

Slobodan Praljak

STATEMENT -

ARCHIMEDES-PRALJAK'S LAW

**A BIT ABOUT WAR, THE CAUSES OF
WAR AND INDIVIDUAL IN WAR**

**METHODOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL
ERRORS IN CONCLUDING ABOUT
THE REALITY OF WAR**

**A VERY SUMMARIZED CROATIAN
HISTORY**

**PRO DOMO SUA – THE FIRST PERSON
SINGULAR**

COVER-UP

**THE INJURED OF A BiH, MUSLIMS –
BOSNIAKS**

**INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
WAR LAW**

**JOURNALISTS AND THE PUBLICITY
OF ACTIVITIES OF THE HVO MAIN
STAFF AND HVO**

**DOCUMENTS - A GENERAL
CROSS-SECTION**

**COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATION**

**THE PRODUCTION OF LIES,
DECEPTIONS, UNTRUTHS**

**THE SUPPLEMENTS FOR
UNDERSTANDING**

**REFUSAL TO ADMIT WITNESSES'
TESTIMONIES AT THE HAGUE
TRIBUNAL**

**SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S CLOSING
ARGUMENTS AT THE HAGUE
TRIBUNAL**

ENCLOSURE - DVD

Facts

www.slobodanpraljak.com

Zagreb, December 2014

free sample

Publisher:

Oktavijan d.o.o.
Radnička cesta 39
HR-10000 Zagreb
Croatia

Editor:

Nikola Babić Praljak

Layout: GENS '94, Zagreb

Printed by: PRINTERA GRUPA, Sveta Nedelja

ISBN 978-953-7597-13-9

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available in the Online Catalogue of the National and University Library in Zagreb as 892631.

Comment

Translations and transcriptions of original documents contained in this book were compiled from a variety of sources. In order to preserve the authenticity of original documents, only the most necessary linguistic adaptations were made in translations.

I	PREFACE	5
II	STATEMENT - ARCHIMEDES-PRALJAK'S LAW	7
III	A BIT ABOUT WAR, THE CAUSES OF WAR AND INDIVIDUAL IN WAR	9
IV	METHODOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL ERRORS IN CONCLUDING ABOUT THE REALITY OF WAR	19
V	A VERY SUMMARIZED CROATIAN HISTORY Facts which will provide you with a better understanding of what happened in Yugoslavia from 1990–1995	25
V-A	PRO DOMO SUA – THE FIRST PERSON SINGULAR Events and their witnesses – DVD enclosed Sunja – Croatia	83
V-B	PRO DOMO SUA – THE FIRST PERSON SINGULAR Events and their witnesses – DVD enclosed Bosnia and Herzegovina	93
VI	COVER-UP Was I covering up?	131
VII	THE INJURED OF A BiH, MUSLIMS – BOSNIAKS Conduct of HVO Conduct of A BiH	143
VIII	INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN WAR LAW	153
IX	JOURNALISTS AND THE PUBLICITY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE HVO MAIN STAFF AND HVO	175
X	DOCUMENTS - A GENERAL CROSS-SECTION	197
XI	COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION - A	211
XII	COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION - B	231
XIII	THE PRODUCTION OF LIES, DECEPTIONS, UNTRUTHS Consequently – the production of crimes in a war Croatia	249
	1. THE MINING OF THE JEWISH CEMETERY IN ZAGREB ON 19 August 1991	250
	2. THE MINING OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN ZAGREB ON 19 August 1991	250
	3. NATIONALITY OF Dr FRANJO TUĐMAN'S WIFE	253
	4. FORTY (40) BUTCHERED BABIES IN VUKOVAR	258
	5. THE AGREEMENT OF Dr FRANJO TUĐMAN AND SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ ON THE DIVISION OF BiH - KARAĐORĐEVO, March 1991	259
	6. WHEN SERBIA DESERTED THE SFRJ - SEPARATISM OR WHO WAS THE FIRST TO LEAVE THE SFRJ?	278

XIV	THE PRODUCTION OF LIES, DECEPTIONS, UNTRUTHS	
	Consequently – the production of crimes in a war	
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	285
	1. THE BOBAN – KARADŽIĆ MEETING IN GRAZ	286
	2. THE DESTRUCTION OF MOSTAR	
	Who, when and to what extent destroyed Mostar	299
	3. TELEPHONES	342
	4. THE SHELLING OF MOSTAR	343
	5. THE ARTILLERY OF A BiH – “UNARMED” MUSLIMS	348
	6. SNIPERS IN MOSTAR	350
	7. THE OLD BRIDGE	351
	8. THE SIEGE OF MOSTAR	355
	9. ELECTRICITY	359
	10. WATER	362
	11. HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS	363
	12. INFORMATION – RADIO, TV, NEWSPAPERS	365
	13. LANGUAGE – THE CROATIAN LANGUAGE	367
	14. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSCRIPTS	368
	15. HV /The Croatian Army/ IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	369
XV	THE SUPPLEMENTS FOR UNDERSTANDING	375
	1. WAR CRIME, CRIME IN A WAR	376
	2. QUID PRO QUO	377
	3. WISHES, INTENTIONS, ACTIONS AND POWER	379
	4. POSSIBLE METHODOLOGICAL ERRORS IN UNDERSTANDING	
	I know that I am repeating myself, but understanding is a painful issue	380
	5. THE PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION	382
	6. THE POLITICIAN WHO KNOWS AND UNDERSTANDS – BARONESS MARGARET	
	THATCHER	390
	7. HUMAN BEHAVIOUR UNDER CONDITIONS OF STATE UNREST	399
	8. STATISTICAL DATA ON CRIME IN SOME COUNTRIES AT PEACE:	
	USA, GERMANY, ENGLAND AND WALES, ITALY	
	How to detect a crime and punish the perpetrator – percentages	408
XVI	REFUSAL TO ADMIT WITNESSES’ TESTIMONIES AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL (ICTY)	415
XVII	SLOBODAN PRALJAK’S CLOSING ARGUMENTS AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL (ICTY).....	433
XVIII	SLOBODAN PRALJAK’S BRIEF BIOGRAPHY	439
XIX	INFORMATION ABOUT THE WEBSITE www.slobodanpraljak.com	440
XX	INDEX	441
XXI	DVD ENCLOSED - THE CONDUCT OF GENERAL SLOBODAN PRALJAK IN CRISIS	
	SITUATIONS	

1. The reason for writing this book is my family, my brothers in arms and my friends, in order to enable them to judge my actions during the war.

The book is open to the public and everyone else may judge it however he / she wishes.

2. In the book I will write a little bit about war, more on the war on the area of former Yugoslavia, more precisely the aggression of the Serbian political idea (a greater part of the Serbian people) and the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. The book is composed of documents and facts, opening more questions than it gives answers.

I am not trying to write a book "*of an exhaustive and rounded synthesis of the times*".

4. The documents and statements of witnesses (DVD enclosed to this book) I present as proof that the things were as I describe them to be. My explanations, although I am convinced in their correctness, are subject to scrutiny, just as any other. Let the reader decide.

5. Please, let the exposition of the facts and the description of events (as I saw and understood them) in no way lead you to the conclusion that I didn't respect, understand and love these people who were my brothers in arms and whom I commanded, in those days and today. They were not ready, mentally and organization-wise for the attack against them, but still, they defended themselves.

"Glory belongs to those who decided to defend the Thermopylae"

(KAVAFIS)

6. I remain convinced that I managed to have and preserve a clear moral dividing line against a very small minority of those to whom point 5 does not relate.

7. But, as such individuals are part of the reality of the society, and especially war, I tried to understand even them.

Just understand, nothing more.

THE AUTHOR

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvođe u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - izvale. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuški, Gode, Posušje
eljevac i o. Sreb.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvođi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspop, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izvesti na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

In order to eliminate any uncertainty about why I wrote – compiled this book it is my desire and intention to prove that my participation in the defence against aggression on Croatia and BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ was subject to

Archimedes-Praljak's Law.

Never and nowhere have I heard, on any meeting, encounter or gathering, whether in Croatia or BiH during the war 1991 – 1995 someone to plan, instigate, tolerate, cover up or in any other way encourage any kind of act punishable by a law in force.

The same applies to me.

Towards the members of my own people, in various occasions, I was known to yell and swear, sometimes beyond any civilized norm, I even occasionally hit someone, I falsely signed my name as general in the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ although I was never a general of the HVO, I commanded certain operations, although formally I did not have the authority to do so, I threatened with acts which have no legal footing and the like.

We were brought up and taught not to speak about ourselves, especially not to speak well about ourselves; this was seen as impolite and something a well-mannered person does not do.

In numerous interviews and conversations, during and after the war, I never and nowhere uttered a word on what good I did and how I conducted myself in war.

And then they began to lie, more and more, construe false witnesses and false “TRUTHS” and thus, they BROUGHT ME TO COURT AS A CRIMINAL.

I have had enough of it, I now switch to the first person singular, free of any respect for the so-called civil politeness and I CLAIM THAT THERE EXISTS →

THE ARCHIMEDES-PRALJAK'S LAW WHICH SAYS:

PRALJAK IMMERSSED IN WAR WILL REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF EVIL IN THAT WAR FOR A UNIT OF “1 PRALJAK”.

This unit consists of

- a) ENERGY – SLOBODAN PRALJAK
- b) DAILY QUANTITY OF TIME IN WHICH THIS ENERGY IS ACTIVE – ON THE AVERAGE 20 HOURS A DAY – SLOBODAN PRALJAK
- c) PASSION OR SPEED OF BURNING OF THIS ENERGY – SLOBODAN PRALJAK
- d) COURAGE – SLOBODAN PRALJAK
- e) KNOWLEDGE – SLOBODAN PRALJAK
- f) IQ – SLOBODAN PRALJAK

In certain enumerated elements some people could score better than me, e.g. in knowledge or intelligence, but they are not great in number and the differences cannot be significant,

HOWEVER,

I REFUSE TO ADMIT THAT SOMEONE AT THAT TIME HAD THE PERSONALITY TRAITS WHICH ADDED UP WOULD GIVE MORE THAN “1 PRALJAK” – THE UNIT DEFINED BY THE ARCHIMEDES-PRALJAK'S LAW.

To accomplish more in those times and in that position, one should have the attributes of God Himself.

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Sreb.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
lavršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZO, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

Diligent (valuable) historians enumerated more than 15,000 wars in history; several hundred of them occurred after World War II, although upon the conclusion of this overall butchery people wanted to believe that such a thing should not and will not happen again.

“Intellectuals”, “humanists” were “surprised”, “caught”, “infuriated” and the like, but why and according to which right they are surprised, they do not say.

They didn't know? Couldn't have presumed? “Never even dreamed” that such a thing was possible?

From which type of comprehension proceed SUCH STATEMENTS, and who are these “intellectuals” who cannot recognize and foresee the end-result of such social phenomena, especially the growth and formation of strong and negative social energies in a given time.

...

*„The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity. „*

(The Second Coming, William Butler Yeats, 1919)

To seek the answers in the personal life of Adolf Hitler, Josif Stalin, Mussolini or Josip Broz Tito is not only funny, but insulting for the millions that were killed.

In the USSR and SFRY during time until the changes of the social system in the 1990-ies, more than 80% of scientific production in the humanities was RUBBISH.

All of these master's and doctoral theses, all these presentations on various congresses, plenary sessions, symposia (BANQUETS), all these texts in newspapers and magazines, all of that is intellectual and moral rubbish.

I do not agree with the thesis that they only adapted to dictatorship in order to survive, because the best of them did not adjust and did not survive.

People, especially the “intellectuals” are building this system, upgrading it, adapting themselves to the system which they build, explain, justify, glorify and provide it with moral foundations ... and live, live comfortably, satisfactorily and normally.

And there is nothing unusual, strange or surprising in that, because this phenomenon is permanent in history: it has the power of a law of nature.

Let me try to formulate it:

“The society (people) can in a brief period of time and in a simple way build such forms of social consciousness (ENERGY), that every evil which these forms produce seem justified, ordinary, normal and morally unquestionable, for the majority of the community.”

The speed of change and magnitude of change of social consciousness?!

Only rare ones have tackled this GIVEN HISTORICAL CONDITION seriously.

For now, we are such and I do not see the probability of this POSSIBILITY to diminish, in time that we call „THE PROGRESSIVE GROWTH OF VALUES“.

I will quote my favourite Sonnet 66 of William Shakespeare:

<i>“Tired will all these, for restful death I cry, As, to behold desert a beggar born, And needy nothing trimm'd in jollity, And purest faith unhappily forsworn, And guilded honour shamefully misplaced, And maiden virtue rudely strumpeted, And right perfection wrongfully disgraced,</i>	<i>And strength by limping sway disabled, And art made tongue-tied by authority, And folly (doctor-like) controlling skill, And simple truth miscall'd simplicity, And captive good attending captain ill: Tired with all these, from these would I be gone, Save that, to die, I leave my love alone.”</i>
--	---

Sociology (and not only sociology), especially this new, modern, liberal sociology avoids the issue of war.

“Intellectuals” flee from the topic of war with an elevated indignation reducing their engagement to the “messages of peace”, “messages of condemnation of war”, “messages of contempt” directed at some unworthy beings who take part in such games and follow a leader, just so, because they are “mesmerized”, “manipulated” and the like.

It is all a banal and miserable babbling.

All of the above is usually pronounced in places where apart from empty stories there is good food and drink in abundance, and the fees for such messages are not to be underestimated.

“The curve of social energies” before the war, if carefully analysed, reasonably, boldly and irrespective of personal interests and projections, always gives a foundation for the prediction of the probability of the event – war.

“The curve of social energies” consists of dozens of complex variables in a causal relationship. In other words - there is no linearity, and in order to arrive at a palpable result, apart from social science it is necessary to be familiar with at least basic differential equations.

War is “the breaking point of the social curve”, “the point of discontinuity”, “the point of singularity”, however you please, and it isn't easily scientifically understood, but a lot more effort could be invested.

Irrespective of the fact that the changes of social balance in war (opinions, attitudes, conceptions, fear, desperation, hate, the system of social values, moral norms, social structure and organization of society ...) are fast, strong and have a great magnitude, it is possible to explore this phenomenon, and all that, please, without the “historical distance”.

The “historical distance” most often offers an ironed, cold, reduced truth and it usually seems that things could have turned out otherwise, if someone, for example, had shot Hitler, Stalin or Tito in time.

These are nursery rhymes, without offense to the children.

In the literature accessible to me, and other sources, I don't find (with worthy exceptions) sufficient effort in understanding the “curve of social energy” before the war, as well as the war itself.

I see a lack of courage, sincere and powerful scientific courage; sociology (and other related scientific disciplines) fled into a liberal “scorn” towards the war and all such “inhuman unfortunate events”.

The problem remains, however, that there are too much of these “unfortunate events” and this “inhumanity” in order for such a position of an “intellectual” to be labelled as “moral”, “scientific”, “daring”.

This is flight.

In the end I will copy citations from two books which helped me in the understanding of what I myself am writing, with the hope that this will make my explanation of certain events in the war clearer.

A)

In 1972 the book by WERNER HEISENBERG “DER TEIL UND DAS GANZE” (*THE PART AND THE WHOLE*) was translated into Serbian language (“NOLIT” – BELGRADE; SAZVEŽĐA).

The book was useful to me in the understanding of notions such as QED (quantum electrodynamics), “STATISTICAL CAUSALITY”, “LAW OF PROBABILITY”, “LAW AND ACCIDENT ARE COMPLEMENTARY notions”, “WAVES OF MATTER”, etc.

I also found three items which touch upon the social sciences:

- THE PRINCIPLE OF INDETERMINATION
- QUANTUM MECHANICAL causality, which says that in equal circumstances we can expect only a probability of an individual event, but it is absolutely certain what will be the statistical result of a large number of identical events
- THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY BY NIELS BOHR:
“EVERY TRULY PROFOUND NATURAL OCCURENCE CANNOT BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY DEFINED WITH THE WORDS OF OUR LANGUAGE AND REQUIRES FOR ITS DEFINITION AT LEAST TWO COMPLEMENTARY NOTIONS WHICH EXCLUDE ONE ANOTHER”

Ever since I read in Aristotle that “*harmony is a mixture and combination of opposites*”, I was always inclined to think that the same should apply to SOCIAL NORMS.

The citation which I quote relates both to “social energy” and “social matter”.

In 1933, faced with the Nazi “cleansing” of German universities of Jewish scientists Werner Heisenberg went to see his older colleague Max Planck.

Excerpt from the book: “THE PART AND THE WHOLE” by W. Heisenberg (original title „Der Teil und Das Ganze“, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, München 1969):

Planck received me in a not too light, but pleasantly old-fashioned lounge, in which I saw – not in reality, but in my thoughts – an old oil lamp hanging above the table. I had the impression that, since our last meeting, Planck had visibly aged. His refined narrow face was now furrowed with deep wrinkles, his smile upon greeting contained pain; he looked extremely tired.

“You came to seek advice from me in political matters?” he began the conversation, “but I fear I can give you no more advice. I have no hope that the catastrophe which threatens Germany, and by that very fact, German universities, can be stopped.

I am glad that as a young man you are still an optimist and believe that with such steps you can avert disaster. But you, unfortunately, grossly overestimate the influence of universities and intellectually educated people. The public, practically, would know nothing about your steps. The newspapers would not report them, or would taint your resignation with such a malicious overtone that no one would be prompted to extract serious conclusions from it.

No one can influence the movement of the avalanche, once it starts moving. What it will destroy, how many human lives will it annihilate, this is already decided by the laws of nature, although we do not know it yet.

If you do not resign and stay here, you will have a completely different task. You cannot stop the catastrophe and must, in order to survive, constantly make some compromises. But you may try, together with others, create the islands of survival.

You can gather around yourself young people, teach them how to work in science, and in such a way preserve in their consciousness the ancient and exact measures of value. No one knows, of course, how many of these islands will remain at the end of the catastrophe, but I am convinced that small groups of gifted young people, which you can lead in such a spirit through this time of horror, will be of the greatest importance for renewal

after the catastrophe. Because, such groups can represent crystallizing cores which will radiate the education of new life forms. This will firstly relate only to the renewal of scientific research in Germany. But as no one knows which role in the future world will be played by science and technology, it may be important even beyond the university compounds.

I think that all who could do something and are not, for instance, compelled to emigration due to their race, should stay here and prepare a further future. This will be very hard and is not devoid of danger; compromises which you will have to do will be quite rightly held against you, maybe even you will be punished. But maybe it still must be done. Of course, I cannot hold against anyone if he decides otherwise, if he emigrates because he sees life in Germany as unbearable, because he cannot look at the injustice being done here, and most certainly is unable to prevent it. But in such a horrible situation as we have in Germany today, it is impossible to act rightly, as one should. Irrespective of the decision which you will make, you are part of an injustice. Therefore, everyone is, in the last instance, left to decide for himself. There is no point in giving or receiving advice. Therefore I can only say to you: relinquish all hope that you could, irrespective of what you do, until the end of the catastrophe could prevent many disasters. However, in taking the decision, think of the time which comes afterwards.”

The Nobel Laureate MAX PLANCK, ONE OF THE GREATEST PHYSICIANS, SAYS :

“THE LAWS OF NATURE HAVE ALREADY DECIDED THAT” !!!?

In 1939 in New York Fermi proposes to Heisenberg to move to America.

Fermi:

“What are you still seeking in Germany? You cannot prevent war; you will only be doing things – be responsible for them – which you neither want to do, nor bear responsibility for them. If you could, by your participation in that misery over there create any good, i could understand your attitude. But, such a probability is minimal.”

“And still you want to return to Germany?”

Heisenberg:

“I think one ought to be consistent in one’s decisions. Every one of us by birth found himself in a certain environment, in a certain linguistic and mental space, and unless he divorced himself very early on from that environment, he is most successful in that space, he can be most productive there. According to historical experience, every country experiences revolutions and wars, sooner or later, and evidently the advice to emigrate cannot stand to reason. Everyone cannot emigrate. People must learn, therefore, to prevent catastrophes as much as possible, not to run away from them. Quite the contrary is being demanded; that everyone takes upon himself the burden of catastrophe in his own country, because this request would be another impulse for him to invest all his efforts for the purpose of preventing a catastrophe. Naturally, even such a request is unjust. Because, oftentimes an individual, with utmost effort, can do nothing to turn the human masses from the wrong way, and he cannot be asked, in the face of impossibility to retain the others, to refrain from personal salvation.

With this I only wish to say that apparently there are no general rules according to which we could govern ourselves. A man must decide for himself and he doesn’t know whether he made the right or the wrong choice. Probably he made both.”

B)

Excerpt from the book: „ON AGGRESSION” by Konrad Lorenz (original title: “DAS SOGENANNTTE BÖSE“, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München, 1983, selected section translated from Croatian edition “Takozvano zlo”, Algoritam, Zagreb, 2004)

I QUOTE:!

Aggression, whose expression is often equalized with the death instinct, is an instinct like any other, and in natural circumstances it is equally important for survival as it is for the preservation of species. In people who changed their circumstances of living too fast on their own initiative, the instinct for aggression is often detrimental, but likewise, though less dramatically, are the other instincts.

If we, as we ourselves admit, rejoice at the colourfulness of an old popular custom, such as decorating a Christmas tree and lighting the candles on it, the precondition is that we like what was given to us by tradition. On the warmth of this feeling depends the faithfulness that we will show towards the symbol and everything that it stands for. The warmth of the feeling is why the goods created by our culture we see as valuable. The life proper of this culture, the creation of supra-individual community which will survive the life of an individual, in brief – the humanity, the true humanity, rests on this independence of the ritual which makes it an autonomous motive of human activity.

It is not war who is the father of all things, as the legend says, but conflict. Conflict, between independent sources of motivating forces which are capable of producing tension within an organism, creating strain like the strings of a violin. This is true not only for simple effects like the swing of a fish's tail, on which Holst discovered the law of relative coordination, but also for many other sources of driving energy, such as those in a parliament, where individuals, by the use of time-tested rules must unite their voices into a harmonious whole.

13.

Ecce Homo!

*Intending to remove black
Boots from my feet
I said: “This is, demon,
The terrible symbol of man; a leg covered in*

*Rough skin, that is neither nature any more
Nor has it become spirit;
A wandering form from an animal's leg
To Mercurius' winged heel”*

Christian Morgenstern

Supposing an objective investigator is sitting on another planet, like Mars, and observing the social behaviour of man by means of binoculars whose magnifying glass is too weak to distinguish individuals, follow them in their individual behaviour, but which nevertheless allows the observer to notice large events like migrations, battles, etc. It would never occur to this observer that human behaviour is governed by reason or responsible morale.

If we presume that our outer-space observer is a reasonable being devoid of instincts and is without knowledge of how instincts function, particularly aggression, and how this function can go wayward, it is clear enough

that he wouldn't understand human history. Historical events which keep repeating themselves cannot be explained by human reason. It became commonplace to say that they are caused by "human nature". Reasonable and illogical human nature allows two nations to compete against each other and fight, although no economic reasons force them to do so. It instigates two political parties or religions with very similar and useful programmes to engage in a bitter fight, and makes a certain Alexander or Napoleon sacrifice millions of subordinates in an attempt to subjugate the entire world. As we grow up we are being told that some of these personalities, who committed such absurdities, deserve our respect, moreover we worship them as great persons. We are brought up to bow down to a so-called political wisdom of the leaders of nations and are so much accustomed to these phenomena, that the majority doesn't realize in which measure such historical behaviour is incredibly stupid and detrimental for humanity.

However, once this is realized, we cannot avoid the question how allegedly reasonable beings can act in such an insensible manner. Obviously, we are dealing with very strong factors that can overcome individual reason of a man and are unable to learn from experience. Hegel said that historical experience teaches us that people and governments never drew any conclusions or learnt anything from history.

It is possible to find an explanation for all these puzzling controversies and things may be, like in a puzzle, placed on their correct spot, presuming social behaviour of man is not exclusively dictated by reason and cultural tradition, but is governed by those laws which govern all instinctive behaviour created by evolution, and well known from the study of animal behaviour.

However, if we presume that our outer-space observer is an experienced ethologist¹¹ with a thorough knowledge of everything that we briefly outlined in preceding chapters, he would have no alternative but to conclude that human society is organized in a manner very similar to rats who live peacefully within a closed clan, but act as veritable devils towards those who do not belong to their closed company.

However, if our observer from Mars, in addition to all of the above knew of the explosive population growth, an increasing build-up of armaments and the division of humanity into several political blocks – he would see the future of mankind in nuances similar to the future of several opposing groups of rats on a boat on which the foodstuffs are close to depletion. This prediction is actually optimistic, because with the rats even after serious extermination a sufficient number of them would survive to continue the species, whereas with man we are not sure of that after the use of the hydrogen bomb.

Like the use of arms and tools, or the worldwide rule of man which grew out of them, the third and greatest gift of conceptual thinking also carries with it a danger. All cultural achievements of man have one big "catch": they relate only to those properties and effects which can be influenced by individual modification, by learning. Many patterns of behaviour characteristic of our species are not that; the speed of their changeability in the change of species remained the same as is the speed of any bodily feature, it is the same speed by which appearance takes place before conceptual thinking came into being.

Which processes took place when man took a bludgeon for the first time? Probably something similar to what we can observe in two- or three-year olds who have no instinctive or moral mechanisms of restraint and beat each other with objects they can hardly lift with their hands, but they swirl it with full force at another's head. Likewise, it is scarcely possible that the inventor of the first bludgeon hesitated to hit his tribal companion who frustrated him on the head with this precious instrument. Emotionally, he knew nothing of the effects of his discovery, as the inborn mechanisms of restraint were then, just as now, adapted to his natural arms. Was he unhappily surprised when his tribal brother lay dead in front of him? We can assume that with certainty. The animals higher up on the social evolution tree often react extremely dramatically to a sudden death of one of their own species. Grey geese stand hissing, ready to defend the dead friend, as reported by Heinroth who once shot a goose in the presence of its family. I myself experienced how an Egyptian wild duck hit the youngling of a grey goose on the head; the small goose staggered to his parents, but soon died of haemorrhage in the brain. The parents didn't see the very act of murder, but still they reacted equally on the death of their young. The Munich elephant Wast who, without any aggressive intention, while playing severely injured his keeper, got extremely excited, protectively bowing over the injured man and unfortunately, with this act prevented a timely medical aid to the keeper. Bernhard

¹¹ Science on the way of life of individual organisms

Grzimek was telling me that a male chimpanzee who bit him inflicting a serious wound, tried to squeeze the edges of the wound as soon as his rage was over.

The first Cain was probably immediately aware of the horror of his act. We don't need to interpret at length that there appears an unwanted weakening of the combat potential of a horde when too many of its members are killed. Whatever the punishment for such an act was, which prevented unsolicited use of new armaments, a form of responsibility was born, which, though primitive, preserved mankind from self-destruction.

The first effect of a responsible morale was the re-establishing of the lost balance between arms and the inborn hesitancy to kill. With the early man, all other demands which reasonable responsibility set before an individual were still pretty simple and easy to fulfil.

In other words, the inborn tendencies of man are not bad at all. Man is not evil from his birth on, he is merely not good enough for the demands of modern social life.

The very increase of the number of individuals belonging to a certain society must develop two effects which disturb the balance between the most important instincts – attraction and repulsion, i.e. between a personal bond and intra-species aggression. First of all, it is not good if there are too many personal bonds. The old wisdom says that one can have only a few truly good friends. A large number of “acquaintances” which is a feature of every sizeable community carries with it the weakening in the strength of an individual bond. Secondly, a large population – i.e. many individuals on a small space leads to wearing out of all social reactions. Every modern man from a large city, over-fed with his social relations and obligations, is familiar with the annoying feature that he cannot be as glad as one might expect, at the visit of a good friend whom he hasn't seen a long time. We also have a noticeable tendency of ill-mannered behaviour when the phone rings after dinner. An increased tendency at aggressive behaviour is a characteristic consequence of crowding, known for a long time by experimental sociologists.

These unwanted consequences of the increase in the population of our society are accompanied by the impossibility to get rid of the aggressive instinct in an appropriate way and in a “foreseeable” measure. Our first civil obligation is to preserve peace and the hostile neighbouring village which was once an appropriate object for intra-species aggression moved away to an ideal distance.

With a higher development of civilization all preconditions for a correct functioning of our natural preference toward social behaviour become more and more unfavourable, while the demands placed in front of these preferences are getting bigger and bigger. We should treat our “neighbour” as our best friend, although we may never have seen him at all. By virtue of our reason we can see that we are obliged to love even our enemies, something that would never occur to us on the basis of our natural instincts. All the preaching of asceticism which warn us that the wings of instinct must be trimmed, the teaching of hereditary sin which says that man is evil since his youth, all of it contains the same quantity of truth: the insight that man ought not to blindly follow his hereditary features, but must learn to govern them, predicting their actions, and questioning them responsibly.

One can expect that civilization will advance more and more rapidly – hopefully without neglecting culture. The doing which is put in charge of responsible morale at the same time must be increased and made more difficult. The disproportion between the acts that man is capable of doing out of inborn tendencies for the common good and what is asked of him is getting bigger and bigger, and thereby his responsibility becomes more and more difficult to bridge. This perception is disquieting, because even with the best of intentions we cannot see any workable selective advantages which could arise in contemporary man from his strong sense of responsibility or from special virtues of his inborn tendencies. We should seriously be afraid that contemporary commercial society has come under an almost devilish influence of interpersonal competition, and the upbringing is going in a precisely contrary direction. From this direction of responsibility there grows the task which is becoming more and more difficult.

We will not make the solution to this problem any easier if we estimate the power of responsible morale. We will sooner achieve this by a humble awareness that this is “only” a mechanism of compensation, which adapts our instincts to the needs of demanding modern life, and together with them creates a functional systematic whole. This viewpoint clarifies certain obscurities.

We all suffer from the necessity that we must govern our instincts, someone more, someone less, depending on how many social instincts and strivings we have. There is a good old psychiatric definition that a psychopath is a person who suffers because of demands the society is placing on him, or he makes the society suffer. In a certain sense we are all psychopaths because each of us suffers due to renunciation of instincts, as demanded by the principle of the common good. But, the definition is particularly applicable to those persons who break down under these demands becoming neurotic, i.e. sick, or delinquent. According to this definition a “normal” person is not different than the psychopath, nor is a good citizen different from a burglar in a measure in which we draw the line between the healthy and the sick! The difference is analogous to the difference between a man with compensated heart defect and the one who suffers from “decompensated vitium cordis” which means that his heart is not any more capable of compensating with increased muscular activity the condition in which one valve does not fully close or is narrowed. This comparison also bears upon the fact that the effect of compensation **demands energy.**

This perception of a significant effect of responsible morale may be capable of solving the contradiction in Kant’s moral teaching, which was observed already by Friedrich Schiller. He, whom Herder called “the most spiritual of all Kantians” rebelled against the degrading of all natural instincts in Kant’s moral teaching and made fun of it in an excellent epigram: “I gladly serve a friend, but unfortunately, I do this out of instinct, and I am often bothered when I think that I might not be full of virtues!”

But, we do not serve our friend only out of instinct, we judge him according to his friendly acts and we ask ourselves whether a warm, natural tendency motivated him to such behaviour! If we were devout Kantians to the last consequence we should do the contrary, we should give greatest praise to a man who, by himself, due to nature, cannot bear even to see us, but who, by responsible self-questioning against the tendency of his heart is forced to behave politely towards us. Such charitable deeds in reality we received with a very cold respect, and we will love only that man who behaves in a friendly manner towards us because it makes him glad to do so, the one who doesn’t think he should be thanked for his deeds.

When the acts of a certain man, even our own acts, must be judged, it goes without saying that we will value them more the less they correspond to a simple inborn tendency, but when we should judge a person, e.g. by choosing that person as a friend, then, of course, we will give precedence to persons whose friendly behaviour is not based on reason, but exclusively on the warm feeling of natural inclination. It is not a paradox, but sane human reason when we use two different measures of value, depending on whether we are judging someone’s acts or the person.

He, who acts socially out of natural propensity, under normal conditions requests a little of the compensational mechanism of his responsibility, and in times of necessity disposes of huge reserves of morale. He, who already in daily circumstances of life must spend all his force of moral responsibility to satisfy the demands of a cultural society, will break under any additional stress. Our comparison with the heart defect is also applicable here, especially from the energy point of view.

Social behaviour of man may be broken in conditions of multiple loads which can be very different in nature. Morale doesn’t break in the face of overwhelming challenge which appears all at once, we are speaking of the exhausting action of long-term nervous overload, whatever its nature. Worry, hardship, hunger, fear, exhaustion, hopelessness, etc. have the same effect. **Whoever was in the position in war or imprisonment to observe people in distress, knows how unpredictable people are and how suddenly moral decompensation can occur. People for whom you believed to be so stable that you could build a house on them suddenly break down, and others of whom you didn’t expect anything special prove to have almost inexhaustible energy and provide example to many others how to keep their morale high. Whoever has been through something of this nature knows also that the strength of good will and its endurance are two independent variables.** When we realize that, we learn not to feel superior over those who break down sooner than us. Even the best and the most noble will finally reach the point when they can take it no more: **Eli, Eli, Lama sabachthani?**

Why so many quotations?

Because I am not as clever as those whom I quote, that's why!

In my, already long life, I have listened to and read so much that is semi-intelligent or stupid, and had the pretence of being original, that I am sick of it.

I had made my way through riddles and entanglements of everything that surrounds us happy if I could understand those who understood.

That is why I quote them.

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravca: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - izvode. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Sreb.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

On the DVD enclosed to this book, there are statements of witnesses, and these witnesses speak truthfully about my behaviour in the real situation, on battlefields on which I was present in various functions.

I wish to stress the word “REAL”, because in the majority of those who write and make judgements about the war, especially those who perceive themselves as “intellectuals” or even worse, “humanistic intellectuals” I see a number of logical errors in concluding. Allow me to state a few basic ones.

When I shall analyse the statements of witnesses, I will refer to the logical errors which I state here.

1. SIMPLIFICATION OR REDUCTION

The real situation will be simplified – reduced on the level of individual knowledge, or rather, ignorance of the person making a judgement.

Reality will be adapted – reduced (all elements which disturb the picture will be left out or ignored), according to the “wishes and concepts” of the person making a judgement.

The reasons, magnitude and form of reduction of reality or a real event serve the ideological, interest, political or other biases of the person making a judgement, always in a way that, had the person making a judgement been a participant of the event, he would solve the problem easily in a moral and legally correct way.

According to this, belated wisdom (poor wisdom), history would look much more differently if they had had their sway or if they had been in the position to decide.

Such persons making a judgement, as well as arbiters will not pose the question: “Why haven’t we decided?” because the answer is degradingly simple and banal – THEY DO NOT participate in war, they wait for the outcome in order to know what to think of the past, how they will judge and over whom they will pass judgement.

2. ASSERTION

The easiness of the solution of a certain real war (and not only war) situation is exponentially proportionate to the distance from that situation and exponentially proportionate to the comfort of life from which this real war (and not only war) situation is being observed.

The same proportionality is true also for OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARBITER, ignorance – cultural and historical, of wars and civilizations and scientific...

3. FAKE PEOPLE - RATIONALIZATION OF PERSONAL IMMORALITY

There is a special kind of people in Croatia who see and feel and describe themselves as “intellectuals”, “humanists”, “progressive”, and they were members of the Communist League, until the beginning of the aggression against Croatia, simply put – they were communists.

To be a member of a fascist organization - subtype: communism – and overnight, by a Copernican turnabout, run across into the forum of “humanistic intellectuals” – is a logical *contradictio in subjecto*.

I am not implying that people cannot change or have no right to change, but the changes of Croatian communists into liberal humanists is a change of “speech” and not of “essence”, it is a change due to interest and retention of social power that enables financial status.

- a) How they professed the communist system in which ideology determined what is reality and which facts determine it (but not vice-versa), they continued even after the war in Croatia.

Used to daily longstanding production of the communist “ideal picture of the world” they continued at their job, now as “renown liberal democrats” with the same methodology:

- Everything could have been different and better if you had only listened to us!
 - Everything that happened, including that war and war crimes, all of that is the product of “right-wing ideas”, “reactionaries” and “rural primitives”... !
 - In order for their position of “the ones who do not participate” be morally elevated, in accordance with the “ideal picture of the world”, they INTRODUCED A RULE:
If EVERYTHING is not morally clean, EVERYTHING is morally dirty;
 - These “Marxists” never seriously read Marx’s 11th thesis on FEUERBACH;
 - These people are here to judge, arbiter, accuse, decide, call names, determine the truth and moral norms ... and they are strong in number.
- b) The energy of their former communist opinion is great. The democratic procedure of a free Croatia enables change, but the democratic procedure is not at the same time a substantial change of the energy of the previous opinion.
- This is how people are, I am not judging, I am merely trying to clarify.

4. THE INTRODUCTION OF WRONG PREPOSITIONS IN THE LOGICAL SEQUENCE

If the arbiter of a certain war event (or any other event) lacks some elements for his foregone conclusion, he will introduce the necessary elements into his logical sequence by personal choice, arbitrarily; this may be due to ignorance, absence of every desire to do research, or for any of a number of possible interests which determine the arbiter.

5. EQUALIZING OF THE NOTIONS BY CONTENT

When a certain society, a nation, undergoes three processes simultaneously – defence against aggression – war, the change of political system - from communism to democracy and the setting up of the state, than surely we can speak about the point of singularity, the creation of the developmental code with a questionable outcome. This is how it was in Croatia 1991, and especially in BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ in 1992.

Some indispensable social structures are being formed and named, and so we get “army”, “government”, “police”, “military police”, “municipal government”... and all of this on very precarious criteria of truthfulness or a positive selection.

For a positive selection a much longer time-frame is necessary.

With regard to the fact that the notions used for these structures are the same as the ones used in Western countries, after a long process of positive selection, we arrive at the point of logical error of equalizing and levelling of the content of notions irrespective of the fact that the embryo carries the structure of the FUTURE ADULT, but is not yet that adult.

In such “thinkers” there is no “*differentia specifica*” and they do not ponder over such “tiny items”, although it is plain to every even mildly serious observer, simply by examining the facts that can be seen on TV, that the social and fundamental state structures have only the same name, only the notion which is the same. And the contents of these concepts differ as “HEAVEN AND EARTH”.

In science also, “enslavement” with a conceptual system substantially slows down the progress and understanding (classical physics – theory of relativity), and the situation is much worse in the social sciences.

6. THE IGNORANCE OF THE BASIC POSTULATES OF THE “THEORY OF LARGE SYSTEMS” – E.G. SOCIETY

Of all the large systems which man investigates, society is certainly if not the biggest, but surely the most complex one, with respect to the number of variables it contains, the interaction of these variables, the lack of firm constants, and quantity and diversity of energies moving within the system.

Who is capable of tackling these complexities, these breaking curves, these abrupt changes in state, these accumulated potential energies which suddenly, without exactly explainable reason, turn into action, into movement, into work.

How to convince those “THINKERS” that even if you want a change in large systems, and wish to make that change work in a favourable direction, you must proceed with precisely calculated speed unless you wish to cause a break of the system.

A “modern”, “liberal humanist” of the Croatian type, usually a former communist, revolutionist, wants everything and now. As he cannot get it, he accuses and judges everyone around himself.

7. IGNORANCE

Reading and listening for over two decades all the explanations and judgements of the war events in former Yugoslavia, the various analysts, I became convinced that the majority of them, neither know the postulates of social psychology when speaking about the behaviour of an individual or groups, nor do they know anything about behaviour in war. They do not make use of the only possible method, the comparative one, just as they know nothing of existing research of cases of behaviour under conditions of a complete breakdown of society and conditions of state in disarray, etc.

Therefore, I intend to insert attachments into the book which shed light on the above.

- a) Society is not a closed system; before the war, and especially during the war, it passes through two simultaneous processes: a reduction of entropy (in cluster of citizens) and a substantial increase of entropy in sub-systems based on various grounds – ideological, religious, territorial (region, municipality, neighbourhood), following the projections of wishes, fear, hatred...
- b) There is no linearity, a cause two times greater doesn't mean twice as great a consequence. The law of equality of action and reaction does not apply – the spiral of growth of the energy of evil is always exponential.
I will return to these issues more at length later in the book.

8. COMPLETE DISREGARD OF EMOTIONS, THINKING AND BEHAVIOUR WHICH PROCEED FROM EXTREME EMOTIONAL STATES

Due to incapacity of the rational mind to resolve relations and problems between nations in an amicable manner, such situations are often resolved by war.

Before the war, and especially during it, emotions determine a large part of behaviour and actions.

As we consume an unending string of wars, hunger, catastrophes of various types, we have become numb, the threshold of sensitivity is very high and the reaction is evoked only when some of those pictures became reality for us.

This is the loop of cause and effect – CATCH 22.

Becoming “numb” protects our minds from such a quantity of evil, death and pain, and being “numb” we lack the motive for efficient action, apart from daily dispatch of benign messages, to soothe our own conscience.

The area of sensitivity and understanding the suffering of others decreases exponentially with the distance from the area where suffering occurs.

The Dubrovnik walls (THEY ARE BEAUTIFUL) were made to protect people, but nevertheless the majority of reporters, while the Yugoslav Army and Chetniks were destroying the city, firstly reported on which tower was hit and how much it was damaged, and only at the end, as an after-thought mentioned human casualties – the dead and the wounded.

Man is evidently a cheap and expendable item, but the walls should remain in order for those who write about it to have a place where to enjoy, once the whole mayhem comes to an end.

In the period after the war these two groups of people, those who were being killed and those who were writing about the damaged walls, will not understand each other for a long, long time.

In the aggression on Croatia, the English were mostly interested in the fate of the Lipizzaner, and one group of “humanists” was primarily worried over a destiny of an old oak.

Distant observers are either indifferent or project into themselves divine attributes, by which they would swiftly and easily solve all these problems.

And all those who go to take part, who go to defend, realize that they have no divine attributes and that everything which constitutes a war is difficult and painful and complicated; they will be the guilty ones for those who observe. More or less, all of them will be GUILTY.

9. FUNCTION AND MIND

Irrespective of the way how someone comes into a position of power, he will become smart overnight – proportionate to the importance of the function he occupies.

At the time of fundamental social changes, especially in the defensive war (The Volunteers create the state) a good enough positive selection is not possible, so that those who fulfil the functions are usually not up to the task they face, is not just a few.

10. THOSE WHO CAME TO CROATIA AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FROM THE WEST AT THE TIME OF AGGRESSION, ASSUMED (VERY FREQUENTLY) THE FOLLOWING RULE:

Knowledge, possibility of judgement and the power of synthetic mind of a Western observer is proportionate, a priori, to the size, economic power and political “weight” of the country from which he comes.

Simply speaking, we were not equal interlocutors, very far from that.

Another, probably the majority of foreigners come with the conviction that even very complex social problems can be managed by application of an algorithm valid for a medium-complexity mechanical process or a medium-size company.

Only very few realize the huge gap between the verbs “to want” and “to be able to”, in the forming and directing the processes in society which is a victim of aggression and finds itself in a nearly destroyed social structure (CROATIA) and completely destroyed social structure (BiH).

This provides fertile grounds for accusations on all bases.

11. RETROSPECTIVE REASON

The projection of retrospective insights into a real, past and completed situation or event distorts the truth, denies the uniqueness of history, diminishes the value of participation, degrades, humiliates those who decided to “*defend the Thermopylae*”.

Retrospective historical reason is no reason at all.

12. THE MULTIPLICATION OF REAL TIME

In subsequent analyses and judgements of an event, or more generally, some real historic situation, the worthy thinkers single out one problem and compress into its solution the entire time frame in which the event takes place.

For another problem which is synchronous with the first one, again the same real time is taken for its contemplation and solution, excluding in this process the existence of the first problem.

This applies to the fiftieth problem and the fiftieth decision in the same real time, they, the thinkers, do not understand or do not wish to understand the synchronicity of events and do not understand that the same body cannot be on two places at the same time.

13. THE PREDICTABILITY OF EVENTS - THE PREDICTABILITY OF CRIME

It is disconcerting what KIND OF MESS APPEARS WITH THE NON-UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYNTAGM “*THE PREDICTABILITY OF EVENTS*” with THOSE WHO EVALUATE AND JUDGE.

We can see A COMPLETE NON-UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CERTAINTY OF A STATISTICAL PREDICTABILITY OF AN EVENT – PHENOMENON and THE INDIVIDUAL UNPREDICTABILITY OF THIS EVENT – PHENOMENON.

As if the quantum electrodynamics failed to explain anything, whether in physics or in society.

This is particularly true of the PREDICTABILITY OF CRIME, WHETHER IN PEACE OR IN WAR.

- a) “THE WAR CRIME” IS PREDICTABLE BOTH STATISTICALLY, and in a great measure also individually, because “the war crime” is embedded in the very sense of such a war.
- b) Nazi crimes were predictable both statistically and individually because they proceeded from the “meaning” and “essence” of the social and political structure.
- c) The same is true of Stalin’s, Pavelić’s, Tito’s, Pol Pot’s, ... regime.

- d) The crimes which OCCUR DAILY in New York, Paris, Berlin, Zagreb, . . . , are statistically predictable and certain, but not individually.
- e) My Lai, Abu Ghraib, the killing of German prisoners after the World War II, crimes in Baghdad, . . . , and thousands of other WAR and peace-time crimes are statistically predictable, but these crimes are not a product and consequence of the system, but the consequence of imperfections of the system and they are not predictable on the individual level.
It is impossible to know how, when and where this will happen nor who will be the perpetrator.
- f) The catchword which I heard so many times: “*Crimes have happened, someone must be guilty*” is frighteningly illogical and immoral.
Not “*someone*” (meaning anyone), THE PERPETRATOR MUST BE GUILTY, the perpetrator must be found, it must be proven “beyond any reasonable doubt” that the guilty party committed the crime and should be punished.
- g) With “crimes in war” guilt is not determined with the “foundation of the crime” but the imperfection of the system. This is true for Americans, the British, the French, . . . as well as for the Croats.
Or maybe the things stand otherwise?
- h) Therefore, “the crime in war” is statistically predictable, but the time, place and the individual perpetrator eludes the predictability. Individuality is not predictable.
- i) The thesis that those who went to war to defend themselves from aggression are “*a priori*” responsible for the individuality of crime, irrespective of how they behaved, what they did, what they commanded, is very dangerous and logically untenable.
- j) And what are they supposed to do, how to behave? Emigrate from New York, Berlin, . . . , lock up the mayor and chief of police because they didn’t predict and prevent the crime, stop producing cars and airplanes because they cause death, stop fighting the Al-Qaida and dictators of the likes of Saddam Hussein or Gaddafi, BECAUSE THERE OCCUR INNOCENT VICTIMS, should we leave the American army because Abu Ghraib happened, . . . , WHAT ARE WE SUPPOSED TO DO?, how to satisfy the absurdity of some moralistic idle talk which has nothing to do with MORALE.

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostar i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

FACTS WHICH WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING
OF WHAT HAPPENED IN YUGOSLAVIA FROM 1990–1995

1. UNTIL THE FIRST WORLD WAR

After these areas where the Croats live, or Croatian areas, were “civilized” for several centuries by great and powerful nations, after their power was demonstrated here by the Turks and Hungarians and Italians (Venetians primarily), and the Austrians and the French, what is the end-result of it all?

All this civilization and all this culture and cultural influences can be summed up, almost without exception, as plundering and extortion, taking Croatian men to fight in wars that were not our own, or be galley-slaves on sleek boats made of oak cut down in Croatian forests, on the cutting down of men and the felling of forests, on all kinds of levies and taxes. All this so much extolled historic and cultural intertwining between the peoples, essentially all this is usurpation of men and territory.

The history of these times is bloody and hard, poor and miserable at least in so far as Croats are concerned.

So it happened that the Croats, following imperial and royal dictates bravely fought for Napoleon and for the black-and-yellow monarchy, and for the interests of Venice, while children that were snatched by Turks were turned into merciless janissary soldiers.

And what has remained?

The neck-tie is a heritage of the Croats, from baron Trenk who fought somewhere around Nuremberg in the 30-years’ war. Near the island of Vis the Italians fought against Austrians, and a bit closer to the coast, near Hvar, the Russians battled the French, while Napoleon stretched from Zagreb to Dubrovnik bringing god only knows what kind of goodness to these areas.

This same great Generalissimo abolished the Dubrovnik Republic, and the Croatian nobility, humiliated and without freedom, stopped reproducing and died out in a silent protest against big ideas and global interests of “great nations”.

And so forth. It was always the same from all who encircle us, the grave-diggers over men and goods in the areas inhabited by small-numbered Croats.

IT'S CALLED HISTORY.

Some nuances must nevertheless be stressed – it was much better under Austria than under the Turks. A lesser evil.

2. THE FIRST WORLD WAR

In their poor legal position within the two, at that time mighty empires – the Austrian and the Hungarian- Croats could not choose the war, and especially the side on which they would get to fight.

Having been made soldiers by imperial decrees they fought where they were sent, and, according to military reports they were obedient soldiers and brave warriors, as they remained until then.

Maybe this courage and fighting for foreign interests was a by-product of the feeling that the poor life they lived is not much worth living even in peace, and maybe it's because we had the slogan:

"No rum, no storm".

Who will know, maybe bravery is something endowed us by nature.

3. BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

When this butchery in First World War ended as the last, fifth act of the tragedy played earlier, there was no Fortinbras on stage, but they started to write up a new play in the ballrooms of Versailles, assigned the roles and the party could begin anew.

A little while later YEATS will write:

*“The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.”*

(The Second Coming, William Butler Yeats, 1919)

How could it be otherwise when a general, far from the mud of Verdun, on the remark that he should not order attack because due to rain, long-lasting rain, everything is soaked and muddy, and tens of thousands of men will die, angrily snapped: “Not men, mister, soldiers.”

When was it in Europe that soldiers were men?

(Maybe a notable exception in this valuation of things belongs only to the Americans!)

As far as Croats are concerned, they lost the war, and not only war, they lost the Austria-Hungary, state to which they belonged, and, as the Europeans cheated on the Wilson plan on the right even of small peoples to freedom, they took refuge with the Serbian king out of fear of being torn apart by someone more powerful than Serbia.

The victorious Serbs charged for their losses and began to realize their political aims, as well as other winners did, in accordance with the logic of force.

They forced the Danube, marched into Vojvodina (Banat and Bačka), patched together a new Assembly of Vojvodina, forged the minutes and annexed this beautiful piece of land to the Kingdom of Serbia.

The Hungarians, Volksdeutscher (ethnic Germans), Croats, all losers in the war, have no good response to that force, though the Serbs in Bačka were less numerous than any of those three nations.

Then this King’s army, victorious soldiery, marched into Montenegro (1918), abolished that state and annexed it to Serbia, Macedonia became Southern Serbia, Albanians from Kosovo did not dare raise a voice in that province called “*Old Serbia*”, Muslims were not even a nation, they marched through Croatia as “liberators”, the Italians marched into Istria and continued toward Dalmatia, and so, with the blessing of the great victorious powers, “*was recognized as justifying the strivings of the South Slavs in the Monarchy for liberation*” – *Th. W. Wilson*.

This is how the new state was born and recognized, a state in which the PEOPLE’S COUNCIL is the political representative - THE KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENIANS.

In this food chain of evil the historians most often deal with those at the top, kings, governments and ministers, deputies, the cessation of eight centuries long tradition of the Croatian National Assembly (*Sabor*) which, at least symbolically, represented a continuity of Croatian statehood, the tricks of the majority representatives on the negotiations in Geneva (1918), the frauds in the proclamation of the Constitution of the New Kingdom, decrees, dictatorship of the King Alexander. . . ., and I will devote a bit of attention to the most important (in my view) link in this chain, the royal Serbian gendarme, his truncheon and his rifle, and finance officer who should fill the treasury in Belgrade.

These primitive and high-handed individuals accomplished (especially in smaller localities and in the villages – 90% of the population) the job of humiliation and degradation of every human dignity, and this was not only among the Croats.

These humiliated, beaten and robbed people, the Croats, began to dream of better days, and start to hate, a sufficient number of Croats hates the KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA.

Hatred, persistent and frequent, a powerful and long-lasting emotion.

There is no use avoiding the discourse about hatred and the recognition of this entity.

And now, a brief, incomplete overview of evil.

- a) Anti-Serbian uprising in Montenegro quelled by killing.
- b) In Zagreb, on 5th December 1918 the Croatian Home Guard – citizens cheered to the Croatian Republic. They were shot at – 13 dead, 17 wounded.
- c) Three most pronounced co-workers of Stjepan Radić, HRSS (Croatian Republican Peasants' Party), the undisputed leader of the Croatian people, were imprisoned. Later, in 1925, after the King's State Protection Act, Stjepan Radić himself was imprisoned.
- d) On August 8th, 1928, in the Assembly in Belgrade the radical Serbian deputy Puniša Račić, a Chetnik Duke, kills with revolver shots the deputies Pavao Radić of the HSS (Croatian Peasants' Party) and Đuro Basariček, and seriously wounds Stjepan Radić, who dies in a hospital a week later. Lightly wounded were Ivan Pernar and Ivan Grandža who tried to protect Radić with his body.
- e) Earlier on, in 1921, Croatian miners staged a revolt in Labin, Istria, against Italian fascists and set up "*The Labin Republic*". The fascists killed them.
- f) In Proština, near Labin in Istria, Croatian peasants revolted against fascism. The fascists killed them.
- g) In 1931 the Serbian gendarmes killed the world-renown Croatian historian Milan Šufflay, fail to kill the writer Mile Budak, but succeed also in killing the communists Đuro Đaković and Nikola Hećimović, seven secretaries of SKOJ (Yugoslav Communist Youth Association) – the leaders of communist youth, mainly Croats, imprison Vlatko Maček, the leader of HSS (Croatian Peasants' Party) and Croatian people after the killing of Stjepan Radić.
- h) In autumn of 1933 in Zagreb, Dr Ivo Pilar, a famous Croatian geopolitical scientist was killed.
- i) In autumn of 1934 the members of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) and members of Ustasha movement from Croatia killed the king of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia Aleksandar Karađorđević in Marseilles.
- j) On February 19th, 1935 in Slavonski Brod, after the mass gendarmes killed eight peasants. The next day the peasants from nearby villages of Vrbe and Rušice came to Brod demanding the release of imprisoned peasants, but were met by the gendarmes who killed five more of them.
- k) On May 9th, 1931 in Senj they killed seven young Croats from Gospić who came to Senj with a Croatian flag to the concert of the Croatian singing choir "Trebević" from Sarajevo.
- l) In 1938, in Primošten, four peasants were killed.

Etc, etc, without end. I enclose the tables with listed crimes and maintain that, as far as Croats are concerned, the First World War did not end in 1918. The form of the war is different, intensity lower, but the war goes on.

Excerpt from "Short historical survey of evil over Croatia" (conquests, persecutions, killings, plundering, ethnocide...) - Original project titled: Kratki povijesni pregled zla nad Hrvatskom i u Hrvatskoj (osvajanja, progoni, ubijanja, pljačke, zatiranja,...) - project manager Slobodan Praljak, edited by Tomislav Donlić, Zagreb, 2006.

KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA 1918-1935

POLITICAL TERROR IN CROATIA

Although Croatia and the Croats in the Kingdom of SHS (The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians), i.e. the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, were supposed to be a constituent part of the state, they received an unequal, subordinate position in the national, political, economic and cultural sense comparing to the Serbs and Serbia.

Although they entered the Kingdom of SHS by an agreement that was supposed to ensure the equality of all nations in that state, one political factor prevailed that had its support in the Great-Serbian middle-class; on the territory of Croatia the repression against any kind of opposition caused by the national, social or political discontent was almost an everyday event;

The politics of centralization and unitarism could be executed owing to the superiority of the centralistic-unitarian class in the state, i.e. the predominance of the Great-Serbian middle-class and the military top lead by the court; the ideological creator of that concept of organization of the government was the regent, and from summer 1921 king Aleksandar I. Karađorđević, he had ardent help from Svetozar Pribičević, a Serb from Croatia, at that time the passionate and bigoted advocate and leader of centralism and unitarism (later he retired from politics completely disappointed with the unjust social system, he was even interned and exiled from Yugoslavia), and then the king also received prominent support from the military circles and the members of the People's Radical Party headed by **dr. Nikola Pašić**, but also members of the Democratic Party;

1. The army, that was the firm support for the king's social system and was favoured and connected exclusively by the Serbian executive personnel, in Croatia and some other parts of the country (Macedonia, Kosovo, Vojvodina) acted like the occupying force;¹
2. Soon military Serbian laws and decrees expanded to the territory of Croatia, e.g. on April 28th 1919, by a law that was passed by the military commander, regent Aleksandar, the military courts had also jurisdiction over citizens accused under military correctional law of the Kingdom of Serbia; **the order considered the area of Croatia as occupied, so as a conquered territory**; by the decree of the regent dated August 19th 1919 those same military laws were extended also to the entire territory of the Kingdom of SHS;
3. On December 20th 1918 the signs of Croatian sovereignty were removed, and ever since then national signs were prohibited by law and prevented; the official flag became tricolour: blue-white-red, what were the signs of the Serbian flag; in Croatia the institution of the Croatian ban was gradually abolished – according to the characteristics of the earlier authority and position he was the Croatian Vice-Roy – until it was completely abolished in 1921, by the Vidovdan Constitution, when instead of ban a regional vice-regent of the king was appointed;
4. By the king's decree published on November 30th 1920 in the Official Gazette in Zagreb, immediately after the end of the elections for the Constituent Assembly, the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) was dissolved;
5. The centralization of the public administration was reflected also on the local level; from 1919 until 1929 the government in Zagreb was dissolved several times and the reasons for that were strictly political; in 1919 the town council was dissolved for the first time; in 1920 the results of the elections weren't recognized, i.e. first the election results were suspended and then annulled; in 1921 the town council was dissolved again and the government commissioner was appointed, it was also dissolved in 1925. And in 1927 the central government interfered when they annulled the terms of office of four "unsuitable" representatives, while in 1929 after the resignation of Heinzel new elections weren't realized but instead after the declaration of the king's dictatorship and the decree on abolishment of town governments the town was administered by the government commissioner;
6. The similar thing happened all over Croatia. In southern Dalmatia the central government postponed the elections for the district government for the entire seven years and when they were finally allowed in 1926 and when the results mostly showed the anti-regime mood then according to the same principle they dissolved assemblies (Split, Dubrovnik, Korčula);
7. From January 6th, 1929 the king with his manifesto annulled the Vidovdan Constitution, dissolved the state National Parliament and declared the absolutist monarchy; prohibited were all legal political parties existing at the time; persecutions, prison, internments, short-term and long-term prison sentences, and even murders followed;
8. At the end of July 1924 with the order of the minister of Education Svetozar Pribičević it was prohibited for teachers and students to enrol to high-school or sports societies that have the separatist „tribal“ character, so the ones that have emphasized in their names the Croatian mark like e.g. „Croatian Falcon“ that had its name changed into „Yugoslavian Falcon“;²
9. The general dissatisfaction of the **Croatian peasants** started in September and lasted until the end of 1920, and the main causes of that riot were the general dissatisfaction of the Croatian peasantry with the new state,

¹ Compare Rajko Jovanović: "Historija bijelog terora u Jugoslaviji", Toronto, 1935; Svetozar Pribičević: „Diktatura kralja Aleksandra“, Pariz, 1933.

² Compare Rudolf Horvat: „Hrvatska na mučilištu“, Zagreb 1942, and: „Narodne novine“ No. 177, 8.VIII.1921.; No. 206, 13.IX.1921.; No. 96, 26.IV.1922.; „Službene novine“ No. 178, 6.VIII.1924.

personified in the Serbian monarchy of Karađorđević and marked with centralism, burdened with the high costs of basic necessities, unsolved agrarian question as well as many other economic and political questions. The direct cause of the riot was the decision of the military government about branding and listing the cattle for the needs of the army, for commissariat service, and the decision on the two-month military practice in the middle of the field works, to which the conscripts had to come with their own wagons and horses; the riot was brutally put down with repressive government machinery (national police force, army), with unprecedented violence, in blood – 25 people were killed, 15 of them were peasants, and hundreds of peasant were wounded;³

10. 1918 – 1941

- There was a systematic political terror (dismantling of the parliaments, denial of mandates, ignoring of the election results, forbidding of political activity, the abolition of political parties);
- There was a systematic persecution of political opposition (killings, imprisonments, expelling into illegality);
- The taxation policy was conducted at the expense of non-Serbian regions (the exchange of kruna for dinar 4:1);
- Every form of dissatisfaction with the government was most brutally punished; in 1920 in a mutiny of peasants there were **25 killed** and over 100 injured;
- All opposition politicians were under severe and continuous pressure by the regime, and especially the members of the Croatian Party of Rights, the Croatian Peasant Party and the Socialist Workers Party of Yugoslavia;
- In the period 1929 – 1932 in Yugoslavia there were **152 political court trials**; they resulted in **18 death penalties**, **4 life imprisonments**, and **734 defendants** were sentenced to a total of **2348 years** of imprisonment;
- In the same period of the **52 indicted members** of the Croatian Party of Rights, **43** were sentenced to **289 years** of imprisonment, **5** were sentenced to death “in absentia”, **2** were sentenced to life imprisonment, and **3** were hanged;

Etc, etc.

Hundreds of social variables linked with very, very complicated differential equations with constants (despair, misery, fear, aspirations, hatred, ...) which are not silencers of this state, but only contribute to the upturn of the Second law of thermodynamics, entropy is lowered; this is the “*STATE OF THE SPIRIT*” OF THE PEOPLES who lived in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia immediately before the Second World War broke out.

A new bloody ball could begin, everything was ready.

The Croatian people split into two groups whose leaders promised the realization of dreams, a new and better world – communists crystallize these wishes and strivings, and expectations and hopes, as a new social and political justice in the fascist system – subtype Stalinism, and the Ustasha into the fascist system – subtype Nazism.

Should the strivings, hopes, wishes of all the participants be condemned because of these crystallizations? In a time when entire Europe, the civilized and educated Europe, loses all moral signposts.

4. THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The war which began in 1914 continued in Croatia (Yugoslavia) at a lower intensity, but a good preparation for events which followed.

Dr. Ante Pavelić and the Ustasha political leadership using relatively well researched (but much less known) social mechanisms crystallize the desire of the greater part of Croats for a state, a homeland and justice, into a fascist formation.

In researching the means of creation of such a governmental and political formation – in looking for the answer

³ Bosiljka Janjatović: „Represija spram hrvatskih seljaka 1918-1921”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, I/1993, p. 25-34.

to the question “*how is it possible*”, in satisfying the striving and wish to understand, you always expose yourself to the danger to be accused of someone who justifies the crimes and their perpetrators.

In communist Yugoslavia that was the rule.

There was a communist truth and communist facts which supported this truth.

The victims were posthumously humiliated, oftentimes without name, and became a number adapted to the political, communist, mainly Serbian propaganda about the “genocidal being of the Croatian people”.

To the question who was Ante Pavelić I quote the response given to historians on that same question by NEVA MIHALIĆ (born in 1972 in Zagreb) because I agree with this response:

“Dictator who wanted to rule over Croats in terror and blood, manipulator and criminal, a false national messiah who dared to think that the life of Croatia depends on his own fate and would have led to moral and physical death the Croatian army and the Croatian people.”

I might add that he not only wanted to do it, but actually did it, to a great extent.

In the team which helped me prepare my defence at the Tribunal in the Hague I had a young historian TOMISLAV ĐONLIĆ. The project was called “*SHORT HISTORICAL SURVEY OF EVIL OVER CROATIA*” (*conquests, persecutions, killings, plundering, ethnocide ...*). I was the head of the project, and Mr. Đonlić researched all available literature and other sources. You can see the book on my web site and see from how many books and other sources this overview was made. Most of the data which I quote about NDH /The Independent State of Croatia/ are from that book. I see these data as relevant, and conclusions founded.

