100211IT

Page 49282

1 myself, will not be having any contacts with our client during his

2 testimony, not even during the examination-in-chief, and our

3 communication with General Petkovic will be reduced to technical matters,

4 if he needs a document or any other technical assistance. And in all

5 such -- if I do have any such communication, I shall inform the Trial

6 Chamber so that you know exactly what our contacts with the general have

7 been, if any.

8 Examination by Ms. Alaburic:

9 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

10 A. Good morning.

11 Q. Let's start off with some information that is pertinent from your

12 curriculum vitae. You know the procedure. I'm going to read that out,

13 and you're either going to confirm them, if they are correct, or say so

14 if they're not.

15 You said, General, that you were born on the 11th of October in

16 1949, and you were born in Sibenik in the Republic of Croatia?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. As far as your education is concerned, I think it's important for

19 the Trial Chamber to hear that you have -- you graduated from the

20 Pedagogical Gymnasium and then the Military Academy for the Land Army in

21 Belgrade. And in Belgrade, you studied from 1968 to 1972. You completed

22 specialist training for missile and anti-armoured units in 1976. Next,

23 in 1979 you graduated from a training course for military personnel at a

24 military school in Sarajevo. You graduated in 1983 from the Command

25 Staff School of the JNA. And in the Republic of Croatia, you took part

Page 49283

1 in three workshops on the work of NATO command and staff, and those

2 workshops were organised by retired officers of the United States Army.

3 General, is the information I've presented correct?

4 A. Yes, it is.

5 Q. The following information is important for your career.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, we've heard a witness

7 whose name I won't mention, because he was a protected witness. He told

8 us that he also underwent training with American generals. When he told

9 me that, I thought that it might be training initiated by the United

10 States of America as part of co-operation with Croatia, or was it some

11 private organisation that had had former US officers to "sell,"

12 quote/unquote, a training course to all those people who wanted to attend

13 this course? This course you had in these three workshops, this was part

14 of what? Why was it organised?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it was organised at

16 the level of the two defence ministries, the Ministry of Defence of the

17 Republic of Croatia and the Ministry of Defence of the United States of

18 America. The school, made up of retired officers - in this case it was

19 General Vuono who headed it - offered its service all over the world.

20 But the contract wasn't made with the school directly but with the

21 ministry of each individual country, so that General Vuono and his team

22 worked in the Republic of Croatia for many years, starting with the

23 Guards Army and the units there, and the other was with superior

24 commands -- or, rather, the superior commands worked with the superior

25 levels of command and control, from brigadiers onwards, regardless of

Page 49284

1 whether they were commanders of brigades or whether they were in the

2 staff of the operative zone or in the Main Staff. That's how the groups

3 were formed. And this same group - let me just finish - for

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, this same group led by General Vuono, according to

5 the programme, it was called "Equip and Train," and after the Dayton

6 Agreement it provided services to officers in the Republic of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, or now rather the Army of the Federation.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just to finish off with this

9 question, can you tell me on what date you started this training course

10 as part of the signature of an agreement between Croatia and the United

11 States of America? When did you start your training?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the training course

13 in the Republic of Croatia started -- I think it was in 1976. I'm sorry,

14 I said "1976." I meant 1996. That was when it started, with the lower

15 structures, that is to say, the units, and then the following year it was

16 continued at the command levels, according to a Ministry of Defence plan,

17 and the plan was adopted by the group. And I became part of it in 1996.

18 And since there were several subjects that were offered - you could

19 choose between several subjects - I chose three relating to the staff

20 command and NATO structures and so on and so forth, and that went on for

21 seven or, rather, ten days.

22 Perhaps General Praljak can put the date right.

23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I don't want to say

24 anything leading, but I think that General Petkovic has said "1996"

25 twice, so I'd like him to think again about when the general started

Page 49285

1 working in Croatia. Thank you.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I started in 1996. They started in

3 1994. So 1994 was the beginning, and various structures were operating,

4 and I became part of that in 1996, in the latter part. There were others

5 after me, but I thought it was sufficient to complete that part.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I asked you a question about

7 the date, it was because it was important, if I asked you a question

8 about the date.

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] The translation hadn't been

10 completed, and, General Petkovic, you are speaking extremely fast. Could

11 you slow down, please? The interpreters would be very grateful if you

12 would slow down, please.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, please slow

14 down.

15 What I wanted to say is this: If I put this question about the

16 date, it is because it is important. And I am discovering that this

17 training started in 1994. You attended in 1996, but the training course

18 was actually organised in 1994. Was this training organised in 1994,

19 when the conflict still existed between the HVO and the ABiH?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in 1994 I did not

21 attend that training course. On the 5th of August, 1994, I left the HVO,

22 and the first time I attended the course was in 1996.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] My last question. I'm not

24 going to dwell on this. Maybe you are unable to answer the question. If

25 that's the case, please let us know.

Page 49286

1 When you started your course in 1996, which was an official

2 course since it was part of an agreement between two governments, as far

3 as you know, did the US government select the Croatian people going on

4 the course or did they accept all those people who signed up for the

5 training course, without the Americans selecting anyone?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the choice was made

7 by the representatives of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of

8 Croatia, and a part of us who had completed the JNA schools joined up

9 only at the end. They said we didn't need the first part, the part of

10 the course which was taught at lower levels. So the Republic of

11 Croatia -- rather, the Ministry of Defence and the Main Staff, based on

12 the development plan for the Personnel Department and each individual

13 officer, they selected the people to attend those courses.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine, thank you.

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, now a few words about your career.

17 You became employed in the Yugoslav People's Army, and you were

18 in Slovenia. You served in Slovenia from 1972 until 1979. Then you

19 transferred to Zadar, and you were at the Military Academy there from

20 1979 to 1991, and you worked there dealing with the training of artillery

21 cadres. Your last rank in the Yugoslav People's Army was a

22 lieutenant-colonel. You left the JNA in July 1991, and on the 1st of

23 August, 1991, on the basis of a decision terminating your service, the

24 status of officer of the JNA was equally terminated officially. You next

25 joined the Croatian Army, and you co-operated with the Croatian Army

Page 49287

1 since the 26th of July as a volunteer. Yes, July. And we said on the

2 1st of August, 1991, you officially left the JNA, and you officially

3 became a commander for the defence of Sibenik, first of all, on the basis

4 of a contract with the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of

5 Croatia, and from the 1st of December, 1991 -- or, rather, November 1991,

6 with the Republic of Croatia Ministry of Defence.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel repeat the date, please.

8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. On the 15th of November, 1991, you were deployed to the Command

10 of the Split Operative Zone in the Operations Department or for

11 Operational Affairs. And on the 14th of April, 1992, you were deployed

12 to Grude, to Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Forward Command Post of the

13 Southern Front, as deputy commander to Janko Bobetko. And from that time

14 onwards, on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you spent until the 24th

15 of July, 1993, as chief of the Main Staff of the HVO. And after that

16 period, until the 9th of November, 1993, you were deputy commander of the

17 Main Staff of the HVO, that is to say, General Praljak. And after that,

18 from the 9th of November, 1993, until the 26th of April, 1994, you were

19 deputy chief of the HVO Main Staff, Ante Roso. And from the 26th of

20 April, 1994, to the 5th of August, 1994, you were chief of the Main Staff

21 of the HVO.

22 At that time, you left Bosnia-Herzegovina to return to the

23 Croatian Army. And from the 1st of November, 1994, you were deployed as

24 chief of staff of the Military District of Osijek. And six months later,

25 you were transferred as deputy commander of the Osijek Military District.

Page 49288

1 After that, from the 23rd of March, 1996, to the 3rd of January, 2003,

2 you were commander of the Military District of Ston, with its

3 headquarters in Dubrovnik. And from the 1st of January, 2003 -- or the

4 3rd of January, 2003, until April of that same year, you were the chief

5 inspector of defence of the Republic of Croatia. You retired in July

6 2004 as colonel of the Croatian Army. That was your last rank.

7 Is that information correct, General?

8 A. Yes, it is. Perhaps I could make a correction. I officially

9 left the JNA on the 1st of August. That's when I received my papers from

10 the JNA. The fact that I left several days before was their goodwill to

11 allow me to leave the barracks. They said, Leave the barracks and you

12 can wait for your papers to arrive. So although I was still in the JNA

13 for a few days, I wasn't actually working, and that was a sort of gift

14 from them.

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Let me just correct the

16 transcript, because the last rank you held in the army was

17 colonel-general of the Croatian Army. Yes, that's fine now, thank you.

18 Q. Tell me, General - you have corrected me - when we discussed your

19 CV, you mentioned that you left the JNA based on an official decision.

20 What was the reason for your insistence on the paperwork to be done in

21 accordance with the rules?

22 A. Your Honours, I had the right to leave the JNA after eight years

23 of service because my contract that I signed with them only stipulated

24 that I stay twice the length of my military training or education, and

25 that only lasted four years. So after eight years, I could have applied

Page 49289

1 to be discharged, but I held out until 1991. That was the year when

2 Slovenia and Croatia were announcing their departure from Yugoslavia.

3 Croatia was already facing a three months' moratorium. The Artillery

4 Training Centre in which I served, on the 22nd of June started relocating

5 some of its elements outside the Zadar Garrison for reasons of security,

6 as they said. And then the School of Reserve Officers, to which I

7 returned, for security reasons was relocated to the Benkovac Garrison,

8 which was the center of the rebellion in Croatia. You can imagine, in

9 Zadar, a predominantly Croatian city, the army feels unsafe and moves to

10 Benkovac. Other elements of the Training Centre were preparing to

11 relocate to Sarajevo. That was the first option, and if that would prove

12 unfeasible, Belgrade was the second option.

