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Page 11279

1 Q. Good afternoon, General.

2 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Stringer.

3 Q. General, when we left off with the cross-examination questions

4 last month, we were in documents that relate in general to what we're

5 calling the joint criminal enterprise that's alleged in the indictment.

6 And as a way to re-introduce some of the issues that are involved, what

7 I'd like to do briefly, and I don't think you need to go back to the

8 document because we covered it already at length, it's the presidential

9 transcript which is P00089. You may recall, General, that this was a

10 transcript of a conversation that occurred on the 27th of December, 1991,

11 although you were not present. I was asking you about it, and I'm going

12 to ask you -- actually, I'm going to -- perhaps with the assistance of

13 the booth, we could put it up on e-court so that the general could see

14 the part I'm going to read from, rather than taking the time to go to the

15 page, which is page 98.

16 And on page 98, we see that President Tudjman is speaking, and

17 this is what he says. And after I read this to you, General, I'm going

18 to move on and begin my cross-examination again. Skipping down a

19 paragraph, he says to the group:

20 "All of history has shown that Bosnia and Herzegovina is no

21 solution for the Croatian people.

22 "First of all, gentlemen, let us not forget that it, Bosnia, was

23 created in the colonial conquests of an Asian power, at the expense of

24 the Croatian people and Croatian territories, between the 15th and 18th

25 centuries.

Page 11280

1 "All colonial creations throughout history fell, both in Africa

2 and Asia. Bosnia and Herzegovina did not exist between the two world

3 wars. The Communists invented it, put it back on the map after World War

4 II, even declared the Muslims to be a nation in order to, supposedly,

5 resolve the differences between the Serbian and the Croatian people.

6 "Did they succeed? No, on the contrary. Therefore, Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina should not be taken as something god-given which must be

8 preserved. We must especially not forget how harmful it is. Because of

9 the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia has been put in an

10 impossible situation regarding its territory, regarding administration,

11 not to mention defence. We cannot establish an independent Croatia, such

12 as it is."

13 So, General, with that as our starting point, those words of

14 President Tudjman from December of 1991, I want to take you back to one

15 of the exhibits I showed you just before the break which we decided to

16 leave for now so that we could get you the original language version, and

17 that is Exhibit 1D00401. Do you see that? That is an excerpt from a

18 book by President Tudjman from 1991.

19 Now, General, I see you reaching for what appears to be the

20 original text. Is that correct? Have you brought the book here today?

21 A. Yes, but it wasn't published in 1991. These texts were written

22 15 years before. You have the 1991 edition because I think that's when

23 they were translated into English. Otherwise, they were written before.

24 Q. Okay. Well, I'm reading what's on this Defence exhibit, but I'll

25 accept your statement on that.

Page 11281

1 Now, what I want to direct you to, and I'm going to turn, in the

2 English version which we have of this exhibit, it's page 112, but I

3 believe that in the Croatian version it is page 103. So if you could

4 turn to page 103, and we'll see if it corresponds, General, because I

5 might have the Croatian version from a different text. And so if yours

6 doesn't correspond, we'll have to go to my version of it.

7 And I'm going to start reading at the bottom of page 112 of the

8 English, and you see if you can follow me. Tell me if you cannot.

9 Tudjman writes:

10 "Several reasons could be given in favour of the decision to

11 unite Vojvodina with Serbia."

12 Do you see that sentence?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. "The two areas had strong historical, national, economic, and

15 cultural ties, and their union was also in the interest of the state

16 community as a whole. The fixing of the boundaries for Vojvodina and

17 Serbia is a different question and will be discussed later. However,

18 there are many indications that the same logical criteria were not

19 applied in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, according to the

20 same yard-stick, should have been made a part of the Croatian federal

21 unit."

22 Then he talks about how Bosnia-Herzegovina was established with

23 borders set during the Turkish occupation. He says:

24 "But large parts of Croatia had been incorporated into Bosnia by

25 the Turks. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina were historically linked

Page 11282

1 with Croatia, and they together comprise an indivisible geographic and

2 economic entity. Bosnia and Herzegovina occupy the central part of this

3 whole, separating southern (Dalmatian) from northern (Panonian) Croatia.

4 The creation of a separate Bosnia and Herzegovina makes the territorial

5 and geographic position of Croatia extremely unnatural in the economic

6 sense and, therefore, in the broadest national-political sense, very

7 unfavorable for life and development, and in the narrower administrative

8 sense unsuitable and disadvantageous."

9 Now, General, what I want to put to you is that these words

10 written by President Tudjman some 20 or more years prior to the conflict

11 in 1993, if what you say is correct, really are no different than the

12 words President Tudjman was repeating here during this meeting in

13 December of 1991. In other words, his views certainly had not changed in

14 respect of the relation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Would

15 you agree with me?

16 A. No, I don't agree with you at all, not in the smallest part.

17 You've read all this wrongly, or read into this wrongly.

18 Of course, to read books like that and read excerpts from books

19 like this is impossible.

20 President Tudjman, since 1968 or 1969, thereabouts, when he was

21 called to attend a congress in Slovakia, he would send out texts that he

22 had dealt with throughout his lifetime, and that is the fate of small

23 nations within large ideas, whether they were the Russian empire,

24 Pan-Slavistic aspirations, Austro-Hungary, or whatever, or whether they

25 be Germanic expansionist thoughts and thinking, or Turkish invasions or

Page 11283

1 whatever, but in that respect he always had a crystal-clear political

2 idea and ideals, and they were composed of two parts.

3 Q. My question is this: It seems to me, General, that President

4 Tudjman's words, as expressed in the book I've just read, are entirely

5 consistent with the views of Bosnia and Herzegovina that he expresses in

6 meeting in December 1991; isn't that true? In 1991, he says all history

7 has shown that Bosnia and Herzegovina is no solution for the Croatian

8 people. He makes reference to the historical boundaries established

9 during the Ottoman Empire, et cetera. It's really just remarkably

10 consistent, isn't it, with what he wrote in his book some 20 years

11 earlier?

12 A. No. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it was formed and as it was

13 constructed politically by Serbian thinkers or Muslim thinkers, was not a

14 solution for the Croatian people, and you can see that on the basis of

15 statistical data, the disappearance of the Croatian people from Bosnia

16 and Herzegovina over the centuries, and that's how it was, the way it was

17 constructed. And then you can draw the historical conclusion that the

18 Croatian people today are rapidly disappearing from the territory of

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is politically quite clear. It is a historical

20 truth, and it means none other than acknowledging that historical truth

21 without territorial pretensions. He's speaking as a historian here, and

22 every sentence here --

23 Q. I think maybe you misunderstood my question, which was whether

24 you would agree with me that the views expressed by President Tudjman in

25 his book are very consistent with the views he was expressing in December

Page 11284

1 of 1991. It would seem to me that his views have not changed and that

2 they remained remarkably consistent over time. Can we agree on that?

3 A. No, he's not talking about the same things here.

4 President Tudjman, in this excerpt, the one that you were quoting from,

5 stated exactly in what way the national question was being solved in

6 Yugoslavia, either through the Versailles Treaty or the taking over by

7 the Serbs [indiscernible] of territory after their victory in World War

8 I, not only at the expense of the Croatians but of the Hungarians too.

9 There were half a million of them in Banat. There were half a million of

10 the Volksdeutchers in Vojvodina, and the Serbs, under the treaty, were

11 not allowed to move into Vojvodina, which had previously come under the

12 Austro-Hungarian Empire.

13 Anyway, well, if you want an answer, I'm here to give you an

14 answer. And this text is about history, and here we see a fact, that the

15 Croatian people will disappear from Bosnia and Herzegovina if

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina is constructed in the manner it has been constructed

17 today, and that's the truth of it.

18 Q. I asked you whether the views appeared to be consistent. You

19 disagreed with me, you said, "No," so I'll take that answer and I'll move

20 on.

21 MR. STRINGER: What I'm going to do now -- what I'd like to do

22 now, Mr. President, is go back to some of the video footage that we tried

23 and failed to run in Courtroom I just before the break.

24 Q. And, General, I'm going to take you back to the film of a couple

25 of the interviews that you gave to the BBC when they were making the

Page 11285

1 "Death of Yugoslavia" programme, so let me play these two videos for you,

2 and then I'm going to ask you some questions.

3 So if you want to watch the screen in front of you, you should be

4 able to follow along.

5 [Video-clip played]

6 THE INTERPRETER: [Voice-over] "We shall return to this issue

7 later, but now we're here, I would like to talk about -- so, on the one

8 hand, you had a communications problem regarding both political and

9 military cooperation with Izetbegovic and the Muslim Army. On the other

10 hand, however, the leadership in Zagreb fully supported you. How was

11 this support manifested? Can you give us a specific meeting, an action?

12 Can you give us a story?

13 "Well, there were many meetings. The support consisted of --

14 once it was realised what the intentions were -- well, the problem was

15 that before the war, we were military allies with the Muslims, but had

16 opposing political ideas about a future state. To be honest, the Serbs'

17 political option for Bosnia-Herzegovina was closer to the Croats' view

18 than that of the Muslims. Oneness was out of the question; either we

19 shall amend the Constitution to provide equal rights, or we'll go our

20 separate ways. Now, as soon as there is a lack of trust, you cannot put

21 all -- everything on one card."

22 MR. STRINGER:

23 Q. All right, General. Before we move on to the next one, I want to

24 ask you -- and transitioning now from the views of President Tudjman that

25 were expressed in the various presidential transcripts and his book, and

Page 11286

1 I want to talk now about your views and your objectives in respect of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina and your involvement down there.

3 You say here that:

4 "To be honest, the Serbs' political option for Bosnia-Herzegovina

5 was closer to Croats than that of the Muslims."

6 It seems to me, General, and I'm going to put this to you, that

7 what you're saying there is that the Serbs' option, which was a

8 separateness, the establishment of autonomous ethnic territories, was

9 closer to the option and the objectives of the Croats, such as yourself,

10 and that this was as part of an effort or a desire to consolidate a

11 Greater Serbia, on the Serb side, and perhaps a Greater Croatia, on the

12 Croatian side. Is that what you're saying when you said that your option

13 was closer to that of the Serbs?

14 A. No. First of all, I cannot agree that in the two texts that

15 we've seen before us, that Mr. Tudjman is talking about two different

16 things which you're claiming. I say that that is not so. And, secondly,

17 it's not a question of any ethnic division and separation within Bosnia

18 and Herzegovina here. And according to you're indictment, ethnic

19 cleansing follows on from that. But there were talks and meetings held

20 in the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the very beginning, that is

21 to say, before the war, when the Serbs did not talk about what they were

22 preparing, at least not publicly. So we're talking about the public

23 option, and that is that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be constructed and

24 formed as a community of three constituent peoples, all of them having

25 equal rights. And the main conflict between Izetbegovic and Karadzic, on

Page 11287

1 the other side, was that Izetbegovic from that time on always claimed

2 that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a civil state, one man, one vote,

3 unitary -- let me -- allow me to finish, please -- unitary, without any

4 protection of national rights, stating in one particular text that it

5 will either be a civil state or there'll be civil war, which is what

6 ultimately happened. And I claim today and I said so then that in that

7 respect, without going into any ethnic questions, it would be a good idea

8 to construct Bosnia-Herzegovina in the sense that it was proposed later

9 on by all the international negotiators, starting with Cutileiro onwards.

10 Q. I'm asking you about your words here and what you said when you

11 indicated that your option or the Croatian option was closer to what the

12 Serbs wanted. Now, that leads to my next question, which is based on the

13 next thing you said.

