view of all the problems that we had with respect

25 to the wounding, the parents of refugees, and all the rest of it. There

Page 7870

1 wasn't any system or organisation, as other states had, so you had to

2 have a lot of versatility in dealing with the problems. So I am calling

3 a professional meeting for the 19th of April, at 1900 hours, and that all

4 the assistants for political -- in the political activity sphere were to

5 attend.

6 Q. Now, the next document is 3D02891, and today you mentioned

7 earlier on something about the intentions here, to the effect that the

8 Croatian Army should be established and behave as armies in Western

9 democracies do. So what is it you wanted to achieve with this document

10 dated the 30th of April, 1993?

11 A. Well, I tried to do what I tried to do in the previous document,

12 and this document once again says that it is a simple matter to write

13 something down on paper, to write down orders on paper, or any other

14 rules and regulations. You could issue 100 orders on paper. However,

15 where faced with reality, it's a different matter, in the kind of country

16 that we lived in, where the vast majority of those who defended the

17 country and state were volunteers and had a political awareness of the

18 situation. And later on they put forward their candidacy at various

19 meetings and so on, and then they would come in to meetings wearing

20 military uniforms. It was a sort of honour for them. And this was

21 contrary to a decision made by the leadership of Croatia and all of us

22 together, that the army and members -- that we must separate the army and

23 politics, and that soldiers could be candidates, but they were not

24 allowed to wear military uniforms. And if they were to win at certain

25 elections, they had to resign from the army, because it was incompatible

Page 7871

1 to perform two tasks at the same time, for the kind of political system

2 that we wished to establish, that a soldier could be elected to a state

3 body and continue to be a soldier.

4 Q. The next document is 3D2826 -- 2896 is the number of the

5 document, 2896, and it is the 31st of August of 1992, signed by you.

6 Perhaps you have a different number. Perhaps it is 022955, but it should

7 be in the same place. 2896 is the document number. The 31st of August

8 is the date, 1992, and it is signed by you.

9 A. I can't seem to find it. What is it about?

10 Q. Never mind, it's not that important. We can come back to it

11 later if we find it.

12 But now look at the next document, which is 3D2898, dated the

13 17th of June, 1993, signed by you again, and once again it is a seminar,

14 a workshop. What would you have to say in that regard?

15 A. Well, nothing new to add. Once again, it's the Political

16 Administration of the Ministry of Defence and the International

17 Red Cross, once again organising a two-day seminar on the subject of

18 international humanitarian war law, and then we have the programme and

19 agenda and who is to attend. I don't need to go through all that. You

20 can see the topics.

21 Q. General, I'm just going to ask you one question, summing it all

22 up, to be sure that this is understood. On the following pages of this

23 document, on e-court it is 0093, 0094, and 0095, up to 97 inclusive, we

24 can see the details of that programme, the topics, where and when, and so

25 on and so forth; is that right?

Page 7872

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you. Would you now look at 3D03066, the next document.

3 It's one document further on from the one we've just been looking at.

4 3D03066 is the number, and it is dated the 21st of September, 1992. Once

5 again, your signature. The subject is: "Visit to the 102nd Air Force

6 base in Dijon, France." What is this about? As I said, the date is the

7 21st of September, 1992.

8 A. Well, we tried to establish links with the NATO pact alliance

9 countries in all manner of ways, and here we received an invitation to

10 visit the air force base in Dijon. I consulted people and chose those

11 who were to go there.

12 Now, I'd like to mention, and this is a little strange for this

13 Tribunal, but as Croatia was constantly being accused of being

14 nationalistic, when talking about ethnicities, I'd just like to say that

15 that is just not true. And, for example, from Croatia we have

16 Mr. Vladimir Sumanovic. He is a brigadier. He was a Serb member of the

17 Yugoslav People's Army previously and was invited by Franjo Tudjman to

18 join the army, and Mr. Sumanovic joined up. He was a pilot, and he was

19 tasked to go to Dijon, France, to establish contacts there.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 A. Well, we have Cologne before that, and it is 3D02992, that

22 document, and that took place on the 13th of July, 1992. We received an

23 invitation from Germany to take part in some military exercises there,

24 and once again it was Mr. Vladimir Sumanovic and I, myself, who went

25 there, and that was the first visit by the representatives of the

Page 7873

1 Croatian Army to an international training exercise which was held in

2 Germany. We reached Frankfurt and then were received there. We spent

3 several days there, but the exercise itself was near Nuremberg, and it

4 was an exercise in the landing of the Tornado-type aircraft on a very

5 short, small runway.