Why such a project as preparation for defence in front of the International Tribunal?

Because I was and I remain convinced that without knowing the past, we cannot judge accurately and truthfully the phenomena of the war 1991 – 1995 and, consequent to the above, we cannot judge the difference between the verbs “*want*” and “*can*” in streamlining social processes, especially those who lead to the perpetration of crime.

Excerpt from “Short historical survey of evil over Croatia” (conquests, persecutions, killings, plundering, ethnocide...) - project manager Slobodan Praljak, edited by Tomislav Đonlić, Zagreb, 2006.

NDH - THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA

It emerged as the expression of the deepest natural aspirations of the Croatian people for their own state which would be independent, autonomous, sovereign; in that crucial historical moment none of the present Croatian politicians (above all dr. Vladko Maček – HSS (Croatian Peasant Party) – the strongest political factor in Croatia wanted to take the responsibility for the faith of the people.

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was falling apart; Hitler asked Yugoslavia to take sides; the government was already in exile (London); on April 10th 1941 Slavko Kvaternik declared the Independent State of Croatia; Ante Pavelić came from Italy supported by Mussolini; HSS appealed to the people to support the regime; on April 15th Mussolini and Hitler recognize NDH with the condition of territorial concessions.

*Since the regime was subject to the domination of Italy and Germany, it also accepted to a great extent the legislative practice of the Axis forces, so from April 30th 1941 also in Croatia the **racial laws** were valid, in fact decrees:*

1. **Legislative regulations on citizenship,**
2. **Legislative regulations on racial affiliation and**
3. **Legislative regulations for the protection of Aryan blood and honour of Croatian people**

Also special courts and court-martials were founded; on April 17th 1941 special national courts for the enforcement of the legal regulations on national and racial intolerance were founded (Zagreb, Varaždin, Bjelovar, Osijek, Gospić, Banja Luka and Tuzla); court-martials were founded in June 1941 with the Legislative regulations about mobile court-martials (Zagreb, Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Bihać, Brčko, Derventa and Višegrad).

As the consequence of the enactment of racial laws the interment of Jews, Serbs and Gipsies, but also Croats and Muslims unfavourable to the regime soon followed.

The first phase of the creation of the Ustasha camps was the foundation of the so called “gathering places”, better known by other names: assembly camps, emigrant camps, assembly points. Those were the places of temporary stay of the arrested people, and from there they were deported – the biggest ones were in Caprag near Sisak, Bjelovar and Slavonska Požega.

At the same time progressed the construction of concentration of camps, better known as “camps of death”. First such camp was founded near Koprivnica (Danica), then the camp Jadovno near Gospić was founded, then in Lobograd, Đakovo, Tenja near Osijek, Sisak and Jastrebarsko. Main and biggest camps were in Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška.

So the Croatian people in the Second World War were divided in two camps: one which supported the Ustasha regime until the end, believing in the survival of (acceptable) Independent State of Croatia after the war and the other that joined the partisan movement believing that with the victory of the anti-fascist forces in the Second World War those forces will become stronger in Croatia, Dalmatia, Istria, Međimurje and that in this way they will unite those Croatian provinces in a new Croatia (“Soviet”).

JASENOVAC AND OTHER USTASHA CAMPS

When we are talking about the research on victims (crimes?) killed by the members of Ustasha regime in the Second World War we must remember the tendencies in the earlier historiography whose idea was to ideologize the history discrediting one regime (Ustasha), whatever it was.

In other words, the problem of the study of total number of the war victims, on all levels, was ex-Yugoslavia reduced to discussions about Jasenovac, more accurately to the number of victims Jasenovac had. In that way, in mid-1980-ties, the discussions about Jasenovac – in books and in media – developed into public arguments and competition to estimate the number of victims. In the process the numbers mostly took an upturn and differed so much that an estimate of hundred thousand more or less was considered an irrelevant difference.

NUMERICAL INDICATOR OF JASENOVAC MYTH:

Number of victims	Year of origin	Autor
55	18.5.1945.	Insight into Jasenovac made by the Polling Board
481	June 1964.	Anthropological excavation made by professional board
8.500 (until March 1942.)	31.3.1942.	Tito's Directive to El. School NOP (Peoples Liberation Movement) for Bosanska Krajina
8.500 (until March 1942.)	4.4.1942.	Tito's <u>dispatch</u> to IK /Executive Committee/ of “Internacionala”
30.000 – 40.000	1989.	Dr.Franjo Tuđman , „Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti“ /Wilderness of historical reality/
50.000	1992.	Vladimir Žerjavić
200.000 – 300.000 (The end of 1942.)	1942.	<u>Pamphlet of AVNOJ</u> (Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia)
480.000 – 900.000	1986.	Antun Miletić
500.000 – 600.000	1946.	Results published by the Temporal commission
500.000 – 600.000	1986.	Jefto Šašić
500.000. – 700.000	1989.	Vladimir Dedijer
550.800	15.11.1961.	Commission of SUBNOR (Union of the society of the fighters in the national liberation war) of Bosanska Dubica
600.000 (until 1943.)	1945.	State Board of Yugoslavia
700.000	1989.	Srboľjub Živanović, one of three anthropologists who took part in the commission for anthropological excavation 1964.
700.000	1974.	Radovan Trivunčić, pamphlet Jasenovac and Jasenovac camps
900.000 (until 1943.)	18.5.1945.	Milan Duzemlić
1,110.929	1990.	Radomir Bulatović
1,400.000	18.5.1945.	Mihajlo Marić

From this data it is noticeable that there isn't even a minimum of harmony in historiography about their method of calculation of the number of victims of Jasenovac, indeed most of the works, and exclusively the ones that deal with numbers from 500.000 and up, are trying to prove the big and planned genocide that was allegedly realized against Serbs, Jews ... placing the great responsibility on the catholic church as the ideological initiator and the Ustasha as executors.

The majority of authors claimed that their works were scientifically founded, although their research which had measurable results differs so much that they don't have any logical connection one with the other.

Except for Bruno Bušić and Franjo Tuđman, none of the historiographers who occupied themselves with this subject cited that in Jasenovac, besides Ustasha camp, there was also a partisan camp where the participants of the Way of the Cross were imprisoned.

The amount of significance that the power-holders gave to the control of the subject of war victims (read: of Jasenovac) testifies also fate of two people who tried to question the set frameworks of the understanding of war victims: Bruno Bušić was killed, and Franjo Tuđman was sentenced twice by a court and socially marginalized.

If we compare the census before and after the Second World War (1931-1948) we can easily determine that the biggest demographic and immediate war losses appeared only in Federative Republic of Croatia (in the total amount):

SR	1921 – 1931	1931 – 1948
Bosnia and Herzegovina	+ 433.115	+ 240.212
Montenegro	+ 48.703	+ 17.145
Croatia	+ 361.303	+ 8.713
Macedonia	+ 141.234	+ 203.028
Slovenia	+ 98.163	+ 53.840
Serbia	+ 906.473	+ 802.054
SFRJ*	+ 1,307.566	+ 1,989.000

* (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)

Comparing the ethnic structure of the population in pre-war (1931) and post-war (1948) Yugoslavia we come to the following data:

Nationality (in percent)	1931	1948	difference + or -
Serbs	40,0	40,6	+ 0,6
Croats	23,1	22,9	- 0,2
Muslims	5,3	5,6	+ 0,3
Slovenians	8,1	9,0	+ 0,9
Macedonians	4,6	5,1	+ 0,5
Montenegrin	2,9	2,7	- 0,2

From the table we can see that in the same period the relative share of Croats in the ethnic structure of Yugoslavia decreased, as well as Montenegrins while in all other nationalities it grew.

Total war losses in the total amount in Croatia were 661.543, while in Bosnia they were 580.767.

Because of the irrational growth of the victims of Jasenovac it was inevitable to delegate the moral and with it the penal responsibility to the entire Croatian nation, what had as a consequence grave political and economic burdens in the development of the Croatian nation.

The prominent participant of NOB (Yugoslav People's Liberation War) and a respectable Croatian writer Vjekoslav Kaleb like many other Croatian communists realized those facts and wrote: "I know that the ones who increase tenfold the number of murdered people, let's say in Jasenovac, partially, know well that by far the most Croats were killed in that camp, but "they want to cash somebody else's blood and use it for their impure purposes" - Vjekoslav Kaleb: "Govorimo o toleranciji" (Talking about tolerance).

According to the verbal estimate of Mirko Peršen the survived camp inmate from Jasenovac and the author of the book "Ustasha camps", the number of victims does not surpass 30.000.

Approximately the same number of victims in Jasenovac camp also mention others who analyzed this subject e.g. Bruno Bušić and the historian Franjo Tuđman - according to their estimates the number of victims in Jasenovac ranged around 30.000, and maximally up to 40.000.

All of this shows that the subject of war victims in Yugoslavia had an exceptional political and social purpose, whose aim, we can freely say, was not to make public the historical truth about victims of the Second World War using scientific approach but:

1. To present the “genocidal character” of one nation using selective approach
2. That the members of defeated forces weren’t considered at all as victims of war, nor were they shown as such, in fact, they were shown as victims “who probably committed collective suicide on themselves”.

With this approach, as it was until now, nothing has been solved. Downplaying, but also exaggerating the number of victims enables the true guilty people to avoid the comeuppance, the moral and penal responsibility is transferred to a huge number of individuals (collective), and even to those who were born after the tragic was events. Also the execution sites of the innocent, commemorations and monuments to the innocent victims lose their humanitarian significance and become gathering places and altars where the evil spirits of the past are invoked and old hatreds are renewed.

Besides concentration camps in Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška existed also assembly camps where people were temporarily interned, and then deported; such camps existed in Caprag near Sisak, Bjelovar and Slavonska Požega.

In occupied Serbia the Nazis brought to power Milan Nedić. This governor reported to Berlin that he “solved the Jewish question in Serbia”, and I personally, having examined all the evidence, do not understand where lies the difference between that Nazi regime and the Nazi regime in Croatia.

The Chetniks were rehabilitated in the new, democratic Serbia and the rehabilitation of their leader, Draža Mihajlović, is under way at a Belgrade court.

Excerpt from “Short historical survey of evil over Croatia” (conquests, persecutions, killings, plundering, ethnocide...) - project manager Slobodan Praljak, edited by Tomislav Đonlić, Zagreb, 2006.

CHETNICK CRIMES IN CROATIA AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1941 – 1945)

ETHNIC CLEANSING OF CROATS AND MUSLIMS – CIVILIANS !

Intensifying national and religious hatred, Chetniks (insurgents) all over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially in eastern Herzegovina, eastern, south-western and parts of central Bosnia (but also in the neighbouring areas of Croatia – Dalmatia) committed, from 1941 to 1945, the most brutal crimes of slaughter, killing, rape and annihilation of the entire Croatian and Muslim population, with general robbing of mobile property and destroying of real estate.

During the Second World War Chetniks on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina burned to the ground and destroyed some 300 Croatian and Muslim towns, villages and hamlets with over 500 scaffolds execution sites, some tens of thousands of homes were robbed, burned and destroyed; in the process Chetniks robbed and desecrated tens of Catholic churches, Muslim mosques and cemeteries, then parish offices and apartments, and foundation religious-educational buildings, and also burned a number of Croatian and Muslim libraries and school buildings.

*The consequences of Chetniks crimes during the war against Croats and Muslims in BH were terrible, they are manifested in tens of thousands of executions with systematic use of the most brutal force against the civilians (so e.g. in the **diocese of Trebinje**, which encloses the largest part of eastern Herzegovina, by personal identification it was determined that **4415** people were killed slaughtered by Chetniks and members of the NOP (People Liberation Movement) (insurgents), and this number even included **817 women and 684 children**).¹*

¹ I.Puljić, S.Vukorep, Đ.Bender: “The suffering of Croats during the Second World War and post war period in eastern Herzegovina”, Humski zbornik 5, Zajednica Hrvata istočne Hercegovine, Župe trebinjske biskupije, Općine Čapljina, Neum, Stolac, Ravno; Zagreb, 2001.

The number of victims was constantly manipulated, the crimes were concealed and even exaggerated; according to the estimates of objective demographers (Vladimir Žerjavić) from the total number of war victims in BiH (it is estimated the number of real human losses was 316.000) somewhere around **45.000** dead people accounts for the victims of Chetnik genocide, and from that some 12.000 were killed Croats and 33.000 were killed Muslims; however, not even this number should be considered final because, for example, until now it was established, based on the personal identification, that some 16.414 Croats died during direct terror in Herzegovina from 1941 to 1945;² and when we are talking about Chetnik crimes against Croats we should mention that also Croats in Croatia suffered from Chetnik hands, mostly civilians from Lika and Dalmatinska Zagora and terrible crimes were committed against them.

It should be also mentioned that even after the end of the war (1945 - 1959) in several places in BiH there were single and smaller Chetnik group crimes and even victims, until the destruction of the final organized Chetnik groups; for example in Prnjavor Register's Office of the diocese of Banja Luka some **seven** roman Catholic parishes disappeared because the believers were killed. Part of the Polish believers living there was forced to move out to Poland immediately after the war in 1945 exactly because of Chetnik violence.

As a consequence result of all Chetnik atrocities against the Croats and Muslims on the territory of BiH fact is that in all districts of south-western, eastern and parts of central Bosnia, as well as in eastern Herzegovina Croats "disappeared" or their numbers were more than cut in half comparing to the pre-war period; the similar situation was with Muslims in the same areas of BiH and almost the same districts as with Croats, only that their number of casualties was greater; I would like to mention some of those districts: Bosanski Petrovac, Drvar, Bosansko Grahovo, Glamoč, Ključ, Mrkonjić Grad, Prozor, Mostar, Stolac, Ljubinje, Trebinje, Bileća, Nevesinje, Foča, Goražde, Višegrad, Rogatić, Srebrenica, Vlasenica, Zvornik, Bijeljina, Brčko.

During the first period of the uprising, when Chetniks and guerrilla fighters lead by communists (from September 1941 called partisans) participated together in the actions, the first mass crimes against Croats and Muslims in BiH and Croatia were committed; at that time there was no difference in the way the insurgents lead by Chetniks and insurgents lead by communists treated Croats and the Muslims.

1. The bloody terror against Croats in Bjelovar district from April 9th to April 30th, 1941 marked the beginning of Chetnik crimes in Croatia; the crimes were committed by the members of the Yugoslavian Army and Chetniks,³ who during that period committed numerous crimes all over Croatia; **28 Croats** were killed in Bjelovar from April 9th to April 30th, 1941.⁴
2. The press reported about the crimes that in those days Chetniks committed together with the rests of the Yugoslavian Army, especially the local papers: so "Hrvatski list" (The Croatian paper) from Osijek, No. 104, dated April 15th, 1941 reported on the page 12 about the funeral of Miroslav Exinger and a 23 year old Ivan Blaž "the victims of Chetniks from Čepin"; there was also the news that in Tenja Chetniks attacked agriculturist and sacristan Antun Šimić who was living there "and stabbed him in the neck with a knife"; a Zagreb newspaper "Hrvatski glas" (The Croatian voice) in No. 74 dated April 29th, 1941 reports on the page 2 that Chetniks in Kiseljak "killed without a motive a young man of 18 years called Mijo Blažević"; the newspaper "Hrvatski narod" (The Croatian people) No. 65 dated April 18th, 1941 on the pages 8-9, reports about the funeral of dr. Aleksandar Belobrk who was killed near Varaždin by Chetniks; in No. 97 dated May 20th 1941 on the page 6 in the article "Second victim of Chetnik violence on Risovac near Knin found" reports about the death of a young man Nino Matić who was taken from his home to Risovac and killed there by Chetniks.
3. In eastern Herzegovina we have the first mass crimes against Croats and Muslims already in April 1941, i.e. from April 13th to April 15th 1941 Chetniks killed 25 Croats (21 Catholics and 4 Muslims) in **Čapljina** and the surroundings, and in **Cim** near Mostar 4 Croats were killed. Among the killed were also 5 women; on that occasion the victims were: from the village Gabela: Šušak Mirko who just finished the civil engineering school, 17 years old he was killed with bullets immediately after Chetniks came to Gabela; from the villages

² "Hrvatske žrtve rata u Hercegovini 1941-1945", Mostar 1995, p. 52.-53.

³ Archive of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Beograd, Archive NDH, box 136, reg.No.19/1-2.

⁴ Tomislav Heres: "Bjelovarski ustanak i proglašenje NDH 8. travnja 1941. godine", Savo Velagić: "Ratne operacije u Podravini i Bilogori za vrijeme travanjskog rata 1941.", Bjelovarski zbornik, No. 4—5, Bjelovar, 1994, p.109-114 and p. 117-143.

Struge and Gorica: Rožić Dragičević Ilija, 56 years old he was stabbed with a bayonet in the eye, shot in the stomach, his nose and both ears were cut off. Dragović Pero, 56 years old – was shot in the stomach and the head, his nose was cut off and his arm was broken; Frana the wife of Marko Vega, the head of Struga - 34 years old, was killed in the basement where she hid with her children. Badly wounded children were thrown on top of the dead mother; Jakić Hasan, Muslim, young man of 20 years was killed in front of the house;

Kavara Hasan, was killed in front of the house; Pervan Jakov, 70 years old man was killed because he protested his house being robbed; Mrvalj Pavao, 23 years old, was killed for the same reason; Čuljak Jure, 27 years old, was killed in battle on the side of the defence; from Čapljina and the surroundings: Jurilj Pero from Čeljevo, 60 years old, was killed while urinating in front of the house early in the morning; Pavlović Ivan from Trebižat, Brajković Ivan, Čolić Marko, Putica Jozo - 70 years old, Fazligić Mujo, Vasilj Martin from Međugorje was killed as a fighter on the side of the defence, Škegro Ante from Radišić, and three women: Mandžin Mara, Šarić Biserka and Ramić Zada. To this number should be added two more that later died in hospital. Only two of the mentioned died as fighters, all the rest were killed on their doorsteps. In the village **Cim** were killed: Jure Zelenika, Stojan Lasić, Ivan Cvitković and Luca Mustapić;⁵ those two villages were completely burned.

4. The first joint action of insurgent Chetniks and communists happened on July 27th 1941 and the next several days in the surroundings of **Drvar and Bosansko Grahovo**. The insurgents were Chetniks with four caps and Chetnik signs, and guerrilla-communists with a hat and five-pointed red star on the head.⁶
5. In **Bosansko Grahovo** and five surrounding villages (Obljaj, Korita, Luke, Ugarci and Crveni Lug) all Croatian houses were robbed and burned; more than **90 Croats**, mostly civilians, were killed; among the killed were 5 women and 9 children; after cruel torture Chetniks impaled on a spit the parish priest of Bosansko Grahovo Father Juraj Gospodnetić and grilled him alive in front of his mother and a group of parishioners; so that this roman Catholic parish founded in 1863, with more than 1.000 Croat believers before the war, disappeared during the Second World War; the parish office and the roman Catholic church of St. Ilija the Prophet in Obljaj were set to fire. The killing of Croats from Bosansko Grahovo also continued later and only a few survived the war. Part of those survived Croats wasn't allowed to come back to their robbed and burned hearths for the reason that many of the ones who killed their loved ones later joined the partisans and after the war in 1945 became the bearers of the partisan power in the places where Croats lived.⁷
6. In **Drvar**, the seat of the roman Catholic parish, and its surroundings, on the eve of the war some 800 Croats lived permanently; on July 27th 1941 insurgents took over the town and killed some **400 Croats** who lived and worked there, and a certain number of Muslims who worked there in the wood pulp works, that made some 90% of the total number of imprisoned and arrested people; from the Croats killed in Drvar and Bosansko Grahovo and the surroundings only some 10% were armed members of the Ustasha movement, and the rest were unarmed civilians; most of the arrested were killed in the village Kamenica and thrown into ditches and one abyss.⁸
7. The same day, on July 27th 1941 insurgents attacked **200 pilgrims** (Croats Catholics) who together with their parish priest Waldemar Maximilian Nestor were returning by a forest train from Knin to Drvar, after the celebration of St. Ana. Most of them were killed, including the parish priest, whose head was cut off and carried on a stake, and they were not guilty for anything except being Croatian Catholics.⁹
8. On July 28th 1941 in Brotinje insurgents killed all surprised inhabitants, **55 of them**, all elderly and women with children because they didn't want to or didn't have time to leave their homes, from that number 37 were from one family – Ivezić, and their houses were robbed and set to fire.¹⁰

⁵ M. Sobolevski, Z. Dizdar: «Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1941.-1945.», Zagreb 1999.

⁶ Zdravko Dizdar: »Četnički zločini u Bosni i Hercegovini«, Zagreb 2002.

⁷ Ante Mile Krvavica: "Svjedok sam četničkih zločina u Grahovu", Slobodna Dalmacija, 10.VIII 1995., Anto Orlovac: "Trinaest ugaslih svijeća — Župe Banjalučke biskupije nestale u drugom svjetskom ratu", Studia Vrhbosniensia 7, Sarajevo - Bob, 1995, p. 596-599.

⁸ AOS SRJ, A NDH, box 195, reg. No. 7/5-29.

⁹ Odmetnička zvjerstva i pustošenja u Nezavisnoj Džavi Hrvatskoj u prvim mjesecima života Hrvatske Narodne Države, Zagreb, 1942.

¹⁰ Zdravko Dizdar: »Četnički zločini u Bosni i Hercegovini«, Zagreb, 2002.

9. On the border of BiH and Croatia in July 1941 in the village **Rudopolje**, the districts of Bruvno and Mazin, county Gračac (Lika), Chetniks slaughtered **24 Croats** on their doorsteps, among the murdered were seven women and several children; after the war the survivors were not able to return to the charred remnants of their houses so the whole Rudopolje with the surrounding villages was obliterated.¹¹
10. At the same time Chetniks killed some twenty Croatian families in **Otrić and Zrmanja**; for now the data is known for 15 Croats living there: and so the roman Catholic parish Zrmanja-Palanka ceased to exist; in **Gračac, Malovan, Medak** and other surrounding places at the beginning of the uprising Chetniks slaughtered **26 Croats**, and then **11 more Croats** during 1942 and 1943.
11. In **Podgrmeč** on July 30th 1941 "a group of Chetniks attacked the villages Dubovik, Potkalinje, Ostrožnica, Badić mali and Badić veliki near Bosanska Krupa, and using brutal force, "picks and axes", **killed 20 Muslims**, mostly elderly people.¹²
12. In August, 2800 Croats moved out from **Boričevac**, advised by the experience from the place Brotinja, and set out for Kulen Vakuf; until now **149 victims** from Boričevac were recorded, from the total of 302 who were identified to have been killed by Chetniks during the Second World War; after the war it was not allowed to rebuild the place: in that way ceased to exist the roman Catholic parish Boričevac (2800 parishioners), as well as the neighbouring parishes Palanka, Rudopolje and Gračac. Those are only some of the 19 roman Catholic parishes on the right and 4 roman Catholic parishes on the left river bank of Una that ceased to exist after the war.¹³
13. At the beginning of August 1941 a group of Chetniks organized with Dragan Pećanec a massacre of Croatian families from a colony **near Oštrelj**; personal data for **35 people** killed in Oštrelj are known, and **25 in Potoci**: then the roman Catholic church of St. Ana on Oštrelj was set to fire. This roman Catholic parish, that in 1939 had 1.051 people, disappeared because of Chetnik terror; the communist authorities in 1949 destroyed the remains of the burned roman Catholic churches in Drvar and Bosanski Petrovac, and a few believers that survived the massacre in 1941 settled elsewhere in the country and the world, most of them were not able to return to their destroyed houses; in Drvar only some 30 Croats were left, mostly members of KPJ and SKOJ and members of their families, and in Grahovo there were no Croats left.¹⁴
14. On August 6th 1941 Chetniks burned the villages **Dabrovina and Briševo** in Visoko district, and the village **Ljubovo** in Jajce district, and the Muslim population of those villages escaped to more secure places.
15. On August 9th and 19th 1941 insurgent Chetniks and guerrilla fighters in **Krnjeuša** killed or slaughtered **232 Croats**; mostly they were women, children and elderly who were killed in front of their houses and on their properties; all Croatian houses and the Roman Catholic Church in Krnjeuša were robbed and burned. The insurgents cut the face and the rest of the body of the parish priest of Krnjeuša - Father Krešimir Barišić with a knife, cut off his fingers, nose and ears and stabbed his eyes, and then they threw him half alive inside the burning parish church, after that the seminarian Ivan Skender from the neighbouring Risovac and Ilija Poplašen from Prijčani near Banja Luka were killed; the few Croats from Krnjeuša who survived the war sufferings were not able to return to their home after the war so also this parish, that in 1939 had 1.368 believers and enclosed 10 villages or hamlets, ceased to exist.¹⁵
16. On August 23rd 1941 **Muslim** houses were set to fire in Krupa Podgrmeč villages **Arapuša, Jasenica and Mali Badić**, and the remaining ones in Dubovik and Potkalinje.
17. On September 3rd 1941 Chetniks entered **Podlapac** (Lika) and on that occasion killed 6 people, robbed the village and set to fire Croatian houses.¹⁶

¹¹ HDA, A NDH, Fund: General board committee in the command of the II. Armada of the Italian army hist., No. 2.804/1941.

¹² Zbomik dokumenata i podataka o NOR-u jugoslavenskih naroda, Volume IV, Book 1; Borbe u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941., Beograd, 1951.

¹³ Z. Dizdar — M. Sobolevski: »Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini«, Zagreb, 1999.

¹⁴ The same.

¹⁵ Josip Jurjević: "Pogrom u Krnjeuši 9/10. VIII 1941.", Zagreb, 1999.

¹⁶ Prof. Jure Karaka: "Selo Podlapac i njegovo stradanje tijekom II. Svjetskog rata (1941 — 1945)", "Krbavska bitka i njezine posljedice", Zagreb 1997.

18. On September 4th 1941 Chetniks attacked the village **Čorak** near Glina, they killed 10 peasants and 22 were able to save themselves by running away.¹⁷
19. On September 5th 1941 insurgent Chetniks and partisans attacked **Kulen Vakuf** and captured it; they captured more than 3.000 civilians from the surrounding villages (mostly Muslim) who took refuge in Kulen Vakuf; then during the next two days they did a terrible massacre of the Muslim and Croatian population; a group of 450-500 women and children were saved; the biographical data exists for more than 1.000 victims.¹⁸
20. On October 20th Chetniks in the area of **Sanski Most** set to fire Muslim villages: Gorice 60 houses, Naprelje 120 houses, Fajtovci 20 and Kisak 12 houses and attacked Kamengrad. Then in **Mrkonjić Grad** and the surrounding 44 Muslims and 12 Croats were killed, and in **Glamoč** and the surroundings 45 Muslims and two Croats; during and after those crimes some 50.000 Croatian and Muslim refugees arrived to Bihać, Jajce, Knin, Sanski Most, Prijedor, Livno and other towns. Part of them, mostly women and children, were moved to Zagreb and other places north of the river Sava. Serbian Chetnik uprising started in eastern Herzegovina on June 24th 1941 near **Gacko**, but it was put down by the armed forces of NDH; another uprising happened in August in the entire eastern Herzegovina.
21. On June 28th 1941 47 Muslims were slaughtered and killed near **Gacko**. Among them were women and children, the village and the surrounding villages were entirely robbed and burned.
22. After they captured **Berković (Dabar)** on August 28th 1941 "the Montenegrin guerrilla units" and local Chetniks committed "general massacre and arson" and over 300 Muslim women, elderly and children were slaughtered.
23. The same units after capturing **Plane** on August 29th and the town **Bileća** the day later (except of the fort and barracks where, next to the 500 NDH soldiers, also 4.500 Muslims were saved until the arrival of Italians) "slaughtered 40 persons, civilians", robbing and later burning Muslim houses.
24. On September 3rd 1941 from the village around **Fatnica** toward Stolac a transport of "around 400 women, elderly and children", which was escorted by 12 partisans, was intercepted by a group of Chetniks and Serbian policemen on **Dabar** and almost all of them were killed and thrown into **pits (Čavkarica)** - only a few people saved themselves by running away. Hadžera Bijedić survived and she stated that in that group there were some 600 women and children who were executed on that execution site; from the district of **Divin** from 425 killed people, mostly elderly, women and children, and for which there are personal data, some 375 people were killed and thrown into the pit Čavkarica, and others were killed in the surroundings or in villages; another 41 people were killed by the Chetniks on Plana while running away to **Bileća**.
25. In September 7th 1941 Chetniks robbed the village **Dubljanje** and set to fire 23 houses, on September 8th on the area of Stolac district they robbed and then burned 20 houses and 70 barns in the village **Bitonja**, and the entire village **Grablje**, and on September 9th and 10th they robbed and burned the villages **Kruševica** and **Žabica**; according to the documents of the NDH authorities on the area of eastern Herzegovina until the end of 1941 there were 1.056 slaughtered and killed Muslims and more than 100 killed Croats.
26. In **Međeđa** (south of Višegrad) and **Koraj** (south-western of Bijeljina) during October and November 1941, and later in the surroundings of **Zvornik** they slaughtered and killed more than **1.000** Muslims mostly women, children and elderly.
27. In burned villages **Klašnik, Banja, Strumica** and others, where Croats and Muslims lived, some **600** people were killed.
28. On October 7th and 8th 1941 in **Donji Ervenik**, Chetniks slaughtered 7 Croats and three of them were women.
29. On December 11th 1941 in the village **Velika Plana**, near **Lovinac**, Chetniks slaughtered **8 Croats**, one of them was a woman and her three year old daughter; in the area of the neighbouring **Ričice** 33 locals were killed by the end of 1941.
30. On December 19th and 20th 1941 in **Štikovo**, Chetniks entered the undefended Croatian village and on that occasion killed and massacred 11 Croats civilians and killed one gendarme; at that occasion were killed:

¹⁷ AOS SRJ, A NDH, Box 61, reg. No. 27/17-1.

¹⁸ Z. Dizdar, quoted work.

Vujović Ilija, son of the deceased Ivan, was slaughtered with the knife below the neck, Vujović Grga, son of the deceased Marko, was killed with a gun, Puća Mate (of Mile) was shot in the chest with a gun, Puća Petar, son of the deceased Luka, was killed with the gun and then his eyes were dug up with a knife, Vujović Jura, son of the deceased Ante, was killed with a gun, Vujović Marija the wife of Grga, Vujović Petar, son of the deceased Ante, was slaughtered and then shot, Vujović Mara, the wife of Petar, was raped and massacred, Vujović Boja, daughter of Petar, was killed and massacred, Vujović Mile, the son of Petar, Vujović Stana, the wife of Ilija.¹⁹

31. On November 30th 1941 a new agreement was achieved between Chetniks and Italians. Major Boško Todorović, the commander of Chetniks from Herzegovina, and the Italian colonel Castagnero agreed on the entrance of Chetniks into **Foča** and **Goražde**. So Chetniks entered Goražde the same day, and on December 5th 1941 they entered Foča. The same night, after they entered those two towns the killing and slaughtering started (according to the witness statements Sejfo Čelik: "The ones they caught they slaughtered not below but above the neck. I saw Hastar Salko, the son of Nadžib, from the village **Prolaz** who had his larynx taken out and who died only after a month after a lot of torture and suffering").²⁰

According to the statement of Sergij Mihajlović (the commander of Chetnik units in Foča) only in the town of **Foča** and **Goražde** 5.000 Muslims were slaughtered and some hundred Croats; according to the statements of witnesses Chetniks brought (groups of people from 50 to 300) Muslims and Croats from **Čajnići**, **Rogatica**, the surroundings of Foča and Višegrad, as well as all nearby districts in surrounding of Goražde to the stone bridge in Goražde. Then to one side of the bridge they would bring an accordion and play, and on the other side they would put a car, turn on the motor and step on tire gas so that the sound of the motor on one side and playing on tire other side would eliminate the screams of poor victims who they would slaughter in the worst possible way; as the consequence of those atrocities the population of entire districts disappeared (Čajnići-Batovo some 1.500 people).²¹

32. On the territory of **Srebrenica** Chetniks committed mass crimes from August 18th 1941 to January 16th 1942; we quote part of tire report of the district head from Srebrenica dated January 29th 1942: "The exact number of victims cannot be known at the moment, but in Srebrenica district approximately some 1.000 people were killed, and material sacrifices were priceless, because they robbed everybody, they slaughtered and destroyed all tire cattle as well as other movable property. During the robberies they treated women and people brutally, beat them with wire, rifle butts, stab with knives in different parts of the body, undress people and women to tire skin and in that way force them to give them money, to say who has money and who escaped, and killed many of them although they gave them everything they had. There were several rapes of 14 year old and older girls. Some people were shot with rifles, some killed with rifle butts, and most of them were slaughtered like lambs. People constantly lived in fear, because everybody dreaded like sheep from the knife, and spend many nights and days in the woods in that cold. Besides people who were killed and slaughtered by Chetniks there were marry dead from the consequences of beating and cold ..."²²
33. In May 1942 Chetniks attacked the village **Novi Martinec**, in **Prnjavor** district and burned 50 Croatian houses, slaughtered several people and robbed all the food,²³ the roman Catholic parish Novi Martinec had in 1939 total of 3.570 believers and was one of seven roman Catholic parishes of Prnjavor Register's Office of the diocese of Banja Luka, which because of the killings of believers disappeared during the Second World War. The other parishes were: **Rakovac, Devetina, Stara Dubrava, Gumjera, Šibovska and Kunova**.
34. About entire situation in **Višegrad** (surrounded) reported the district of Višegrad we quote a fragment of the report from the May 28th 1942:²⁴ "The population of this district from September 2nd 1941 until today is living the worst days of their lives. Tire villages are on fire. The population is dying from hunger and illness on

¹⁹ Z. Dizdar - M. Sobolevski: „Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini”, Zagreb, 1999.

²⁰ AOS SRJ, A NDH, Box 78, reg. No. 23/6-4.

²¹ AOS SRJ, A NDH, box. 183, reg. No. 43/2-21 and 22; stated numbers on slaughtered and killed people (district **Goražde** 7000, **Foča** district + **Višegrad** district some **20.000**). Although also given by other witnesses the name lists could not be confirmed. It should be mentioned that name lists of the population at the beginning of the war 1941 did not exist, and in many places almost all the inhabitants were killed and registers of births and deaths were destroyed, so nobody could provide name lists for all victims.

²² AOS SRJ, A NDH, box 64, reg. No. ½ .

²³ AOS SRJ, A NDH, box 172-a, reg. No. 27/5-1. Report of the Parish police district in Nova Gradiška from 24th May 1942.

²⁴ The entire reports from Višegrad, as well as this one, can be found in AOS SRJ, A NDH, box 155, reg. No. 574-1-4 and reg. No. 15/7-1.

streets of the town, providing they avoided the communist-Chetnik bandits who came to their village homes. Until today some 5.000 Croats, Muslims and Catholics were killed in this district and the number is rising. In the town there are some 10.000 unprovided refugees. There is no food, and if it can be found then the prices are too high for the poor part of the population to stay alive."

35. According to the report of the Parish police district Banja Luka dated July 13th 1942 "Chetnik patrols made rounds of Croatian villages Pavlovac, Motike, Petričevac, Šargovo, Rebrovac and Vlaški Brijeg, where they carried out searches of houses of Croatian peasants.
36. At the beginning of August 1942 Chetniks in Foča district (outside the control of the NDH authority) slaughtered some 80 Muslims and Catholics (Croats).
37. On August 19th 1942 Chetniks captured Foča for the second time, at the moment there were some 8.000 Muslims living there, some locals some refugees. Some 5.000 Muslims managed to escape towards Sarajevo, smaller groups went into hiding, and the rest were caught and killed. Zaharije Ostojić (major commander of the operation; distinguished member of the Chetnik Supreme Command that was located in Serbia and headed by Draža Mihajlović) informed on August 23rd 1942 the Chetnik Supreme Command: "Yesterday finished the action up to Ustikolina and the ridge of Jahorina (...). From past data (...) 1000-3000 Muslims were slaughtered. All troops are good fighters, and even better robbers (...). The fall of Foča had a good response. Masses of Muslims run away to Sarajevo." One of the surviving Muslims from Foča reported: "As soon as Foča was captured by Chetniks, the caught and killed all men as well as a big number of women and children, while almost all girls and young women were raped. Only 11 men that were hiding survived. Stores and houses were completely robbed, and some were set to fire."²⁵ On September 5th Chetnik second in command P. Bačović informed D. Mihajlović "that during a Chetnik attack in Foča 2200 Muslims were killed, and the personal losses were 4 dead and 5 wounded".
38. On August 29th 1942 some 1000 east-Herzegovina Chetniks committed mass robbing, arson and crimes on the territory of the big parish of Cetina, in places Raščani, Župa Biokovska, Kozica and Dragljani, some **160** Croats were slaughtered, shot and burned, among them three priests: Father Ivan Čondić, Father Josip Braenović (whose head was cut off) and Father Ladislav Ivanković.²⁶
39. From May to September 1942 based on the agreement with Italians in eastern Herzegovina Chetniks took over the power from them, except in the towns. They intended to remove all Croats and Muslims from the area of eastern Herzegovina, and they succeeded. So at the time they killed some 500 Croats and some Muslims, and later followed mass emigration of mostly Croatian and partly Muslim population from the left bank of Neretva River. In that period the exodus of Croatian population, and less of Muslim, mostly happened from the area of Stolac district where from some 28000 Catholics and Muslims there were hardly any left, as one Chetnik document said; after emerging to the bank of the river Neretva, Chetniks intended to continue the "cleansing" of Croats throughout western Herzegovina in order to create a corridor with Chetniks around **Knin** and in south-western Bosnia and southern Lika.
40. In order to succeed in their intention, Chetniks tried to cooperate with the proserbian orientated Muslims (Dr. Ismet Popovac, Mustafa Pašić, and Major Fehim Musakadić). So with the consent of Italians, Muslim Chetnik troops were formed (Muslim national military organization under Chetnik supervision and direct command, hiding of course the final intentions towards Muslim population. Those intentions were clearly shown by Captain Danilo Salatić (Chief of Staff of the Chetnik Command of operative units of eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina) in a confidential notice addressed to the commanders of the Chetnik units, hi it the current much-needed cooperation with Muslims is explained in order to reduce the number of Chetnik enemies, at the same time they are making an effort to set Muslims and Croats against each other "to have them kill each other". With a clear message: "it should be clear to everyone that after the war or in a certain moment we will complete our task and that in the Serbian lands (Great Serbia) no one else will live except for Serbs", bit about this "you cannot write or speak in public because the Turks would hear it."²⁷

²⁵ AOS SRJ, Chetnik archive, box 251, reg. No. 32/3; A NDH, box 172-a, reg. No. 42/6-1; Z.Dizdar: »Četnički zločini u Bosni i Hercegovini«, Zagreb 2002, p.192-193.

²⁶ AOS SRJ, Chetnik archive, box 170, reg. No. 51/3; HDA, A NDH, inv. No. 33215, Fund: Chetniks No. 294/1; Fund: ZKRZ GUZ, No. 2362/5 - 41/45; Ivo Omrcanin: "Holokaust of Croats", Washington, 1986, p.33-34.

²⁷ Dokumenti o izdajstvu Draže Mihajlovića, book I, doc. No. 528, p. 505.

41. So Chetniks from September 19th to 25th 1942 exiled Croats from Stolac and Dubrava and while doing that slaughtered hundreds of Croats. Muslims in those places didn't get hurt according to the agreement of Chetnik leader D. Jevđević and the representatives of the Muslims living there. Then Chetniks in the village **Prenj** near Stolac poured gasoline upon a 83 year old parish **priest Father Vido Putica** and burned him alive; then in 12 villages some **350** people (mostly elderly people) were killed, some 1.000 Croatian homes were burned and finally some 10.000-15.000 Croats were exiled from the whole district of **Stolac**: so Chetniks, under the auspices of Italians, completely cleaned the left river bank of Neretva and attacked the villages of the districts of Čapljina and Mostar.
42. Chetniks completely burned the village **Hotanj**, destroyed the houses in the village **Tasovčići** and exiled the Croatian population from Počitelj.
43. On October 3rd 1942 in villages **Goranci** and **Bogodol** "58 Catholic homes were robbed and property of peasants was destroyed". On that occasion 4 Croats in **Goranci** and **Raška Gora** were slaughtered and killed. At the same time in the village **Dabila** "8 peasants" were killed.
44. On October 6th 1942 Chetniks, together with several Muslims, attacked the village **Višići** and killed and slaughtered **17 people**. Killed were: Boras Franjo, head of the village, slaughtered with a knife, Manda Boras - his wife, slaughtered, Jaka Boras his daughter, slaughtered, Nikola Falak slaughtered. Anđa Falak slaughtered. Stojka Ivanković slaughtered, Andrija Ivanković killed with a gun, Božica Malić slaughtered, Anica Cvitanović slaughtered, Miško Malić killed, Boško Malić killed, Mara Blažević killed, Kata Krešić killed, Pero Raić slaughtered, Marija Raić slaughtered, Luca Ljiljanović killed with a gun.
45. On October 12th 1942 they burned the villages **Belenići**, **Kijev Dol** and **Golubinjac** in the district **Ravno**, and the population saved itself by running away to Slano on the Adriatic coast. During the next two days they robbed and burned 46 Croatian houses in Bivolje Brdo and 29 houses in Domanovići. According to the estimates of the Ministry of the Interior of NDH²⁸ at the time some 6000 people escaped and 76 people were killed and 50 women were raped.
46. After those "operations" (mid-October 1942) Chetniks went towards the zone Prozor-Rama Šuica-Livno-Makarska - the coast up to the mouth of the river Neretva. Chetniks across Rama and Prozor came to the **Mountain Vran**. In that area they committed terrible crimes, according to the data gathered by authorities of NDH at the time Chetniks first on the territory of Mostar killed some 200 Croats and Muslims, and then on the territory of **Prozor** killed, slaughtered, threw into water or a pit and in that way killed 1716 people, 340 of them were Muslims, and the rest civilian Croats. On the way back to **Konjic** district they killed some 20 Croats, robbed houses and villages and burned many of them. So, some 4000 burned houses and farm buildings are stated in the documents. Baćović send a telegram on October 23rd to notify' Draža Mihailović: "during the operation **Prozor** were slaughtered over 2000 Catholics and Muslims. The soldiers returned thrilled."²⁹
47. In the partisan newspaper "Borba" (Fight) the news correspondent Jovan Popović wrote about this Chetnik slaughter in the surroundings of Prozor: "some 200 people were killed by Chetniks in Croatian and Muslim villages of the districts of Prozor, Konjic and Vakuf. Smaller groups of Chetniks climbed even to the huts on high hills. They looked everywhere for valuable objects, ducats, money, and even crammed household objects onto horses. They rummaged through beehives, destroying them, then through flour, milk and cream. Drunk they left desolation behind them. To extort money they used special methods. They would start to slaughter a victim until it would buy itself off. Some peasants were tortured (slaughtered) and half-slaughtered several times, because they would buy themselves off several times. Hundreds of women were victims of Italian and Chetnik animal lust. Masters and servants competed here. In one house they would imprison a dozen women, undress them, and they would disperse men with light machine-guns. Three women committed suicide, one jumped in the river Rama, and some were killed by the tempters themselves."³⁰

²⁸ HDA, A NDH, Fund: General board committee of the II. Armada of the Italian army on Sušak, No. 11490, 11491 and 11609/1942; AOS SRJ, A NDH, box 172-a, reg. No. 47/7-1 and 51/7-1.

²⁹ HDA, Fund: ZKRZ Zh, box 21 and 647; Fund: MVP NDH, box 3; Fund: NDH, Doc. Inv. No. 33.215 and Fund: Chetniks Doc. Inv. No. 294/1.

³⁰ Borba, official organ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Drinići, near Bosanski Petrovac, 20. November 1942.

48. In August 1942 Chetniks from **Trebinje**, without any reason and contrary to the agreement they signed with the authorities of NDH, attacked and disarmed the company of home guardsmen in the villages **Botajica** and **Dugo Polje** near Gradačac, slaughtering in Dugo Polje more than 70 home guardsmen.
49. On September 10th 1942 after they captured **Bosanski Svinjar**, Chetniks burned 30 Catholic and Muslim homes, and slaughtered the captured commander of the gendarmerie-station and one gendarme.
50. On August 23rd 1942, 96 captured home guardsmen were slaughtered on the river Bosna in Podnovlje, and on entering the village Višnjik on September 28th, besides robbing and setting to fire three houses, they forced a group of Croatian peasants into one house, threw bombs inside, shot from a machine-gun and in that way killed two men and two women and seriously wounded five.
51. At the same time in the area of **Žepče** and **Zenica** districts "several people were slaughtered, i.e. killed or taken away".
52. On the area of **Fojnica** district, Chetniks on August 30th and 31st 1942 robbed Croatian population in the villages Skladna, Krnjače, Vranice and Šajtovići.
53. On November 5th 1942 in **Milino Selo** Chetniks met "the salesmen Meho Haračić and Meho Memišević, both from Koraj, Brčko district. They robbed them and later killed them in a brutal way and threw them into a brook where they were found".
54. On November 9th "Chetniks killed Kata Bender and Mara Krsić, both from the village **Vinina Hrasno, Čapljina** district because they opposed the seizure of cattle".
55. On November 13th 1942 near **Derventa**, Chetniks "arrested the peasants Petar Gavran and Mate Sirovina, tied them up and took them with them, and on the way to the village **Gornji Smrtići** they killed Petar while Mate managed to run away".
56. On November 17th 1942 in the village **Agići**, Derventa district, they killed Ivan Mamić and his wife Manda, because Mamić "wanted to move out of their territory".
57. At the same time also on the territory of central and northern Dalmatia Chetniks (lead by the duke Rokvić) under the auspices of Italians committed several crimes of genocide over Croats; a group of 120 Bosnian and Dalmatian Chetniks at the beginning of October 1942 in the area of the big parish of Cetina in the villages **Gata, Naklice, Čišla, Ostrvica, Zvečanje, Dugopolje, Kotlenice, Srijani and Dolac Gornji** killed some 200 Croats, and after robbing them they burned more than 1500 houses and farm buildings. Killed were mostly elderly people, women and children who had nothing to do with the army.
58. On October 21st 1942 Chetniks of the priest Đuić and Brane Bogunović in **Bitelić**, near Sinj, on the order of Italians, killed 29 Croats, and in Otišić 6 Croats, burning also 220 Croatian houses.
59. Chetniks from **Medački Džep** on October 5th 1942 killed 5 Croats from Ribnik in Lika; in all those massacres only civilians got hurt.
60. On January 30th 1943 Chetniks (commanded by major Zaharije Ostojić and major Pavle Đurišić) at the command of Draža Mihailović³¹ started the "cleansing of Muslims" in **Bijelo Polje** district; some 400 Muslim fighters and some 1000 women and children were killed, and 33 villages were destroyed to the ground.
61. Then they moved on the districts **Čajnić, Foča and Pljevlja** where in the period between February 7th and 13th 1943 they killed some 1200 fighters and up to 8000 !!! other victims – civilians - women, elderly and children³² while Chetniks during the whole operation had only 22 dead; according to the statements of the people who managed to escape Chetniks: "Almost no one was killed with fire-arms, but the killings were done by throat cutting, burning several people in one building, taking children out of pregnant women and trampling them with feet, girls were taken away and raped and later tortured in horrible ways";³³ German

³¹ Zdravko Dizdar: »Četnički zločini u Bosni i Hercegovini 1941-1945«, Zagreb 2002, p. 204.

³² V. Dedijer and A. Miletić: »Genocid nad Muslimanima 1941-1945. - Zbornik dokumenata i svjedočenja«, Sarajevo 1990, p.330-332.

³³ HDA, Fund: ZKRS Zh Inv. No. 12.904, file 49, box 647: Report of the board for refugees in Pljevlje about the events «against Muslims committed by Chetniks helped by the Italians in the period from 1st to 15th February (1943)»; Fund of the welfare No. 5.201/1943 and Fund: State Treasury, Main Inspectorate of the treasury guard, secret No. 138 and 381/1943 ; HDA, Archives of NDH, Fund: Croatian state parliament, Presidential files No. 770/1943, box 3.

general Rudolf Lütters, the commander of German force in NDH writes to the Headquarters in Berlin the following: "It should be pointed out as a trait of Chetnik war - making their attacks on the unarmed and weak enemy ... slaughter of helpless women and children for Chetniks is an understandable, honourable and brave act, and executors are considered as heroes."³⁴

62. At the end of January 1943, between 25th and 29th, Chetniks in Dalmatia under the command of Duke M. Đujić and P. Bačović started an operation also in the villages **Kijevo, Kosori, Maovice, Vrlika, Ružić, Otavice, Gradac and Kričke**, while robbing movable property and burning Croatian houses (in Maovice 360 houses were burned, and in Kijevo from 450 houses half were destroyed and burned; other villages were burnt to the ground), they killed more than 100 Croats in the most brutal way, raped women and girls, and all under the slogan: "burn and slaughter all that is Catholic"; then for example Chetniks impaled the old man Niko Blažević (68 years old) alive on a stake and grilled him on a fire until he died, and in **Otavice** they threw the old man Ilija Meštrović (86 years old), uncle of the renowned Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović, alive into his burning house and killed him in this way.³⁵
63. On February 3rd and 4th 1943 Herzegovinian Chetniks in the area of **Imotski** and the surrounding villages (Grabovac and Zagvozd) slaughtered and killed 32 Croats, robbed and destroyed property, burned houses, raped women and girls.³⁶
64. On June 7th 1943 in the district **Brnjic** they slaughtered 42 Muslims; on August 13th 1943 in the village **Velika Lišnja** near **Derventa** the burned 18 Muslim and 3 Catholic houses and killed 10 Muslims and one Catholic and after that robbed everything in the village they could get their hand on.³⁷
65. During August 1943 they burned the villages **Karačići, Tihnjići, Salkovići, Tokoljak and Rolovci** near Srebrenica and in them killed the Muslim population that wasn't able to run away on time. Chetniks previously robbed from those villages everything that they could, especially cattle and food, and transported it over the river Drina.³⁸
66. In October 1943 in Višegrad and the surroundings and on the area of the Rogatići district local Chetniks together with the Chetniks and the army of general Nedić from Serbia committed unprecedented horrible crimes, **killing 2500-3000 Muslims**. Most of them were, after being captured, brought to the bridge over the river Drina in Višegrad and killed and slaughtered there and then they threw them into the river. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of NDH in their review of the events from September 11th 1944 noted the following: "On October 5th 1943 Chetniks entered Višegrad and on that occasion tortured, and then slaughtered or shot 2500 people. In those killings were also involved the regular soldiers of the Serbian volunteer corps. They shot from the right side of the bridge on the victims that were brought, and after that threw them still half-alive into the river Drina. Besides the most horrible way of torture and rape of women there were also other crimes like seizing cattle, burning houses, imposition of tributes and taxes, announcement of all possible kinds of givings that the local Muslim population had to support."³⁹
67. In February 1944 Chetniks in Dalmatia in the villages **Dubrava, Danilo, Radonići and Goriš** killed 30 Croats, in Promin village **Nečmen** on April 4th 1944 they killed 9 Croats (Petar Perica - 65 years old, Kaja Perica - 65 years old, Pero Perica - 85 years old, Cvita Perica blind 83 year old women, Jelka Perica 45 years old, Joso Perica 35 years old, Joso Perica Jr. 21 years old, and two children: Mara Perica 18 months old!!!, Ana Perica 8 months old !!!! – they dug her eyes out and tortured her for more than 20 minutes).⁴⁰
68. On March 24th, 25th and 26th 1944 the joint units of the SS (Protective Squadron) and Chetniks entered **Dolac Donji** (republic of Poljica), and after two days of stay, on the third day they gathered some 420 people civilians (elderly, women and children) and killed them all; the whole village was burned.

³⁴ HDA, Fund: ZKRZ GUZ, No. 2549/46, box 91 and 647.

³⁵ Z. Dizdar: «Četnički zločini u Bosni i Hercegovini», Zagreb 2002.

³⁶ The same.

³⁷ HDA, Fund: ZKRZ Zh, Inv. No. 12904, L-I 1 and 12/1945, box 647.

³⁸ HDA, Archive of the NDH, Fund: Ministry of national economics of NDH No. 2181-M/1943. Weekly report of the Great parish of Usor and Soli from 31. VIII. 1943.

³⁹ HDA, Archive of the NDH, Doc. Inv. No. 30.965, box 313; Fund: ZKRZ GUZ No. 2362/2-1945, Chetniks, box 21.

⁴⁰ HDA, Fund: NV-179/410. Original, duplicated on a stencil-duplicator, in Latin script Separat.

69. On March 28th 1944 the units of Knin Chetniks (lead by the priest Duić) dressed in uniforms of German soldiers in **Podkamešnik** places Gala, Gornji Otok, Ruda, Podi Gornji and Podi Donji, Voštane - Rože committed terrible crimes. During that campaign they killed some 1700 people; only in Voštane they killed 367 people.
70. In April 1944 on the territory of **Dubrovnik (parish of Dubrava)** Chetniks in **Konavle** killed 4 Croats (Pero Bjelokosić, Ivan Miljaž, Niko Vukić i Vlaho Separa) and constantly robbed the people in the area of Trebinje.
71. In May 1944 Chetniks in **Goražde** slaughtered some **50 Muslims** and burned down two mosques.
72. Chetniks from **Trebinje** on October 8th 1944 in the villages **Tramošnica, Turić, Liporašće and Srednja Slatina** killed 36 Croats and robbed houses; then on January 3rd 1945 in the villages **Kladari and Carevac** they killed 43 civilians, and out of those they "captured, raped and shot 27 Croatian women and girls", burned 10 houses and robbed the rest, and 10 days later "in a brutal way they killed 23 civilians, among them a parish priest Roja Ljubo, from **Pećnik**, and robbed the church and 150 houses".⁴¹
73. On the territory of **Skradin** on November 12th 1944 they killed 27 Croats; then the remaining Chetniks from the Dinara Chetnik division (three battalions, one was Bosnian), lead by the duke Momčilo Đuić during the transfer from Dalmatia to Istria at the end of December 1944 in **Bribir, Grižani and Tribalj** near Crikvenica killed 32 Croats, burning down 70 houses and the Bribir church.⁴²
74. On December 21st 1944 in the village **Vinograd** near Trnov, in **Rogatić** district, Chetniks killed 23 Muslims (only on the area of Rogatić distinct until June 1944 according to the collected data of the government of NDH 3677 homes were burned and 4635 Muslims were killed, among them a small number of Croats).⁴³
75. At the beginning of February 1945 on the area of **Derventa** district in seven villages Chetniks burned some 120 houses and slaughtered some 100 Croats – mostly women and children.⁴⁴
76. It should be pointed out that from the end of 1943 anti-fascists, activists, fighters and participators of NOP (People Liberation Movement) were almost without exception killed if captured by Chetniks; it's enough to mention that a Chetnik putsch in **Majevisa** NOP was done on February 20th 1942 and then Chetniks killed forty people; or on April 1st 1942 with the attack on a partisan hospital in **Jošavica**, where they killed 25 wounded people or a month later when a hospital in **Čemernica** was also attacked, when were captured or killed 29 wounded people; similar thing happened during other twenty putsches done by Chetniks on the territory of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with over 1000 killed partisans.

5. COMMUNISTS, PARTISANS, TITO – THE COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA

The SET "partisans" is not equal to the SET "COMMUNIST PARTISANS".

In numbers and in content.

Croats who decided to fight against fascism had various motives: the resistance to Ustasha crimes, non-acceptance of the annexation of a part of the Adriatic coast to Italy, the dream of social justice as part of communist ideology...

In the entire Kingdom of Yugoslavia there were 10,000 to 11,000 communists at the beginning.

After the capitulation of Italy the communists in the partisan movement start turning the initial antifascism into a Bolshevik-Stalinist movement. In a word, they convert antifascism into communism.

⁴¹ HDA, A. NDH, Fund: GRAVSIGUR MUP-a NDH 1945, box 532. Political review No. 23 and 24, from 12th February and 6th April 1945.

⁴² Z. Dizdar - M. Sobolevski: "Prešućivani četnički zločini u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini 1941-1945», Zagreb, 1999.

⁴³ HDA, ZKRZ GUZ box 21 and 647, Ustasha-HOP, box 4; Fund NDH, box 235,493, 532 and Doc. Inv. No. 24.947; NOV-1 79/410; KP-309/3064.

⁴⁴ Report of the Ustasha camp Derventa from 12. 11. 1945. to the Ustasha headquarters Posavje about that Chetnik slaughter. Z. Dizdar-M. Sobolevski, p. 660-661 and 715 (facsimile of the document).

The group of countries – states which fought against the “Axis alliance” is not identical with the group of countries – states that we can call the “antifascist block”.

Fascism, subtype communism (USSR + Tito’s partisans) battle against Hitler and with their victory win the moral epithet of “antifascist warriors.”

This is incorrect, but lasts to this day.

THEY HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST NAZISM, BUT THEY ARE NOT ANTIFASCISTS.

I will not write about the crimes of Tito’s partisans in the Second World War on the territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, because new facts are being uncovered daily, facts which were taboo for a long period of time.

6. COMMUNIST CRIMES AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Excerpt from “Short historical survey of evil over Croatia” (conquests, persecutions, killings, plundering, ethnocide...) - project manager Slobodan Praljak, edited by Tomislav Đonlić, Zagreb, 2006.

BLEIBURG, WAY OF THE CROSS AND AFTER-WAR MURDERS

Immediately before the end of the war, and after it (until 1948) the members of the Peoples Liberation Movement (NOP – partisan movement) committed mass murders of the members of Ustasha movement, Croatian home guardsmen and civilians (some 200.000 people were in lines that went towards Bleiburg and the Way of the Cross).¹

The war circumstances on the eastern front, as well as the circumstances in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) narrowed down the area of the military actions of HOS (Croatian Armed Forces); at the end of 1944 the major part of Croatia was under the partisan control (Kordun, Banija, Gorski Kotar, North-Croatian coastal area, Žumberak, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Hrvatsko Zagorje).

Under those circumstances it was difficult to expect that there can be a change in the balance of the forces on the field, and so started the abandonment of threatened areas as well as the concentration of population in Zagreb and the surrounding areas.

According to the statement of the famous author and editor Vinko Nikolić “people run in panic”; in 1941 the number of people in Zagreb was 260.000, in November of 1942 it was 300.000, in the autumn of 1944 the number reached 417.000, and by the beginning of May 1945, according to different estimates, as the ones coming from the institutions of town authority, so the ones coming from NOV (National-Liberation Army) and NOP the number of inhabitants in Zagreb reached 1,000.000.²

On May 1st 1945 the political and military leadership of NDH considered the possibility of retreat of the Croatian Armed Forces and the Croatian population towards Istria and further into northern Italy, where they would surrender to the western allies, i.e. the British; they were also considering a guerrilla war in the adversary’s rear.

The units of HOS offered resistance to the artillery-tank-aircraft attacks of the brigades of the Yugoslavian Army until May 25th, sixteen days after the official end of the war.

Given the situation, on a night-meeting from May 3rd to 4th the government of NDH decided to send a petition to the western allies in Caserto; then they translated it to English and at three o’clock on May 5th 1945 it was accepted and signed by all members of the government; however that intent was unsuccessful.

On May 3rd the units of NOP captured Trieste; as until that day NDH was reduced to the area that enclosed Varaždin, Koprivnica, Krapina, Ivanić Grad, Zagreb, Samobor, Sunja, Petrinja, Sisak and Karlovac; on May 5th the government of NDH brought a decision to abandon Zagreb and start towards Austria where they intended to surrender to the western allies (British).

¹ Vienna Catholic newspapers “Die Furche”, No. 23, from 7th June 1958, Article: “210.000 ljudi za jedan automobil”; Nikolaj Tolstoj: “Ministar i pokolji: Bleiburg i Kočevski rog 1945”, Nakladni zavod Matice Hrvatske, Zagreb 1991.

² Vjesnik, Zagreb 14th June; Feuilleton, Author prof.dr. Anđelko Mijatović.

The next day the evacuation of Zagreb begun; with the retreat of HOS the population of Zagreb moved, as well as the ones who left their homes and came to Zagreb running away from Chetnik and partisan-communist crimes, no matter of the occupation, sex and age, on trucks, horse-drawn and bullock carts, bicycles and on foot; this line was joined by the group of Montenegrin National Army and citizens and followers of dr. Sekula Drljević, advocate of the independent Montenegro.

BLEIBURG - THE WAY OF THE CROSS

What is meant by Bleiburg and the Way of the Cross of the Croatian nation are the events and developments linked to the operational retreat of the armed forces, state institutions and many inhabitants on the Independent State of Croatia in front of the Yugoslavian Partisan National-Liberation Army (NOV) in May 1945 through Slovenia towards Austria with the intention to surrender to the forces of the western allies of the anti-Hitler coalition; the surrender to the British and extradition to the Yugoslavian Army; then the disarmament, robbing, being taken to nearby prisoner camps, the most cruel killing of that multitude in Slovenia, and even in Austria and sending them in lines on a hastened march through Slovenia, Hrvatsko Zagorje, Podravina and Slavonia towards Banat and further through Serbia all the way to Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro; the other route, that the lines of people took, went through Slovenia and Croatia towards Samobor and Zagreb, Karlovac, Sisak, to Banovina, Kordun, towards Primorje, to Istria, on the islands, to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while individuals, smaller and bigger groups, in tens, hundreds and thousands, were killed near the roads down which they were pursued.³

In Celje (Slovenia) on May 9th 1945 a line of 190,000-220,000 soldiers and civilians was formed and also an military council was formed headed by the general Ivan Herenčić which was supposed to work until the final surrender to the English;⁴ the line of exhausted, infinite multitude was some 40 to 60 km long⁵ and retreated in the direction of Dravograd; the forces of the Yugoslavian Army (NOV) tightened the grip around the military and civil lines more and more and in that process the units of HOS made an effort to keep the line of retreat and to secure a relatively undisturbed passage of the line through Slovenia to Austria.⁶

On May 12th 1945, near Dravograd, the command of the 51st division of the Yugoslavian Army send an ultimatum to the Command of HOS to surrender and put down the arms until 10 o'clock on May 13th; however, on the same day after taking battle positions, the forces of YA (Yugoslavian Army partisans) from Otiški Vrh and Tolsti Vrh started to attack the refugee line in lower Mislinjska Valley between Slovenjgradec and the entrance to Dravograd, the battles continued also at the rear of the linearound Huda Luknja, Mislinje and Gornji Dolič, around Vojnik and Višnja Vas.⁷

In the night from May 12th to 13th the forces of YA captured Dravograd bridges and in that way blocked the further passage of the line towards Austria, and the units of HOS lead by general Boban were forced to clear the way for the line;⁸ a bridge was liberated over which "run the line of refugees the whole night, slowly, miserably, endlessly";⁹ still in the morning at 9 o'clock the pedestrian line was crossing the bridge, after that moved the car line, and only after them the horse-drawn and bullock carts were supposed to move.

So the majority of the refugee line reached Loibaško polje on May 14th, where its passage towards the allies to whom they indented to surrender was blocked again; already on Loibaško polje they made contact with the British forces, member of the 38th Infantry Brigade of the Fifth Corps of the Eighth Allied Army under the command of Patrick Scott.

Negotiations on the surrender of the Croatian refugee line to the British units that started the day before, continued on May 15th in the nearby castle of the count Thurn above Bleiburg; the Croatian leadership on the

³ Anđelko Mijatović, quoted work.

⁴ Vienna catholic newspapers "Die Furche" No. 23 from 7. June 1958., Article: «210.000 ljudi za jedan automobil».

⁵ According to the statement of the colonel Danijel Crljen in „Hrvatska Revija“ from December 1966 in the article „Bleiburg“; lieutenant-colonel of the National-Liberation Army Milan Basta in his book: «Rat posle rata» mentions the information that in that line there were more than 100.000 people.

⁶ Anđelko Mijatović, quoted work.

⁷ Milan Basta: "Rat posle rata", Zagreb, 1963.