14 "Oneness was out of the question," and what you're telling us

15 there, and I think you've said it many times here in a different way, is

16 that this is a rejection of the unitary state model for

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the one-man-one-vote model, and then in fact what you

18 and those with you on the Croatian side embraced, like the Serbs, was the

19 establishment of an autonomous unit, an autonomous, separate living space

20 for Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Isn't that what you're

21 saying here when you say "oneness is out of the question"?

22 A. I never said that unity or singleness, oneness, was never an

23 option. This is quite a different idea from a unitary state that cannot

24 survive and serve all three nations equally well. And Tudjman, in his

25 books, shows this very clearly, that they will --

Page 11288

1 Q. I'm asking you now about --

2 A. -- disappear --

3 Q. Sorry to interrupt. I'm asking you now about your views. You

4 talked about the views of President Tudjman a great deal in this trial,

5 but I've got you here in the witness box and so I want to talk about your

6 views. And when Slobodan Praljak says to the BBC here that oneness was

7 out of the question, I'm putting to you, sir, that what that means is

8 that you're rejecting the unitary state system of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

9 you are advocating instead a separateness based on autonomy and territory

10 for different peoples. Isn't that true?

11 A. Yes, that's correct, that's what I advocated then, I advocate

12 that today, and I think that in Bosnia-Herzegovina a catastrophe was

13 provoked because a nation was given a republic, that nation having

14 committed many evil deeds, and this nation is disappearing slowly. So

15 today I am advocating these interests crystal clear and the fact that

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina should have been established at the beginning in the

17 same way that Switzerland is formed. I don't want Judge Trechsel to be

18 angry with me when I say that. You can't, of course, create a

19 Switzerland in the space of a fortnight. But that was a model for

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, that did not happen, and even through

21 the mediation of the international community, what happened was that a

22 system was established which was untenable. So I stand by what I said.

23 I fully support my words.

24 MR. STRINGER: Let's go to the next clip, then, to continue.

25 [Video-clip played]

Page 11289

1 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "And this brings me to the basic

2 question of whether we are going to wage war. We were no longer ready to

3 wage a war, and so this unity or dis-unity of Bosnia became absolutely

4 clear and obvious. The option of a state which constitutionally -- well,

5 if we cannot agree about the Constitution, if you want us to be

6 second-class citizens, then we would be prepared to secede militarily."

7 MR. STRINGER:

8 Q. Now, that's the next step. You've expressed some agreement with

9 me about -- or you've indicated to us what your view was of how Bosnia

10 and Herzegovina should be configured internally, and here you indicate,

11 I'm putting to you, that you, the HVO, your co-accused,

12 President Tudjman, Gojko Susak, were prepared to exercise a military

13 option in order to create this separate Croatian living space, this

14 separateness, because, as you said, oneness was out of the question, so

15 that military secession, as you refer to it here, is really what the war

16 with the ABiH was all about; isn't that true?

17 A. I agree with you in very few things, but what you said, that we

18 agree on certain matters, is not correct, unfortunately. Mr. Prosecutor,

19 we agree on basically nothing. Either you do not wish to interpret the

20 problem clearly or you are putting forth the agenda proposed by the

21 indictment. I do not agree with that, and I do not agree with your

22 interpretation of this part.

23 This interview came about after my talks with Mr. Izetbegovic in

24 Mostar in 1992. I have mentioned that. During that --

25 Q. This interview came about after the war?

Page 11290

1 A. No, no, no. Yes, the interview, but the ideas I'm expressing in

2 the interviews is simply conveying the discussion I had with

3 Mr. Izetbegovic in 1992 on the topic of the unitary state of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And to use a metaphor or comparison, I said that

5 Mr. Izetbegovic, within the domain of his political options, when

6 discussing the unity of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO,

7 proposed a thesis which he often repeated, stating that we need to fight

8 the Serbs, and once we beat them, although it wasn't clear to me how we

9 were supposed to do that, and Mr. Izetbegovic was even more lost on that

10 topic because he kept negotiating with them, it was then that he proposed

11 that we agree on the framework of the state. I asked him, given that

12 death is mentioned, although you omitted that part from your quotation --

13 Q. And I know you've told us previously about this discussion with

14 Mr. Izetbegovic, so I'm going to -- and I'm going to cut you off to try

15 to make it move a little faster here.

16 What you said in the interview here is -- you've said before in

17 this courtroom, essentially, that that was a basic question. Izetbegovic

18 wanted to fight first and agree on the framework later; you and the

19 others wanted to agree on the framework first and then fight on that

20 basis. Isn't that a correct understanding of your testimony on this?

21 A. Correct. I asked to --

22 Q. Excuse me.

23 A. Well, I said that people being killed is too dear a price and

24 that we have to have a plan first and then set out to implement it. This

25 is not talking about seceding one part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and

Page 11291

1 annexing it to Croatia. I'm talking here about what I had foreseen, and

2 that is that a conflict would ensue because we did not wish to be ruled

3 by anyone, much as we never wanted throughout history.

4 Q. And the fact is that no agreement with Izetbegovic or the

5 government in Sarajevo was ever reached beforehand; correct? That's a

6 "yes" or "no."

7 A. Unfortunately, as I'm stating here as well, and you could see

8 that he kept lying, cheating, and breaking every deal, such a deal was

9 not reached. He did consent to one type of agreement -- well, excuse me,

10 but let me finish. We cannot bring this down to a simple "yes" or "no."

11 These are international relations. If you are asking me for an answer,

12 I'm trying to give you as short one as possible.

13 Mr. Izetbegovic did not have a plan at first. The plans he

14 consented to --

15 Q. General, I asked you whether there was agreement or not. You

16 said that there was not, and we all know that there wasn't.

17 A. When, when? There was an agreement in 1993 by way of the

18 Vance-Owen Plan. He broke that. Then there was another one in early

19 summer --

20 Q. We'll talk about Vance-Owen later and the fact that it never came

21 into being because the three sides never accepted it. It never became

22 operative as an international instrument or treaty.

23 What I'm putting to you, and you're free to disagree with me, and

24 you probably will, but what I'm putting to you, General, is that when you

25 make this statement here in this interview, that, "If we cannot agree

Page 11292

1 about the Constitution, if you want us to be second-class citizens, then

2 we would be prepared to secede militarily," you told that to the BBC

3 interviewer as the statement you made to Izetbegovic, what I'm putting to

4 you is, in fact, the war with ABiH, certainly in the area of

5 Herceg-Bosna, was about just that, it was about the HVO's objective to

6 obtain or to impose its vision, its separate living space, within that

7 Herceg-Bosna territory. That's what the war was ultimately about; isn't

8 that true?

9 A. You are using a rather strange term, "living space," which in

10 German has a bad -- negative connotation, "lebensraum." I disagree with

11 you. We did not ask for such type of space to live in. We were asking

12 for another thing. We did not want to become second-class citizens in a

13 state we helped create. If someone wanted to subdue us, as the Serbs and

14 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina tried to do so, I said we would fight.

15 I can tell you this: I'm sorry that we have Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina as it is now, and if it were up to me, I would have never

17 signed that. We were simply forced to do so by the forces which directed

18 our fate through centuries. We were supposed to sign something which is

19 unjust, which is beyond reason.

20 Q. Let me take you --

21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me. May I be allowed to make a little

22 correction to the transcript. As it is a German term, I don't know

23 whether someone else will be able. It is "lebensraum," not "trama" or

24 the "traum," which would be possible but means something quite different,

25 "lebensraum." And the reference, Mr. Praljak, you made critically is

Page 11293

1 "volk ohne raum." That was one of the key sentences of the Nazis. Would

2 you agree to that? Thank you.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Prosecutor said the

4 Croatians wanted their own "lebensraum" or living space. This is a grave

5 accusation. It is not correct. Correct is what I say. I stand by my

6 words, save for certain interpretations. We did not want to be

7 second-class citizens in our own state. That was key. The right not to

8 be second class is one's natural and just right. That was my position.

9 Unfortunately, another thing happened.

10 MR. STRINGER:

11 Q. And there's been testimony in this trial by a number of

12 witnesses, and I believe you've talked about it as well, that over time

13 demographically the percentage or the proportion of Croatian or Croat

14 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina was diminishing, and it's for that reason

15 that the unitary system or the one-man-one-vote system for you would not

16 work for Bosnia-Herzegovina because Croats or Croatian people could

17 always be out-voted in such a system, correct, assuming that people would

18 always vote along ethnic lines, of course?

19 A. It is in our interest, national, economical interests. We went

20 through various empires, the Turkish, Austro-Hungarian, Italian, and so

21 on and so forth. It was for such state institutions that there are more

22 Croats as emigres from Australia to the Americas than in the territory

23 covered by Croatia. The percentage of the Croat population was reduced

24 significantly after the agreement after the end of the war for the simple

25 reason, and that was that there are some natural laws in place in a

Page 11294

1 society which can be packaged nicely using skilled words by those who are

2 ignorant of history. In this way, solutions were offered to us which can

3 end in disasters when small nations are concerned. This is precisely

4 what is happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 Q. On the 29th of June, this is what you said about the objectives

6 or the aspirations of those that you were with. You say:

7 "We were hoping --"

8 This is page 42159 of the transcript, line 22:

9 "We were hoping all the time that the leadership would finally

10 understand that Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted only one thing, and

11 that was an autonomy in the area that could have been 17 or 18 per cent

12 of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an area in which they were an

13 absolute or relative majority, equal to anybody else, and that was all;

14 nothing else, only that, and there were also some human connections."

15 Do you recall that testimony? Shall I read it to you again?

16 A. I recall my testimony. Some documents speak about that as well,

17 including certain statements I gave at meetings with the French

18 delegation in Zagreb. We kept repeating that as parrots. That was our

19 natural request. Nothing has changed in the meantime, save for the fact

20 that there are no longer 17 or 18 per cent of us. Even that figure is,

21 historically speaking, incorrect, because many people from Austria and

22 other countries did not come to join the census. This is something that

23 is often taken at face value but may not necessarily be correct.

24 Q. So now within this autonomous area where Croats were going to

25 have an absolute or a relative majority, was it envisioned that because

Page 11295

1 of their majority, in terms of population, the Croats then would be

2 autonomous in terms of self-governance? They could govern that territory

3 as well; correct?

4 A. Sir, not Croats. In that area, which ultimately was set up by

5 Cutileiro and others, the rule of democracy and citizens right would be

6 in place. In such a case, the protection of other ethnicities in that

7 area would be a mirror image to the protection Croats who were outside

8 that territory would enjoy. This would ensure protection both ways and

9 would be a precondition for a sensible development of that state, but the

10 way it was set up was not incorrect, and the state as it exists today is

11 untenable.

12 Q. So what you wanted was an autonomous territory within

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina where Croats were an absolute or relative majority,

14 but where there could be protections for minority also living in that

15 territory; is that what you're saying?

16 A. Not minorities. These would be equal citizens, not minorities.

17 One cannot have three constituent peoples within a state and that those

18 same peoples would at the same time be minorities. That's impossible.

19 The state should have been constructed in keeping with what the

20 international factors proposed, and that is to say that the state was

21 supposed to be made up of either cantons or republics. That is -- the

22 name is of lesser importance, in which way the national interests of each

23 of the peoples would be protected.

24 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, I'm going to ask the Trial Chamber

25 to intervene, I'm trying to get more succinct answers from the general.