13 It became clear to me that, in practice, there were no real

14 negotiations about the reorganisation of Croatia. Being a Croat and born

15 in Croatia, where all my relatives are, it was unimaginable to me to

16 leave Croatia to go with the JNA to Macedonia, or any other place, to

17 continue living there and make a living that way as then already things

18 started happening that shocked the Croatian public, such as the events at

19 Plitvice, where allegedly rebel Serbs who actually came out of JNA APCs

20 attacked the police force of Croatia, and then Borovo Selo. Behind all

21 these incidents, there was the JNA, because it is obvious from the

22 footage made that these weren't Serb volunteers or rebel Serbs, but

23 rather the JNA.

24 So in Zadar, we raised the question why the railroad lines out of

25 Benkovac, Knin, Gracac, Zagreb was blocked and why the army did not

Page 49290

1 unblock that important railroad line in Croatia. The reply we received

2 was that it wasn't for us to worry about that, that there was a general

3 staff, the so-called SSNO, who was monitoring the situation and would

4 take adequate steps. In the meantime --

5 Q. General, I just want to ask you to cut short this part because

6 we'll run out of time.

7 A. All right. So, basically, the JNA in the Zadar Garrison was

8 planned to leave Zadar and move out of Croatia, and that didn't suit me.

9 I was born neither in Serbia, nor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and without

10 Croatia there could be no Yugoslavia in which I wanted to live. I didn't

11 want to run away, which some people had done, and there was a

12 recommendation by the federal secretary for everybody to leave who felt

13 like that, and that's what I did. I was even escorted by my commander to

14 the gate.

15 Q. Tell us, General, until that time, until the late 1980s, were you

16 satisfied with your life and work in the JNA?

17 A. Your Honours, yes, I certainly was. The salary wasn't high, but

18 the salaries were still higher than those paid out in the private or

19 social-owned economy. My wife -- or, rather, I even was allotted an

20 apartment within three months. Others had to wait for years. My career

21 advanced rapidly. So I was, all in all, satisfied, but the time came

22 when I had to leave the JNA, which became what it became at that time.

23 Q. You told us, General, that in 2003 you were appointed chief

24 inspector of defence of the Republic of Croatia. Tell us, was that a

25 promotion or not? Was it an advancement in your military career or

Page 49291

1 something else?

2 A. With regard to everything I had gone through in Croatia until

3 that time, it was an advancement in my career. Having said that, I would

4 like to add that I left the HVO as chief of main staff of an army, that

5 was my title, and I returned to the Croatian Army, to zone of operations,

6 as a third man there, because they said to me, Well, you'll be given the

7 post of operations officer, and your next post will be that of a staff

8 officer. Take it or leave it. I accepted. And where I had left off in

9 the Croatian Army, that's the same level at which I started again after

10 this interval.

11 Q. Who was the minister of defence at that time, General?

12 A. It was Mr. Gojko Susak.

13 Q. No, in 2003.

14 A. It was Ms. -- I'm stalled.

15 Q. Zeljka Antunovic?

16 A. Yes, Zeljka Antunovic, a member of the SDP. Before her, it was

17 Mr. Rados, who was also from the coalition government.

18 Q. "SDP" stands for the Social Democratic Party; right?

19 A. Yes, that's what they say.

20 Q. Tell us, who was president of Croatia at that time in 2003?

21 A. Mr. Stipe Mesic. He still has a few days left and then he'll be

22 leaving.

23 Q. Tell us, General, do you consider yourself a professional

24 soldier?

25 A. I most certainly do, because I have everything it takes to be a

Page 49292

1 professional soldier.

2 Q. Tell us your personal view, General. Does the quality of work

3 of -- or can the quality of work of a professional soldier depend on the

4 programme of the ruling party? Or, in other words, you will be a good

5 soldier/officer if the Christian democrats are in power, but you will be

6 less good if the social democrats are in power? What do you say to that?

7 A. Your Honours, the quality of your work only depends on what you

8 know and how you go about your work. Another issue is whether the party

9 that is in power at the time appreciates it appropriately. There were

10 instances of people being selected by computer to retire because there

11 was a down-sizing process in place in Croatia that included officers,

12 NCOs, and soldiers. I must add that the political suitability also

13 played a role in that respect, and that is how the computer recognised

14 them. And when I say "computer," that's, of course, a metaphor.

15 Q. Speaking from the point of view of a professional soldier, should

16 he go about his job regardless of who is in power or will he behave

17 differently depending on that element?

18 A. There can be no difference. We all know what it means to be a

19 professional, and in your working hours you must go about your job

20 professionally, irrespective of who is in power. Another issue is how

21 that will be appreciated, because the criteria can be different, you

22 know.

23 Q. Tell us, General, what's your opinion? Should the objectives of

24 an army be set by the civilian authorities or can the army, itself,

25 define the reasons of its existence and the objectives of its actions?

Page 49293

1 A. Your Honours, it is clear that these objectives are set by

2 politics rather than the military. The military must implement these

3 decisions.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, regarding where you

5 were positioned, I have two questions to ask you. The first one is the

6 following:

7 When you were within the JNA, were you a member of the Yugoslav

8 Communist Party?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I joined the

10 League of Communists during the second year of military academy. And to

11 be honest, when I left the JNA I forgot to leave the League of

12 Communists, but probably when I left the army I probably automatically

13 ceased to be a member of that organisation. But throughout my army

14 career, except for the two years at the beginning of my training, I was a

15 member of the League of Communists; that is, 21 years in all.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And when you were a member of

17 the League of Communists, was it because it matched your ideals, or did

18 you have to become a member if you wanted to reach higher ranks? In

19 other words, was it not possible to reach higher ranks if you were not a

20 member of the League of Communists, so did you join for that reason, or

21 did you join because of ideological reasons?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, let me explain.

23 When you are admitted to a military academy, they start

24 monitoring you, they say, You're studying well, and so on, and the party

25 is present in your platoon, your company, in your generation. It's

Page 49294

1 there. You cannot do anything without the party being involved. Once

2 you complete a training that lasts for a month, it is normal to analyse

3 that training subsequently, and the military structures take part in

4 that, but there's also the party that has its say and points out how

5 party members fared in that training and how they influenced others, who

6 were not party members, to go about their duties and responsibilities.

7 So you couldn't make a single move in your unit without the party

8 being present. So sometimes there were the three levels talking about

9 the same thing; the military collective, then the command structure of

10 that collective, and the party, and there was a fourth. That was the

11 Union of Socialist Youth. It was also present in the military and

12 military schools. So there were two political structures that also had

13 its say about all of us.

14 For example, toward the end of my first year in military school,

15 the party also assessed my performance, what I could have done better, or

16 worse, or whatever. So the party was present everywhere, and what -- and

17 I want to say something else, too.

18 It was essential to your career to be a party member, so people

19 considered that -- well, that party sanctions are a more serious

20 impediment to your advancement than disciplinary punishment. If you were

21 thrown out of the party, you could remain in the JNA, but you wouldn't be

22 promoted for 50 years, and they would find you a position somewhere out

23 of the way. So the party basically determined your development and your

24 advancement. You couldn't become a division commander without being a

25 member of the League of Communists, or even battalion commander. You

Page 49295

1 could be company command, because they would think, Well, he's still

2 young, he still has time to join the party. But at the meetings of that

3 organisation, they would try to induce you to join.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a second question to put

5 to you.

6 When you left the HVO, you said that you went back to the

7 Croatian Army, and you were the third man or number three in an operative

8 zone. And I believe I understood, but perhaps I'm wrong. Through what

9 you said, I had the feeling that, in a way, you were rather disappointed.

10 Perhaps you found that given that you had a very high rank within the

11 HVO, you could have expected to have a similar rank or position, whereas,

12 in fact, you were only number three. And you also specified that at the

13 time, the minister of defence was Mr. Susak.

14 Could you perhaps tell me if this appointment did not take into

15 account the role you had within the HVO? Given that you were a volunteer

16 within the HVO, the Croatian Army, did it have to take this on board?

17 Was that some sort of a sanction, or was there any other reason for this

18 appointment? Could you perhaps tell us what is your personal opinion as

19 to why you were appointed at that position?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I wouldn't say that

21 it was any sort of punishment or me being ignored. At that time, Croatia

22 had a lot of its own commanders and generals who had been in war in

23 Croatia all that time, so it would not have been appropriate,

24 irrespective of the fact that I'd been the chief of the Main Staff there,

25 to have people removed because of me. I was very glad that neither the

Page 49296

1 minister of defence nor the chief of staff made such moves, although I

2 had been promised that I would be in charge of military education. That

3 was one of the options. But there was a person there who had two years

4 until retirement, after having worked there for three or four years, and

5 they didn't want to eliminate them, and that was okay. I accepted the

6 post of the chief of staff in the Military District Osijek because I'd

7 been told how the professional developments would go there.

8 My first deputy soon joined the Office of the President of the

9 Republic, and there were also announcements that the commander would also

10 leave and join the Ministry of Defence. So within a very short period of

11 time, I would become the commander of the military region. However, it

12 didn't happen that way. The commander stayed on a bit longer, and in the

13 meantime the Croatian Army was reorganised and a new military district

14 was set up in the south of Croatia under number 4, Military District 4,

15 and what was offered to me was either to wait for the commander in Osijek

16 to be reassigned and then for me to take his position, or I was offered

17 to go to Dubrovnik. Being a Dalmatian, I accepted to go to Dubrovnik,

18 and in Dubrovnik I established a military district.

19 And then after seven years, due to a new reorganisation of the

20 Croatian Army, I closed the military district. And I hold the record in

21 those terms, because I was a military district commander for seven years.

22 I didn't object to being the commander of that district, because

23 Dubrovnik is a wonderful place. I don't like big towns like Zagreb. I

24 had peace and quiet over there. And at the end of the day, when I was

25 offered that position -- or, rather, when I was offered to become the

Page 49297

1 inspector of defence, I had two or three more years before retirement,

2 and that's why I accepted that position. And I remained in the position

3 until I was transferred to Scheveningen, to the Detention Unit, and here

4 I don't hold any function or positions, as you know.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

6 Ms. Alaburic, please proceed.

7 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. General, what is your position? In a well-organised society, do

9 civilian authorities exert control over the military?