⁸ Colonel Danijel Crljen: "Bleiburg" in „Hrvatska revija“, December 1966.

⁹ The same.

negotiations consisted of three men (colonel Danijel Crljen and the general Ivan Herenčić and general Servatzy) was forced to accept the surrender to the partisans under the threat of being bombed if they refuse.¹⁰

Around 4 pm that same day started the surrender of arms accompanied by the disapproval and disbelief; an unprecedented chaos arose, some generals headed by Ivan Tomašević and Slavko Štancer decided to try to negotiate again with the British, however they referred them to the partisans who told them that they have to surrender; so that the intent to save the line consisting of some 190,000 and 220,000 soldiers, political functionaries and civilians failed.

After the British leadership decided to surrender "the Croatian refugees" to their allies - members of Yugoslavian Army - started the hunt for the Croatian refugees that were scattered over the surrounding hills.¹¹

The surrender continued unquestioningly, so that according to the research of the British historian Nikolaj Tolstoj, in front of Bleiburg in May 1945, "almost a quarter of a million people" surrendered.¹²

According to the general-colonel Fedor Dragojlov at the time of the surrender in front of Bleiburg, in the area of Celje-Šostanje-Slovenjgradec, there were more than 100.000 members of HOS and civilians, at the same time in front of Bleiburg there were 150.000 people (and according to Dragojlov 90% of them were members of HOS), and a third part of civilian refugees mixed with smaller numbers of military units, according to the estimates more than 100.000 to 150.000 people, who by then haven't arrived to Bleiburg; during the march they surrendered to special groups wherever they were at the moment.¹³

One of the representatives of the Yugoslavian Army and the commissioner of the 51st division lieutenant colonel Milan Basta said that "from the generals who came to their headquarters they found out that the line certainly had more than 100.000 soldiers and officers. And many more civilians. In view of the last battles and constant drifting away they didn't know the exact number".¹⁴

In the reports of the Yugoslavian Army the losses are mentioned for the period from May 8th to 15th 1945: 142 dead, 324 wounded and 55 disappeared from the Third Army of the Yugoslavian Army, and for the enemy (HOS forces) the losses are: 25.000 killed, 4.000 wounded and some 60.000 imprisoned Ustasha and home guardsmen and some 5.000 home guardsmen;¹⁵ however nothing has been said about the imprisoned civilians and their destiny.

From the testimony of the survivals it is undoubtedly clear that after the extradition to the partisans lines and **marches of death followed**; they were left at the mercy of the Yugoslavian Army and the new Yugoslavian communist government, and then to merciless killing, i.e. the precise intellectually organized murder of the great part of prisoners already in Slovenia; in lines, more than thousand groups, they were sent on marches through Slovenia, Hrvatsko Zagorje, Podravina and Slavonia towards Banat and further through Serbia all the way to Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro; the other route went from Slovenia towards Zagreb, Karlovac, Sisak, to Banovina and Kordun, towards Primorje, to Istria, on the islands, to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro.¹⁶

On May 16th according to the statement of Milan Basta the line was formed down the whole road from Dravograd (where the first assembly centre was) to Maribor, nearly 60 kilometres.¹⁷

In front of Maribor followed the compulsory march, they had to run all the time; who couldn't run was shot immediately; all that got separated from the line for any reason whatsoever were shot without hesitation.¹⁸

On those compulsory marches they were robbed, badly beaten up, killed and murdered individually, in smaller

¹⁰ About that as well as the circumstances under which the negotiations were lead you can read more in Milan Basta: "Rat posle rata" and in Danijel Crljen: "Čimbenici Bleiburškog sloma", Hrvatska revija, XX, vol.1,2 (p. 77 and 78).

¹¹ Anđelko Mijatović, quoted work.

¹² Tolstoj Nikolaj: "Ministar i pokolji: Bleiburg i Kočevski rog 1945.", Nakladni zavod Matice Hrvatske, Zagreb 1991.

¹³ Anđelko Mijatović, quoted work.

¹⁴ Milan Basta: "Rat posle rata: Pavelićevi generali se predaju", Stvarnost, Zagreb, 1963.

¹⁵ Anthology of the documents and data about the national liberation war of the nations in Yugoslavia. Operations of the Yugoslavian Army in 1945, Military-political institute Belgrade, volume XI, book 1, 1971; book 2, 1969.; book 3, 1976; book 4, 1975.

¹⁶ Anđelko Mijatović, quoted work.

¹⁷ Milan Basta: "Rat posle rata", Zagreb 1963.

¹⁸ The testimony of Krunoslav Bačić and Ivan Hrvoje; published by A. Mijatović.

and bigger groups, without court and sentence; very often they were exposed to exhaustion caused by thirst and hunger; many testimonies exist about this - one is by lieutenant-colonel Krunoslav Bačić or Ivan Hrvoje who testify that the partisans killed as they wanted and who they came across (near Dravograd, according to Ivan Hrvoje, the partisans opened fire on the refugee line and on that occasion killed more than 100 people ... I. H.: "I saw with my own eyes a women running in fear towards the river Drava, dragging along a girl of some 8-10 years old. She didn't even do 50 steps when she was caught by a machine-gun burst and she fell dead together with her girl...").¹⁹

The main assembly point was located in Maribor. as well as the place of mass execution of the prisoners; here the selection of prisoners was done - they separated officers and non-commissioned officers from soldiers and civilians; then they were taken to the airport Tezno where they were shot by machine-guns (apparently 24 thousand people were killed here); according to the statements of guards who accompanied the victims, in lines from Maribor several thousand soldiers and civilians were taken in trucks of the Red Cross, seven kilometres from Maribor towards Ptuj, where anti-tank ditches existed; here they were undressed and the valuable objects (watches, rings ...) were taken away from them, and then they were killed.²⁰

According to the historian and the participant of Bleiburg tragedy Dr. Father Oton Knezović, the army and the people who arrived to Maribor couldn't be counted, hundred thousand arrived.²¹

HOW MANY OF THEM LEFT MARIBOR AND WERE PART OF THE WAY OF THE CROSS???

Until now in Slovenia 410 "hidden graves" – mass graves were found in 298 pits, 87 abyss, 15 anti-tank ditches, 6 mines and 4 anti-aircraft shelters: it is estimated that 190 thousand people of different nationalities were killed in Slovenia, among them the majority were the members of Croatian nation. The mass graves are found in Bistrica ob Sutla and its surroundings, near Rogaška Slatina, on thirty locations around Celje, in the surroundings of Krško, between Krško and Laško, in the surroundings of Kamnik, Kamniška Bistrica, between Velenje and Slovenjgradec, on Poljana pri Preveljah, near Dobova, on Gorenjsko, in the surroundings of Crnogrob then in Kočevski rog, Tezno near Maribor, Stari Hrastnik, Bistrica ob Sutla, Ilirska Bistrica, Krakovski gozd, in Mostec, in the surroundings of Šoštanje and elsewhere.²²

According to the testimony of Ivan Gugić who was a guard, two big camps existed in Celje and from those camps people were taken away in mass to be shot on Maceljška Gora, and then to Teharje; some witnesses claim that in Teharje some 10.000 prisoners were shot, some 7.000 prisoners were killed in a mine near Hrastnik; some 3.000 corpses were thrown in the old mine in Laško; some 3000 prisoners of Croatian and Montenegrin nationality were killed in the place Ratec.²³

From Slovenia, where the lines were formed, the ones they didn't have time to kill were send on a march of death through Croatia; the lines moved in several directions:

- a) from Maribor towards Ptuj, Varaždin, Slatina, Osijek and further;
- b) from Maribor through Krapina and Celje towards Zagreb and further;
- c) from Jesenice and Ljubelj through Kranj and Ljubljana towards Kočevje, towards Zagreb and through Novo Mesto towards Karlovac;
- d) from Jesenice through Kranj, Ljubljana, Rudnik, Kočevje and Delnice to Rijeka;
- e) from Celje through Krapina and Zidani Most towards Zagreb; the prisoner lines that moved through Zidani Most towards Zagreb were also divided: some went through Zaprešić towards Zagreb, and others through Bregana and Samobor went towards Sisak and towards Karlovac, Vojnić and Topusko; from Zagreb the lines also moved in several directions: Zagreb - Sisak - Petrinja; Zagreb - Ivanićgrad - Kutina - Novska - Okučani - Nova Gradiška - Požega; Zagreb - Sisak - Kutina - Jasenovac; Zagreb - Karlovac - Gračac - Knin - Šibenik -

¹⁹ Anđelko Mijatović, quoted work.

²⁰ The same.

²¹ "Bleiburška tragedija hrvatskog naroda", edited by Vinko Nikolić, Knjižnica Hrvatske revije and Agencija za marketing - Azinović, Zagreb 1993.

²² Mitja Ferenc: "Prikrito in očem zakrito ...", Celje, 2005.

²³ Anđelko Mijatović, the same.

Metković (by boat) -Mostar; some lines were driven up to Đevđelija;²⁴ They were forced to run or march, and some went by train (the ones who couldn't fit into the railroad car were shot on the station).²⁵

In Zagreb there were several camps (Prečko, Maksimir, near the Bus station, in Vrapče, on the airport in Borongaj ...) where the new government imprisoned people of different views, who were killed without court sentences; the head of OZNA (State Security Police) of the Ministry of Defence of the Democratic Federative Yugoslavia Aleksandar Ranković on May 17th sent a letter to OZNA in Croatia where he expressed his discontent with the small number of murders since the arrival to Zagreb.²⁶

The official dispatch said: "Your work in Zagreb is unsatisfactory. During ten days in liberated Zagreb only 200 bandits were shot. We are surprised by this indecision to clean Zagreb from criminals. You do just the opposite from our orders, because we told you to work quickly and energetically and to finish during the first few days. You forget that Zagreb now has almost one million people and that the entire Ustasha apparatus that run away from the interior in front of our army settled here."

It is estimated that at the time more than 80.000 men and women were imprisoned in prisons and camps in Zagreb; then the war wounded and other "suspicious" patients were gathered from Zagreb hospitals and killed in the cruelest way in the immediate and wider neighbourhood of Zagreb.²⁷

In the report of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslavian Army for Croatia to the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslavian Army dated May 15th is written that there are 77.047 prisoners in camps in Croatia, from that there are 15 thousand in the camp Prečko, Vrapče 943, Zagreb (probably on Kanal) 4.190.

According to the estimates, at the time more than 15000 civilians from the area of Zagreb were killed, without a trial and according to the lists composed by OZNA and the regional party committees; only in the Zagreb mountain and its foot some 9150 civilians were killed from May until August 1945;²⁸ Other places where people were killed are found in the area of Gornje Vrapče, Gomji Mikulići, on more than twenty locations in Gračani, in Šestine, Mlinovi, near the hospital Brestovac, on Jelenovac, Mirogoj, Remete, Maksimir, Bukovečka woods, Markuševac, Čučerje, on Markovo polje, Sesvete, in Horvati, Rakov Potok ...

The rest of the prisoners who came from Slovenia (from Loibaško polje and Bleiburg) via Zagreb continued their way through Zagreb into the unknown.

Often they were intentionally taken through the places mostly inhabited with Serbian population where, with the kind disposition of the ones who were taking them, they were beaten up, poisoned²⁹ with food and water and killed in the cruelest ways by those inhabitants.

So one line with some 300-500 people was killed near Čazma, on the way they were systematically beaten up and killed as the Yugoslavian Army soldiers wanted;³⁰ that was the destiny of one of the lines, and the other lines had a similar destiny.

On the roads the lines of death took or next to them, in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, until now some 1100 mass execution sites were listed by name where the mass murders of the participants of the Way of the Cross were committed.

According to the research of the Commission for the victims of the war and after war in 1991 in the area of **Ilovec** in 22 mass graves (from 135 found in that area) 1164 skeletons were found; in Donji Macelj, in the area of Lepa Bukva, a mass grave was found where in the night of June 4th and 5th and also 8th and 9th 21 priests, friars and seminarians of the province of Bosna Srebrena, the Herzegovina Franciscan province, the archdiocese Vrhbosanska, diocese of Krk, diocese of Đakovo and the archdiocese of Zagreb were killed.

²⁴ Anđelko Mijatović, quoted work.

²⁵ Luitenant-colonel Krunoslav Bačić in: "Spomenica povodom 50-te obljetnice Bleiburga i Križnog puta 1945-1995", edited by Mirko Valentić.

²⁶ Josip Jurčević: "Bleiburg: jugoslavenski poratni zločini nad Hrvatima", Zagreb 2005.

²⁷ Anđelko Mijatović, the same.

²⁸ The same.

²⁹ Anđelko Mijatović, the same.

³⁰ The testimony of the reserve officer of HOS Kazimir Kovačić.

It is estimated that in the area of Gornji and Donji Macelj from ten to twenty thousand people were killed, among them a thousand and a half of Germans; in memory of those victims in Donji Macelj a memorial church with a charnel-house is being built where the bones of that crime will be stored.

In the area of Zaprešić the participants of the Way of the Cross were executed in mass by firing squads in Zaprešić, Brdovac, Javorje, Ključ Brdovečki, Prudnica, Šenkovac and elsewhere in the surroundings of Zaprešić.

In Karlovac the infamous camp Dubovac was known, from that camp the prisoners were taken to suitable execution sites in the town area of Karlovac and the area of Duga Resa, Petrakovo Brdo, Gornje Mrzlo Polje, Brezova Glava, Vukmanički Cerovac, Rečica, Tušilović.

In Ogulin and the surroundings more than twenty mass graves of the participants of the Croatian Way of the Cross and the local population are known; the graves are located in the areas of Josipdol, Generalski Stol, Krnjak, Vojnić (844 victims), Slunj.

On Banija the places of execution of the participants of the Way of the Cross are known around Glina in Majske poljane, in the pit Grabovac, in the forest Šaševa (the estimate is some four to five thousand victims), Donje Selište, Klasnić, Stankovac; near Petrinja in the forest Brezovica (the estimate is some 5-6 thousand victims), Mostec (some two hundred victims).

In Čemernica near Topusko existed the infamous extermination camp under the command of the Yugoslavian Army from Petrinja to which the prisoners were brought from camps in Zagreb, Karlovac, Sisak and elsewhere; it is estimated that in the surrounding ditches and water-worn ravines more than 10 thousand imprisoned members of HOS and the German Army were killed.

Around Gvozd the mass graves of the participants of the Way of the Cross are found in Blatuša, in the forest Muljci (the estimate is some two thousand victims), in Kozarac (710 victims).

Mass places of execution and graves of the members of HOS and other participants of the Way of the Cross in Lika exist in several places on the area and the surroundings of Gospić, Otočac, Brinje, Korenica etc.; in Gorski Kotar in the surroundings of Brod Moravica, around Rijeka, Kostrena, Kraljevica, Crikvenica, in Kastav, on Cres near the place Beli; in Istria in a pit in the area of Miljevo near Buzet, in two places near Pazin, in the pit Golubična near the road between Raklje and Krnić.

The area of Sisak, known for the camps with bad reputation like Viktorovac and Staklana, is also the execution site of many victims of the Way of the Cross; mass graves were found in the forest behind Stari Farkašić, between Željezara and Caprag, where it's assumed that more than three thousand people were shot, on Viktorovac, in Lalićev gaj, and also some were killed and thrown in to the river Kupa; more testimonies exist about the camp Jasenovac and the killings of prisoners there.

In Hrvatsko Zagorje exist several tens of mass graves in the area and the surroundings of: Varaždin, Ivanec, Lepoglava, Ludbreg, Novi Marof, Beretince, Donji Martijanec, Gornji Kneginec, Sračinec, Tmovec Bartolovečki, Vidovec, Visoko: mass execution sites and graves are also found in the area of Koprivnica and Križevci in the places and the surroundings of Đurđevac, Križevci, Ferdinandovac, Kalinovac, Kloštar Podravski, Novigrad Podravski, in the area of Sirova Katalena, it is estimated that two thousand prisoners brought in two trains were killed in the forest towards Kloštar Podravski, and in the woods Limbuš near Kloštar Podravski 400-500 prisoners were killed.

In the area of Bjelovar and the surroundings some three thousand members of HOS, from the assembly and transit camp Vojnović that existed there, were killed in the woods near the camp, while for the entire area of Bjelovar is estimated that up to eight or nine thousand people were killed: mass execution sites and graves are found around Bjelovar, Čazma, Daruvar, Grubišno Polje, Velika Pisanica, Ivanićgrad, Kutina, Lipik, Pakrac, Stara Gradiška (in the area of and around the penitentiary), Nova Gradiška (in Rešetari, on Cerničko brdo, Malčansko brdo, Urije, Mašić firing range, Kruljčeva ledina), Slavonski Brod and elsewhere: famous mass execution sites and graves can be found in the area of Slatina, Virovitica, Čačinac, Gradina, Suhopolje, Voćin.

About the mass crimes near Suhopolje six members of NOV and NOP - Ivan Lucović, Stjepan Reder, Mirko Vinter, Gjuro Stipić, Josip Škvorc and Ferdinand Lisinski - notified on July 20th 1945 the war secretary of CK KPH (Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia) and the minister of trade and industry in the Yugoslavian government at the time Andrija Hebrang: "A month ago several hundreds of prisoners were brought

to Suhopolje, who were taken to the nearby woods and killed there. Before that they were beaten up and then slaughtered. It was done by the comrades from the 4th battalion of the 5th proletarian Montenegrin brigade who were in Suhopolje at the time, and when they returned to Suhopolje they told the people how they slaughtered them ...”³¹

It was established that the total number of killed prisoners between Pitomača and Sladojevci was 1416 people; that same brigade killed seven hundred members of HOS near the village Tropinska.

Murders of the members of HOS and civilian "enemies" were done also in the southern Croatia; it's assumed that near Trogir, by the road Trogir - Šibenik and near the cemetery of St. Ivan more than two thousand members of HOS were shot.

Many mass execution sites and graves from the time of the Way of the Cross of Croatian people in 1945 can also be found on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosanski Brod, Bosanska Gradiška, Brčko, Čapljina, Drvar (Tičevo), Han Pijesak, Ljubinja, Mostar, Sarajevo, Stolac, Trebinje, Vlasenica, Zenica, Cazin (Pećigrad), Mala Kladuša (Marijanec), Prnjavor (the forest Dolina) and other places.

Near the village Grede (Bosanski Brod), some two thousand members of HOS were killed; in the woods near Lužan around thousand were killed; in Podgraci in Potkozarje (below Mrakovica) – the famous top of the mountain Kozara members of the Yugoslavian Army in May and June 1945 killed in the most cruellest way several thousand prisoners members of HOS, Catholics and Muslims, originating from BiH, brought from the prisoner camp in Požega.

In Herzegovina mass murders were committed around Mostar, where they killed them and threw them into the river Neretva, took them away and killed them in the pits around Stolac (pit Varduša where it's estimated more than seven thousand people were brought from Mostar and other places), Ljubinje, Nevesinje, Bileća, Trebinje and elsewhere.


Many arrested Croats in Herzegovina were taken by trains towards Montenegro, on the way on certain railway stops they were taken of the train, then taken to previously determined pits: near Hrženi Dol, Veličan, Jasenice-Lug, Talež, Orah, Gluha Smokva, Aleksina Međa, Babin Zub, Vilus, around Bileća and in the canyon of Morača and killed them in there; in June 1945 several members of HOS were killed on Čemovsko polje near Podgorica.

About further killing of the prisoners of the Way of the Cross also testify' the camps in Banat and Bačka (Bečej, Bela Crkva, Apatin, Sombor, Novi Sad, Novi Vrbas, Pančevo, Kovin and Vršac); in Serbia (in Beograd, Bor, Užice, Kraljevo, Jabuka near Užice, Aleksinac, Petrovac na Mlavi, Požarevac, Čačak, Čuprija, Niš, Smederevo); in Trepče on Kosovo; in Macedonia - in Skoplje, Demir Kapija and Veles; in Montenegro in Titograd, Danilovgrad, Nikšić, Tivat and Kotor.

³¹ More: A. Mijatović, quoted work.



An overview of the main routes of the Croatian Way of the Cross.



An overview of the most important mass grave sites of killed Croatian soldiers and civilians on the areas of post-war Yugoslavia



C


A sight from one of 26 explored mass graves on Maceljska gora in which the post mortem remains of executed prisoners, Croatian soldiers and civilians, imprisoned in several nearby concentration camps were found.



D

An overview of major concentration camps on the territory of post-war Yugoslavia

E



The "Maksimir" prisoner camp in Zagreb, May 1945

Excerpt from “Short historical survey of evil over Croatia” (conquests, persecutions, killings, plundering, ethnocide...) - project manager Slobodan Praljak, edited by Tomislav Đonlić, Zagreb, 2006.

VOLKSDEUTSCHER (ethnic Germans)

The fact that precisely Volksdeutscher (ethnic Germans) suffered the most difficult demographic losses in the post war period is indisputable; a great loss of Germans is explained by the military and civil victims during the war, then the post-war suffering with different aspects of internment and the forced labour in Yugoslavia, and the mass emigration, some during and most at the end and after the Second World War; historiographers and demographers report of the demographic loss of some 460.000 Germans in Yugoslavia, so the total number of emigrants, dead and unborn.

The census from March 31st 1931 determined that in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia lives 499.969 or 3.59% of the population whose mother tongue is German.¹

The first post-war census (1948) determined that in the new Yugoslavian state lives only 55.337 members of the German national minority (the Austrians were in the census of 1948 included in the section "Others"); only 10.144 people declared themselves German;² a certain number of Germans was denationalized because of fear (hidden Germans) and declared themselves as members of some other nation.

Because of the spiritual atmosphere that was aggressively promoted by the new government, in the middle of the intolerance and antagonism towards German national minority, Germans in Yugoslavia couldn't maintain their basic existential, cultural and economic rights; only two possibilities existed for them: or to move out or to assimilate.

So with every new census their decrease was recorded; in 1953 in Yugoslavia there were 60.536 Germans and 1.459 Austrians; in 1961 there were 12.785 Germans and 852 Austrians; in 1981 there were 8.712 Germans and 1.402 Austrians.

The destiny of Volksdeutscher in Yugoslavia during and after the Second World War was connected to, besides partisan movement and communist government, the downfall of the Third Reich; Volksdeutscher were persecuted, arrested and imprisoned in camps.

During the Second World War the leadership of the German ethnic group confronted the fact that the developments on the front-lines and the general situation ensured the security of life and property; already at the end of 1943, after the initial relocation of Volksdeutscher from the most endangered areas, the leader of the German ethnic group Branimir Altgaver started to make a plan for the complete evacuation of Germans from Slavonia and Srijem (because in that area lived the majority of German population in Yugoslavia).

During the first half of 1944 the evacuations were sporadic, but already in the second half and at the end of 1944 they became organized.

The last stage of the relocation of Volksdeutscher started on 16th September 1944 with the delivering of the proclamation and the order in a sealed envelope. They were directed to all local managements of German ethnic group or authorized people, with a remark that it can be opened and put in use only in the case of the pass-word "Heimatnot" – Homeland in trouble; the emigration was lead by the Headquarters for the evacuation that also made the plan of emigration.

According to the information provided by the management of the German ethnic group, during the last stage some 110.000 Volksdeutscher were evacuated. Using press, radio, pamphlets and manifestos they warned the Volksdeutscher about the revenge of the communists and the partisan movement. How justified was all of that showed the following turn of the events.

On the Potsdam Conference of the allied forces winners of the war (July 17th - August 2nd 1945), it was

¹ Definitive results of the census from March 31st 1931.

² Definitive results of the census from March 15th 1948; book IX, Stanovništvo po narodnosti, FNRJ, Savezni zavod za statistiku, Beograd 1954.

concluded (XII "orderly emigration of the German population")³ that the remaining population from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would move to the territory of Germany. The relocation (ethnic cleansing) was legalized as the most permanent and most satisfactory solution, and it was supposed to be done in an organized and "humane" way.⁴ The ones who were not included in the conclusions of the Potsdam Conference solved the problem of Germans on an even more drastic way (first of all Yugoslavia).

NKOJ (National Committee of the Liberation of Yugoslavia) and the Presidency of AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia) in April 1944 in the "Draft of the declaration on the basic rights of nations and citizens of the Democratic Federative Yugoslavia" decided that "in the interest of the security and consolidation of the democratic order and brotherhood of people of the Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, in the interest of the security of all achievements of the national liberation struggle, all fascist and pro-fascist organizations and activities aimed against freedom, independence and friendly society of Yugoslavian nations are prohibited, persecuted and destroyed by the government. All assets of those organizations are confiscated to the benefit of the people." (Document-1)

The communist authorities in Yugoslavia indented to exile form the country as many Germans and Austrians as possible. The Volksdeutscher were not considered Yugoslavian citizens, and they prohibited the return of the refugees and exiled Germans and Austrians.

Proclaiming Volksdeutscher as collective culprits and enemies, the communist government confiscated their assets and took away their national and civil rights - the Yugoslavian nationality was taken away and they were erased from the voting lists. (Document-5)

The procedure by which the confiscation was realized was, according to the decision of the Presidency of AVNOJ from November 21st 1944 more than simple. The question of German assets was solved without a compromise; there was no difference between German national and private assets, because the local Germans Yugoslavian citizens, had completely the same rights as Germans from the Third Reich and were declared the enemies of the Yugoslavian nation. (Documents 6-7)

From the middle of 1945 to 1948 in Yugoslavia were confiscated 97.720 properties of the total area of 637.939 hectares of the Volksdeutschers land property; from that: in Slovenia were seized 5.703 properties of the total area of 114.780 hectares, in Croatia 20.457 properties with the total area of 120.977 hectares, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.523 properties with the total area of 12.733 hectares, in Vojvodina 68.035 properties of the total area of 389.256 hectares and in Serbia 1 property of 193 hectares.⁵

In the period from 1945 to 1947 over twenty thousand discussions about objects of agrarian reform were held; for the properties of German and Austrian minority, as well as the properties of national enemies, the discussions were not held; for them the district commissions for the agrarian reform and colonization made a decision about the establishment of the objects of agrarian reform based on the sentences of the district national courts.⁶

From the total land reserves of the agrarian reform and colonization, Volksdeutscher properties were represented with 59%. and the areas of the land property with 37%.⁷

From December 1944 until March 1948 existed some seventy camps (of different kinds) for the remaining Germans/Volksdeutscher in Yugoslavia that were established by the official bodies of the state at the time. Documents confirm that the entire families with children, no matter the age, were sent to camps.

According to the German/Volksdeutschers data from 195.000 Germans who stayed in Yugoslavia, from the end of 1944 to the beginning of 1948 some 170.00 people of the German nationality were interned in Yugoslavian camps (Velika Pisanica, Šipovac-Našice, Gakovo...); some 60.000 Volksdeutscher died or were killed from illness, exhaustion, hunger and cold, mostly elderly, women and children (until now some 70% of victims were identified by name). Some 6.000 children under 14 years of age were killed in the after-war Yugoslavian camps only because they were German (Documents-10, -11a, -11b, Picture 12).

³ Compare: Ujedinjene nacije: Zbirka dokumenata 1941-1945, Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke, Beograd 1947, p. 124-125.

⁴ Compare: Fritz Krotz: "Das Potsdamer Abkommen und seine volkerrechtliche Bedeutung", Frankfurt/M.-Berlin 1969.

⁵ Nikola Gačešić: "Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Jugoslaviji 1945-1948.", Matica Srpska, Novi Sad 1984, p.78-79.

⁶ Compare Marijan Maticka: "Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Hrvatskoj 1945-1948.", Školska knjiga – Stvarnost Zagreb, 1990.

⁷ Nikola Gačešić: "Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Jugoslaviji 1945-1948.", Matica Srpska, Novi Sad 1984, p.78.-79.

Otpusnica
 Iz Radnog logora Šipovac od 9. listopada 1945. za obitelj
 Ladislava Hogela iz Osijeka

Datum: 9. 10. 1945.
 Broj: 110/45

1/ Hogel Ladislav
 2/ Hogel Esterija
 3/ Hogel Erich

S. F. 110/45
 I. K. 110/45

Document 10: Letter of dismissal from the labour camp Šipovac dated October 9th 1945 for the family of Ladislav Hogel from Osijek.

Narodna Republika Hrvatska
 Narodni odbor kotarske Djakove
 Narodni odbor općine Vrbica
 Broj: 425/45

U Vrbici, dne 12. studena 1945. g.

Heimkehrer-Beschleunigung
 Heilbrunn am 9. 11. 45
 Reg. Präs. Nordwürt.

P O T V R D A
 Kejom se potvrđuje, da oviitelji Švob Josipa iz Zankovca sa sljedećim članovima: 1. Švob Josip rođj. 1935. g., 2. Švob z. Hirsberger "Magdalena" rođj. 1934. g., 3. Švob Stjepan rođj. 1930. g., 4. Švob Ana rođj. 1942. god. - nije upisana u knjigu štrajkarske Narodne Republike Hrvatske koja se vodi kod ovog narodnog odbora iz razloga što se za vrijeme ropstva nije nalažila na području ovog narodnog odbora. Ista obitelj je tada boravila u logoru u Krndiji kod Djakova, s to od 10. VI. 1945. do 5. V. 1946. god. Ova potvrda se i dalje ne vlastiti sahtjev Švob Josipa a u svrhu priloga molbi za izlaznu vizu. Takva po tar. broju 1 i 27 Zakona o takozvan naplaćena i pšepčeno poništena. - Kart. fašizma - Slobođnog narodu! Predsjednik (Antun Radišević) Radišević

Potvrda NO općine Vrbica kraj Đakovo da su se Josip i Magdalena Švob iz Mrzovića sa djecom Stjepanom (1930.), Josipom (1934.), Magdalenom (1938.) i Anom (1942.) nalazili u logoru Krndija od 10. lipnja 1945. do 5. svibnja 1946.


Document 11a: Confirmation of the People's Committee of the Vrbica district near Đakovo that Josip and Magdalena Švob from Mrzović with their children Stjepan (1930), Josip (1934), Magdalena (1938) and Ana (1942) were in the camp Krndija from June 10th 1945 to May 5th 1946.

KOMANDA RADNOG LOGORA VALPOVO
 Broj: 623
 Valpovo, dne 23. kolovoza 1945.

O T P U S N I C A .
 Za Rotu Ivicu rođj. 1944. u Osijeku, koji se otpušta iz Radnog logora Valpovo na temelju odluke Oblasnog ureda za slavonsku upravu odjel pod brojem 11552-2222/45 od 22. 8. 1945. i predaju na zbirnu i otklanjanja Balog Jelisavice rođj. 1944. iz Osijeka. Ova otpusnica važi kao prop. lista za put od Valpova do Osijeka. Molimo sve vođe i stivara, da imenovanoj putu da čestitka da obine nikakve smetnje. Kart. fašizma - Slobođnog narodu! Fon. upravnika: J. O. Upravnik logora: Belodreva

Otpusnica iz Radnog logora Valpovo od 23. kolovoza 1945. za Ivicu Rotha (1944.) iz Osijeka

Document 11b: Letter of dismissal from the labour camp Valpovo dated August 23rd 1945 for Ivica Roth (1944) from Osijek.



Herta Gärtner (Indija, 1944.) nakon bijega s bakom iz logora Gakovo u Bačkoj umrla je od posljedica logora u dječjoj bolnici u Bad Hallu (Linz) u Austriji 3. travnja 1946.

Picture 12: Herta Gärtner (Indija, 1944) after escaping with her grandmother from the camp Gakovo in Bačka died from the consequences of the camp in the children's hospital in Bad Hall (Linz) in Austria on April 3rd 1946.

EMIGRATION (PURSUIT) OF POLES FROM YUGOSLAVIA (BIH) IN 1946*

The ethnic community of the Poles disappeared as the consequence of the direct Chetnik terror in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Poles settled in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Austria-Hungary rule; two groups of Polish immigrants existed: one was made by the Poles who spoke Polish and were Catholics, and the other by Ukrainians with the Ukrainian language and Eastern-rite Catholic faith; they were settled in the districts Prijedor, Derventa, Bosanska Gradiška, Banja Luka and Bosanski Novi;¹ it is estimated that at the end of the Second World War some 15.000 Poles lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina.²

*After the end of the war (1945-1950) there were individual and smaller Chetnik crimes and even victims in several places in Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the annihilation of the last Chetnik organizations; among the victims were Croats, Muslims and **Poles**.*

When they found themselves in an exposed position, on the conference on July 1st 1945 their community expressed the intention to return to Poland; with that request their delegation turned to the president of the government of BiH Rodoljub Čolaković; after that the Polish representatives (Jan Komuš, Jan Urban) turned to the embassy of the Republic of Poland in Belgrade, where they received the support for their intentions; then they went to Poland and met with the Polish president, the foreign minister and the minister of home affairs, and after the positive response they visited Lower Silesia, where they chose an area to settle.

The problems followed when the government of Yugoslavia didn't want to recognize the indemnification of the acquired property, i.e. houses and land that the Poles left. Yugoslavia even asked that Poland pays indemnification for the cattle and food that Poles took with them to Poland.

Because of that the delegates of the Polish minority in Yugoslavia on December 6th 1945 turned to Josip Broz and asked that the questions of their emigration be solved as justly as possible; among other things they wrote this: "The occupier, and especially Chetniks, robbed, burned and killed many of us because we compactly participated in NOP (People Liberation Movement).

Even today tire Polish settlements in Bosnia are exposed to the Chetnik terror, and almost half of the population escaped from their settlements and took refuge, together with poor people, in towns or Slavonian villages, where hungry, naked and barefoot they look for salvation".³

The District National Committee of Srbac on November 17th 1945 reported that "the Poles as well as Ukrainians leave their homes every day and run away because of robberies committed by the Serbian population helped by Chetnik bands.⁴

In the period from December 25th 1945 to January 25th 1946 from 5700 Poles that lived in Srbac escaped 2482, and from that 1241 towards Prnjavor, 1123 towards Derventa and 118 to Slavonia.⁵

On January 2nd 1946 a Protocol was signed between the Polish ambassador and the government in Yugoslavia; according to that protocol every emigrant stated in writing that he is moving out voluntarily and giving up his immovable property in Yugoslavia;⁶ in this sense a fictitious buying and selling was done, the protocol was signed in the name of Yugoslavian government by Vladimir Velebit, and in the name of Poland by Jan Karol Wendle, special and authorised ambassador of the Republic of Poland in Yugoslavia.

The communist government, besides not providing appropriate protection, didn't even provide the appropriate indemnification for their property.

The process of emigration lasted from March 28th until the beginning of November 1946; the transport was done

* Husnija Kamberović: "Iseljavanje Poljaka iz Bosne i Hercegovine 1946. godine", Časopis za suvremenu povijest, No. 1, Zagreb 1998.

¹ Artur Burda: "Poljski naseljenici u Bosni", Zbornik krajiških muzeja, III, Banja Luka, 1968/69, p. 186.

² Husnija Kamberović, quoted work.

³ Archive of Yugoslavia (AJ), fund Government of FNRJ (50), 35-73., Letter addressed to Josip Broz, 6 December 1945.

⁴ Archive of Bosanska krajina (ABK), fund of the District national committee of Banja Luka, box 125, No. 199/45.

⁵ ABK, ONO BL, box 125., No. 199/45.

⁶ ABiH, fund Government of BiH, box 44, No. 16/46

by four trains each with 40 wagons, which were secured by the Polish government.⁷

Judging by individual reports, from Bosnia and Herzegovina organized in 32 convoys' emigrated more than 2941 families with more than 14.961 members.⁸

The data that the Yugoslavian Commission for the Return of the Poles to their Country in its final report submitted on November 2nd 1946 to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina differs somewhat from that data, but not essentially; according to that summary report emigrated 2649 families with 14.088 members; however to that number were not added another 231 families with 999 members that emigrated from Croatia, 45 families from Serbia with 198 members and 5 families from Slovenia with 16 members.⁹

TABLE: The emigration of Poles expressed according to locations

Name of the District	Families	Family Members	Number of cattle that they took	Agricultural and artisan tools they took	Left undamaged houses	Left damaged houses	Left cultivable land (ha)	Left woods (ha)
Srbac	1.318	7.311	3.042	1.143	797	131	7.326,4	810,2
Prnjavor	539	2.824	1.309	785	368	22	2.349,1	222,8
Derventa	120	596	348	166	77	1	356,4	60,0
Laktaši	327	1.637	743	529	191	22	1.256,6	281,6
Bosanska Dubica	1	4	5	0	1	0	0,3	0
Prijedor	4	22	7	6	2	0	8,4	0
Doboj	1	5	4	1	0	0	0	0
Bosanski Brod	2	9	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vareš	9	43	12	2	6	0	6,0	0
Zenica	10	36	13	2	0	0	0,3	0
Teslić	7	28	16	2	1	0	0,3	0
Zavidovići	4	11	10	2	1	0	6,1	0
Sarajevo	10	31	4	5	4	0	6,8	0
Banja Luka	63	303	72	24	18	4	84,2	7,0
Bosanski Novi	33	205	40	16	5	1	165,3	63,1
Bosanska Gradiška	200	1.014	770	440	107	25	784,6	51,1
Piskavice	1	9	5	0	0	0	0	0
T O T A L	2.649	14.088	6.400	3.123	1.578	206	12.350,5	1.495,8

INFORMATION BUREAU

Socio-political changes happened after the Second World War in Yugoslavia, as well as in Croatia; it was the total turn with the respect to the earlier values and views. Instead of national, civil, Christian virtues and values, the class, national, international and atheistic principles were pointed out.

When they gained power, the communists during the first after war years systematically closed all national institutions, dissolved associations and organizations, prohibited their work and confiscated their property: memorial plaques were removed, monuments demolished (e.g. to Jelačić in Zagreb, to N. Tommase in Šibenik etc.).

With the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization from August 1945, the Law on Nationalization of the Means of Production from 1946 and the Law on the Five-year Plan from 1947 the most affected were the agrarian and industrially most developed Republics. With the colonization in eastern Croatia and Vojvodina, Serbs from Croatia and BiH settled on the properties of the exiled Germans.

In summer 1948 a dispute arose between Tito and Stalin; Stalin was considered to be the first man of Comintern and the leader of the world communist movement and as such he was recognized by all leading personnel of the party and his orders were carried out; Tito and Yugoslavia had behind them the charisma of the victorious

⁷ ABiH, VLBH, box 16, No. 10153/46, Yugoslavian Commission for the return of Poles - Presidency of the Government of BH, 15.6.1946.

⁸ Husnija Kamberović, quoted work.

⁹ ABiH, VLBH, box 16, p. 10153/46.

liberation war and second/third successful revolution in the world, for that reason they asked USSR to respect their war merits and specific quality. In summer 1948 Stalin used Cominform of the communist parties that on a meeting in Bucharest introduced a resolution where they gravely accuse Tito and asked for the inner forces of KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) to overthrow him from the inside. A fierce score-settling with all Stalin's followers in KJP followed, mostly with early resistance fighters who idealized the "First socialist country".

Then "Goli Otok" was opened, where most of them ended up, and according to the methods of brutality Goli Otok was equal to the darkest Stalin camps. 16,312 people were sent to camps for Cominform supporters **Goli Otok and Grgur**.

According to the official data of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 55.663 people in the state were marked as Cominform supporters and from that 4.543 of them were in BiH.

In the Republic of Croatia there were 100.000-150.000 files kept by the State Security Service.

	YUGOSLAVIA	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Number of registered Cominform supporters	55.663	4.343 (7,8%)
Arrested	16.312	2.219 (13,6%)
	29,30 %	51,09 %

VICTIMS OF OZNA AND UDBA ABROAD

WORK OF YUGOSLAV SECRET SERVICES IN CROATIAN EMIGRATION

Yugoslavia and the communist order were not based on the legitimate will of the Croatian people; The State and the regime without legitimacy that is based on the will of the people do not have a reliable base for their existence and it can only be ensured for a while by means of violence.

Aware that neither Yugoslavia as a state nor its government have any legitimacy, and uncompromising in their efforts to ensure their survival, the Yugoslav regime decided to get even with all state-building Croats who questioned their legitimacy, and also with the prominent Croatian emigrants, on the most extreme and brutal way possible.

The leaders of KPH (Communist Party of Croatia) knew that the politics of Yugoslavianism and bolshevism could not find a serious footing with the Croatian people, so they considered as mortal enemies the ones who represented the idea of the Croatian state independence (especially the ones from the Croatian emigration).

After the war, and later, the victim of Yugoslav secret police were not only members of Ustasha's and Home-Guard units or civilians who uncompromisingly represented the idea of Croatian independence, but even partisan and communist leaders like Ivan Goran Kovačić, dr. Andrija Hebrang or the former officer and later deserter of the JNA Zvonimir Kučar. The main criterion for the hostility was not the ideological affiliation to the left or right origin, but first of all showing the tendency towards the Croatian state-building and national identity.

For physical murders OZNA was responsible, i.e. from 1946 UDBA (State Security administration) and from 1966, after the Plenary session on Brijuni and the fall of Aleksandar Ranković - SDB (State Security Service).

With every murder Yugoslavia tried to achieve a triple goal:

1. Eliminate the person who presents the problem
2. Frighten other political rivals
3. Give the impression that the emigration makes war among itself (each execution was followed by propaganda saying that it's seemingly a question of mutual "showdown of Ustasha underground")

The first estimates about the necessity or usefulness to kill or kidnap an emigrant were usually brought by the so called operative on the field, this estimate would then be assessed by the superiors from his service and sent to the Republic centre of SDB (in the Republic SDB of Croatia existed an official department that dealt only with the Croatian emigration); then they would ask for the consent of the Republic secretary for the home affairs, who would, before making a decision, consult the closest collaborators from the Republic party leadership.

If and when the suggestion was accepted it was passed on to the federal headquarters of UDBA (SDB) in

Belgrade, there it should first receive the consent of the federal secretary for the home affairs and finally the approval of the "Federal committee for the protection of the constitutional order" headed by, according to the position, the president of Yugoslavia (Tito), i.e. later the president of the presidency.

In the period from 1946 to 1990 there was a total of **109 (hundred and nine) attacks of OZNA i.e. UDBA and KOS (Counterintelligence Service) on Croatian emigrants**; in Europe the total of 89 attacks, 9 attacks in Northern America, 6 in Southern America, 2 in Australia and 2 in Africa.

If you break that down to individual states, one can notice that the most attacks happened in Germany -56, in France -10, in Italy -9. From that there were 67 killed, 29 unsuccessful attempts of murder, 4 realized kidnapping, 5 unsuccessful kidnapping and 4 disappeared people for which there is a reason to assume that they became victims of the Yugoslav terrorist actions; besides Croats the victims of the Yugoslav secret services were also 12 Serbs and 4 Albanians.

LIST OF UDBA VICTIMS IN CROATIAN EMIGRATION

KILLED

1) Dr. Ivan Protulipac	1946. In Italy	35) Ilija Vučić	1975. In FR Germany
2) Ilija Abramović	1948. In Austria	36) Ivica Milošević	1975. In FR Germany
3) Dinka Domačinović	1960. In Argentina	37) Nikola Martinović	1975. In Austria
4) Mate Miličević	1966. In Canada	38) Matko Bradarić	1975. In Belgium
5) Marijan Šimundić	1967. In FR Germany	39) Vinko Eljuga	1975. In Denmark
6) Jozo Jelić	1967. In FR Germany	40) Stipe Mikulić	1975. In Sweden
7) Mile jelić	1967. In FR Germany	41) Nikola Penava	1975. In FR Germany
8) Petar Tominac	1967. In FR Germany	42) Ivan Tuksor	1976. In France
9) Vlado Murat	1967. In FR Germany	43) Ivan Vučić	1977. In FR Germany
10) Anđelko Pemar	1967. In FR Germany	44) Jozo Oreč	1977. In SAR
11) Hrvoje Ursa	1968. In FR Germany	45) Bruno Bušić	1978. In France
12) Đuro Kokić	1968. In FR Germany	46) Križan Brkić	1978. In USA
13) Mile Rukavina	1968. In FR Germany	47) Marijan Rudela	1979. In USA
14) Krešimir Tolj	1968. In FR Germany	48) Zvonko Štimac	1979. In USA
15) Vid Maričić	1968. In FR Germany	49) Goran Šečer	1979. In Canada
16) Ante Znaor	1968. In Italy	50) Cvitko Cicvarić	1979. In Canada
17) Josip Krtalić	1968. In Italy	51) Nikola Miličević	1980. In FR Germany
18) Nedjeljko Mrkonjić	1968. In France	52) Mirko Desker	1980. In FR Germany
19) Pere Čović	1968. In Australia	53) Ante Kostić	1981. In FR Germany
20) Mirko Čurić	1969. In FR Germany	54) Mate Kolić	1981. In France
21) Nahid Kulenović	1969. In FR Germany	55) Petar Bilandžić	1981. In FR Germany
22) Vjekoslav Luburić	1969. In Spain	56) Ivan Jurišić	1981. In FR Germany
23) Mijo Lijić	1970. In Sweden	57) Mladen Jurišić	1981. In FR Germany
24) Mirko Šimić	1971. In FR Germany	58) Stanko Nižić	1981. In Switzerland
25) Ivo Bogdan	1971. In Argentina	59) Ivo Furlić	1981. In FR Germany
26) Maksim Krstulović	1971. In England	60) Đuro Zagajski	1983. In FR Germany
27) Drago Mihalić	1972. In FR Germany	61) Franjo Mikulić	1983. In FR Germany
28) Josip Senić	1972. In FR Germany	62) Milan Župan	1983. In FR Germany
29) Dr. Branko Jelić	1972. In FR Germany	63) Stjepan Đureković	1983. In FR Germany
30) Stjepan Ševo	1972. In Italy	64) Slavko Logarić	1984. In FR Germany
31) Tatjana Ševo	1972. In Italy	65) Franjo Mašić	1986. In USA
32) Rosemarie Bahrić	1972. In Italy	66) Damir Đureković	1987. In Canada
33) Josip Buljan-Mikulić	1973. In FR Germany	67) Ante Đapić	1989. In FR Germany
34) Mate Jozak	1974. In FR Germany		

UNSUCCESSFUL MURDERS

- | | | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| 1) Mate Frković | 1948. In Austria | 16) Dane Šarac | 1974. In France |
| 2) Dr. Ante Pavelić | 1957. In Argentina | 17) Pavle Perović | 1974. In FR Germany |
| 3) Dr. Branko Jelić | 1957. in FR Germany | 18) Stipe Bilandžić | 1975. In FR Germany |
| 4) Tomislav Lesić | 1964. In Australia | 19) Pavle Perović | 1976. In FR Germany |
| 5) Obitelj Deželić | 1965. In FR Germany | 20) Stipe Bilandžić | 1977. In FR Germany |
| 6) Ante Vukić | 1968. In FR Germany | 21) Franjo Goreta | 1980. In FR Germany |
| 7) Mirko Grabovac | 1969. In FR Germany | 22) Luka Kraljević | 1982. In FR Germany |
| 8) Dr. Branko Jelić | 1970. In FR Germany | 23) Luka Kraljević | 1983. In FR Germany |
| 9) Vlado Damjanović | 1970. In FR Germany | 24) Danica Glavaš | 1986. In USA |
| 10) Dr. Branko Jelić | 1971. In FR Germany | 25) Miro Barešić | 1987. In Sweden |
| 11) Gojko Bošnjak | 1972. In FR Germany | 26) Ante Tokić | 1988. In Australia |
| 12) Nikola Vidović | 1972. In France | 27) Tomislav Naletelić | 1988. In FR Germany |
| 13) Dane Šarac | 1973. In FR Germany | 28) Nikola Štedul | 1988. In Scotland |
| 14) Gojko Bošnjak | 1973. In FR Germany | 29) Slavica Barešić | 1989. In Paraguay |
| 15) Miro Barešić | 1974. In Sweden | | |

KIDNAPPING

- | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| 1) Drago Jilek | 1949. From Italia | 3) Vjenceslav Čížek | 1977. From Italia |
| 2) Krunoslav Draganović | 1967. From Italia | 4) Ivica Novaković | 1987. From FR Germany |

UNSUCCESSFUL KIDNAPPING

- | | | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1) Dr. Branko Jelić | 1950. From FR Germany | 4) Alija Koso | 1971. From Brazil |
| 2) Ankica Zubić-Ilek | 1970. From Brazil | 5) Ante Medolić | 1973. From Brazil |
| 3) Franjo Mikulić | 1979. From France | | |

DISSAPEARED

- | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------|----------------------|------------------|
| 1) Zlatko Milković | 1949. In France | 3) Geza Pašti | 1965. In France |
| 2) Zvonimir Kučar | 1963. In France | 4) Stjepan Crnogorac | 1972. In Austria |

Croatian political emigration was placed under completely different conditions from other émigré groups, most of which were, not only better protected against liquidations, but were even actively assisted in their political activities. This puzzled even the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi who, as it seems, decided to get rid of his political enemies according to the Yugoslav recipe.

Namely, after several Libyan political émigrés were killed in Europe, Muammar Gaddafi was exposed to harsh criticism and pressure by the western democracies, even threatened with sanctions and other forms of punishment, lest he stop with such killings.

Therefore, in an interview to the German weekly magazine Spiegel he said the following: "Tito sends agents into the Federal Republic of Germany with the mandate to liquidate his Croatian opponents. But, Tito's reputation in Germany is not tarnished because of that. Why is Tito allowed to do that, and I am not? Moreover, I didn't, as I already said, personally give an order for the liquidation of anybody on foreign territory."

7. THE CROATIAN SPRING

Dissatisfied with the state in Yugoslavia, especially dissatisfied with the position of Croatia within Yugoslavia (economy, centralization, personnel policy...) in 1971 students and intellectuals gathered around the Central Croatian Cultural and Publishing Society (*Matica Hrvatska*) and part of the members of SKH (The Alliance of Communists of Croatia) initiate the movement called "*The Croatian Spring*."

The movement is not uniform, the demands of various groups in it differ, but I will skip over these differences now.

When he felt threatened, Tito responded.

I quote the data from Miroslav Tuđman's book "THE PROGRAMMING OF TRUTH", ("Programiranje istine"), Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 2012:

"The crackdown on "nationalistic" networks was harsh, large-scale and multi-layered. According to official data in the crackdown on the carriers of the Croatian Spring more than 25,000 members were evicted from the SKH /Communist League of Croatia/; Matica Hrvatska (Central Croatian Cultural and Publication Society), the oldest cultural institution, founded in 1846, which had several tens of thousands of members in 1971, was banned. All the publications of the Society were suppressed, among them Hrvatski tjednik (Croatian Weekly) – a journal for cultural and social issues with a circulation of more than 130,000 copies. In 1971 there were 553 persons accused for crimes of political nature, and in 1972 this number rose to 1,151, for a total of 1,274 crimes of political nature. A further 300 persons were indicted for severe forms of these crimes where the verdict more severe than rigorous prison, which means death penalty, can be pronounced! Due to political persecution, pressure and psychosis thousands of persons fled the country, legally and illegally.

The ruling structures, fearing that alternative blueprints of reality will gain legitimacy, fearing the institutionalization of knowledge advocated by social networks, pressed down most harshly on writers and scientists, precisely on all those who proposed and promoted alternative definitions of reality. The longest terms of imprisonment were pronounced against the editors and writers of "Matica Hrvatska" publications: Dr Marko Veselica, the poet Vlado Gotovac, Dr Šime Đodan, Matica's Secretary Jozo Ivičević, Dr Franjo Tuđman, Dr Hrvoje Šošić. Their guilt was that they were the "ideologues of counterrevolution" i.e. the advocates of redefining reality in economy, history and culture. Student leaders, including Dražen Budiša, Ivan Zvonimir Čičak and Goran Dodig were sentenced to many years of imprisonment and pronounced responsible for the pandemics of deviant knowledge of current reality.

The communist structures recognized the authors of new definitions of reality, i.e. deviant knowledge, as the main carriers of social networks and main causes of potential pandemics of deviant knowledge. The Croatian Spring only confirmed the conviction of communist structures that social networks can quickly blossom into a movement for the change of ruling structures and the social setup. "

Josip Broz Tito belongs to the group of the worst criminals of the 20th century.

He came to the helm of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia by denouncing and elimination of his party comrades. With the growing of the military might of partisan units after the capitulation of Italy, he dedicated more and more effort in carrying out the revolutionary terror, especially those who he deemed and marked as enemies of the revolution.

The dictator who, after the Second World War in Yugoslavia carried out terror and mass murders, in the manner of communist exclusivity, he abolished all political rights, eliminated his political opponents in the Alliance of Communists and outside of it by killings and imprisonment.

He was an extraordinary political manipulator, within Yugoslavia and on the world scene, a good military strategist, a hedonist without a trace of moral scruples.

By contrast to fascism-Nazism which is an open and transparent evil, fascism-communism hides within itself the metaphysical dimension of intelligent cover-up of evil.

Due to his standing up to Stalin, he became a favourite of the West, and due to independent decisions and "fight for freedom" he became a model for many people without freedom, whether political or economic.


It goes without saying that in political decisions you often must choose the lesser of two evils, which makes understandable the economic, military and political aid which Tito received from the democratic states of the West, because he weakened the monolithic character of the Warsaw Pact and through the Non-Aligned Movement he decreased the potential impact of Soviet communism in these countries. Therefore, the crimes which he perpetrated were only a "collateral damage" in the great Eastern and Western block Game of Fear;

But, it remains a miraculous fact that his funeral was attended by all the statesmen of democratic countries, who abolished all his crimes and quashed every possible political morale.

These were the foundation stones of the future war on the territory of SFR Yugoslavia 1991 – 1995, and on these foundations the judgements were made about the sides in this war, as well as on political and military decisions toward the parties in that war.

Croatia reached peace in 1995 and the war that began in 1914 has finished.

TITO'S VILLAS, HUNTING GROUNDS AND SHELTERS IN SFRJ



LEGEND:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1) THE "BRIJUNI" ARCHIPELAGO - CROATIA | 7) "TITO'S VILLA" - MOSTAR - BiH |
| 2) VILLA "DALMACIJA" - SPLIT - CROATIA | 8) VILLA ON OHRID - MACEDONIA |
| 3) VILLA "ZAGORJE" - ZAGREB - CROATIA | 9) PRESIDENTIAL PALACE ON DEDINJE - BELGRADE - SERBIA |
| 4) VILLA "IGALO" - HERCEG NOVI - MONTENEGRO | 10) VILLAS AND HUNTING GROUND IN KARADORDEVO - SERBIA |
| 5) VILLA AND HUNTING GROUND NEAR BUGOJNO - BiH/BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA/ | 11) VILLA ON BRDO KOD KRANJA - SLOVENIA |
| 6) UNDERGROUND SHELTERS FOR THE ARMY AND POLITICAL TOP ESTABLISHMENT IN CASE OF ATTACK BY NATO OR WARSAW PACT FORCES ON SFRJ - KONJIC - BiH | |

8. SOME DATA ON MONEY OF TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA

1. One hundred billion dollars of help, mainly from the USA and other western countries – (100,000,000,000 USD - (100 X 10⁹ USD) – denominated on 1988.
2. At the beginning of the 1960s the communist planned economy went bankrupt. Western Europe needs workers and Tito opens the borders. An absolutely greatest number of Croats, proportionality is even worse, leave Croatia and go to Europe. The remittances of workers from abroad until 1988 are between 130 and 140 billion dollars (130-140,000,000,000 USD) – (130 – 140 x 10⁹ USD).
3. Anti-nuclear war command post near KONJIC was built from 1953 until 1979 at a price of 4.6 billion dollars (4.6 x 10⁹ USD). DENOMINATED ON 2012, the price is 27 x 10⁹ USD (27 billion dollars).
4. The Žerjava airport near Bihać was built between 1948 and 1968 at a cost of six billion dollars – (6,000,000,000 USD) – (6 x 10⁹ USD). Denominated on 2012 the price is 43 billion dollars (43,000,000,000 USD) – (43 x 10⁹ USD).
5. In addition, around 40 military objects were built – the prices of their construction are not fully reliable, so I will not quote them, but this megalomaniac projects cost dozens of billions US dollars.
6. The base year for the calculation is 1945. The total cost of construction is allocated proportionately by years of construction, because there are no precise data. The value of the dollar is corrected by arithmetic means between the methods based on the consumer price index and the GDP deflator.
7. When Tito made peace with Khrushchev in 1956, the Soviet leader forgave him a debt of 822,000,000 rubles.

9. POLITICAL AND MILITARY PREPARATIONS FOR AGGRESSION AGAINST CROATIA

1. I copy the text by dr. Miroslav Tuđman, because it is founded and not long.

Excerpt from the book of Miroslav Tuđman: “THE PROGRAMMING OF TRUTH”, (“Programiranje istine”), Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 2012:

- 1.

Protagonists without a State

The disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia in the 1990s has a number of consequences for the societies of the state which disappeared and for the states and societies which continued to live in new political, economic, historical, social and other circumstances. What we are interested in is what happens with the social distribution of inventories of knowledge, i.e. what is the behaviour of those who legitimized the Yugoslav formation and what is the fate of knowledge which legitimized this formation.

Without the right to a state: a parallel society

The task of those who legitimized the Yugoslav socialist reality was to provide a public space to all the advocates of the “proletarian revolution” starting with the October Revolution, communist and workers’ internationalism, all the way to the Yugoslav integralism. The other task of those who legitimized the socialist reality was to block the access to public knowledge for the carriers of any national ideas and the advocates of national sovereignty. The consequence is a dual society, i.e. an irreconcilable social differentiation, political fragmentation and disintegration of values of the socialist society which created two opposed camps.

The ruling structure in Croatia by distancing itself from the politics of national sovereignty denied the right to the “majority Croatian population to be a nation”.⁷⁷ The key determinant of any nation is that it is a union of free

⁷⁷ Ivan Rogić, 2011, p. 100

human beings, i.e. that the freedom and right to sovereignty and the independent taking of decisions represent the basic values. The blockade of the consolidation of the national union had, as a consequence, the reality of a “parallel society, with scant ties and separated actors”.⁷⁸ Although the parallel society functioned “with scant ties and separated actors”, it produced a “surplus of knowledge” in relation to the official definitions of reality, offering autonomous alternatives to the national development. Until the 1990s these alternatives didn’t have the power of institutional knowledge because they were created in social networks with a greater or lesser impact.⁷⁹

Social networks which strive towards an affirmation of the national union are not connected by power, but rather, they are connected with the right to freedom. “In the first texts of modernity, we remind, it has been written that man is by his birth, or naturally, free. Therefore freedom is indistinguishable from the fundamental content of his memory.”⁸⁰ The objections to all national movements that they are oriented towards the past, history or mythology do not see that the primary message of their use of history – even of myths – is “the memory of solidarity in freedom”.⁸¹

The principle of “solidarity in freedom” keeps together a parallel society, i.e. the identity social networks, because the “solidarity in freedom” is a measure of identity of the national community. By contrast to the social networks based on interest, function or territory, the members of the identity social networks, precisely due to the principle according to which they are structured, have a greater readiness to sacrifice and the recognition of sacrifice. The sacrifice is a symbolic measure of solidarity, i.e. the survival of the social community with which they identify themselves.

The division between the parallel society and ruling structures in the socialist society constantly grew with the use of revolutionary violence. The ruling class justified the revolutionary violence by a constant danger of enemies. As the formation of socialist Yugoslavia was institutionalized on the victory in antifascist struggle in World War II, every opposition which offered an alternative interpretation of reality was equalled with one of the enemies from the range of defeated forces.

For those who legitimized reality nothing has changed in that respect even after fifty years, in the final stages of the breakdown of the Yugoslav formation: “The harsh reality pits our armed forces, factually, against the same enemy as in 1941. The foreign factor is already largely here, heralding also a military presence. Here are also the domestic quisling forces –fascist, Ustasha, Chetnik, White Guardsmen, the Muslim “Balijas”, Bulgarophiles. We are again confronted with them in the battle for Yugoslavia.”⁸² That’s why the JNA in Croatia fought against the “Ustasha Government”, “fascism”, “neo-Nazism” and “genocide against the Serbian people”. While such judgements had its full or partial justification in the events during World War II, at the end of the 20th century they were a product of pseudo-events and legitimizing reality on pseudo-knowledge.

Revolutionary violence in the federal Yugoslavia served a purpose – by “reducing national communities to a kind of **secondary users**”,⁸³ it served to ensure that social change is managed by the central government. Supranational formations were always seeking justification in international ideologies, and at the same time, they were a product of those policies. Likewise, the internationalism of Yugoslav ruling structures⁸⁴ reduced nations to “secondary users”, offering social changes and development without freedom.

In history every international idea proved to be an instrument of some imperial policy, the real aim being supremacy and domination; from imperial wars for the colonies, communist internationalism, hegemonistic political alliances, global civilizational integrations, all the way to financial and informational market globalization.⁸⁵

⁷⁸ I. Rogić, 2011, p. 99

⁷⁹ Here we should point out to an essential difference between power and influence. Although this difference is known, it is not getting sufficient attention.

⁸⁰ I. Rogić, 2011, p. 95

⁸¹ I. Rogić, 2011, p. 99

⁸² B. Jović, 1996, p. 287

⁸³ I. Rogić, 2011, p. 100

⁸⁴ In the first phase, the Communist Party offered internationalism in the name of the dictatorship of the workers' class of the Soviet type, and with self-management they advocated a movement of unified workers and a classless society, to which any state is a barrier and historic anachronism.

⁸⁵ “All supranational integralist, universalist and internationalistic ideas proved to be utopian. It is not known in history that any of them were realized, except through great-state nationalistic hegemonism and expansionism” F. Tuđman, 1981, p. 246

All these imperial policies offered, in the best of cases, a projection of growth at the expense of reduction of personal and national freedoms. What all of these imperial policies have in common is the production of colonial mentality in the function of an imperial power structure. The followers of imperial policies are required to have formative thinking: the execution of plan and programme. The indicators of growth were offered as a measure of success of every imperial policy in history. Advance was measured only by technical indicators, and not with an expanse of freedom. The logic of every imperial system is to divorce social development from freedom.⁸⁶

We needed this digression for several reasons, in order to understand the features of a dual society. Ideology is not the only cause of the current division in Croatian society. We are dealing, in effect, with much deeper divisions on the level of values. National communities are being constituted on “solidarity in freedom”, on universal values of freedom, justice, truth and democracy. The supranational formations which confront them function according to the principle of solidarity in the mission of imperial power structures. The values to which they belong are the values of globalism: the freedom of movement of people, goods and means, market freedom and the freedom of information. But this is only the current name for supranational ideologies which express their success with indicators of growth, and not freedom. Social development without freedom is the common denominator in the philosophy of both the communist internationalism and modern globalism.

Aggressor without a state: JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/

The socialist order in SFRJ /Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ kept itself for decades and functioned for decades as a one-party system in which the key institutions were the SKJ /League of Communists of Yugoslavia/ and the army (JNA). They prescribed and provided legitimacy to a corpus of generally accepted truths about reality, and the truth had the status of untouchable “social facts”.⁸⁷ They controlled the social repository of knowledge and they were unavoidable in the legitimization of objective knowledge and social practice. As the makers of the only legitimate knowledge on reality and guardians of the institutional setup they themselves had to stick to the rules of behaviour, social roles and tasks. Any deviation from the institutional setup is seen as the distancing from “reality”, i.e. from the truth and reality of the order in force.

Every institutionalization of the social formation implies social control. In totalitarian formations, such as the Yugoslav one was, this control is “totalitarian”, i.e. without alternative. The behaviour of JNA by the end of the 1980s and beginning of 1990s is an example of the unbreakable bond of the institution (army), institutional roles (guardians of Yugoslavia) and institutional knowledge, i.e. “a truthful and objective” view of reality.