Page 11296

1 I think I'm entitled to that. I think he's wasting a lot of time, going

2 far beyond what is needed in terms of his testimony, and so I'm going to

3 ask the Trial Chamber to intervene rather than continuing to argue with

4 him or cut him off.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, the Prosecutor

6 is asking you difficult questions, but they are essential questions. So

7 if you are not in agreement with a question asked, say so, say that

8 you're not in agreement with the question. And then if he wants you to

9 complete your answer, he will tell you why, and then you will eventually

10 develop, because the Prosecution has got time and he wants to use the

11 time in the best possible way. So when he feels that you do not answer

12 exactly to his questions, he tries once again to reposition you on the

13 question, and finally he requests the Chamber to tell you this is what

14 should be -- this is the problem. So when you are in a cross-examination

15 stage and you say, "I agree," or, "I don't agree," or, "I don't

16 understand ," if he then wants you to be specific, then he will ask you

17 to be specific.

18 You will have noted that for the last hour or so, I did not

19 intervene. I let things happen normally while the Prosecutor was asking

20 questions his question on this important subject, and therefore I'm

21 letting the Prosecution continue. I may have, myself, questions to ask,

22 but for the moment try and answer precisely to the questions asked from

23 the Prosecution. And if you think the question requires some

24 specifications, tell him. Tell him you disagree or tell him, "I might

25 answer, but I need more time," and you'll see what he wants exactly.

Page 11297

1 So let's go on.

2 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

3 MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Pardon me, Mr. Stringer.

4 In the transcript, there is something missing. What is the

5 exhibit number of the video excerpts we saw? I don't think we have that

6 in the transcript. We don't have the number. I cannot follow it, and I

7 was unable to locate it in e-court.

8 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Counsel. The first clip was P09447, or

9 it was a part of it. The video, itself, is longer. And then the second

10 clip came out of P09488.

11 Q. Now, General, I want to come back again to your testimony about

12 your objective here for an autonomous area, where Croats would be an

13 absolute or relative majority. Would you agree with me that such an

14 area, for it to exist, would have to have an identifiable border?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Would you agree with me that such an area that you envisaged,

17 that you're speaking about here, would not be a temporary entity under

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina or within Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that what you wanted

19 was a permanent autonomous area for Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina ?

20 A. Yes, it was supposed to be permanent. We agreed with the

21 international proposals which went along those lines.

22 Q. And would you also agree with me that in order to maintain these

23 Croat -- or to achieve and maintain these absolute or relative Croat

24 majorities, it would be necessary to control, over time, the ethnic

25 composition of that territory?

Page 11298

1 A. What do you understand by controlling the ethnic composition?

2 Can you explain that to me? How do you envisage one controlling an

3 ethnic composition?

4 Q. Well, I guess that's what I'm asking you. Given the trends that

5 were taking place over the decades, where Croatian people were moving

6 away either to Croatia or elsewhere, Muslim people were moving in from

7 other places, in order to maintain this Croatian autonomous area, perhaps

8 you could tell us, how was it proposed or envisaged that Croatian people

9 would maintain their majorities?

10 A. Nothing was proposed or envisaged of that type. Such type of

11 control, without going back to certain fascist and Nazi systems, is

12 impossible. The only discussion that occurred was that this would

13 prevent the departure of Croatian people, be it to Germany, France,

14 Switzerland, or Croatia, because they would be able to enjoy their

15 ethnic, national, and civil rights. Since that failed to realise, the

16 situation that we now have in Mostar [as interpreted] is that by now we

17 have the Muslim majority, and this is the result of the lack of

18 comprehension, and that is something that anyone historian could explain

19 to you.

20 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise to

21 Mr. Stringer. I have a correction at page 25, line 3.

22 General Praljak discussed Sarajevo, rather than Mostar. Is that

23 correct, General?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is correct, but I could have

25 said "Zenica" or any number of cities. This would serve as a protection,

Page 11299

1 preventing people from leaving, which is something that more or less

2 occurred en masse.

3 MR. STRINGER:

4 Q. General, I'm going to put it to you that certainly based on the

5 situation that prevailed in 1991 and 1992 and 1993, that in order to

6 achieve this autonomous Croatian area, where Croats would be an absolute

7 or relative majority, what was absolutely required, in terms of

8 controlling the demographics, was to move Muslim people, non-Croats, out

9 of many of these areas in order to tip the balance ethnically back toward

10 Croats. Isn't that true? Isn't that what was necessary?

11 A. You mean remove them the way you did with the Indians? No, we

12 did not have that. Quite the contrary. When Herceg-Bosna was being

13 established and during the fight, in hundreds of examples, as you could

14 see, Croats protected each and every Muslim in that territory. In terms

15 of military-judicial practice, there was no distinction between the two.

16 Please do not interpret it that way and impute that to the Croats. It is

17 incorrect, and I refuse to discuss this along such lines unless you show

18 evidence.

19 Q. Well, I'm going to put it to you directly, General, we're going

20 to be talking about a lot of places like Prozor in October of 1992,

21 Gornji Vakuf, January, the events in Mostar and Western Herzegovina

22 throughout the summer of 1993, where we see hundreds -- thousands of

23 Muslims evicted from their homes, put in camps, driven away. And what

24 I'm putting to you is that that was all part of this need, on your part

25 and the part of your colleagues in the HVO, to establish a Croatian

Page 11300

1 autonomous area where Croatian people would be a majority -- an absolute

2 or relative majority. Isn't that what all these crimes that took place

3 were about, the creation of a Croatian area in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

4 A. No, absolutely not. In Prozor, that was not the case. 90 per

5 cent of the people returned after the incident which was caused by the

6 Muslims. Gornji Vakuf was divided. Mostar, which under that

7 interpretation, was supposed to be the central part of Herceg-Bosna, was

8 split in two. In the Muslim part, there were 140 Croats left, whereas in

9 the Croatian part there were at least 7.000 Bosniaks. Everything you

10 said is not true, and you keep using these empty words.

11 Q. Let's talk about the Muslim refugees who came into Herceg-Bosna

12 from other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina after they were evicted and

13 driven away by the VRS, the Serb armies. As a starting point, it was

14 going to be imperative --

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a question to ask, a

16 follow-up question.

17 The Prosecutor asked you a series of questions on the

18 geographical entity which might have been established where Croatians

19 would have had a majority or a relative majority, and while listening to

20 him I wondered whether he wasn't creating a parallel between the

21 Vojvodina, because a moment ago we saw, in the book written by

22 Mr. Tudjman, that there was a whole paragraph concerning the Vojvodina.

23 As you know, Mr. Praljak, since everybody knows about this, this is

24 public knowledge, I can speak about it, Vojvodina is a province -- an

25 autonomous province of Serbia where there would be 25 different ethnic

Page 11301

1 groups, as one reminds me of, and which is -- and six different languages

2 which are used, including Hungarian. Hungarian is one of the languages

3 used in Vojvodina, but Vojvodina is a province which is an autonomous

4 province.

5 Now, do you and your friends and others thought maybe to create

6 in Herceg-Bosna an autonomous province within Bosnia-Herzegovina? Was it

7 a possible assumption, hypothesis, which had been muted, or was the

8 Herceg-Bosna scheme had nothing to do with you?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was precisely the foundations

10 of our thinking for the establishment of Bosnia-Herzegovina, precisely to

11 create autonomous provinces. You are well-acquainted with the situation,

12 that is to say, in Vojvodina before World War II there were more than

13 half a million Hungarians, half a million of what were known as

14 Volksdeutchers, there were 200.000 Croats in Backa and Srem, those

15 provinces, there were some Jews, and so on and so forth, Romanians, and

16 an autonomous province was established. The Serbs were -- of course,

17 they were in the majority, individually speaking, but I don't think the

18 number exceeded 35 or 36 per cent compared to the total population. So

19 in the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, there were already existing

20 models. Kosovo was in Serbia, too. It was an autonomous province, the

21 autonomous province of Kosovo. Before, there was Sandzak. Sandzak was

22 autonomous during World War II, with an anti-fascist movement, the

23 Sandzak anti-fascist movement, and then was divided up between Serbia and

24 Montenegro, six districts to Serbia, two districts to Montenegro, and the

25 Bay of Kotor as well, which was [indiscernible] since 1918, was part of

Page 11302

1 Bavaria, and during World War II it was a separate area, and so on and so

2 forth. So wherever this principle of autonomy was not respected, but the

3 unitary principle was applied, the minority nation disappeared, and

4 that's the law, that's how things went.

5 After World War I and World War II -- well, after World War II,

6 perhaps the Hungarians fared worse. Of the 1.300.000, a lot of them

7 remained in Transylvania, and I'm sure the Judge -- Judge Prandler will

8 know this better than me. But, anyway -- and so where the Hungarian

9 people were in the vast majority, these territories were clipped, and we

10 see the example of Silesia in the Sudetenland, Germans and so on.

11 So all the proposals were made to prevent a situation of that

12 kind occurring and to have a logical solution, and there were already

13 logical solutions in the offing, and that was autonomous provinces within

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether they be called cantons or autonomous province

15 or whatever. The name was immaterial. The essential point was that the

16 constitutional order should guarantee each and every nation their rights,

17 without having to move out and relocate. We moved during the Turkish

18 Empire, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and during modern-day Yugoslavia, and

19 the number of Croatian emigres amounts to three and a half million of the

20 second, third, and fourth generation, and that's a catastrophe.

21 So, Your Honours, all this is tantamount to just stories put out,

22 and you want to bring it under a criminal act. So in that respect, until

23 the spiral of war escalated and brought terrible things to pass, but not

24 at a single moment did anybody that I talked to or I knew -- nobodies'

25 thinking went along those lines. The only question was how to prevent

Page 11303

1 what had happened in the past from happening again. But it did happen

2 when we had an "Islamic Declaration Plan" at the basis of a state, and

3 then when this person wanted to make you a second-class citizen. So that

4 was the situation.

5 And we lost in Bosnia and Herzegovina because a very distorted

6 state came into being in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thanks to the Americans, and

7 so on and so forth.

8 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

9 Q. General, when we talk about this, just for the record, I should

10 ask you, when we talk about this Croatian -- this autonomous Croatian

11 area that you spoke about in your testimony in June, what we're talking

12 about is the territory of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna,

13 correct, which then became the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna? That

14 is what was envisioned to be the autonomous Croatian area that you have

15 been talking about; correct?

16 A. No. Herceg-Bosna was established as a defence organisation. In

17 every portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was sufficient numbers of

18 Croats for them to be able to associate and to set up an armed uprising

19 to prevent themselves from being exterminated. But as far as I know,

20 certain parts of Herceg-Bosna were to remain parts of, for example, the

21 autonomous province of the Croats.

22 Q. I'm going to go back to my original -- the last question I was

23 going to, which was to take you back to 1991, 1992, and into 1993.

24 You've testified a lot about the so-called ethnic occupation, as I think

25 you put it, where many Muslims came into the Croatian territories from

Page 11304

1 elsewhere, driven out by the Serbs. Do you recall that testimony?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now, in order to achieve this autonomous Croatian area and to

4 achieve the majorities that were envisioned, it would, at the very least,

5 be necessary to move those people back out, send them home, send them

6 elsewhere, but to move them out of this Croatian territory; isn't that

7 true?

8 A. The basis of every setup in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in logical terms,

9 was that first of all the results of the war should be abolished to

10 enable all people to go back to their own homes, and to abolish the

11 effects of ethnic cleansing or the fact that people had left out of fear

12 and so on, to create conditions whereby each person could safely go back.

13 That's a humanistic option which is always repeated again and again, but

14 never actually takes root. Everybody goes home satisfied that they've

15 created another Frankenstein who -- well --

16 Q. Some parts of Herceg-Bosna or some parts of this Croatian

17 territory where the HVO is exerting its authority, its military authority

18 and its political authority, it was also going to be necessary to change

19 the demographic composition among Muslims who were living in these

20 territories for years and generations, such as Jablanica and Stolac;

21 isn't that true?