10 A. The civilian authorities do control the military. I -- as the

11 chief inspector of defence in the Republic of Croatia, I was not

12 subordinated to the supreme commander. I was subordinated to the

13 minister of defence, and the minister of defence is a member of the

14 Government of the Republic of Croatia, i.e., a member of the civilian

15 authorities, which means I was not subordinated to the supreme commander

16 and I didn't fall under the category of those who were members of the

17 armed forces. I was in charge of a department that, as a whole, was a

18 department of the Government of the Republic of Croatia; i.e., a civilian

19 department which controlled the armed forces in Croatia.

20 Q. Still, if we are trying to define the position that applies to

21 other social communities, irrespective of the concrete situation in

22 Croatia, would you say that it is normal and that the civilian

23 authorities should, indeed, control the military?

24 A. Absolutely. It would be bad if it was the other way around or if

25 the army controlled itself. That army would be good for nothing. Or far

Page 49298

1 be it from anybody for the military to control the civilian authorities.

2 That would be bad.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, I listened carefully

4 to the question put to you, and I listened even more carefully to your

5 response. If I understand correctly, you're saying that the Ministry of

6 Defence in Croatia was controlled by civilian political authorities, and

7 if there were any military actions, they would be under the remit of

8 political authorities.

9 At the time of the events that unfolded that are mentioned in the

10 indictment, the president was Mr. Tudjman, army general but also

11 president of the Republic of Croatia. Would this mean that everything he

12 may have done and everything that the HV may have done has always been,

13 as far as you are concerned, controlled by the civilian political

14 authorities?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the supreme commander

16 of the army has its authorities within the system of control and command,

17 and you can't control him, as such. However, all the other segments in

18 the army are under the control of the civilian authorities. In Croatia,

19 for example, the government issued a decision on the reduction of the

20 strength of the military. It was not the commander -- the supreme

21 commander who issued that decision. It was the Croatian government that

22 took into account its budgetary constraints and issued a decision for the

23 Croatian Army to be reduced firstly by 30 per cent, then in the second

24 period by a further 20 per cent. Therefore, a decision on the reduction

25 in numbers was issued by the Ministry of Defence, and the Main Staff was

Page 49299

1 just the operational segment that had to respect dead-lines and implement

2 the decision on the reduction of the strength of the Croatian Army.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let me stream-line my question.

4 It is an important question, in my view. And every time I put a

5 question, remember, it is always an important question after four years

6 of trial.

7 If the Croatian Army intervened in the Republic of

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, does this mean, according to you, that this falls

9 within the exclusive competence of the supreme commander, namely, at the

10 time President Tudjman, or does this have to be approved by the civilian

11 authorities, either the government, parliament, or the people, through

12 elections?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'll try and be even

14 more careful in answering your question.

15 The Croatian Army, with all of its elements that it had, did not

16 intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means that it didn't send its

17 formations as they existed and as they were. It never established a

18 command structure that would have been in charge of all that. The

19 Croatian Army at first, which was also the time when I joined, sent a

20 group of officers to organise, prepare, and deploy forces which existed

21 in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time. During the war,

22 there were some elements that belonged to the Croatian Army, but they

23 were volunteers. The chain of command finished with the Main Staff of

24 the Croatian Defence Council. Their command chain certainly did not go

25 to the nearest operative command in Croatia or even the central command

Page 49300

1 in Zagreb.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You must have noticed that when

3 I put my question, I started off by saying "if," so this was a

4 hypothetical question. And you answered by saying, if I have understood

5 your answer correctly, you ascertain that the Croatian Army did not

6 intervene in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is what you're

7 saying, isn't it?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's exactly what I said,

9 because when I think about the Croatian Army, I think about the

10 organisational form, with all the elements belonging to it. For me, the

11 organisational structure of the Croatian Army are not 100 or 150 men that

12 arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a majority of them were -- or

13 99 per cent were nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina who had fought in

14 Croatia and then returned to their homeland. It's an entirely different

15 thing, to my mind, than when we say Croatia and the Croatian Army.

16 Let me tell you, in the month of October, we had 10.000

17 something -- I don't know the exact number. We had about 10.000 soldiers

18 who hailed from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were

19 absent for a reason, because they still had their status and there is

20 only three in the Croatian military. If the HVO had been more active,

21 they could have had two or three more brigades composed of such troops of

22 volunteers. So when we say "the Croatian Army," then one has to take

23 into account a system that is capable of performing a task, a system

24 which has its head and a tail, it has its organisation in the command

25 structure.

Page 49301

1 Since we have touched upon that, let me tell you that those

2 elements that found themselves around the borders between

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, they pursued the principles of war

4 because they opposed an army that would have consisted a whole in the

5 Republic of Croatia, in its south, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the

6 OG-2 of the JNA under the command of General Strugar, and in Herzegovina

7 the commander of one part was General Perisic, and in Croatia from

8 Dubrovnik to Neum, the commanders were Admiral Zec and Jokic, I believe.

9 So that was one military, a military that had taken an operative

10 and strategic area and included Bosnia and Croatia, and from there it

11 carried out maneuvers and attacks against the territory of the Republic

12 of Croatia. In those cases, the Army of the Republic of Croatia did

13 cross over the border into the territory that belonged to the Republic of

14 Bosnia and Herzegovina, quite justifiably so, but it was not at the very

15 beginning. It was only from November 1991. And then, on the 6th of

16 December, 1991, when the Croatian Army finally took some 15 kilometres of

17 the front-line south of Stolac, the so-called Stolovi, and then we called

18 that area "TG-2," you will remember that, it was only then that the JNA

19 forces did not manage to fool the defence of the Republic of Croatia

20 which, up to then, exclusively defended itself in a narrow part of the

21 Republic of Croatia; whereas, from its rear, from the territory of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was attacked by the forces of the JNA. And it was

23 only when somebody realised that that territory of defence had to be

24 extended 10 kilometres deeper into Herzegovina because those were the

25 same forces, both in Croatia and Herzegovina. It was only then that it

Page 49302

1 was stopped. They didn't manage to take Neum. They were stuck there for

2 several months. And then in 1992, they were pushed back towards

3 Dubrovnik. And in the month of October of that year, they were chased

4 away to the territory of the then Yugoslavia, currently Montenegro.

5 I believe that somebody else will ask me about that. I certainly

6 hope so.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Rest assured, there will be

8 other questions. Thank you for your answer, anyway, which, unless I'm

9 mistaken, enables me to understand that you are saying that the Croatian

10 Army intervened on a distance of 10 kilometres because of the action

11 conducted by the JNA, but that on the 6th of December, 1991 - you are

12 very precise - one should consider that the Croatian Army put an end to

13 its action and did not take part in a military action in the Republic of

14 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which you define by giving us all its components.

15 Have I summed up your position adequately?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, on the 6th of

17 December, the Croatian Army stopped the advancement of the JNA from

18 Stolac across a sector called "Stolovi," in the direction of Metkovic and

19 the Neretva Valley, and along the Croatian literal [as interpreted] down

20 to Neum, which means that on the 6th of December the JNA forces were

21 finally stopped on that line and never again after that.

22 Not only did they not cross that line, but also in the month of

23 May 1992, the Croatian Army launched an offensive to push the JNA forces

24 towards the very south of the Republic of Croatia. And then on the 15th

25 of October - I believe that I am not mistaken about the date - the

Page 49303

1 international community intervened. Your fellow countryman

2 General Morillon conducted the negotiations between General Strugar and

3 General Bobetko on the Invincible, and it was then agreed that the JNA

4 would be given a possibility to retreat with dignity, that the Croatian

5 Army would stop its advancement and allow them to retreat.

6 And then the international community sent military observers on

7 the border with Montenegro, which was in Yugoslavia at the time, and the

8 peninsula of Prevlaka, and I had the honour, as a commander who had

9 arrived in 1996, to co-operate with the military observers. Truth be

10 told, they came to me, to my command post. I couldn't go to their

11 command post, because their command post was in the area which was under

12 the UN mandate, and not a single Croatian soldier, including generals,

13 was allowed to go to that territory.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as you know, to be very

15 specific, on what date exactly did the HV, with its flags and banners and

16 car license plates and soldiers, crossed over the border again of the

17 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina? On what date, exactly?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Croatian Army, that was

19 sometime at the end of November 1991, after the fall of Slano, a place

20 called Slano, and then Smokovljani and Visocani - it could not be

21 defended in that narrow part because there were attacks from the flank -

22 put part of its forces, let's say some 10 kilometres away from its

23 border, to cover the area towards Stolac because the JNA was attacking

24 from that axis.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, you're a specialist,

Page 49304

1 and my questions are extremely specific. Try to answer my questions very

2 specifically.