In the 1990s JNA was not prepared to change its behaviour, to renounce its role in the social setup, nor to change its perception of reality. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, international circumstances changed too, and multi-party elections in Yugoslavia had, as consequence, the emancipation of republics. As a consequence of these changes, JNA became a protagonist without a state: “We remained without a state” are the words of the Minister of Defence of SFRJ as a reason for the final shoot-out with “neo-Nazism”.⁸⁸

The generals of JNA were aware that the multiparty system fundamentally changes the institutional role of the JNA. After the 14th Congress of SKJ in January 1990 (which never ended, because the Slovenian and Croatian party delegation left it) the then Premier of SFRJ Ante Marković said that SFRJ can survive even without the SKJ. This view was opposed by general Kadrijević: “To defend the Party means to defend the country.”⁸⁹ Thereby, he clearly stated that JNA is not prepared to renounce its role which it had in the one-party political system, according to the Constitution of SFRJ.

The General Staff and generals of JNA were not prepared to accept political changes which were also reflected in Yugoslavia, after the historical changes in Europe by the end of the 1980s. Immediately before the multiparty

⁸⁶ This thesis is borrowed from I. Rogić.

⁸⁷ Of the 25 important dates which were celebrated in SFRJ, 15 were related to JNA and military victories in the NOB (People’s Liberation Struggle) (see: Praznici u SFRJ, wikipedija, <http://sr.wikipedia.org>).

⁸⁸ “I believe there is no army in the world which at any time in history found itself in a worse situation than ours. We remained without a state...” Veljko Kadrijević – Tanjug News Agency, press release October 3rd, 1991

⁸⁹ Ivan Bilić: „Kronologija raspada SFRJ i stvaranje Republike Hrvatske do 15. siječnja 1992“ National Security and the Future, Vol. 6, No 1-2, pp 73-184, p. 84

elections in Croatia, in the spring of 1990, the Minister of Defence of SFRJ, general Veljko Kadijević accuses the ruling communist establishment by saying that with their behaviour they bring the “Ustasha to power in Croatia”.⁹⁰

In other words, immediately prior to the multi-party elections in Slovenia and Croatia, Kadijević seeks (March 30th, 1990) the implementation of “constitutional measures towards all who destroy Yugoslavia”, because there is a threat of a civil war⁹¹. He promises “military confrontation against everyone who wishes to destroy the territorial integrity of SFRJ” (April 4th, 1990).

Kadijević informs the President of the Presidency of SFRJ B. Jović that “JNA has prepared plans for its deployment, above all in Croatia and Slovenia” where it “ensured that in the shortest possible time everything will be put under their control” (April 26th, 1990).

The generals are also aware that democracy dismantled Yugoslavia: “The multi-party system brought nations into confrontation”. After the debacle of the military intervention in Slovenia, the Head of the JNA General Staff Blagoje Adžić on the celebration of the “Day of the Combatant” in 1991 in front of 150 JNA officers declares: “We lost a battle, but not the war.” And orders military action of the JNA with the purpose of overthrowing democratically elected government: “...the destroyers of Yugoslavia took over the power and wish to change the social system by introducing capitalism in its worst form. Irrespective to the views of the Presidency, we shall strike with all our might, we cannot wait any longer, and there will be no retreat. The betrayal of Yugoslavia is evident, and confirmed by the decisions of Slovenia and Croatia... The traitors must be killed on the spot without mercy or second thought... and from now on we must compel the enemy to capitulate out of fear, which means use all your forces and open fire on anyone who opposes our actions... Finally, comrades officers... use all your knowledge and skill in the battles for the realization of the ideals of the October Revolution and in the battle for Yugoslavia”.⁹²

The ideals of October Revolution and preservation of Yugoslavia oblige the JNA to use all its military potential because they couldn't prevent the change of the social order, i.e. the institutional role of the JNA, by political means. By forming its own political party JNA did not succeed in keeping its legitimacy and its institutional status. In the Belgrade-based “Sava Centar” in November 1990, the SK-PJ /League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia/ was formed, and its members were mostly retired or active members of the JNA. General Stevan Mirković elaborates the aim of founding SK-PJ: “it should be a support to the Army in the preservation of Yugoslavia as there is no other Yugoslav party”.⁹³

SK-PJ did not succeed in ensuring a democratic legitimacy to its aims, nor the legitimacy of the role and tasks of the JNA in the newly developed circumstances.⁹⁴

In spite of that, JNA did not renounce its old mission and its interpretation of the political realities. In a planned way, JNA increases the use of military force in order to retain its institutional role and political power.

After the multiparty elections in Slovenia and Croatia, Kadijević produces plans (September 1990) to “remove only a hundred people and everything will be fine. The army is making plans for such an eventuality.” In order to “resolve the crisis” in SFRJ, JNA was three times ready to implement its plans and make a military coup in

⁹⁰ V. Kadijević, *Moje viđenje raspada*. Beograd: Politika, 1993, p. 92

⁹¹ I. Bilić. Slovenia deleted the provision “socialist” republic from its Constitution as early as February 1990, and the League of Communists of Slovenia severed all ties to the SKJ.

⁹² Head of JNA General Staff Blagoje Adžić, on the Military Academy in Belgrade, July 5th, 1991. Document quoted by Hrvoje Kačić: “U službi domovine”, Zagreb, Matica hrvatska, 2003, p. 130

⁹³ The leading men of SK-PJ were generals and admirals: Branko Mamula, Veljko Kadijević, Stevan Mirković (who publicly assumed the role of organizer), Perunčić, Mile Babić, Vojo Radović, Žika Mirčetić, Aleksandar Vasiljević, Blagoje Adžić, Andrija Rašeta, Simeon Tumanov, Jovan Popović, Brana Kuzmanović, Radojica Nenezić, Dušan Pekić, Todor Vračarević, Milosav Đorđević and colonels: Boško Todorović, Dušan Vilić, Slobodan Rakočević (Rakočević was one of the key protagonists of the operations “Opera” and “Labrador”). Dragan Atanasovski was chosen as president of SK-PJ. Vukota Popović was the secretary of the Yugoslav Committee of SK-PJ, and Mirjana Jakelić was the president of the Coordination Committee of SK-PJ for Croatia. (I. Bilić, 2005, p. 99-100).

⁹⁴ An important role in the creation of the SK-PJ was played by the wife of Slobodan Milošević, Mrs. Mirjana Marković who was a member of the inner circle of SK-PJ leadership. After the SK-PJ proved an unsuccessful project, she acted to unite 14 smaller parties and form a new political party in Serbia: JUL /Yugoslav United Left/ into which SK-PJ was merged.

Croatia (November 1990, the so-called Operation "Shield"; January 24th 1991 and in March of 1991).⁹⁵ The aim was for the JNA to carry out the "coup" to "replace the Government and the Presidency", while the Parliament would remain, but without the right to hold meetings.⁹⁶

As he did not get the green light of the majority in the Presidency of SFRJ, V. Kadijević cancelled all three prepared coups in the last moment. Namely, the Presidency was divided on this issue so that the scenario which generals Kadijević and Adžić agreed on a meeting with Slobodan Milošević and Borisav Jović (March 13th 1991) did not succeed either. According to this scenario, Borisav Jović after the meeting gave his resignation in the Presidency of SFRJ, in order to open a legal way for the JNA to execute the planned coup.⁹⁷

Also in May 1991 Kadijević schemes with B. Jović and S. Milošević a new scenario of military coup according to which "the Committee for the Defence of Yugoslavia", headed by admiral Branko Mamula would assume the role and authority of the Presidency of SFRJ for a period of up to one year. ⁹⁸ Kadijević insists on the creation of constitutional and legal "conditions" which should lead to the necessity of carrying out a coup. Milošević on his part insists that "Slovenia legally secedes", which is hard for Kadijević to take because with the secession of Slovenia Tito's Yugoslavia doesn't exist any more.⁹⁹

As the JNA couldn't obtain the political legitimacy for a military coup, and Croatia already had the support of some foreign factors, Kadijević and Jović forfeited preventive action. At the beginning of autumn 1990, the tactics of disturbances seemed better to them: "...to let the disturbances break out, and then use them for the removal of those who led to such a state. ... Therefore, we should let them play out the real cards, and then we will have the arguments to explain to the world the justification of our action."¹⁰⁰

In April 1991 generals V. Kadijević and B. Adžić at a meeting with Borisav Jović and Slobodan Milošević reach an agreement: JNA in Croatia guarantees protection to "Serbian towns which are now under Serbian rule"¹⁰¹ JNA doesn't any more seek the decision of the Presidency, but only the order to act which the President of the Presidency Borisav Jović must sign. At the end of September (September 28th, 1991) V. Kadijević and B. Adžić report to Slobodan Milošević, Borisav Jović, Miomir Bulatović and Branko Kostić that "all Serbian territories in Croatia are liberated".

Croatia declared independence on June 25th, 1991, but under pressure from the EC agreed to a moratorium of three months for that decision to take effect. Precisely on the day of expiry of this deadline, on September 25th, 1991, the Security Council of the UN takes a decision on the embargo on the import of weapons for Yugoslavia.¹⁰² JNA, which never received the decision of the Presidency of SFRJ to militarily intervene against Slovenia and Croatia, interpreted this decision of the UN Security Council as a political permission to deal with the secessionist republics with the full force of arms.¹⁰³

And JNA undertook everything for a final settlement of accounts with the "Ustasha government" in Croatia.

General V. Kadijević publicly gave the reasons for the attacks by the JNA: "We remained without a state ... Certain members of the Presidency of SFRJ consciously sabotaged the reaching of the decision with a clear aim to

⁹⁵ On March 1991, an extraordinary meeting of the Presidency of SFRJ was held in the JNA command post, in the underground chambers of the house in Užička St. 15 in Belgrade. Present at the meeting were generals Kadijević, Adžić, Đušić, Čubra, admiral Brovet and colonel Vuk Obradović. JNA for the second time asks the go-ahead for a forceful overthrowing of the governments in Croatia and Slovenia, the declaration of the state of imminent danger of war on the entire Yugoslav territory, and taking the decision to raise the level of military alertness and additional mobilization of members of the JNA (I. Bilić, B. Jović).

⁹⁶ Kadijević lays out the plans of JNA to the President of Presidency of SFRJ B. Jović; B. Jović 1996.

⁹⁷ In spite of this agreement and the resignation of Jović, Kadijević did not dare carry out the coup, as he didn't get the support of Marshal Jazov, i.e. Russia (B. Jović, 1996).

⁹⁸ B. Jović, 1996

⁹⁹ Cf. I. Bilić, B. Jović

¹⁰⁰ B. Jović, 1996

¹⁰¹ B. Jović, 1996, p. 317

¹⁰² The proposal to the Security Council of the UN was presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of SFRJ Budimir Lončar.

¹⁰³ On September 30th the attack on the greater Dubrovnik area and the city of Dubrovnik started; on October 7th the Government building in Zagreb was rocketed, with the primary aim of eliminating President Tuđman, while collateral victims should have been the Prime Minister of SFRJ Anti Marković and (formally) the presiding of the Presidency of SFRJ Stjepan Mesić. JNA is undertaking everything in its power for the breaking of the defence of Vukovar.

break Yugoslavia by restraining and breaking of the army.”¹⁰⁴ The aim of the engagement of JNA was to “prevent bloody interethnic clashes and prevent the repetition of the genocide over the Serbian people.” That is why the Minister of Defence V. Kadijević proclaims imminent danger of war and the application of the rules of war (October 3rd, 1991), because “in the Republic of Croatia the neo-Nazism is in power. It is currently the greatest threat to the Serbian people in Croatia... the Army at this moment seeks nothing else but to... protect Serbian population from pogrom, destruction... The precondition for that is to defeat the Ustasha forces.”

Already on December 7th, 1990 Kadijević attacked President Tuđman and Croatian leadership on Belgrade TV for “renewal of fascism and genocide against the Serbs”.¹⁰⁵ Less than a year later he issues a call to arms, inviting “patriots from all the nations and ethnic groups to fulfil their duty in the defence against fascism and genocide on our territories”.¹⁰⁶

A month after having ordered the saving of Yugoslavia, and overthrowing of the Croatian “Ustasha government” due to genocidal threat against Serbian people, the Federal Ministry of Defence issues an order (November 7th, 1991) for the obligatory removal of “Tito’s pictures from the walls of offices and change of the previous symbols of the JNA on caps: the five-pointed stars are to be taken down, and the Yugoslav flag is to be put on their place, without the five-pointed star”. On the same day the Republic of Serbia issued a decree on the formation of its own army, which “caused wonder” among the members of the JNA.¹⁰⁷

The removal of Tito’s pictures and change of symbols is a symbolic end of the JNA. The order on the change of symbols made this army even formally a protagonist without a state.¹⁰⁸ However, the symbolic end of the JNA did not mean an end to its destructive actions. Moreover, only after its symbolic end began a fierce and unrestrained destruction of Croatia: from Vukovar to Dubrovnik.

The outline of events which led to the JNA to become a **protagonist without a state** doesn’t pretend to be a full account of the historical, political or military goings-on in the 1990s. The purpose of this outline is to be a model for the understanding of the power of knowledge, change of the role of the ruling knowledge and a redistribution of the inventories of knowledge. On the basis of the presented model we can see some general features at work.

In the socialist Yugoslavia JNA was not only a guardian of the Yugoslav formation, but also one of the key factors of legitimacy of this formation. The institutional task of JNA was not to allow a departure from reality, i.e. from the truth and reality of the Yugoslav socialist setup. JNA ensured, with its military presence, the security of generally accepted tenets of this reality. The official knowledge of the Yugoslav formation defined the truths which had the status of untouchable social facts, which in turn obliged JNA itself to behave in accordance with these truths.

With the loss of the institutional status of the guardian and legitimising factor of the Yugoslav formation, the generally valid truths prescribed by the JNA cease to have effect. This leads us to conclude that the social power of knowledge does not necessarily proceed from objectivity and the epistemological dimension, but from the power structure of social institutions. It is the institutions which ensure objectivity and truthfulness of knowledge, on the basis of their institutional power and legal rights and obligations with which they render legitimacy upon the social reality.

In other words, the social power of knowledge does not proceed from the objectivity of knowledge, but from the incorporation of knowledge in institutions and social networks. At the moment when JNA lost its institutional status in the social setup, the knowledge on which its behaviour and understanding of reality was founded ceased to be objective knowledge: it didn’t have any more the power of institutional legitimizing of reality. It became only one of alternative knowledge systems at the moment when its advocates lost their positions of legitimizing factors in institutions.

¹⁰⁴ The statement goes on: “They were joined with his perfidious trickery by the Federal Prime Minister. The world has never seen such an attitude of the Supreme Commander and Prime Minister towards his own army.” This was said only four days before the rocketing of the Government building in Zagreb in which the Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković was at the time.

¹⁰⁵ Laura Silber and Allan Little, 1996

¹⁰⁶ V. Kadijević, press release, Tanjug, October 3rd, 1991

¹⁰⁷ I. Bilić, 2005.

¹⁰⁸ The process of transformation of the JNA into a Serbian army had begun earlier, when the generals of JNA sided with the politics of Slobodan Milošević to defend the borders of a “Greater Serbia”. The transformation of JNA into a Serbian army was completed at the beginning of 1992

The loss of the institutional status for JNA and the League of Communists had, as its consequence, not only the change of official definitions of reality, but the changes in the structure of power of the Yugoslav society. The terms breakdown of the totalitarian socialist formation and multiparty democracy cannot describe and understand changes in a deeply divided society. Moreover, oftentimes a renewal of old inventories of knowledge and old definitions of reality are being legitimized in the name of democratization, the aim being a renewal of old social divisions.

Protagonists without a unitary state: insurgent Serbs

Insurgent Serbs in Croatia are also protagonists who remained without a state. How much they were made instruments of the “Great Serbia” policy and the JNA will be determined by historical debate. It is a fact that insurgent Serbs didn’t want to accept the loss of Yugoslavia, and some of them cannot get over the disintegration of Yugoslavia and their position in it even today. Such standpoints largely influence the redistribution of social inventories of knowledge after the collapse of Yugoslavia, and an official legitimization of reality of a failed social formation continues to have a place in public knowledge.

The problem is not that the definitions of reality of that period exist in public knowledge. The issue is what kind of knowledge it is: knowledge of events, pseudo-events, or non-events?

The insurgent Serbs argued their programme of staying within Yugoslavia again and again in similar ways. The following quotation is paradigmatic for such a thinking:

“Croatia was created within the state of Yugoslavia and it can exist only so long as Yugoslavia exists. ... Therefore, we will recognize the state of Croatia only as long as the Croats will recognize the Federal Yugoslavia which in a constitutional sense unites the Serbian people and all Serbian lands on the Balkans...”

The claim “Croatia was created within the state of Yugoslavia” is a pseudo-event, i.e. in the best of cases a non-event, if we wish to draw a conclusion from it about the entry of the AVNOJ /Anti-fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia/ Croatia into Yugoslavia. The legal and political legitimacy of Croatia lasts for centuries. The negation of this fact is necessary for the purpose of the conclusion: “it can exist only so long as Yugoslavia exists”. This statement explicitly admonishes of the institutionalized practice, according to which the Croatian people doesn’t have the right of sovereignty and autonomous decision on its destiny:

“As long as we live on common territory and under the same sky our state of Yugoslavia and Croatia can only be a common state and sovereignty can be only a common sovereignty of the Serbian and Croatian peoples. The Serbian people will never accept to be a national minority in its own country...”¹⁰⁹

Not only will the Serbian people refuse to be a minority in Croatia, but it will not accept the change of the “official” definition of reality and institutional practice in socialist Yugoslavia, even then these changes are pro-Yugoslav, but depart from Serbian hegemonistic interests:

“As regards our Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković and his pro-Yugoslav party I wish to say the following ... we will never again allow to have at the helm of Serbian people someone who does not belong to the Serbian people and Serbian culture...”

The message “**we will never again** allow” evidently implies an attitude towards Marshal Tito who, in the great-Serbian interpretations of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, is the culprit due to the Constitution of 1974 in which SFRJ is defined as a federation with numerous confederate elements.

For one part of the leaders of the Serbian people even the existing SFRJ with confederate elements was not acceptable, and the project of an independent Croatian state was ruled out of hand.

“With the destruction of Yugoslavia, which is the beginning of the idea of the creation of NDH /Independent State of Croatia/, around 4 million Serbs would find themselves outside of the borders of the Republic of Serbia. This would again place on the agenda of history the Serbian national question, and thereby the issue of borders on the Balkans.”

¹⁰⁹ Quoted according to the speech by Jovan Opačić on August 12th, 1990 in the village of Divoselo. Jovan Opačić is one of the leaders of SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/ and one of five deputies of SDS (Jovan Opačić, Dušan Zelenbaba, Radoslav Tanjga, Ratko Ličina and Dušan Ergarac) in the Croatian Parliament 1990. In addition to deputies from the SDS, on the first elections in 1990 24 more Serbs, deputies of the SKH SDP /League of Communists of Croatia – Party of Democratic Change/ were elected into the Parliament. We could quote an abundance of such opinions, but we chose Jovan Opačić because he was one of prominent Serbian leaders and an elected deputy in the first multiparty composition of the Croatian Parliament in 1990.

For every breakdown of Yugoslavia or a breakdown within the institutional formation in the interpretation of official definitions of reality, the Croatian history was reduced to the genocide of the Jasenovac myth:

“... A renewal of the use of Ustasha symbols is an attempt at the political rehabilitation of NDH and the Ustasha ideology in the whole package on which this monstrous state formation rested... Under this state symbol over one million Serbs were killed often in the most bestial way without comparison in the world history.”¹¹⁰

The thesis of the renewal of “Ustasha symbols” is the production of another pseudo-event, because from the Croatian coat of arms and flag only the socialist markings were taken down (five-pointed star). To reduce Croatian history to the Jasenovac myth, in order to use it as the key argument against the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Croatian state, is the production of pseudo-events and pseudo-history. On the one hand, we see here an irrational exaggeration of the crime whereby it assumed mythic proportions; on the other, because the pseudo-event began to function as truth and an argument for the projection of future reality.

That the advocacy of Croatian independence is the “rehabilitation of the NDH and Ustasha ideology in its fullness” is an argument used by all the protagonists who were in favour of Yugoslavia, and were now left without it. It was used by the legitimating factors of Yugoslav reality against the advocates of the confederative formation of Yugoslavia in official institutions, as well as against the protagonists of the parallel society.

The protagonists who were left without a state wish to forget that the political and military mobilization of the Serbian minority in Croatia began before the multiparty changes in 1990. Their aim was a change of the federal and confederate provisions of the Constitution, in favour of a unitary state. Even those who were close to the Yugoslav legitimizing factors of reality admit this:

“Serbian nationalist intellectuals and politicians as early as 1988 began to organize the Serbian minority in Croatia, in order to exert a pressure on the Croatian party (SKH, author’s note) and government to enlist their support of the policies on Kosovo. This all happened with significant assistance from Belgrade by means of massive meetings and placing into circulation the symbols of extremist Serbian nationalism. In this way, the aggressive mobilization of Serbian nationalists in Croatia started long before the election of Tuđman’s nationalistic government. This also meant that Serbian nationalists began with their attacks on Croatian moves towards a loose federation or confederation before they could perceive their rights in Croatia threatened in any way.”¹¹¹

In other words, the whole construction about the Croatian state as a rehabilitation of NDH is the production of pseudo-history, the aim being the preservation of Yugoslavia. The purpose of such pseudo-history is to legalize the formation of the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” and the “Republic of Srpska” which were supposed to unite some day, when the international circumstances allow it.¹¹²

To the protagonists who didn’t want to “remain without a state” pseudo-history is a key proof of the necessity of preserving Yugoslavia. That’s why these protagonists were making long-term plans to preserve the existing setup and their positions in it:

“2. In Croatia institutionally and politically strengthen the Serbian Krajina and support its secession from Croatia (not publicly, but factually). 3. Organize mass meetings in Croatia against the HDZ, lift Bosnia and Herzegovina to its feet “for Yugoslavia”, and in Macedonia employ the concept of mass meetings for the overthrowing of pro-Bulgarian leadership. Mass meetings to be organized in Serbia and Montenegro. Ban gatherings on Kosovo”.¹¹³

The directive “not publicly, but factually” implies a strategy of creation of a pseudo-event, production of disinformation and deceiving of the public. Therefore the policy “not publicly, but factually” instrumentalized the public through systematic fabrication of disinformation and pseudo-knowledge and the item “factually” refers to the arming of the Serbian minority in Croatia.

¹¹⁰ Transcript of the speech by Jovan Opačić on August 12th, 1990 in the village Divošelo.

¹¹¹ Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism, The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London, 1994, 106, 197; quoted according to: Albert Bing, *Hrvatska i ljudska prava 1990-1992*, ČSP, No. 1, 195-218 (2008)

¹¹² A lot of literature exists on this subject, so we will not get into the presentation of these policies and events.

¹¹³ B. Jović about JNA plans for the overthrowing of the governments in Croatia and Slovenia, February 1991. B. Jović, 1995, p. 277

One, although not the only centre for the production of pseudo-events and disinformation was the Department for Conducting Special War which JNA organized under the code name "Opera". Through "Opera", disinformation was placed into all the media in Yugoslavia, and via the International Press Centre in Belgrade also into the international media. The authorization of disinformation was under the competence of the Council of the Operational Group which consisted of the highest officers of the JNA.¹¹⁴ By means of "Opera" the JNA successfully spread a number of disinformation, which exists to this day as a part of the corpus of public knowledge, and which gave to the pseudo-events the status of "objective" knowledge.

The policy of "factual" military institutionalization of the Serbian insurgency in Croatia (as well as in other republics) was carried out in parallel with the seizure of the arms belonging to the Territorial Defence, the civilian authorities of Croatia. Under the pretext that it is conducting a protection from genocidal politics of the "Ustasha government", JNA in April 1990, i.e. before the multiparty elections, seized all the arms of the Territorial Defence.

The top of the JNA in a planned manner armed parts of the Serbian minority in Croatia since the mid-1990. The JNA Security Service led the operation of illegal arming of the Serbian population in Croatia and BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ under the code name "PROBOJ" (breakthrough).¹¹⁵

JNA did not only arm the insurgent Serbs, but also militarily occupied parts of Croatia in order to preserve at least a "shrunk" Yugoslavia: "On those territories on which the Serbs represented a majority population, and which were perceived to belong to the so-called 'shrunk' Yugoslavia, JNA acted in an offensive manner, in order to 'round off' the new borders".¹¹⁶

The guardians of the unitary Yugoslavia had to change their tactics and synchronize the behaviour of the JNA with new political and military circumstances. On the same day, i.e. October 1st, 1991 when an overall attack on Croatia took place, the Minister of Defence of SFRJ general V. Kadijević issues an order to form the Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of SAO /Serbian Autonomous Oblast/ of Krajina. "We shouldn't lose sight of the indisputable fact that the Territorial Defence is formed exclusively as a Serbian army and by the legal command organs of the armed forces of SFRJ."¹¹⁷

"We shouldn't lose sight" neither that the JNA, the "Serbian army" of Krajina and volunteers from Serbian are connected with a common pseudo-history, although they use it for the realization of somewhat different aims. The support to the "Serbian army" of SAO Krajina was not just the units of JNA active in these territories. "The Ministry of Defence of Serbia was carrying out a 'distribution' of Serbian volunteers in SAO Krajina and to the front in eastern Slavonia and western Sylvania" and the collaboration was planned by the General Staff of the Yugoslav army and Headquarters of the Serbian army of Krajina.¹¹⁸ The response of Serbian volunteers "for the territories of the western part of RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/" was the greatest in 1993: around 4300 men. According to Serbian analyses around 55% of volunteers was from Serbia, 19% from unoccupied parts of Croatia, 6% from BiH, 1% from Montenegro, 2% from abroad, and "for 16 percent of the volunteers the place of birth was not determined".¹¹⁹

The politics of preserving Yugoslavia at all costs, i.e. the refusal to live side by side with Croats in Croatia was made plain in the institutionalization of violence: "The basic motto of the SDS was 'expel or kill, plunder and burn' everything which is Croatian, because we, the Serbs, cannot live any more alongside the Croats..."¹²⁰

¹¹⁴ On the activities of "Opera" see M. Tuđman, 2008, pp. 143-150; G. Akrap, 2010; Radenko Radojčić "izjava" (URL www.slobodanpraljajak.com/.../IZJAVA%20-%RADENKO%ZORADOJCIC%202%20DIO.pdf – 20.3.2011)

¹¹⁵ According to the testimony of M. Čandić at the Hague Tribunal in the process against Slobodan Milošević. „PROBOJ 1“: arming of the Serbs on the areas of "Krajina" and eastern Bosnia was under the command of the JNA lieutenant colonel Smiljanić and major Čedomir Knežević (members of KOG /Counterintelligence Group/ from Zemun; "PROBOJ 2": arming of the Serbs in eastern Slavonia and Baranja was under the command of JNA KOG major Ljuban Karan "PROBOJ 3": operation of arming the Serbs in western Herzegovina did not succeed.

¹¹⁶ M. Sekulić, 2000, p. 15. M. Sekulić is a trustworthy witness because he was member of the JNA General Staff and also a general in the Headquarters of the Serbian Army of Krajina

¹¹⁷ M. Sekulić, 2000, p. 35. In October 1992 the Headquarters of the Territorial Defence of RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/ was renamed into Headquarters of the Army of RSK.

¹¹⁸ M. Sekulić, 2000, pp. 48, 49

¹¹⁹ M. Sekulić, 2000, pp. 54, 55

¹²⁰ And further: "...I couldn't believe my ears that I heard that from an official of the SDS" testifies M. Vrcelj, a JNA officer who was assigned to Banija in 1991 (N. Barić, 2005, p. 371)

Ethnic cleansing of non-Serbian population on the occupied territory of Croatia was institutionalized also by the decrees of local government. In this manner the "Official Gazette of the Beli Manastir Municipality" (No. 10/90) publishes the "Decision on cessation of work contract for all persons who openly supported the overthrown regime of the Republic of Croatia". This Decision "regulates" the cessation of work contract for "all persons...whose continued presence on the workplace would disturb the normal work process or would irritate other workers...irrespective of the nation or religion to which these people belong."¹²¹

The same Official Gazette also publishes the "Decision on the cessation of work contract and ban on the return and stay in Baranja of all persons who participated in enemy forces and persons who assisted them, as well as the members of their immediate family". SUP /Secretariat of Internal Affairs/ Beli Manastir was in charge of the realization of this decision. It was supposed to prepare the lists for expelling according to the existing "official records as well as on the basis of information obtained from local communities, companies, institutions and citizens."¹²²

The project of preservation of Yugoslavia at any cost, i.e. the programme of assembling all Serbs in one state can be illustrated and analyzed in a range of other examples. As we are interested in the redistribution of knowledge from those times into the present, i.e. how the mechanisms of these redistributions function, we wish to point out to some other of the constants and dimensions of these processes.

The protagonists who fought against Croatia with the force of arms, in order not to be left without Yugoslavia had a strong army, but also great sacrifices which they admitted.

"The so-called "Serbian Army of Krajina" reached its peak on February 13th, 1993. On that day it had 71,409 members, of which 3,291 officers, 3,424 NCOs, 60,496 conscripts and 4,198 volunteers..."

According to incomplete Serbian data, around 1,200 soldiers and officers lost their lives in the battles for Vukovar. On the area of the 'RSK' from June 1991 until August 1995 there was a total of 3,496 killed and 6,189 wounded. The greatest part of the casualties was from the territories of 'RSK' (80%), Croatia (5%), Serbia (5%) and BiH (5%). Among the casualties 3% are suicides, and another 3% lost their lives in shoot-outs among themselves."¹²³

In spite of the casualties and military defeats, the advocates and leaders of great-Serbian imperial politics stubbornly rejected not only official Croatian peace proposals, but also the proposals of international factors. In the autumn of 1994 the representatives of the international community proposed the "Plan Z-4". According to this plan, the insurgent Serbs could, through negotiations, realize a greater part of their political aims. Namely, the "Plan Z-4" offered practically a "state within a state". However, this offer was rejected not only by the leadership of the Serbian insurgence in Knin, but they had the support of the Serbian democratic opposition.

Milan Martić refused the Plan Z-4 with the argumentation that this plan does not offer the Krajina Serbs to "live in one state". The Prime Minister of RSK Mikelić rejected the Plan Z-4 because the "statehood of RSK cannot be put under the question mark". Rajko Lazović, who was the President of the Assembly of RSK stated that: "I, personally do not believe the Croatian leadership and Croats as a whole, because the Latins are old cheaters." Kosta Čavoški, professor of law at the University of Belgrade, gave support to Milan Martić because, in his interpretation, the proposal of this plan to the Krajina Serbs reminds him of an "offer of professional killers to their victim to negotiate its own liquidation". Zoran Đinđić, the leader of the Democratic Party, and later the hope of the West, also supported the decision of the leadership in Knin to reject the Plan Z-4.¹²⁴

Academician Ljubomir Tadić, member of SANU /Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts/, where the famous Memorandum from 1986 was crafted, was a guest of the Knin Television on June 23rd, 1995. Speaking in the

¹²¹ Official Gazette of the Beli Manastir Municipality (No. 10/90), "Decision on the cessation of work contract for all persons who openly supported the overthrown regime of the Republic of Croatia", Article 1. The Decision was taken by the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipality on its session of September 5th, 1991.

¹²² The Decision on the cessation of work contract and ban on the return and stay in Baranja..." Official Gazette of the Beli Manastir Municipality (No. 10/90), Article 2. According to estimates of the Krajina Serbs from 1993, Croats made up only 7% of the population of RSK (N. Barić, 2005, p. 384). On occupied territories under the rule of Serbian insurgents, according to the census of 1991 there lived 549,083 persons, of which 287,830 (52,4%) were Serbs. This means that a half of the population of the occupied areas was expelled.

¹²³ Tomislav JONJIC. Bežanija Srba pod prezidentom Martićem (URL http://www.tomislavjonjic.iz.hr/V_5martic.html) The source of data is the book of M. Sekulić, 2000.

¹²⁴ Data and quotations according to N. Barić, 2005, pp. 475-476

“Open studio” programme, six weeks before the “Storm”, he said: “the battle for the unity of our people” is the highest law, and because “the salvation of the Republic is the highest law, those who do not respect this salvation of the Republic, must be excluded from the political process.”

Academician Tadić sends his message from Knin: “I see this salvation in an open, clear, unwavering programme for the unification of all Serbian states... in front of our eyes must be not only the ideal of unification of the Serbian people, but we should be working at it incessantly, untiringly, every day; and if my eyes see well, the attempt at uniting which the RSK and RS /Republic of Serbska/ intend to realize, this is an introduction into our full integration”. Moreover, academician Tadić sees a unified Serbian state on the Balkans: “I see it and hope for it with all my heart and strength, and I think this is the only way for our survival.”

But he also sees that “banana states such as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is recognized by the United Nations... wish to turn Serbia and Montenegro into... so that they could be easily manipulated with”. Croatia reminds him of South American dictatorships and totalitarianism “because here we have a kind of fierce authoritarian regime in Croatia with a clear chauvinist sign, with elements of the Ustasha factor – that is, if I want to be fully explicit, and just; this is an unquestionable fact”.

Academician Lj. Tadić describes president Tuđman in a way he is portrayed by opposition Croatian media and opponents of his policies. If we take into account of the time sequence of events, we can see very easily that academician Tadić is not the user, but the originator of such opinions which appear in a part of Croatian media:

“... Mr Tuđman with his funny ribbon really looks like a South American dictator, and not only with his ribbon and medals, but with his entire demeanour he is precisely that. But he can do it because behind him he has a guaranteed background that he can intervene, attack with the help of his allies, he can effectuate in the United Nations that the Vance plan for RSK goes down, so that he can invade western Slavonia, commit a massacre of the civilian population without any serious reprisals, to continue with provocations here, I see it in the surroundings of Knin, on the Dinara Mountain, wishing to carve off part by part of the RSK, to deny the right of self-determination to the Serbian people who remained to live in Croatia, as well this people here, he believes that he is, how shall I put it – in a permanent ownership of the Croatian sovereignty.”

Academician Tadić tries even to be critical towards these attitudes of his: “I think that many opposition parties in Croatia are even more aggressive than Tuđman himself and his party.”

The former views should serve as an illustration that nothing has changed in the attitudes of Yugoslav legitimizing factors of reality, which were and remained on the standpoint that Croatian people isn't and cannot be “in the permanent ownership of the Croatian sovereignty”. Those who fought for a sovereign Croatia, and who ultimately succeeded, in the eyes of Yugoslav legitimizing factors of reality did not fundamentally change: from the “Ustasha government” in 1990 the evolved into an autocratic regime with a “clear chauvinist sign, with elements of Ustasha ideology”. This inventory of knowledge remained in the public as a heritage of Yugoslav legitimizing factors of reality, and their followers and clones keep repeating it even after 20 years of the independence of the Croatian state.

All these “unquestionable facts” which are being repeated by former “official” legitimizing factors of reality, produce new pseudo-events in their sphere of public influence. We are witnessing how the military and police operation “Storm” is being transformed into a pseudo-event and interpreted as an operation of ethnic cleansing in spite of proof and Serbian testimonies of immediate witnesses. The military commanders of insurgent Serbs testify to the decisions and political moves which had as a consequence the withdrawal of civilian population: “On the Defence Council we took the worst possible decision – on the evacuation of the population. This will turn out to be worse even than the decision on capitulation ... Those who took this decision on evacuation, should have known well and they did know, that they took the entire people and army into exile.”¹²⁵

The decision of the Supreme Council was made public on August 5th, 1995 at 8 p.m., and it said:

“The Supreme Defence Council of the Republic of Serbian Krajina took, on its session earlier today, the decision to organize the evacuation, due to preventive and safety reasons, of the civilian population of northern Dalmatia and southern part of Lika. The organization of the evacuation and the escorting of the

¹²⁵ The session of the Supreme Defence Council of RSK was held on August 5th, 1995 at 5 p.m., in the presence of Milan Martić and general Mile Mrkšić. M. Sekulić, 2000, pp. 178-179

population will be with the active participation of the members of peacekeeping forces of the United Nations, along with the Civil Guard of the RSK. The Supreme Council decided to take this decision in order to protect the civilian population from possible further attacks of Croatian artillery and to relieve the Serbian fighters who are keeping the lines of defence, of the concern for their families.”¹²⁶

The transformation of the “Storm” into a pseudo-event after 15 years is taking on mythic proportions. For the president of Serbia Boris Tadić, which means for the highest Serbian officials, there is no doubt that the operation “Storm” was a planned ethnic cleansing and a planned crime of the greatest proportions in Europe after World War II. The fact that great-Serbian politics advocated to the very last moment a unity of all “Serbian lands”, that a part of the Serbs didn’t want Croatia, but only Yugoslavia, all of this is getting lost in pseudo-knowledge which becomes a part of public knowledge.

The part of Serbs which didn’t want Croatia, but wanted Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia, was leaving Croatia even before the military-police operations. According to the research by the OESC from 2004, financed by the USAID, 36% of exiled Serbs left Croatia in 1991. After the operation “Flash” several thousand Serbs left the liberated area in the organization of UNPROFOR, 27,000 Serbs left Croatia after the operation “Storm” from the former Sector North – with the mediation of international factors and at the head of this column on a tractor there sat Peter Galbraith. According to UNTAES data 45,000 Serbs left the Danube basin area before the completion of peaceful reintegration in 1998. From the same reasons, after the Dayton agreement, around 100,000 Serbs left Sarajevo because they didn’t want to live in the Federation.

All these numbers and human destinies turned into pseudo-proof about ethnic cleansing carried out by a “fascist state”. For Milan Martić nothing has changed in his relationship towards Croatia and the Croats. In his appeal he said: “... it is terrible to hear that in the cases Gotovina, Čermak and Markač both the prosecution and defence agree that “Storm” was a legitimate action. In the heart of Europe, a fascist Croatian state has been formed, a state in which the greatest cultural event is the concert of Thompson.”

Pseudo-history lasts and lives even without its key protagonists.

2. The maps show clearly what was supposed to happen and what did happen.
 - Please pay attention on the **coincidence of map No. 1 with the map No. 3**


1. GREATER SERBIA ACCORDING TO THE CHETNIK IDEOLOGIST STEVAN MOLJEVIĆ’S PROJECT (30th JUNE 1941)



¹²⁶ M. Sekulić, 2000, p. 179

1985

2.



Armies have the signs of their respective republics

1985

revealed intentions

3.




operationalization


1987

AD - ARMY DISTRICT
 VPO - NAVAL DISTRICT

5. PLAN OF ATTACK ON CROATIA AFTER RETREAT OF JNA FORCES FROM SLOVENIA (VII/1991)




6. MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION IN CROATIA DECEMBER 1991 - JANUARY 1992



- 1) All borders of the JNA in Croatia were captured by Croatian forces, or they were evacuated.
- 2) The zone of the Serbian armed insurgency is reduced by the liberation of the northern part of West Slavonia, but at the moment when the planned continuation of a successful offensive from the Pakrac – Požeška line towards Sava is supposed to begin, the political top takes the decision to stop all military activities.
- 3) Two attempts to unblock Vukovar fail and the town is in the hands of the aggressor.
- 4) Counter-strikes in the flanks of the enemy positions in the Bukovica area did not give significant results, but the borders of zones of insurgency are under the control of HV.
- 5) On the Ston – Hutovo line the penetration of enemy forces into the Neretva Valley has been definitely halted.
- 6) Defeat of the JNA on the battlefield in Croatia (heavy losses in the fight for Vukovar, and a complete breakdown in the advancement toward Osijek and Đakovo. This is a consequence of activity of HV, but also of unsuccessful mobilization in Serbia, where military draftees refused to go to battles outside of their republic.
- 7) The overall relation of forces is completely changed in favour of Croatia: HV numbers around 250,000 soldiers in 63 brigades and dozens of independent battalions, it is well armed, and a satisfactory command system has been established; it is fully capable for a general offensive with the aim of removing armed insurgency and complete liberation of Croatia.
- 8) In alliance with the defence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that state instead of a general offensive, on 2nd January 1992 in Sarajevo a permanent ceasefire is signed;
- 9) The war is transferred into BiH, and the state of neither war nor peace in Croatia will last for four more years.
- 10) Aware of the definitive defeat, the top of the JNA saves what it can and forms three Serbian armies: Srpska vojska Krajine (for preserving territorial gains in Croatia), Vojska Republike Srpske (for taking over a major part of BiH, 65 – 70%) and Vojska Jugoslavije (as the armed forces of Serbia and Montenegro). SVK was annihilated in the spring and summer of 1995, while other armies exist until the present day.

7. ZONES OF SERBIAN ARMED REBELLION



h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne valove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mbr - Trebinjska, 10.
br - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspap, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

1.

A SMALL LOCALITY near Sisak - Croatia

An important railway node, the only bridgehead on the right bank of the river Sava, 20 km of the defence line, the only retreat is a ferry across the river, 60 lads from the 2nd ZNG /Assembly of National Guard/ Guards Brigade – they have had some battle experience earlier, around a hundred men from the police reserve changes every two weeks, plus around a hundred villagers from the neighbouring villages along the defence line, armed mainly with hunting rifles, no-one has mobilized them, they fight without pay, they have their fields and cows and chicken, we also have two mortars 120 mm (one doesn't work) and 5 grenades.

This is a cross-section of the situation which I found when I arrived to Sunja as a volunteer in early September 1991.

A friend, ŽARKO PEŠA, took me with a group of police reserve which was changing shift, due to my size they didn't have a uniform that I could put on, I look like a mountaineer, I have a WWII submachine gun, a gift from a friend from Bonn, a lawyer, I smuggled it in the car engine. I also have two dozen bullets and a small video camera.

The guardsmen gave me a nickname Hemingway.

In a short time, the Headquarters in Sisak nominated me as commander of the defence of Sunja.

A week after me a friend came, a renowned Croatian theatre director MIROSLAV MEĐIMOREC, we are friends from the times in the Academy, and a little while later one of Croatia's best actors SVEN LASTA, who was during the Second World War, still as a child, in the partisans.

I stayed six months in Sunja, after which I assumed the role of the Assistant for IPD – Informative Propaganda Activity in MORH /Ministry of Defence of Republic of Croatia/. During these six months more than 20,000 artillery missiles were fired at Sunja, mainly from MB-120 mm. I will skip the dead, wounded, the destruction.

2.

Before the beginning of aggression in Sunja lived a bit less than 50% of Serbs, and the majority of them left one night and settled in the surrounding villages with Serbian population, and already the next day they were shelling the place hoping the population would flee into Sisak.

This was before my arrival.

Those who left, the Serbs, never said a word to anyone who was not Serbian, and there were friendships and acquaintances, godparents, groomsmen, mixed marriages, but everything was done in secrecy, a true conspiracy within the framework of some Serbian national project.

Some of the Serbs remained, older people and a some younger people who, probably, saw Croatia as their motherland.

Why am I writing this? Because I want you see what kind of shock it was for the people, the Croats, who remained and who were shelled, what it looks like when in a split second all the stories about brotherhood and unity of Yugoslav peoples crumble, when in that split second vanish all the friendships, and all the years of joint living become only a delusion compared to Serbian national compactness. Colloquially speaking “*one simply cannot believe it*”, and there is a need to constantly repeat this story.

3.

For modern and fashionable “researchers” the situation is simple. We have a half-uniformed or uniformed man (later we also had women) carrying some kind of weapon – THIS IS A SOLDIER.

A group of such persons – THIS IS THE ARMY.

This army has a commander and gradually, some position commanders – THIS IS STRUCTURE.

The commander commands the lower levels, and they command the army on individual segments of the defence line.

All such logic and such conclusions, well, you can simply forget it.

4.

Until January 15th, 1992, when the countries of the EU recognized Croatia and when ceasefire was signed (though there was no real ceasefire) I walked along my entire defence line, half in the day, half in the night, talked and persuaded, built the system brick by brick.

After the ceasefire, the workload was a bit lighter, but not much, and with the build-up of the system the job became easier and commanding more efficient.

5.

You can write a command that they start building bunkers and draw the blueprint, but they will not do it because they are deeply convinced that this war will end up in a month's time the latest.

6.

The guardsmen don't want to do it, because they are brave, wonderful young people, not the people for bunkers.

7.

In a village on my left wing they made two bunkers, which are immediately next to high corn stalks and look onto the corn and see nothing. They don't want to level these stalks and destroy their crops, with what shall they feed their cattle when winter comes?

And what then?

Whence the redundancy to replace them and with which punishment and according to which law can you punish them? They are volunteering here and whenever they want they can cross over the river with the ferry and go wherever they please. They can even take their cattle along.

Besides, they claim that the neighbouring village, populated by Serbs, will not attack them because they took care of each other and had good relations in the Second World War. The situation changed only when they were attacked, in spite of all, and had some dead and some burnt houses.

My job was to foresee such a situation, repel the attack with groups I had formed for such situations and later I could take command. The corn stalks were levelled.

8.

By the time we made 150 bunkers, but I had to fight for each one of them, though the task grew easier with the time, as the structure grew generically, not command-wise.

9.

Soldier, a brilliant soldier, a brave soldier, whose family fled from the occupied part of Croatia and settled in the vicinity of Sisak, took some white goods from a shop.

As all the shops were open, and all the glass shattered by shells, did he take or steal the goods is a legal question, but I almost had him executed in an attack of moral fury, I took his Croatian badge from the cap and put him in prison in Sisak.

Then his comrades came to talk, so I called my friend, a lawyer in Zagreb, to represent him in court and to ask the judge to punish him lightly so he can come back as soon as he can.

A great fighter.

10.

We had to get rid of the goods from the shops, food, furniture, agricultural machinery,...

I organized an auction as if we were at Sotheby's, twice delayed due to shelling, and the money received I sent half to Sisak to the military headquarters, half in cash register in Sunja.

And already two sisters, two volunteers, meticulously took care of all the necessary documentation.

11.

One night in autumn there was a thunderstorm (and what else?, were we under attack?) a group of peasants, dressed in military uniforms, left their position on the defence line.

They fled and left part of the arms. I brought another group, the guardsmen, and the next day I told those from the village that, unless they return to their position, or if it happens again, I will slaughter all their cattle.

It was a good, appropriate and efficient threat (and UNLAWFUL THREAT).

It never happened again.

11a.

When these people were leaving their position, when they fled, one of them accidentally dropped a hand grenade and got buried in the soaked earth. Later, when winter came, they lit a fire above that grenade.

The story about the consequences I prefer to skip.

12.

In the building of the Voluntary Firefighters' Brigade, where I held a meeting with the commanders every morning, there comes this guy and starts shooting at the walls from a submachine gun.

I sent the two last civilian policemen to bring him in, and he attacked me with a knife. I overpowered him, gave him to the policemen and told them to take him to the Sisak prison.

Along the way, he disarmed the policemen, they didn't tie him because they know each other, because they are friends from the same locality, etc. Ultimately, he fled, returned to Sunja, he deserted.

A different approach, lots of effort and this young man became one of my best soldiers, and later got a lower military rank. At one moment he simply "broke out" and this breach of the curve had to be healed.

13.

I managed to get four military policemen.

But they, and especially the commander "projected themselves into the role" in a way you can find out in "*Social psychology*" textbooks and experiments on that theme.

He started abusing people, soldiers, and when he once beat up a guy without real reason, I banished them all over the river, back where they came from.

Former admonitions did not work, and he wasn't under my direct command (this is a matter of command structure) and he thought he could do whatever he wished.

If I hadn't banished him his stay in the unit could have ended up tragically.

This is how it was.

14.

Late at night I got a phone call from the Headquarters in Sisak that they have an important message for me and that they are sending it by courier, as they cannot do it over the phone, and would I, please, send the ferry to the other side of the river and someone to take over the sealed envelope.

It was the first time they were sending a courier and a message, it must truly be important.

I sent one of my men on duty to the ferry 4-5 km from our location to go there and get the letter.

He came back with the information that the ferrymen (two soldiers) are playing cards and that they work until 22 hours and will not take him across.

I explained to him what he was supposed to explain to them, and sent him back, but he returned with his job undone, because, they refuse to move, their work shift was over.

I called three guardsmen with arms and “*bullet in the barrel*” (this is the expression) and sent them to bring over the ferrymen. As soon as the first of them entered the room and started to explain something, I slapped him on the face so he barely stayed on his feet, and kicked him in the ass (UNLAWFUL CONDUCT).

I was furious, I was mad, I was “*Orlando Furioso*”, they moved the ferry, I got the message.

14a.

Now you will ask what is the difference between that military policeman and me?! I understood those people, and respected and loved and this “gave me the right” to such behaviour.

Two days later, this ferryman, after a MIG 21 of the JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/ rocketed the ferry, jumped into the Sava River and saved his severely wounded comrade.

He was commended, he got two beers, we had coffee together and he understood it all. I didn’t hit the man, but his mistake, and this can be differentiated, this can be felt.

I was a commander, but even more I was the father who loves and understands them, and people feel the difference.

14b.

The behaviour of the ferryman and many other similar acts will not be understood by those who don’t know what the Yugoslav political system of “*SELF-MANAGEMENT*” was, and what type of thinking resulted from it.

The Communist Party did not enable or permit political freedoms, and as a compensation it gave to the “working class” the right to manage companies, so that “*The Workers’ Assembly*” decided e.g. what kind of oscilloscope to buy for a laboratory, while 70% of those who decide hasn’t got the faintest idea what an oscilloscope was.

After the war, after 1995, I was director of a factory which employed 400 people. Of this number, 250 were surplus, and they had 276 descriptions of the work-places. For instance, a fork-lifter was only a fork-lifter and didn’t want to do anything else, because that is not “*in the description of his work-place*”.

Full stop.

Likewise, the ferryman in whose “*description of the work-place*” it says that the ferry doesn’t run after 22 hours.

This is how it was in peace-time, this is how it was in the war.

How much social power and energy have these social habits and acquired rights, and how much time is needed for a change, just a small number of researchers can understand and comprehend?!

15.

“*RADIO 101*” from Zagreb opened its affiliate in Sunja.

The guys had the habit to come into the radio office, ask for a musical wish, a song, and the editor fulfilled their wishes.

Several of them came once (these were volunteers who were slowly coming to the front line) and killed the cat which had made the radio room its home – I guess because their music wish wasn’t fulfilled?!

They had to take down their uniforms and in very scanty clothes I banished them with the ferry across the river. It wouldn’t be polite to quote the words I used then (UNLAWFUL CONDUCT).

Testimony of the retired colonel of the HV /Croatian Army/ Miroslav Crnković, 100% war disabled, then a member of the 2nd Brigade of the ZNG, commander of defence on the railway station in Sunja.

(See ENCLOSURE 1)

16.

Mr. Alojz Arbutina, a Serbian from Sunja didn't go to "the other side".

In JNA he ended the school for reserve officers and had a rank of reserve lieutenant.

I nominated him chief logistician for feeding of all the soldiers in this area, because of his age he was not for carrying a gun.

Was it clever, was it logical, what kind of risk goes with such a nomination.

He can disable all the soldiers in an easy and efficient manner.

Could such a gesture be expected of an American, British or German officer, bearing in mind what happened to American citizens of Japanese origin in America at the start of the Second World War, when hysteria ruled America?

Is fear and hysteria in small-numbered nations smaller, especially when they are defending themselves with hunting rifles?

My judgement, my decision, my choice; I overruled the objections and resistance and got an excellent logistician from an excellent man.

I have never seen any sense in statements like: "All Serbs are ..." , "All Germans are ..." , "All Japanese are ...".

According to my orders Arbutina took care that all elderly people – Croats and Serbs GET the food just like the army, on a daily basis.

Likewise, before winter all elderly people, Croats and Serbs, unable to collect wood for heating, got a sufficient amount of wood, as well as medical care, and...

The statement of Mr. Arbutina as well as his testimony in The Hague you can read on my website and on the enclosed DVD.

17.

I also had two Serbs in communications which remained in Sunja.

That I found out because of strong objections and big resistance. Communications are very important in peace-time, and in war??? Can you trust them?

So if you wish, dear reader, read the testimony of Predrag Stojaković.

18.

On the railway station, twenty metres from our forefront and most blatantly position where the members of the Guard were, there remained freight wagons full of grain.

When they got tired of shelling and attacking, the Serbs firstly sent the women to collect the grain which was pouring from the pierced wagons.

Later on, the men in civilian clothes would come too, or they were soldiers who had disguised themselves?

My soldier never fired at these people, and it remains a controversy whether it is logical to let the civilians of the opposing side come this close.

19.

Not one Serbian house was set aflame in Sunja. Not after 20,000 shells they fired on this locality.

IT HAS NEVER BEEN BROKEN INTO ANY SERBIAN HOUSE.

20.

On days without attack, or with fewer shells, the level of adrenaline diminished, nervousness grey, there is no barracks, no psychologist and alcohol becomes a problem.

The ferry is under control, but many men have boats on the Sava River, fishermen's boats and alcohol was hauled in as contraband.

We opened a canteen, entry without arms, guard in front of the entrance, maximum two beers a day.

I also threatened them that, if I ever find a bottle of alcohol, I will pierce all the boats without exception, so let them sort it out among themselves who smuggles the liquid (UNLAWFUL THREAT).

Can such a threat be realized?

And what if the attackers crush our defence lines, and the ferry is small and only a small number of men can get onto it?

How will the people save their lives with unusable boats?

To surrender to the enemy and become a prisoner of war towards whom the Geneva Conventions will be applied?

Don't pull my leg.

Remember the Vukovar Hospital, remember Vukovar and all the rest.

21.

After the fall of Vukovar, after the images that we have seen, after the song of drunken Chetniks who sing: *"Send us salad, Slobodan, there will be meat, we will butcher the Croats"*, and the BBC speaker doesn't translate, but says that Serbs are singing some folk songs. After the embargo on the purchase of weapons for defence against aggression, a decision which offends the human reason, contrary to every written and customary right to self-defence. In brief, we were in a bad state indeed.

Something which we pathetically call "the international community", removed from our field of vision all human and moral orientation points.

Croatia was buying arms on the "black market" which means, that along the sincere patriots, there was a bunch of those who make money on the side and thus additionally destroy the fragile social tissue.

We were happy for every new rifle, bullet, rocket-propelled grenade, recoilless cannon....and still it kept coming.

In such a state we organized the arrival of the best tamburitza group in Croatia, to sing for us.

In the overfilled hall of the provincial cinema at one moment they sang an ugly song, similar to the one which the Chetniks were singing in Vukovar – only with roles reversed.

And again the fury, I cut short the singing, sent away the musicians, dismissed the gathering.

We are not going to sing that, whatever the situation might be.

A year later I got a letter from this group of musicians in which they explain that they are not that song, that they neither feel nor think as the lyrics of this song go, but they thought that we expected something in that vein – something violent, with hatred. The hall was silent, in discomfort, because I cannot cut short the well-known and popular musicians. But, how behaviour changes when you give in to expectations, and how to radicalize the group – all of it you can read in every competent textbook on social psychology.

The statement of STANKO ŠARIĆ.

22.

All that I have written is only a small, very small part of the life in war and a small part of the problems which were there on a daily basis.

I don't intend to write on purely military matters.

Did I succeed?

Yes, I succeeded!

Is it all my merit?

No, not in the least. I was the one who establishes the basic form of the social crystal, the one who initiates the crystallization, and then, every day a greater and greater number of people does the same, in the same direction, with the same zest and power.

The crystallization of certain social situations, especially war-time situations as Croatia has been through, can be done piecemeal, at a certain speed, with a correct sequence of moves.

The sequence of moves is equally important as the choice of moves, like in chess.

If we want to speak about the morale of every man, especially that group which pompously calls themselves “intellectuals”, then we can only speak about the responsible morale.

And the “responsible morale” is only the one which is active, which expresses itself with an act, participation, risk of one’s social position, and in war, the risk of losing life.

I don’t think much about the understanding of history from the so-called “historical distance”, because it is all an ironed-out, filtered, monotonous story, adapted to later politics and interests and moral justifications.

There is no man, no fear, no pain, no despair, no hatred, no...

EMPTY.

Therefore, I preferred to read “*DIARY OF SAMUEL PAPYS*” and books like this, rather than the majority of those wise books about the history, which are mostly chronicles of events with poor, inadequate explanations.

And when the presumptions are WRONG or incorrect or insufficiently correct, then every, including good logic leads to the WRONG conclusion.

ENCLOSURE 1:

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS MIROSLAV CRNKOVIĆ CRNI IN CASE PRLIĆ ET AL.,
ICTY, 22 SEPTEMBER 2009

CRNKOVIĆ:

In the month of September/October 1991, a group of young people from Zagreb arrived and established a radio service in Sunja so that people on the front-line could receive greetings from their loved ones. A girl was there. She also came with that group of people, and she brought a cat from Zagreb, that was her cat. Four members of the Croatian Army at the time were on their way back from Zagreb. They returned from Zagreb, went to the radio station, and wanted to order a few songs, and then she told them that they had to wait a little. One of the soldiers took the cat and threw her - threw the cat against the radiator and killed the cat. The girl started crying, came to me. I conveyed all that to the general. At that very moment, the general appeared up there, disarmed all the four soldiers. He removed their insignia and their uniforms and sent them packing for Zagreb, and those men were never again members of the Croatian Army in Sunja.

PINTER:

And how did you explain the whole thing to yourself? How did you interpret General Praljak's reaction to yourself?

CRNKOVIĆ:

It was a message, of course. The message was, If you can be removed from the Croatian Army on account of a cat, you should also be aware of what can happen to you on account of a human being.

ENCLOSURE 2:

STATEMENT

STANKO ŠARIĆ, member of the vocal-instrumental band „Zlatni Dukati“

I, Stanko Šarić, am a singer of the vocal-instrumental band „Zlatni Dukati“. „Zlatni Dukati“ is the tamburitza band from Slavonia, very known for years and popular throughout Croatia.

Then, in war, we were members of the Croatian Music Aid agency. It was an agency which, in the cooperation with the Ministry of defence (or some other similar institution) established a military formation under the name „The art company“ or some similar name, consisting of artists of various profile. The art company had a role and function to visit battlefields and perform shows, concerts and similar during the war for the homeland.

So, in autumn 1991, after the fall of Vukovar, under the sponsorship of the same agency Croatian Music Aid, we had an organized concert on the battlefield in Sunja. The concert was scheduled in the community premise of this town - it was a cinema or the hall of culture.

Apart from me, Stanko Šarić, another four members of the band performed in the concert; Mato Lukačević, Mirko Gašparović, Mato Miličić and another member who died in the meantime.

As it usually is in such type of concert, the majority audience were soldiers. The concert programme referred to patriotic songs while the atmosphere was war and military – since we were singing to the army and the war was in rage.

As the atmosphere of the concert and the audience mood were heating up, we replaced certain refrains of certain songs with the text of different content. So we mentioned the Serbs couple of times, Ustashas and sang something offensive against the Serbian people.

I emphasize that the concert took place immediately after the fall of Vukovar and that the soldiers were ultimately exasperated; therefore those refrains were in accordance with their rage and wrath, as well as the general situation at that time.

After a performance of one of the songs, despite all and such time, commander of Sunja defence, Slobodan Praljak climbed the stage and banned the singing of anything similar with a voice which didn't stand a replica. He explained it as follows:

There is Croatian Army here, which is in the war with the aggressor according to original right to defend home and the homeland. Such war cannot be gained by offending any nation, not even a Serbian one.

JNA can be offended, Chetniks can be offended but the nation cannot be offended! He also said the following; "Guys, everything is fine, but there are no Ustashas here. But there are members of Serbian nation, those who fight with us!"

Those who tried to disapprove shut their mouth quickly.

Now, as I observe the entire case form the time of peace, I realize that some lines were offensive and that Slobodan Praljak made the right step.

But then, in war, after incredible crimes occurred- than I was disapproving and it seemed to me that what I was singing was perfectly fine.

In Zagreb, on 26th of February 2005

Stanko Šarić

/signed/

/identical text of the aforementioned statement signed by other three members of the band/

Stanko Šarić

/signed/

Mirko Gašparović

/signed/

Mato Lukačević

/signed/

Mato Miličić

/signed/

STATEMENT

I, Stanko Šarić the undersigned, declare that in February 2005 I gave a statement to the defence councils of Slobodan Praljak on my own free will, about the events I had participated in and which are connected with the wartime actions in the Republic of Croatia and/or the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I gave consent for the statement to be used in the procedure before International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and to be published. I am willing to testify in the procedure before ICTY against Slobodan Praljak in the prosecution case of Prlić et al.

I declare that before giving the statement to the defence counsels of general Slobodan Praljak I was told to tell the truth and that the false statement is a criminal act pursuant to the Criminal Law of the Republic of Croatia and rules and procedures of ICTY.

I declare that I have understood the caution and that everything I have stated is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

I have read the statement carefully and it corresponds entirely to what I have stated. (I have personally corrected the mistakes which occurred during the writing of the statement while I was reading it.) I have personally signed the written text.

In Zagreb, 28 April 2008

/signed/

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvođe u/d u do
oriji Istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostar i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
line Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuški, Grude, Posušje
Ključ i o. Šibenik.

jerjaku vatreni podršku izvođa različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje ključnih avionis
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u BiH rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mbr - Trebinjska, 10.
mbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspap, 13. lap
ob, 13.mtb, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Ključ, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebi - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

epređiti proboj neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izvesti na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING

1. That war will break out in SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ I predicted with a great certainty, ALMOST DEFINITELY, as far back as 1975, and in many conversations in a close circle of friends I explained my analysis.

They were looking at me pale-faced, and later on some admitted that they thought I had parted with reason, i.e. that I was crazy.

But it wasn't so difficult to predict and it doesn't require such a powerful mind to arrive at such a conclusion. It is more an issue of courage, which is important in every type of comprehension. Namely, if the analysis leads you to the CONCLUSION which should be your attitude, you then risk the danger of losing social benefits, of whatever kind they might be. This "curved consciousness", this danger that your conclusion, your attitude, does not result the cutting of the branch on which you are sitting, prevents people to make the analysis properly and conclude what this analysis shows.

Read the testimony of Alojz Majetić. (DVD)

2. To everyone who has even a little "courage of thinking" it was clearer than a summer sunny day at noon that the war in BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ in all its manifestations will be worse than in Croatia and that the aggression on Croatia will not be isolated. Unfortunately, in communism not many are endowed with that quality. I was explaining this to my guys in Sunja at the time when Alija Izetbegović considered the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ to be his army and explained the aggression on Croatia with the words: "*This is not our war*" and tried to make a "*Historic Agreement*" with Serbian political and military leadership.

Read the testimony of Žarko Peša. (DVD)

3. The first free elections in BiH showed that 45-year old communist stories about "*brotherhood and unity*" and the "*solved national issues in Yugoslavia*" are empty trash.

Croats voted for the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/, Muslims for the SDA, Serbs for the SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/.....

It was compatible to that extent as declaration of nationality in population census. The amorphousness of society according to civic determinants was not worth mention.

4. JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ – the Serbian and Montenegrin army – armed the Serbs in BiH, positioned itself on all the areas where the Serbs had any significant presence, in a word Bosnia and Herzegovina was already occupied in all the areas which the Serbs considered theirs – 70% of BiH.

5. The plans of the JNA for a breakthrough on the routes Livno (BiH) – Split (Croatia), Mostar (BiH) – Split (Croatia), Mostar – Čapljina (BiH) – Ploče (Croatia) I already published in previous books.

6. The JNA military equipment from barracks and military warehouses in Croatia, according to the demands of the "international community", by the end of 1991, was transferred into BiH (SIC!).

7. When I came to Herzegovina at the beginning of April 1992 as commander of the operational zone South-east Herzegovina (KONJIC-JABLANICA-MOSTAR-ČAPLJINA – to the Croatian border) in Croatia I had been assistant to the Minister of Defence for informative psychological activity.

How is that possible? How it is not possible?

I was born in BiH, I lived there until my 18th year, my parents lived in Mostar.

Whose citizen am I supposed to be?

Is there such a state whose citizen I should be, or is it all pass judgement?

Isn't it clear enough who is the aggressor, and isn't it clear what the aggressor wants and isn't it clear that it isn't the states/republics who are attacked, but the people, two peoples and the territory on which they live and did the international military law not define the notion of "BATTLEFIELD", etc.

One aggressor and one, unlimited right to self-defence.