22 A. No, completely incorrect. Had we wanted to change the ethnic

23 composition of Stolac, then in 1992 we would not have enabled the Muslims

24 to return to their homes and to set up their own armed force with my

25 help, to set up a brigade, and to fight together with us, and you've seen

Page 11305

1 documents to that effect here before. So not in our wildest dreams did

2 we wish to do anything to persecute any nation within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3 What happened in 1993 has completely different causes, and those causes

4 belong to the whole war situation and so on.

5 Q. And then, thirdly, of course, in order to maintain this

6 demographic composition of majority -- absolute or relative majority, it

7 would be helpful as well, wouldn't it, if Croats from other territories

8 and other areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina were to come down and live within

9 this autonomous Croatian area that you've talked about, to set it up, and

10 then to have other Croatian people move in? That would assist in

11 maintaining the requisite majorities, wouldn't it?

12 A. No, no. As far as I know about the plans drawn up by the

13 international community, not a single cantonal line was drawn to have

14 people relocate somewhere or come in somewhere, but on the basis of the

15 1991 population census and the descriptions thereof.

16 Q. I'm not asking you about plans of the international community.

17 I'm asking you about the goals and the policies of the HVO. And it was,

18 indeed, a goal and a policy of the HVO to bring Croat people from other

19 parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Herceg-Bosna in order to strengthen

20 those territories as being Croatian territories; isn't that true?

21 A. Untrue. That is an insinuation not backed up by any proof or

22 evidence. You're just saying it just like that.

23 Q. Well, let me then put this to you: that in order to achieve or to

24 maintain any sort of demographic control, what's likely to result and

25 what may, in fact, be envisioned right from the start is violence, some

Page 11306

1 form of violence, to move people away from places where they are living,

2 and that you knew, and your co-accused knew, and President Tudjman knew,

3 in the meetings that were taking place all the way back, as far back as

4 1991, that when you were talking about creating an autonomous Croatian

5 area, contrary to the legal-constitutional framework of

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, this was going to result in violence, violence

7 necessary in order to drive non-Croat populations out; isn't that true?

8 A. I have no idea what you're talking about. Would you break that

9 up into smaller questions, where the Croatian area was mentioned, who

10 mentioned it first, where the order was given for any population movement

11 and relocation? So unless you ask me specific questions, then I take

12 your questions to be just off the bat, which might have, in your history,

13 American history, might have certain good examples, but not in our part

14 of the world.

15 Q. Well, General, I'm talking about your words here when you're

16 talking about what you wanted; autonomy in the area, territory of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there were absolute or relative majority. Now,

18 in order to achieve that, when you talk about maintaining demographic

19 control, that is always going to result in violence, isn't it, because

20 it's going to result in the prevention of people moving or staying as

21 they wish; isn't that true?

22 A. That's completely untrue. Tell me, please, in any country --

23 well, there's migration all over the world; England, America, France.

24 Now, if you're preventing 10 million of your citizens to gain citizens'

25 rights, but you're using them as a labour force, that doesn't mean to say

Page 11307

1 we did that down there. Perhaps you could perform this analysis in

2 America, but we adhered to -- let me finish. We adhered to the stands

3 and --

4 MR. STRINGER: No. Mr. President, there is an argument that's

5 taking place here that's rather one-sided. I'm not going to argue with

6 the general, and I'm not going to accept repeated personal remarks of the

7 kind that are starting to flow in my direction. I'm going to ask the

8 Trial Chamber to take control of this.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, don't make any

10 personal comments on what might have happened in the US, or in France, in

11 Hungary, or elsewhere. The Prosecutor is asking you questions on

12 Herceg-Bosna. He has a case to put, and he's putting it to you

13 relentlessly. You can agree with it or not. I thought I understood that

14 you really disagree, so tell him, "I disagree," and just let him put his

15 questions.

16 But I do have a follow-up question to ask you. On several

17 occasions, the Prosecutor is saying an absolute majority or relative

18 majority. While listening, I'm wondering about one thing. In

19 Herceg-Bosna, was there a majority or a relative majority of Croats? I'm

20 wondering, and I'm wondering because, thinking about Vojvodina, in this

21 autonomous province of Vojvodina, the Serbs represented 65 per cent of

22 the population, and the Hungarians 14 per cent, so there was a Serbian

23 majority, and still it was an autonomous region, so I would like to know

24 whether Herceg-Bosna could have operated with a majority of Muslims,

25 possibly, but with a strong presence of Croats.

Page 11308

1 When the Prosecutor is putting this question to you, I think that

2 in his mind the majority in Herceg-Bosna was a Croat majority. Do you

3 agree with him or not on this point?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Herceg-Bosna did not have the

5 borders that we're talking about, but let's assume that there was some

6 kind of Herceg-Bosna which --

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, I'm asking a very

8 specific question. When you're talking about Herceg-Bosna, I would like

9 to know whether there was a Croat majority in that region, or whether

10 there were maybe 40 per cent of Croats but more Muslims. That's what I'd

11 like to know. In Vojvodina, the Serbs were a majority, they were 62 or

12 65 per cent of the population. I would like to know whether in

13 Herceg-Bosna there was a Croat majority. Yes or no?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. But Judge Antonetti,

15 Your Honour, look at it this way: In 1918, when the Serbs crossed the

16 Danube, there were not more than 35 or 37 per cent of Serbs in Vojvodina,

17 and then they impose that kind of administration and system whereby the

18 Hungarians moved out, half a million Volksdeutchers were sent home, the

19 Croats were sent home, and when they established the autonomous province

20 there was 65 per cent of them. That's what we wanted to avoid. That's

21 what this is all about. So where we were in the majority and the

22 province of Posavina, Odzak, that area and West Herzegovina, there was an

23 absolute Croatian majority there, and it was in this absolute Croatian

24 majority, to the surprise of the Serbs, is the Banovina Hrvatska of

25 Croatia was established. It was established when the Croatian had an

Page 11309

1 absolute majority.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Prosecutor is

3 asking a second question to you, and you haven't answered it. He put a

4 very simple question to you. He was asking whether you and also those in

5 the HVO, maybe Tudjman and others, didn't have the political will to make

6 sure that this region would be peopled by Croats, you know, with Croats

7 coming from elsewhere in order to increase the number of Croats there.

8 That's what the Prosecutor is asking. Do you agree with him; yes or no?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, and three times "no." And I

10 say that here and now, and I say that in this text in the interview. I

11 address that issue too. But then we should look at the integral text,

12 and if we have time to do that, well, we have time. If not, we don't.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer, you have the

14 floor. So he is answering "no" to the question you put to him, the idea

15 you had that they might have wanted to increase the number of Croats by

16 bringing Croats from Croatia.

17 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

18 Q. General, the next exhibit is -- I'm going to move to is 3D01279,

19 1279.

20 A. I haven't got that.

21 MR. STRINGER: We've got the next binder which we meant to

22 distribute before, but this is all continuation of the same topic,

23 Mr. President.

24 Mr. President, maybe now that -- we could take the break. We're

25 approaching the time, and we could make the distribution now and then

Page 11310

1 start with this when we come back.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It's time for the

3 break, anyway.

4 We'll have a 20-minute break, and we'll resume with a new binder.

5 --- Recess taken at 3.38 p.m.

6 --- Upon commencing at 4.06 p.m.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer, you have the

8 floor.

9 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Q. General, the next exhibit, I think you have it there in front of

11 you, 3D01279. This is one of the issues of "Croatian Soldier" magazine

12 that you talked about during one part of your direct testimony, and I

13 just wanted to use this to introduce the idea that there were other

14 visions within the Croatian people or among Croat people in

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina of the structure and relationships between the Croats

16 and the Muslims. And I noticed in this article, in this issue, at the

17 very end, the very last page of your version, the original language

18 version, and it's on page 25 of the English, this article, at the very

19 last paragraph, talks about:

20 "The Serbs are doing everything they can to prevent any

21 possibility of living or co-existing with the other two national groups

22 long into the future."

23 Do you see that?

24 A. Yes, the Serbs are doing everything that they can to prevent any

25 possibility of, and so on and so forth, yes.

Page 11311

1 Q. And it continues down and it says -- and for the record, this is

2 from August 28th of 1992. It continues on, and it says:

3 "The Croatian Community is not attempting to take advantage of

4 the war situation to prejudice and impose political solutions to the

5 future organisation of BH. Instead, it is cooperating and participating

6 in the talks sponsored by the European Community, which are based on

7 organising the state into cantons. However, it is interesting that there

8 are attempts to cause rifts within the Croatian political body by forming

9 the HOS/Croatian Defence Force units, who advocate a unified Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina as their goal."

11 And just briefly on this, General, you made a reference at one

12 point during your direct examination to the HOS, and I just wanted to ask

13 quickly on that: Would you agree with me that during this period of time

14 in mid-1992, and perhaps earlier, that there was this HOS which was a

15 militia that was formed with a large number of both Croats and Muslims

16 who were unified within this particular militia called "HOS "?

17 A. What is your question?

18 Q. Is that -- was this "HOS" -- this militia called "HOS," was it

19 composed of Croats and Muslims together?

20 A. Yes, much as the HVO. However, the HOS was a party force of the

21 Croatian Party of Rights. The basic idea was based on the policy of the

22 independent state of Croatia, including Ante Pavelic's policies, to the

23 effect that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia together comprise a single

24 state; that is to say, that the Croatian state stretches up to the Drina,

25 not Bosnia, and that Muslims are actually Croats of a different religion.

Page 11312

1 That is the basic political principle of the Croatian Party of Rights

2 which, during the war, organised HOS. Because our policy was completely

3 different, we had serious problems with them. However, Izetbegovic

4 recognised them as long as he needed them.

5 Q. And in terms of difference in policy, this article here indicates

6 that at least one of the differences in policy is that HOS advocates a

7 unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I take it that is different from the

8 vision of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was envisioned by the HVO.

9 A. No, you are not right, sir. The Croatian Party of Rights at

10 elections received 5 per cent of votes in Croatia. In

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, they received none. Unfortunately, Davor Gjenero was

12 not precise here. He only put it partially. The unified state of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is not correct. For HOS, Croatia and

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a unitary state, stretching up to the Drina, was

15 supposed to be a single state, treating Muslims as Croats, as of the

16 constitutional assembly in 1921 and the formation of the kingdom of

17 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, out of 40 plus deputies, 20 deputies declare

18 themselves Muslims, 1 -- 2 declare themselves Croats. Based on such

19 distorted view of history, they advocated policies without a foundation.

20 Save for that, it also relied heavily on the idea of the NDH or the

21 independent state of Croatia.

22 Q. The next exhibit --

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, the document

24 which Mr. Stringer is showing you is important, it's an important

25 document, and I thank Mr. Stringer for showing it to you. When one reads

Page 11313

1 the last paragraph, it seems that there is -- that there are two aspects

2 on the Croatian point of view, one which is the HOS, impersonated by the

3 HOS, and the other one by the rest. The HOS, you say, represents 5 per

4 cent of the voters in Croatia and 0 per cent for Bosnia-Herzegovina. If

5 I have understood what you said, the HOS wanted a state, a unified state,

6 and this unified state would have been Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in

7 one single state.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. And the other

10 Croatians, the other -- the HVO, for their part, were following the

11 European Community trend. They wanted to have a Bosnia-Herzegovina

12 organised like a state, but a state constituted or made up with cantons,

13 which means, if I understand the text properly, there should be the

14 Republic of Croatia as a state, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as

15 another state, but within the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina there would

16 be cantons, including the famous 3, 8, and 10, which would, by majority,

17 have a Croatian population. Is this, indeed, what the text says?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct. And it reads on that the

19 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna or Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina never

20 manifested any disloyalty to the Bosnia-Herzegovinian state, they were

21 not disloyal to it. They defended its territory, a significant portion

22 of the territory, and its population. It is also stated that we weren't

23 efficient in repelling the aggressor. Then it says that the Croatian

24 Community is not trying to take advantage of the war situation in order

25 to prejudice and impose any political constitutional solutions of

Page 11314

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 We cooperated in the negotiations under the auspices of the

3 European Community, which had a plan based on the cantons, including the

4 three you mentioned. According to the census, there were some 60 per

5 cent of Croats.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Right. I had to interrupt you.