6 Q. Well, General, I seem to have my documents mixed up here, the

7 ones that relate to that trip and visit. But the first one you mentioned

8 shows the programme and agenda, and then we see your office applying for

9 airline tickets. And then the third document, 0251, is a report on the

10 visit, as far as I can see. Is that right?

11 A. No, I don't seem to have the report. It is a document of the

12 9th of July, 1992, a request for contact with the office in Cologne.

13 Q. Very well, we have that, the document on that visit. I'd like

14 now to propose that we move on to another document, which is 3D03086.

15 A. Yes, I found it.

16 Q. This relates to a telefax cover page signed by you, and then the

17 21st of October, 1992, a report. Now, who signed that or compiled the

18 report?

19 A. That was the press release by General Tus, prepared by

20 General Tus, and a letter from him is attached, along with all the

21 documents concerning this problem, and this is what it was about: The

22 incident broke out because General Branston [as interpreted] --

23 Major General Cranston sent to the chief of the Main Staff of the

24 Croatian Army a letter, which we attach, in which Mr. Tus denies the

25 truth of an observer mission report with respect to an incident that took

Page 7874

1 place in Softat [phoen].

2 Q. Now, events of this kind in -- along that separation line, were

3 they important, were they frequent occurrences?

4 A. Yes, they were frequent occurrences, the violation of the truce

5 or cease-fire, and I cooperated with UNPROFOR over questions like that on

6 one occasion. It was very difficult to coordinate and dovetail

7 everything because cease-fires were violated; of course, they were on the

8 Croatian side, too. I'm not going to say they weren't. But they were

9 disproportionate with respect to the amount of violations on the Serb

10 side by the Serb rebels, and of course the events that took place did

11 take place.

12 We had very good cooperation with some units, some very difficult

13 cooperation with others. I'm not going to name them, but, for example,

14 UNPROFOR in Knin sold a million tonnes of fuel to the Serbs every month.

15 That's one case in point, and in the General Gotovina trial this was

16 shown, because these people did everything. They were engaged in black

17 marketeering, they sold cigarettes and all manner of other things, and of

18 course there was disinformation -- misinformation being sent out

19 intentionally, and you always had to remain diplomatic. But, of course,

20 you couldn't take all the lies that were being put around. And I don't

21 think we were very bad in that respect, and we pointed out instances

22 where lies were being put about and other instances where they were not.

23 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to draw your attention to the next

24 document, which is 3D03088. It is a document dated the 7th of June,

25 1993, signed by you, and it is about a dinner you had with the German

Page 7875

1 military attache. Now, you've mentioned meetings of that type. Perhaps

2 you could say a few words about this particular meeting and encounter.

3 A. Well, we discussed the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

4 Croatia, and what the world powers wanted, and as far as we were able to

5 see, they kept changing their positions so it was very difficult to make

6 our way in all this and see what the ultimate goal of the international

7 community was. And here I refer to Dr. Ellner and Mr. Salas [phoen]. I

8 say that they were well informed, but then I say that the other two

9 gentlemen were not very interested in the situation and were observing

10 the entire situation from an easy-going European perspective.

11 Q. Thank you. Now, the next document which I'd like to have your

12 comments on is 3D03089, and you signed it on the 16th of June, 1992. The

13 first document is not that important -- or, rather, this document is

14 dated the 16th of September, 1992, re. an order and so on. Can you tell

15 us briefly what the problem was here, because it refers to Posavina?

16 A. Well, there would be some commanders who would over-step their

17 limits, their remit, and then they would come to me -- people would come

18 to me and send me their explanations set out in a letter and so on, and I

19 would consult the ministers and would stay the order, for example, issued

20 by the commander of the 124th Brigade of the Croatian Army in this

21 particular instance. And I said that they couldn't send people to the

22 Posavina battle-field. They could go if they were volunteers.

23 Now, Your Honours, you will see that an order is written and

24 people being sent voluntarily, as volunteers, so that's a problem, a

25 problem that would occur when certain members wanted to go as volunteers.

Page 7876

1 They -- the question was: What would happen if that person were killed,

2 what rights the family members had, and unless you provided them with a

3 piece of paper saying that you were sending them there, although these

4 people were volunteers, then he and his family could not enjoy the

5 benefits provided by the Croatian state if something happened to them

6 there.

7 So you have a problem whereby people would go voluntarily and an

8 order would, nonetheless, be written, but if you had an order written

9 without the volunteers, that order would be stayed. And, for example, a

10 general on one occasion was taken to court or, rather, there was an

11 investigation and inquiry undertaken for the fact that he wrote an order,

12 so he had to go through the procedure of being taken to task, and the

13 whole question rested on his unit crossing over the Sava River.