8. Perišić and JNA took all the hills around Mostar, they shell and destroy at will, from the JNA barracks in Čapljina they shoot at everything that moves, the planes rocket small towns in Western Herzegovina, the main traffic routes are cut, telephone communications are cut, two main transformer stations near Mostar are destroyed (one is 400 kV), and the scarce production plants are out of work... the state and entire social structure were falling apart completely.

Disbelief, ignorance, incomprehension, fear, fury, despair, hate, dead, wounded, the refugees...

SEE „URBICID“– on www.slobodanpraljak.com*.

9. The JNA military barracks in Čapljina – Grabovina

Two tanks, two dozen anti-aircraft guns, Bofors, plus the rest, they shoot at Čapljina when and how they please.

Eleven Croats were killed.

Negotiations on peaceful leaving of the barracks, but without arms. Perišić refuses.

And BiH is internationally recognized, and they are an occupation army.

The European observers, men in white, set up a meeting at the entrance gate, 50 metres from my grandfather's house in which I was born, between the wives of men who work in the barracks, NCOs and officers, Prof. Moro, whose son is a doctor in the barracks and their closest family members in the barracks.

And when they came to the gate, shooting started from the barracks.

Haven't I been there, didn't I lift them from the asphalt and removed them into a shelter AND SOMEONE FROM THERE STILL SHOOTS.

"What's Hecuba to him or he to Hecuba" and where are the men in white.

And from the barracks someone still shoots; I will not immediately accuse the commander.

On the road, visible, 190 cm tall, I yell at him to stop through the megaphone and I swear at him *"Mother fucking Chetnik"*.

What else, what am I supposed to do, read Ovid to him?!

I carry the badge of a general and those who think they understand could ask what am I doing here and is this my job and my duty. The Croatian TV cameraman filmed it all and you can see it on the enclosed DVD.

This was never broadcasted because for a good civil upbringing it is much more important not to hear me swear, but see how a man, accidentally a general, saves some people who, by the way are not even Croats, completely exposed on the road – no tiny target.

You can read the statement of Prof. Moro, Dr. Moro and women who were there on whom they were shooting. (DVD)

10. A few days later, Perišić sent 11 MIGs to fire at Čapljina and around the barracks in Grabovina, then the cannons, multiple rocket launchers, chaos and smoke and he pulled the majority from the barracks with helicopters.

Dr Goran Moro with 25 more young men – JNA SOLDIERS, surrendered. My job would have been a swift pulling out of weapons, so much needed weapons and two tanks, and I ask of Dr. Moro that the guys quickly change into civilian clothes, because I know:

* www.slobodanpraljak.com, "URBICID KOJI SU POČINILE POSTROJBE JA POD VODSTVOM MOMČILA PERIŠIĆA NAD MOSTAROM U LJETO '92", Zagreb, May 2007

When from a large group of those who at that moment don't like, despise, hate the JNA start extracting smaller and smaller subgroups I will arrive to a NONEMPTY subgroup consisting of at least one member who will come and kill some of these "prisoners".

Two came.

I will not delve now into psychology, but these are not cold-blooded killers, these are men whose structure was broken, revenge, they act "according to justice", they set straight "the injustice".

To cut the story short, you can stop them only if your fury, your hatred against them, your yelling and your arms have a greater energy value. How much of all of this is real, and how much is the artistic skill which every theatre director possesses, is a matter of subtle analyses.

But, I didn't give the boys, although those two repeated their guns.

And answers to some other questions.

Why didn't I turn over the prisoners to the military police, don't I have any other "more important" military things to do?

Shortly before this event, I managed to persuade one gentleman, a member of the Croatian Army, to come and help in the forming of military police.

Some young men donned the uniforms with the white belt and other regalia of military police, but these are not the bravest ones (these are on the positions), they haven't been through any training, they don't possess the energy sufficient to discourage those who came to kill.

The title they carry and power they possess are in complete discrepancy.

Why am I wasting so many words for this group of "prisoners" and Dr. Goran Moro. Because, there is no bus, a bus is an abstraction, and when I found someone who knows someone who has a bus, this guy worked and saved for ten years in Germany and bought a bus and drives to Munich and back (and half the population of Herzegovina is in Germany), and he asks who will pay him if his bus gets under fire and is destroyed, and I have no answer to that.

So why I took them to Metković, to Croatia, and according to which right?

According to the right of assessment of their safety. And on the paper it all looks so clear and so simple – one general who has prisoners and military police, to whom, by the rules, they should be handed over, and that's it - the problem is solved?!

11. While the JNA was still in the barracks in Grabovina, I took three of my officers and we went to explore the possibility of blocking the road which leads from the barracks over a small field to Čapljina – 600 metres, when there was a burst of submachine fire aimed at us from one of the houses at the foot of the hill in Čapljina. There were some 60 – 70 houses there and I would like to hear an explanation just how you find a man who is left in that town, left to kill from the back.

And this was not an isolated case.

My order to keep all windows in Čapljina closed permanently, or..., and the weather is already hot and in the rooms, without air conditioning, it is hot as hell, doesn't look very human.

But I have to make about 50 decisions a day and I am responsible for every one of them, including the decision to keep the windows closed, however, death is more inhumane than heat.

12. I already wrote how simple it is, with two ferries on barrels, to transfer 15.000 Muslims from East Herzegovina fleeing the JNA, over the Neretva River, including 3000 cars and trucks and accommodate them in a location which population is three times lower than the number of refugees.

13. Before I came, the commander in Mostar was a certain PERAK.

The mighty KOS /Military Counterintelligence Service/ of the JNA – the most powerful structure of the former state succeeded in the intention that Croats and Muslims from Mostar nominate Perak as the commander of the city defence.

And this commander, when Perišić intensified a bit his shelling of the town ordered evacuation of the town on grounds that it is indefensible.

At that time in Mostar there were nine groups of fighters of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ formed by neighbourhoods. They all knew and trusted each other.

They called themselves “*battalion*” because this military formation in Croatian language sounds superior to “*company*”.

The fact that not one of these groups has the number of soldiers even to complete a company, under such circumstances is really unimportant.

No one listened to Perak, the commander. All refused his order and he fled Mostar and later lived in Serbia.

So much about commanding the army, and you should know this when you become commander, and what, in the last instance, you mean to these coherent, closed groups, and how are you to take command after Perak?

Answer:

There is only one way: to repeatedly show to these brilliant and brave lads, who mostly bought their own arms and uniforms, whom no one has drafted, who receive no salary, to show them repeatedly again and again that life doesn't mean much to you, especially that you do not value your life of a general more than theirs.

They, who have had enough of the JNA generals, don't like that word very much.

The road over Goranci is the only road by which you can enter Mostar, and the JNA artillery has this road, especially one BEND of 180 degrees like on a plate, from several artillery positions.

On that bend they killed six people, and the number of wounded I don't know.

And if I want to take command in Mostar I must get to Mostar and do it by day. I've passed along this road 13 times, seven times to go in, and six to go out, the seventh exit was by another road after we liberated the right side of the town of Mostar.

And every time they were aiming at me, every time they fired the mortars, or from the tanks, on this last entry, I had a ball in my stomach, because I knew the time of statistical probability is getting near – IT'S TIME TO HIT ME.

SINCE I'VE SURVIVED, I BECAME A COMMANDER.


And when on the second night while liberating the eastern part of Mostar I demanded, ordered the protection of the Old Bridge from further destruction of Serbian artillery with steel construction and thick wooden planks, guys from the HVO fulfilled the order although it was very dangerous - battles were fought at 150 meters, and Serbs artillery has grenades as desired.

This army didn't do it because a “general” had ordered it.

This is not so, and while the war is on, they cannot become an army as imagined by those to whom “*the unbearable lightness of concluding*” is a daily amusement.

ENCLOSURES 1-2: Map and picture of the curve.

Read the statement of MIRKO MIKULIĆ on enclosed DVD.



- JNA positions
- The only possible road to enter Mostar is the one below the blue line
- The curve where 6 people were killed by JNA artillery

1.

2.



“The Road of Salvation” - a stretch of the Mostar-Goranci road, the only way out of Mostar during the war destructions

14. One other thing seems to me worth mentioning in this kind of war and self-organized army which resists an aggression and that is the issue of the “metaphysics of death”.

What are these people fighting for, what is the possible meaning of their death? The home in which they were born, neighbourhood, town, parents, tombs of their ancestors which someone is trying to appropriate, the emblem, the flag, justice, state which can be perceived as homeland (Bosnia and Herzegovina), the idea of freedom, civil and human rights, national rights.... What is it in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Croats that is worth risking “existential annihilation” of a fighter, a soldier.

And what is the “metaphysics of death” among the Serbs, among the Muslims when they fight against the Serbs, and what when they attack the Croats?

To what extent the justice (injustice) of political goal, along with other factors, affects on fighters morality?!

The answers to these questions and changeability and lack of definition of the political and military situation, the breakdown of international negotiations, breaching of all the agreements and signed ceasefires, will give you the answer to the question how much and how an army could be structured, specifically the HVO, along with battles which are on without cessation.

15. The centralized communist political system didn't allow any fruitful inter-municipality dialogue and cooperation; for wisdom and the decisions one went to Mostar, Mostar to Sarajevo, Sarajevo to Belgrade. The consequence of these acquired habits is a military and political isolation of the municipalities within their borders. They didn't know how to work in any other way.

Example one:

On the border of the Čitluk municipality, towards the border of the Ljubuški municipality (in BiH - Herzegovina), a large group of men is digging the trenches, all at a distance of 10 km from JNA and VRS /Army of Republic of Srpska/.

A little further on, people are doing the same from the Ljubuški side.

It is easy to chase away the people, but to change the perception of reason and meaning which led to such an absurdity, one cannot change throughout the duration of the war.

Example two:

Telephone lines in BiH, in Mostar and Mostar vicinity are cut (later one, some of them will be mended), and from Čitluk to Široki Brijeg there is more than an hour's drive. The field telephone line isn't working and I send a soldier to follow the cable and see where it is broken and to connect the wires.

When he came back, and the telephone still isn't working, his answer was:

"The wire is not broken in our municipality."

To those to whom such things are trifles, unimportant trifles, I say that they are unable to perceive the social reality and cannot recognize the signs which point to a general state of mind, society and the times.

16. I was commander for a short time, and as soon as the lines were a bit stabilized and as soon as I found a replacement, I returned to my job in Zagreb.

My wife and I accommodated refugees from Sarajevo, the wife of my long-time friend, poet and screenwriter, his daughter who works in the embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb, and a daughter which the lady has from her first marriage. They are all Muslims.

The girl has a brain tumour, and the Croatian state, the Croatian society, with a little influence from my wife and me, treats this condition free of charge, i.e. they pay nothing, but the treatment as such is not "free of charge". Such stupidities as "free" medical care, "free" education,... you can read only in post-communist countries.

The girl recovered completely.

In the small country house which I have in Pisak near Makarska, I gave shelter to thirteen refugees from Mostar - they were all Muslims.

In autumn of 1992, I purchased in Livno 1,5 tonnes of coal for Pisak, because the refugees are living there and one has to have in mind that the winters in Dalmatia are anything but warm.

Before the winter in 1993 I couldn't get the coal, so I sent my cousin, who is an electrician and knows how to do these things, to fix the electricity counter so that people use the electric stove, but the counter doesn't record the electricity used.

Briefly speaking, I was stealing electricity from my own state, but thirteen people is a lot, and there are children among them.

You can read the testimonies if you like.

17. A few more family stories.

My sister, professor at the Faculty of Economy in Sarajevo, took refuge in Zagreb with two small children, and her husband, with an MIT doctorate, also a university professor in Sarajevo and head of the *Energoinvest*

Institute for I don't know what, digs the trenches in Sarajevo, according to orders of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Everyone must participate in the defence, in one way or another, but if someone could name to me a single Muslim – Bosniak even close to his rank who was digging the trenches around Sarajevo, I'd be very thankful.

In the summer of 1992 my father had a stroke. He was immobile, doesn't speak, 200 cm tall, weighs 125 kg and is not for hospital. He would die in September of 1993.

There were NO regrets, NO condolences, nothing, these information are only a small contribution to innumerable information which comprise a true picture of the "state of affairs".

You remember: „... *abundance contributes to the clarity...*“.

18. Faced with aggression, unprepared for the "*terrible face of war*" Alija Izetbegović recognized as legal defence forces of BiH not only the A BiH, but the HVO and all other armed groups, including HOS /Croatian Liberation Forces/.

The political mentors of these forces toyed with the idea of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), and had a parole "*CROATIA ALL THE WAY TO DRINA RIVER*", which means that Bosnia and Herzegovina is Croatian territory.

How to comprehend the support they had from Alija Izetbegović?

No way, panic, being lost in the problems of war and possible total defeat??!

These HOS forces were not so small in number, they were armed, had their headquarters, their commander, there were many exemplary young men there, and the ratio of the nationalities in the HOS in Herzegovina was: 70% Muslims, 30% Croats.

It took a long time and huge effort for this group to disband.

In one conflict, unresolved to this very day, their commander was killed.

Smaller HOS groups remained until the end of the war, and many had good and honourable fighters.

When I briefly came to Herzegovina – Čapljina in the summer of 1992, I learned from the Military Police commander in Čapljina, that HOS is keeping in Dretelj imprisoned Serbs and no one knows what exactly those people are doing there, and the whole thing has a foul smell.

But apart from the wish to change things, one ought to have power to change them, and risk an armed conflict within the defence forces at the time when you are barely keeping the territory is not so easy and simple.

Another question is would those to whom I would give this command listen to me.

I ordered the commander of the Military Police Žarko Pavlović (without any formal right to order anything) to find the buses, take them to the lager in Dretelj, turn two anti-aircraft guns toward the building and tell them they have 10 minutes time to release the prisoners or I will order the killing of everything that is moving there.

Frightened, they let the Serbs go, we took them into the HVO barracks, the former JNA barracks in Grabovina, and as far as I know, and I kept trace, all of them survived.

Would I have remained true to my threat?

I would give an order to shoot, but not at people, but the whole thing is a question not of a military, but theatrical skill.

Please read the testimony of Žarko Pavlović. (DVD)

There remains one other problem to be clarified, and this is the question how to behave when organizational structures of a society, army, government, military and civilian police are not nearly on the level which would guarantee the solution of every problem which either is a crime, or can become a crime.

If you act only within the existing organization you will not prevent possible evil, but if you act "*ACROSS THE LINES OF AUTHORITY*", you weaken the level of organization, and take decisions by yourself, and your personal judgement.

What if others start doing the same?

What is the measure of things? What to trust?

In a later analysis of my actions I think that, apart from the rational mind, I took the decisions instinctively, as some kind of “emotional intelligence”, the instinct of morally responsible behaviour.

I do not regret a single decision I’ve made.

19. Following the clash of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in PROZOR – RAMA on October 23rd, 1992 I was summoned to the President of Croatia Dr. Franjo Tuđman.

President Tuđman and President of the Presidency of BiH Alija Izetbegović, who was at that meeting, asked me, requested that I go down there and try to calm down the conflict.

The Constitution of Croatia did not allow for such an order, so that my consent is at the same time my attitude.

I stayed in Bosnia and Herzegovina until after Christmas of 1992, two months in all, and I cannot remember if I ever went to Zagreb during that period, even for a short while.

The documents which I present to a good and knowledgeable reader will tell everything by themselves, about what we call “social and war-time circumstances”, so I will only briefly comment on what the enclosed documents say.

D-1

The advocates of the theses of a civil war, in Croatia as well as in BiH, are not right, because this was not a conflict of citizens of the same nationality, but a conflict of peoples (and their armies), in Croatia Croats against the Serbs, and in BiH Muslims and Croats against the Serbs, and later on, the Muslims against Croats.

Apart from the change of the social system, in essence it was a war for territories.

Croats in Croatia, Croats and Muslims in BiH, wanted to preserve their territory.

And later on the Muslims, powerless against the Serbian forces, wanted to expand their territory by attacking the Croats (HVO).

When we have a conflict of armies, it then means, entirely, a conflict of nations, on the territory where the conflict took place.

- It says that when Praljak came many things have changed
- It says I set free all the prisoners irrespective of the criminal charges filed
- It says I held a meeting with all the representatives of the village (150 people), making peace between the people, before making peace between the armies
- It says that Željko Zadrić was wounded by Ivan Iličić on December 3rd, 1992, but it doesn’t say that both were Croats
- It says that “on December 8th Ivan Baketarić puts a gun on the temple of the president of HVO (civilian government), and then repeats the gun on the commander of the HVO brigade Ilija Franjić”.

It doesn’t say that all three are Croats.

It doesn’t say in this document, but it says in others how many of these threats, killings, burning houses was among the Croats themselves.

Therefore for the understanding of this violent and completely chaotic situation one should read the statement of the president of HVO (civilian government) in Prozor – Rama, Mr. Mijo Jozić. (DVD)

In that statement he says that after one such threat of death he asked my help, and when I sent Ilija Franjić into his office, Franjić returned with a gun pointed into his back.

The man who threatens that he will fire, that he will kill if we don’t give him the money for the house which someone set on fire is drunk, beyond control, and the phrase that your life hangs on a thread is literally true.

With a warm baritone, soothing lying words that we will somehow resolve the situation, I managed to get close to him and overpower him.

Therefore to all those who project their own ignorant and arrogant contents into the notions of “*army*”, “*commanding*”, “*commander*”, “*general*” I only say – you haven’t got the slightest idea what you are talking about.

20. DOCUMENT D-2

Protected witness “BM” was the commander of Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Prozor – Rama.

The document is a transcript of my examination of protected witness “BM” at the Tribunal in The Hague.

- Witness says that the aim of my actions was to put an end to conflict, calm down the situation;
- I separated the armies;
- Witness speaks of no small groups on both sides (HOS, Juka Prazina,...) who are beyond any, even minimal control;
- Witness speaks how I was running after one of the “idiots” with a gun in my hand, how I took away a stolen car (*MERCEDES*) from armed thieves, and how they were intent to prevent it;

He could have said that they were armed and that they repeated their weapons, because that’s how it was.

Witness says that after my first stay, at the end of 1992, on this entire territory - Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor – Rama, Uskoplje – Gornji Vakuf, Travnik, Novi Travnik, Bugojno, Mostar:

“The situation could be described, conditionally speaking, as tolerable.”

I claim that in that period I held more than fifty meetings with both sides – the HVO and Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with Croats and Muslims both together and separately and I managed to calm high tensions on not so small territory.

21. DOCUMENT D-3

Ivan Vidović in his testimony (of which I extracted only a part) speaks what these meetings looked like.

- Vidović says that I should ask them to help me because no one, but literally no one can solve this by himself, if these locals, this people doesn’t want peace;
- Vidović says that those who would like a fight, the aggressive ones, I invited into my headquarters, and that I should wait for them, so let them fight against me.

I should mention that those who think that the events take place according to lofty roles which they allocated to themselves, will never realize their delusion.

The roles must adapt to reality, whatever this reality may be, if you want to achieve at least some result.

Should the professor of philosophy Slobodan Praljak maybe explain Kant’s second categorical imperative on these meetings and other described events?!

22. DOCUMENT D-4

This document should be read carefully.

It is addressed to the chief of headquarters of A BiH Sefer Halilović and reveals a number of interesting attitudes.

23. DOCUMENT D-5

With the help of some officers A BiH, and I will quite only one name – Jasmin Jaganjac, military advisor to Alija Izetbegović, formerly brigade commander in HV /Croatian Army/ and the commander of HVO forces in Mostar – I managed to move from the dead point the basic problem that two armies fighting on the same side can have, which is – a joint operational headquarters.

D-5 has the stamp of HVO and A BiH.

Note:

In these efforts we didn’t have significant success. At the end I will write why it was unsuccessful, who obstructed and why.

Documents published in my previous books give a good answer.

The document is clear, I will only comment point V.

During the fights around the JNA barracks in Grabovina – Čapljina, I got information that there is a threat that the Serbs who lived in a hamlet of this village might be killed.

I set aside the HVO fighters from this village, and I knew them, and ordered them to keep guard night and day and keep an eye on these people.

This could function in western Herzegovina where there are only a small number of Serbs, but it is an illusion and beyond reason to expect that in such a way one could protect the Muslims, or Croats in Central Bosnia, where the population is scattered in villages and hamlets in a mixed fashion, and every municipality has about 40-50-60 of them strewn on the hills.

How to protect these people, how to prevent either individuals or small groups from committing a crime.

However much I explained the necessity of forming village guards, I didn't succeed.

It is easier to accuse the commander or commanders in retrospect that they didn't keep control over their units.

It would be funny, if it weren't tragic.

READ THE STATEMENT OF BOGOLJUB ZUROVAC. (DVD)

24. DOCUMENT D-6

After the VRS /Army of the Republic of Srpska/ took Jajce, the line Jajce-Travnik-Busovača-Sarajevo remained practically undefended.

Under these conditions Bosnia and Herzegovina would be cut into two parts, while Zenica and Tuzla and other areas east from this corridor would remain surrounded by VRS.

In Travnik there are fighters of both the HVO and A BiH who want to fight and even more who want to retreat.

The town is under heavy artillery fire and a place of dangerous living.

The cooperation of headquarters of HVO and A BiH is almost nil.

The state of the spirit of the town – fear, apathy, despair.

In one theatre piece by Witold Gombrowicz, some man – a king yells: “*I am the king, I am the king*”, and after him others start to yell: “*He is the king, he is the king*” and so he becomes king more and more, until the voices start to appear saying: “*He's not a king, he's not a king!*”

A beautiful theatre piece.

Likewise in Travnik, on my own accord and on nobody's orders, I start to yell, only in my head to be quite honest: “*I am the king, I am the king*” and proceed to do things which are permitted to a king and which verify a king.

Namely, the defence of the town in such a state of spirit is not nearly a military question, i.e. the mere military knowledge does not help.

We should choose new defence positions and make fortifications.

On this task I am engaged together with Tihomir Blaškić, the commander of this operative zone, but that's the easier part of the work.

People refuse to give to Blaškić the necessary construction material for fortification, and ask the receipt for the taken goods, which he, an orderly officer doesn't have.

I roar, I swear, what receipts, what stupidities, let him write the receipt on any kind of paper, let him yell, let him shoot, take, but he must make the defence.

And there is a little time, too little, little too little, the theoreticians of chaos would say that only the beat of a butterfly's wing is sufficient for the entire structure to collapse, all the variables are on the brink of breakdown.

A group of soldiers of HVO left the position and is returning home. I stop them and ask are there officers among them, and when three or four came forward, I threaten with the military prison (which I don't have) and point to some door behind me.

They accept, and the remainder of this group show solidarity with their commanders and say they accept to go to prison, too. "Inspired" I tell them they can go to prison, but not in the uniform they are carrying and with the seal on the cap and would they please undress, and as such, semi naked, they can go to prison. I yell, I repeat my weapon, I threaten.

At the middle of taking down the uniforms, ashamed, they change the tune, I also change the tune and we end up on the position which they had deserted.

They stayed there.

There is one physical phenomenon in techniques, in transistor techniques and it is called "*the tunnelling*". If even one civilian leaves Travnik, he will destroy the potential barrier and the number of his followers will grow by progression, like the breakdown of uranium atoms in the explosion of the atomic bomb.

Therefore, I ordered the closure of two main and only exits from the town, you can leave only with a certificate which I sign, a forced attempt to get close to the check point will be prevented by shooting above the heads.

If civilians start to leave town, the army will follow them because they have no one to defend, and vice versa. The first who returned, after exit was denied him (namely, there are always lads who will do their duty in a brave and fair manner, as they were ordered) was the deputy president of the Municipal Council or something like that, the man No. 2 of the civilian government in Travnik, A Croat nicknamed "*Klemo*".

He came with his entourage, angry, insulted, he protests loudly, he questions who am I (the author of this book) to issue certificates, and who will forbid him anything, and what do I think... I ask him where was he heading to, and all his entourage. The exchange happens on a "stage" before a certain building and there are onlookers.

He responded that he was going to Split, and on my insistence what was he going to do in Split, and what kind of business does he have in Split, he says he goes to organize the defence of Travnik, which is when I hit him in the ass with my foot as hard as I could.

The rest is irrelevant, the "king" shows his royal face, and there are more and more voices shouting: "*He is the king, he is the king*".

Tunnelling was stopped.

In order to boost weak positions, I tell Blaškić to lift 100 workers in Novi Travnik in the "*Bratstvo*" factory (MILITARY PRODUCTION) and have them produce, however they can, 100 pieces of MRUDs (Anti-personnel mine), and not to stop working until they produce 1000 pieces. And let the director of the factory be with them all the time.

These focused fragmentation mines are put in from of defence positions, they are connected by wire to electrical ignition, detonate strongly, and when the VRS comes near and comes upon 100 strong explosions, we got a break, in my judgement, of at least 36 hours, which is a lot of time.

And we would get a psychological advantage, because they would have been stopped.

When around two o'clock after midnight, date unimportant, I returned from the tour of some positions, I find Tihomir Blaškić speaking and speaking and speaking to someone on the telephone.

On my asking, he says he is talking to the director of the "*Bratstvo*" factory and that the director doesn't want to go to the factory.

I politely introduced myself to the director and asked him did Blaškić tell him what he was supposed to do, and Mr. Director, the communist BIG BOSS of an important military facility, asks me: "Do you know what time it is?", i.e. do I know in the first person singular, what time it is, because he – the director – at that time sleeps.

The meaning of swear words is actually annihilation of the person at whom the swear word is directed, and I am doing precisely that, I swear as badly as I can, and I know well my native tongue, I swear on a language which has various horrible and ugly swear words and these swear words cannot be translated into the language into which this book will be translated, and besides, there are many peoples who cannot understand what it's all about.

Therefore, I will skip the swearing.

I tell the director on the phone that some guys will now come for him, take him to the factory, tie him up to the radiator and I will have a firing squad execute him tomorrow morning at seven.

I didn't shoot him, MRUDs were made, Travnik was defended.

With this director I shared a coffee two years later in Zagreb and helped him solve some personal problems.

READ THE STATEMENT OF TIHOMIR BLAŠKIĆ. (DVD)

25. Conclusions

Without formal appointment at any command position in Travnik I issued various orders, which is an unlawful act. I illegally hit the man with my foot into the ass, I had no legal grounds to ban the exit of civilians from Travnik, in a most uncivilized, barbarian way I swore at the director of "Bratstvo" in Travnik, I took him from his apartment, threatened to tie him to the radiator, and threatened to shoot him, in brief I contravened a whole range of positive legal norms, undressing the soldiers until they were practically nude also does not come under the authority of a commander, the issuing of false receipts which Tihomir Blaškić was doing on my orders represents an illegal appropriation of personal property, etc, etc. I am fully conscious of my every unlawful act at that time, in that war, in those conditions, and I am prepared to take responsibility, but not more than that and not in a way of "punishment of the scapegoat" and not for fantasies and mental constructions devoid of any logic.

That is out of the question.

26. DOCUMENTS D-7, D-8

A colonel of HV /Croatian Army/ Miro Andrić came on his own accord at the beginning of the summer 1992 to Mostar, joined the HVO and commanded the operation of crossing the Neretva River and liberation of Bijelo Polje – north from Mostar.

On my request, he was transferred to Bugojno in order for him to help me in the work I described on the previous pages.

At that time he became deputy to the chief of headquarters of HVO, general Milivoj Petković.

His reports are clear.

Obstructions to my and our joint efforts were great. Sefer Halilović, the man No. 1 of A BiH, Enver Hadžihanović, the commander of the 3rd Corps of A BiH in Zenica, Refik Lendo, the commander of A BiH in Novi Travnik, Fahrudin Agić, the commander of A BiH in Uskoplje – Gornji Vakuf, followed other and different political and thereby, military instructions, and all of this led to a further deepening of the rift between the "allies" in BiH – Croats and Muslims and ultimately lead to the preparation and later attack of A BiH on the HVO and the Croats.

On all of this and on relations and behaviour of the sides HVO - A BiH, I said everything in the previous three books, and what has been said has been said by documents.

27. After the situation in Travnik militarily stabilized, I asked A BiH to execute a joint offensive operation with HVO on the Komar hill in order to improve the tactical situation of Travnik and Novi Travnik, in order to show the VRS power and for HVO and A BiH to show unity. The officers of A BiH agreed, and then, on that day in the morning, their units didn't budge an inch, nor fire a single bullet.

Refik Lendo and company had other and different intentions, they double-crossed me as the last fool.

28. At the end of September 1992 I briefly stayed in the area of Bosanski Brod.

When around 2 a.m. I went to make a tour of the positions, I came across a unit of 60 – 70 soldiers of the HVO orderly marching in the direction contrary to the defence positions.

Upon my inquiry where they were going, they said that retreat was ordered, and when I asked who ordered the retreat, they answered: “*general Praljak*”. When I said that I am “*general Praljak*” they glanced at each other, then continued in the direction in which they were going.

Nothing can be done about it and therefore, to all those who are surprised that the system is not as simple as they imagine:

GENERAL → ORDER → EXECUTION

I RECOMMEND TO READ AT LEAST SOMETHING OF THE WAR LITERATURE.

29. **DOCUMENTS D-9, D-10, D-11, D-12**

Dear reader, if all of this what I am writing about and what the documents say is beyond the boundary of your interest – throw the book away.

For those who want to know what was going on in BiH, what was the political thinking of the Muslims before the attack of the A BiH on the HVO and the Croats, what was the behaviour and the actions of the leadership of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ and want to know which role I had in all of this, please read the documents. And I really sweat my blood to avoid the conflict.

Note:

Jasmin Jaganjac was an advisor to Alija Izetbegović for military matters and was one of the rare Muslims who sincerely advocated everything that might prevent the worsening of the situation.

30. And at the end of this chapter, a short story on PREDICTABILITY.

For a better understanding please read three pages of statements by Ivica Tomić, brigade commander in the HVO. These soldiers make war according to this system: 15 days of war, 15 days at home to do the daily chores.

It is absurd, illogical, it destroys these people, but that's how it is.

They don't have the military barracks to come back to, no psychologist to talk to, they take their weapons home with them, most of them paid for these weapons with their own money, they get no financial remuneration, or get up to 100 DM per month, they don't know who will care about their families if they get killed, and whenever they like they can cross into Croatia over a hundred possible crossings and no one can bring them back, they can even go to Germany, because the majority of them have someone who works there, and no one was ever punished for desertion,...

I accidentally found out in which state they were, the allies of yesterday killed their beloved commander, and non-linear systems can have drastic effects due to small changes of magnitude at the point of entry and every death in war, for some reason, doesn't have the same effect, and accidentally I was on that place and I TOOK THEM TO MASS.

No one knows what would have happened if I hadn't taken them to church and if something nasty would have happened who would be the perpetrator and whether he would ever be identified.

But there are hundreds of such units and such returns and what can you do, and what is possible to do to avoid being told that you are guilty?

D-13 - STATEMENT OF IVICA TOMIĆ

D-14 - STATEMENT OF JAKOV BIENENFELD

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
 Security and information sector
 Number: 02-73/92
 Prozor: 8 December 1992

R E P O R T

In the last few days, after General Praljak's arrival, many things in Prozor change. General Praljak arrives in Prozor on 30 December 1992. Immediately after his arrival, he order the release of the group of prisoners, Salih Ruvić, commander of the BH Army, being one of them, under whose authority the first combat line of the OS BH (Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina) troops was left during conflicts in Prozor, and against who the criminal proceeding has been already initiated.

On 1 December 1992 at noon, the meeting of the second operation zone was held, and immediately after that, the meeting with extremists that set the background for this conflict in Prozor, being present in other municipalities, was scheduled; however, the meeting does not take place, since the commander Salih Ruvić, released by the General, was beaten on the same evening by the town-inhabitants of the village Uzdol; the general, revolted by this act, interrupted the meeting and scheduled a new one, with the eminent representatives of the Croatian people on 2 December 1992 at 1200 hours.

The meeting took place in Motel, 150 people being present, lasted rather shortly, whereby the general introduced the real situation within these areas as well as the interests of the Croatian people to the present ones.

The special accent was set on improvement of relations between Croats and Muslims, as well as on the return of the Muslim people on the municipal territory.

By the last group of Muslims a part of the material has been found, pointing at reorganization of those Muslims that did not return to their homes, and to the attempt they could do something to renew the conflict, which is hardly possible, and there is a doubt to do so. A part of the material, testifying about activities of certain individuals at the time of conflict has been found as well; therefore we deliver it to you.

The situation and relations among one part of the Croatian population are getting worse, which is especially apparent after the fail of sabotage, when the houses of couple of Croatian deserters were blown up, while the information on committers are still missing.

If the situation continues to develop this way, some undesirable circumstances could occur. Such was the case of Ilija Baketarić; He is from Rumboci. His house got demolished and he spent a certain time in troops. He went to Germany afterwards, where he still is.

On 3 December 1992 Željko Zadrić gets wounded on the street by Ivan Iličić, familiar for similar cases from before, because the same person acted the same way with group of outlaws for several times, whereby no measures took place.

On 8 December 1992 Ivan Baketarić puts a gun against the HVO President Miško Jozić's temple; the same person pulls a trigger towards the brigade commander Ilija Franjić.

On the same day, one part of the management resigns because of the individuals' behaviour under excuse not being able to execute their duty; therefore we deliver you one of those resignations.

Having in mind that nothing has been done so far in order to solve these problems that are going on and on, becoming more significant, we are afraid of a total HVO troops chaos in these areas, therefore we ask you to take certain measures, as much as you are able to in order to settle down the temporary tensions within the Prozor municipality territory.

Report has been done in two copies.

Made by:

L.M./F.K.

PROSECUTION WITNESS BM-CROSS EXAMINATION BY GENERAL SLOBODAN PRALJAK
 PRLIĆ ET AL, 21 SEPTEMBER 2006 - excerpt from the trial transcript

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, what is this document?

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] It's a telefax. It's a fax. It's from the ABiH. And on the 25th of October, 1992, it was sent from Mostar to Igman. It's the Tactical Group 1, Konjic. We've mentioned this. And the deputy commander of the 4th Corps, Mr. Budakovic, sent it. His nickname is Tetak, and the text reads as follows -- can I read it or should the witness do so? He can control it. A message from Mostar from Tetak the Mostar Brigade. General Praljak has informed us that ABiH forces and HVO forces in the territories of the municipality of Jablanica and Konjic should move away from each other to avoid a conflict. It was conveyed to Dr. Rusmir and the staff in Konjic and Jablanica were informed of this fax.

Q. Do you know who Dr. Rusmir was?

A. Yes, I do. He was the chief of the Konjic municipality. Dr. Ruzmir.

Q. Hadzihuseinovic --

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could the booth please interpret, because I'm not receiving any interpretation.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Dr. Ruzmir Hadzihuseinovic?

A. Yes. He was the chief of the Konjic municipality, the head of the Konjic municipality.

Q. Thank you. Does this date, two days after the conflict in Prozor, and could we agree that I had already had meetings in Mostar and that I had requested that the units in Konjic and Jablanica move away from each other so that the conflict in Prozor wouldn't spread beyond those boundaries? That's what this text here says. Do you agree with me?

A. That's what it says here.

Q. Thank you very much. I'd just like to establish the date of my arrival in Rama.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me. Just to make one thing clear, you, Mr. Witness, have answered, "That's what it says here." Does this mean that you learn about this by reading this document, or did you know so at the time in 1992?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as the contents of this document are concerned, well, I wasn't familiar with them, but I do know that there was contact at the level of the armija and the HVO so that this could be done, and so that what Mr. Praljak said could be treated as the objective or, rather, the objective was what Mr. Praljak said. They didn't want the conflict to spread beyond those boundaries.

Q. Thank you. Can we now see 3D00418. Could we please have 3D00418. There it is. Please enlarge this. Could we enlarge it, the first part of it. There it is. We also have the English translation, of course, for the Judges. Do you want me to read it out or should you read it out?

A. I will.

Q. Aloud or --

A. "There is a great deal of chaos and tension from Igman-Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Bugojno, Novi Travnik and we can see a marked change in the conduct of the HVO on the whole territory but also very murky activity amongst the ranks of the independent platoon or -- no, independent leaders as well as voids --"

Q. It says "like Juka Prazina" if I can say what it says there.

A. All right. "Juka Prazina MUP and everywhere -- and everywhere, in all places there are one to two independent commanders from the ranks of the army, which intensifies -- is intensifying its destructive activity."

THE INTERPRETER: Could the English be placed on the screens, please. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. My question to you is as follows: First of all, that there is tension. We've read that out. Then that Juka Prazina is causing problems and he has a brigade, almost an entire brigade in the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

A. Well, Juka Prazina, for a time, was a very positive individual, but afterwards he became more of a renegade and he did and acted according to other people's instructions.

Q. Thank you. Now, I have a few more points to look at here. May I look at paragraph 8 on the next page, please. Yes, thank you. May we zoom in on point 8. Here it is. I'm going to read it slowly. "On several occasions the general stress that the HVO, and he respected only Izetbegovic and the Supreme Command - he doesn't know the Supreme Command of the armed forces of BiH and expects to see Sefer Halilovic tomorrow or the following day at the meeting in Jablanica. He also emphasized that the BH army command - that he would ask of the BH army command that they exclude certain members of the military command and that energetic measures be taken to do so, and it was evident that he was alluding to Sefer and of the lower command especially Zejnil." And in brackets it says, "Which would be a good service as far as I'm concerned says the signatory of this text. He agrees that we should solve the problem of joint commands and the schedules for them including the forward command post." Now, from this text can we see that we invested a great deal of effort to come into contact one way or another with Sefer Halilovic and that I claim that Zejnil, who was later arrested and escaped to Germany, wasn't working probably, wasn't doing good work in bringing Muslims and Croats closer together? Would that be correct?

A. Well, I could accept some of those assertions. However, I don't have reliable information to the effect that Zejnil Delalic was an impediment to cooperation but I can't say that there were not obstacles on both sides and lack of trust on both sides.

Q. Thank you. Now, Their Honours will be able to read the text for themselves, so I'd just like to read out point 11. It says: "In Jablanica where general -- where they referred to us, General Praljak said that there should be a meeting with refugees from Prozor at 2100 hours. He was calm and able to give guarantees that the relations in Prozor would be set right quickly." And then point 10: "In Gornji Vakuf the two previous commissions continued their way to Bugojno and we, Amidza and I, started out for Prozor, and a fighter who had been detained was release from Gornji Vakuf according to promises made in Vakuf." Now, do you know how many meetings I had at that time in that area in Vakuf, Jablanica, Konjic, Prozor with all parties concerned?

A. I can't tell you the number of meetings. I don't know, but I do know that you were active during that period of time.

Q. Thank you. I'd like us to see another text on the ELMO.

MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise for having to intervene, but I think there was a mistake in the translation on page 12, line 5. The witness's answer was that there was interference and lack of trust on both sides, and I think that "interference" -- the word "interference" was left out.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request that if an English text exists, could it be placed on the ELMO so that we could read the text that already exists. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Could we have 3D00291, please. May we zoom in on the text, please. We saw in the previous document -- that the previous document claimed that the situation in the area changed. It was improving quite obviously with respect to relations between the army, et cetera. Now, can we read the report? It is probably compiled by the information service which says: "In the last few days, after General Praljak's arrival, many things in Prozor changed. General Praljak, on the 30th of December, 1999, arrives in Prozor and, immediately after his arrival, he orders the release of a group of prisoners, including Salih," and then the name. Et cetera. Now, since in your statement you speak about this extensively, what the situation was like, I'm going to ask you just two things. Do you remember that when you were in Prozor you were returned, and when they beat you up on the road towards Here and when you were insulted by a young man from HOS, do you happen to remember that

I ran after that idiot with a gun in my hands and I was almost ready to shoot at him? Do you remember that?

A. Sir, I remember that, but he wasn't a member of HOS. He was a member of the HVO, and I know his surname as well. I know who it was.

Q. Thank you. Unfortunately, I was not informed.

A. Well, I know his name.

Q. Thank you. Now, do you know --

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please. You said that you knew the idiot's name. Can you give us his name?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Nikola Maric, nicknamed Nidja. He was a pupil of mine.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. You know that after that conflict they collected up all the Muslims' cars and took them -- drove them off. Now, do you know that as far as a green Mercedes was concerned that belonged to a prominent Bosniak Muslim from Prozor, a prominent citizen, I seized it and returned the car to the gentleman, and that this almost caused shooting between myself and those people who against this, what I did. Do you know that happened?

A. I know whose car it was, too.

Q. Well, you say if you like.

A. Well, if you want me to say, I'll say. The car belonged to Emir Delilovic. It was a Mercedes. His Mercedes was seized and a member of the HVO stormed the garage to do so. Do you know that there was -- I don't know about that but I don't doubt it. I'm sure that he was ready to do what he wanted. He wanted to prevent you from returning the car because it was big booty for him.

Q. Thank you very much. Could we now answer the following: Do you know from the 29th or 30th of October, over the following two months, I was staying in the areas of Jablanica, Konjic, Prozor, Novi Travnik, Travnik, and Busovaca, and what my role was there until Christmas 1992? Did you have any information about this?

A. I had partial information. And we met once. If I'm correct about the date, it was on the 17th of November, in the museum in Jablanica. We spoke at length then --

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Can you characterize my activity, the energy I invested as something that contributed or substantially contributed to resolving the misunderstandings and conflicts with the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 23rd of October until the end of the year?

A. Your public statements, the ones I know about, would lead to such a conclusion, yes.

Q. After the 23rd, when the conflict in Rama erupted, until the end of 1992, were there any conflicts in Jablanica, Konjic, Prozor, Vakuf, Travnik, Novi Travnik or was the situation relatively good and peaceful?

A. Well, the situation might be described, conditionally speaking, as tolerable.

Q. Thank you very much. If, then, I acted in that manner and these men here who are accused were--or, rather, interpreter's correction. Had these accused here been opposed to this activity of mine, would they not have sent someone there to arrest me or obstruct me or ask for my authorization and stop me from doing all this? Wouldn't that have been normal if they had disagreed with my activities?

A. I personally am convinced that the gentlemen you mentioned knew about your activities. That's my opinion, because if it had not been the case, you would have been removed just as some other people had been removed.

Q. Thank you very much.

IVAN VIDOVIĆ

Rama, September 2005

The interview was recorded, the recording is registered as follows

vidovic

7.21 MB

duration 22:34

The interview was conducted in Prozor, Rama

Have you met General Praljak during that period?

Well, yes, at the time he was, between that...

Between what?

Between the first attack and the second.

The Muslim attack or... ?

The Muslim attack. They said: "Praljak called for at least two serious men from each village. There will be a conference, a meeting in the motel in Prozor." So they sent me. It was 9 of us.

You went from Jurići?

Yes.

From what other village people arrived?

Well, it was at least a hundred people there.

Only Croats, or were there Muslims as well?

Well now, I don't think that there were a lot of Muslims, there was a conflict with Muslims before that and that was mostly the reason he called for people.

So, he called for you because of conflicts with Muslims? Village aldermen?

Yes. That were some young men from our side and theirs, I guess, in a coffee bar, but he was scolding our men. He was yelling: "Don't do that! You should be calming things down, so we'll tell these people, those that are a bit more serious, we will tell them that there is no need for that. Don't do such stupid things! And if you agree, if someone thinks he is that mighty, after this meeting I will be on the command spot for about one hour. Those who want to fight, come up there! Don't do such stupid things! We can do it peacefully! And the rest of you, it makes no difference whether you have a rank or not, you can tell your men that it can be done peacefully!" And so we stayed here and went home.

So, did you try to pacify the situation after that?

Well yes, we did. We would work on agreements as much as we could. They would come from up there, from Here, there is a water spring about one hundred, hundred and fifty meters from our house, so they would come from up there, and we would come from down here. And we would negotiate, and they would also come here to negotiate, they would come from Prijedor to negotiate. And when UNPROFOR was present, they would say that things can be done peacefully. And Praljak was really, truly for peace. I have heard of him before and then I had a contact with him.

You had a direct contact with him?

Yes, that is correct.

You met him in person?

He was sitting here, about three or four meters away, at a different table. He was suggesting people to pacify the situation.

Did people listen to Praljak, did they trust him?

Well, yes, they did. Older people, there were all kinds of people, people of all ages. But older people are more serious, you see, and he called for them. Everyone came, it was like at a mass. Those who believe and those who don't, my God. But he said: "Look, people, I cannot do it myself! We can avoid bigger conflicts!" He was telling people to calm down, to pacify the situation.

Were there younger people as well?

Yes, yes.

And when you mentioned him saying: "...I will be up there for one hour...", who was he referring to, young people or... no one in particular?

He was... who was that mighty, young or old, at that time you could not even argue with him, he was tall, bearded, with his big nose and that little sabre...

Was that after the first conflict?

After the first conflict.

That means, October of 1992.

He was calling for people, that happened in Prozor, and calming things down, he was calling for people from all sides, to instruct their armies what should be done. That there is no need for the war to continue, no need to make things worse. That is what he said and all serious people considered him, I think, to be an intelligent and refined man.

/handwritten: We received confirmation of receipt by the QTC /expansion
unknown/ at 0515 hrs/

Konjic TG /Tactical Group/

Date: 4 November 1992

GŠ VK OS RBH

/Main Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republic of BH/

To: Sefer

Interim Report

1. The situation is nightmarish and there is great tension in the area including Mt. Igman - Konjic - Jablanica - Prozor - Gornji Vakuf - Bugojno - Novi Travnik. An abrupt change in the attitude of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ in the whole area has been noticed, as have other very dubious activities among the independent leaders such as Juka PRAZINA, the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ and in each locality one or two independent commanders from the Army ranks, who are intensifying their disruptive activities.

2. We have no information on the appointment of two commissions seven days ago by our representative and Mr. BOBAN, but they are working with a rather biased membership in our view (biased in favour of the HVO): i.e., three SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ members from Mostar and Arif PAŠALIĆ, and their delegation is headed by Mr. Božo RAJIĆ.

3. Among others, Avdo PANJETA is carrying out a mission which amounts to gathering MTS /materiel and equipment/ for the MUP, but we have no information that he is doing anything to strengthen the Army's reserves. In addition, he convinced REKIĆ that he is a MUP member, and on account of this the supplementary actions needed to complete /the formation of/ the *Neretva* Brigade are considerably behind schedule.

But we think that in spite of everything it should be finished by Saturday, 7 November 1992.

4. Today at 1130 hrs. our first meeting with the refugees from Prozor was held in Jablanica. We established that around 80 Muslim houses had been destroyed and burned; in addition to other abundant hardships, a list is being circulated of those who are to be arrested or killed immediately after any possible return to Prozor, i.e. all those soldiers who provided any kind of support, be it armed or logistical, to the BH Army in Prozor. We will have a precise list of the names tomorrow.

5. At 1500 hrs. the Prozor meeting was held, with the following of our people present: V. KARIĆ, A. PAŠALIĆ, accompanied by SDA members Safet ORUČEVIĆ, Čamil SKOKOVIĆ, Zijad DEMIROVIĆ and Z. DELALIĆ.

From the other side: General PRALJAK, Božo RAJIĆ, three unknown members and the local HVO officers. The centre of Prozor is a horrible sight. The unrestrained HVO and HOS /Croatian Defence Forces/ team, which was and is obviously taking care of the dirty work, has been roasting lamb on a spit in the centre of town and kicking a large flag with the lily emblem through the mud. We approached the group at full strength, but not even PRALJAK had the authority to make them listen to him. We heard that they do that to spite the *Balije* /derogatory term for Muslims/, saying that it would be better if they did not return and laughing at and threatening those of us who were wearing BH Army insignia. In this situation and the general atmosphere in Prozor, no one can provide a guarantee for the safe return of the displaced families or the

soldiers that have been expelled. Seven members of the staff are still in detention, but it has been promised that they will be released conditionally tomorrow; General PRALJAK was visibly embarrassed at hearing this. In the Prozor staff headquarters he issued several verbal commands, which he intends to put in writing tomorrow, concerning the introduction of joint checkpoints, the prohibition against carrying rifles, a curfew, a joint command (in this respect no one from Prozor who would be permitted to be assigned there - and who would represent the Muslims, something which PRALJAK has no knowledge of), and further the withdrawal of all artillery, armour and units from elsewhere, abolishing the ultimatum for our soldiers to lay down their weapons, along with the confiscation of weapons from civilians (which is basic), the maintenance of joint positions, and a joint military police, both admittedly from Mostar or Grude; he approves limited village guard duty where the situation is critical and has ordered the filling in of the positions dug by both sides.

6. Božo RAJIĆ urges the filing of joint reports stating that everything is in order as being most important, especially to the English journalists, who have been waiting for that in the local press in Gornji Vakuf /sentence unclear/. I should mention that none of us has given any kind of statement and I do not know what they have reported.

7. General PRALJAK's approach was evident at the very beginning, i.e., the introduction of HVO commands in Herceg-Bosna and central Bosnia, which shall also include Muslims in the command. He has stressed that the basic criterion will be individual ability and not nationality. The structure of the staffs - commands will be proportional to the number of active soldiers, and not to the relative proportion of the Croatian and Muslim populations. The main command of the above-mentioned areas shall exclusively be the command of the main staff, and the BH Army shall have a command in the Zenica and Tuzla region/s/, and in this respect he thinks that they do very little for Sarajevo. He thinks that Sarajevo should be liberated as soon as possible because of the Muslims, then immediately resolve all tensions and before 20 November 1992 begin a joint offensive on Bugojno, Kupres, Donji Vakuf, Nevesinje and the stretch towards Sarajevo. He like the others is upset by our checkpoints around Jablanica, but in his view the main issue is the blocked shipments of the BH Army in Posušje, Grude, etc. In response to Zejnil's protest that Jablanica is no problem at all in comparison to the blockade of the HVO and Croatia, he says angrily that the captured MTS /material and equipment/ will be released tomorrow.

8. On several occasions the General has said that he and the HVO recognise only IZETBEGOVIĆ and know nothing of the VKOSBH, and that he is expecting to see Sefer HALILOVIĆ at the meeting in Jablanica tomorrow or the day after. He also said that he would firmly request the expulsion of certain members of the VK and other commands of the BH Army. In this respect, it was evident that he was alluding to Sefer, and regarding the lower commands Zejnil (which in my opinion would be doing us a favour). He agrees that we should draw up the schemas of the joint commands as soon as possible, including the VK IKM /Forward Command Post/.

9. The Mostar SDA is generally intimidated by him and the HVO /?sentence unclear/ which is understandable to a certain extent. The general impression of him and A. PRKAČIN is that they take a much broader and more democratic view of the joint struggle in BH, and in particular their attitude toward the Chetniks is more combative and has more direction than that of the HVO representatives so far.

10. From Gornji Vakuf the two earlier commissions went on to Bugojno, and we (Amidža and I) went to Prozor for a short time with General PRALJAK, where one captured soldier was released from Gornji Vakuf, as promised in Vakuf.

11. In Jablanica where they General PRALJAK unhesitatingly responded to our request /as written/ at 2100 hrs. to arrange a meeting with the refugees from Prozor. He managed quite efficiently and soothingly to give a guarantee for the quick improvement of relations in Prozor.

12. A series of meetings and activities of the HVO, the Army and the parties in Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor and Gornji Vakuf is planned for tomorrow and the next few days.

13. Advocating such a position of the HVO, as General PRALJAK presents it, are acceptable on condition that they obligate themselves to the following /as written/:

- That it /?the HVO/ participate in the fight against the Chetniks with all resources in the described areas, and also in the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo.
- That in no case should there be any impediment to the passage of our convoys with MTS which in the described area would be considered joint property.
- That the authority (of the region) or the province and the federal government be provisionally established.

14. It has been noticed that everyone is talking without any reservations about an integral BH and that they recognise Mr. IZETBEGOVIĆ as its president.

It is obvious there is a touch of haste and a certain degree of obligingness among them, especially a readiness for a joint command. The competent representatives must promptly weigh up how this is to be maintained economically and politically.

15. In order for brigades up to corps level to be jointly organised at OP /?municipal/ SOS /expansion unknown/ level and in keeping with the instructions given, the following is proposed:

A) That the president appoint work groups which shall form joint commands in the relevant region/province as quickly as possible, with 4 or 5 members who are merely politicians /?should/ appoint local commanders already in place and BH Army chiefs of staff, /as written/. Given the current situation, this would apply to: Mostar, Jablanica, Čapljina, Stolac, Gacko, Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Novi Travnik, Konjic, Fojnica, Kreševo, Kiseljak and Busovača.

B) That after obtaining Mr. BOBAN's proposals, the president by joint appointment assign five HVO members/representatives to the same task.

C) That until this task is brought to a conclusion, the members of the work group should be freed from all other obligations, and that the deadline be set for 5 days from now.

D) That the D-O /expansion unknown/ feature in Konjic be established as one of the command posts of the BH Army VK and the Main Staff of the HVO.

E) That the removal of Sefer HALILOVIĆ from the post of Chief of Staff of the BH Army VK with total veto-power over all kinds of decisions issued by the staff of the HVO (even at the level of Herceg-Bosna), is not to be permitted either by ultimatum or in any other way.

Amidža and Oganj

/hand-written: 6-56/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

MAIN STAFF

Number: 01-2496/92

Mostar, 6 November 1992

TO ALL HVO AND BH ARMY MEMBERS

ORDER

- I. Along road communications:
Konjic - Jablanica, Jablanica - Prozor,
Prozor - Gornji Vakuf, Gornji Vakuf - Bugojno,
Bugojno - Novi Travnik, Novi Travnik - Gornji Vakuf,
and Jablanica - Mostar
you are to establish permanent mixed roadblocks - checkpoints, consisting of members of the HVO Military Police and members of the BH Army.
The composition of the checkpoint patrols shall be based on the principle of ethnic parity. All past checkpoints on the said communication routes are hereby abolished.
- II. The exact location of the checkpoints shall be jointly agreed by HVO and BH Army members within 48 hours, by which deadline the checkpoints must be operational.
Transports of weapons for military units shall be escorted by HVO military police and members of the BH Army.
- IV. Mixed joint patrols shall be set up in every town to control the movement and conduct of members of military units.
- V. In every village establish village guards composed of men who are not members of any military units and issue them the necessary weapons.
- VI. All citizens are obliged to surrender their weapons to the members of the mixed patrols, who will issue them the appropriate documents.
- VII. Any weapons pointed in directions other than the frontline and all other military activities must cease.
- VIII. Joint mixed patrols in Prozor and Novi Travnik must ensure a safe return of the persons who left their homes and guarantee for their personal safety.
- IX. All members of military units are strictly prohibited from carrying other weapons when not on the frontline.
- X. The HVO Military Police Administration and the BH Army Command shall assign 64 /sixty-four/ HVO Military Police members and BH Army soldiers according to ethnic parity to work in Prozor municipality.
- XI. Impose a curfew beginning from 1800 - 0600 hours in Prozor municipality as of 7 November 1992.

The assignments above shall be completed within 48 hours, of which you shall inform me in writing.

MAJOR - GENERAL

Slobodan PRALJAK

/stamp of BH Republic/

/A signature and a stamp of the HZ HB/

Stamp

/CROATIAN STATE ARCHIVE-ZAGREB/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
MAIN STAFF

Ref. No: 01-2505-4/92

Mostar, 10 November 1992

APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY MEMBERS OF THE COMMAND

- Re the preparations for the actions on the defence of Travnik and liberation of Jajce temporary command has been appointed.

1. TIHO BLAŠKIĆ - Commander
2. ANTE PRKAČIN - Chief of Staff representing HVO
3. ARIF PAŠALIĆ - Chief of Staff representing A BiH

Abovementioned are authorised to organise the command by recruiting necessary number of officers.

Stamp: /REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
JOINT COMMAND OF BH ARMY AND HVO/

Stamp: /CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL MAIN STAFF/

MAJOR GENERAL
SLOBODAN PRALJAK
/signed/

OS /DEFENCE FORCES/ AND HVO
 /CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL/ COMMAND
 BUGOJNO, GORNJI VAKUF
 Bugojno, 01 December 92
 No: 04-11/92

for: General PRALJAK

/Stamped upon receipt; partly illegible/:
 "Received: 05.12.92; 02/170/126"

REPORT

Following the order issued to me on the task of taking over the co-ordination and command with the aim of joint command of OS and HVO Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf, I hereby submit the following report for your review and as a potential guideline in decisions on a higher level, since they are above my competencies. You have also issued me with an order on the withdrawal of HVO Prozor forces and Gornji Vakuf OS to Mt Makljen. In light of the above, I report that the first degree of co-ordination and command has been established, but that the reached agreements are ignored in practice. It is somewhat difficult to reach an agreement because OS Bugojno receives instructions from Zenica which do not coincide with the agreement on joint command in the area of responsibility entrusted to me.

I assess the combat readiness of both units as satisfactory, but not at such level as I consider realistic for the situation this town is in. Curfew and military police joint patrols have been introduced and there is good will to abide by them. Co-ordination in defence has shown positive development, but it must be borne in mind that HVO Bugojno can reach the level of readiness for offensive operations in a shorter time period. OS Bugojno need to work more on defence and have a smaller number of soldiers for offensive operations. An agreement has been reached on the manner and better movement of convoys and other vehicles to Bugojno, Travnik, Zenica and Tuzla. There are certain problems in Prozor, which you are already acquainted with.

As for your order on the separation of opposing parties HVO Prozor and OS Gornji Vakuf on Mt Makljen, I report that I have received a report in writing from "Rama" Brigade on their order for the pull-out of troops from the area and the deadline for execution of the order (15 November 1992).

On 24 November 1992, I saw for myself the truth together with HVO Gornji Vakuf Commander, "Rama" Brigade Deputy Commander and OS Gornji Vakuf Commander, Fahrudin AGIĆ. After this, on 25 November 1992, I issued an order to OS Gornji Vakuf to withdraw the second battalion from the village of Pridvorci, the southern slope of Mt Crni Vrh, Cipovi slopes and elevation 1303. Following the order, Mr AGIĆ informed me he had withdrawn his units from the said area. At 2350 hrs on 28 November 1992, according to "Rama" Brigade Command, infantry fire, lasting 45 minutes, was opened from the direction of Kosara above the village of Jurići. One can continually hear sporadic fire from the direction, especially from Hera village.

Following my order on closing all catering facilities at 1500 hrs, HVO Gornji Vakuf has been adhering to it, while OS Gornji Vakuf does not want to abide by the issued order because Mr AGIĆ says his superior command is in Zenica and that he will execute the order when he receives it from them.

I conclude that Mr AGIĆ indirectly does not want to implement the agreement.

Due to all the above stated, pertaining to relations and the execution of orders in the AOR I was entrusted with, the problems which are encountered are above my competencies. OS Gornji Vakuf Commander Fahrudin AGIĆ, with his promises, signatures, behind which nothing lies, and bypassing the truth does not instil hope for a better solution to relations within Gornji Vakuf or between Gornji Vakuf and Prozor. I note this particularly because the second battalion of OS Gornji Vakuf has been utilised in the direction of Prozor, and if the relations were to be resolved, it could be utilised on the Bugojno defence line.

Cooperation with "Ante Starčević" Brigade is satisfactory and one can sense that they are taking the execution of tasks seriously. I have not had the opportunity to check the quality of defence because the lines were not jeopardised by the enemy infantry.

Colonel Miro ANDRIĆ
 /stamped and signed/

JOINT COMMAND OF HVO AND OS BiH
 BUGOJNO AND GORNJI VAKUF
 Bugojno, 10th December 1992

Major General Slobodan Praljak

According to Order for special task execution in Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf, for the purposes of informing the joint command of HVO HZ HB and OS BiH I hereby submit the following

REPORT

At Order proposal, identification number 02-1262/92 dated 14th November 1992 the 2nd HVO brigade in concordance with GS HVO Chief, brigadier Milivoj Petković, on 15th November 1992 I went to Bugojno and managed to perform the task, according to oral directions.

I made contacts with HVO and OS BiH commanders as follows:

- Mr. IVICA LUČIĆ, commander of HVO Bugojno
 - Mr. ZRINKO TOKIĆ, commander of HVO Gornji Vakuf
 - Mr. SENAD DAUTOVIĆ, commander of OS BiH Bugojno
 - Mr. FAHRUDIN AGIĆ, commander of OS BiH Gornji Vakuf
- Making a tour around HVO and OS BiH positions, I determined that these positions were not fortified in satisfying measure therefore I asked the commander to remove the lacks, which was related to covered bunkers construction, being well fortified with embrasures, as well as forwarding of certain bunkers to better positions for the purposes of more efficient defense.

HVO Bugojno and HVO Gornji Vakuf approached the task immediately and, according to my opinion, made some quality and well fortified defense lines of positions, they are located on.

The OS BiH of Bugojno shows interest for cooperation and work on fortification of positions. Relation with Mr. Senad Dautović, the commander has been established, he is willing to cooperate and open to agreements, respecting the agreed issues.

I think that his jurisdiction is restricted and that every agreement must follow from talks in Bugojno as well as from consultation with his supervisor in the command. The defense lines are not well fortified and constant pressures to act upon the agreed issues make an impression of quality move in order to fortify lines and defense itself.

The OS BiH Gornji Vakuf, Commander Fahrudin Agić does not show interest to cooperate and keeps searching the way how to disobey the agreed issues, which reflects to every agreement and every order. In spite of all consequences, there was still a part of remote manpower, holding positions along with HVO members. The 1st December 1993 report argument is still actual: in order that Mr. Agić shows will to cooperate and respects the reached agreements, it is necessary to make pressure on him through his superiors.

Report submitted by
 Colonel
 Miro Andrić

JASMIN JAGANJAC

ZAGREB

12 February 1993

18:45 hrs

Attn. Mr. President of the Presidency of RBiH

Alija Izetbegović

1. During today's contacts with General Praljak and General Čermak, I arranged shipment of certain MTS quantity for Pazarić (actually East of Bosnia) as follows:

a) bullet 7,62 x 31 300.000 pieces

b) RPG - 7 200 pieces

c) Maljutka 20 pieces

Total quantity can be placed in 2 cargo trucks. When the cited quantity arrives, the following shall be sent /crossed/. The material is symbolic, however they do mention passage.

2. To Mr. Praljak and Mr. Šušak I gave the proposal of Statement that you suggested to Mr. Boban. They find it quite approximate; however they admit the insufficient investigation of the statement. At my query whether they gave up on HZ Herzeg-Bosnia, General Praljak responded that it no longer exists and that one provisory period is necessary. Since Boban arrives from Germany yet tomorrow, they promised to make pressure on Boban to reach the signature. I think the item 5 was problematic. And those were insignias. Praljak thinks this also won't be controversial, to place the province flag next to the Bosnian flag as state flag. If anything is controversial, I shall inform you tomorrow.

3. As General Praljak travels to Herzegovina tomorrow, afterwards to Central Bosnia, he asked me to tell you to determine one or two prominent politicians (Muslims) that would, together with him, survey the Central Bosnia and influence the further situation appeasement. Determined men should report to Mostar. Communication should be Zijo or Safet.

4. For the job in Germany I did all the preparations. I expect that on Monday, Pohara receives the passport and on Tuesday he will contact you from Cologne.

5. From the certain sources I received information that, 3 days ago, Mr. Adil Zulfikarpašić was on reception by the President of the United States, Mr. Clinton. Also, I found out that Adil and Sefer or Adil and Šiber communicate on daily basis.

Mr. President, I am really not familiar with all the schemes, that is why I send you the information. They are most certainly reliable. The statements of the chief soldiers in the last couple of days are not by chance, on the contrary, they enjoy support from Adil. He allegedly promised to give a substantial amount of money for weapon and equipment that would head for Bosnia. I am not sure for the second issue, because, one weapon trader praised for the job in front of me. The business failed after all because Adil didn't give the money. 7 days ago, Zulfikarpašić gave an interview in Frankfurt to the Globus newspapers (the Zagreb edition), which is expected in the following edition. In this interview, he accuses you for the sufferings of our people and for the problems of Bosnia. I am not familiar with his final goal, but the analysis say that he cares about agreement and co-existence between our Muslim people and the Croats. In that sense, it would be good that you keep the military command Sefer-Šiber-Divjak in sight. For the behaviour that he has, Adil promised Šiber that he would help him to obtain the general's rank and high position after the war. Knowing his /illegible/ character for a short time, I think this is not so far from the truth. I kindly ask that you take my information and concern for you as support and honest intention to persist and succeed. You are on the path of God. You will succeed. Selam!