7 This text, which was published on the 28th of August, 1992, I

8 don't know who wrote it, but if one looks at the beginning of the text,

9 where the Serbians are mentioned, I believe I understand that the

10 Serbians have ethnic cleansing as a solution, but this is not the

11 solution of the Croatian Community. Is this what is, indeed, written in

12 this text?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honour Antonetti.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Therefore, if I understand

15 properly, in 1992, in August, there was a text which was a quasi-official

16 text coming -- published in the "Croatian Soldier" where reference is

17 made to ethnic cleansing by the Serbs, but this is condemned by the

18 Croatian -- by the Croats because they say this is not the solution. Do

19 you agree or not?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was fully our position, and we

21 behaved accordingly.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, this is what I read here,

23 would be saying. You are the one who actually started this.

24 So I'm giving you the floor again.

25 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 11315

1 Q. Is it true, General, that HOS recognised the legitimacy or the

2 direction of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo and

3 that this was one aspect that put it at odds with the HVO?

4 A. That is not correct.

5 Q. All right.

6 A. We recognised their authority as well. HOS was, unfortunately, a

7 party force. Many great guys were among their ranks who wanted to fight,

8 but, politically speaking, that option was not acceptable. And because

9 of that reason, and because one could not afford to have political

10 armies, with a lot of effort on the part of the HVO we managed to

11 dismember HOS, having many of their troops move over to the HVO.

12 Q. Okay. The next exhibit is P00524, which is the minutes of a

13 meeting of the National Defence Council on the 26th of September, 1992.

14 General, you were present at the meeting, and you've testified about

15 these minutes already earlier, and --

16 A. Mr. Stringer, excuse me. All of my Croatian pages are empty.

17 Q. Turn to page 17.

18 A. I can't have a look at anything because I only have the English

19 texts. Perhaps there is something here. Sorry, yes.

20 Q. I'm looking at page 17 of the English text, and, General, for you

21 that should be -- I'll refer to the ERN number. It should be the page

22 with the numbers ending 2856 on the ERN number, 2856. And I'll read you

23 what you said. You're speaking, and you say:

24 "Mr. President, we have open threats in Croatia from all those

25 staffs. They reject any possible talks about Herceg-Bosna or something

Page 11316

1 similar. They do it openly at the tables of the restaurants and secretly

2 in Baska Vode, in Brela ..."

3 I'm going to skip down:

4 "As it seems now, and due to the people settling on the territory

5 from Travnik and below, I'm afraid our chances will be bad at the moment

6 when the war is over. There's been a great change in the ethnic

7 structure. And to solve that with them by war, the civil, international

8 rights, et cetera, and it will be difficult in any form to expel these

9 people from there, and without expelling those people we will not have a

10 majority there."

11 So, General, this goes back to what I was talking to you before

12 the break, about the need to control or to manage the demographic or

13 ethnic structure within the territories that you wanted to be autonomous

14 Croat territory, and here in this meeting what you're doing is saying

15 that an obstacle to that is the fact that you have a lot of refugees,

16 that it will be difficult to expel them, and without expelling them

17 you're not going to have a majority. So I take that to mean, General,

18 that you considered expulsion necessary to the creation of this

19 autonomous Croatian area that you've been talking about; is that correct?

20 A. No, completely incorrect. I'm only saying here that one cannot

21 use war to change ethnic structure of any part of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

22 and that is what was taking place, the ethnic structure. We are not

23 talking about expulsions here, and not of the people who were originally

24 there, but who came because of the war and the result of the efforts of

25 the international community. The principle was that war cannot be used

Page 11317

1 to change ethnic structure. This is a fundamental principle of

2 international law, as far as I know.

3 As for the rumours, at the beginning I was referring to the

4 staffs of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Brela and in Basko Voda in

5 Croatia. It was openly discussed that they cannot hurt the Serbs, but

6 all of the areas where Croats were in majority and Muslims in minority,

7 they would repopulate, thus creating a majority.

8 The basic principle of international talks was what I repeated,

9 and that is that war cannot be used to change ethnic structure. The

10 Serbs used that and proclaimed that as their elementary military goal.

11 It is clearly stated here.

12 Q. But what you are acknowledging, General, is the fact that the

13 presence of all those Muslims now in these areas does constitute an

14 obstacle to the establishment of a majority Croatian area; isn't that

15 true? At the very least, the demographics were now an obstacle to the

16 establishment of Croatian majority territory in this area?

17 A. No, sir, in that area, without those who were expelled, did have

18 a majority. Those who were expelled and ethnically cleansed trespassed

19 to others' properties, houses, occupying other peoples' flats, changing

20 the ethnic composition as a result of the war, which is impermissible

21 under international law. I merely said that if the conclusion of the war

22 would be in violation of international law, and if, for example, there is

23 a war between, say, Switzerland and India and there are 15 million

24 Indians in Switzerland as refugees, that would be impermissible, because

25 that would mean the end of the Swiss. This is what I meant by saying

Page 11318

1 that those people had originally been driven away.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, Mr. Stringer

3 has asked you a very pertinent question. He tells you, in his question,

4 that the refugees have created a new situation. How are you going to

5 solve the situation? And I am looking at what Mr. Susak says after you.

6 Well, see what he is saying. It's very interesting. He says there are

7 20.000 refugees in Mostar and that the orders come from Sarajevo in order

8 to create new Muslim brigades, in a way, at Mostar, Capljina, Stolac.

9 Therefore, Mr. Susak says here, "We have 20.000 more Muslims at Mostar."

10 If you add up these 20.000 Muslims with those who are already there, the

11 Croatian majority doesn't exist any more in Mostar.

12 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You agree. So how did you

14 think you would solve the problem? The Prosecution believes that you

15 were going to solve it by ethnic cleansing. What do you say? How are

16 you going to solve this problem? Because he advocates because of the

17 number of refugees you don't have a Croatian majority anymore.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I simply said that if this is not

19 resolved and it would take place after that, we would have the violation

20 of international or domestic law and it would be very difficult to drive

21 those people away. If you allow violations of law and international law,

22 and if you allow a people to occupy you, then there is no solution, there

23 is no rule of law anymore, and you lose a state. The solution is

24 international law, which was supposed to be used to stop the war and

25 bring about peace by just means. That means allowing everyone to go back

Page 11319

1 to where they hailed from. Otherwise, what would take place is what,

2 indeed, did take place, because the 200.000 Croats from Republika Srpska

3 are no longer there. This was an unjust war with an unjust end, and I am

4 sitting here accused of producing that although I spoke out against it.

5 That is why we said, let's bring in international negotiators, let us see

6 the problem at the outset and devise a solution. And now, after all

7 that, people are being blamed, where I'm not to be blamed for that. I

8 foresaw this back in 1991, I spoke about that, and all of a sudden now it

9 seems I'm guilty. Well, fine.

10 We were unable to resolve the problem, we knew that, and we did

11 take them in. We constructed roads, we brought food, and we never

12 expelled anyone. After that, the war brought about certain changes in

13 movements because it could not be stopped, but that was not because of

14 our political or military attitude and position. We only defended

15 ourselves, although within the framework of international talks we were

16 always on the losing end, irrespective of the fact that we signed

17 everything. The only thing that matters is force and the stronger side,

18 unfortunately.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor.

20 MR. STRINGER:

21 Q. General, the next part I want to take you to is found on page 23

22 of the English, which in your version is the page ending with the numbers

23 2888.

24 Now, General, in this part of the transcript, President Tudjman

25 is talking. He's talking about his discussions with Mr. Eagleburger,

Page 11320

1 also Vance and Owen, and then there's discussion of a board on which

2 yourself and General Bobetko would participate. And then Tudjman says,

3 in the middle of page 23:

4 "We will openly tell Izetbegovic, when he comes here, what we

5 said in the beginning. There can be no discussion about them

6 establishing military and civilian government in areas that used to be

7 within the Croatian Banovina."

8 Now, General, I'm going to put it to you that President Tudjman

9 is saying that because, in fact, those areas are supposed to fall within

10 this autonomous Croatian territory that we've been talking about so far

11 today, which was itself based upon re-establishment of the Croatian

12 Banovina; isn't that true?

13 A. It is not, sir. Banovina Hrvatska encompassed the whole of

14 Croatia, et cetera. What is discussed here are the areas of Vanja

15 [phoen] and Hrvatska which were in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and such areas

16 were formed because of the absolute Croatian majority. He's only saying

17 here that we should tell Izetbegovic not to use force as he did in Mostar

18 and Rama in order to establish his Muslim authority, but that he should

19 stick to -- well, Sancevic was the -- Bosnia-Herzegovina's ambassador to

20 Croatia. Again, what was discussed was that we should establish

21 something that would be able to exist and function as the state of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather by means of force either by the Serbs or

23 Muslims.

24 Q. Well, what's being said here is that the president of Croatia is

25 deciding that the president or the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina isn't

Page 11321

1 going to have a say in what authorities are established within these

2 areas; isn't that true? What business is it of Tudjman? It's not his

3 country.

4 A. This is what the behaviour of Mr. Eagleburger and the

5 international community was. If he's still alive, you should call him

6 up, you should bring him here, as well as Messrs. Vance and Owen.

7 Throughout the negotiations, they honoured Franjo Tudjman as a person of

8 influence and authority. Prlic and Boban and others will decide on the

9 fate of their peoples, but they saw Tudjman as a partner. Eagleburger

10 did not tell him, "Well, you have nothing to do with this."

11 Unfortunately, this difficult process lasted for years and

12 Franjo Tudjman's role was actively asked for.

13 Q. In September of 1992, when this discussion is taking place, in

14 fact, the military and civilian government, certainly the civilian

15 government, in areas located within Bosnia-Herzegovina under the

16 constitutional framework, is going to be a war presidency, since a decree

17 on a state of war has been declared; isn't that true? Isn't there

18 already a framework in place for the establishment of a legitimate

19 civilian government within Bosnia-Herzegovina?

20 A. Well, I think that you could consider it that way, and this

21 civilian authority was set up on the basis of the elections. Authorities

22 were formed on the basis of the results of the elections and not as is

23 done in Western democracies, whereby the winner decides all. In the

24 HZ-HB, the parties became part of the government in relation to the

25 election results. Regardless of the fact that the HDZ was the winner and

Page 11322

1 could have filled all the seats, the government was set up together with

2 the SDA proportionately to the number of votes. This was the case in

3 Rama, Mostar, and so on and so forth, so a more democratic base.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. The Judges have

5 a few questions to ask. Judge Prandler first and then I will have a few

6 questions.

7 Judge Prandler, please.

8 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you, Mr. President.

9 I would like to go back to a few pages here, and in order not to

10 forget it, actually, the same transcript, page 17, 17 of 71, and 18 of

11 71. Here you, Mr. Praljak, you speak about the questions of the

12 refugees, and then I would quote that:

13 "There were some talks in the government that the refugees from

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina should be allowed to enter Croatia in any way and at

15 any price, since these refugees are already on the territory where the

16 Croatian people are."

17 And then you continued:

18 "Then from Croatia, under the pressure of the international

19 community, they should be sent to the border and to hell with them."