3 My question was as follows: According to you, on what date,

4 exactly, did the HV cross over the border again of the Republic of Bosnia

5 and Herzegovina? That's my question. Either you know or you don't know.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I'll tell you is this: In the

7 second half of November -- now, what date it was exactly, I don't know,

8 but it was 1991 -- I can't give you an exact date. That's the most I can

9 do, because on the 15th of November I arrived in the Split Operative

10 Zone, and then several days later -- but, anyway, on the 16th I came out

11 onto the area where the JNA forces were stopped.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I have understood what you

13 are saying, on the 1st of January, 1992 -- I'm just taking this date

14 randomly. On the 1st of January, 1992, you state that in the Republic of

15 Bosnia and Herzegovina, within its boundaries as part of the Yugoslav

16 Federation, there wasn't a single soldier of the Republic of Croatia

17 left?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that's not what I said. What I

19 said is this: In that southern part in the second half of November 1991,

20 it entered, and it stayed there right up until May 1992, when it moved

21 from those positions towards the JNA and towards Dubrovnik to liberate

22 the area. And then they penetrated 300 metres or 1 kilometre, depending

23 on the configuration of the terrain, how far in depth they went, to allow

24 them to stop the attacks coming from Eastern Herzegovina, or, rather, it

25 was Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the Croatian Army, as it attacked

Page 49305

1 along the borders, suffered onslaughts from the Serbian Army and the JNA

2 until it withdrew from the flanks from Bosnia-Herzegovina. So that's how

3 it had to position itself, and that's what General Beneta said, too. He

4 was in that region along Popovo Polje right up until the hinterland of

5 Dubrovnik.

6 And now the Serb side always insisted on the Croatian Army

7 withdrawing from that part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so on the 6th of

8 April, 1993, there were negotiations in Sarajevo, and the three

9 commanders from Bosnia were invited, three of us. General Cervenko came

10 on behalf of the Croatian Army to negotiate with Mladic, and then he

11 said, When you withdraw from there, we will withdraw, too, from the 100

12 metres or 200 or 300 metres, because it's a narrow belt down there.

13 So that's what happened, and that's how it stayed right up

14 until -- well, I left the area, myself, by the Dayton Agreements. And

15 then after the Dayton Accords, in that area, which is where the Croatian

16 Army was, soldiers of the Croatian Defence Council entered because they

17 were now the legal army in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So it's this

18 Popovo Polje area that was taken over by the soldiers of the HVO, and in

19 that way the Army of the Republic of Croatia was no longer in that part

20 of the territory.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Petkovic --

22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] With your permission, I'd just

23 like to correct the transcript to avoid any misunderstandings.

24 General, what was interpreted was that you stayed until Dayton.

25 We're not quite clear.

Page 49306

1 Q. When you mentioned the Dayton Accords, how did you link the

2 Dayton Accords up?

3 A. The Croatian Army, in that border belt towards Dubrovnik, that is

4 to say, this very narrow belt towards Dubrovnik, it stayed there -- it

5 remained there at positions which entered into Bosnia-Herzegovina for a

6 bit until the Dayton Accords, up to the Dayton Accords, because then the

7 army of the Croatian Defence Council was sent into the area, which was

8 then the legal army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the

9 Croatian Army left. So it was no longer down there; it was just along

10 its border.

11 And let me tell you that in 1996, in June, I, as the commander,

12 was -- demobilised the last 1.000 soldiers of the Croatian Army and

13 handed over the border to MUP.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, thanks for

15 your answers, which are now very specific.

16 I think I understand that the Croatian Army stayed in a border

17 area which was approximately 100 to 200 or 300 metres long. We're not

18 going to measure this. The army remained in this border area until the

19 Dayton Accords. And then after the Dayton Accords, the Croatian Army

20 left the area and got replaced by the HVO; is this right?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. And I think that

22 after that, it was the MUP forces that arrived, because I met one of us

23 here. It was Valentin Coric, actually. He was the chief of MUP of that

24 district. And from the other side of the border, he deployed the forces

25 of the civilian police there, so that the problem was definitely solved

Page 49307

1 there, the civilian police on the Croatian side and the civilian police

2 on the side of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Therefore, until the

4 Dayton Accords, the international community knew that you were there in

5 this border area, and it tried, together with the Serbs and the Muslims,

6 to settle this issue. But clearly this issue was only settled after the

7 Dayton Accords?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honours, you couldn't

9 have any guarantees from the Army of Republika Srpska. That was the

10 situation. You couldn't expect any guarantees from them as to what they

11 would do at any point in time, because you just had the elevation from

12 which you were defending yourselves, and if you left those positions you

13 were in the sea. There was no depth, nothing. And let me just tell you

14 of one particular detail.

15 When the Yugoslav Army, in mid-October 1992, had to pull out

16 pursuant to an agreement, then they thought up something, and that was

17 that the Army of Republika Srpska should enter the region they had to

18 leave, regardless of the agreement confirmed by General Morillon, so --

19 and that was the game they were playing. However, General Bobetko saw

20 through that and arrived at that part of the border before them. And

21 I think that they were pushed back towards Trebinje. And then the JNA

22 forces and volunteers from Serbia were transferred to the Nevesinje and

23 Bileca area, because had they lost the sea belt, they wanted to go back

24 to the Neretva River. And in that case, we keep talking about

25 Operation Bura, but nobody says why that was undertaken.

Page 49308

1 Now, the volunteer forces from Serbia-Montenegro were transferred

2 to the Eastern Herzegovina region to try and get back to the

3 Neretva River Valley because they had lost the access to the sea when

4 they had seized the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and that is why

5 this Operation Bura that we keep mentioning had to be undertaken, to

6 attack the concentration of these forces that had prepared to move

7 forward, and that's when these forces were routed. The volunteer forces

8 were very small in number in Eastern Herzegovina, anyway.

9 I thought I was speaking slowly.

10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Now, General, you see how it's very difficult to speak slowly.

12 Now, to go back to General Antonetti's [as interpreted] question,

13 does that mean that along that border belt of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

14 Croatian Army was there after the Washington Agreement was signed? Is

15 that what that means?

16 A. Yes.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A correction to the transcript.

18 I'm not a general. I'd like this to be corrected.

19 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was told that I did

20 not make a mistake, but I apologise if I misspoke anyway.

21 Q. So it was after the Washington Agreements. Now, the presence of

22 the Croatian Army in that border belt of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the

23 Muslim side of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was that a problem of

24 any kind for them?

25 A. No, Your Honours, it was no problem at all. If you look at

Page 49309

1 Sefer Halilovic's directive, then we can see that he wished to tie in the

2 forces of the army in Herzegovina with the forces of the Republic of

3 Croatia and plan to take Bileca with them, or, rather, Nevesinje, Bileca,

4 and Trebinje, and in the western parts against -- towards Livno and

5 Grahovo. And in his directive, he is tying in the forces as his

6 right-hand neighbour, the forces of Croatia, and is counting on their

7 support and reinforcement to take control of the Nevesinje, Bileca, and

8 Trebinje area. That is what the directive was for the defence of

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We've seen that directive here in the courtroom, and

10 we studied it. But he referred to the Agreement on Friendship and

11 Co-operation for the two neighbouring countries.

12 Q. Tell us now, please, General, give us the date of the document,

13 Sefer Halilovic's directive for defence. What date was that?

14 A. I think it was September 1992. I can't remember the exact date,

15 but we can take a look at it on the document and see.

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] For the record, I'm going to say

17 it's 4D1240. That's the document number. It's not in your binder. The

18 date of the document is the 10th of September, 1992, and it has the state

19 of a sovereign exhibit.

20 Q. General, you also mention the Agreement on Friendship and

21 Co-operation. Now, can you tell us what that agreement was? What kind

22 of document was that, and when was the agreement reached and signed?

23 A. The agreement was signed in July 1992. Whether it was the 21st

24 of July, I'm not quite sure, 1992, as an inter-state agreement between

25 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia. Now,

Page 49310

1 before that notes of goodwill -- of an intention of goodwill were

2 exchanged, because Mr. Izetbegovic couldn't leave Sarajevo at the time,

3 and this was the first time he left going to Zagreb to sign the Agreement

4 on Friendship and Co-operation.

5 And I think that in point 8 of that agreement, it talks about a

6 joint enemy and an attack on Croatia from the territory of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there's mention of co-operation along the border

8 between the two countries. And it was on the basis of this agreement

9 that I became a member of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The

10 HVO was recognised as a component part of the armed forces of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was the position.

12 Q. Well, we'll deal with that in due course. But one more question

13 to you, General, as a professional soldier.

14 For a professional soldier, where does -- at what point do you

15 have the right to refuse to carry out an order? Where is that line

16 drawn?

17 A. At all times, if in complying I would be consciously committing a

18 crime, and if the person who was conscious of his order being a crime,

19 the person issuing it, and if I am conscious of the fact that if I were

20 to carry out the order, I would be committing a crime.

21 Q. You've given us a lot of elements there, and it is a subject for

22 a more extensive discussion, I would say. Perhaps we'll do that on some

23 other occasion, but let's start off with the first topic that we decided

24 to discuss during your testimony, and that is your arrival in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Page 49311

1 Yes. My colleagues tell me it's time for the break, so perhaps

2 this is a good moment to take the break.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Since you are going to address

4 this topic, we shall have the break now, a 20-minute break.

5 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

6 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Court is back in session.

8 Ms. Alaburic, you have the floor.

9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General, we have so far used up 27 minutes, so I would like to

11 ask you to be concise, and I also remind you to speak slowly because it

12 would be a shame for the transcript not to record everything you said.

13 To the question of Judge Antonetti, you have explained rather

14 extensively the circumstances of your arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

15 which is our following topic. I believe that we can start with a map

16 right away, because that will be easiest.

17 I would like to call document 4D2024. I don't know whether you

18 have my binders next to you.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, when there is a

20 new document, I've just discovered that we received three binders, but

21 when there is a new document which hasn't been admitted, please tell us.

22 Please say that it's a new document, a new exhibit, and in that case

23 I can look more closely at those documents.

24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we always mark the

25 documents in your binders with stickers in two colours, yellow and

Page 49312

1 orange, yellow for the documents that are not exhibits, orange for those

2 that are. I believe it will be clear, and I hope no mistakes have been

3 made. Moreover, in the lower half of the document, you will see a mark

4 showing the status of the document.

5 Q. General, can you see the documents in front of you?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You're looking at it on the screen. Tell us, General, do you

8 know this map?

9 A. Yes, Your Honours, I know this map. I drew it, personally.

10 Q. Tell us, General, what exactly does this map show?

11 A. Your Honours, in this map I wanted to show you the connection

12 between that part of the Republic of Croatia, where the zone of

13 operations is, with the free area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So if you

14 allow, I can comment what I have marked.