Jasmin

MINUTES

of the meeting of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo TUĐMAN, with representatives of Central Bosnia municipalities and of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ of Herzeg-Bosnia with their associates, held on 8 March 1993

Beginning at 1115 hours

Presiding: Dr. Franjo TUĐMAN, President of the Republic of Croatia

PRESIDENT:

Gentlemen, I wish to welcome the representatives of the Central Bosnia municipalities with whom we're having this meeting, at their request, in the presence of the President of the HVO of Herzeg-Bosnia, Mr. BOBAN and member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mirko LASIĆ. Minister ŠUŠAK will also be coming when his meeting is over. We agreed just now that you, from the Central Bosnia municipalities, should set out your problems. Be brief, be accurate and truthful, so that this remains as a document, not only for our discussion but for the discussions we will subsequently hold. Go ahead, please!

Pero KRIŽANAC: (Travnik) Mr. President, I must reiterate

4/1/JG

Unfortunately, people were killed and this war has taken about 400 people on both sides so far, meaning that about 60 Croatian sons were killed. We were hoping that there a conflict would not occur, however the influence of the media in Zenica, the politics from Zenica promoted the islamisation of Bosnia and resulted in individual Muslims causing a conflict in the territory of Busovača, the extremists did it.

We gave them everything. However, they turned against the Croatian people in Busovača. At this time there is an apparent peace and the majority of Muslims went to Zenica, those extremists, while the people, the refugees from the territory of the Krajina were sent to kill Croats in this little town. There are videocassettes of the evil crimes they committed, which can be viewed. The massacres committed by the people from the Krajina are unbelievable.

PRESIDENT:

The Muslims from the Krajina?

Zoran MARIĆ:

The Muslims from the Krajina. At this time, our only passage is via Vitez while we cannot pass through Kiseljak. They hold 11 kilometres of territory that they cleansed where there is ethnically pure Muslim population now. They destroyed about 400 Croatian houses. They did things that Croats could not have dreamed that their former Muslim brothers would do, because we were preparing for the Serbo-Chetnik aggression and we also fought

4/2/JG

in the Travnik area where our units had gone. However, we have just withdrawn them in order to defend ourselves because what Sefer HALILOVIĆ is doing, or rather Enver HADŽIHASANOVIĆ, commander of the Third Corps, who had placed units around Sarajevo to shell Sarajevo together with ĐURĐEVAC ... He has now taken over the Third Corps in Zenica and is now its commander.

The Muslim people of Busovača were ready to take part in the HVO government. However, as soon as the Third Corps was established, they only obeyed orders from Sarajevo, or rather from Zenica, so that a Muslim from Busovača will only obey orders, and will not or rather must not come to us and work together with us.

However, we are working on this since they have seen what the extremist part of their party has done. I would ask ... we in Busovača, or rather in the central part of central Bosnia, do not have any educated men. While Mr PRALJAK was in Travnik, things were moving along fine, but as soon as he left, things changed for the worse and the situation turned for the worse. There is no military discipline, crime became prevalent, and some military commanders have taken over the civilian authority and behave like that. That is why I would ask that Mr PRALJAK be returned to help us with this.

At the moment there are very few Muslims in Busovača. They have all left for Zenica and now that they have seen the situation in Zenica, they want to go back to Busovača again. However, we put Croats into their homes because we did not have where to put them up temporarily. Our policy is that this province, or rather we were the happiest that we became a part of this and we fought for this from the beginning, but if province number 10 should be Croatian, it should stay that way.

9/3/JG

Gojko ŠUŠAK:

I know all this, and we are purchasing and helping as much as we can. I do not know what the businessmen are telling you, but they came to see me twice with MARTINOVIĆ and I thought that the problem was solved. According to what ČERMAK has reported to me, they are buying everything from them. Allegedly in the last week or ten days there has been a halt with the explosive and ČERMAK asked me to intervene, but what is received directly ... but that explosive is usable and is paid for immediately. I just would not want that to be understood as a debt, regardless of the fact that you voted for your state in a referendum. I am not giving anything from the budget of the Ministry of Defence, Vitez, Osijek, Gospić and Ljubuški, let me be clear on that. Whatever is at the disposal of the Ministry of Defence, that is equally distributed between Šamac, Derventa, Osijek, Vukovar, Vitez and all other municipalities involved.

Mate BOBAN:

... that you have surrendered to the enemy.

Gojko ŠUŠAK:

Thousands of pages have been submitted, but the problem should be resolved. You have to take it out of your businessmen's heads that someone owes somebody something. The President is saying that this is historical, and since it is historical, if we calculate, without including anything else, only the weapons, the number of 100 million dollars is a small number in comparison to what we

9/4/JG

have sent to these territories.

I would not like anyone to think that they owe something to somebody. We have our one policy, one goal and we accept that as a fact of life, and I am asking you... Your meeting today is going to be useful to you in that you can go back to your place and say over there in Busovača, Novi Travnik or Vitez that you were with the President of the state. This is his view and they will trust you more than if you were to say you were interpreting something, or /trying to explain/ who is the one supporting you. That is the essence of today's meeting with the president, you will do everything else with Mate, while Mate will work with us. There is not much beating about the bush here.

Two things - PRALJAK warned me about what you have just mentioned that there is no commander. We did not withdraw PRALJAK. PRALJAK had to go to a seminar in the Netherlands that had been agreed six months before. He is coming back Wednesday evening and is going back there on Thursday morning. PRALJAK is permanent down there. PRALJAK was not withdrawn but came here for a purpose, he has a military seminar in the Netherlands, which we have to be present at and he was the one proposed to attend it six months ago.

We will send ... PRALJAK has made of list of names of several colonels and majors including the young LUBURIĆ to send down there. The work of the party ...

Excerpt from the presidential transcript 27 March 1993

I've been thinking these days what we should do, on my way here, whether I should go to Tuzla and see precisely what the situation in Tuzla is like. (Comment: /The problem of/ Konjic should be solved first.) But in Konjic, we shall solve the situation in Konjic.

Gojko ŠUŠAK:

Alija, you have five planes full of goods sitting here, in Zagreb, and three are allegedly on their way. Until this is completely solved, I shall not send a single bullet.

... PRALJAK, and nobody can tell me, either from your side or from any other side, that he is being unreasonable, he is down there with Jasmin, pissing blood, day and night, making rounds, driving ... himself, on both sides. He called today, panicky, and said - I don't take orders from you, or anyone else. He thought you were to arrive at 0230 hours and asked me to go to the airport to meet you, so you can give me a statement.

The President then said that we would be here at 0630 hours and I said we would phone later on.

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ:

That is very chaotic.

Gojko ŠUŠAK:

You see, they were down there, they were sitting down there for two days, negotiating, they reached an agreement and everything was all right, and now somebody else comes along and says that it is not binding on him.

PRESIDENT:

Alija, let me tell you something openly now, I agreed that General PRALJAK should go to Herzeg Bosnia or Bosnia and Herzegovina after I heard him say that he believed that maybe the Muslims were being wronged a little by our Croats there.

So there, the man who was completely, mind you, do you understand?

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ:

No, no, I believe that.

PRESIDENT:

So, you understand. When such a man says that now, you know that it is so. That is why I think you should give a joint statement down there, for both sides.

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ:

I have decided to stay in Zagreb one more day, as a rule, and I shall probably go to Sarajevo the day after tomorrow. I shall try tomorrow to /talk to/ PRALJAK, PRALJAK and Jasmin and Jaganjac and the others, to /talk to/ all of them, so that is what I have /as printed/, as far as that is concerned.

(Comment: Was there any shooting today?)

/coat of arms/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ OF THE TRAVNIK MUNICIPALITY

Number: HVO-01- /93

Date: 12 April 1993

Re.: Report of the Travnik HVO regarding armed conflicts in Travnik prior to and during Easter holiday celebrations

Dear Mr. President,

We wish to inform you about the exact chain of regrettable events that occurred in the town of Travnik during preparations for the holiday and over Easter itself.

As you are probably aware, BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Army military units and the Muslim police burnt a flag of the Croatian people and then there was an armed incident, which resulted in the death of three BH Army soldiers.

We will recount the said events in chronological order:

On 7 April 1993, the Croatian Defence Council of the Travnik Municipality decided to mark the Easter holidays by displaying flags of the Croatian people throughout the territory of the municipality. Thus, on Good Thursday, in addition to the flags of the BH Republic already displayed (temporarily) since the Bajram holidays, the flags of the Croatian people were hung out.

Immediately after the flags were hung, BH Army units and the Muslim police organised the burning of these flags and there was a celebration of this abominable act, much like wild tribes celebrating: there was singing and dancing around the burned flags of the Croatian people. When the (displayed) flags which had been placed across from our units were being lowered, weapons were fired on the perpetrators of this abominable act, killing two of them. Prior to that, the BH Army stopped a vehicle, mistreated and beat four officers of the Croatian Defence Council. The described activities of the BH Army soldiers were led by Mujahedins stationed in Travnik and belonging to the ranks of the BH Army. BH Army units, again prompted by Mujahedins receiving full financial and other help of the Travnik Muslim leadership, arrested our policemen. This being an unprecedented insult to the Croatian inhabitants of Travnik, the Travnik Municipality HVO demanded that the representatives of Muslim authorities make a public apology in the media and that the flags of the Croatian people be returned to the places from which they had been removed.

We also asked the BH Army not to welcome into their ranks any more foreign citizens who were waging a holy war against all Croatian and Christian elements in Travnik.

The HVO soldiers and police undertook all necessary action to calm the tense situation, so that Croatian, Muslim and Serb inhabitants of the town could continue to live peacefully together.

The following day the provocations continued; an officer of ours was caught in sniper fire and on this occasion we succeeded in neutralising one of the sniper shooters. Four explosive devices were thrown at catering establishments and shops owned by Croats. Armed Muslim civilians appeared on the streets. On Easter Day, 11 April, there were no larger provocations, but on 12 April, the situation culminated in the erection of roadblocks on the access and exit roads to and from the town.

Croatian citizens, policemen and soldiers were stopped and in this way harassed. We did our utmost for our part to calm the situation, thus carrying out your order to calm Croat-Muslim relations throughout the territory of the Republic. Only exceptionally did we have to return fire in order to exchange prisoners and prevent the passage of Muslim forces through Croatian settled areas.

We admit that it is extremely difficult to restrain our units from fighting, since the aggressiveness of the Muslim units is at its peak.

It is evident from the situation across the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina that there was a sudden deterioration of Muslim-Croat relations on the eve of the Easter holidays, caused by increasingly aggressive behaviour of Muslim military units toward Croatian civilians and soldiers.

The events in Travnik were only a continuation of earlier events including the unresolved killing of Croatian officers by BH Army and dismissals of Croatian citizens from their jobs - all of which culminated in the burning of flags of the Croatian people on the eve of the Easter holidays, as well as military provocation, harassment and beating of Croats in the town of Travnik during the holidays.

Our patience is wearing thin, as there is no reason for the opposite side to behave in such a way.

Dear Mr. President,

Every instance when we give ground and calm the situation is perceived as weakness on our part by the Muslim units, and they in turn, become even more aggressive. We are asking that you use political pressure in your talks with representatives of the Muslim people to help resolve the problems in the town of Travnik and the entire Lašva valley. It would be of great help if you could prohibit foreign citizens from Islamic and Arabic countries who are fighting in the ranks of the BH Army against all that is Croatian and Christian, to enter Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Republic of Croatia, which they are using for transit purposes. It would be of great help to us if you would again order your associates to dispatch high-ranking officers of the Croatian Army headed by General PRALJAK to our areas, so that they would link up our ranks in the Lašva valley.

We are aware that the Republic of Croatia lacks for equipment and materiel, as it has been already stricken by war for two years. However, we ask that you allocate some equipment to this part of the total Croatian corps, so that we can continue to defend ourselves from the chetnik aggressor, but also from the increasingly aggressive behaviour of Muslims, who, until yesterday, were our allies and whom we assisted both with equipment and personnel in defending part of the territory in Central Bosnia, but who are now attacking us and treating us in the same way as the chetnik aggressor is treating them.

Muslims in Travnik and Central Bosnia are undertaking everything to ethnically cleanse the Croatian people.

We are asking for help in spreading the truth about the events in Travnik, the Lašva valley and throughout Central Bosnia, so that it reaches the ears of every Croat and friend of the Croatian people, since all the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the BH press, radio and television, are creating rifts between the Croatian and the Muslim peoples; not a single report from us can be published. We therefore ask that you open the media of the Republic of Croatia to us, so that we can state the truth. At the same time, we ask you to help us establish Herzeg-Bosnia radio and television stations, as well as to see to it that Croatian Television and Radio broadcasts reach these historically Croatian territories.

Please help us.

Thank you in advance.

Yours faithfully,

PRESIDENT

OF THE HVO OF THE TRAVNIK MUNICIPALITY

Željko PERVAN

COPIES:

1. President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo TUĐMAN
2. President of the HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/ Mate BOBAN,
3. President of the HZ HB HVO, Dr. Jadranko PRLIĆ
4. Files

IVICA TOMIĆ

Zagreb, 2006

The interview was conducted in Zagreb at «Leut» restaurant on the lake of Jarun

O.K. Ivica, could you please tell me whether you witnessed the event involving people returning from fight in Mostar, and when Praljak waited for them and delivered a speech in order to prevent any future retaliation?

That was on a day when Zvonko Čuvalo was killed. He was a commander, or deputy commander of a battalion within 4th brigade. Parts of 4th brigade were involved in fight in the town of Mostar. That man, late Čuvalo was a distinguished soldier and had a reputation among soldiers. He died on the battlefield, on Bulevar. After he was killed, members of his battalion demanded to go home. When I say "demanded" I mean there was no way that you could have forced them to stay. It was impossible. That speaks of how the military structure in a way functioned or did not function. It was feared that in case they return to their municipalities under such psychosis that they would retaliate against Muslim population living there. In a way, Praljak was concerned about their return. He tried to alleviate the trauma and insisted they leave for Humac and attend the mass and talk to the priests first. It was feared that they might begin firing shots into the streets, break into Muslim houses etc... everything might have gone wrong in their heads, thus Praljak told them to go to the mass on Humac which had previously been arranged by himself or Tomo Tomić. They were taken to the mass and a sermon related to the latest events was delivered for them. The sermon was used to ease their mind and make some things easier to accept and understand. I cannot remember all the details. I don't know. Mostly he predicted problems that might have arisen from various situations and found ways of solving those problems.

I have here written something regarding the functioning and behaviour of men within HVO units. It has to be emphasised that it mostly depended on individuals in command who had character, attitude, strength, ability to command etc. I had some of these men in my unit as well. There were also men who wanted to hide behind the masses and avoid doing their duties. In second half of 1992 and followed by 1993 we already had regular practice of rotating soldiers after a 15 days tour of duty on the battlefield. Certain formations would hold positions on the frontline for some time while rotating men within their own units. Somewhere in 1993, I held a command within tactical group 2 holding a position between Stolac and Popovo polje. We had a situation when a group of soldiers, around several hundred men, who were supposed to leave for their tour of duty, did not wish to leave and posed all kinds of questions. Among other things they asked me about the territory we held, duties and tasks that they were supposed to execute while in the army, etc. The soldiers also asked a whole lot of questions to which there were no answers such as: Where is my neighbour who fled to Germany etc? They refused to leave for the battlefield for three days. They demanded that the brigade commander come and give them some answers. I had been present in such situations numerous times before, but since the procedure turned into a regular one, I passed the duty onto lower rank commanders and other lower level officers within battalions and independent companies. Since they did not succeed in forcing the army to leave, I went there again and replied to all their questions again. After half an hour of exhausting questions we finally reached the end. I told them: "Now stop with these questions. You got your answers. Since there are soldiers who have been waiting for the rotation for three days on the battlefield, and since they are soldiers like you, who have families and have a right to return home, and who have already exceeded their stay on the battlefield for three days, who will assume the responsibility if some of them in the meantime get killed, get into the trucks and leave for you tour of duty". I turned around in direction of my car and heard the following comments: "Where will you go for lunch, to this or that restaurant? You could have put more antennas on your vehicle, referring to the car with mobile and radio station antennas." Finally after a third comment: "If it were bought by your father you wouldn't drive it around here". I turned around and asked: "Who said that?" Half of the soldiers were at the point of leaving and going home. One of them stepped in front and said: "I said it". I wanted to grab him by his shoulders and tell him that was not the way to talk to... but he grabbed me instead and wanted to wrestle with me and discredit me in front of all those people, and I knocked him out. I hit him with my head and knocked him out. A friend of his, who was standing next to him, reloaded the rifle and pointed at me. I told me: "Shoot, shoot what are you waiting for?" Since he did not react I took his gun, removed it and said to the two military police officers: "Write a report and take

this guy to an ambulance to mend him, and all of you off to battlefront". They asked: "What if the doctor says he cannot go to the battlefront?" I responded: "Doctor gives advice but I make decisions. Off with him to the battlefront." Finally they left for the battlefront. That was one of the examples how I functioned on duty and solved problems. There was no institution or authority above me in charge of sending them to the front, nor had there existed the authority that would impose any kind of sanctions for disobeying the order. They wanted to go, but feared getting killed. They accepted my authority because I was there with them all the time on the frontline. That was the example of how chain of command functioned. That happened on all levels. Praljak had contacts with international community and the other side in negotiations however you had such examples at higher instances as well. On the whole, chain of command structure within HVO mostly depended and relied on the authority of the commanding officer. If a commander was a competent man his unit was competent as well and if not the case was the opposite.

I, the undersigned, Ivica Tomić, state that in December of 2005, of my own free will, I gave a statement for the Defence of General Slobodan PRALJAK about events in which I participated and which are connected to the wartime events in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1994). I agree that my statement be used in proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and that it be made public. I am willing to testify in the proceedings before the ICTY against Slobodan PRALJAK in the case Prosecutor versus PRLIĆ et al.

I state that before giving and certifying this statement to the Defence of General PRALJAK I was warned that I had to speak the truth and that an untruthful statement is a criminal offence under the Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Penal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rules of the ICTY.

I state that I have understood these warnings and that everything I said in my statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

I have read the statement through carefully and it corresponds in its entirety to what I stated. I signed the written text of the statement in my own hand.

In Mostar

/signed/

I, NOTARY PUBLIC, Jurica MUSA from Mostar, With my seat at 88, Stjepana Radića Street

Confirm that

Ivica Tomić, resident at the address Mostarska Vrata no number, retired, whose identity I established by inspecting his identity card No. 03DRB9986 issued by the MUP ZHK Ljubuški, PIN 2301964152737 signed in his own hand, in my presence, this Statement which is written on one page in three copies. The signature on the letter is genuine. In accordance with Article 95, paragraph 3 of the Law on Notaries Public, a notary is not responsible for the content of a document he certifies. _____

The notary's fee for certification under Tariff Number 10 of the Tariff on compensation and fees of notaries amounting to 8.50 KM plus VAT amounting to 1.45 KM, total 9.95, has been paid. _____

_____ Number: OPU
1402/07 _____ In Mostar,

10th of December 2007 _____

NOTARY PUBLIC

Jurica MUSA

/signed and stamped/

8. This is how I established direct contact with Mr. Slobodan PRALJAK, amongst others. The first time I met him in person in Zagreb, in what I believe was mid-1992. I laid out our plans to him and asked if he could help. Without hesitation PRALJAK said he would do everything he could to ensure unobstructed passage of the convoy from and into Sarajevo.
9. PRALJAK kept his promise. The first convoy I led following this conversation was on 14 November 1992 and this was the convoy in which we transported the first group of people out of occupied Sarajevo.
10. As far as food, medicine, medical supplies and other essentials are concerned, these goods were collected in Split. With the direct assistance of PRALJAK I even found haulers and drivers in Herzegovina and in Croatia. I was especially impressed by the drivers from Herzegovina, who agreed to take part in the convoy despite the great risk to their lives.
11. Every time I prepared a convoy for either transport of persons out of Sarajevo or for the transport of goods into Sarajevo I would speak to PRALJAK or to persons he would direct me to, and I inform them of the desired plan of travel. In principle, one or two days later, PRALJAK or the people he tasked would inform me of a detailed plan of travel (routes and time).
12. The size of the convoys varied, and they usually consisted of two to five busses when transporting people out of Sarajevo, and 10 to 15 trucks when transporting aid into Sarajevo.
13. In practice, the convoys would travel the Split – Metković – Stolac – Todorići – Nevesinje – Foča – Lukavica – Sarajevo route. On certain occasions the route would be slightly different.
14. On one occasion, I think it was in mid-1993, we managed to organise a transport out of Sarajevo for the personal belongings of Sarajevo Jews.

PRALJAK played a key role in this. He also found a way to arrange everything with the forces of the VRS /Republika Srpska Army/ and the package was transferred from Sarajevo in HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ vehicles with an HVO escort using the Srb – Stolac – Međugorje route. I took over the package in the Ana Marija Motel in Međugorje.

15. I led a total of 11 convoys and all were successful. No one in the convoys was ever wounded or killed. I remember one incident when during a checkpoint search, the VRS soldiers stole some of the Jews' belongings we were transporting from Sarajevo. As soon as I found out about this I sent the convoy back and insisted that the stolen items be returned, which was quickly done. I must say that on many occasions they frightened us, but this never happened in the sections under HVO control. On a few occasions, the VRS forces fired several bullets at the truck cabin, usually right behind the driver. I am convinced that these were shots from a sniper that were intended to show us they could stop us if they so wished, i.e. to let us know we were dependent on their good will.
16. On several occasions, PRALJAK personally negotiated with the high ranking officers of the VRS to secure undisturbed passage of the convoys. I know he spoke to the VRS GŠ /Main Staff/ and I remember that there was mention of someone by the name of General MILOVANOVIĆ, with whom I spoke several times on Pale. That conversation was made possible by PRALJAK and I believe that the first meeting was in August or September of 1993. On that occasion, HVO officer Žarko KEŽA assisted me as an escort and met me at the airport in Dubrovnik (Čilipi) and drove me to Pale. He had documents that would ensure we could pass through all the control points, which PRALJAK got from the HZHB /Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna/ and the HVO, but also from the VRS.
17. In many situations it was very clear that without PRALJAK's help the convoys would not have been able to get through. Other people, such as Ljubo ČESIĆ ROJS, Mate BOBAN, Ante JELAVIĆ and others, also helped out but PRALJAK's help and involvement were the most significant, especially regarding contact with the Serbian side, which obviously respected him for reasons unknown to me.
18. Mr PRALJAK was also of great assistance in establishing contacts with the heads of the VRS and/or the JNA regarding other operations I was leading. Immediately after the fall of Vukovar (on 19 November 1991) I became involved with the exchange of prisoners from the RH arrested by the JNA or the VRS, and before that I was an intermediary during the exchange of persons arrested by the JNA in the RH. During those activities I managed to secure the release of several persons who were publicly known.

For example, this is how General Đuro DEČAK, Dr Vesna BOSANAC, Dr Njavro JURAJ, and a platoon of Vukovar defenders and a few others were liberated. Mr PRALJAK somehow managed to put me in contact with JNA General VASILJEVIĆ, with whom I had a few meetings in BH, where for the same reasons I also met with General MLADIĆ, BEARA (on Pale) and some other JNA/VRS officers, whose names I do not remember. The help offered by General PRALJAK was important and it would have been difficult without his help.

19. During my stay in BH, I had no personal contact with members of the HV, nor did I ever see any kind of organised HV forces in BH except in the border areas between the RH and BH.
20. On a few occasions I had the opportunity to have an extended conversation with PRALJAK about various issues regarding the state of war in BH in 1992/1993. From these conversations and from PRALJAK's activities that I was informed of, I realised that PRALJAK was opposed to the war, especially between Bosnian Croats and Muslims, and that under the circumstances he was doing everything possible in this chaotic situation to help people who were directly affected or endangered by the war events.
21. The firm position of my organisation was that there should not have to be "bribing" to allow the convoy to pass freely as this could compromise the whole project and have an adverse effect. At the direct inquiry of the defence counsel and based on many facts I am convinced that PRALJAK helped me and provided support for the convoys for purely humanitarian reasons, and he did not expect nor did he receive any counter-favour or remuneration for this.
22. I can say that PRALJAK is my "casual" acquaintance and I was lucky to have met him at that time because this helped me to launch an operation that was very difficult to carry out. It is my belief that PRALJAK is undoubtedly a courageous and moral person, and with the actions described he helped to save many lives.

Done in Zagreb on 25 February 2005

Jakov BIENENFELD

/signed/

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostar i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatrene podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

Documents D-1 until D-9 are a representative choice on this topic and are clear enough by themselves, so I will comment only some of them.

D – 1

I report a tipsy military policeman, so I presume I should be a type of man and commander who wouldn't report rape, killings,....

D – 2

I report military policemen.

The military commander, according to the structure of the HVO, doesn't have commanding power over the Military Police.

D – 4

Same as D-2. I demand, I do not command, because the MP is not under the authority of the HVO Main Staff.

D – 7

Volunteers from Vinkovci – Republic of Croatia. Most of them took part in the battles in Vukovar or around Vukovar, mainly the descendants of people who were settled on the property of expelled

Volksdeutscher (ethnic Germans) after World War II, they came to help.

They had six killed, 21 wounded and one missing.

I don't know if they bought or took that freezer, refrigerator, stove, one heater and one TV set.

But I reported them.

Those who think this is easy, that it doesn't hurt, don't understand a thing.

Six young men killed, 21 wounded, one missing, they came on their own, came to help the HVO from attacks by the A BiH, 700 km away from their homes from which they were expelled by the JNA, and you report them for what?

For what?

I did report them, but the malaise in my stomach didn't leave me and I think it never will.

On everything else I leave you do draw the conclusions by yourself.

/stamp/ CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
HERZEG-BOSNIA
MILITARY POLICE, ČITLUK

TO THE MAIN STAFF
OF SOUTHEASTERN HERZEGOVINA

SUBJECT: Official Note

Regarding the interview conducted with member of Čitluk Military Police Franjo KLARIĆ.

On 30 April/1 May 1992 Franjo KLARIĆ was on night patrol in town. At around 0100 hours Franjo says he stopped a vehicle which was driven by General PRALJAK, whom he had not known personally before that. He says that everything was very correct on both sides during the inspection.

When told that the General had noticed that he was under the influence of alcohol, Franjo said that it was true that he had had a few drinks, but that he was under control, which is no justification for a unit member being under the influence, or for drinking alcohol at all.

Franjo is from Žitomislići, which is where he had been just before reporting for duty, at home with his father in Žitomislići, sitting and drinking and talking about the present situation.

Having deeply apologised for this and said that this will never happen again, Franjo asked that his apology be taken into account and no sanctions imposed this time.

Yours faithfully,

Čitluk, 1 May 1992

VP /Military Police/ COMMANDER

Antonio MILETIĆ

/signed and stamped/

/handwritten:/ Sent to Mostar at 0146 hours on 31 July 1993 /stamp/

/signed:/ Mile

ONO /Operations and Training Organ/

/a signature/

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ of the HZ HZ /Croatian Community of
Herzeg-Bosnia/, R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
IZM /Forward Command Post/ of the S/Z /Northwest/ HERZEGOVINA OZ /Zone of
Operations/

No: 01-2081/93

DEFENCE

Prozor, 30 July 1993

MILITARY SECRET

- TO: - THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE HZ HB, MOSTAR
(for information)
- THE HEAD OF THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT, MOSTAR
(for information)
- THE MILITARY POLICE ADMINISTRATION, MOSTAR
(to Valentin ĆORIĆ in person - for implementation)

The wilful, impudent and anti-Croatian conduct of the military police will not be tolerated.

I demand that the names of the policemen who, contrary to procedure and by violating all authorisation, detained the drivers of the humanitarian aid from Germany, beat them up and seized the vehicles, be sent to me. Notify me in which prison they are located.

HVO GS /Main Staff/ Commander

Major General

Slobodan PRALJAK

/two illegible stamps/

/Coat of arms of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia

Croatian Defence Council

S/ZH /Northwest Herzegovina/ Operations Zone

IZM /Forward Command Post/ Prozor

No: 01-3308/93

Date: 27 August 1993

PROZOR MILITARY POLICE

ORDER ON ESCORT

1. You have to escort the prisoner Marjan MIKŠIĆ, who is in the Prozor VP
/Military Police/detention.

The above mentioned person is to be handed over to the Croatian VP, together with all the interrogation and supporting documentation.

2. Execute the order on 27 August 1993.

Commander of the GS /Main Staff/

General Major

Slobodan PRALJAK

/hand signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ MAIN STAFF
 Number: 02-2/1-01-2243/93
 IZM /Forward Command Post/ Čitluk,
 31 August 1993

DEFENCE /stamp/
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Relieving of duty and
 initiating disciplinary measures

To the Head of the Defence Department
 Mr Bruno STOJIĆ, personally
 To the UVP /Military Police Administration/
 Mr Valentin ĆORIĆ, personally

Mr Zdenko ANDABAK, a VP /Military Police/ unit Commander, has left the front on several occasions without asking permission from the Commander in whose contingent he was carrying out tasks.

This act requires that strictest disciplinary measures be imposed. In conjunction with the above, I hereby

REQUEST

1. Relieve Mr Zdenko ANDABAK of duty and initiate proceedings against him pursuant to the Decree on the OS HZ H-B /Armed Forces of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/.

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 Service for the Exchange of Prisoners and other Persons
 MOSTAR

Received: 8 September 1993			
Org. Unit			Value
02	-1-1239	/93	

GS HVO /HVO Main Staff/ COMMANDER
 Major General Slobodan PRALJAK
 /signed and stamped/

/handwritten: Pursuant to Decision number 02-1-1099/93 of
 6 September 1993 he was relieved of duty of Assistant Chief of UVP.

/a signature//

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

HZ HB HVO MAIN STAFF

Ref. number: /illegible/

Forward Command post Čitluk, 22 September 1993

Reported: OZ Southeast Herzegovina
 OZ Northwest Herzegovina

To: all operative zones and directly subordinated to
 the HR HB Armed Forces HQ
 presidents of VSS /extension unknown/ of 1st (2nd)
 degree

Serving of disciplinary detention/prison sentences
 imposed by Commander or a person authorized by law.

ORDER

1. Pursuant to the Regulation book about military discipline and pursuant to the responsibility of perpetrators for disciplinary faults and disciplinary offences, military members of the HR HB armed forces will serve disciplinary measures imposed upon them in the MILITARY PRISON DRETELJ.
2. Military persons will serve disciplinary detention and prison sentences in the Military Prison Dretelj.
3. Commanders on all levels, as well as Military Courts, are due to submit to the Military Prison Dretelj, together with the convicted person, the order (verdict) about disciplinary measure.
4. All directly subordinated commanders will be responsible for consistent implementation of this order.

/Seal/

HR HB HVO MAIN STAFF
 Major-General
 Slobodan Praljak /signed/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 COMMAND OF THE OZ /OPERATIVE ZONE/ NORTHWEST HERZEGOVINA
 Number: 01-4478/93
 Tomislavgrad, 23 September 1993

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Received: 23/09/93			
Organizational unit	Number	Enclosure	Value
	01-380/93		

To all units in the OZ
 Northwest Herzegovina

/Hand written text: ?Tomo Vukoja o issue order based on this order./ /Signed/

Remand in custody-prison as a disciplinary measure pronounced by commander- person who is authorised to pass such disciplinary measures, I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. Military personnel will undergo disciplinary measures against members of the HR HB Armed Forces, pronounced pursuant to the Regulation about Military Discipline and in accordance with the responsibility of the perpetrator, in the MILITARY PRISON DRETELJ.
2. Military personnel will undergo disciplinary measures of custody and prison sentences in the Military Prison Dretelj.
3. Commanders on all levels and military disciplinary courts are due to submit to the MILITARY PRISON DRETELJ, together with the convicted person, also the order (verdict) about disciplinary measure.
4. Directly subordinated commanders are responsible for a consequent implementation of this order.
5. This order enters into force immediately.

cc:

- Brigade Petar Krešimir 4, Livno
- Brigade Kralj Tomislav Tomislavgrad
- Brigade Posušje, Posušje
- Brigade Eugen Kvaternik, Prozor
- Brigade Dr. Ante Starčević, Gornji Vakuf
- Brigade Rama, Prozor
- Brigade Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić, Prozor - Kucani
- 6th MP battalion, Tomislavgrad
- LTRD Anti-aircraft defence, Tomislavgrad
- 2nd MP light assault OZ battalion, Livno
- OZ Reconnaissance company, Prozor Šćit
- Lašva battalion, Prozor
- Forward command post Prozor (serve notice on)
- Archive

Deputy Commander:
 Ante Govorušić

/Coat of Arms/
 Republic of Croatia
 Ministry of Defence
 41000 Zagreb

MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
 BY COURIER

Osijek Military District
 Military Post 3132
 1st Motorised Battalion

Class: 833-05-01/02

Reference no: 3132-39/01-93-6

Vinkovci, 1 October 1993

Subject: REPORT from the field
 by Assistant Commander for Political Affairs
 of the 1st Motorised Battalion

On 21 August 1993 after receiving the order, the 1st Motorised Battalion, parts of the 3rd Motorised Battalion and the Armoured Battalion under the command of the 1st Motorised Battalion and the assistants assigned to it, set out to the field in the Southern front. Preparations and transport were organised.

The infantry departed from the Vinkovci army barracks at 0800 hrs on 21 August 1993 and the part of the 3rd Motorised Battalion was supposed to join it in Našice, which was done with a delay of an hour and a half. The trip to Rijeka went quite good. In Rijeka, there were problems with boarding because of the three vehicles that fell behind the column due to a breakdown and its repair. The delegation of the Ministry of Defence decided to allow departure of the ferryboat before the mentioned vehicles arrived. However, the ferryboat was stopped, and soon after the vehicles arrived it departed. When we got to the Ploče port, Junior Lieutenant Vlado BEŠKER, who was by the order appointed Assistant Commander for Political Affairs of our combat group, was waiting for us. After that, the troops were transported to the "Zenit" Hotel in Neum.

We stayed in Neum for several days. During that time, nobody called the command of the combat group to inform them on the people to whom they could turn to about any kind of problems, that is, on those who could give orders. No information was provided on possible areas of responsibility so that command reconnaissance could be carried out. There were situations in which the Assistant Commander for Logistics of the 5th Guards Brigade tried to give an order to the commander of our combat group and nobody informed that commander on the duty he was to perform and whether he was in position to issue orders to the combat group. During our stay in Neum, members of our combat group were issuing orders to parts of the formations without the knowledge of the commander of the combat group, which is not in accordance with the rules and regulations on the use of formations of the guards units of the Croatian Army, and it ruined its orderliness and performance.

Our unit was divided in many parts and sent to different front lines, which at the very beginning disrupted its functioning and the quality of execution of the combat assignment. Part of the unit was at the front line near Mostar, and part was in Uskoplje.

After arriving to the Uskoplje battlefield, the 3rd Motorised Company was deployed at the front line on Mačkovac - Kuk hills. The situation found in the Uskoplje battlefield, with regard to the organisation of supply and replenishment of material and technical equipment was disastrous. The local units were practically doing what they wanted, which significantly violated the safety of the entire sector; there was no authority and no certain chain of command that could function in a quality manner. The commander of our unit, Mr Vinko MAŽAR was almost completely disregarded, he was never participating nor was he informed about planning of any operations, especially about the offensive operation on the Mačkovac hill that needed to be liberated and cleared from the enemy. One hour after the 1st Motorised Brigade and the 82-mm Mortar Support Platoon returned from Mostar, an order came from the Commander of the 5th Guards Brigade about going into the attack on the Mačkovac hill. Mr MAŽAR was not informed about that order; Brigadier KAPULAR even stated that he was going to execute him by a firing squad, as the troops did not come on time, that is,

immediately. During the offensive operation, the mentioned units completed their part of the assignment maximally good and quick, emphasising that they were not able to learn about the terrain nor to organise and plan the operation. On that occasion one member of the 1st Motorised Battalion was killed, Silvestar FILIĆ. On 4th of September, after taking over the front line, those same men remained on rain and cold for two nights and three days without a shift change. When the rest of the unit came, the men were rotated, and the following day the front line in the Stublić - Kuk area was taken over. The front line was in complete disorder, with no possibility of supplying food, replenishing ammunition and reinforcing with manpower, so that all that was done at the very front line. Bringing the front line in order, which began after that, was difficult and long lasting due to bad organisation and malfunctions on the machines. I would like to mention that when we arrived at the Uskoplje battlefield, we did not receive any maps with enemy positions marked on them nor any information on his artillery, strength and power. We had to ask for everything, nearly take it by force, so that the performance of the combat group would be possible, in a quality manner and safe.

Because of all this mentioned. Commander MAŽAR was not able to bear his powerlessness regarding the proper use of his formation and so, speaking in military slang, he simply "lost it", which manifested in his performance. However, despite all that, in my opinion and based on the facts, our unit completed its assignment maximally good.

Since certain offensive operation had been planned, the Command of the 3rd Motorised Company went to conduct reconnaissance on 13 September 1993, and on that occasion the Commander of the Company, Petar MATANOVIĆ was wounded in a minefield, as well as Tihomir PENAVALA and Platoon Commander, Vlado GLUHAKOVIĆ. That weakened the 3rd Motorised Company leaving it without most of its commanding officers, in which case according to all regulations that unit automatically had to be withdrawn from the front line. However, the unit as such remained there the next fifteen days without a shift. Somebody's (ir)responsibility exists, but it was not Vinko MAŽAR's, it was some superior commander who was not able to make the rotation of troops with the soldiers he had at his disposal.

On 15 September 1993, part of our unit that was in reserve, that is, resting, was brought to Uskoplje so the 2nd Motorised Battalion could be withdrawn from the positions. During that day, the Muslim Armed Forces carried out the strongest attack on the positions of the 3rd Motorised Company in the Mačkovac - Kuk area. On that occasion, while repelling the attack and taking over the lost positions, our unit had one missing (which was determined the following days, because of the inaccurate information by the Prozor Command Post), two killed and twelve wounded members. The following days, two more members of the unit were wounded while taking over the lost positions, including Tomislav JAKOVLJEVIĆ, Commander of the 2nd Motorised Company and Boško VUKUŠIĆ, Assistant Commander for Political Affairs of the 2nd Motorised Company. Consequently, out of four company commanders our combat group was left with one living and capable commander, as the Commander of the Anti-Armour Rocket Company, Darko LJUBAS was also killed, and the remaining two were wounded. Nobody appreciated such information and acted how one is supposed to act under such conditions, and so the unit stayed another ten days in the field at the front line. By the end of the field-duty, the unit suffered the following losses:

- one missing
- six killed
- 21 wounded

By the end of the field-duty, the situation was rather fine. The troops were engaged in active defence on a daily basis, which prevented the possibility of Muslim Armed Forces organising offensive operations on our decimated units.

During the rotation of troops, between 26th and 27th of September, we were given four large buses and two small buses, but one small bus broke down and one large bus was not even in order. The other one was even worse than the previous one, while the third one barely made it to Prozor. In our attempt to get a better bus, we were told that there was not a better one. So, after recognising an accomplished fact, our members sat on the existing buses and drove to Cigenica, where the buses for the transport to Vinkovci waited for them. The members of our unit, who were at the front line for two days and two nights so they could prevent a possible attack and a greater loss in manpower, waited for the bus the entire night so they could reach the bus for Vinkovci.

During the transport to Vinkovci, we had a breakdown on one bus and two breakdowns on the other, so because of this second one we were forced to find another bus in Bjelovar, which we did, therefore the last bus carrying the troops arrived in Vinkovci at around 2100 hrs.

The column of material and technical equipment was stopped at the toll booths in Karlovac, allegedly by the order of Major General Slobodan PRALJAK, Commander of the Croatian Defence Council in Herzeg-Bosnia. Our unit was accused of looting the houses in the Uskoplje battlefield. After a check by the military police, the following appliances were found and confiscated: a refrigerator, freezer, wood/coal stove, heater and a television set. During the check, neither of the sides caused any incidents. I believe that this check was necessary for the Croatian Defence Council units to distance themselves and shift the responsibility from themselves to members of the 5th Guards Brigade. It is a fact that the Croatian Defence Council members were offering our members household appliances, personal cars and similar things at extremely low prices. If the Croatian Defence Council units want to solve the problem of robbing, they have to deal with the Croatian Defence Council units in the Uskoplje battlefield and with the members of the military police in Prozor. According to the information from the citizens of Prozor, they are afraid to leave their homes because they fear that the members of the military police would come and "clean up" their homes. Based on the information and all what had happened to our unit and to other units of the 5th Guards Brigade, we suggest to Mr Slobodan PRALJAK that he deals more with the Croatian Defence Council units and the military police of Herceg-Bosna and that way prevents and puts an end to their illegal money-making and war profiteering. With this I do not want and I can not claim that there are no individual members of our unit who ruin the reputation of the 5th Guards Brigade, which has preserved with its conduct and combat engagement a great part of the Croatian territory, which they were prepared to leave to the Muslims.

In the end I want to say that it is about time the Croatian Army units are used as they should be used. It has to be known where are they going, how long they will stay and who is going to relieve them in the field. That is required from me by the service for Political Affairs as well as by all the members of our unit, who are prepared to give their lives for the Croatian country and for the Croatian people, which slowly starts to become a rarity. I include all the Croatian Army units among their ranks. As a note, I would like to point out what everybody knows, and which can be heard more and more often, and that is that our soldiers say that they are just a bridge on which "the mummy's and daddy's sons" will walk over, and who will enjoy everything that the Croatian people and the Croatian soldiers have created in this homeland war.

In the interest of the Croatian soldiers and the entire Croatian people, I ask you nicely to take that into account to remove the bitterness of the true defenders of the Croatian country and the Croatian interests.

Respectfully,

Assistant Commander for Political
Affairs of the 1st Motorised Battalion
Mato PRCE
/signed/

MP/SL /expansion unknown/

Deliver to:

- Assistant Commander for Political Affairs of the 5th Guards Brigade
- Commander of the 1st Motorised Battalion
- Assistant Commander for Political Affairs of the 1st Motorised Battalion
- Archives

GS HVO
Operational number; 02-2/1-01-2689/93
Due to neg. activities of individuals and units

/handwritten document/

Attn. Commander of «KB» brigade
Attn. Chief of VP HVO

ORDER

1. Military conscripts Jozo, son of Žarko, Sulić and Martin Bevanda are assigned as help to the 1st battalion of “KB” brigade of Čitluk. They are immediately to be withdrawn from /illegible/ battalion and “KB” brigade Čitluk. The defence department shall dispose them according to valid regulations.
2. The unit “Jelen” from RH that is /illegible/ in the territory of the zone of responsibility of “KB” brigade Čitluk, is to be withdrawn from the HR HB territory and returned to the RH territory.
3. The paragraph number 1 shall be executed by the command of the “KB” brigade, the brigade VP, whereby the paragraph number 2 (two) of this order shall be regulated by UVP HVO. I request to be notified in written on the execution of this order.

Commander of the GS HR HB
Major General Slobodan Praljak
/signed and stamped/

/handwritten document/
HV/partially illegible/
Main Staff HVO – illegible
No. 1168-92
illegible

/stamp/
Defence
Military Secret
Strictly confidential

Return of the seized
M/V /Motorized vehicle/ „Renault 5“
O R D E R

- illegible/
attn.. com. OZ SB
/Central Bosnia/

1. Execute the return of the seized motorized vehicle type “Renault 5” metallic, the ownership of Ramiz Đaferović.
2. Immediately execute the arrest of Goran Međugorac, the member of PPN who is one of the /illegible/.
3. The order is effective immediately and the deadline for execution is 18 November 1992 until 23.00 hours.

Major-general
Slobodan Praljak

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

jerjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, namo
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspop, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

I already published the list of wounded of the A BiH and wounded civilians Muslims – Bosniaks who were transferred across the territory under the control of HVO in BiH.

This number is in excess of 10,000.

And this number refers only to the Split Clinical Centre.

Who transferred them, in whose cars, who paid for the drivers and gasoline, who paid the treatment?

The Croats!!

About aid in medicines and related equipment I published relevant documents.

Did the medical management of the wounded Muslims stop when the A BiH attacked the HVO, expelled the population and cleansed Central Bosnia from Croats.

It did not.

D-1

The helicopter of the HVO cannot, must not fly low, because the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/, i.e. A BiH fire on all such craft although the sign of the Red Cross is plainly visible.

D-2

The document D-2 confirms that the assertion from the document D-1 is correct.

Commander of the 3rd Corps of A BiH Enver HADŽIHASANOVIĆ signs document (D-2) on 9 September 1993 and within that month, between D-1 and D-2 the situation is the same.

He speaks on planned military activities executed by the units of his Corps. In the Lašvanska valley – in VITEZ, against HVO and Croats.

“*Planned activities*” is attack, offensive, and all worldwide media transmit “*objective information*” that the Croats (HVO) attacks the A BiH.

The power of already formed PATTERN about "victim" - Muslims, doesn't allow a true and accurate insight into the facts.

His helicopters should help rescue the wounded of A BiH, and Croatian helicopters should be destroyed and “*not allow landing under any condition...*”

Statement that these are the helicopters (always there was only one) of the HV /Croatian Army/ is only one in a series of lies with which at that time was fed to domestic and international media space.

The majority of these lies stand to this day, and I am writing and claiming, that however long it lasted, it was only an ordinary and transparent lie.

D-3

That was the manner of Hadžihasanović, this is the manner of HVO, and this is the manner of Praljak.

September 9th, 1993 Slobodan Praljak orders a helicopter to transfer a wounded Muslim women, the physician Almira Čandžić to Split.

D-4

No comment.

D-5

And I say to the readers of these pages that the child Haris Silajdžija and his family got Croatian citizenship and that Croatia at the time of war paid for his treatment abroad. The same is with other from the list, and there are four Muslim surnames, two are families, but there are also Serbs.

Praljak had the authority and he did help them to obtain Croatian citizenship.

In front of whom should I now be ashamed and to whom should I apologize and why?

D-6

THE FACTS CONFIRMED BY UN-SPABAT REPORTS

September 1 st , 1993	From the Muslim Hospital in East Mostar the UNPROFOR (SPABAT) transferred 34 wounded fighters of A BiH to the territory under the control of the HVO in Međugorje, and these two helicopters of A BiH went away, wherever they pleased.
September 4 th , 1993	Bad weather prevented further evacuation.
September 6 th , 1993	In the same way transferred and medically provided for 31 wounded soldier of A BiH.
September 7 th , 1993	We accepted and provided for three children with mothers from Jablanica. Muslims – Bosniaks.
September 8 th , 1993	In the same way as earlier, 38 wounded soldiers of A BIH transferred from East Mostar.
September 12 th , 1993	In the same way as earlier, 38 wounded soldiers of A BiH transferred from the hospital in East Mostar.

And their attacks, their offensive “Neretva 93” did not wane – “all the way to Neum and Ploče”, as demanded by their commander-in-chief Sefer Halilović.

Ask the SPABAT commanders, check for yourself.

D-7, D-8, D-9

HVO and its commander of the Main Staff fulfilled every agreement, not only about the wounded, which was reached with A BiH.

As regards the wounded Muslims, more, far more was done than requested by humanitarian war law.

A BiH betrayed every agreement reached with the HVO, including those on the release of the wounded from the Eastern side of Mostar, the wounded of the HVO.

And then again they send the helicopters which the BETRAYED and DOUBLE-CROSSED and exasperated parents BLOCK.

But now, no one is interested any more in what was agreed and no one cares why the top commanders of A BiH lie and cheat and DEMAND “*the shooting down of helicopters of the HV /Croatian Army/*”.

Now it is only the problem of CALMING THE CRIES and yelling of Alija Izetbegović and others, because, look now, these bad Croats “impounded” the helicopters of A BiH, which is, by the way, unarmed.

The same PATTERN, the “victim” cannot be guilty, and it is easy to FORCE THE WEAKER SIDE to endless giving in.

How about the justice, the truth, the BETRAYED agreement, the cheated parents?

Who cares.

/handwritten:/ Sent to Tomislavgrad at 1913 hours
 9 August 1993
 - Vitez via Tomislavgrad -
 /illegible/
 ONO /Operations and Training/

Republic of BH HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/
 HVO /Croatian Defence Council/
 I/illegible/ NORTH-WEST HERZEGOVINA OZ /Operations Zone/
 No. 01-2203
 Prozor, 9 August 1993

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET

Response to request

IZM /Forward Command Post/ CENTRAL BOSNIA OZ, VITEZ
Kralj Tomislav Brigade, Tomislavgrad

Further to the request of Ivan DRMIĆ, please be informed of the following:

- A. We are doing everything we can to secure a helicopter to transfer the seriously wounded Ante DRMIĆ and Vlade SIKIRIĆ from Vitez.
- B. Fog is preventing high-altitude flights, while flying low is dangerous because of the operations of MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/.
- C. As soon as conditions allow, the transfer of the wounded will be taken care of.

HVO GS /Main Staff/ Commander
 Major General
 Slobodan PRALJAK

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 COMMAND OF THE 3rd CORPS
 Str. conf. No. 02-33-2153
 Zenica, 19 September 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT !

Order

- delivers -

333. Mountain Brigade
 305. Mountain Brigade,
 7. Mechanized Brigade
 27. Kbb, 17. Kbb
 /Krajiška Mountain Brigade/
 308. Mountain Brigade
 306. Mountain Brigade
 325. Mountain Brigade
 Municipal Defence Headquarters Zenica

On the day 19 September 1993 a helicopter of the RV A R BiH /Air Force of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ of blue-white colours with the markings of the red cross will fly above your zone of responsibility with the aim of transporting the wounded. These helicopters will fly in the following days too, as long as the planned military actions in the Lašvanska valley are taking place. In parallel with these flights, by means of UNPROFOR a flight of the helicopter of the Croatian Army has been announced, probably coloured in camouflage colours or some other colour and this flight is not approved by the Army of the R BiH.

On the basis of verified information we know that this helicopter will carry reinforcements in military personnel and military equipment.

On the basis of the above findings,

I ORDER

1. Immediately shoot down the helicopters of the Croatian Army.
2. In no way allow the landing of the helicopters of the Croatian Army in the area of the Lašvanska valley.
3. In case of shooting down a helicopter of the HV /Croatian Army/ immediately notify this command.
4. Strictly pay attention not to make the mistake in identifying the helicopters, in order not to shoot down a helicopter of the Army of R BiH instead of a helicopter of the HV.
5. Also pay attention during the flight of the helicopter at dusk and early dawn when there are conditions for camouflaging and surprise.

C O M M A N D E R

Enver Hadžihasanović

Verified by stamp and signature

/handwritten 1001 Ivančić/

/fax marks/

from ***** with G3 standard SEP 06.93 2:29P /handwritten 10:31/

total page : 001 failure page : none

4969 253151 PHINBERT IMPORT-EXPORT GMBH 541 P01 06.09.93 13: illegible

/header/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

MAIN STAFF

Number: 02-2/1-01-2338/93

IZM (Forwarded post) Čitluk 5th of September 1993

/handwritten approved/

Demand for the transfer by helicopter

OS HRZ Zagreb

We ask you to accomplish the transfer of the heavy wounded Almira Čandžić /handwritten doctor/, born in 194/illegible/ dg. Status post amputatione numeri dex, Vulus explosivus abdeninis.

For the heavy degree of the wound, it is necessary to transfer her from Mostar (Mostarsko blato) KBC Zagreb. /handwritten Split illegible/

Respectfully yours

Commander of the GS HVO

General Major

Slobodan Praljak

/signed and stamped/

/fax marks/

from 4969 253151 with G3 standard SEP 06.93 2:36P

total page: 001 failure page : none

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA
SERVICE FOR WOUNDED PERSONS' CARE
MOSTAR, 11 September 1993
No: 02-5/3-39/93 HR HB

Chief Assistant of OO
Health sector
Attn Brigadier Dr. Ivan Bagarić

Subject: report on Muslim nationality child transport (exchange) and his evacuation to Split regarding further medical treatment

On 11 September 1993, by the Order of Chief of Control-security service in the Sector for health care, Dr. Ivo Šandrak and by the Order of Mr. General Praljak, I, as Doctor, escorted the sick child (leukaemia in remission), Silajdzija Haris, 4,5 years old along with his mother, Silajdzija Enisa and younger brother, 2 years old, from the locality War Hospital Rama Rumboci to Split.

The mother and children were transported by UNPROFOR and European observers, Mr. Rudy Gerritsen from the Netherlands (540509115) and Mr. David MacIver from Canada (1496) - European observers, and in Mr. Tomić's presence at 14:30 hrs, they consigned the mother and children to my care.

The HTV crew witnessed the moment, having it recorded.

At 14:45 hrs we moved to Split and arrived there at 18.45 hrs. Dr Škrabic took further care on them in KBC Firule Split.

STR. Co-operator of service for
Wounded persons' care
Dr. Pero Marić
/signed and stamped twice/

/coat of arms/

(on the right side Croatian text, on the left English)

CLINICAL HOSPITAL SPLIT

58 000 SPLIT, Spinčićeva 1

CROATIA

Telephone (058) 515-055

Fax: 365 738

Split, 29 October 1993

C E R T I F I C A T E

That hereby confirms that the below cited children, victims of war, being treated in KBC Split, according to Decision of Supreme Medical Commission, are recommended to continue the medical treatment abroad.

Nevertheless, all of them were registered as urgent cases from the battle fields, without personal identification. Since they must continue their treatment abroad, it is necessary for them to be provided with a passport. Therefore, we kindly ask you to issue the passports so they can become healthy citizens already tomorrow. The above cited is related to:

1. ALEKSANDRA VUJICA, with family
2. IVANA MARTIĆ, with family
3. HARIS SILAJDŽIĆ, with family
4. MERSIHA VELEDAR, with family
5. GORAN BOŠNJAK, with family

Civilians, victim of war, adults:

1. FRANCISKA MARTIĆ, with two children
2. SENAD ZEC

Members of the BH Army and HVO:

1. MARIN BAČIĆ
2. BERNARD MATOŠEVIĆ
3. ZORAN KASALO
4. SPASOJE JEREK
5. FIKRET HODŽIĆ

Thank you in advance!

Main nurse:

M. Županović, vms

/signed and stamped/

Principal:

Mr.sc. dr. Goran Dodig

/signed/

Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosnia
Main staff of HVO HR HB
Operational number; 02-2/1-01-3220 /illegible//93
Mostar, 29 October 1993

SPABAT Međugorje
Attn; exchange commission
Of the 4th corps

Response to the letter

Helicopters in Međugorje are under protection of UNPROFOR and VP HVO. Blockade of helicopters took place due to Muslim failure to fulfil obligations, which refers to release of HVO prisoners in accordance with Ganić-Silajdžić agreement and the list of ICRC.

Despite the agreement on evacuation of wounded persons, revolted families and relatives of the captured HVO members, blocked the run way.

Besides our convincing, they do not want to let the helicopters go in a peaceful manner, however, we are not ready for the use of force at this moment.

In order to get this situation going, we suggest that the Muslim side carries out release of HVO prisoners according to ICRC list and previous agreement simultaneously with the evacuation of their wounded combatants regardless the number, with full guaranty to the safety of all wounded persons and support staff.

We suggest that the Muslim exchange commission comes to Međugorje so that we can agree upon some technical details.

Main staff of HVO
Major General
Slobodan Praljak
/signed and stamped/

Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosnia
 Main staff of HVO of HR HB

Operational number 02-2/1-01-3216/93
 Mostar, 29 October 1993

Defence
 Official
 SPABAT Međugorje
 UNPROFOR Kiseljak
 Attn General Briquemont

Dear Mister General,

Regarding our conversations from yesterday in relation to approve the take off of Muslim helicopters from Međugorje, I must inform you that, along with all efforts that I made, women and parents of the prisoners, who should have been exchanged and are currently in Muslim prisons, do not allow the take off of the helicopters.

The only solution for me would be the usage of force, which is something I am not ready to do at this moment. Women and parents ask for release of prisoners as well as for the release of wounded combatants at the same time.

I shall persist in convincing them to let the helicopters to take off and in case if I succeed, you shall be notified on it on time.

Sincerely yours,

Main Staff of HVO
 General Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
 MAIN STAFF OF HVO
 Operational number: 02-2/1-01-3244/93
 Mostar, 30 October 1993

SPABAT
 To general BRIQUEMONT

1. General Praljak does not connect the release of Muslim Army helicopter with the exchange of detainees, as I told you on the meeting, so I acted.
2. General Praljak regrets the disbelief that the release of helicopter is only possible if the families of detainees are removed from the runway by force.
3. Mr. General, if you want me to, I can move the HVO military police, safeguarding the helicopters, along with SPABAT and then let SPABAT to take care of taking off.
4. To express myself in a simple way, I tried everything, the civilians are not under my command, therefore I cannot convince them.
5. Tomorrow, Sunday afternoon, Mr. Petković is coming back, I shall leave the case to him.

Phone: 058 365 249

Main Staff of HVO
 General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, namo
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom sa
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

D-1

At the end of March or beginning of April 1992 the IPD /Section of Informative Psychological Activity/ Department of the Croatian MO /Ministry of Defence/ which I then directed, printed, in cooperation with the ICRC /International Committee of the Red Cross/ the booklet “RULES OF BEHAVIOUR FOR COMBATANTS”.

In the middle of March I was back from Sunja, took the duties in the MO and immediately we printed the handbook, as soon as we managed to defend ourselves and were in the position to organize the MO in a more serious way.

“THE RULES OF BEHAVIOUR FOR COMBATANTS” were printed in around 100,000 copies and I claim that every member of the HV /Croatian Army/ got his copy.

If we wish to be mathematically precise, then the above assertion cannot be correct, but in the usual way of making assertions, it is true.

As soon as in May 1992 this booklet was distributed to the fighters of the HVO, because we sent them the copies – I cannot remember the numbers any more.

As the IPD Department of the MO had its representative, its member in all units of the HV to the level of company, in the function of assistant commander of the unit, this booklet had to be studied on all the levels of the military structure.

D-2

HZ-HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/ printed a leaflet on the same topic – *The rules of engagement in a military conflict*. They did this in cooperation with the ICRC.

D-3

On October 1st, 1992 I sent a detailed letter to all operational zones of the HV, Croatian Navy, Croatian Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence to the level of company, in order for them to read, study and EDUCATE MEMBERS OF HV on what must not be done in the war.

There is no sense commenting, so I am asking the reader to read the document.

Note:

It would be wrong to conclude that the stated violations of law are directed nationally, only towards the Serbs. Just the contrary, at the time of the “ceasefire” due to many factors, increase the number of violations and criminal offenses within the unit.

D-4

International humanitarian war law as a constant topic and preoccupation of all my co-workers at the Ministry.

I cannot produce all the documents, but I place at your inspection another document from May 17th, 1993.

D-5

At that time, on September 26th, 1993 the offensive of A BiH on the HVO was of maximum intensity.

After the Muslims and the Serbs in the summer of 1993 signed the Agreement on non-aggression,

A BiH moved along the 200 km wide front towards the HVO and the Croats.

All relevant documents about that I had already presented in earlier books.

In more than a precarious military situation – a huge advantage of the attacker in manpower, and with all the problems besieging the military structure of the HVO, we, I, continued the practice of continuous education of fighters about International Humanitarian Law.

D-6 (I)**D-6 (II)****D-6 (III)**

The military training which we practiced in such war conditions, as far as it was at all possible, always contained an item “PROGRAMME OF MILITARY TRAINING AND EDUCATION OF SOLDIERS”.

This education contained the lessons about the moral soldier and moral behaviour, the Humanitarian War Right included.

Note:

Every member of the HV and HVO was informed of the Humanitarian War Law and knew that he has the right and obligation to refuse any command (verbal or written) which would demand committing a crime. He had an obligation to report the person who gave such a command to the officer next above in the command chain.

RULES OF CONDUCT FOR SOLDIERS



International committee of Red Cross (ICRC)

19th Avenue - de la Paix

CH - 1202 Geneva, Swiss

RULES OF COMBAT

1. Fight only against soldiers
2. Attack military targets only
3. Spare civilians and civilian facilities
4. Restrict destruction specifically on your mission requirements.

SOLDIERS

Respect this sign! 

It protects:

- wounded and ill;
- medical staff and red Cross staff;
- ambulance vehicles and Red Cross convoys;
- Hospitals, first aid station and Red Cross facilities.



WOUNDED ENEMIES ON THE BATTLEFIELD


1. Pick them up




2. Offer them aid



3. Hand them over to your superior or closest medical team



4. Respect medical staff and facilities



WOUNDED ENEMIES AND VICTIMS OF SHIPWRECKS


1. Protect wounded, ill and shipwrecked individuals (as well as air staff)




2. Look for them and pick them up after each battle



3. Protect civilian boats saving wounded and victims of shipwrecks



4. Respect ship - hospitals and medical airplanes with Red Cross insignia




IMPRISONED ENEMIES

1. Spare them.



3. Surrender them to your superior officer

2. Disarm them.



4. Treat them humanely. Their families must be informed about their capture.


CIVILIANS

1. Spare them.



3. Protect them from violence. Retaliation and hostage taking are forbidden.

2. Treat humanly those who are in your custody.



4. Respect their property, do not damage it and do not steal it.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Certain rules must be followed during the time of war even when it comes to the enemies. These rules are mainly contained in four Geneva Conventions for 1949 and Supplementary protocols from the 1977 Convention.

Until July 1993, 181 states have signed Geneva Convention's; 125 states signed 1st and 116 signed 2nd Supplementary protocol. As a party who signed Geneva Conventions and its Supplementary protocols your state is obligated to follow those international contracts.

These contracts were based on concept to respect each individual and his or her dignity. Individuals who are not directly involved in combat or individuals who are not fighting because of the illness, wounding or some other reason, must be respected and protected from war; people in trouble must be helped and cared for without discrimination. Special protection must be provided for the hospitals, medical staff and convoys, as well as Red Cross staff, facilities and equipment.

ICRC

States that signed Geneva Conventions are obligated to:

- Care about wounded equally, with no difference whether it is the friends or foes;
- Respect physical integrity, honor, dignity, family rights, as well as morale and religious beliefs of each individual.
- Prohibit torture and inhumane actions, death sentence without due process, extermination, deportations, hostage taking and robbery and destruction of civilian property.
- Allow ICRC delegates to visit prisoners and to talk to them face to face.

Geneva Conventions protect:

Wounded and sick members of armed forces on the battlefield and medical staff (1st Convention).

Wounded and sick members of armed forces at sea and shipwreck victims. (2nd Convention)

Prisoners of war. (3rd Convention)

Civilian individuals in enemy's custody or on occupied territories. (4th Convention)

Article 3, which is shared by all four Conventions, refers to internal conflicts and obligates to humane treatment for all individuals who are not involved in conflicts or who are no longer involved in conflict. This provision especially prohibits inhumane actions, hostage taking, torture and carrying out of death sentence without a due process and dictates that trials must be carried out according to regulations.

Supplementary protocols deal with, in more detail, with international (Protocol 1) and internal conflicts (Protocol 2). Difference between civilian objects and military targets must be respected during the conflict.

ICRC with seat in Geneva (Switzerland) is founding body of Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements.

As neutral intermediary in the case of armed conflicts. ICRC tries to, on its own initiative or based on Geneva Conventions, to offer aid and protection to the victims of international and civil wars as well as internal unrests and tensions and by doing so it contributes to world peace.

As initiating body and promoter of Geneva Conventions. ICRC is guardian of International humanitarian law.



VISITS TO PRISONERS

Visits by ICRC have objective to determine physical and psychological condition of captivity and treatment of prisoners.

In the case of need ICRC proposes measures for improvement of imprisonment conditions to the authorities holding the prisoners.