20 And now my first question is that: It was your idea to send them

21 to the hell, to put it in a way rough -- in a way rather roughly, and

22 because then you continued later on that there has been a great change in

23 the ethnic structure, and on the next page, that is, 18, you continued

24 that:

25 "... and it will be difficult in any form to expel those people

Page 11323

1 from there, and without expelling those people we will not have a

2 majority there."

3 And I repeat again "and without expelling those people we will

4 not have a majority there."

5 So my question is: If it was your view at that time that those

6 people, I mean refugees, should be sent to other countries, and what

7 solutions or forms of solution would you have preferred that very time

8 when the discussion took place?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Judge Prandler, Your Honour, I

10 never said that they should go to hell. I don't know what the

11 translation of that was, but that's not what I said. I said that they

12 should be placed at the borders and send them where they see fit to go.

13 It's not a good translation.

14 Now, I'm going to state my position, which is this and was always

15 this: When Croatia had over 500.000 refugees, occupied as it was, it was

16 my position that the refugees should be sent to the borders, towards

17 Slovenia and so on, and then in the way -- in a humane way, because we

18 couldn't take them in anymore, that they should be sent out to Europe,

19 and that is because I claimed then, as I do now, because, you see, it's a

20 big problem, even for large countries such as Germany, France, and so on,

21 when such a large number of refugees arrives, then those countries would

22 be more included in a just solution to the Bosnian crisis. That was my

23 position. And, Your Honour, you were able to see what happened when

24 Hungary was faced with a large number of refugees, and Hungary asked that

25 they be taken back. But when this problem broke out, nobody minded

Page 11324

1 whether it was a burden or not, how much it cost or didn't, and how it

2 would all end, so I thought that this should be solved in the following

3 way: to show these other countries what the problems were so that the

4 problem could be solved.

5 And I didn't say, "Let them go to hell." That's a wrong

6 interpretation, completely wrong, not the right translation. So it might

7 have been -- I might have said it in a rather blatant fashion, but the

8 fact remains that unless the question of ethnic occupation is resolved,

9 then we've got nothing to discuss. We have somebody waging a war with a

10 view to changing the population structure, and then, of course, it is the

11 political and moral -- and it will be a political and moral catastrophe,

12 and that's what happened to us. And our conduct and behaviour toward

13 refugees is the kind that I've already explained.

14 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you, General Praljak. Then it would be

15 enough for me, as far as your answer is concerned. Thank you.

16 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I wanted to say the

17 following: Yes, the translation is quite incorrect. The end part of

18 that text in English on page 17 of 71, where it says "then from Croatia

19 under the -- [In English] "... the community, they should be sent to the

20 border and to hell with them," [Interpretation] nowhere in the Croatian

21 version do you have that. In the Croatian version, it says that under

22 pressure from the international community, they should be placed at the

23 border, and send them to wherever they want to go. Allow them to come

24 into Croatia, and then under pressure from the international community,

25 to be placed at the borders and let them fend for themselves and go where

Page 11325

1 they like. Precisely like the general just said.

2 And there is another problem. Some pages of this document have

3 been admitted into evidence. Now, according to the e-court versions, it

4 is the English pages, that is to say, the translations, that have been

5 exhibited, whereas the Croatian pages are in complete disarray. The

6 pages numbers aren't correct, and General Praljak's experience, that

7 part, continues ten pages later. So the Croatian pages have been mixed

8 up. So we should look through that exhibit once again and see which

9 pages have been admitted into evidence, and to deal with the translation

10 mistakes as well.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, I had a

12 question on pages 22 and 23.

13 Earlier, the Prosecutor was telling you in his question -- he was

14 asking you why President Tudjman decided to get involved in what was

15 happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and quickly you answered by saying

16 because he was asked to do so, and then you continued speaking about

17 something else. I was listening to you, and I was wondering the

18 following. What you just said is very important. If Mr. Tudjman is

19 looking into what is happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it's not because he

20 wants to recreate this banovina. It may be because he was asked to take

21 care of it, which is what you said. So here's my question. It's quite

22 simple. What evidence do you have to back this, to say that Mr. Tudjman

23 was looking into what was happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina because the

24 international community had asked him to do so and to play a role in

25 this? Do you have any evidence to back this?

Page 11326

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do. Well, look at the

2 beginning. Why would Eagleburger and Vance-Owen talk so many times, why

3 would they invite him to Geneva sessions, however many there were. Why,

4 if they did not recognise the HZ-HB [realtime transcript read in error

5 "HDZ"] did they invite Mate Boban as an equal participant in negotiations

6 about the internal establishment of Bosnia-Herzegovina, together with

7 Alija Izetbegovic? Had Franjo Tudjman wanted to -- well, why did he need

8 Ambassador Stancevic, the ambassador of the Republic of -- the ambassador

9 of the Republic of Croatia, to Bosnia-Herzegovina? Why do the British

10 and French ambassadors go to visit Franjo Tudjman? Because they're

11 seeking him out, wanting to know his opinions and position. And, of

12 course, Mate Boban and the others down there will either sign or not sign

13 the document. He can make his suggestions and proposals, and he

14 recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina and Stancevic down there, and then he

15 negotiates just like hundreds of other people with their mostly very

16 stupid proposals, and here we have how this all ended.

17 MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon to everybody in

18 the courtroom. I'd just like to put right an error in the transcript.

19 On page 52, line 8, the general said "if they did not recognise

20 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, why then did they invite

21 Mate Boban to the negotiations?" In the transcript, it says the HDZ and

22 not the HZ-HB, so it should read "HZ-HB."

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At all negotiations from the very

24 beginning, that is to say, before Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised from

25 the Cutileiro plan -- well, we've gone through all this. The Croats were

Page 11327

1 always the first to sign. They did not question the existence of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina and asked for a minimum of political and moral

3 correctness for a constituent peoples to be placed in a position of

4 equality. I think that is so clear and we've said it so many times here

5 that I don't know what else we can add.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. General Praljak, in a

7 nutshell, if I understand you correctly, Mr. Tudjman insisted on the

8 interior affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina because, according to you, he had

9 been asked to do so by the international community in order to find a

10 solution to the situation. Is this what you're telling us?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, precisely that. They

12 asked him for that, he made his proposals, but his political options was

13 this: Croatia has recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina, you have an

14 ambassador. However, if they're asking a board to be set up, and the

15 board is something that the international community is calling for, made

16 up of the Croats, then he says Bobetko and Praljak, as far as military

17 issues are concerned, and we're going to send a politician. So this is

18 what Croatia is offering down there, to help them find a solution, and

19 that, of course, fell through as well.

20 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President.

21 Q. General, in fact, the reason why -- or if the international

22 community sought out President Tudjman's assistance or participation,

23 it's because they knew that he, as the president of Croatia, was the

24 person who was dictating policy within the HZ-HB, that Mate Boban was a

25 puppet, essentially, and that in all matters of substance, particularly

Page 11328

1 involving international negotiations, it would be Tudjman who would

2 ultimately be making decisions on behalf of the HVO and HZ-HB. Isn't

3 that how it really was?

4 A. No. Had you shown the clip to the end, you would have seen that

5 I say -- at one point I inform Franjo Tudjman that we would cross the

6 Neretva River. So if what you claim is true, then I couldn't have

7 informed him of that, and I informed him. I said I was going, and you,

8 Mr. Tudjman, can do what you will with it later on, et cetera. So

9 Herceg-Bosna, in the political sense, and Mate Boban as the number-one

10 man, if you will there, was autonomous. It is true and correct that

11 Franjo Tudjman did take into consideration, and this was his

12 constitutional duty, to look into Croatian interests, and we from

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I'm talking about a double role here, that we

14 very often gave way because the international community managed to

15 persuade Franjo Tudjman, and I explained this in the text where we --

16 Croatian integralists did not want to see a Croatian state not be

17 established, so we gave way, but it wasn't a just thing or a moral thing

18 to do, to give way. But power is might, of course, might is power.

19 Q. If you would turn, please, to page 54 of the English. For you,

20 General, it's page 2865 of the transcript P00524. We're going to come

21 back to the HOS for a few moments.

22 General, at this part of the discussion, Gojko Susak is talking,

23 there's discussion about the gentleman named Ante Prkacin, and I believe

24 that you mentioned him once or twice in your direct testimony in

25 connection with a unit that was brought in, attempting to get to Jajce in

Page 11329

1 October of 1992. Is that the same man?

2 A. Correct, the same man.

3 Q. And they're talking about Prkacin being in Zagreb, and wearing a

4 Croatian uniform, and the rank that he was representing himself to hold,

5 and President Tudjman says:

6 "Feel free to send military police to him, if he has got one,

7 feel free to take it away from him."

8 And they're upset about him -- his conduct in connection with

9 wearing the uniform.

10 And then turning to the next page, you say this, General. You

11 say:

12 "Mr. President, please, I would like to say that it is not so

13 simple. Openly speaking, we have used Mr. Prkacin, I personally and in

14 cooperation with others, for destruction of the HOS down there. He has

15 done a good job down there."

16 And the president asks then:

17 "What is he, a major general?"

18 And you say:

19 "Nobody speaks about that whatsoever, nobody has said that. That

20 is how he calls himself. He was allegedly offered a major general rank

21 by Alija Izetbegovic, who invited him up there."

22 And you continue:

23 "However, when we needed him and all of his troops, he was fully

24 available to do whatever was required. On the other hand, we can also

25 say it here, although it was repeated ten times, the HOS issue has been

Page 11330

1 solved just now in Zagreb ..."

2 Now, General, when you said here that you personally, and in

3 cooperation with others, used Mr. Prkacin for the destruction of HOS,

4 what are you -- what are you referring to there? What did you do to

5 destroy HOS down in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

6 A. What they mean is that the HOS was an irregular party army and

7 that, for example, if somebody were to do something within the HVO and

8 you punish him, then they would take his rifle and place himself under

9 the protection of another army, or if he were to have committed theft or

10 something like that, he would go to HOS. That couldn't be tolerated, of

11 course, at the beginning of the war, and this impossible situation --

12 well, it was difficult to maintain law and order anyway, and with two

13 armies, of which one had its political leader and you didn't know who it

14 was responsible to, and no organ of Herceg-Bosna could do nothing about

15 it, then Mr. Prkacin went down there at my request, and the request of

16 others, and he was shown that there would be an even bigger catastrophe.

17 And as he was a reasonable man, he accepted that and the problem was

18 solved.

19 And now here, as far as Croatia is concerned, that is to say --

20 Q. Sorry to interrupt you. I want to ask you about the HOS events

21 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The commander of HOS, up until shortly before

22 this meeting, which occurred on September 26th, 1992, the commander of

23 HOS down in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a man named Blaz Kraljevic; is that

24 correct?

25 A. Correct.

Page 11331

1 Q. And it's true, isn't is it, General, that about six weeks before

2 this conversation took place at the Presidential Palace, Blaz Kraljevic

3 was assassinated, he was shot to death with others in his car, in the

4 Mostar area in August of 1992; isn't that true?

5 A. The word "killed," well, you could -- or "assassinated," you can

6 only use words like that when the investigation has been completed. It

7 is true that he died. Whether he was killed, assassinated, or what, I

8 wouldn't go into that until the investigation is finished, and we'll here

9 what the law courts have to say about that.

10 Q. Well, General, you know exactly what happened down there, don't

11 you? He was ambushed and shot to death; isn't that true?

12 A. No, that is not true. I don't know enough about it to be able to

13 say, and I don't think you do either. And the court investigation is

14 still underway, and we'll have to wait to see what the findings are.