14 Q. You made a slip of the tongue. You said he filed a criminal

15 report, where actually you meant to say that he issued an order?

16 A. Yes, that's right, and he was taken to task, in a way.

17 Q. This brings us to the next document, which is 3D023091.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have this document dated

19 16th of September, 1992. It prohibits the 124th HV Brigade from going to

20 the Posavina battle-field. This is a clear document. As far as you

21 know, because this is a very relevant question, by the way, as are all my

22 questions, were they units of the Croatian Army that found themselves in

23 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina with all their equipment?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will answer

25 correctly.

Page 7877

1 Pursuant to an order, some units of the Croatian Army went to the

2 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina only in the vicinity of Dubrovnik,

3 because Dubrovnik could not have been defended in any different way. The

4 territory is simply too narrow. If you wanted to reach the border, you

5 couldn't, because it is on top of the hill, and if you did only that,

6 they could still keep on pounding Dubrovnik from the border.

7 During the operation to liberate Dubrovnik, the units did cross

8 into the hinterland, and that was the only way to do it. And I believe

9 that that was also permissible, as far as I read the literature and as

10 far as I informed myself about that.

11 The second time it happened was on the 10th of April, 1992, and

12 that was the day when I was appointed commander of South-Western

13 Herzegovina. Pursuant to an order, one battalion, the 4th Battalion of

14 the 4th Guards Brigade, with 160 men, crossed the border in order to

15 cover a gap in the territory between Citluk and Mostar, in order to

16 prevent an expected breakthrough of the Yugoslav People's Army towards

17 Split, and 160 men is an insignificant number. They stayed there for a

18 short while, and as soon as I managed to amass the army, they left.

19 While I was there, as far as I know, it never happened that the

20 Croatian Army crossed the border pursuant to an order. Volunteers did

21 that. In military terms, their number was insignificant. I claim that

22 there were never more than 500 or 600 of them scattered all over the

23 place in a random way.

24 When I became commander down there, and you will see the

25 document - this was on the 24th of July, 1993 - I asked Minister Susak

Page 7878

1 and President Tudjman to take into account the very adverse military

2 situation after the breakthrough of Muslims across Bugojno, that I be

3 provided with at least two battalions of the Croatian Army to be put at

4 my disposal. They wouldn't allow that. I, as a soldier, requested that,

5 although I knew very well that I would be turned down, that my request

6 would be denied.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, as far as you

8 know, if an HV unit had found themselves in the Republic of Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina, in the internal documents of the said unit would one find

10 any trace of this transport from the Republic of Croatia towards the

11 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina? And I'm going to be even clearer

12 than this, because now we don't want to waste any more time. We really

13 have to go to the heart of the matter, so I'll be even more specific.

14 We heard witnesses who spoke about the Heliodrom, and mention was

15 made of the presence of HV units. So you are under oath. Are you

16 telling me that as far as you know, there never was a single HV unit that

17 crossed the border in order to go to a battle-field in the Republic of

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina? One couldn't be any clearer than this, could

19 one?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Your Honour

21 Judge Antonetti, save for the unit with 160 men in 1992, on the

22 10th of April, who went there to close the gap, in Heliodrom, in its

23 surroundings, there was never a unit of the Croatian Army that would have

24 arrived pursuant to an order as an HV unit.

25 In a situation that I was in, I did request -- I did implore my

Page 7879

1 peers, commanders in Croatia, and I received from the 1st Guards

2 Brigade -- I had some 40 men who came from there, and then a few lads

3 came with whom I had waged a war in Sunja. 500 of them volunteered to

4 come. I did appeal to the volunteers to join me, but I never requested

5 and a request was never approved for a unit of the Croatian Army to be

6 sent.

7 It is true that volunteers, when they came, they would be covered

8 by an order, and this is what instills confusion. He -- they would say,

9 I am going as a volunteer, but I still need a paper. People will get

10 killed. They were ready to get killed, but they were wondering what

11 would happen with their wife, children, and parents. The Croatian

12 government and the Croatian minister of defence were of an opinion that

13 the volunteers would receive their salary and all the other benefits as

14 they would in Croatia, but they were still considered volunteers. And

15 that applied to the Croats in the BiH Army and the Croats in the HV. The

16 same rule applied, and the documents will prove that.

17 MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. Again we have an

18 error in the transcript. On page 53, line 24 and line 25,

19 General Praljak said that this applied to the Croats and Muslims in the

20 Croatian Army.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the same rules applied,

22 because both groups went there as volunteers.