15 Q. General, let us try and not describe the map, because it is

16 all -- all markings are clearly explained. This southern part of

17 Croatia, you say that the southern part of Croatia was occupied and that

18 the HV had to enter BiH territory in order to defend Croatian territory.

19 Show us which territory we are talking about.

20 Perhaps we can enable the general to mark on the map.

21 A. I don't know if you can see it. I'll mark it blue and place a

22 "1" next to it [marks]. So this red stretch next to this blue marking is

23 the southern part of Croatia which was occupied by the JNA with part of

24 the VRS from Bosnia-Herzegovina. This round spot here [indicates] is the

25 city of Dubrovnik, which was under siege, but it was not taken by the

Page 49313

1 JNA. To the west - it isn't clearly visible, though - there's the line

2 that the JNA and the VRS has been able to reach. That is close to Neum.

3 That is the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina that is on the sea, and here

4 there's the JNA and the VRS.

5 Q. Please place a number 2 next to the line where the JNA and the

6 VRS were stopped.

7 A. [Marks]

8 Q. Now explain to us, General, when we say in this courtroom that

9 this territory of Southern Croatia and the neighbouring area in

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was not occupied, constitute a single theatre

11 of war, what does that mean? And please circle it.

12 A. [Marks]. This is the single theatre of war in which Operative

13 Group 2 of the Army of Yugoslavia acted. It included the entire area of

14 Eastern Herzegovina, the western parts of Montenegro, where JNA units

15 were deployed, and the occupied part of the Republic of Croatia. This is

16 a hole in which one force is active, and that is the JNA. It's the same

17 forces in Croatia and outside of Croatia. These forces are under a

18 single command, and this is called an operational strategic territory.

19 The JNA called it "theatre of war." And there was the Groups of

20 Operations number 2 with the Belgrade Corps, the Titograd Corps, and -- I

21 don't need to enumerate them.

22 Q. In answering to Judge Antonetti's question, you said, General,

23 that the Croatian Army stopped the onslaught of the JNA in late 1991.

24 You mentioned the month of December in 1991. Is that the time when the

25 events you marked with a number 2 happened?

Page 49314

1 A. Yes. I placed a number 2 next to it. I can also add, although

2 it will be difficult to see, I can add an arrow above the number 2. This

3 is the line where the offensive of the JNA was stopped [marks]. They

4 were advancing on Croatian territory, and there were also forces from

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina that attacked Croatian territory.

6 Q. When you are saying "from the flanks," please show this with

7 arrows, and put a number 3 next to them.

8 A. [Marks]

9 Q. So the number 3 represents attacks from the flanks by the JNA and

10 the Serbian forces from Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Croatian

11 territory?

12 A. Yes, from BiH territory.

13 Q. General, please place today's date on this map. It is the 11th

14 of February, 2010.

15 A. [Marks]

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] And I would like an IC number.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, in order to avoid that

18 this document is rejected, you drew this map with colours, et cetera.

19 This corresponds to the state of play exactly when; which month, which

20 year?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this situation, I

22 will mark here [marks], is that of the 6th of December, 1991.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. When I look at this

24 map, and if I'm mistaken, please correct me - you're free to do so - if I

25 understand correctly, in December 1991 the JNA, in the area of the

Page 49315

1 Operative Group 2, was launching an action aiming at occupying the

2 entirety of the area circled in blue, with an added intention to seize

3 Dubrovnik, and you have circled the city of Dubrovnik in blue as well.

4 This would mean that if there had been successful, militarily speaking,

5 the entirety of this area as well as the coastal area would have been

6 under the control and the influence of the JNA, and as a result of this

7 part of the Republic of Croatia's territory would have been cut off,

8 especially the coastal area; is that correct?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you're right, Your Honour.

10 Let me just add that in this situation as shown here, the JNA forces

11 reached the Neretva and also controlled the eastern part of the city of

12 Mostar. I may have drawn the line off the River Neretva. So they were

13 on the banks of the Neretva. They held the east of Mostar and the

14 southern part of Croatia.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, General Praljak, I believe

16 it would be better for you not to intervene because we have

17 General Petkovic testifying here, and any clarification or any changes

18 can be done during the cross-examination by the Defence team of

19 General Praljak, unless there is really a mistake. But I don't believe

20 that is the case.

21 So, Ms. Alaburic -- just a second. My colleague wants to take

22 the floor.

23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Petkovic, I am still a little bit confused,

24 because you have shown this map and commented on it, and it is supposed

25 to be a view of a specific point in time, 6 December 1991. Now, as the

Page 49316

1 map is drawn, the yellow part, which is South-Eastern Herceg-Bosna, and

2 the coastal part, which is in pink, according to the legend, are areas

3 already occupied by Serb forces. On the other hand, you have put two

4 arrows pointing roughly in a south-western direction. But I do not

5 understand. If that territory along the coast is already occupied by

6 Serbs and the VRS, why should there be any operations planned? Perhaps

7 you can clarify.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was requested to

9 show the directions of the succession of advancement. When the

10 conquering of the south of Croatia started in October 1991, then

11 operations began simultaneously here from this part and from up there,

12 and that's how it went on until the 6th of December, 1991, when the

13 entire area became a single occupied whole. Certainly, at that moment

14 there was -- there were no more operations from the flanks.

15 In early October 1991, it started -- attacks started from the

16 south and from the flanks. On this day stated here, the entire area is

17 controlled by the JNA, including the territory of Croatia. But most of

18 the area in Bosnia-Herzegovina was controlled by the VRS because the JNA,

19 due to a Security Council resolution, started pulling out of that

20 territory in 1992.

21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. Just to make sure that you actually

22 confirm my conception, it is not entirely correct to put the date "6/12"

23 for this whole map, because what the -- the arrows marked as number 3

24 refer to a previous period when they were still fighting to get to the

25 coast. Is that correct?

Page 49317

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct. This started in

4 mid-October 1991. There was an attack from the flank, followed by the

5 next one, and then another attack. And then it all stopped, the attacks

6 were stopped.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, you want an IC

8 number?

9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just a few more

10 words about the map before we do that.

11 Q. General, let's be very precise. The date refers to the situation

12 as it was on the territory of the Republic of Croatia; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. On that day, did this territory of the Republic of Croatia which

15 is marked by pink, was it occupied by the JNA and the Serb force?

16 A. Yes, it was.

17 Q. On that date, the 6th of December, 1991, the Republic of Bosnia

18 and Herzegovina was still an integral state, there were no occupied

19 territories?

20 A. Yes, it was an integral state in Yugoslavia. I did not draw any

21 occupied territories. I drew something that, in military terms, is

22 called the theatre of war.

23 Q. If we look at the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, and if

24 we look at the territory which is coloured orange, and the rest of the

25 territory, which is not coloured, for which you said that it was a free

Page 49318

1 territory, what could one say about such a division of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina, and what period did that apply to?

3 A. This was the situation in April 1992.

4 Q. Very well. General, when you say "a free territory," what are

5 you referring to? Is this the free territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

6 A. Yes, this is the free territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In

7 the map, that part is not coloured.

8 Q. Who controlled that part of the territory?

9 A. That territory was controlled by the BiH Army and the HVO or the

10 Territorial Defence and the HVO, and it depended on the municipality.

11 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Could I please now be given an IC

12 number for the map.

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me, I seem to get confused again and

14 again.

15 Now you have said -- I refer to page 42, line 9. The question

16 was:

17 "On that day, the 6th of December, 1991, the Republic of Bosnia

18 and Herzegovina was still an integral state, there were no occupied

19 territories?"

20 And you say: "Yes."

21 But if one looks at the map, Stolac definitely is in the area

22 painted orange, which according to the legend is an area occupied by Serb

23 and VRS forces. And you have then said that this refers to April 1992.

24 Is there still another period covered by the map, or do you correct what

25 you have said, that Bosnia and Herzegovina was entirely unoccupied on the

Page 49319

1 6th of December? It cannot very well be both, can it?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, on the 6th of

3 December, 1992 [as interpreted], Bosnia-Herzegovina -- or, rather, in

4 1991, I apologise. The yellow part of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the area

5 where the forces of the JNA were deployed, as they were pulling out from

6 Croatia, as well as those that had pulled out of Slovenia, but that was

7 still part of the Yugoslav territory. When Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed

8 its independence, the pink territory became an occupied territory for

9 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. I think the pink areas are not part

11 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are part of Croatia on this map. But it

12 seems that you confirm --

13 [Overlapping speakers]

14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Please do not interrupt me. It's not because

15 it's impolite - I'm not so touchy - but it is because the interpreters

16 lose what you say and what I say at the same time, so we have to apply

17 some restraint. I may not always be correct, myself, and then I

18 apologise.

19 But the result of this exchange now is that you must correct the

20 statement on page 42, line 9, 10, 11, 12, according to which, when you

21 said that on the 6th of December the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

22 apart from the fact that it did not really, as such, exist then, was

23 still an integral state, there were no occupied territories, that was

24 wrong, correct, or the map is wrong?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, correct, that was an

Page 49320

1 integral state. And this yellow territory was where JNA units were

2 deployed, those that were pulling out from Croatia and previously from

3 Slovenia. When Bosnia and Herzegovina proclaimed its independence in

4 April 1992, and when they proclaimed the JNA a hostile army, the yellow

5 territories, as they are drawn here, became occupied areas for Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Well, I will not -- I will not insist now, but

8 it seems a bit confused, I must say. Thank you.

9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could you please

10 allow me to do my job properly and bring my examination about the map to

11 an end, and then everything will become clear.

12 Q. This date, 6th December 1991, refers to what you marked by

13 numbers 1, 2, and 3 on this map; is that correct?