15 Everything else would be speculation, which I don't want to enter into.

16 Q. And the end of Blaz Kraljevic was, in fact, the end of HOS? The

17 destruction of Blaz Kraljevic was, in fact, the destruction of HOS; isn't

18 that true?

19 A. No.

20 Q. All right.

21 A. On the contrary. The situation deteriorated somewhat and it

22 required a great deal of effort to deal with the situation, because there

23 were various rumours going 'round, stories going 'round, so what was

24 needed was a calm end to the situation, whatever it was and whatever had

25 caused it.

Page 11332

1 Q. Now, when you say that you used Mr. Prkacin for the destruction

2 of HOS, what did you have him do?

3 A. Mr. Prkacin was an independent person, and regardless of the fact

4 that it says here that they used or "you used Mr. Prkacin," well, we

5 talked to him frankly, we asked him to go down and take a look at the

6 situation for himself, which was an impossible situation, and that if he

7 arrives at the conclusion that I suggested to him by quoting examples,

8 and if he came to see that my positions were the right ones, not only

9 mine by Boban's and the others, that he could then help solve the

10 situation. And he did help in that respect. I don't think you can use

11 the term "to use Prkacin," that's the wrong word, but in talks like this

12 the wrong words are very often uttered. Well, not very wrong, not

13 terribly wrong, but --

14 Q. The assassination of Blaz Kraljevic was very much in the

15 interests of the HVO at that time; isn't that true?

16 A. I don't agree with the word "killing" or "murder." Once again,

17 the investigation is underway. So until we know the facts, I cannot

18 accept the fact that killings or murders would be in anybody's interest.

19 Yes, it would be in everybody's interests to resolve the situation, but I

20 cannot accept that the HDZ was the kind of organisation which would

21 settle matters through killings and murder, certainly not.

22 Q. The death of Blaz Kraljevic was very much in the interests of the

23 HVO; isn't that true?

24 General, tell us if you want to take a break.

25 A. No, no, no, we can continue.

Page 11333

1 No, I can't agree with your interpretation. Mr. Blaz Kraljevic

2 was an emigre from Australia. He had a history behind him, a strange

3 history and a strange past, and I did clash with Mr. Blaz Kraljevic in

4 Capljina. That was quite open and clear. I said there couldn't be two

5 commanders on the territory in which I was, so we had this difference of

6 opinion. I had my very set, definite views. But your insinuations about

7 a killing and a murder as the end of it all, that's not true. Many of

8 his members understood -- well, he paraded in his uniform and went 'round

9 collecting some very good guys, but there were also some bad guys who had

10 military protection who were engaged in some bad guys who had military

11 protection who were engaged in some bad things, and that's the truth of

12 it.

13 Q. Yes, well -- hold on.

14 A. But there were first-class guys, too.

15 Q. After Blaz Kraljevic died, many of the HOS soldiers then actually

16 came over and joined the HVO; isn't that true? The HVO was stronger by

17 virtue of the fact that the HOS was destroyed; correct?

18 A. Even before Blaz Kraljevic's death, many people who had been in

19 HOS joined up with the HVO, and I talked to them, and I had individual

20 talks and group talks. Cano Stanak [phoen] was a case in point, a

21 brilliant fighter who came over to the HVO. HOS had all sorts. There

22 was some very good and brilliant guys who wanted to lay down their lives

23 for the truth and for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then there were others that

24 Blaz Kraljevic or some people around him had collected. And luckily the

25 situation ended on a positive note, except for the fact that the BH Army

Page 11334

1 gave Prkacin -- well, it was in their interests to weaken the HVO through

2 HOS, but they took some units over and they treated HOS as part of their

3 defence force, which we no longer did.

4 Q. The next exhibit related to this topic is P10983. This is an

5 article from a publication called "Borba," from the 8th of September,

6 1992, and it's talking about this issue of the death of Blaz Kraljevic.

7 Page 2 of the English says:

8 "But at precisely the time --"

9 This is about a quarter of the way down from the top:

10 "But at precisely the time when Major General Blaz Kraljevic,

11 whose fighting name is 'Arrow,' was killed on 9 August in Kresevo, near

12 Mostar. News about the conflict between the HVO and the Muslim units,

13 but also between the HVO and HOS/Croatian Defence Forces, began to break

14 through what amounted to a news blockade. HOS units, it was reported at

15 the time, had been recognising the legitimacy and legality of the civil

16 authorities and military commands in Sarajevo, while HVO units did not

17 want to do that."

18 And it skips down and says:

19 "The very day before his murder, which many in Herceg-Bosna

20 blamed directly on the HVO, Kraljevic declared, for instance, that the

21 Croatian Defence Council was solely to blame for the conflicts between

22 Muslims and the HVO and Travnik. 'We are fighting for a state which will

23 be free. It is not important whether the borders are on the Drina, a

24 little bit this way, or a little bit that way. Everything depends on the

25 will of the Croatian and Muslim people who live here. And from the time

Page 11335

1 of Starcevic to this day, it has been clear to everyone who has any

2 knowledge of Croatian history that the Croatian Rights Party has always

3 been a party of the Muslims and Catholics.'"

4 And he continues on. It says:

5 "The very day after Kraljevic was riddled with bullets, his

6 deputy, Colonel Ivica Primorac, transferred from the ranks of the HOS

7 into the ranks of the HVO."

8 Now, let me take you to the next document and then we can talk

9 about these two, because they're somewhat similar.

10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise to my learned friend

11 Mr. Stringer and to His Honours.

12 The document Mr. Stringer just read out, document P10983, is not

13 in e-court.

14 My other intervention has to do with this: It is a new document.

15 Since the Bench adopted certain rules on the ability to introduce new

16 documents during cross-examination, when the Prosecutor is examining,

17 then Mr. Stringer should stipulate what this document is about and to

18 what aspect of the indictment it is related to.

19 MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] I have another question. Given the

20 nature of the questions put to Mr. Praljak, does this mean that the

21 Prosecutor, although it is not stated in the indictment, does the

22 Prosecutor see Mr. Praljak as the person responsible for the death of

23 Blaz Kraljevic? Does this amount to an extension to the indictment?

24 Because it is not currently in it. We were not notified in time that

25 such a thesis about the responsibility of Mr. Praljak would be put forth.

Page 11336

1 This is what we conclude on the basis of the questions that were put to

2 him concerning the murder. I would kindly ask the Prosecutor why he is

3 asking these questions. Otherwise, I would deem this a speculation.

4 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, in response to Ms. Alaburic's

5 remarks, the document, I'm told, is in e-court, or it is now. It's one

6 of the newer ones that we added just within the last couple of days, but

7 I'm told that it is there. And if we -- if we tender the document after

8 the completion of General Praljak's testimony, then at that time we'll do

9 what we always do, which is indicate for what purpose it's being tendered

10 into evidence.

11 And then in response to the remarks from Ms. Pinter, I've gone

12 into this as part of the JCE part of our cross. We have

13 General Praljak's words at the National Defence Council meeting, where he

14 says that he used Prkacin to destroy HOS. The Prosecution's not prepared

15 to make any more specific allegation than that. However, it's extremely

16 pertinent, in our view, to the issue of the joint criminal enterprise,

17 the destruction of a unit that, in fact, had an allegiance to

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which in our position is not the -- was not the

19 policy of the HVO. So we're not expanding the indictment. It's our

20 position that all of this goes directly to the existence of JCE,

21 furtherance of the objectives, and the general's involvement in that.

22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I may, I wanted to

23 share something with you and my learned friend. That right at the moment

24 as we were exchanging our views, this document was introduced into

25 e-court. Therefore, my first objection is no longer important, since the

Page 11337

1 situation has now changed.

2 As for the other part, I would like to draw the attention to this

3 Bench's decision pertaining to the intention to use new evidence and

4 documents. If we violate that, we would declare that guide-line null and

5 void. If we allow the introduction of new documents, irrespective of

6 whether they meet the criteria put forth by the Bench or not, then the

7 bottom line might be that it is completely irrelevant in admitting this

8 document. We would end up with an examination which would be based

9 solely on such documents, and indirectly such a document could become

10 evidence.

11 If the Bench recalls the contents of that decision, I believe

12 there is no question about the Prosecutor's obligation by which he has to

13 notify in advance on the intention to use such documents.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [Previous translation

15 continues]... the new document. You didn't indicate this. Is there a

16 reason to that?

17 MR. STRINGER: We don't have to, Mr. President. We're free to

18 use any document that we wish on cross-examination. Now, whether we

19 tender it into evidence remains to be seen. If we tender it into

20 evidence, we will, in conformity with the decision, indicate whether it's

21 something that is tendered for culpability or --

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer, wait, wait,

23 Mr. Stringer. The Chamber made a decision about new documents, where it

24 was said -- I'm not going to -- I don't have the text now in front of me,

25 but it was said that when, during a cross-examination, a new document was

Page 11338

1 introduced, it could be only used to test the reliability of a witness.

2 Now, here it's not on the reliability of the witness, it is on the joint

3 criminal enterprise, this matter.

4 MR. STRINGER: Well, Mr. President, his testimony goes -- on this

5 point goes to the joint criminal enterprise, and the testimony obviously

6 is evidence. The topic, in our view, is highly relevant to the existence

7 of joint criminal enterprise.

8 Now, General Praljak said this in a meeting with General Tudjman,

9 that he was involved with or he used Prkacin to destroy HOS. We know

10 what the position of HOS and Blaz Kraljevic was. The general denied

11 knowing whether Kraljevic was murdered, or killed, or how he died. This

12 document was put there on the assumption that he would claim that he

13 wouldn't know, even though it's our submission that he does know very

14 well what happened, and that --

15 MR. KHAN: Your Honour, Mr. President, I have heard my learned

16 friend's eloquent, as always, response to the objection that's been put

17 forward regarding the death of Blaz Kraljevic. I do note that the

18 Prosecution, with the greatest of respect, seems to back off somewhat

19 when they say that they are not willing -- they're not prepared to make

20 any more specific allegation than they have done. But, Your Honours,

21 when you review the transcripts and have in mind the focus of my learned

22 friend's questions, it at least appeared patently obvious to me that my

23 learned friend was making an allegation that General Praljak, in some

24 way, shape, or form, was in the know, if not ordered, he knew about the

25 killing of that individual. My learned friend has said but a moment ago

Page 11339

1 that they believe that General Praljak knows more than he says.

2 Your Honours, it's not for the Prosecution, in the discharge of

3 their onerous obligation, to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, to

4 seek to do so by innuendo or by leaving a whiff of suspicion. If they

5 have evidence, they should put it forward. If they do not have evidence,

6 the allegation should not be made.

7 Now, that is my respectful submission. My learned friends, like

8 the Defence, have on numerous occasions lamented the lack of time

9 available to the parties, and spending the amount of time we've spent on

10 this issue, given General Praljak's answer, unless there is clear

11 evidence that they've put -- they wish to put to controvert

12 General Praljak's denial of any involvement in that, we should move on.

13 That's my respectful submission, Your Honours.

14 MR. STRINGER: Well, Mr. President, I've been extremely cautious

15 on this. The general said it in the meeting. It's the general that

16 said, "I used Prkacin for the destruction of HOS."

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I didn't say "I did." It reads

18 "we used."

19 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, I'm not going to argue with the

20 witness.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is a misquotation.

22 MR. STRINGER: The general said --

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let Mr. Stringer say what he

24 wants to say, Mr. Praljak. You shouldn't interrupt Mr. Stringer,

25 General.

Page 11340

1 Right, Mr. Stringer, would you please conclude what you wanted to

2 say.

3 MR. STRINGER: I read to the general his words. He says:

4 "I would like to say that it is not so simple. Openly speaking,

5 we have used Mr. Prkacin, I personally and in cooperation with others,

6 for destruction of the HOS forces down there."