23 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Even before that --

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment. General Praljak,

Page 7880

1 we have thousands of documents, and I believe there's one, but I can't

2 remember it's number, you'll forgive me, because it's impossible to keep

3 all the document numbers in mind, all the more so because I had not

4 planned to ask you this. But your reply prompted this, so I quote from

5 memory, but I never make a mistake.

6 I believe that there is one international observer who said that

7 he saw an HV unit pass by, so could it be that he was confused, that he

8 made a mistake? Were there volunteers who went by? How can you account

9 for this?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, there were some

11 ignorant observers who would see two or three men bearing the insignia of

12 the Croatian Army and they would call them a unit. Second of all,

13 Your Honours, you've heard a witness here who said that he had seen a

14 division of the Croatian Army, and when I asked him how many men, he

15 said, 50. Where? Down there near Metkovic or close to the Croatian

16 border. Third of all, we're going to hear a witness whom I can't mention

17 by name. He is an American who will say precisely how much and to what

18 extent those men erred whence they said that they saw the Croatian Army.

19 Another important thing. Despite the fact that General Petkovic

20 and myself provided very clear instructions, saying that when people came

21 from Croatia as volunteers, from the Croatian Army, that they had to

22 remove their original insignia and replace them by the HVO insignia, that

23 was sometimes not done. That's just because some lads wanted to boast

24 for being members of another unit, a glorious unit.

25 Your Honours, I would also sometimes wear the insignia of the

Page 7881

1 Croatian Army because I had two uniforms. While one was in the wash, I

2 wore the other one. And when somebody saw me, they would say, Okay,

3 there is a guy from the Croatian Army, but I simply didn't have anything

4 else to put on. I'm a big man, and it was difficult to find a suitable

5 uniform for me.

6 I repeat, there was -- there were no members of the Croatian Army

7 who would have crossed the border pursuant to an order, save for those

8 who did it in that one exception, an exceptional case.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One last follow-up question,

10 but we'll have an opportunity to return to this. You'll see I have a

11 good memory, because I remember that you said that there were

12 13.000 volunteers. You said that earlier today. There were volunteers

13 who, in fact, came from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had gone to

14 Croatia, to return back to the ground. So I did take a very careful note

15 of this. But for residents of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

16 were they Croats, say, who were born in Zagreb but never been to Bosnia

17 and Herzegovina, but declared themselves volunteers to join the HVO?

18 Were there such cases, as far as you can see?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, very often. For example, in

20 autumn 1992, from the battalion of the 2nd Guards Brigade that I was in

21 command of in Sunja, lots of lads reported to me or contacted me offering

22 me their help. I referred some of them to the BiH Army, asking them to

23 help them with their experience, and I transferred them to the left bank

24 of the Neretva to Mahala, and I gave some of them to the HVO.

25 In the operation to liberate Capljina and fighting around

Page 7882

1 Capljina, I had a few volunteers from Zagreb. There was some 15 of them.

2 One of my volunteers was President Tudjman's grandson. In Capljina,

3 there were volunteers who simply arrived from Croatia.

4 And the 13.000, Your Honours, I believe that you remember the

5 document that I provided to you, and when you said, Wow, that's a lot,

6 was that as many as that, there is a cemetery in Zagreb, in Croatia, and

7 you can see a list of all those Muslims who were killed as members of the

8 Croatian Army, but those were not only people who resided in Croatia at

9 the time, but also those who had arrived from Bosnia and Herzegovina when

10 war in Croatia started, for various reasons that I would not be willing

11 to discuss. For example, in the operation to defend Dubrovnik, during

12 the last strike, when there was a question whether Dubrovnik would fall,

13 we had a group of Herzegovinian volunteers who participated, and one of

14 them got killed. And together with the citizens of Dubrovnik, they

15 managed to save the city.

16 I repeat, once again, it was a war not against the Serbs,

17 irrespective of the territory or the republic, and there is no way you

18 can do a vivisection as it could be done in a classical conflict of one

19 state fighting another.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have just mentioned the

21 example of President Tudjman's grandson, who was a volunteer. When

22 people would learn that President Tudjman's grandson had volunteered,

23 could they think or infer that, in fact, the entire Croatian Army had

24 moved to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Could it be that some

25 drew that kind of inference from it?