14 A. Yes, that's exactly so.

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Can we now be given an IC number

16 for the map, and then we will put another clean copy of the map, and then

17 we will discuss the map in the light of a different date, the 6th of

18 April, 1992.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, could give an IC

20 number, please.

21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, I still need the map.

22 Ms. Alaburic, now, you've said the 6th December refers to 1, 2,

23 and 3, but a short while ago the general accepted on my question that

24 number 3 refers not to the 6th of December, but for a period previous to

25 the 6th of December. I'm not pleased with your observation that we are

Page 49321

1 hindering your examination, because there are contradictions which the

2 Chamber must clarify. I'm sorry. And you have again contributed to the

3 confusion, I'm sorry to say.

4 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, very well, I

5 apologise. Well, let's take things one at a time.

6 Your Honour, the problem is I'm losing my minutes on your

7 questions, and I'm not going to be able to do what I planned to do. And

8 my analyses show that I have to spend about 20 to 25 per cent of my time

9 to follow up on the Judges' questions, which prevents me from working the

10 way I should. That's why I intervened.

11 Q. Number 3, General, shows the axis and directions of actions that

12 resulted in an occupation as it was on the 6th of December, 1991; is that

13 correct?

14 A. Yes, it is.

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] And now could we please be given

16 an IC number for this map, and then I am going to call up for a clean

17 copy of the same map.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are going to give an IC

19 number, but I have a question to ask. So please give an IC number, and

20 then I'll ask the question.

21 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.

22 The marked version of Exhibit 4D02024 shall be given

23 Exhibit IC01173. Thank you, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 General Petkovic, based on this map, you have let us know how,

Page 49322

1 according to you, the JNA and the Serbian forces were positioned on the

2 6th of December, 1991. And you gave us loads of details, and this is all

3 in the transcript. And upon the request of your counsel, you also

4 pointed out that the JNA had positions in the coastal areas, and they had

5 taken up those positions in October. And you put the number 3 there.

6 That's all very well.

7 However, we have to look at the words that are used, because as a

8 legal expert, I have to make sure that the correct language is used.

9 When we talk about occupied areas, "occupied" has a legal connotation, of

10 course. And unless I'm mistaken, on the 6th of December, 1991, from an

11 international point of view, we had a Yugoslav federation made of several

12 socialist republics which were members of this federation. Therefore,

13 the All People's Army or the JNA, in December 1991, while the Republic of

14 Croatia was not recognised internationally, nor was it the case for the

15 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so I would like to know if I'm

16 mistaken in saying that the JNA deployed its forces in areas which

17 belonged to the territory of the Yugoslav state. And I'm using the word

18 "deployed," and not "occupied."

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, that's how one

20 could say, strictly speaking, and looking at the period up until Croatia

21 proclaimed its independence on the 15th of January, 1992, or, rather,

22 when it was recognised as an independent state.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So if we use

24 military jargon, we have to use the word "deployed"?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, if troops are deployed as a

Page 49323

1 result of combat, then you can't use the term "deployment." Deployment

2 is something that is done peacefully, freely, and you just send troops to

3 certain areas. That's deployment. However, if you start from the border

4 and engage in combat, then this is not deployment. And although Croatia

5 was still officially part of Yugoslavia, the JNA carried out attacks

6 against the forces which were deployed in the area, which were mostly the

7 police forces of the Republic of Croatia. So we can't be talking about

8 peaceful deployment of the kind practiced by an army in peacetime. It

9 was combat, irrespective of the fact that it was still the territory of

10 their common state.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I fully understood

12 what you say. But to clarify this point, I'll take an example.

13 Let's assume that today, in the Republic of Croatia, part of the

14 territory is facing some problems, and the new president, and unless I'm

15 mistaken it's Ivo Josipovic, the new president decides that the Croatian

16 Army will position itself on those territories, where there will be some

17 strife or something happening. According to you, do you think that the

18 Croatian Army would deploy itself or would occupy those territories?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Croatian Army would be deployed

20 in such areas. However, if to do that it had to engage in combat, then

21 that area would be placed under control by military action. Deployment

22 is free and peaceful, and if, on the other hand, there is something that

23 I'm not happy with, then I engage in action. When, on the 6th of

24 December, the JNA torched the entire Konavle Valley and did in Dubrovnik

25 what they did, it is not deployment. It is not in the spirit of what our

Page 49324

1 -- the militaries do to deploy their troops. This is an entirely

2 different matter. The JNA did not arrive and deploy its troops in six,

3 eight, or ten locations in the south of Croatia, but rather they had

4 engaged in combat for several months using the territories of both the

5 Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And then

6 on the 15th of January, when independence was proclaimed and when the JNA

7 was still there, it became an occupational force from what could have

8 been a force that only deployed its troops.

9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. General, please focus. On the 15th of January, 1992, did Croatia

11 proclaim its independence or was it internationally recognised on that

12 day?

13 A. On that day, Croatia was internationally recognised. Its

14 moratorium expired sometime in the month of November.

15 Q. October?

16 A. Yes, October. And according to that --

17 Q. Hold on, hold on, hold on. I'll take things one at a time.

18 When we speak about the three-month moratorium, could you please

19 explain to the Trial Chamber what it means? When was it that Croatia

20 actually proclaimed its independence, and what is the meaning of the term

21 "Croatian moratorium"?

22 A. Well, Croatia, I believe it was in June that Croatia proclaimed

23 its independence, and then, at the incitement of the international

24 factors to have the situation resolved more easily, allegedly, that that

25 should be frozen for a period of three months.

Page 49325

1 Q. Now, when you say "June," what year is that?

2 A. 1991.

3 Q. And was it then that the presidents of the former Yugoslavia,

4 pursuant to a proposal from the international community, that they

5 decided about the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, to freeze that

6 for three months, their independence, in order to achieve some agreement,

7 and that was the moratorium; is that it?

8 A. Yes, precisely.

9 Q. Tell us, please, officially, what is the official date of

10 independence for the Republic of Croatia? Is it the 8th of October?

11 A. Yes, that's right, the 8th of October is Independence Day for

12 Croatia.

13 Q. Therefore, General, since when was the Republic of Croatia an

14 independent state?

15 A. From the 8th of October, 1991.

16 Q. The Yugoslav People's Army, on the territory of the Republic of

17 Croatia in December 1991, can it be considered to have been an

18 occupational army then?

19 A. Yes, absolutely. I apologise for the misunderstanding earlier

20 on. The 8th of October, the day Croatia was declared independent, is

21 when the attack started; in 1991, that is.

22 Q. Thank you. Let's go back to that same map that we were dealing

23 with a moment ago, and I'm interested, General, in what the situation was

24 like in April 1992. So we're now going to speak about April 1992.

25 The parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia coloured

Page 49326

1 pink here, and we're just referring to the territory in the Split

2 Operations Zone, was that territory under the occupation of the JNA, or,

3 rather, the forces of the Croatian Serbs?

4 A. Yes, that's right, they were under occupation.

5 Q. Tell us, please, General, on the -- or, rather, in the month of

6 April 1992, the territory in orange or yellow, was that territory under

7 the control of the Yugoslav People's Army and the forces of the Bosnian

8 Herzegovinian Serbs?

9 A. Yes, that was it exactly. That territory was controlled by the

10 VRS and the JNA.

11 Q. Now, General, please, could you tell us whether, at the beginning

12 of April 1992, you had any knowledge about any combat plans of the

13 Yugoslav People's Army and the forces of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbs?

14 And if so, could you draw that in on this map, please?

15 A. The forces of the Yugoslav People's Army and the army of the

16 Bosnian Serbs, in April 1993 --

17 Q. 1992, you mean?

18 A. Yes, 1992, undertook the implementation of a plan that had been

19 devised previously at the level of the JNA, and it meant this: From the

20 west, Kupres, Livno, Tomislavgrad --

21 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Might we provide the general with

22 a felt-tipped pen so that he can mark this in on his screen?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm going to draw a circle 'round

24 that territory [marks]. And then they moved across Herzegovina down the

25 Neretva River Valley, and another branch towards the Republic of Croatia

Page 49327

1 and Split.

2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. General, could you put a number 1 for this plan of invasion, plan

4 of occupation?

5 A. [Marks] The second part of the plan was for the forces located in

6 the Neretva River Valley to continue the advancement towards Ploce,

7 Metkovic, Makarska, that is to say, Croatia, and another branch to

8 continue and link up with the forces -- to continue the advancement and

9 link up with the forces coming in from the western part, Livno,

10 Tomislavgrad, and Kupres, who were moving eastwards [marks].

11 Q. General, could you put a number 2 for those axes?

12 A. [Marks]

13 Q. And let's state this once again. What period are we talking

14 about for these plans?

15 A. It was April 1992.

16 Q. Tell us, please, General, had these plans been carried out, what

17 would have happened to the Republic of Croatia?

18 A. The Republic of Croatia south of Split would also have been

19 occupied, just as the southern-most part of the Republic of Croatia,

20 which means the entire region south of Split would have been under the

21 occupation of the JNA and the Army of Republika Srpska.

22 Q. Tell us, please, in that area, would the state of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina or the free territory of the state of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, would it border on the Republic of Croatia?

25 A. No, it would not. The territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina would also

Page 49328

1 have been cut across, cut off, and the corridors from -- well, north of

2 Mostar, Posusje, would have been an enclave under siege in the Central

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, without any access to any of the states surrounding

4 it, which in this case is just one, Croatia.

5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no further

6 questions on this map. Now, before I tender it into evidence or ask for

7 a number, do you have any questions? If not, may I have an IC number for

8 this map, please.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, can we have an IC

10 number for this map, please.