Reports written by ICRC after the visit to places where prisoners are being held are strictly confidential and can not be published.

When it comes to internal conflicts reports are given to the authorities holding the prisoners and to the authorities of the country of prisoner's origin.

In international conflicts reports are given to the authorities holding the prisoners and to the authorities of the country of prisoner's origin.

MORE PRECISE CRITERIA

ICRC implements same criteria in its actions to aid prisoners whether there is a situation which is covered by Geneva Conventions or not. In other words:

ICRC delegates must have access to all prisoners and they must be allowed to talk to them freely and without witnesses;

Delegates must have access to all places where prisoners are being held and they must be allowed to repeat their visits;

Delegates must be given the lists of all individuals to be visited (or they must have opportunity to create such lists on the spot).



CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA

TO SOLDIERS AND OFFICIALS

RULES OF CONDUCT IN THE ARMED FIGHT

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

Certain humanitarian rules must be obeyed in the time of war, even when this concerns the enemy. These rules are determined by the Geneva Convention.

FIGHTERS!

1. Fight only against the armed enemy
2. Attack only the military targets
3. Spare civilians and civil objects
4. Destroy only those targets, defined within your plan



Related to enemy fighters that surrender

1. Do not kill them! Disarm them!
2. Treat them in human manner!
3. Deliver them to your superiors!



Related to wounded enemy combatants

1. Provide them with First aid!
2. Deliver them to your superiors!
3. Deliver them to the closest medical crew!



Related to civilians

1. Respect them! Treat them in human manner!
2. Do not mistreat them!
3. Do not damage and do not steal their property!
4. Revenge and holding hostages are strictly forbidden!

- | | | |
|--|--|---|
| | | Red Cross or Red Crescent |
| | | Civil protection |
| | | Cultural objects, monuments, sanctuaries, museums, etc |
| | | Dams, embankments, atomic power systems and propulsions |
| | | White flag of peace negotiations |

Related to special marks of humans and objects

1. Respect persons, guard them and do not enter facilities, bearing these marks
2. Let the persons, bearing these marks, to perform their tasks
3. Do not impede vehicles, bearing these marks
4. This is applied if no other order is received

/coat of arms/
 Republic of Croatia
 Ministry of defence
 41 000 Zagreb
 IPD administration
 Zagreb, 1st October 1992

/stamp of receipt/
 Republic of Croatia
 Ministry of defence
 IPD administration
 Class: 804-04/92-02
 Operational number: 5120-25-92-852/3

Attn: IPD services of all operational zones
 HRM, HRZ and PZO
 (please forward it to IPD companies)

Information on frequency of criminal offenses of the Croatian army members

Lately, especially in the period after cessation of fights and direct warfare activities on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, there was an increase of criminal offenses, committed by the members of HV or persons which were recently demobilized. The increase of criminal offenses is concerning, because it is the question of significantly high number of offenses, with tendency of current increase. The concern is even bigger due to the fact that heavy criminal offenses with grave consequences prevail, for which the law does not anticipate severe punishments.

In the most of cases, one observed that the perpetrators of these offenses decided to execute offenses without proper, or even any consideration, as well as that they do not have a critical attitude towards what has been done; moral component is also missing, there is no remorse of conscience, even a conscience on prohibition of those offenses is missing, especially referring to gravity of consequences and gravity of regulated punishment.

Without involving in finding and establishing the cause of such phenomenon, it is necessary, right away and without delay, to start with preventive activity in the HV troops. The least one can do is introduce the soldiers to several important facts about which they might have partially forgotten, due to their activities in war or they might have gotten a wrong impression that the aforementioned are no longer important. Besides, one should intend to respect the military discipline, especially obeying orders which refer to carrying and use of weapons and explosive devices. Firstly, each member of HV must be familiar with two basic matters:

1. Croatian army fought and won the war in which Croatia is liberated and in which it has the opportunity to establish its democratic state for the first time ever. First and basic condition such state could exist and operate on, is the RULE OF LAW. Therefore, nobody, not even current or former member of the HV can breach its laws and regulations without punishment.
2. By one's participation in war to liberate the country, by one's courage, self-abnegation, merits and personal sacrifice, nobody gained ability to receive moderated punishment for committed offenses, let alone to be forgiven.

In regards to the aforementioned under item 1, each Croatian soldier must know that this entire war with all its casualties had sense only if this enabled establishment of national, free and in each term, better state than the one which was brought down. In that kind of state there must be, as well as it should be defended, personal safety of the citizens and inviolability of private and state property. If the Croatian soldier in his own state, established through his courage and self-abnegation, as well as courage, health and lives of others, commits offenses by which he endangers basic values of such state, he questions its activity, he loses his own dignity and belittles the victim of those who died or remained permanently disabled.

In regards to the aforementioned under item 2, one should know that the law does not envisage a possibility that somebody is forgiven a criminal offense and that he is free of punishment, because he previously did some good or great deed. To be fair, the law does provide possibility that some merit can be taken into consideration by punishment determination as the so called mitigating circumstance. However, when it is known that frames of possible punishment for each individual criminal offense are set extremely broad, such mitigating circumstance can, with final degree of punishment, be imperceptible or almost insignificant.

One noticed that the major number of the gravest criminal offenses, committed by the HV members or by immediately demobilized person, was done, having involved three factors:

- a) in alcoholised condition
- b) by using weapons or weapon threat
- c) operating in a group

Exactly those three aforementioned factors bring the perpetrators of such grave criminal offenses into a less favourable position, other than the position of such perpetrators of criminal offenses actually is like. The criminal law finds that criminal offenses committed by use or threat by weapon, as well as those which were committed in group, are more severe form of criminal offense. Therefore the law anticipates significantly heavier punishments for such offenses than those which are anticipated for the similar offenses, but which were committed without weapon usage and without participation of several people.

The influence of alcohol, to the contrary of ingrained belief of the major number of uninformed persons, is not a circumstance which can excuse someone for what he did in alcoholised condition. On the contrary, with some sorts of criminal offenses, such are, for instance, criminal offenses, which endanger the public traffic, a circumstance that the perpetrator was under influence of alcohol makes that criminal offense graver and therefore a graver punishment was stipulated for such person.

Knowledge and awareness about the gravity of certain criminal offenses and gravity of prevented punishments can influence the decrease of crime.

Although one often finds that the basic matters from the field of criminal law are known to everyone, the practice shows the opposite. Therefore cases of an appalled individual who committed some grave criminal offense are quite often, and who found that his offense was barely punishable. Finding that the law for such offense anticipates, for example, the lowest possible sentence of 3 or 5 years of imprisonment is devastating. Therefore it is more likely that the majority of such persons wouldn't even have decided to commit such criminal offense, if they had been aware of a possibility of being criminally responsible, regardless of their membership in HV, regardless of their war merits and the fact that their act is something, which was marked by the law as an especially grave form of criminal offense and therefore anticipates especially severe, several years long imprisonment sentence.

Criminal offenses, mostly committed by the members of HV or former members of HV, can be classified in 4 groups, whereby such classification does not necessarily refer to regulation of penal code and the partial reason for this is frequent interference of various criminal offenses, committed in one single occasion. The following are in question:

- a) criminal offenses by which one endangers life of health of other people
- b) criminal offenses at the expense of other people's assets
- c) criminal offenses against dignity and morale
- d) criminal offenses against safety of the public traffic

Under a)

MURDERS

For the homicide with malice aforethought, the law anticipates minimum punishment of 5 years imprisonment, whereas the maximum, of 15 years imprisonment (article 35, item 1 of the Croatian Penal

Code). Perpetrator, by his offense, decided to take other person's life. First degree or qualified homicide bears even more severe punishment in range between 10 and 20 years. It refers to homicides which are committed under such aggravating circumstances due to which the law anticipates severe punishments: murder in cruel or perfidious manner, murder on the occasion in which other people's lives are endangered, murder committed by unscrupulous violent behaviour, murder for gain in order to execute or to cover other criminal offense, murder from ruthless revenge or other basic instincts, murder of the official person while that person performs affairs of public and state security or another official person which guards the arrestee. All the aforementioned are modalities of the heavy criminal offense of homicide.

Homicide in a fit of passion (article 36 of the Croatian Penal Code)

This homicide is committed in case of temporary reaction of the perpetrator to attack, abuse or severe insult, and he is therefore brought into the state of significant irritation without this being his fault. The punishment's range moves from 1 to 10 years of imprisonment.

Manslaughter by negligence (article 38 of the Penal code of RH)

The perpetrator in this case does not want to kill, but he is responsible for cause of death which occurred and he could have been aware of. This occurs due to lack of caution, unprofessional, light-minded or easy managing of weapon or explosive devices. This often occurs during the war. The punishment stretches between 6 months and 5 years of imprisonment.

Severe physical injury (article 41 of the Croatian Penal Code)

We differ between severe physical injury, for which the determined punishment stretches between 6 months and 5 years of imprisonment and especially severe physical injury, whereby the punishment, determined by the law, stretches between 1 and 10 years of imprisonment. Modalities for especially severe physical injury are the following: when the victim is brought to the state of life jeopardy, when physical disability is caused, when the permanent disability to work is caused, when it came to permanent and severe health jeopardy or when the permanent disfiguration is caused. For the severe physical injury with lethal consequences, the law stipulates imprisonment sentence in duration of 3 years minimum.

For the severe physical injury in a fit of passion, when the perpetrator, without this being his fault, is brought into severe state of irritation by attack, abuse or insult of the harmed one, the law stipulates imprisonment sentence in duration from 6 months to 3 years. For the severe physical injury with lethal consequences, committed in a fit of passion, the law stipulated imprisonment sentence in duration from 1 to 5 years.

Light physical injury (article 42 of the Croatian Penal Code)

The law determines 3 years imprisonment sentence to the one who slightly injures other person or who slightly jeopardizes his health.

Participation in the physical fight (article 43 of the Croatian Penal Code)

The one who participates in any physical fight, in which somebody was deprived of life or in which someone is severely physically injured, shall be punished for the mere participation by imprisonment sentence, in duration from 3 months to 3 years. We shall also cite some criminal offenses against the public order and traffic, in which life and health of people are also endangered.

Preventing the official person in execution of his/her official duty (article 193)

The law determines imprisonment sentence in duration up to 5 years for those who, by force or under threat of using force, prevent the official person in execution of his/her official duties; the same punishment refers to the situation in which insult, abuse, causing of light physical injury or threat to use weapon occur. The punishment refers to offenses committed towards the official person while executing duties of public or state safety, which refer to prevention or reveal of criminal offenses, arresting perpetrators of criminal offenses and guard of the aforementioned.

Violent conduct (article 198 of the Croatian Penal Code)

Anyone who, by violent insulting or abusing other person, by violence or other impertinent or ruthless conduct endangers peacefulness of citizens, shall be punished with imprisonment sentence in duration from 3

months to 3 years. If the deed is committed in group, the imprisonment sentence stretches from 1 till 8 years of imprisonment. The same punishment is determined if only light physical injury occurs.

False introduction (article 204 of the Croatian Penal Code)

Anyone who falsely introduces himself as official or military person or who, unauthorized, wears insignias of official or military person with intention to have gain, monetary fine or imprisonment sentence up to 1 year is determined.

Unallowed holding of weapon and explosive devices (article 209 of the Croatian Penal Code)

For unauthorized making, acquisition, selling or holding, imprisonment sentence in duration up to 3 years is determined, whereas for major quantities the punishment from 1 to 10 years of imprisonment is envisaged.

Participation in group which commits the criminal offense (article 21 of the Croatian Penal Code)

Anyone who participates in group of people, which, by joint activity deprives a person of life or causes to this person a severe physical injury, damages property of major proportion or commits other severe violence, for participation alone, shall be punished by 3 to 5 years of imprisonment. Determined punishment for the leader is 1 to 10 years of imprisonment.

The practice of courts is that, by punishment determination for each of described deed, it will consider the usage of firearms, explosive or any art of weapon which is considered as especially dangerous as especially grave circumstance. It shall influence the degree of punishment, in the manner it shall be higher, respectively, closer to the upper than to the lower level, anticipated by the law. Also, participation of several persons in execution of the aforementioned deeds, is mostly anticipated by the law itself as special circumstance, which makes the criminal offense more grave and in any case, if it is not the question of special, heavy form of criminal offense, for which the more severe punishment is already anticipated, such circumstance represents special aggravating circumstance and brings to passing of more severe sentence than average.

Under b)

Property of citizens, property of state, equally as the property of the enemy are protected by the law. This is visible from regulations of the Penal Code in which the most severe punishments are anticipated for all forms of appropriation of other people's property, whereby no difference was made in terms of private, social, state or property of the enemy.

Theft (article 130 of the Croatian Penal Code)

For the plain theft, imprisonment sentence in duration from 3 months to 5 years is determined. The intention of the perpetrator is appropriation of illegal property use by alienating other people's movables.

Severe theft (article 131 of the Croatian Penal Code)

For the severe theft the law determines imprisonment sentence in duration from 1 to 10 years and it occurs in following cases: when the theft is carried out by breaking in in especially dangerous or impertinent manner, by using conditions, in which fire, flood, quake or other disaster (war included, of course) occur, by using other person's inability, by people who had a weapon or dangerous tool along, as well as by several persons who joined in order to steal.

Robbery (article 132 of the Penal Code of RH)

For this criminal offense, act of appropriation of other people's property with help or threat of weapon, or generally, by using force, 1 to 12 years of imprisonment sentence is determined. If the offense is committed in a group, the punishment is 3 to 15 years of imprisonment, whereby already 3 perpetrators are considered a group.

Robbery theft (article 133 of the Croatian Penal Code)

It is a theft, whereby the perpetrator, caught within its execution, used force in order to keep the stolen good. The punishment stretches between 1 and 12 years of imprisonment.

Under c)

Moral and dignity are especially protected by the law. It is visible by very severe punishments which are determined for the acts of rape, as well as other kinds of sexual delicts. Easy engagement to commit such criminal offense, especially when there are 2, 3 or several of perpetrators and especially if the female person was hurt in any way whatsoever, brings the perpetrators to a rather grave position before the court. It is especially important to emphasize that neither here, nor, generally, referring to other criminal offenses, the law makes any difference in relation who is and what is she like, the female person which was raped. The only difference is that helpless persons, minors and especially children till the age of 14 are protected by especially severe punishments.

Rape (article 83 of the Croatian Penal Code)

Punishment for this criminal offense is 1 to 10 years of imprisonment. However, if the victim was severely physically injured or that person died, if the offense was committed by several persons or in especially cruel or humiliating manner, the imprisonment sentence is 3 to 15 years. One should emphasize that well-established practice of the courts, according to which already two perpetrators are considered by the law as several persons, therefore the rape, committed by only two perpetrators is liable to significantly higher sentence, stretching from 3 to 15 years of imprisonment. One should have no doubts that each threat by weapon or any use of weapon, even mere possession on the occasion of perpetrating the criminal offense of rape, exerts an influence of an aggravating circumstance and results in pronouncing a more severe punishment.

Under d)

During the war operations the public traffic developed under extraordinary conditions. Traffic lights were out of order, neither the surveillance nor control of vehicles and drivers was operative. Major number of vehicles, used by members of HV was included in traffic, which were not properly registered or technically examined. Members of HV often drove such vehicles without necessary driver's exam of adequate category, often in alcoholised conditions. It all resulted in major number of traffic accidents with grave consequences despite low traffic density. By establishing the traffic in peace, there were no longer reasons which could represent an excuse for some of the aforementioned oversights. Therefore every other member of HV must count with the fact that he, as well as every other citizen, is liable to harsh traffic discipline, which means that he is obliged to stick to all regulations and rules which are valid in public traffic, whereas on the other side, they, as well as everybody else, are responsible for criminal offenses which they commit by jeopardizing the public traffic.

Jeopardizing the public traffic due to intoxication (article 164 of the Penal Code of RH)

For this criminal offense the law stipulates punishment of up to 3 years of imprisonment. It is the question of the perpetrator who, alcoholised or intoxicated, drove the motor vehicle and thereby jeopardized the public traffic.

For the criminal offense against safety of the public traffic, on the occasion of which a death of one or several persons occurred, the law stipulates 3 to 15 years of imprisonment. If only severe injury or major proportions damage occurred, the punishment is up to 10 years of imprisonment. Those are severe criminal offenses against safety of the public traffic. This is valid for all cases in which one finds the aforementioned consequences due to violation of traffic regulations, such as major exceeding the speed limit, going through red light or violation of zebra crosswalk regulation and similar. This is especially in force for all cases when the accident was caused due to alcohol influence and one considers that the driver was under the influence of alcohol if the alcohol level in his blood was over 0,5‰.

From all the aforementioned, one concludes that practically every use of weapon or any threat whatsoever, any practical use outside of training or combat activities is liable to punishment, moreover, every criminal offense, committed with the use of weapon, even, in some cases, by mere possession at the time of perpetrating an offense, makes such offense especially grave and punishable by more severe punishment. Furthermore, each criminal offense committed in a group or by several persons, whereby in some cases already two perpetrators are considered "several persons", is especially grave offense and is therefore liable to more severe punishment.

Any criminal offense, committed under the influence of alcohol, does not become lighter, neither can it bring to less severe punishment, but some offenses, such as traffic criminal offenses, can bring to more severe punishment.

Since none of the Croatian soldiers can count with the fact that he can be forgiven a criminal offense, or that he will not be processed due to his membership to HV, he must take into consideration his acts as well as acts of other soldiers. Major number of criminal offenses wouldn't have even happened, if, contrary to the orders, weapons hadn't been carried out from the barracks and brought into the bars, if alcohol hadn't been over-consumed and if one hadn't followed various propositions of irresponsible and unconscientious individuals without thinking.

Accordingly, by better obedience to military discipline and especially by better self-discipline, everybody can avoid the conflict with the law. It is sad that a HV member, after he bravely and honourably defeated the enemy by fight, instead of continuing his honourable military carrier, or, after taking off the military uniform, and moving to broad open world of private initiative, entrepreneurship and establishment of every kind of well-being, due to imprudence in management of the weapon or excessive consummation of alcohol, he must serve several years of imprisonment sentence.

Finally, every Croatian soldier, as during his service in HV, so after taking off the uniform as well, must take into account that every action of his, influences the global picture of HV among the citizens.

Every criminal offense, committed by the current of former member of the Croatian army rips off a small part of huge, however untouchable reputation that the Croatian army created among the population in only a year of its existence.

Remark: pursuant to report that we received from IPD service of the zone of operations Osijek and which are considered valid for the others as well, we send you this information you are obliged to introduce all employees to, as well as other members of the Croatian army units.

Assistant minister

Major General

Slobodan Praljak

/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
 ZAGREB
 POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

DEFENSE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

File no. 512-14-05/93-851

Zagreb, 17 May 1993

Pursuant to the Agreement between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and the International Committee of the Red Cross on the dissemination among the Croatian Army of International Humanitarian War Law, the Political Administration of the MORH /Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia/ and the MKCK /International Committee of the Red Cross/ are organizing a two-day seminar on the following topic:

"INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN WAR LAW"

The seminar is intended for HV /Croatian Army/ officers occupying the most demanding command and other leading positions in the MORH and GSHV /Main Staff of the Croatian Army/ and it will be held on 26 and 27 May 1993 at the HV Hall in Zagreb (the small conference hall - no. 26 - entrance from Zvonimirova Street) beginning at 0830 hrs.

In keeping with the above, I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. Officers from the following are to be sent to the seminar:

- the Main Staff of the HV	2 representatives,
- the Health Administration of the MO /Ministry of Defence/	2 representatives,
- the Personnel Administration of the MO	2 representatives,
- the Legal Administration of the MO	2 representatives,
- the Political Administration of the MO	2 representatives,
- the Administration for Education of the GSHV	2 representatives,
- the Administration for Training of the GSHV	2 representatives,
- the Croatian Military Academy	2 representatives,
- the Security and Information Service	1 representative,
- the Military Districts	1 representative,
- the Guards Brigades of the HV	1 representative,
- the Education Centres of the HV	1 representative,
- the Commands of the HRZ /Croatian Air-force/ and PZO /Anti-aircraft defence/	2 representatives,
- the Command of the HRM /Croatian Navy/	2 representatives,
- the Main Inspectorate of the HV	1 representative.

2. Application forms indicating the names of the seminar participants and possible accommodation requests are to be submitted to the Political Administration of the MORH, Zagreb, Stančićeva Street 4/1, before 22 May 1993 (tel. 467-569, 467-431, Mr. Milan Jagec, M.Sc, fax 467-563).

3. To be sent to the following:
 1. the Main Staff of the HV
 2. the Health Administration of the MO
 3. the Legal Administration of the MO
 4. the Personnel Administration of the MO
 5. the Political Administration of the MO
 6. the Administration for Education of the GSHV
 7. the Administration for Training of the GSHV
 8. the Croatian Military Academy
 9. the Security and Information Service
 10. Military Districts: Osijek, Zagreb, Gospić, Split, Karlovac and Bjelovar
 11. Guards Brigades: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th
 12. the Commands of the HRZ and PZO
 13. the Command of the HRM
 14. the Education Centres of the HV in: Jastrebarsko, Požega, Koprivnica, Sinj, Pula.
 15. the Main Inspection of the HV
 16. Archives.

Enclosure: seminar program

Assistant Minister for
Political Affairs
General-Major
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

Cc:

- Minister of Defence
- Chief of the GSHV

SEMINAR ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

PROGRAM

Zagreb, 26 and 27 May 1993

DAY 1

0830: Opening of seminar - keynote address

0900: Film - "Appeal for Humanity"

0945: Basic terms of the MHRP /International Humanitarian War Law/

1030: Break

1100: Strategic situations and the MHRP

1145: Film: "Retrospective 92"

1330: Command responsibility and the MHRP

1415: ICRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movements

1500: Participants' questions

DAY 2

0830: Operation planning and execution

0945: Conduct in combat (prisoners of war)

1030: Break

1100: Training - Military - MHRP

1145: Film: "British Military"

1330: ICRC in the territory of the former Yugoslavia

1415: Croatian Red Cross

1500: Participants' questions - closing address

The seminar is being organised by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (MKCK), the Political Administration of the MORH and the Red Cross of the Republic of Croatia.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

/coat of arms/

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG BOSNIA

CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

MAIN STAFF OF HVO HR HB

Operational number: 02-2/1-01-2669/93

Mostar, 26 September 1993

International Committee of
The Red Cross Zagreb,
Đure Salaja 8

Re: your letter Zag. 93/15191-PHA/am, Zgb, 20 September 1993

We are in agreement with your proposal of organization of the seminar on the International humanitarian law for the HVO officers. We completely accept and find it reasonable, therefore we kindly ask you to suggest the terms in order to precise the schedule of lectures.

Respectively,

Commander of the GS HVO HR HB
Major General
Slobodan Praljak
/signed and stamped/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /the text of the round stamp illegible/
 Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council

/The coat of arms of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/
 Main Staff of HVO /Croatian Defence Council/
 Ref. Number 02-2/1-01-1808/93 /11 hand-written above/

IZM /Forward Command Post/ Čitluk, 10.08.1993

Defence
 Military Secret
 Strictly Confidential

Department for schooling and
 education of GS /Main Staff/ HVO
 Attn. Željko AKRAP

The draft of the curriculum of basic and specialised training and education of soldiers

Order

Pursuant to Order on Training of Recruits No. 02-1-884/93 dated 20.07.1993, of the Defence Department, according to the need and the beginning of the military training and education of recruits, and with regard to a prompt planning of the training and draft of subjects of the plans of the military training and education,

I order

1. Department for schooling and education of GS HVO shall draft curriculum on basic and specialised training and education of soldiers, using the curricula of the military training and education of soldiers of Croatian Army.
2. In its contents and duration of the training (30 working days for basic military training and 60 days for specialised training), the curriculum is to be adjusted to the curriculum of military training and education of HV /Croatian Army/ soldiers.
3. The curriculum is to be finished until 12.08.1993 when it has to be brought to me for my analysis and approval.
4. The curricula are to be printed in certain number of copies in the Grafotisak Grude, and submitted to the training centres for recruits and to the units where the specialised training is carried out.

the GS HVO Commander
 Major General
 Slobodan PRALJAK
 /signed and stamped on
 behalf of for the commander/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /the text of the round stamp illegible/
 Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council
 /The coat of arms of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/
 HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Main Staff/
 Ref. Number 02-2/1-01-1806/93

IZM /Forward Command Post/ Čitluk, 10.08.1993

Defence
 Military Secret
 Strictly Confidential

- P.P. / as written/ Ludvig Pavlović,
attn. Dragan ČURČIĆ
- Heads of branches of:
Communications, Engineering,
RZ /Air Force/ and PZO /Anti-
Aircraft Defence/, GS /Main Staff/
HVO Artillery
- Knez Domagoj Brigade, Čapljina,
attn. Colonel N. OBRADOVIĆ
- Department for Schooling and
Education, attn. Colonel Željko
AKRAP

The recruits assignment to further training after the completion of basic training Order

Pursuant to Order No. 02-1-884/93, dated 20.07.1993, of the Defence Department on training of recruits and after completed basic training:

I order

1. After the completion of basic training, the recruits are to be sent to the specialised training as follows:
 - Infantry VES /Military Occupational speciality/ group continues its training in Ludvig Pavlović Unit
 - Artillery VES in MTRP /as written/ GS HVO
 - VES of communications branch in the (a) communications company of GS HVO
 - Engineering VES in an engineering company selected by the Head of Engineering
 - VES RZ and PZO in the 2nd LARD /Light Artillery Rocket Battalion/ PZO
 - VES OMP / as written/ in the artillery company of Knez Domagoj Brigade Čapljina

The schedule by VES is to be made according to the following:

- a) COMMUNICATIONS: Grude: 11801-2; 11801-1; Ljubuški: 11812-3; Čitluk: 11807-1; 11808-1; 11812-2; 11801-1; 11802-1; Čapljina: 11807-1; 11812- 1; 11802-1; Total: 15
- b) RZ and PZO: Grude: 11301-1; 11304-1; 13805-2; Ljubuški: 11314-1; 13801-1; Čitluk: 11301-4; 11314-2; Čapljina: 11304-1; 11326-1; 11314-1; 11301-1; 13801-1; Total: 17
- c) Artillery: Ljubuški: 11222-1 ;11221-1 ;1 1619-1; Čitluk: 11207-2; 12701-2; 1 1602-1; Čapljina: 11207-1; 1 1223-1; 11602-3; Total: 13
- d) Engineering: Grude: 11701; 11740-1; 12802-1; 12141-2; Ljubuški 11701-2; 11749-1; 11604-1; Čapljina: 11702-4; 11713-2; 11749-1; 11701-2; Total: 18
- e) OMP (Armoured-Mechanised Units): Ljubuški: 11406-1; 11401-, 11413-1; Čapljina: 11404-1; 11401-1; 11413-2; 11403-1; Total: 8
- f) Infantry: Grude: 11101-52; 12102-1; 12108-2; 12403-3; 12208-1; 11903-1; 11601-2; 12105-2; 12117-1; 11901-1; 12501-1; Ljubuški: 11101-, 12503-2; 12203-1; 12302-1; 12117-1; 12201-2; 12011-1; 12403-1; 12101-1 Čitluk: 11101-9; 12401-1; 12403-2; 12105-1; 12102-1; Čapljina: 11101-1, 12403-1; 12102-1; 12302-1; 12101-1; 11601-2; 11903-1; Total: 139

The sorting and preparation of documentation (units records, military IDs, medical record cards and individual duty records) for assignment to units where the recruits are to continue the training, shall be carried out by ROP /as written/ of Ludvig Pavlović Unit.

3. The recruits shall complete the training on 12.08.1993, when they are entitled on two days off. They shall report on 15.08.1993, no later than 1000 hrs, in the Čapljina Barracks, where the unit commanders in charge of specialised training shall receive and accommodate them. They are also in charge of the entire organisation and execution of the specialised training.
4. The lists according to the VES and municipalities are to be made and submitted to the commanders of units, in which the recruits shall continue the training, together with other documentation of ROP of the Ludvig Pavlović Unit.
5. Enclosed with the documentation, unit commanders are also to be delivered information on further training of the recruits, extracts from the curriculum of specialised training separated by branches, thematic plans, schedules of work and training, and records on the follow-up on the military training and education.
6. I hold the assistant for the schooling and education of GS HVO responsible for the entire implementation and control of the execution of this order.

GS HVO Commander
Major General
Slobodan Praljak
/signed and stamped on behalf of
the Commander/

UNION OF REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA /HR HB/

DEFENCE SECTION
HVO /CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL/ MAIN STAFF /GS/
Ur. no. 02-2/1-01-3134/93

Pursuant to the order of the GS of the HR HB HVO, no. 02-2/1-01-3100/93, of 20 October 1993 and the already approved PROGRAMME for Basic Military Training and Education of the soldiers of 12 August 1993, I hereby

APPROVE

THE INTENSIVE TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR THE SECOND GENERATION
OF HR HB HVO RECRUITS

which will come into effect on 25 October 1993 and will last until the completion of intensive training. The HR HB GS Section for Training and Education will issue any explanations required.

COMMANDER OF THE GS OF THE HZ HB HVO
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji Istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, namo
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru Ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspop, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

epređiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

DOCUMENTS D-1 - D-19

I maintain that there is no journalist to whom I refused to give a pass to visit whatever he wants and see whatever he can and write whatever he wants to write, not only in cases when I was authorized to issue such permits, but even then when I was not authorized.

This also applies to the HV and HVO.

I don't wish to comment the issue of journalist objectivity.

The Main Staff of the HVO had no connection with the formation of military prisons or detention centres, had no connection with the functioning of these facilities, had no connection with the legal regulations according to which such prisons and centres functioned.

Why did I then sign the passes for entry into objects, when I wasn't authorized to?

Because I knew that under conditions in which the "*institutions*" of HZ-HB /Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia/ came about, and how they were created, they won't be able to do the job in a satisfactory way, and if my signature enables someone to enter, irrespective of the right, I will give that signature.

The conclusion drawn from that, that I knew what is inside and how it is inside, is illogical and I refuse it with indignation.

/header/

CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG BOSNIA

CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

MAIN STAFF HVO HR H-B

Operational number; 02-2/1-01-2649/93

Mostar, 24 September 1993

APPROVAL

that herewith allows free pass to the BBC TV crew to the final check point of HVO military police on Buna; the TV crew in the below cited composition makes a documentary film in these areas:

Emonn Matthews, Jeremy Bowen, Brian Hulls, Nicolas Walker and Vanessa Vasić Janeković.

Commander of GS HVO

Major General

Slobodan Praljak

/signed and stamped/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /the text of the round stamp illegible/

Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia

Croatian Defence Council

/The coat of arms of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Main Staff

Ref. Number 02-2/1-01-2138/93

Mostar, 24 August 1993

APPROVAL

Whereby Miss Sally BECKER is allowed to cross the HVO checkpoints, and depart to the left side of Mostar controlled by Muslims forces.

On her way back, Sally BECKER will bring a seriously ill child Azem DROCE and his mother.

All HVO soldiers are ordered to make this humanitarian action of Miss Sally Becker possible and to render help.

HVO Commander

Major General

Slobodan PRALJAK

/stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL (HVO)

MAIN STAFF HVO

Number: 02-2/1-01-2239/93

Mostar, 1st September 1993

APPROVAL

Whereby Miss Sally BECKER, the humanitarian aid worker is allowed to cross the checkpoints, and depart to the left side of Mostar controlled by Muslims forces, during the day.

On her way back, Mrs. Sally BECKER will bring children, ill and powerless persons with two sanitary vehicles.

All HVO soldiers are ordered to make this humanitarian action of Mrs Sally Becker possible and to render help.

HVO Commander
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ MAIN STAFF

Number: /handwritten:/ 02-2/1-01-2265/ 93

Čitluk IZM /Forward Command Post/, 1 September 1993

ORDER

Permit the ZDF /Zud-Deutsche Rundfunk/ TV team led by Mira IVANIŠEVIĆ to enter and film inside the Gabela prison.

COMMANDER, HVO GS /Main Staff/
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

IVANIŠEVIĆ MIRA

April 2006

Split

The conversation is recorded, registered under designation*Ivanisevicmi*

6,88 MB

Conversation took place in the apartment of the collocutor

Here, we are connected. I would ask you to introduce yourself, at the beginning of the recording. Well, your first and last name, date and place of birth, your profession and place of residence.

I am Mira Ivanisevic, born 16 February 1933 in Salzburg, my profession is electro engineer.

You are now living in ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■? Is that right?

Yes.

Reason of our conversation is Hague indictment against General Praljak. Therefore I would ask you to converse about what you did during the war '92, '93. You were the secretary of Croatian German Centre in Split, you were translating. Could you in the beginning remember of that time? Well, where were you? What did you do? For whom did you translate?

At that time, every political and newspaper delegation, would turn for help to honorary Consul Karl Grentz in Split. And we, as the Centre, were with him on the same floor, of the same locality. The German Embassy was paying for the area, rent for the premises – for him and for us, so during those years we were as an entirety. Quite often I substituted for the secretary of the honorary Consul. He then didn't even have the command of German language, just mediocre, so under the circumstances I was present at all important conversations they had. If the German Ambassador came to Split, and visited different institutions, I was always going along. We even organized different talks, so even the German Ambassador gave talk about democracy in Germany after II World War. I would organize round table with Mr. Kosnik and professor Rogeman and the students from Berlin. We, as the Centre, would offer free courses of German language for university and high school students, for a long time.

In '92 and '93?

Yes, yes! In '93 we had courses. The professors for the courses were paid by the Embassy. Consequently, they covered the cost of the professors only. Well, we are like a center of the broad activities. We even received the books and wanted to organize a library for lending of the books. Many books we sorted out and donated to the universities. According to the themes we gave them to Zadar and Law Faculty in Split. We really got into full swing, because we considered that Germany is our friend. Secondly, I have studied in Germany, completed the studies, and had otherwise sympathy towards Germany, because my good friends are there. We helped on humanitarian grounds everyone who turned to us, regardless if that was a person of Serbian nationality, from Zenica, or from somewhere, a Bosniak. We helped everybody, as much as we could. Well, that was my activity, since then until '94.

Generally, your headquarters was in Split?

In Split. On the waterfront.

Working in that job, did you travel?

At the time I followed everything. Not only in Split, but in the entire region. From Zadar, Šibenik, our Zagora, Peruća, Oboljan, Makarska where the refugees were placed in the hotels. Then I even organized with the teachers union from Bavaria a trip for Bosniak young people, who learned some circus skills, and children folklore groups from our people from Vrlika. I took two children groups to Munchen for performance. Well, my activities at the time were very broad. Or, let's say I accompanied ZDF after barrage of Dubrovnik, when they were recording on film. They recorded, it could be said, good film about Dubrovnik and destruction of

Dubrovnik. Then to Herzegovina and all the way to Tomislavgrad, over that mountain where the convoys were driving the help, I believe towards Bila that was going either to Livno, Posušje, and Metković where the UNHCR depot was. And we recorded that.

It means you were going as translator?

As translator!

To whom were you the translator?

To all possible groups! First I was the translator to different journalists. And I would, let's say organize a newspaper, magazine conference. We went to Obojan. And really we were accepted everywhere. The police would take us with their patrol boat to Obojan. I led the newspaper and political delegations, accompanied and translated at the meetings with them and similar political organizations. When there was SDP delegation then we visited SPD in Split. Or Slobodna Dalmacija! There I also accompanied two, three delegations. Or even trade delegations in our Komora. And there was even a large gathering of Austrians, businessmen, in Mostar...

All Right. I would like to return into the time of the event when you had contact with General Praljak. That was, if I understood you correctly, your only contact with General Praljak?

The only one.

Can you tell me about that contact? Why and how it came to that contact?

I was with the crew of ZDF...

Excuse me. We are talking about the beginning of '93?

That's right!

Don't you know the correct date?

I can't remember, but the weather was already warm. It was the spring or something like that. That time ZDF was stationed in Međugorje. We were in a private hotel and really the plan was to remain two three days, but it lasted ten days. There was always the same journalist from ZDF, Dietmar Shultz, while the cameraman and the helper were always hired through some firm in Cyprus. Sometime it would be an American, sometime British, because for them that was cheaper than a German cameraman. At the time there was the center of all television crews in Međugorje, because one of the hotels had satellite possibilities for direct transmission of the news to the home offices in Europe. He as a journalist did cost the home office quite a bit, because he always had to look for some news of the day...

Exclusive?

Exclusive news. And then he was interested about the campground in Gabela. All other journalists were mentioning this camp in Gabela, how it is not possible to enter there etc. Town of Čitluk was nearby, I got from my husband the number of Mr. Slobodan Praljak, and I knew where he was located. We went to Čitluk, we wanted to talk to him. But, there they told us Mr. Praljak is not here, he is on the field. And then I proposed to go to Čapljina to see the mayor Mr. Marković.

It means, you are doing all of this to succeed...

To get to Gabela. That was the target, the task. Gabela was some bugaboo, and everybody wanted to get into Gabela. Mr. Marković wasn't present, but there was some assistant. He refused: he can't give any permissions, he has no jurisdiction. Then I asked him if I could try and see if Mr. Praljak came back, and he allowed me that. I called, and Mr. Praljak really responded immediately, without some inter-switchboards, so I as I remember got surprised. I thought they would now transfer me etc.

This means you did talk with Praljak?

With Praljak, that's right! I introduced myself I am Mira Ivanišević, translator for the ZDF crew and that they have the desire to enter Gabela to tape that camp in Gabela. To get the taboo subject cleared. He didn't deliberate at all, and he immediately said we can go and tape.

Did Praljak then over the phone pose any restrictions? And did you get the feeling that he didn't want something to be seen?

No! No! Nothing! He immediately said we can go. Then I asked, knowing those people which we will encounter there, the mentality, that there could be problems and I can't just refer to, that Mr. Praljak allowed me. So, then I asked him if he could fax me to the office of Mr. Marković, his permission. We waited very shortly, and the fax arrived.

The fax came immediately?

Immediately! Immediately!

And who signed the fax?

He did! Slobodan Praljak.

What was written in the fax?

He is allowing the crew of ZDF to enter in that – now I don't know how he called this Gabela, but he didn't call it a camp.

Do you have that fax?

I really preserved it in that journal for many years, because to say it truthfully, it was like some trophy. But, then later the fax faded, and then afterward I threw it away. I didn't photocopy it.

That means we don't have it?

I don't have it.

All right. It means, in that fax which was signed by Mr. Slobodan Praljak, it was written that you could enter and you could tape?

That's right! And we started immediately for Gabela. I know there was an access ramp, and to the right there was the administration building or something. And we entered.

Did you have problems entering?

No! No! None! I showed that fax, we are the ones, the ramp was raised and we... I know the road was asphalt and we walked to the top and on the right side of the road, there were low, long brick built ground level buildings.

Let me interrupt you for just a second. Do you have the feeling that Mr. Shultz, who was the main journalist, was surprised getting the permit for entrance?

Yes, he was the highest. He knew that if I started something, it will somehow end successfully. Because quite often he would find the doors closed, and then I would, as the translator and intermediary succeed to get him to see what he wanted. He was more than happy that ZDF would be first to enter Gabela.

But was he surprised that something taboo gets the permit? You were in that moment their translator?

Yes! Yes! But he considered me for a person who was more than just a translator. He knew my husband was in the Croatian Army and... He was surprised, but his main goal was to enter into Gabela and tape.

I am now interested in these: What did, Shultz say when he saw the paper signed by Praljak?

Well, he was happy! We picked up the paper and disappeared through the door faster than we entered, into the car and off to Gabela. That was the reaction. On the way we didn't talk much. I remember the asphalt road, then no asphalt road, because I didn't really know Herzegovina. And when we came there, we introduced ourselves in the administration building, we showed the fax, the ramp was raised and we entered. And we went to the end of that road, that way. And on the top, I remember very well, there were some cisterns with water. The men were bathing. And they also washed the clothes. There was some quiet atmosphere.

What does it mean "quiet atmosphere"?

There wasn't much speech to hear, or something. It was really very silent. Now I don't know whether the men were surprised when all of a sudden the television comes with cameras for the first time

That means, it was the first time the television entered?

First time!

Then they most likely were surprised?

Yes! Yes! They were not accustomed and they didn't know what is happening. I got such an impression about those men. One of the long halls was open and he was taping the hall from the doorway, and the surrounding of the entire Gabela. I personally talked to one of them. He was a professor of German from Čapljina. He got out and talked about something with Shultz. I asked a young man if he needed anything. He said he didn't need anything. They were there all together, next to each other in that hall. And then, to my surprise, a couple of them came on the road from below. In the first moment I thought they are maybe some kind of guards, but they answered they are not, they went outside to work and now they were returning.

Well, that was your encounter with Gabela? After that Dietmar Shultz made his part?!

Yes! And we didn't stay long, he was in such a hurry to get his news as first in the world, we were rushing to Međugorje. And I didn't have a chance to see his tape, because we were in a small private hotel, and transmission was from another hotel. But all of us were on the same small street. And he has sent that and was very happy that this was a first such feature shot by ZDF and ZDF later sold it to other television companies.

Were you present all the time during his filming? Did he then talk with people?

He was talking probably with the ones who knew German. I even entered into the hall and he filmed from the door. I entered inside and wanted to talk with the people.

You were the translator, there was Dietmar and the cameraman! Who was the cameraman?

And the assistant was there. And the cameraman was there – I think it was an American, who ordinarily accompanied us a few times. And he, the cameraman, always had an assistant who held the microphone or... Well, there were four of us.

Do you know the names of those people?

No, I don't remember.

All right, I think we came to the end of our conversation. Just tell me – Dietmar Shultz, gentlemen with whom you worked in the '93, where is that gentleman today? Do you have any information?

After the war in Croatia he went to Israel. And he even told me that his spouse is going with him to Israel. And then, I've heard from him maybe one more time and after that nothing.

It means you have no more contacts?

No, nothing more!

What is happening with him now, what is he doing?

I don't know. Sometimes I thought I would get in touch, but I don't have time.

Madame Mira, you told me what was important, do you think we forgot anything, should we mention anything else?

In connection with Mr. Praljak?

In connection with this event.

I don't think so. That happened exactly as I told you.

Thank You.

STATEMENT

I, the undersigned, Mira Ivanišević, state that in April 2006, of my own free will, I gave a statement for the Defence of General Slobodan PRALJAK about events in which I participated and which are connected to the wartime events in the Republic of Croatia and/or Bosnia and Herzegovina. I agree that my statement be used in proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and that it be made public. I am willing to testify in the proceedings before the ICTY against Slobodan PRALJAK in the case Prosecutor versus PRLIĆ et al.

I state that before giving and certifying this statement to the Defence of General PRALJAK I was warned that I had to speak the truth and that an untruthful statement is a criminal offence under the Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Penal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rules of the ICTY.

I state that I have understood these warnings and that everything I said in my statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

I have read the statement through carefully and it corresponds in its entirety to what I stated. (I corrected the errors that had crept in when the statement was being written out in my own hand as I was reading it.) I signed the written text of the statement in my own hand.

In Split, 24th April 2008 /signed/

I, public notary Nevenka Kekez from Split, Hrvatske mornarice 1b, hereby confirm that:

Mira Ivanisevic, from Split, ***** in my presence, signed with her own hand, this statement. I have established the identity of the statement submitter pursuant to his identity card ***** issued by the PU /police department/ Splitsko-dalmatinska.

The signature is authentic.

The public notary fee for certification, pursuant to tariff no. 11, item 4 of the ZJBP /Law on Public Notary Fees/, in the amount of 10,00 Kuna was paid. Stamps pasted and cancelled on the copy of the document retained for archives.


The public notary remuneration has, according to article 19 PPJT, has been charged amounting to 30,00 kunas, plus value-added tax in the amount of 6,60 Kuna.

Business number: OV-52392008

In Zagreb, 24 April 2008

Public notary
Nevenka Kekez

/signed and stamped/



CROATIAN - GERMAN CENTRE

SPLIT-CROATIA

DALMACIJA

BULLETIN FOR THE PROMOTION OF COOPERATION

BETWEEN CROATIA AND GERMANY

No. 1 1993

Izdavač:

Hrvatsko-njemački centar
Obala Hrvatskog narodnog preporoda
10/II
58000 Split- Hrvatska
Tel. 058-362-114
Fax. 058-362-115
Žiro - račun u HRD kod SDK Split
34400-678-34483
Žiro - račun u DM kod Splitske banke
25731-280-0310611

U suradnji sa:

- Hrvatsko-njemačkim društvom - Ogranak Split
- Hrvatsko - njemačkim gospodarskim društvom - Ogranak Split
- HGK - Regionalnom komorom Split
- Hrvatskim fondom za privatizaciju, Područnim uredom Split
- Gradom Splitom
- Nadbiskupskim ordinarijatom Split

Vijeće biltena:

- Drago Simundža (predsjednik)
- Smiljan Grđurev
- Petar Grisožono
- Ivo Kelez

Odgovorni urednik:

- Zoran Ribarović

Uredništvo:

- Roza Brkušić (kultura i umjetnost)
- Dragutin Korlaet (zakonodavstvo i institucije)
- Zdenko Matošić (razvoj gospodarstva)
- Mirko Milihalj (religija i društvo)
- Slobodan Paparella (izvješća i informacije)
- Milivoj Roje (promocija gospodarstva)

Tehničko grafičko i jezično**uredništvo:**

- Igor Drača (tehnički urednik)
- Zdenko Milišić (likovna oprema)
- Vesna Ribarović (vizualni identitet)
- Arnold Postrak (prevoditelj) za njemački jezik)
- Tanja Popović (lektor za hrvatski jezik)
- Hannelore Trebotić (lektor za njemački jezik)

Priprema:

GRAFIK-Print Split

Tisak:

Grafičko poduzeće
"SLOBODNA DALMACIJA" Split

Sponzor pripreme i tiska:

DALMACIJCEMENT

ACTIVITIES ON THE PROMOTION OF THE CROATIAN-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP IN SPLIT

Utemeljenjem Hrvatsko-njemačkoga centra u Splitu otvara se mogućnost suradnje i promicanja kulturnih, gospodarstvenih i drugih odnosa koji su bili zapostavljeni u dugom vremenskom razdoblju. Međutim, treba pripomenuti da je prije II. svjetskog rata postojala i djelovala u Splitu Njemačka akademija. U njoj je bio učlanjen velik broj građana i mladeži koji su učili njemački jezik i upoznavali se s njemačkom kulturom. Nastojanje da se osnuje Društvo hrvatsko-njemačkoga prijateljstva u Splitu započelo je prije više godina inicijativom današnjega počasnog konzula Savezne Republike Njemačke u Splitu, gospodina Karla Grenca, ali vrijeme za jedan ovakav pothvat očito još nije bilo došlo. Tijekom 1991. i 1992. godine gospodin Karlo Grenac obnavlja svoja nastojanja da se u Splitu otvori sada Hrvatsko - njemački centar. Dana 6. veljače 1992. predsjednik Republike gospodin Richard von Weizsaecker imenovao je gospodina Grenca počasnim konzulom.

Nakon dosta poteškoća grad je pronašao i dodijelio počasnom konzulu prostorije u zgradi nadomak Dioklecijanovoj palači (Obala Hrvatskog narodnog preporoda br. 10/II). Jedan dio ovih prostorija bio je predviđen za Hrvatsko-njemački centar. Prostorije su se obnovile uz financijsku podršku raznih poduzeća, institucija i grada.

U isto vrijeme utemeljen je i jedan Koordinacijski odbor u kojemu su sudjelovale razne institucije u gradu, a koji je poslije prerastao u Vijeće Centra.

Dana 9. listopada 1992. godine u Splitu je otvoren njemački konzulat, a za prvoga počasnoga konzula imenovan je gospodin Karlo Grenac.

Prigodna svečanost uprihčena je u Arheološkome muzeju u nazočnosti veleposlanika Njemačke, gospodina Horsta Weisela, gradskih čelnika i oko 1000 uzvanika.

Tom je prigodom u muzeju pred-

stavljen antički sarkofag s prikazom lova koji se čuva u Umjetničkom muzeju u Budimpešti. Kako je dio sarkofaga u prošlom stoljeću završio u Budimpešti, a ostali manji dijelovi

odnosa između Njemačke i Hrvatske na svim područjima, s ciljem brzog uključivanja zemlje i regija u zajednicu europskih naroda gdje Hrvatska po svojoj povijesti i kulturi i pripada.



Gospodin Karlo Grenac u nazočnosti veleposlanika Njemačke gospodina Horsta Weisela potpisuje prihvaćanje dužnosti počasnoga konzula

sačuvani u Arheološkome muzeju u Splitu, tek je prošle godine rekonstruiran gotovo cijeli sarkofag i nazvan "Sarkofag Budapest-Split".

U svom pozdravnom govoru veleposlanik gospodin Horst Weisel naglasio je značenje razvitka dobrih

Odlukom Skupštine općine Split od 29. listopada 1992. njemački kancelar gospodin Helmut Kohl proglašen je počasnim građaninom Splita što je izraz poštovanja i zahvalnosti njemu i Njemačkoj koja je najviše pridonijela da dođe do priznanja Hrvatske u svijetu.

Dana 7. prosinca 1992. godine održana je osnivačka skupština Hrvatsko-njemačkoga centra u Splitu, što je na neki način nastavak tradicije njezgovanja kulture između Hrvatske i Njemačke kao i zemalja gdje se govori njemački jezik.

U ovom teškom, ali povijesnom vremenu za Hrvatsku, uspostavljanje suradnje s Njemačkom od izuzetnog je značenja. Stoga je osnovni zadatak Hrvatsko-njemačkoga centra u Splitu



Najbolje očuvana strana »Sarkofaga« s prikazom lova Budapest-Split

da tu suradnju provede.

Djelovanje našega Centra posebice je značajno u obnovi srpskom agresijom porušenoga dijela Hrvatske. U toj obnovi i humanitarnoj pomoći i do sada su SR Njemačka i njezini građani dali velik doprinos.

Međutim, ne samo humanitarna pomoć, nego i promicanje partnerskih odnosa na svim područjima suradnje i suradnje s brojnim hrvatsko-njemačkim društvima u Hrvatskoj i Njemačkoj temeljna su zadaća i obveza našega Centra.

Kulturna baština i ljepota Hrvatske, a posebice Dalmacije, uvijek su bili poticaj dolasku brojnih turista iz raznih zemalja od kojih su najbrojniji bili građani Njemačke. Treba očekivati

da će to biti i ubuduće pa stoga Centar djelovanje svojih sekcija valja usmjeriti na stvaranje takvih programa koji će se moći odmah i ostvariti kada prilike to omoguće.


Zbog velikog zanimanja građanstva za suradnju sa SR Njemačkom stalno se povećava broj članova Hrvatsko-njemačkoga centra, a kako se prostorijama Centra koriste i neka srodna društva, ne mogu se razviti sve aktivnosti koje Centar ima u svom programu.

Grad Split stoga će uskoro Centru dodijeliti dodatne prostorije u istoj zgradi, gdje će biti knjižnica i čitaonica kojima će se koristiti građani Splita.



Gradonačelnik Splita gospodin Petar Slapničar predaje u Bonnu 14. siječnja 1993. kancelaru gospodinu Helmutu Kohlu posebju o počasnim građaninu Splita, rad akademskog slikara Vaska Lipovca

ORGANIZATION OF THE CROATIAN-GERMAN CENTRE SPLIT



PROGRAMME OF WORK OF THE CROATIAN-GERMAN CENTRE SPLIT

1. Section for culture and the arts

U okviru Sekcije za kulturu i umjetnost djeluju do sada dvije skupine, i to glazbena i likovno-kiparska.

Glazbena skupina organizirala je ZBOR HRVATSKO-NJEMAČKOGA CENTRA u kojemu djeluju 40 pjevača Opertnog zbora HNK - Split pod vodstvom Silvine Čuljak. Po potrebi će uz zbor gostovati eminentni solisti HNK - Split. Glazbenoj skupini su pridruženi i "Zbor mladih" crkve Gospe od Zdravlja s 25 pjevača pod vodstvom Stipe Grčala i muški komorni sastav "Chorus Spalatensis" katedrale sv. Dujce s 10 pjevača pod vodstvom Šime Marovića.

Likovno-kiparska skupina još nije osnovana, a na tome rade Želimir Hraste, Josip Šeravić i Kuzma Kovačić.

Obje se skupine pripremaju za nastupe u Hrvatskoj i Njemačkoj s mjesovitim hrvatsko-njemačkim programima.

Priprema se organiziranje i drugih skupina bilo vlastitih ili u suradnji s postojećim sastavima (komorni orkestar, folklor i dr.)

2. Section for German language and literature

U ovoj sekciji djeluju tri skupine, i to prevodilačka (Arnold Postrak), jezika (Nevenka Petek) i skupina za književnost (Roza Brku-

šić). U okviru prevodilačke skupine određeni su korespondenti, odnosno prevoditelji za potrebe pojedinih sekcija: 1. Nives Ciprića - Radun, 2. Arnold Postrak, 3. Pero Bekavac, 4. Nada Polić, 5. Margareta Kučer, 6. Magdalena Gabrić, 7. Minka Vidović. Skupina za jezike organizirat će razne tečajeve njemačkoga jezika. Prvi tečaj koji vodi Ada Čeman održava se za učenike koji u školi već uče njemački jezik, a služit će kao priprema za posjet tih učenika Njemačkoj. Skupina za književnost upravo priprema kratki pregled hrvatske i njemačke književnosti koji će biti objavljen u biltenu Centra.

3. Section for public education, sports and youth

U planu rada sekcije značajno mjesto zauzima upoznavanje njemačkog školskog obrazovnog sustava osnovne i srednje škole i visokškolskog obrazovanja te uspostavljanje suradnje i razmjena učenika i studenata.

Također će se raditi na upoznavanju propisa, organizacije i brige o mladeži, te razvijanju prijateljskih veza hrvatske i njemačke mladeži. U svemu je tome vrlo značajna pomoć u organiziranju sportskih susreta, posebice između prijateljskih gradova Republike Hrvatske i Njemačke.

4. Section for humanitarian and legal issues

Imajući u vidu tešku situaciju uvjetovanu ratom u kojemu se našla naša domovina, Sekcija za humanitarna i pravna pitanja organizirat će pojedinačne i konkretne humanitarne akcije u okviru svojih mogućnosti i posredovati u pružanju pravne podrške. U nemogućnosti da Centar izravno udjelji pomoć, Sekcija će se uključiti posredno iznoseći prijatelja u Njemačkoj konkretne potrebe i koordinirajući u realiziranju pomoći.

5. Section for science and ecology

Cilj sekcije za znanost i ekologiju jest potpomagati izmenu informacija i ljudi te informacijski podržavati zajedničke projekte i skupove. U tu će svrhu sekcija komunicirati sa znanstvenim institucijama i institucijama visokog obrazovanja, Goethe institutom te okupljati bivše potencijalne stipendiste njemačke vlade i nevladinih institucija.

6. Section for tourism

Sekcija za turizam ima za cilj promicati hrvatski turizam na njemačkome tržištu. U tu svrhu će se uspostaviti veze s domaćim i njemačkim turističkim tvrtkama te surađivati

s turističkim agencijama i ugostiteljskim poduzećima. Pored toga održavat će se stručne rasprave o raznim temama iz turizma.

7. Section for economy

Sekcija za gospodarstvo Hrvatsko-njemačkog centra Split obuhvaća aktivnosti Sekcije za gospodarstvo Hrvatsko-njemačkoga društva, Ogranak Split, i Hrvatsko-njemačkoga gospodarskog društva, Ogranak Split, koje djeluje pri HGK - Regionalnoj komori Split, a koje je preteča buduće Hrvatsko-njemačke komore. Sve ove sekcije održavaju svoje zajedničke sjednice svakog ponedjeljka od 18 do 20 sati u prostorijama Centra.

Ove sekcije pripremaju gospodarske projekte, planove i programe gospodarskih zona u Dalmaciji i informacije o svim konkretnim resursima. Komisiji za izbor i pripremu programa vodi Jerislav Kuštera. Ovi programi bit će prezentirani prigodom sastava s poslovnim ljudima u Njemačkoj.

Prva prezentacija predviđena je u Münchenu. Priprema se i izdavanje publikacije pod naslovom "Mogućnosti gospodarske suradnje između Hrvatske i Njemačke". U ovoj publikaciji, pored općih informacija, bit će predstavljene zainteresirana poduzeća i poduzetnici kao i njihovi razvojni programi.

ACCOMODATION FOR EXILED RETARDED CHILDREN AND ADULTS SHOULD BE PROVIDED

	muški	ženski
U mjestu Vrliki, nedaleko od Splita nalazio se dom za zbrinjavanje 264 retardirane djece i odraslih osoba, od 2 do 60 godina starosti:		
2-4 godina	1	1
5-14 godina	17	16
15-60 godina	124	105
Ukupno	142	122

Stupanj retardiranosti:

	muški	ženski
- teška duševna retardacija	31	25
- teža duševna retardacija	32	30
- srednje teška duševna retardacija	30	31
- jaka duševna retardacija	12	12
- duševna retardacija i tjelesni hendikep	19	12
- duševna retardacija i oštećenje sluha	9	4
- duševna retardacija i oštećenje govora	5	2
- duševna retardacija i sva oštećenja	4	6
Ukupno	142	122

26. kolovoza 1991. godine "jugoslavenska" vojska okrutno je napala Vrliku, oštetila dom i pokrala svu opremu, između ostaloga i opremu ambulante. Štićenici i osoblje doma, njih 107 skupa sa svojim obiteljima bili su prognani samo s onim što su imali na sebi. Kako je u to vrijeme u Splitu i okolici tisuće izbjeglica i prognanika bilo smješteno, za štićenike nije bilo moguće naći jedan zajednički smještaj. Smješteni su na razna mjesta, pa i u školske domove. Najteže retardirani nažale se još uvijek u jednoj sportskoj dvorani. Bez odgovarajućih sanitarnih uvjeta, grijanja i svega ostaloga potrebnoga za donekle normalan život štićenika, a i osoblja.

Kao direktor ovog doma molim vas da pomognete prognanicima kojima je posebice potrebna čvrsta posteljina, donje rublje, sredstva za održavanje higijene i dezinfekciju i radna odijela za osoblje koje radi sa štićenicima. To bi bilo najpotrebnije, ali, naravno, dobro dođe svaka pomoć koju nam možete pružiti.

Naša je adresa:
Zavod za smještaj i rehabilitaciju djece i omladine - Vrlike
Mostarska 2
58000 Split
Tel.058-43-395, Fax.058-42-876

Zbog potrebe normalnijeg zbrinjavanja ove djece i odrasle planira se izgradnja novog doma za što nam je potreban novac pa smo otvorili devizni račun za pomoć koji glasi:

ZAKLADA IVANA BRLIĆ-MAŽURANIĆ
ZAGREBAČKA BANKA
30101-620-16-2421722983
ZA IZGRADNJU Dječjeg Zavoda
VRLIKA

Za razumijevanje i svaku pomoć bit ćemo vrlo zahvalni.

Lucija Čikeš

CROATIAN-GERMAN KINDERGARTEN IN SPLIT

Sredinom studenoga 1992. otvoren je hrvatsko-njemački vrtić u Splitu (Teslina 17) koji radi po elementima Montessori metode. To je drugi vrtić takve vrste otvoren u Splitu. Na inicijativu voditeljice hrvatsko-engleskoga vrtića Ligiije Krolo, a uz podršku Sekretarijata za prosvjetu, kulturu i šport općine Split, Izvršno vijeće dodijelilo je tom vrtiću prostor za rad. Pri tome treba istaknuti pomoć koju ovom programu pruža Kinderzentrum iz Njemačke - München na čelu s gospodinom Hellbrüggeom. Kinderzentrum iz Münchena pomaže duže vremena i Hrvatsku te je organizirao u okviru svoje sponzorske akcije "Sonnen-schein Aktion" i hrvatsko-njemačku akciju "Sunčev sjaj". U okviru ove akcije financira se otvaranje novih vrtića po Montessori programu, školovanje odgojitelja za rad na ovom programu, pomaganje integracije djece s poteškoćama u razvoju u redovite škole te nabava Montessori materijala. Bez njihove pomoći teško da bi ovaj vrtić mogao početi s radom.

Ligija Krolo

SPONZORI CENTRA: Dalmacijacement, Brodamerkur, Grafičko poduzeće Slobodna Dalmacija, Grafik Print, Dalma - Hotels - Omiš, Brodosplit - zaštitna organizacija, Jadrankeman, Bobis, Salonit, IGH - Poslovni centar Split, TEM, Muše - Commerce, Restaurant Bohan, Hotel Split, Villa Neretva

DONATORI CENTRA: Dvodjelac, Lavčević, Arheološki muzej Split, HPT, Splitska banka, Trgovačko - turistička banka, Dalmacija - cement, Pomorska banka, Nik-Sil, Song, Slobodna Dalmacija - Novine, Franco's, Salonit, Boesbeck, Barz & Partner, Ugostiteljsko-turistička škola, KUD Jedinstvo, Gradski zbor Brodosplita, Franjo Kluz, Flexopress, Sofair, De Pol Trade, Hrvatsko narodno kazalište



Letter to the readers

Štovani čitatelji,

Split, 30. travnja '93.

uz prvi broj našega biltena namjeravali smo vam uputiti jedno popratno pismo. Iz tehničkih i financijskih razloga to nije moguće, pa smo umjesto toga uveli ovu rubriku koju ćete stalno nalaziti u našem biltenu.

Ovaj ćemo bilten distribuirati svim prijateljima Hrvatske i Njemačke koji promiču suradnju između ovih dviju prijateljskih zemalja. Stoga vas pozivamo da za potrebe institucije ili društva u kojemu djelujete i za svoje prijatelje naručite potreban broj dodatnih primjeraka koje ćemo vam odmah dostaviti, također besplatno. Bilten se izdaje u hrvatskom i njemačkom izdanju, pa nam navedite za svako izdanje koliko vam treba najmanje i najviše dodatnih primjeraka biltena. Kako vidite u ovom broju, posvetili smo dosta prostora predstavljanju utemeljenja i organizacije našega Centra. U sljedećim brojevima koji će izlaziti jednom mjesečno čitav prostor će biti na raspolaganju suradnicima i čitateljima iz Hrvatske i Njemačke. Posljednja stranica biltena rezervirana je za stalnu rubriku "Hrvatska-Njemačka" u kojoj će usporednim tekstovima enciklopedijski biti obrađena ista područja kako bi se osiguralo da se prošire relevantna znanja i informacije iz obje zemlje. U sljedećemu će broju tako u ovoj rubrici biti obrađeno područje hrvatske i njemačke književnosti. Za vaše tekstovne priloge, informacije, fotografije, crteže i oglasne priloge bit ćemo vam zahvalni. Pišite nam o manifestacijama i akcijama u kojima sudjelujete, o svojim idejama, prijedlozima i primjedbama i kritikama.

Pošaljite nam sve što možete, bez da to od vas tražimo, a mislite da bi moglo biti korisno za rad našega Centra, naše knjižnice, datoteke i učionice. Pošaljite nam telefonske imenike svojih gradova (mogu biti i stara izdanja), privredne i druge adresare, godišnje i informativne publikacije svojih institucija i društava, kataloge, prospekte, cjenike, ponude za novu irabljenu opremu, knjige, udžbenike, izvješća, stručnu literaturu, video snimke, gramofonske ploče, kazete itd. Uvrstite nas u adresar distribucije svojih biltena, novina časopisa i drugih redovitih i povremenih publikacija. Na ovaj način mnogo ćete pomoći budućem razvoju ovoga Centra za što ćemo vam biti zahvalni. Naš Centar financira se isključivo na temelju sponzorstva i donatorstva. Postanite naš sponzor i donator - samoinicijativno - svaki i najmanji prilog vrlo ćemo cijeniti.

Članom našega Centra može postati svaka punoljetna osoba koja Upravnom odboru podnese obrazloženu pristupnicu za prijem, pismeno podržanu od najmanje dva člana Centra i koju Upravni odbor primi u članstvo.