Page 7883

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, President Tudjman's grandson

2 was my soldier in Sunja also. He was a volunteer already in Sunja. He

3 was under my command. He was an excellent fighter, an excellent lad, and

4 he followed his commander down there. The interpretations of the war are

5 various, to a large extent wrong, and if you don't have precise facts you

6 cannot reconstruct anything. Facts are facts, very precise, as to what

7 Croatia wanted, what it did, and how it behaved.

8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

9 Before we proceed, on page 53, line 9, I believe that the

10 interpretation was good. However, it was mis-recorded. The way it was

11 recorded, it seems that the General Praljak answered to Judge Antonetti's

12 question that save for the unit consisting of 160 men in 1992, on the

13 10th of April, who had gone there to close the gap, and then in the

14 record it says "in Heliodrom," and there should be another comma here

15 after the gap that had to be closed, and then General Praljak moves on to

16 a different area, which is Heliodrom.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no Heliodrom. It was a line

18 which went from Citluk, Tepcici, Slipcici, towards Mostar, from

19 Medjugorje towards the left, Tepcici and Slipcici towards Mostar. They

20 didn't have anything whatsoever to do in Heliodrom.

21 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Well, if there was a comma, the

22 sentence would be clear.

23 Q. Let's move on. General, you have just spoken about this, and now

24 the next document is 3D03091. A reference is made to an officer of the

25 Croatian Army that has been mentioned a lot of times in the courtroom. I

Page 7884

1 believe that his name already rings a bell. Could you please explain who

2 the officer is, and within the context of my questions could you take him

3 as an example.

4 A. Mr. Jasmin Jaganjac, whom I know very well, we cooperated quite a

5 lot. He is a Muslim who joined the Croatian Army at the very beginning

6 of the attack against Croatia, and I believe that for a while he was in

7 charge of compiling a book of exercises and training for the Croatian

8 Army because he had originated from the Yugoslav People's Army; and

9 that's why I returned him to the unit called the Officers' Centre, as we

10 had wanted to have in Mostar, where Muslims simply lagged behind,

11 although they did wish to fight, but they were not well prepared.

12 Pursuant to his wish and pursuant to our agreement, he was appointed the

13 commander of the defence of Mostar after having been released from the

14 Croatian Army.

15 Mr. Jaganjac, together with me -- he was an official, and I was

16 not officially appointed to be in charge of the operation in 1992, he was

17 in charge of the liberation of the right bank of the Neretva River and

18 the left bank of the Neretva River. After that, I returned to my regular

19 tasks, and he remained down there until the moment -- and I don't know

20 why. He wanted to return to his mother unit, which was the Officers'

21 Centre.

22 Around that time, Jasmin Jaganjac, after his return to the

23 Officers' Centre, he became the military advisor of President

24 Izetbegovic. At the time, we had achieved good military successes in the

25 southern part, Petkovic, Stojic and all of us, and if I sometimes say

Page 7887

1 went back or, rather, when he went away and came back? What happened to

2 his rights? Were his -- once he activated his status in the HV, did he

3 receive his rights again?

4 A. No, Mr. Kovacic, he enjoyed his rights all the time. He enjoyed

5 his right to a salary. If he were wounded or killed, he would be treated

6 as a Croatian soldier, so he retained all his rights. He left the

7 Croatian Army to go to the HVO, to join the HVO and work together with

8 them down there, and we'll see from the documents what it was he did in

9 1992, and then he returned to the Croatian Army.

10 Q. I see. Everything is quite clear now, crystal clear.

11 A. Just like me. You can skip over the next documents. There's

12 nothing to deal with there.

13 Q. Yes. The -- although, on second thoughts, maybe not.

14 Look at 3D02218 now, please. That's perhaps a characteristic

15 document and tells us a great deal. It is dated the 14th of September,

16 1992. The document is 02218, signed by you, and addressed to the

17 president of the republic. It says: "Dear Mr. President." What's this

18 about?

19 A. Well, we had a major problem, large numbers of refugees and

20 soldiers who were in the Croatian Army but refugees at the same time,

21 from Vukovar -- well, this was before Vukovar. But, anyway -- and the

22 problem was a major one with the property belonging to the

23 Yugoslav People's Army. The Yugoslav People's Army had enormous

24 property, and a lot of property on the territory of the Republic of

25 Croatia as well, so this property became the property of the state of

Page 7888

1 Croatia, but the Ministry of Defence managed it, the MORH. Various town

2 mayors came to me and asked to be given this or that plot of land,

3 building or whatever, and there were very tense situations, because I had

4 to explain to them that we, the MORH, managed that property, but that it

5 was the state who was the owner and that it was the state who could

6 decide whose property it would become. That was one problem.

7 The other problem was that I wasn't very prone to have this

8 property distributed in that kind of way, for the simple reason that they

9 had no programme as to how they would utilise the land or property. They

10 would be given a sizeable chunk and didn't know what they were going to

11 do with that. And I asked them what the army was going to do. For

12 example, if 100 hectares of land would be given to a town which had

13 previously been owned and controlled by the Yugoslav People's Army, if

14 they were to be given that free of charge without having a plan as to how

15 they would utilise the property or land, well, that was a problem. That

16 was one problem.