11 THE REGISTRAR: The second marked version of Exhibit 4D02024

12 shall be given Exhibit IC01174. Thank you, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a follow-up question,

14 General Petkovic.

15 We have just seen two maps in quick succession. You've explained

16 how the JNA took up its position and how the troops were positioned on

17 the ground. I assume that your counsel will ask for these two maps to be

18 admitted. Can you tell me, according to you, in what way these maps are

19 relevant to understand the military situation resulting from the

20 indictment?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, based on the

22 indictment raised and the assertions made with respect to the involvement

23 of the Army of the Republic of Croatia with the events in

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, this map is highly relevant.

25 The situation in the Republic of Croatia was tied in with the

Page 49329

1 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The general territory between the two

2 red occupied territories in the Republic of Croatia was not

3 [indiscernible] by Croatian forces, but for moral and psychological

4 relationships towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, not to be considered closed

5 off, but the defence was based on joint resistance to the Serb forces and

6 the Yugoslav People's Army.

7 Now, these events, from April 1992 onwards, in the west, which is

8 number 1, I showed the direction taken by the forces, and then later on,

9 with the liberation of the eastern part from Neretva to Stolac, the

10 liberation of East Mostar, in my view, led to a joint agreement between

11 President Izetbegovic and President Tudjman, and an Agreement on

12 Friendship and Co-operation which was reached. And in point 4, it

13 emphasizes the need for trans-border military co-operation, because it

14 was noted that both Bosnia-Herzegovina -- that Bosnia-Herzegovina and the

15 Republic of Croatia had come under attack exclusively from the territory

16 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that Croatia was being attacked from BH, and that

17 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, just a few days after independence

18 had been proclaimed, did not have the necessary number of troops to help

19 the Republic of Croatia to repel and prevent attacks by Serb forces on

20 Croatian territory and thereby to block entry into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 Therefore, these events, which took part in the first part --

22 took place in the first part of 1991, tells us that Croatia did not have

23 its own interest, but the joint interest was to stand up to a joint

24 adversary in the trans-border region, the border belt between

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia.

Page 49330

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, this is a

2 question I'm putting to you and which I shall not put to you again. It

3 might be the most crucial question.

4 To understand the indictment, should one only look at the

5 conflict between the HVO and the ABiH, or should one consider this

6 conflict including the Serbs?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, looking at

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and only the conflict there between the HVO and BH,

9 would not be complete. You mustn't leave the Serbs out from this

10 equation and from the overall conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That means

11 that they are the ones who must be considered a component of the

12 conflict, and not to leave them aside and then just look at the conflict

13 between the HVO and the BH. Why? Because the part of the territory that

14 we are looking at now, we have, on the one side, the Serbs doing what

15 they're doing, occupying territory and so on, and on the other side you

16 have the HVO and the BH Army and certain other forces of the Republic of

17 Croatia helping them to stand up to the Serb aggression and to prevent

18 the closing off the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, therefore,

19 jeopardising -- thus jeopardising the Republic of Croatia.

20 So all three sides are linked up. You can't exclude the Serbs in

21 this equation. Had there not been the Serbs, there wouldn't have been

22 any need for activities on the part of the HVO, BH, and so on. We would

23 just be sitting in Geneva and negotiating. Everybody would have waited

24 for the negotiations to end, and nobody would have resorted to rifles.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.

Page 49331

1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. General, let's move on. We'll skip the next map in your binder,

3 and let's look at P162 now, please, which is an order dated the 16th of

4 April, 1992, from Commander Janko Bobetko, on the establishment of a

5 forward command post and southern front in Grude.

6 Tell us, General, does this order have anything to do with the

7 map we've just looked at for April 1992?

8 A. Yes, it has an important connection. Because of the situation,

9 the forward command post was set up in Grude, which, since the forces

10 were less well organised in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it took on

11 the role of the organiser for the establishment of these forces, for

12 deploying them along the lines, and for commanding the troops in the

13 battles against Republika Srpska and the JNA, and that is the sole reason

14 that the forward command post in Grude was set up in the first place.

15 Q. Now let's look at the next document, which is P163. It is also

16 an order from Commander Janko Bobetko about the composition of the

17 command at the forward command post at Grude. And, General, you are

18 stipulated here under item 1?

19 A. Yes, that is true. Now, this is -- these are the specifics,

20 listing the names of the people making up the command post. And there

21 were a total of 11 of us, and those people were responsible for these and

22 forthcoming expected operations in this territory in April, May, and June

23 of 1992.

24 Q. Tell us, please, General, when did you arrive in the territory of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Page 49332

1 A. I arrived on the 14th, in the evening.

2 Q. "The 14th," meaning what month?

3 A. The 14th of April, 1992. And I was officially recorded as being

4 there on the first -- next day, on the 15th. So the first day was sort

5 of reconnaissance, but I always list the actual date of my arrival,

6 although I actually took up my duties on the 15th. So it would have been

7 more correct to say, perhaps, the 15th of April, 1992.

8 Q. Tell us, please, General, in arriving in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did

9 you expect any main staff to exist over there or anything like that, any

10 HVO Main Staff, or the Main Staff of any other Croatian and Muslim

11 forces? What did you actually expect to find?

12 A. Well, I was told that a main staff existed. I didn't know in

13 what shape or form. But I was told that as it was, the Main Staff, from

14 the 4th to the 10th of April, commanded the HVO force in the battles

15 against the JNA and the Serb forces at Kupres, Tomislavgrad, and Livno,

16 and we did expect to find this Main Staff in place. However, what

17 happened was that the man who headed it and some other men had left,

18 allegedly to return. However, I actually never saw them.

19 And let me just add that I was surprised, upon my arrival in the

20 area, to see that the BH authorities, south of the line running from

21 Prozor to Jablanica, which is a long line of Eastern and Western

22 Herzegovina, the central authorities had no operative command. It had no

23 units whatsoever, except for an independent battalion in Mostar. So in

24 that respect, I was really surprised to find that, because I had expected

25 at least two or three brigades of the Territorial Defence, but there was

Page 49333

1 nobody there.

2 Q. Tell us, General, what about Herceg-Bosna? What existed of

3 Herceg-Bosna in that area when you arrived?

4 A. Well, it's like this, Your Honours: If I were to be asked about

5 that particular day, I can tell you that I couldn't find my bearings at

6 all and I didn't know anything. It was only later on, after the 24th --

7 after the fighting in Livno, that I sat down and talked to Jozo Maric,

8 discussed the situation. He was the head in Grude. He was a professor,

9 and he explained to me about Herceg-Bosna, which was an organisation of

10 Croats for the defence of the territory. He said, We have these troops

11 in the municipalities and so on. And then I asked him, All right, now

12 Boban and the others, who else was there? Well, they couldn't point to

13 anybody. Anything that was said, they would say, That's Boban, the HDZ,

14 the Presidency, nobody around him allegedly leading the HVO. And around

15 him you, you had three men in a hotel in Grude.

16 Now, I expected in those first 10 days that I would meet at least

17 15 people who meant something, but, no, that wasn't the case. I had the

18 feeling that Boban was quite alone in all that territory, so that I

19 wasn't acquainted with the structure, I never saw any of the people that

20 made it up until, say, August 19 -- well, in 1992.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, your answer

22 is an important one, and it merits one spending time on it.

23 On the 16th of April, 1992, you go to the forward command post in

24 Grude because there is going to be fighting with the Serbs. And when you

25 arrive there, you say, I thought that there was a staff of the HVO, and

Page 49334

1 there was nothing there. You don't see a single HVO member anywhere.

2 Then after the fighting in Livno, you talk to Mr. Maric, who talks to you

3 about the HVO and who says that there is Mate Boban.

4 When I listened to you, I had the feeling that before the 16th of

5 April, 1992, you had had no contact whatsoever with Mate Boban and all

6 the people from the HVO, and now, in this instance, you are discovering

7 that it actually exists after the fighting has taken place. Is that what

8 you're telling us?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, not exactly.

10 In late March 1992, while with a team from the Split Zone of

11 Operations, I visited the area, the areas that were shown in red where

12 the Serb attack was stopped, by mere chance at a hotel in Metkovic, I ran

13 into Mate Boban. My assistant for logistics from the zone of operations

14 stood up and greeted the man. They were hugging each other, and he

15 introduced him to me as Mr. Boban and introduced me to him as

16 Mr. Petkovic, the operations officer in our zone. That's how we met and

17 sat down, and then I drew my conclusions from the ensuing conversation.

18 This assistant of mine was a manager of a hotel chain in Split,

19 whereas Mate Boban was the manager of a company -- of a wholesale company

20 in Imotski, and they did business together. And I believe that Boban's

21 brother was also in logistics in the navy.

22 The conversation took about an hour, and we spoke. What the

23 situation was like here, will Neum fall, what will happen, those were his

24 questions. And I asked him to tell us what kind of forces can be found

25 along the Neretva from Capljina to Mostar on which we were leaning, in

Page 49335

1 Croatia, as forces that could provide security to us, and that's how the

2 conversation ran.

3 And then at one point he said, You commanded the defence at

4 Sibenik. It would be good if you could come to help us out and see what

5 kind of structure we have and what kind of forces we have. And I said,

6 No problem, I can come and visit for two or three days and see what you

7 have set up, and it would be good if I could meet two or three of your

8 people who know something about that. He insisted on me coming to join

9 their ranks, but I didn't. That's when we met first.

10 We never spoke about Herceg-Bosna at the time or anything else.

11 He told me that the Croats organised themselves by municipalities,

12 whichever way they thought fit or were able to implement, and he needed

13 someone with experience, because in the war in Croatia I commanded the

14 defence of Sibenik, I was in the zone of operations. And that's where we

15 broke off.

16 After three or five days, three of their men arrived who worked

17 for the defence and gave us information about where the HVO was, what

18 they had, et cetera.

19 My following contact was a phone conversation, when Kupres came

20 under attack. I believe it was on the 4th of April, 1992, when he

21 requested help from the zone of operations, but we were unable to provide

22 it. We were just saying we were monitoring the situation and see what

23 was happening.