7 Now, I asked the general to tell us how did he use Mr. Prkacin,

8 which was fair. I -- I'm not shy about putting our case to the general,

9 and if I wanted to put to him that he was responsible for murdering

10 Kraljevic, I would have done it. But I was careful about reading the

11 text of what he said, giving the general an opportunity to explain

12 exactly what he meant when he said it. For us, it's not -- it doesn't

13 matter who killed Kraljevic. What matters to the Prosecution on this is

14 that in the Presidential Palace, a major general of the Croatian Army, a

15 member of the National Defence Council, is telling the president of

16 Croatia that he used others for the destruction of HOS, and I'm putting

17 it to him that the destruction of HOS was based upon different policies

18 of HOS and its leadership and the fact that it was in the interests of

19 the HVO.

20 So I don't care whether the general's involved or not in the

21 murder of Blaz Kraljevic. I'm interested in his role in the destruction

22 of HOS, and I've been very careful, I believe, about limiting it to that.

23 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.

25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] If I may, I have to go back to the

Page 11341

1 objection of my learned friend Ms. Nika Pinter. This is a new charge,

2 one way or another. The Prosecutor puts it crystal clear, this is

3 relevant for the existence of the JCE. General Praljak mentioned what he

4 did on the record about HOS and Blaz Kraljevic, and the Prosecution is

5 now using that to connect that to the JCE. Your Honours, just think

6 about that. If that story about the death of Blaz Kraljevic is so

7 important for the existence or assessment of existence of the JCE, then

8 in any case it should have been mentioned in the indictment.

9 Another important thing. This Defence, in its possession, has a

10 number of documents about Blaz Kraljevic, about his death, including

11 different reports about his death, different rumours, et cetera. When we

12 were preparing the 68 ter list -- sorry, 65 ter list, we didn't find it

13 necessary to include them on the list. Why would we? No one was charged

14 with the death or the killing of Blaz Kraljevic. In no case it can be

15 important for the existence of the JCE or any other charge. Therefore,

16 this story is irrelevant.

17 General Praljak may answer any question. We will not oppose

18 that. But this has nothing to do with anything. This is merely wasting

19 time. Since the Prosecutor seems to be operating on the basis of certain

20 rumours, as I can tell you, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where we worked a lot,

21 we know for at least -- at least, and it seems I'm testifying, of at

22 least 30 rumours about the reasons and the way Blaz Kraljevic was killed.

23 It changes from village to village, from one social circle to another.

24 You hear different theories, as General Praljak said. Officially, the

25 judicial investigation was not completed. No one can say for certain how

Page 11342

1 Blaz Kraljevic was killed. Therefore, this is just speculation.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [Previous translation

3 continues]... to us why he asked this question.

4 Now, Mr. Praljak, you told us that you would answer every

5 question. Mr. Stringer tells you, in front of Mr. Tudjman, you said that

6 you had used Mr. Blaz Kraljevic to destroy the HOS -- no, Mr. Prkacin,

7 Prkacin, to destroy the HOS, and Mr. Stringer would like to know about

8 this destruction. What was the reason for it? This is the merit of the

9 question. We're not talking about the murder of Mr. Blaz Kraljevic.

10 What the Prosecution wishes to know, and the Chamber also wishes to know,

11 is why you wanted to destroy the HOS, because this, in front of

12 Mr. Tudjman, you don't explain. So please tell us why you used

13 Mr. Prkacin to destroy the HOS.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll repeat. The word used is

15 what's in the text, but it actually means this: Prkacin at that time, or

16 thereabouts, commanded HOS for both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. HOS

17 existed in Croatia as well as an army. And if you see, therein I say

18 only recently did the Croatian state manage to break up HOS in Croatia,

19 because they had their headquarters, their generals, and units. Hence,

20 the Croatian state was too weak to keep up two armed forces, because at

21 that point the HV was in its inception.

22 Secondly, Prkacin was the military boss of HOS for both states.

23 He cannot be used. He can only be convinced. This number-two man,

24 Mr. Ivica Primorac, was the second person in HOS in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 He realised that what was going on in that organisation, in addition to

Page 11343

1 the fighting. When they realised what we had, and that is to say that

2 the existence of two armed forces would only result in an increase in

3 crime and further divisions, and the absolute inability to conduct a

4 unified struggle, they concluded that HOS should simply disappear or,

5 rather, transfer to the HVO.

6 Your Honours, on the one hand we have the accusation that

7 Franjo Tudjman, in his political ideas, saw Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of

8 Croatian territory, and then we opposed HOS and the political party which

9 saw Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state with Croatia stretching all the

10 way to the Drina with no Serbs in it. Their political option is a state

11 without Serbs. That was the NDH policy, Ante Pavelic's policy. All of

12 us who thought about -- along political lines, this idea gave creeps.

13 This person came from Australia, started doing something which at such

14 turbulent times could result in a disaster.

15 I have nothing to do with his fate, but I intensively cooperated

16 with the second person in HOS, Ivica Primorac, and with Prkacin, with

17 their best commander, Primorac. I talked to them so that they would see

18 where all this was taking us, in terms of organisation and setting up the

19 state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HZ-HB. I am very proud that we

20 succeeded in this. I wasn't in it alone. Boban worked on it as well, as

21 well as many others. Otherwise, it would have been a disaster. Two

22 armed forces? We barely managed to assemble one, and we had a minimum of

23 control over the situation, and then someone else pops up, having no

24 authority over most of its soldiers, just popping up all over the place

25 after certain operations, and even having the camp for Serbs in Dretelj

Page 11344

1 which I managed to disband by means of force, a rifle against rifle.

2 Sir, I positioned anti-aircraft machine-guns to open fire if they

3 refused. They had their own camp. Come on.

4 MR. STRINGER:

5 Q. General --

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could we have a break, Your

7 Honours? We are almost at the time for the break.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. We are going to

9 take a 20-minutes break.

10 --- Recess taken at break 5.29 p.m.

11 --- Upon commencing at 5.51 p.m.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

13 Mr. Stringer, you have the floor.

14 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

15 I'm going to move on to the next topic, General, or the next

16 exhibit, I should say, and show you a videotape, part of which we saw

17 during your direct testimony. You played a part of the speech that you

18 gave in Zenica in December of 1992, and I'd like to show more of that

19 video and ask you some questions about it.

20 This is P00842, it's in Sanction, and I'm going to let it play

21 for longer than probably normal for videos, and there are going to be

22 some parts that I'm going to ask that we skip over, but I'm just going to

23 let this roll, Mr. President, if that's okay, and then I may stop at

24 certain points with questions. But it's going to take a couple

25 minutes -- a few minutes, I should say.

Page 11345

1 Q. Let me actually -- and before we start, General, do you recall

2 the speech that I'm referring to now, the speech you gave in Zenica in

3 December of 1992?

4 A. Well, partially, yes. I know the basics of what I said, the

5 essential points.

6 Q. We'll show it. It's the one that you -- you showed it to us.

7 You were telling the soldiers not to smoke cigarettes during the time of

8 the ceremony. That's the incident I'm talking about, and so we'll play

9 that now.

10 [Video-clip played]

11 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "At the ready for the homeland, at

12 the ready.

13 "I'm going to inform you with our guests today, and they are the

14 vice-president of the Community of Herceg-Bosna, Mr. Dario Kordic,

15 General Praljak, General Ante Prkacin; the operations zone commander,

16 Colonel Tihomir Blaskic; the secretary of the Croatian Community of

17 Herceg-Bosna, Ignjac Kostroman; the president of the Zenica Croatian

18 Defence Council, Mr. Dominik Sakic; the president of the HDZ, Josip

19 Pojavnik; the Croatian Defence Council vice-president, Zvonko Popovic;

20 Veronika Malbasic; and the president of the Bureau for Defence, Jozo

21 Jerkic."

22 MR. STRINGER:

23 Q. Okay. Just before we continue, General, a few questions. He's

24 going to speak later, but the General Prkacin that's introduced at the

25 beginning, is that the Prkacin that we've already been talking about

Page 11346

1 today?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And the flags that have been shown there, and there is one on top

4 of the structure that's behind the speakers, are those Croatian flags,

5 that is to say, flags of the Republic of Croatia, or some --

6 A. No.

7 Q. -- variation of the Croatian flag, or what flag is it?

8 A. It's the flag of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9 It's not the flag of the Republic of Croatia.

10 Q. Is it the flag of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?

11 A. Well, I don't think that any decree proclaimed it as such, that

12 the -- the Republic of Herceg-Bosna, Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna,

13 didn't proclaim it that. It didn't want to have a hymn or flag. It was

14 a flag of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, quite simply,

15 nothing more than that.

16 Q. And then the song that was just playing, was that the national

17 anthem of Croatia?

18 A. It's the Croatian national anthem, but also the anthem of the

19 Croatian people, and Croats in America sing it when there's a festivity,

20 and Australia, or wherever. So it is also the Croatian national anthem

21 in Croatia, but it's much broader than that. It's the national anthem of

22 the Croatian people, wherever they may be.

23 MR. STRINGER: We can continue now.

24 [Video-clip played]

25 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "I swear to discharge my duties as

Page 11347

1 a member of the Croatian Defence Council with honour and loyalty, and

2 that I will observe conscientiously and responsibly the official orders

3 and commands. I swear on my life to protect and defend my homeland,

4 Herceg-Bosna, its right to exist, and all its citizens.

5 "Fellow soldiers --"

6 MR. STRINGER: Okay.

7 Q. General, what we've heard is the swearing in, and they talk about

8 this more later, but is this the swearing in for members of the

9 Jure Francetic Brigade in Zenica?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. So this was a brigade that fell under the command of

12 General Tihomir Blaskic, or Colonel Blaskic at the time there, who was

13 the head of the -- or commander of the Central Bosnia Operative Zone?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Now, if a Muslim person wanted to join this brigade to fight,

16 would the Muslim person have to swear his loyalty to his homeland of

17 Herceg-Bosna?

18 A. I don't know whether there were any Muslims there, but there were

19 a lot of Muslims in the HVO. It was a temporary oath and pledge for

20 Herceg-Bosna. I see nothing bad in that. You could either keep quiet or

21 say it out loud.

22 Q. And Jure Francetic was actually a Ustasha -- a well-known Ustasha

23 commander of the World War II era; isn't that correct?

24 A. Of an Ustasha formation on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a

25 professional unit, not the political section. As far as I know, that was

Page 11348

1 who Jure Francetic was. He died, I think, in 1943. He was killed when

2 his plane was shot down somewhere in Croatia.

3 Q. Do you know the name of the man who administered the oath to the

4 soldiers just there?

5 A. No, I can't remember. Probably I know who he was, but not from

6 looking at it from here. I could, I suppose, remember if I were to be

7 shown a photograph or whatever, but not just like this off the bat.

8 [Video-clip played]

9 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Fellow soldiers, non-commissioned

10 officers, and officers, I congratulate you on completing your swearing-in

11 ceremony.

12 "Thank you.

13 "Jure Francetic, a Croatian Knight, fought alongside the Serbs at

14 the Salonika front. In World War II, he defended the Croatian and Muslim

15 peoples. He expelled the Chetniks from Sarajevo from Mount Romanija and

16 the left banks of the Drina River. We, as his followers, don't want

17 anything more. We believe this to be the Muslim army's objective, too,

18 because only together are we able to stand up to the bloody plans of the

19 Chetniks. On this occasion, I would like to wish you all a Merry

20 Christmas and a blessed New Year 1993, with the wish that we celebrate

21 the next holidays in peace and freedom, because we owe it to our homeland