17 The second problem was with respect to forcible entry into

18 premises and buildings. You see, when people are expelled and houses set

19 on fire, and these people fought, they expected that the many flats

20 belonging to the Yugoslav People's Army would be assigned to them, and

21 the government was dragging its feet with respect to that problem. And

22 you know what my character is like. I tend to use strong words and

23 strong language, but I insisted that they resolve the problem. And, If

24 you don't resolve the problem legally, or even if you do, there will be

25 problems, but if you don't solve it legally, then the problems are

Page 7889

1 enormous.

2 So that's what I talk about there and say that there are various

3 crimes being committed where -- and the military police is expelling the

4 HVO [as interpreted] and civilians together in similar situations and so

5 on. I'm writing the president, himself, directly and Mrs. Turic, who

6 dealt with these problems.

7 Anyway, the problem came to a head on the 15th of September,

8 1992, and this was a very sensitive question, and it began to infringe

9 upon the authority of the state and the president and the government and

10 the Assembly, because people were expelled from their homes, expelled

11 from the army, and they just stormed the flats that were available. So

12 this problem had to be solved urgently, and it was solved to a certain

13 extent. And in the post-scriptum down at the bottom, I say that at the

14 Coordination for Internal Policy meeting, the problem was resolved with

15 the help of Mr. Milas.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Counsel.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, General Petkovic.

18 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your

19 permission, there was a technical mistake. It wasn't the HVO, it was the

20 HV.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, of course, the HV. I beg

22 your pardon.

23 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] It's on page 63, line 5 of the

24 transcript. "The HVO" should read "the HV," and we can see that from the

25 contents.

Page 7890

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I confirm that, the HV.

2 And now the final sentence is that I was involved in the problem

3 because for who knows what reason, they came to me to complain. Now,

4 although other people were in charge of this, I was a sort of -- well, I

5 was a sort of lightning rod, and the guys knew that if they brought a

6 problem to me and I thought that it had -- should be solved, that then I

7 would fight to have it solved. I wouldn't put it in a drawer and forget

8 about it, and that I was ready to tackle any president or person in the

9 government if I thought I was right.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Counsel, please.

11 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. I'd like to move on to the next document, but I think you wanted

13 to add something about the previous document. No?

14 All right, then, let's move on to 3D02504. Is that an example of

15 what you were telling us earlier on, that it's the easiest thing in the

16 world to write an order and it's quite another matter to see whether it

17 was implemented and whether it all functions properly? Is this an

18 example of that?

19 A. Well, yes. You need a lot of time for an organisation to be set

20 up, especially an army, and that's something you can read in any

21 textbook, even when there's no war on, let alone when there is a war.

22 And here the Chief of Staff and I, myself, jointly signed this. It

23 refers to the operative zones and all HVO [as interpreted] units, the

24 Croatian Navy, Air Force, Commands of the HV and so on, and we list all

25 the problems, from the IPD ranging to how regular reports are being sent

Page 7891

1 out, when they should be sent out, any deviations, the homogeneity of the

2 units, inter-human relations in the units, current issues, the reaction

3 of the soldiers, and so on and so forth, rumours and the reasons for the

4 soldiers' dissatisfaction.

5 And then under D, part of the Psychological Department -- or,

6 rather, some of what the IPD did was to work to look into the combat

7 readiness of the troops. And under D we see that in some units the

8 soldiers' readiness was at a lower level, morale was low, and that it was

9 the commanders whose fault it was, that there was very poor commanding,

10 that there was fatigue among the units, that the units were being

11 deployed and utilised without the necessary preparations beforehand, that

12 there was a lack of direct contact with the soldiers, and so on and so

13 forth. And I'll be happy to answer any queries from Their Honours,

14 but --

15 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me. I've got a question, actually, because

16 the document, at least the translation that I'm looking at, does not

17 appear to bear a date in the heading or at the bottom of the document,

18 although in the body, about midway through the first page, there's a

19 reference to a report that has to be delivered before the 24th of July,

20 1992. So I wonder if the general could give us the time-frame for this

21 or indicate whether this document is dated sometime prior to the

22 24th of July, 1992.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is quite certainly July 1992,

24 the 7th of July, in fact -- or, rather, July, it's July 1992. I don't

25 know what day it was. Probably a day or two before. If I gave them a

Page 7892

1 dead-line of 48 hours to report back to me, then it might have been the

2 22nd of July and 48 hours would have been a dead-line I would have set.