24 Those are my contacts with him in 1992. I met him for the first

25 time when we spoke for about an hour at the hotel in Metkovic.

Page 49336

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In the document we have before

2 us, those 11 people who are mentioned, under point 7 I see that this is a

3 civilian by the name of Bruno Stojic. Is it the same Bruno Stojic who is

4 sitting here in the courtroom? And if that's the case, why is the term

5 "civilian" used for someone in the forward command post?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, indeed, under 7 there

7 is "Bruno Stojic." It is stated that he's a civilian. He was charged

8 with the logistics in this forward command post. As far as I know, for

9 some time prior to that he was involved in some logistical activities

10 which were under the authority of that Main Staff that was or was not in

11 existence, and everybody else, except for the last person mentioned, were

12 considered members of the Main Staff, and they are all the people from

13 the Main Staff I met. The chiefs had gone to Zagreb or wherever, and I

14 never saw them.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This civilian by the name of

16 Bruno Stojic, who was in charge of logistics, was this someone whom you

17 knew already or was it someone you met in April 1992?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I only met him then. Except

19 for the person under 2, Jure Zadro, I met him sometime in late March or

20 early April. And I met Zarko Keza at the same time as Zadro, because

21 Boban had sent them off to Ploce to present the situation in Herzegovina

22 to us. I didn't know the others, except for number 11 because he was

23 from the Croatian Army also.

24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Tell us, General, when you went to Bosnia-Herzegovina, if we

Page 49337

1 disregard the JNA officers who worked there and who you didn't know them,

2 did you know anybody else in Herzegovina; relatives, business partners,

3 anybody close to you?

4 A. Your Honours, I knew nobody in Herzegovina. In my military

5 career, as far as Bosnia is concerned, I was in Sarajevo and in

6 Kalinovik, and it took me -- or, rather, I travelled through Mostar when

7 I travelled from Sarajevo. I spent 15 minutes at the bus station there

8 and continued. That's all I know about Bosnia-Herzegovina, although I

9 was a soldier for 23 years.

10 Q. When you went to Bosnia-Herzegovina, sir, did you have your own

11 concept of the internal structure of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

12 A. My concept? I never thought about these things, because it

13 wasn't for me to do so, nor did anybody care to hear my opinion. But I

14 did hear that the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina talked, and I thought

15 that it would be best for them to accept what the international community

16 was offering them in 1992 and 1993, because at that time solutions for

17 the situation in that country were being put forward then.

18 Three peoples lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I thought that

19 each people must have the same rights, irrespective of their share in the

20 overall population. And that, to my mind, would have been a well-ordered

21 state. Anything else, I thought, would not have been a good outcome,

22 because the one with lesser rights would not have been satisfied. But

23 they could've reach any agreement at all. If they had decided to turn

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina into a monarchy, it would have been fine by me. I

25 would have saluted that king.

Page 49338

1 Q. General, if I understand you well about -- or, rather, you mean

2 to you, as a professional soldier, any solution the leaders of the three

3 constituent peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina come up with would have been

4 all right with you, even a monarchy?

5 A. Yes, absolutely, even today.

6 Q. Now, let's be brief, General, because we have heard much about

7 these things in this courtroom before. Were the attempts to stop the

8 onslaught of the VRS around Livno successful?

9 A. Yes. On the 24th of April, 1992, a large operation of the VRS

10 and the JNA still at the time was launched, focusing on the town of Livno

11 and the municipality of Livno, but also on the remoter parts of the

12 municipality of Tomislavgrad.

13 Q. Tell us, to Janko Bobetko, what was the most important thing at

14 the time?

15 A. At that time, it was extremely important to him to stop the Serbs

16 at lines beyond Livno at any cost. The fall of Livno-Tomislavgrad were

17 not an option. That's why orders were given that the towns of

18 Livno-Tomislavgrad be provided with concrete blocks to make impossible

19 traffic along the roads. So Janko Bobetko was determined to stop the

20 attacks of Livno, because that would have -- that meant making impossible

21 further attacks on Herzegovina and on the parts of Croatia south of

22 Split.

23 Q. Tell us, under these circumstances, was it possible to start

24 considering the liberation of Dubrovnik and the occupied part of Southern

25 Croatia that we saw on the map?

Page 49339

1 A. No, by no means, because any effort to liberate Dubrovnik and the

2 other territory we saw on the map, with someone being in the position to

3 attack you from behind was, militarily, not an option, so we first had to

4 do what I've just mentioned and then go south toward Dubrovnik.

5 Q. The towns you mentioned, General, were not recorded in the

6 transcript. You're speaking too fast. When you say "attack you from

7 behind," which territory do you mean?

8 A. Speaking about Croatia, the towns of Split, Makarska, Ploce, all

9 the way to Metkovic; that is, the Neretva Valley.

10 Q. Which liberation actions were organised in that period? We are

11 now referring to May and June 1992.

12 A. After remedying the situation in the area of Livno-Tomislavgrad,

13 and setting up a firm line of defence, which can also be termed a major

14 defeat of the VRS and the JNA, it was General Bobetko's assessment that

15 at the moment when the JNA, in May, started leaving the territory of BiH,

16 in a way, and handing over authorities to local forces, and those who

17 belonged to the JNA but crossed over to those local forces, he assessed

18 that was a convenient moment to do something and undertake an offensive

19 action while they are re-positioning their forces.

20 Q. Tell us, in one sentence, which area was liberated.

21 A. The eastern banks of the Neretva River from the town of Capljina

22 to Mostar, the eastern part of Mostar, Bijelo Polje, the Dubrava Plateau,

23 and the municipality of Stolac. Some parts of that municipality, we were

24 not able to liberate.

25 Q. Let us now take a look at the following document, P279.

Page 49340

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, I've been listening to

2 you carefully. And based on the documents that we had had, I seem to

3 understand the following: The Serb forces occupy the Dubrovnik area, and

4 this causes a great deal of an issue for the Croats. In military terms,

5 General Bobetko is launching a military action in sector Mostar,

6 Bijelo Polje, the Dubrava Plateau, as well as the municipality of Stolac,

7 in order to take up positions and to allow the Croatian Army in the area

8 of Dubrovnik -- to allow this army to fail any attempt of the JNA. And

9 in April 1992, there is a military operation that is directed against the

10 Serbs. This is what I seem to understand from what you're saying.

11 But in the indictment, which I'm sure you've read, you are aware

12 that the Prosecutor claims that you were part of a JCE with

13 General Bobetko, and in fact this joint criminal enterprise had the

14 following purpose: either to take the control of municipalities by ethnic

15 cleansing, and so on and so forth. I'm not going to go into the details.

16 Based on that, one could think that in 1992, the forward command post in

17 Grude was part of this plan.

18 And here you are giving us an explanation of a military nature.

19 So to summarise, you're saying to us that the Croatian Army, in April

20 1992, had only one objective; namely, to launch a military action against

21 the Serbs. And if I understand the way you're looking at this, the

22 question of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina or anything to do with

23 Muslims was not really the main purpose of this action. Is that correct?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, you're absolutely

25 right, this is exactly how it was.

Page 49341

1 When we liberated the eastern bank of Neretva, Mr. Izetbegovic

2 proclaimed a state of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on that day we gave

3 him a gift of a large part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, some 70 kilometres'

4 long and 30 kilometres' wide, from Capljina to Stolac. That was the

5 largest area that was liberated in 1992 and 1993 from the Army of

6 Republika Srpska and the remains of the JNA.

7 After these events, General Bobetko continued acting in the

8 territory of the Republic of Croatia towards Dubrovnik and liberated the

9 southern part of the Republic of Croatia, and the HVO, which had already

10 acted in concert with the 1st Brigade of the BiH Army, took it upon

11 itself to secure the newly-liberated line in the newly-liberated area.

12 In July 1992, General Bobetko withdrew elements of the

13 Croatian Army from that territory and deployed them in the direction of

14 Dubrovnik. The only group that remained was the TG-2, which changed

15 sides every three months.

16 And let me say just one more thing. After the operations which

17 were carried out in the southern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be more

18 specific, in the eastern part of Herzegovina, which were all either

19 actions to liberate the territory or to defend the territory, there was a

20 meeting between Tudjman and Izetbegovic which resulted in an agreement on

21 co-operation and friendship. I believe that Mr. Izetbegovic would not

22 have come to Zagreb if he thought that somebody had occupied Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina, and he would not have signed the agreement on co-operation

24 with the Republic of Croatia in that case.

25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

Page 49342

1 Q. General, according to what you know, the engagement of the

2 Croatian Army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, did it

3 have even the least note of animosity or hostility towards the peoples of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

5 A. No. On the contrary, Muslims also participated in those

6 operations, together with the Croats and the Croatian Army and the Croats

7 in the HVO. Therefore, all militarily-capable men who wanted to do so

8 took up arms and joined the operation. Do you think that the 30 per cent

9 of the Muslims who were in the HVO would have participated in those

10 operations if they didn't want to? They would have said, No, we don't

11 want to wage a war.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, you see how

13 difficult it can be for an international judge. If we had before us the

14 documents of the Main Staff, the Croat Main Staff, documents dealing with

15 all operations under the remit of General Bobetko, given the case that

16 you're putting forward here, namely, Dubrovnik and what happened there,

17 perhaps a reasonable judge would have better understood the situation if

18 they had everything before them. Unfortunately, as I've already said, we

19 only have what is given to us, what the Prosecutor is lodging, what the

20 Defence teams are lodging, and based on that we have to ask questions,

21 question that are intricate, that are very sensitive sometimes, and, in

22 fact, we have some pieces of the puzzles that are missing.

23 And to really be very precise, General Petkovic, in this sort of

24 case when you have military operations being carried out, as far as I'm

25 co