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Very well.

4 On page 64, line 23, it says "HVO," and it should read "HV." It

5 says "HVO units" instead of "HV units."

6 Q. The next document is similar in content, 3D02859, of the

7 25th of March, 1992, once again signed by you. It contains two reports

8 as attachments. Could you explain this, because it's fairly typical.

9 A. Yes. We're dealing with the 25th of March, 1992, once I had been

10 appointed assistant minister, and I enumerate all the points:

11 demobilisation, which is a major problem, who should be demobilised, who

12 wishes to stay on and so on; then promotions and transfers, "transfers"

13 meaning that all people who came from the Yugoslav People's Army were

14 promised the same rank as they held while in the JNA, generals remained

15 generals, although there were certain misunderstandings because the guys

16 thought that some of the ranks were too high and that they would have to

17 prove their mettle on the battle-front before they were allowed to carry

18 the same rank. Then we had the problem of officers and soldiers'

19 training, which was supposed to begin straight away. Then there was the

20 consideration of commendations and decorations and so on, and I state

21 that difficulties emerged with respect to legal regulations. Now, who

22 this was addressed to, I don't really know. Franjo Tudjman, Gojko Susak,

23 I don't know.

24 Q. Well, you can't see from this, but I'd like to draw your

25 attention to the report attached, especially the first one dated the

Page 7893

1 24th of March. After sizing up the situation on the ground, certain

2 irregularities were uncovered. Can this all be considered as part and

3 parcel of the building up of an army?

4 A. Well, I think the most important thing here is -- or I want it to

5 be understood in the following way: that we never wanted to hide

6 anything. All the bad points, all the storming of flats, the problems,

7 and a document we forgot to present, suicides, killings, legal

8 proceedings against people, military courts and so on, I state here and

9 now that the documents that we compiled and so on, we never hid any

10 problems. All this was accessible to all the journalists, military

11 attaches. They could go into the field to see what the problems were.

12 We just tried to use our knowledge and experience to help solve the

13 problems, but we never did anything to hide them, any evil-doing.

14 Everything was recorded. People were taken to task. If the

15 perpetrators were apprehended, they would be taken to court. They

16 weren't swept under the carpet. Nothing was hidden from the public or

17 any observer from the international community. And as you were able to

18 see, when I was in Herceg-Bosnia, for example, every journalist had the

19 right to go and see for themselves when they wanted to, what they wanted

20 to see, and I say that with absolute certainty because that is something

21 that I okayed and I did.

22 Q. General, what you've just told us, was that a pattern of

23 behaviour? Is that how you behaved later on in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24 A. Well, I'm too old to change my feathers. I think from start to

25 finish, I always acted in the same way, identically. I didn't change one

Page 7894

1 iota.

2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Honours, I'd like

3 to move on to a different topic now, but I think that it's time for our

4 break, or at least it is in a minute or two. So shall we take the break

5 now?

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, it might be better to have

7 a break now, since you're going to move on to another topic. Let's break

8 for 20 minutes until 10 to 6.00.

9 --- Recess taken at 5.30 p.m.

10 --- On resuming at 5.55 p.m.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, please, Mr. Kovacic.

12 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

13 Q. [Interpretation] General Praljak, as we said yesterday, just

14 briefly, and I'll repeat it for everybody and for the Trial Chamber here,

15 you mentioned that, amongst other things that you did in your department,

16 the department was in charge of publishing "The Croatian Soldier"

17 magazine that was in the Defence Ministry of Croatia, and from that

18 magazine we can see the positions of the Croatian government and most

19 prominent figures of the Croatian politics. We're going to look at the

20 magazine now, and when we come to each of the pages, I would kindly ask

21 you to read the e-court number at the bottom for the interpreters and for

22 everybody else's benefit.

23 This also has a bearing on the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

24 and can you please look at 3D01278. The date is 15 January.

25 A. 279?

Page 7895

1 Q. Okay, 279, yes. Go ahead.

2 A. "The Croatian Soldier" was the magazine of the Ministry of

3 Defence of the Republic of Croatia. I have the originals, of course, if

4 anybody wants to look at the originals. Maybe the Trial Chamber would

5 like to see the magazine to see its design. "The Croatian Soldier"

6 summarises all the problems that were present in Croatia with regard to

7 the Croatian Army, the positions of the Ministry of Defence, the

8 positions of the supreme commander of the armed forces of the Republic of

9 Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and in a certain way they are a succinct

10 representation of political and military positions, desires, problems,

11 intentions, everything that was going on at the time. The date here is

12 the 15th of January, 1993, describing the meeting of the editors-in-chief

13 of Croatian journals and newspapers with General Tudjman.

14 Q. General, just a moment. This is 3D29-051?

15 A. Yes, you're right. And in the second paragraph here, the

16 president says that in 1992, the Croatian area established itself as the

17 factor of peace in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the

18 international factors are counting with it, and they are interested in

19 the issue of the Croatian official policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina,

20 especially in light of the fact that some individuals from some of the

21 states had voiced some accusations which were not justified. And the

22 president briefly speaks about the threats that exist in his view. He

23 also speaks about the Mujahedin and the willingness of some Islamic

24 states to help them.

25 And in the last part on the right-hand side, he says that no

Page 7896

1 sanctions were imposed upon Croatia; every attempt to do so has failed.

2 There are statements by the Islamic states that Croatia is the only state

3 in Europe that had recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina and received over half a

4 million refugees. There is a resolution of the United Nations to that

5 effect. And then he says that the Croatian politicians were very much

6 interested in Bosnia and Herzegovina because the development of events in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina very largely influenced the territory of Southern

8 Croatia from Split to Dubrovnik just the way I described it in my

9 testimony.

10 Croatian politicians did take into account the interests of the

11 Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he continues to say that

12 because of that, Bosnia-Herzegovina is today not a part of the Greater

13 Serbia. Croatia has enabled the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina to

14 organise themselves and to defend themselves. And to make sure that

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina was not annexed to the Greater Serbia, Croatia

16 advocated the referendum for an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina as a

17 community of three constituent peoples.

18 Q. General, I have to interrupt you. We have a wrong document on

19 e-court. I need 3D01278, and the page number is 3D29-051.

20 A. Thank you. Now we have the right document. And, finally, it

21 says that the president emphasised, and this has to be underlined, that

22 Croatia itself, and Muslims themselves, cannot militarily end the war,

23 especially not in their favour, because of the supremacy of the Yugoslav

24 People's Army. If the war continues, this would lead to further

25 complications in European and global terms. The international factors

Page 7897

1 have adopted a political solution which is in keeping with the real

2 position and the democratic relationships in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 Franjo Tudjman did not want a war. He tried to see that things were

4 resolved in a peaceful way, as much as he could.

5 The following document, 3D29-0513. I'm just going to read the

6 title, "To the Best Western Military Academies," which means that classes

7 started for high-ranking officers at the Officers' Centre. People had to

8 be educated subsequently, post festum, unfortunately. However, it arises

9 from all the documents, all the positions that were voiced, that our best

10 officers would attend Western academies, and that the overall desire of

11 the Croatian Army and the Republic of Croatia was for Croatia to be

12 integrated into NATO and the European Union. So much about that.

13 Q. The following --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel.

15 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. The following document is 3D01279. The issue covers the period

17 from 19 to 28 August 1992.

18 A. I'm reading. The page number is 3D29-0515. Autumn 1992, Croatia

19 started recruiting recruits. In the second paragraph, you can see that

20 there was a 95 per cent response of the recruits. Those who could not

21 serve in the army were to be provided different jobs and posts in the

22 civilian life. And it says that every recruit, irrespective of the

23 evaluation of the recruiting commission, can file an appeal against their

24 decision within two weeks.

25 And in the second paragraph, in the right-hand-side column, it

Page 7898

1 says that there were no requests for the civilian service in the army,

2 although every recruit was entitled to file such a request. Every

3 soldier had the right to opt for the civilian service in the army, rather

4 than taking a weapon in their hands. Finally, it says that we have

5 established five training centres where the military training will take

6 place. So much about that.

7 And now we are moving on to 3D --

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I have again a question. What has this got to

9 do with our case? Recruitment in Croatia, the fact that Croatians can

10 opt out of being recruited, that there is an appeal, what is the

11 relationship to our case? I do not even see a fathom that leads to

12 something like joint criminal enterprise, let alone all the rest.

13 I am a bit afraid, when I see this huge file, that we are

14 expected to listen to a lot of evidence that I cannot find the link, but

15 I stand to be corrected. If I am convinced, that's so much the better.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Trechsel,

17 Franjo Tudjman is the first one on the list of people charged with the

18 joint criminal enterprise, an intention regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, a

19 nationalist, and so on and so forth. There are a lot of accusations

20 against Franjo Tudjman. Now I believe that it is necessary, and finally

21 it will maybe take no more than two hours in this trial, it is necessary

22 to show that the first accused on the list of those who were charged with

23 joint criminal enterprise with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

24 according to the accusations that we heard about nationalism and other

25 things, I believe that we should look at the overall way of thinking or