Članarina iznosi 0,50 DM mjesečno. Tajništvo Centra radi svakog petka od 18 do 20 sati i subotom od 10 do 12 sati.

Telefonski kontakt s Centrom moguć je svakoga radnoga dana od 8 do 15 sati.

Srdačno vas pozdravlja,

odgovorni urednik

COOPERATION OF CHILDREN FROM OMIŠ AND DUISBURG

Gospodin Julius Schroeder, dugogodišnji prijatelj grada Omiša, zaposlen u upravi škole grada Duisburga, već duže vrijeme pomaže ljudima u našoj domovini. Posebnu brigu posvećuje njemu dragom gradu Omišu, njegovim žiteljima, njihovoj djeci, pa i djeci izbjeglih iz Bosne i Hercegovine, koja su smještena ovdje u Omišu. Između ostaloga pokrenuo je široku akciju za božićne blagdanice kada je djeci Omiša otpremio 1900 paketa koje su sakupljale i spakirale vrijedne ruke školske djece iz Duisburga.

Preko gospodina Schroedera uspostavljen je i kontakt između srednje škole "Jure Kaštelan" i Opće škole Duisburg-Beeck u Duisburgu. Obje se škole nadaju boljim vremenima kako bi

se mogla organizirati razmjena učenika. Škola iz Duisburga je izrazila spremnost pomoći i poduprijeti školu "Jure Kaštelan" u Omišu.

Nedavno je gospodin Julius Schroeder doznao 1000 DM, koju je svotu prikupila Evangelistička crkvena općina iz Duisburga, a namijenjena je djeci siročadi iz Bosne.

Sretna sam što se mogu ubrojiti među prijatelje gospodina Schroedera.

Razlog tome su pisma koja međusobno izmjenjujemo, a i misao kojom on završava jedno svoje pismo: "Molim za Tebe, za Tvoju domovinu i za sve ljude koji su prisiljeni trpjeti", možda na to daje odgovor.

Mirjana Lehts

Željko Rogošić

Split

At request of Mr. Slobodan Praljak's defence team, against which the proceeding is conducted before the ICTY under no. IT-04-74-PT, according to my best knowledge and recollection, under material and criminal responsibility, I give the following

STATEMENT

On 7th of September 1993, I stayed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the area of Čapljina as reporter of the "Globus" magazine. I departed from Split in dawn with a task to find the locations of Gabela and Dretelj camps under control of Croatian powers in which people of Bosniak nationality were detained for some time as well as to inform the Croatian public on real condition and events in those camps. A motive for such, at that time, extremely dangerous trip was a story published on CNN two days earlier, filmed in the place of Drežnica, northern from Mostar. In this TV report, several enervated Bosniaks, just released from two mentioned camps, Gabela and Dretelj near Čapljina, testified about torture and hard life conditions of thousands of Muslim detainees in two biggest camps under the control of HVO. That news was shocking also for the Croatian public because one heard for the first time then about the existence of Croatian camps in BH. Therefore, "Globus" as the leading Croatian independent weekly magazine wanted to be the first one to release an extensive report about that. Soon after, we established that in summer of 1993, there were unfortunately not only the Serbian camps Manjača and Omarska, but Croatian as well; "Heliodrom", Rodoč, Gabela, Dretelj and Bosniak museum in Jablanica, Musala in Konjic, in Zenica, Bugojno and many others.

As the first Croatian reporter, on 7th of September 1993 I managed, despite resistance, oppositions and danger for my own safety, enter and visit the Dretelj camp. The Zagreb political weekly magazine "Globus" released my report on 10th of September 1993, along with photograph from Dretelj, the former biggest oil warehouse of the former JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which in 5 hangars and two tunnels, 1478 Bosniaks were detained in inhuman conditions. Within the released story, I noted the interviews with poorly-fed and tormented people, mostly disarmed members of HVO Čapljina, Stolac, Mostar and Prozor who testified about great sufferings they were going through in July and August 1993, as well as the positive changes of the regime and life conditions since the new warden, the former policeman was appointed.

On this occasion, my duty is to emphasize the circumstances under which I managed to enter the Dretelj camp. Nevertheless, it was logical to expect, as far as camps Gabela and Dretelj are concerned, which were guarded by the persons in uniforms of HVO and with insignias of the HVO military police, that one should ask for entry permission by the competent military powers. We started from the assumption that visit approval permission to the aforementioned Croatian camps must be requested in the main staff of HVO, which later turned out to be wrong. Therefore, on 7th of September 1993, in the early morning hours, I came to the place of Čitluk, close to Čapljina in order to get the necessary permission in the Main staff of HVO. In the main staff I found commander, General Slobodan Praljak and asked him for a short conversation. As a reporter, I stayed in BH on several occasions and reported about the war conflict in that state and I also knew many Croatian politicians and military officials, among them, General Praljak as well.

To my great surprise, the commander of the Main staff of HVO, General Slobodan Praljak didn't have information on the situation and events in Dretelj and Gabela at all. His responses sounded rather sincerely to me. However, at the first moment, I was surprised by General Praljak's assertions that the command structures of HVO, respectively, the Croatian army in BH did not participate in decisions on establishment and existence of camps therefore they cannot be responsible for the events in those camps. Later on, we indeed were convinced that – although mainly the disarmed members of HVO of Bosniak nationality were detained in camps, who lived in western Herzegovina, although guards in camps were wearing uniforms of the HVO military police, the entire system of camps functioning relied exclusively to the civil powers, from the local level till the government of the Republic of Herzeg Bosnia.

During the conversation I spotted a clear opposition of General Praljak to the practice of existence of camps and judgment of inhuman life conditions in them as something which is opposite not only to ethics of making war, but to Croatian national interests in BH as well. As to my request to be permitted to visit Gabela and Dretelj camps, and contingently “Heliodrom” and Ljubuški, in which the HVO keeps the detained Bosniaks, followed by signed pass by him personally, General Praljak readily gave order that I was issued with such written confirmation. General Praljak has a position that truth must be found out about everything and that media can contribute to abolishment of camps and release of people to their homes. After the confirmation by which I am approved to visit Dretelj and Gabela has been written and certified with an official stamp, I headed towards Čapljina. Within contacts with BBC team colleagues I found out that General Slobodan Praljak signed the pass to visit Dretelj and Gabela also to reporters from Great Britain.

However, as I came to the entrance of Dretelj camp, in front of the big iron fence, there was a post nearby, guarded by armed guards, I was rather surprised. I asked to be received at warden’s of Dretelj camp, but the person on the post of the camp told me that he was absent at the moment. Than I asked for a competent official person who enabled me to visit the camp. As the person in camouflage uniform arrived, haven’t even introduced himself, I assume the deputy warden or shift commander, whose name I did not manage to find out afterwards, I gave him the written pass to enter Dretelj and visit to the camp, signed by general Praljak. To my great surprise, as he read the content which approved the visit, stay and interview in all parts of the camp, the man said rather furiously; “This permit isn’t worth a thing!” When I recalcitrated and asked whether he sees that the commander of the main staff of HVO, General Praljak, personally signed the permission, a person in uniform, visibly upset by the reporter’s visit, said back; “That’s why it is not valid exactly! Praljak does not have competence over this place and do not refer to him! You can’t enter; his signature is not valid at all!” Than the person in camouflage uniform furiously tore the permission with General Praljak’s signature apart. I concluded that nothing more can be done and I retreated.

I decided to return to Čitluk and inform general Praljak on the entire event, from which it was obvious that, either the camps are indeed outside of his competence or his authority as the GS HVO commander was seriously brought in question. At the entrance to the main staff, I found out that General Praljak has already left and that he wouldn’t come back soon. At this moment, General Žarko Tole came by, being at the time chief of the main staff of HVO. I knew him personally as well so I asked him for help. Tole came to Herzegovina recently, in July or August 1993, after a short recovery and long-lasting detention in the Serbian camp Manjača, in which he arrived as officer of HVO, after being captured in Bugojno. Therefore General Tole was rather surprised with my request to visit camps under control of Croatian powers. After I told him about being disabled from entering the Dretelj camp and that the uniformed person, having introduced himself as competent official, without hesitation tore apart the pass, signed by General Slobodan Praljak, General Žarko Tole remained surprised by information that such camps indeed exist on Croatian side. In addition, in Herzegovina, in Dretelj, Gabela and Ljubuški. He reacted furiously and loudly saying that these camps are disgrace and they should be shut down immediately. “Those camps are disgrace to our politicians and they shall become disgrace of Croatian people in BH! It is necessary that exactly Croatian reporters come in and tell to the public what is going on! I shall sign the confirmation on entering!” Žarko Tole indeed signed the new confirmation. Again, with a confirmation in my pocket, I headed to Čapljina and Dretelj on the same day in the early afternoon.

The same uniformed and armed person awaited me at the entrance, giving me the threatening look. He couldn’t believe that I enter again with a confirmation, issued at the main staff of HVO. However, this time, although obviously unwillingly, the commander of the shift reacted differently. Having seen the signature of the HVO main staff chief, General Tole, obviously impressed by his new command duty or the detainee destiny by which he directly opposed to the war criminal, Ratko Mladić and survived the Serbian Manjača, the shift commander or the deputy warden mumbled something, nodded his head and I entered the camp, escorted by two armed guards. After check and identification, I was provided with a permission to move around the camp. At that moment, the warden, Tomo Šakota, former policeman from Čapljina, came to Dretelj and he walked me through the camp, rather friendly, without making any troubles. Afterwards, he walked away and allowed me to talk to detainees and take a picture of all what we wanted to, without his presence. That day, the detainees expected a visit of the representative of the international Red Cross. Šakota, respecting all conventions of the international law, improved the positions of the detained Bosniaks in significant measure, detained Bosniaks themselves used to testify about and tell us about it with praises.

After visiting Dretelj, in the late afternoon of 7th of September 1993, we went to the camp Gabela, on the road towards the border with the Republic of Croatia and town Metković. However, at the entrance to Gabela, the duty officer was relentless. Regardless the confirmation with General Tole's signature, he didn't want to let us go into the camp, I didn't come tomorrow. I returned to Split, wrote a story that, along with my photo among detainees of Dretelj, was released in the weekly magazine "Globus" on 10th of September 1993. The following days, due to releasing the truth about Croatian camps in Herzegovina and the article in "Globus" which obtained outstanding publicity, I received major number of anonymous and non-anonymous threats, so I was exposed to pressures from certain circles who took as their right to interpret the report's engagement as political activity contrary to Croatian interests. During those September days, in camps under the control of Croats in BH and according to UNHCR records, there were approximately 10 000 Bosniaks detained, while in camps under the control of Bosniaks in BH there were 9 000 Croats detained, having passed their Calvary in the madness of BH war.

However, I described an event in which General Praljak's approval to visit Dretelj camp was not obeyed, in the article that I published in the weekly magazine "Nacional" on 21st of August 2001, where I am permanently employed, after I left "Globus" in autumn 1997 and its editor EPH. After the Tribunal in The Hague requested from the Croatian Government in summer of 2001 documents of Croatian military and intelligence community on the Croatian-Bosniak conflict in BH and existence of camps in Herzegovina, I released an extensive analytic article on key documents in Zagreb weekly magazine "Nacional". Within, I described events in Dretelj, having mentioned this episode with General Praljak's confirmation. In August 2001, in the aforementioned text, I wrote; "It is also saying about the former deployment and ratio of forces in Herzegovina".

/signature/

Željko Rogošić

Željko Rogošić, reporter for "Nacional" magazine

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ED VULLIAMY
on 8 MAY 2006 at ICTY, case Prlić et al.

Q. Let me ask you, sir, what steps, if any, you took in September, 1993, to visit any of the camps that we were discussing a few moments ago; that is, Dretelj, Gabela, or Rodoc.

A. We drove straight to Grude to find -- or to try and meet Mate Boban and ask him if we could go. Dretelj was the one that I think we chose. I think the UNHCR had said it was the one they were most worried about, and it was the one we tried last time so why not try again.

Q. Did you have any discussions with anyone at Grude concerning entry to this camp?

A. Yes. Canadian George again. And we asked to see Mate Boban. I'm not sure he was there when we got there about late morning. We were told to come back that afternoon, and Canadian George then said, "No, you can't go to Dretelj."

Q. Do you recall the approximate date or -- and time that you had this discussion with Canadian George?

A. The last one was during the afternoon.

Q. And the approximate time period in terms of dates; month, year?

A. This is September, 1993.

Q. And, sir, what --

A. I think we're in early -- early-ish September, 1993.

Q. What steps did you take after you were told by Canadian George that you can't go to Dretelj?

A. We decided that this was pressing matter now and we stayed in Grude and thought that we'd try again the following day.

Q. Did you in fact try again the following day?

A. Yes.

Q. Where?

A. Same place, back to Mr. Boban's office.

Q. Who did you encounter on that day?

A. Well, we met Canadian George again first. He -- I think maybe he did go to ask Mate Boban if we could go to Dretelj, and we were -- I think he told us no again and we asked him to go and try again. We were sitting in an office attached to this complex, whatever it was, I don't know what it was, on the outskirts of Grude, and then somebody came into the room or passed us whom all three of us recognised although it wasn't me who recognised him first, and it was one of my two colleagues, I think from the BBC. He said, Oh, there's General Praljak, why don't we ask him?

Q. And what happened next?

A. We did ask him. And I can't remember exactly whether he left us for a while. I think he did and came back but not that long afterwards, and said, I have to say to my surprise, Yes, so far as I'm concerned, you can. Or I paraphrase those words. I wasn't taking notes.

Q. And after this discussion with General Praljak, what did you do?

A. An order paper, "odobrenje," was drawn up. I honestly don't recall whether General Praljak returned into the room with it or whether it was typed up. I think it was typed up in our presence. It was stamped and signed, and with surprisingly little ado, and I don't think we talked to General Praljak very much after that. We set off to Dretelj.

Q. How did you know where to go?

A. Our translator guide knew where to go. And it was -- it was towards Capljina. I think by then we'd found it on the map, actually.

Q. This document that you were provided with, whose signature appeared on it?

A. To the best of my recollection, it was General Praljak.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL (HVO)

MAIN STAFF HVO

Number: 02-2/1-01-2477/93

Mostar, 15th September 1993

A P P R O V A L

Whereby a free pass with a police escort on relation Čitluk - Žitomislić - Mostar (left bank) is to be secured:

1. SALLY BECKER - sanitary vehicle of HVO
2. ELVIS BARUNČEVIĆ
3. ROGER LUCY - armoured Landrover

HVO Commander
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL (HVO)

MAIN STAFF HVO

Number: 02-2/1-01-2478/93

Mostar, 15th September 1993

A P P R O V A L

Whereby a free pass with a police escort on relation Čitluk - Žitomislić - Vinjani Gornji is to be secured, as well as the departure route to the Republic of Croatia:

1. Sally Becker
2. Mirsad Handžar (wounded)
3. Tanja Kaniža
4. Nina Kaniža
5. Damir Kaniža
6. Mirza Kaniža
7. Roger Lucey
8. Elvis Barunčević

HVO Commander
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council
 /coat of arms/

Main staff of HVO
 Operational number; 02-2/1-01-2149/93
 Mostar, 25th August 1993

Confirmation

Herewith we confirm that Mate Boras, bearer of Canadian passport, document no. 2006964, works for the Foreign Press Bureau, and is fully supported by the Main staff of HVO HZ HB.

Please enable them to work freely with the journalists and to move in HZ HB undisturbed; also enable them a full support in their work by all HVO employees.

Commander of the GS HVO
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council
 /coat of arms/

Main staff of HVO
 Operational number; 02-2/1-01-2148/93
 Mostar, 25th August 1993

Confirmation

Herewith we confirm that Mirko Volarević, personal identification of BH no. 2101966300009, works for the Foreign Press Bureau, and is fully supported by the Main staff of HVO HZ HB.

Please enable them to work freely with the journalists and to move in HZ HB undisturbed; also enable them a full support in their work by all HVO employees.

Commander of the GS HVO
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council
 /coat of arms/

Main staff of HVO
 Operational number; 02-2/1-01-2147/93
 Mostar, 25th August 1993

Confirmation

Herewith we confirm that Darko Vučina, personal identification of BH no. 1212965380028, works for the Foreign Press Bureau, and is fully supported by the Main staff of HVO HZ HB.

Please enable them to work freely with the journalists and to move in HZ HB undisturbed; also enable them a full support in their work by all HVO employees.

Commander of the GS HVO
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council
 /coat of arms/

Main staff of HVO
 Operational number; 02-2/1-01-2145/93
 Mostar, 25th August 1993

Confirmation

Herewith we confirm that Dado Lozančić, bearer of the US passport, no. H635432, works for the Foreign Press Bureau, and is fully supported by the Main staff of HVO HZ HB. Please enable them to work freely with the journalists and to move in HZ HB undisturbed; also enable them a full support in their work by all HVO employees.

Commander of the GS HVO
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council
 /coat of arms/

Main staff of HVO
 Operational number; 02-2/1-01-2150/93
 Mostar, 25th August 1993

Confirmation

Herewith we confirm that Maurice Radalj, bearer of the US passport, works for the Foreign Press Bureau, and is fully supported by the Main staff of HVO HZ HB. Please enable them to work freely with the journalists and to move in HZ HB undisturbed; also enable them a full support in their work by all HVO employees.

Commander of the GS HVO
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG - BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
 DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

SECTOR FOR MORALE EDUCATION
 Number: /
 Mostar, July 26th 1993

*/Square seal - Defense department
 Date: July 27th 1993
 Number: 508/93/*

PERMISSION

Permits the team from Reuters, Corinne Lee Dufka, Predrag Kojovic and interpreter Diane Alilovic, to visit Heliodrom.

Team is escorted by Drazen Pervan.

For IPD
 Veso Vegar
 /Signature/

/Round seal - Defense department/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG - BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

SECTOR FOR MORALE EDUCATION

Number: 02-06/1-121/93

Mostar, August 17th 1993

/Square seal - Defense department

Date: August 17th 1993

Number: 562/93/

PERMISSION

This permission is for the visit to Heliodrom and visit to detention center issued to journalists from German television R T L: Gerhard Tuscha, Fridrich Lex and Marija Kobasic.

This is also permission for Uwe Berininger from German humanitarian organization Teamwork and Jelena Penava as well as Ralf Rudiger the soldier of HVO.

Visit was negotiated with the detention center's administration.

For IPD

Veso Vegar

/Signature/

/Round seal - Defense department/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG - BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

SECTOR FOR MORALE EDUCATION

Number: 02-6/1-131/93

Mostar, August 23rd 1993

PERMISSION

This permission is for the visit to Heliodrom and visit to detention center issued to journalist Askold Krushelnycky. Visit was negotiated with the director of detention center Mr. Bozic.

Assistant to Head of Defense department for IPD

Veso Vegar

/Signature/

/Round seal - Defense department/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG - BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

SECTOR FOR MORALE EDUCATION
Number: 02-6/1-157/93
Mostar, August 30th 1993

/Square seal - Defense department
Date: September 1st 1993
Number: 627/93/

PERMISSION

Permission issued for the visit to Helidrom, in order to visit the detention center, which was negotiated with the director of detention center Mr. Bozic, to the team of ITN journalists: Paul Simpson, Alex Thomson, Chris Wood and Dubravka Kukic and Rysmad Poyrchal.

Permission is valid for August 30th 1993.

Assistant to Head of Defense department for IPD
Veso Vegar
/Signature/

/Round seal - Defense department/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG - BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

SECTOR FOR MORALE EDUCATION
Number: 02-6/1-158/93
Mostar, August 30th 1993

/Square seal - Defense department
Date: September 1st 1993
Number: 626/93

PERMISSION

Permits the team from SKY NEWS television: Arpad Nemet, Patricia Ennis, Jeremy Bishop and David Hamilton Green to visit Heliodrom.

Permit is valid for August 30th 1993.

Assistant to Head of Defense department for IPD
Veso Vegar
/Signature/

/Round sea! - Defense department/

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

Documents D-1 to D-17 give to the reader a REPRESENTATIVE choice from the documents which I signed as well as an insight into general facts.

Comment on the document D-5

A conclusion was drawn on the basis of this document that Slobodan Praljak moved out these people, from these two villages, and later expelled (THE MUSLIMS) on the territory under the control of A BiH.

CENSUS IN BiH

USKOPLJE - GORNJI VAKUF

	1981	CROATS	MUSLIMS	1991	CROATS	MUSLIMS
VILLAGE PIDRIŠ	281	246	33	302	302	0
VILLAGE MAČKOVAC	100	100	0	32	32	0

How is this conclusion possible?

Because of formerly created preconceptions, because of wrong hypotheses, because of the MORALISTIC HYSTERIA about the perpetrators, all and everywhere, because....

Truth must be built on facts, such truth will lead to JUSTICE, and such justice will lead to PEACE.

PUNISHMENT OF THE SCAPEGOAT IS NOT THE SOLUTION.

/stamp of receipt/
 Republic of Croatia
 Ministry of Defence
 IPD administration
 Class;
 Operational number; 512-14-01/92-745

/coat of arms/
 Republic of Croatia
 Ministry of Defence
 Zagreb

Zagreb, 30th April 1993

Assembly areas
 HRM /Croatian military Navy/
 HRZ /Croatian military air force/ and
 PZO /Croatian counter air force defence/
 To all units

Subject; warning

At Parliament sessions, as well as county and town assemblies, at public gatherings with political meaning, processions and other manifestations with partial political content, one can often see members of Croatian army in uniforms.

We warn that the aforementioned phenomena are contrary to basic provisions of the Republic of Croatia armed forces regulations. Namely, by article 18 of the basic provisions, military persons as well as persons on duty in armed forces are forbidden to participate in gatherings, processions and manifestations with a political meaning, while wearing a uniform.

Therefore an attention is drawn to all members of Croatian army, parliament members, members of county and town assemblies, participants in public gatherings, political and other manifestations with partial political content that they are obliged to act according to Rules of regulations of the RH armed forces.

Assistants of commanders for political activity are obliged to introduce this warning to all members of the Croatian army.

Assistant minister
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

/stamp: Croatian State Archive, Zagreb/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

MAIN STAFF /GS/

Number: 02-2/1-01-1642/93

Mostar, 31 July 1993

DEFENCE

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/handwritten:
 JIH /South-Eastern
 Herzegovina/ OZ
 SZH/North-Western
 Herzegovina/ OZ
 SB /Central Bosnia/ OZ
 Bosnian Posavina OZ/

To:

Order regarding the stopping and
 inspection of UNPROFOR vehicles.

- all OZ /Operations Zones/ 4
- professional units
- TRP /?Artillery Rocket Regiment/
- Defence Department, for information

ORDER

1. Members of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ (soldiers - noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers) carrying out their regular duties in the areas of responsibility, commanders and commands at all levels have no right to stop, inspect or search UNPROFOR vehicles.
2. Enable UNPROFOR units free movement along approved roads and routes, of which you will be promptly informed, and provide them with full protection and assistance.
3. Do not let humanitarian aid convoys pass through without thoroughly checking their cargo. On searching the convoys, let them pass through and go along approved routes with escort and with inspections en route.
4. Commanders at all levels are responsible to me for carrying out this Order. Inform the entire unit about this Order.

SM/DS

/handwritten: For/ HVO GS /Main Staff/ COMMANDER

/a signature/
 Major General
 Slobodan PRALJAK
 /stamp/

/stamp: ?Croatian State Archives/

/stamp:

ECV /Electronic Communications Centre/ /illegible/ CV		
I/illegible/	Received	Teleg. /Telegram/ no. 3739. Po/?v/ /?confidential/
Date: 17 August 1993 at 1424 hours		
TLP /teleprinter/, TGR /telegram/ , TLF /telephone/,		
RRV /radio relay/, ŽV /wire communications/, RV /radio/		
Processed by: /a signature/ (signature) /		

/

/handwritten: SIS /Information and Security Service//

R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/

DEFENCE

HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/

MILITARY SECRET

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

S/Z H /Southwest Herzegovina/ OZ /Zone of Responsibility/

Prozor IZM /Forward Command Post/

Number: 01-2142/93

Date: 17 August 1993

To: - Rama Brigade in Prozor
 - Dr. Ante Starčević Brigade in Uskoplje
 - Rama Military Police

1. On 17 August 1993 all prisoners are to be withdrawn from the tasks they have been given in your respective zones of responsibility by 1800 hrs.
2. Those responsible for /their/ safe return and security in prison shall be the Rama Brigade SIS and the Rama Military Police.

Commander
 Major General
 Slobodan PRALJAK

/handwritten: Sent to the Rama VP /Military Police/

/a signature/

/stamped: Croatian State Archives
Zagreb/

RAMA BRIGADE
No: 01-1583/93
Date: 18 August 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

S/Z /North West/ H /?Herzegovina/ OZ /Operative Zone/, Prozor IZM /Forward
Command Post/

In connection with the order of commander Major General Slobodan PRALJAK, no. 01-2142/93 of 17 August 1993, on the withdrawal of prisoners from work to which they were assigned, we hereby inform you that all prisoners have been withdrawn from the *Rama* Brigade's zone of responsibility within the deadline indicated.

CC: Files

Commander
Ante PAVLOVIĆ
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/

NORTH-WESTERN HERZEGOVINA OPERATIONS ZONE
PROZOR FORWARD COMMAND POST

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Number: 01-3328/93
Date: 28 August 1993

HVO, GORNJI VAKUF
HVO, PROZOR (for information)

ORDER FOR EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS FROM WAR ZONE

The area around the villages of Pidriš and Mačkovac is being affected by fighting and as such is considered to be a war zone in which there should be no civilians unfit for combat. With the aim of ensuring their protection and safety, I hereby issued the following

ORDER

1. The HVO of Gornji Vakuf shall organise the evacuation of the civilian population of the villages of Pidriš and Mačkovac to areas that are not affected by war.
2. Evacuate women, children, older men and men unfit for combat and keep only the civilians who are included in units either as soldiers or support workers.
3. Make sure that you also evacuate livestock.
4. Implementation of this order must begin immediately.

COMMANDER, HVO MAIN STAFF
MAJOR GENERAL
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed/

/header/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

Number: 02-2/1-01-2235/93

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET

Subject: Truce

SPABAT - MEĐUGORJE

1. We are ready to establish the cease of combat actions in Mostar and Mostar area during the negotiations in Međugorje. General Felin is presiding negotiations, which are led by representatives of HVO and the Muslim Army.
2. SPABAT-UNPROFOR and UN observers shall supervise the cease of combat actions on both sides.
3. The cease of combat actions starts on 31st of August 1993 at 1800 hours and shall last for 48 hours.
4. During the cessation of combat actions, UNPROFOR and UN observers shall be completely free to move across the filed, controlled by the HVO.
5. The cessation of combat actions shall be invalid exclusively in case of an attack of the Muslim Army.

Commander of GS HVO
Major General
Slobodan Praljak
/signed and stamped/

/header/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

/double printed/

Number: 02-2/1-01-2245/93

/handwritten military police must pass the observers/

31 August 1993

APPROVAL

Herewith approves to the MILITARY OBSERVERS
In period from 1 September 1993 till 2 September 1993, till 1800 hours
To travel in the area of JIH operative zone
Because of the supervision of cease-fire violation

/round stamp/

the approval is issued for the purposes of free travel across Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Republic of Croatia and

Major General
Slobodan Praljak
/handwritten name/

President - Commander
Slobodan Praljak
/signed/

The pass must be returned after the expiry

/stamp/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HVO HR H-B /CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
OF THE CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA/ MAIN STAFF
No. /illegible/

Separate Command Post Čitluk, 28 September 1993

Command of the Operative Zone Central Bosnia
Attn. Colonel Tihomir Blaškić

Regarding new indications on the use of poison gas in the battles around the village Bobaši in the municipality of Vitez, send us as soon as possible:

- Medical confirmations, if any
- Description of the means of use of poison gas (time, place, type of poison gas, consequences, means by which gas was dispersed)

We also inform you that we already forwarded your documentation about the use of poison gas to competent institutions.

One English newspaper which deals with military matters, published that there is evidence about the use of poison gas in Central Bosnia, which is supported by the findings you sent us.

COMMANDER OF THE HVO MAIN STAFF

/signed/
General-major
Slobodan Praljak

/stamp/

Croatian State Archive Zagreb /the text of the round stamp/
 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Main Staff
 Ref. No. 12-2/1-01-2329/93
 IZM /Forward Command Post/ Čitluk, 05 September 1993

OZ / Operations Zone/ Bosanska Posavina,
 Attn. The Commander

Compliance with the agreement on ceasefire

I order

1. You are to fire back at enemy units only if the first defence lines are attacked with infantry and armoured - mechanised units.
2. For any other return of fire, the approval of the Main Staff is to be requested.
3. This order is to be passed on to the lowest level of the chain of command. I hold you personally responsible for this.

GS /Main Staff/ HVO
 Commander
 Major General
 Slobodan PRALJAK

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
 Defence Department
 Main Staff Mostar /the coat of arms of Herzeg Bosnia - the text of the square stamp/

UNION OF REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG-BOSNIA
Main Staff of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/
Reference No: 02-2/1-01-3289/93
IZM /Forward Command Post/ Čitluk, 03 November 1993

Defence
Classified
Strictly confidential

TO: The OZ /Zone of Operations/ of S-B /Central Bosnia/
Attn: Colonel Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ

Subject: Possible Use of Explosives - Order

I ORDER

1. Assess the possibility of setting a large quantity mines towards Travnik and other Muslim-held posts, which would, if activated, cause serious material damage and casualties.
2. Assess the quantity of explosive supplies and inform me about it.
3. Assess the consequences that the activities mentioned under Item 1 would cause to the enemy, us and UNPROFOR.
4. /?Assess/ the way to mine the factory, the consequences, and if you would have it under control.
5. Inform me about everything immediately.

COMMANDER OF THE GS /Main Staff/ of the HVO
General Major
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed/

/Stamp: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia
Defence Department
Main Staff
Mostar 2/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
 MAIN STAFF OF HVO
 Operational number: 02-2/1-01-3246/93
 Mostar, 31 October 1993

UNPROFOR
 SPABAT-Međugorje

Subject: query reply

Pursuant to your fax letter, number T-1717, concerning the annihilation of explosive material, we approve its realization on 3 November 1993, at 0930 hours, on the polygon in Ljubuški.

The 2 November 1993 is All Saints' Day, therefore not appropriate to deal with those issues.

Sincerely yours

MAIN STAFF OF HVO
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
 MAIN STAFF OF HVO
 Operational number: 02-2/1-01-3282/93
 Mostar, 3 November 1993

UNPROFOR
 SPABAT-Međugorje

Subject: Request

The severe offensive of the Muslim forces to Croatian areas in Vareš and its vicinity has been going on for days. In several occasions we tried to solve the problems by agreement, however, we failed.

Since MOS concentrated extremely powerful forces in this area, our units are not able to defend 20000 civilians approximately. Currently, there is a fight in surrounding in the area of 5 km².

We request the pulling out of innocent civilian population through UNPROFOR.

We have data that the massacre of civilians already started in villages Tribija, Vijac, Borovice, Pogar and Ivančica.

For the above cited crimes in villages, there is already panic and disorganization among inhabitants and units, therefore we ask that the UN forces intervene as soon as possible, in order to prevent further massacre and enable pulling out of surrounded inhabitants from the area of combat actions.

MAIN STAFF OF HVO
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
 MAIN STAFF OF HVO
 Operational number: 02-2/1-01-3309/93
 Mostar, 4 November 1993

UNPROFOR
 SPABAT-Međugorje
 To the UN Commander
 Kiseljak

Subject: request

Pursuant to request of GS HVO, no 02-2/1-01-3284/93, dated 3 November 1993, concerning the protection and pulling out the civilians in the area of Vareš, we kindly request to submit the report, as being done so far. We emphasize that the severe offensive of Muslim forces has been carried out for days to the Croatian enclave of Vareš, therefore it is necessary to do everything in order to protect the innocent civilians.

MAIN STAFF OF HVO
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA

HVO GENERAL HQ
 Office No. 02-2/1-01-3350/93
 Mostar, 6 November 1993

UNPROFOR
 COMMANDER OF THE HEADQUARTERS
 A. I. RAMSAY

Dear General Ramsay,

Many thanks to UNPROFOR and in particular to you for your having taken an active part in the case of Vares.

He hope that you are convinced of the persecution of the Croats by the Moslems which began long ago in Konjic and was continued in Kakanj, Zenica, Bugojno, Fojnica, etc.

He shall do our best to find out the committers of what happened in Stupni Do. After such incidents there is always a certain number of people who will return the same sort of ill treatment, which can be attributed neither to soldiers, nor police, nor the people.

I hope that you will show more objectivity in observing all very difficult events.

Concerning the Moslem helicopters, I ask you once more, as I have already asked General Briquemont, to understand that it is the least of a military problem, that you could not expect from me to resolve it, but we have done laterally everything by being flexible towards the Moslem side in order to arrange the prisoners' exchange and thus enable the evacuation of the Moslem wounded by helicopters to Zenica. He hope it will be done, as planned, tomorrow, Sunday, 7 November 1993.

Respectfully,

HVO GENERAL HQ
 General
 Slobodan Praljak

Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosnia
 Main staff of HVO HR HB
 Operational number; 02-2/1-01-3343/93
 Mostar, 6th November 1993

Subject: notification

UNPROFOR

SPABAT Međugorje
 For the command of UN
 Kiseljak

In regards to gathering and inserting of the Muslim sabotage forces, reinforced by Mujahedins around the Croatian enclave Žepče, in relation to the massacre, we inform you that on 4 and 5th November 1993 they committed crime against civil population in the village of Vinište. MOS killed and massacred three civilians, whereby they took one, Ante Bandić, in an unknown direction.

We request from UNPROFOR to do everything to reveal and put sanction to the committer, as well as to inform all relevant factors on insertion and massacre of civilians in the village of Vinište, as well as on gatherings and intentions of MOS around Croatian enclaves in Central Bosnia.

Main staff of HVO
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
 MAIN STAFF OF HVO
 Operational number: 02-2/101-3373/93
 Čitluk, 8th November 1993

UNPROFOR SPABAT
 MEĐUGORJE

Subject: permit to transport the wounded persons

Herewith, the SPABAT transport of Đani Oručević and his mother Edina Oručević is approved. Both were wounded by the shell. The condition is to transport Josip Kordić as well, also wounded by the shell. The above cited persons are to be transported to Mostar hospital, if necessary, further.

To be delivered:

1. Attn
2. Files

Commander of the GS HVO
 Major Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

/handwritten document:/

PETKOVIĆ

SEND ME THE ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS URGENTLY 30 MINUTES BY FAX


- GIVE ME THE NAMES OF COMMANDERS IN A RADIUS OF 45 KM FROM THE LOCATION OF THE FALL OF THE PLANE AND 10 KM LEFT AND RIGHT FROM THE FLIGHT ROUTE OVER THE TERRITORY OF BiH /BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA/
- SEND ME THE PHONE NUMBERS OF COMMANDERS SO THAT UN, i.e. UNPROFOR COULD CONTACT THEM
- SEND ME THE LOCATIONS OF HEADQUARTERS AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS

Praljak

/signed/

DRAWING:

Location of the fall of the plane



h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostar i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, namo
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

DOCUMENTS D-1 TO D-21

The determination of the exact content of the three listed notions should, in a real situation, be the key for the decision on the responsibility of a military commander - by not using the verbs like “one could have...”, “we would like...”, “we would wish...” looking from some far away perspectives.

The documents D-1 to D-21 are a choice and they testify to a militarily un-educated reader on the state (or value) of what is - in the army - called CCC.

If one wants to know.

In document D-14 I call upon the legal right to close all the catering establishments in HZ-HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/ and to ban the use of alcohol.

I DON'T HAVE THAT RIGHT, I MADE IT UP.

HVO is not an occupation army, that I might dare write such a thing and for such an order to be legal.

There are civilian authorities, democratically elected.

This is just one desperate attempt to reduce all forms of law-breaking which occur due to alcohol abuse.

When the HVO soldiers are in their homes (not in their shift) alcohol is the main cause of fights, injuries and killings.

/stamped: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

/handwritten: To Livno, 2237 hours, /illegible signature/, ONO /Operations and Training/ /illegible signature//

REPUBLIC OF BiH
HZ HB
IZM /Forward Command Post/
No: 01-1964/93
Prozor, 25 July 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET

To: *Petar Krešimir IV* Brigade - Livno
(For your information)
Livno PTT
Velinko ČUBELA, personally

Switching on telephones.
Order.

Based on demonstrated need and in order to have successful command over subordinated units, I hereby

ORDER

1. Switch on incoming telephone calls for Tomislavgrad and Livno.
2. Deadline: Immediately.
3. Mr Verinko ČUBELA is responsible for carrying out this order.

ČUBELA, just try not to switch on the telephones. Squeeze those balls and try not to carry out this order.

Commander of the GS /Main Staff/
Major General Slobodan PRALJAK

RBiH
HZHB
HVO
IZM OZ S/Z HERZEGOVINA

/Forward Command Post of the South-Western Herzegovina Zone of Operations/
No: 01-1965/93
Prozor, 25 July 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
Strictly confidential

Measures to be taken,

Order

GS HVO /Croatian Defence Council Main Staff/
HZHB Mostar
Attn. Major General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

1. Units from Kostajnica under the command of Zdravko ŠAGOLJ to be immediately prepared and send to Rama to IZM OZ S/Z H.
2. Who does not carry out this order, is to be disarmed, stripped off from the HVO clothes, detained and kept with no food or water until I come back.

The Commander of the GS
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK

Stamped upon receipt by GS HVO, Mostar
on 25 July 1993 at 2340 hrs
No. 5116
/signature: KOVAČIĆ/

R BH HZ HB HVO
 /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council/
 IZM /Forward Command Post/ of the OZ /Operations Zone/
 of S/Z /North-East/ Herzegovina

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 Strictly Confidential

Number: 01-1963
 Prozor, 25 July 1993
 Order: Engagement of forces

To: GS HVO HZ HB /Main Staff of the Croatian
 Defence Council of the Croatian Community
 of Herzeg-Bosnia/, Mostar Administration of
 the V.P. /Military Police/ of the HVO HZ HB,
 Mostar

To: Valentin ĆORIĆ, personally,
Petar Krešimir IV Brigade, Livno,
 2nd Light Assault Battalion, Livno

Regardless of everything, immediately send a BG /combat group/ from the *Petar Krešimir IV* Brigade and V.P. (Light Assault Battalion), which were in Rama, and find men, civilian police, Home Guards and other Brigade troops, to send to the lines.

The Commander of the Brigade, Stanko VRGOČ, and Zdenko ANDABAK are personally responsible for the execution of the order.

OZ Commander
 Colonel
 Željko ŠILJEG

GS /Main Staff/ Commander
 Major General
 Slobodan PRALJAK

P.S. Just try not implementing this order!

ECV, Name of organ: GS HVO
Sent Received Telegram no. 5120
On 25 July 1993 at 2350 hours
TLP, TGR, TLF,, RRV, ŽV, (RV)
PROCESSED BY: ___/signed/___
/expansions: HVO - Croatian Defence Council ECV - Communications Centre Dispatch Service TLP - Teleprinter; TGR - Telegraph TLF - Telephone RRV - Radio Relay Communication ŽV - Wire Communication RV - Radio Communication/

/stamp:/
CROATIAN STATE ARCHIVE
ZAGREB
Marulić Square /21/

/handwritten:/ 01-1974
26 July 1993

/handwritten:/ ONO /Operations and Training/
/a signature/

Received at 1945 hours.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/

Posušje Brigade
Number: 225s/93
Posušje, 25 July 1993
Colonel Željko ŠILJEG, personally

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
MAIN STAFF /GS/
Number: 02-2/1-01-1562/93
Mostar, 25 July 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

- URGENT -

Livno Brigade
VRGOČ, personally
Posušje Brigade
ĐEREK, personally

Last warning because of failure to carry out orders

The orders of the Chief of the HVO GS on sending units to Prozor are not being carried out. We are wondering within which military system you are operating.

Failure to carry out the received order by 1700 hours on 26 July 1993 would mean:

1. That the said commanders, as the most responsible persons, will be replaced and criminal proceedings instigated against them.
2. I demand that you submit a report on the implementation of this order one hour after the units have been sent.
3. The post office in Livno is to be reopened immediately so that our military lines may operate.

Commander of the HVO GS
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK

P.S.

PLEASE, SEND THE REPORT YOU HAVE SENT TO GENERAL PRALJAK.

COMMANDER
COLONEL ANĐELKO ĐEREK

/stamped: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

/handwritten: Sent to Tomislavgrad at 0939 hours, 26 July 1993

/signed:/ Mile

ONO /Operations and Training/

/illegible signature/

REPUBLIC OF BiH, HZ HB
S/Z HERZEGOVINA OZ IZM
No: 01-1977/93
Prozor, 26 July 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

- URGENT -

- *Kralj Tomislav* Brigade - Tomislavgrad
Colonel Željko GLASNOVIĆ, personally

Glava,

I'm not ordering you. I expect you to come with men fit to fight immediately. The situation is too serious for either talking or screwing around.

Commander of the GS /Main Staff/
Major General Slobodan PRALJAK

Stamp: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb

IZM OZ S/Z H /Forward Command Post OZ, the North-western Herzegovina/

Number: 01 - 2046

Prozor, 28 July 1993

Defence
Strictly Confidential
Military Secret

- Engagement of the Civil Police, -
Tomislavgrad
ORDER

To: Brigade "Kralj Tomislav" -

Brigade "Rama" - Prozor
Civil Police - Prozor

Pursuant to this order the Civil Police of "Rama" stops existing as the Civil Police. It is mobilised in the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ units and temporarily put under the command of sector of Slatina until the completion of the task.

Any disobedience of the order is to be strongly punished, whether by beating or execution by shooting.

Commander of the GS /Main Staff/
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
Signed on the hand-writing /sic/

/small round stamp: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HVO MAIN STAFF

Ref. Number: 02-2/1-01-2228/93

Čitluk IZM /Forward Command Post/

DEFENCE

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
SOUTH-EAST HERZEGOVINA OPERATIVE ZONE

Received 30 th August 1993			
Org Unit	Number	Attachments	Value
02-	2461	/93	

Regarding the non-carrying out of
a GS /Main Staff/ Order -
disciplinary measures against the perpetrators. -

J/I H OZ /South-East
Herzegovina Operative Zone/
personally to the Commander of
the *Klis* Independent Battalion
personally to Mr Marko STANIĆ

I HEREBY ORDER

1. The Commander of the *Klis* Independent Battalion will submit to me a written statement on why he did not carry out the Order No 02-2/1-01-2093/03 issued by GS /Main Staff/ on 21st August 1993.
2. The above-mentioned Order is to be carried out immediately, unconditionally and unquestioningly and I am to be informed about that on 31st August 1993.
3. The Commander of the J/I H OZ /South-East Herzegovina Operative Zone/ and the Commander of the 3rd Brigade are responsible to me for the realisation of this Order.

/handwritten: Report to be
submitted to JIH OZ/
/a signature/

HVO GS COMMANDER
/signed by Slobodan PRALJAK/
Major-General
Slobodan PRALJAK

/round stamp:
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
MAIN STAFF
MOSTAR/

R BiH HZ HB HVO
 N/W H OZ IZM
 Number: 01-2093/93
 Prozor: 31 July 1993

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/handwritten: — / HVO GS /Main Staff/ Mostar
 VP /Military Police/ Administration Mostar
 (Chief Valentin ĆORIĆ, personally)
 Perica TURAJLIJA

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE VP ADMINISTRATION

The Order you issued on 29 My 1993, number 02-4/3-01-1782, on the suspension of VP Platoon Commander Perica TURAJLIJA and his relief of duty will not be implemented.

P. TURAJLIJA's VP platoon is under my operational command and is carrying out all its assigned tasks.

Relief of duty will be carried out only after the conduct of an investigation with the presentation of solid evidence.

In the meantime you may and must implement a fourfold annullment of Mr Zdenko ANDABAK's order, abandoning positions and completely unauthorised activity.

Furthermore, you may investigate all cases of exceeding the authority of the VP with reference to the treatment of people from the German humanitarian convoy. Furthermore, you may initiate proceedings against the members of the VP platoon commanded by Mr Perica TURAJLIJA who abandoned their positions without authorisation, and whose names have been provided to you.

Furthermore, you may instil more order among members of the VP, and make them into people who will be subordinate to the idea of the struggle of the Croatian people, and not their various personal interests.

Commander
 Brigadier General
 Slobodan PRALJAK

/handwritten: to Livno at 0945 hours on 31 July 1993
via Tomislavgrad/ /a signature/

/handwritten: ONO /Operations and Training/
/a signature/

R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ HZ HB

/Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosnia/ HVO /Croatian Defence Council/

IZM /Forward Command Post/ OZ /Operations Zone/

S/Z /north-west/ Herzegovina

No: 01-2091/93

Prozor, 31 July 1993

DEFENCE

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Petar Krešimir IV Brigade

LIVNO

(to Stanko VRGOČ, personally)

1. I request a 128 mm VBR /multiple rocket launcher/ with two charges and crew as requested in document no. 01-2052/93 of 29 July 1993 which will leave on the same day.

Commander VRGOČ, for failing to obey an Order, not only will you be dismissed, but you will also be held responsible under all military laws.

COMMANDER

Major General

Slobodan PRALJAK

/stamped: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

/handwritten: Sent to Livno at 1348 hours, 1 August 1993, /signed: Mile/
ONO /Operations and Training/
/illegible signature/

REPUBLIC OF BiH

HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/ HVO /Croatian Defence Council/

S/Z /North-Western/ HERZEGOVINA OZ /Operations Zone/ IZM Forward

Command Post/

No: 01-2109/93

Prozor, 1 August 1993

DEFENCE

MILITARY SECRET

A reply requested immediately.

To: *Petar Krešimir IV* Brigade - Livno
Stanko VRGOČ, personally

- Answer me immediately, where are the men of the professional battalion from your brigade with Commander VUČIĆ?

Commander of the Main Staff
Major General Slobodan PRALJAK

Stamp: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb

/hand-written/ /word illegible/

ONO /Operations and Training Organ/, /signed, signature illegible/

R BiH HZ HB HVO /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Defence Council/

/letter illegible, probably Operative Zone/ S/Z H IZM Prozor /North-western Herzegovina, Forward Command Post Prozor/

Number: 01 -1140

Defence

Date: 3 August 1993

Military Secret

Strictly Confidential

To: Brigade "Petar Krešimir IV"
 Brigade "Kralj Tomislav"
 Brigade "H. V. - Hrvatinić" - for information

Subject: Return of soldiers,
 Order.

In the last twenty days some soldiers have wilfully left the units of the Brigade "H. V. - Hrvatinić" and joined the units of the Brigades "Petar Krešimir IV" Livno, "Kralj Tomislav" and HOS /Croatian Defence Forces/ Tomislavgrad. In order to prevent these and similar occurrences. I hereby

ORDER

1. Fully carry out the order of the OZ /Operative Zone/ S/Z H number 01-5-215 dated 20. 05. 1993., issued pursuant to the order of the GS /Main Staff/ number: 06-01-553 dated 19. 05. 1993.
2. All soldiers who joined the aforementioned units so far are to be dismissed and returned to the Brigade "H. V. - Hrvatinić" in Prozor by 05. 08. 1993. at the latest, about which I should be reported in writing.
3. Commander of the Brigade "H. V. - Hrvatinić" will in the future follow up on the situation on a daily basis. He will also undertake measures against the self-will of individuals and report to the Command of the OZ S/Z H Tomislavgrad.

Commander of the GS HVO /Main Staff of the Croatian Defence Council/
 Major General
 Slobodan PRALJAK

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
HZ /Croatian Community of/ HERZEG-BOSNIA
HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ OZ S/Z HERZEGOVINA /North-western Herzegovina Zone of
Operations/
NUMBER: 01-2905/93
DATE: 15 August 1993

- PRESIDENT OF THE HZ HB
/Attn. Mate BOBAN/
- GS HVO /HVO Main Staff/

Subject: Request for relief

1. What happened to the relief for the people from Grude that I had arranged with you in Grude, I request an URGENT answer.
2. What was done in regard to the deserters from Grude as per the list from the extraordinary report by the IZM /Forward Command Post/ OZ S/Z H no 01-2890/93 from 14 August 1993.

The above named from the mentioned list to be brought lined up to me to the Command of IZM OZ Prozor within 24 hours.

The Commander of the GS HVO
Major General Slobodan PRALJAK

/stamp: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/

IZM /Forward Command Post/ of the OZ /Operations Zone/ S/Z H /North-Western Herzegovina/

Number: 01-2916/93

DEFENCE

Prozor: 16 August 1993

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE GS /Main Staff/ of the Mostar HVO /Croatian

Defence Council/

OZ S/Z H, Tomislavgrad

LIST OF FORCES ON THE FRONT

A total of 20 units of varied strength numbering altogether 4,424 men are engaged on the Rama - Uskoplje front, as follows:

LIST OF UNITS AND PERSONNEL IN THE FIELD PROZOR - GORNJI VAKUF /AREA/

No.	UNIT	NUMERICAL STRENGTH ON THE DAY OF LIST SUBMISSION
1.	<i>Bruno Bušić</i> Regiment	60
2.	<i>Zrinski</i> Battalion	38
3.	5 th Guards /Brigade/	230
4.	<i>Stjepan Radić</i> Brigade, Ljubuški	470
5.	Grude Brigade	64
6.	Lašva Company	120
7.	Komušina	22
8.	<i>Ante Starčević</i> Brigade	905
9.	Rama Brigade	1,558
10.	<i>H. V. Hrvatinić</i> Brigade	230
11.	<i>Kralj Tomislav</i> Brigade	150
12.	<i>Eugen Kvaternik</i> Brigade	295
13.	Turalija VP /Military Post/	35
14.	Rama VP	67
15.	Grdani	32
16.	OZ /Operations Zone/ Reconnaissance Company	12
17.	IDG /Reconnaissance and Sabotage Group/ TNA /expansion unknown/, Koprivnica	37
18.	ATG /Anti-Terrorist Group/ - Brdarica	9
19.	<i>Alfa Forca</i> ATG	25
20.	Garavi ATG	15
21.	Artillery	50
		4,424

From the total number deduct 10 percent for various reasons (wounding, illness, death, etc), the entire logistics and other accompanying services and take into account the absolute exhaustion of the men from Jajce. 40 percent of the men from Sebešići (Zenica KPD /Penal and Correctional Facility/ and others) suffer from mental illness, part of the men from Grude and Bugojno have fled, only 130 soldiers of the 5th Guards /Brigade/ are foot soldiers, etc.

The only good-quality unit capable of carrying out an attack is near Filipovidi, but they too are supposed to leave the Rama area in keeping with a verbal order (most of them have already left). In fact there are no Klica's men.

FUCK IT ! /as printed/

Commander of the HVO Main Staff
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK, personally

/handwritten: HVO GS
5808
16 August 1993, 0955 hours/
/signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ MAIN STAFF
Number: 02-2/1-01-2069/93
Čitluk IZM /Forward Command Post/, 21 August 1993

To: - HVO Presidents in HZ H-B /Croatian Community
of Herzeg-Bosnia/ municipalities
- All OZ /Operations Zone/

Based on the authority vested in me by the law and in view of the current situation, I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. I prohibit the work of all catering establishments throughout the territory of the HZ H-B.
2. I prohibit all shops and other liquor-vending establishments to sell liquor to individuals who will consume it either on the premises or in their immediate vicinity.

The Administration and military policemen shall look after the implementation of this Order in cooperation with the civilian police and municipal inspection organs.

Individuals violating this Order shall be punished in accordance with the wartime regulations of Herzeg-Bosnia.

SP/DS
Typed 1x1

COMMANDER OF THE HVO GS /Main Staff/
Major-General
Slobodan PRALJAK

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 S/Z H /North-West Herzegovina/ OPERATIONS ZONE
 PROZOR IZM /Forward Command Post/

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 01-3327/93
 28 August 1993

On the basis of demonstrated need and to facilitate better command and control, I hereby

ORDER

The *Petar Krešimir IV* Brigade shall send to its unit in Prozor the following communications equipment and a group of signallers, who will be assigned to operating communications and equipment in their sector:
 Communications equipment:

- Two telephone exchanges, ITC-10 x2
- 20 induction telephones
- RTK/cable/10,000 m
- RU /radio set/ 2 m 5W (stationary) (if you have one spare)
- Hand-held RS /radio sets/ (15 sets)

I shall hold the brigade commander responsible for implementing this order.

Deadline: Immediately! Immediately!

- General PRALJAK wrote:

"Only a fool could send men into the field without communications."

To:
 - *Petar Krešimir IV* Brigade, Livno
 - S/Z H OZ, Tomislavgrad

GS /Main Staff/ Commander
 Major General
 Slobodan PRALJAK
 /signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 OPERATIVE ZONE SOUTH-EAST HERZEGOVINA, MOSTAR
 3rd HVO BRIGADE
 Strictly confidential No: 03-528-31/93
 Mostar, 31st August 1993

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

HVO MAIN STAFF
 ČITLUK IZM /Forward Command Post/

In connection with the Order No 02-2/1-01-2228/93 issued by the Main Staff on 30th August 1993, we can inform you that the *Klis* Independent Battalion did not complete this Order. However, today, on 31st August 1993, it has been verbally agreed between Božo PAVLOVIĆ, the 3rd HVO Battalion Commander, and Marko STANIĆ, the *Klis* Independent Battalion Commander, that the *Klis* Independent Battalion will discharge their duties in the area of responsibility of the 3rd HVO Brigade on 1st September 1993.

Submitted:
 - GS /Main Staff/, Čitluk IZM
 - files

COMMANDER
 /a signature/ _____
 Božo PAVLOVIĆ

/stamped: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/
 REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 S/ZH /North-West Herzegovina/ OZ /Operations Zone/
 PROZOR IZM /Forward Command Post/

No. 01/3512
 11 September 1993

DEFENCE
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
 MILITARY SECRET

Reminder for submission
 of report

Petar Krešimir IV Brigade
 L I V N O

On 9 September 1993 we sent you a memorandum, no. 01-3470, requesting a report on the reasons for the failure to implement the order of the commander of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ GS /Main Staff/, no. 3395/93 of 5 September 1993, concerning the deployment of a battalion to the Uskoplje battleground. We again remind you to send us the requested report.

To:

- *Petar Krešimir IV* Brigade
 - Files

HVO GS COMMANDER
 Major General
 Slobodan PRALJAK
 /a signature/

/stamp/ Croatian State Archives, Zagreb

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
Main Staff of HVO HR HB

Hand-written: OMK - Kutle; */signature illegible/*

IZM, Čitluk, 25 September 1993

Attn. Commander
Attn. Deputy Commander
OZ SZH */Operations zone South-western Herzegovina/*

Response

At the request of OZ SZH

U br. 01/4517 of 25. 09. 93 and OZ. TG */operations zone tactical group/*

U br. 01-4112/93 of 24. 09. 93 IZM */forward command post/* OZ PROZOR

U br. 02-2/1-01-2658/93 GS HR HB of 25. 09. 93

1. The Order of GS HR HB Ur. Br. 02-2/1-01-2658/93 is rendered invalidated.
2. In future the OZ Commander and Deputy Commander must coordinate their positions and the Commander brings the decision. Only the Commander is entitled to bring a decision or if the situation */circumstances/* so require he can change it - bring a new decision.
3. What your Command is doing, to say in a gentle manner, is not serious.

GS HR HB
Major-General
PRALJAK, Slobodan
/stamped and signed/

Round stamp reading:
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
MOSTAR
MAIN STAFF
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Stamp upon receipt reading:

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Operations zone */... illegible/* Herzegovina
/legend illegible/

26. 9.1993			
0-6	45553		

/Stamp: Croatian State Archive, Zagreb/

THE UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

MAIN STAFF OF THE OS /Armed Forces/ OF
THE HR /Croatian Republic/ of HB /Herzeg-Bosnia/
Ur. number 02-2/1 -01-2802/93

/handwritten: 56/

Čitluk IZM /Forward Command Post/, 3 October 1993

Report; on taking over
and occupying the zone
of responsibility

To: J/I /South-eastern/ H /Herzegovina/
OZ/Zone of Operations/
Commander, personally
Commander 5th br. /Brigade/ Posušje, personally
ONO /Operations and Training/ of the
GS /Main Staff/

A number of reports by the 5th br. Posušje stated that OZ J/I H had not yet taken over the zone (left border) of responsibility and completed taking up positions. At 1600 today, 3 September 1993, the deputy commander of the 5th br. Posušje sought the intervention of the GS to carry out the order.

In view of the above, submit the following to the GS:

1. Why was the order not carried out and what is the question at issue?
2. Immediately form a joint team consisting of the Chief of Staff of the OZ J/I H, Chief of Staff of the Grude br. and chief of Staff of the Posušje br. and establish the situation and resolve and questions at issue in the field (positions).
3. Submit a report to me by 1600 hours on 5 October 1993.

/handwritten: for/ Commander of the GS of the OS /Armed Forces/
of the HR /Croatian Republic/ of H-B /Herzeg-Bosnia/
/a signature/
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/stamped/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

MAIN STAFF /GS/ OF THE ARMED FORCES /OS/
OF THE CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA /HR H-B/
Number: 02-2/illegible//93
Čitluk IZM /Forward Command Post/, 10 October 1993

Report on the return of v/o /conscripts/
to the *Knez Branimir* Brigade, Čitluk

As we have still not received any feedback on the execution of Order number 02-2/1-01.2690/93 of 27 September 1993, pertaining to item number 3 (three) of the Order, I URGENTLY demand that you send us the report on its execution.

Measures mentioned under item number 3 of the above Order shall be applied against those who fail to execute the task.

COMMANDER, GS OS HR H-B
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

Copy:

- Čitluk MRTP /mixed rocket and artillery regiment/
- Grdani ATG /anti-terrorist group/
- 2nd Lard PZO /light anti-aircraft artillery rocket battalion/, Mostar
- VP /Military Police/ Administration, Ljubuški
- GS HVO communications company
- OZ JiH /South-Eastern Herzegovina Operations Zone/
- Mostar ZMIN /air surveillance and guidance/
- a/a /files/

/stamp of the Croatian State Archive/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA

CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

IZM OZ S/Z H Prozor

/forward command post, zone of operations of the north-western Herzegovina/

No: 01-4356/93

ON: 10th October 1993

Defence
Military secret
Strictly confidential

Pursuant to agreement between the HVO and MOS, mediated by UNPROFOR, at the meeting, held on 9th of October 1993 on the absolute and unconditional cease of combat activities, in order to implement the aforementioned, herewith I

ORDER

1. Stop the fire from all weapons in sectors 1 to 8 on the battlefield of Uskoplje-Rama as of 11th of October 1993, starting at 06:00 hrs till 12th of October 1993, till 18:00 hrs.
2. Retort fire in case of attack on the lines.
3. In this time period, an agreed exchange of bodies of the killed ones from both sides will take place.
4. The commanders of sectors are responsible for the implementation of this order.

Commander of the GS
General
Slobodan Praljak /signed/

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostar i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

DOCUMENTS D-1 TO D-12

In order to avoid the impression that I was the only commander who fought with knowledge and passion for the improvement of the structure of the HVO, I bring forward a representative sample of documents of other HVO commanders also at the time when I was not the commander of the HVO Main Staff.

Comments on the documents D-11 and D-12:

D-11

Mr. Mate Boban, the supreme commander of the armed forces of the Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia – the HVO, in point 3 of the stated document speaks about imprisonment camps for the prisoners of war.

D-12

Forwarding Mate Boban's command on to lower levels, the commander of the HVO Main Staff, major-general Slobodan Praljak leaves out point 3, because the HVO Main Staff and HVO itself have no competencies over the imprisonment camps for the prisoners of war and no insight into the state of affairs relating to such camps.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

COAT OF ARMS CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

SOUTHEASTERN HERZEGOVINA OPERATIVE ZONE, MOSTAR

Reg. No. 01-1024 193

MILITARY SECRET

Mostar, 23 January 1993

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Over the past few days the situation among the defenders in the zone of responsibility of OZ JIH /Southeastern Herzegovina Operative Zone/ has become complicated and tense. The events in Gornji Vakuf contributed to the escalation of tensions. The frequent statements in which the opinions and views of extremists from the ranks of the BH Army on Radio BH - War Studio Mostar are broadcast and which feature verbal attacks on the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ only heighten tensions and are detrimental to defence

in general and also harmful for the Croatian, Muslim and other peoples living in these territories. Uniformed groups have been appearing in town and arbitrarily establishing checkpoints without the knowledge of the OZ JIH Command, and also without the knowledge of the Command of the 1st/ / Mostar Brigade. In the night between 22 and 23 January 1993, armed persons appeared on several buildings in the centre of the city, a checkpoint was established at the HIT shopping mall at which soldiers represented themselves as members of the Republican MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, and uniformed persons also appeared at Šemovac. The police checkpoint in Grabovica was attacked that same night, and it is supposed

that enemy groups have infiltrated the area of the OZ JIH and are already operating or that this is the work of extremist members of the BH Army, which must be put an end to.

With a view to countering the above-mentioned negative incidents and events, and /on the basis of / OZ JIH order No. 01-1024/94 I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. Entry to the territory of the municipality of Mostar and other municipalities within the OZ JIH shall be prohibited to all persons who are not residents of those municipalities.
2. I prohibit all transport of weapons and other war equipment and material in the zone of responsibility of the OZ JIH without special approval for a specific date issued by the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/.
3. All military formations of the 2nd Brigade /OZ JIH crossed out/ shall regularly report to the Command when their members get passes for /crossed out: towns/ town /crossed out: with arms/, and the HVO Military Police shall carry out consistent control of that, as prescribed by previous orders. All armed persons and groups failing to act in accordance with item 3 shall be disarmed, taken in and legal measures taken against them. The following shall be responsible for compliance with this command: /crossed out: the 3rd HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/ Military Police Battalion/, unit /command corrected to:/ commanders.

4. The HVO Military Police shall regulate the passage of international relief convoys through the OZ JIH and provide escort for them.

The deadline for compliance with this command is by 1800 hrs, 23 January 1993.

OZ JIH COMMANDER
 Brigadier
 /Miljenko LASIĆ/
 /stamped and signed/ TO:

Ist Battalion - 3rd HZ HB Military Police Battalion

II - 2nd HVO Brigade

III - 3rd HVO Brigade

V - 1st HVO Brigade *Knez Domagoj* - Čapljina

MTD /Equipment and Material Records/ - the *Herceg Stjepan* HVO Brigade -Konjic

/crossed out: Signals/ - 4th HVO Brigade

/crossed out: Engineers/ - 1st Mostar Brigade

- RT /expansion unknown/ Regiment

- Tank Battalion

- Light Air Defence Rocket Artillery Battalion

- Operations and Training

- Files

/stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/
 No: 01-185 /93
 Mostar, 29 January 1993

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Instructions for further action

Prozor HVO
 ŠILJEG, personally

1. Arrest and imprison all our extremists.
2. Give a sharp warning to people from the command who resist you and think differently.
3. Point out to the other side that you have given instructions for a list to be made of Muslim refugees from Gornji Vakuf municipality in the RH /Republic of Croatia/, and that we will return them to Vakuf as soon as possible.

Quote this as my order, and really do charge someone from the civilian structure with obtaining a list.

4. We will sort out Bugojno as soon as possible.
5. We will give a sharp warning to the gentlemen from Posušje.
6. Engage people to impress upon our soldiers not to cause further damage or provoke incidents.
7. Station responsible police patrols at the exit from Vakuf and the entrance to Prozor to arrest looters from our side, detain them and confiscate their plunder.
8. Let them make it difficult, it is better that the army is here, than for them to engage it in the Busovača direction.

CHIEF OF THE HVO GS /Main Staff/
 Brigadier
 Milivoj PETKOVIĆ
 /signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

Northwestern Herzegovina Operative Zone
Prozor Forward Command Post

DEFENCE
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
MILITARY SECRET

Number: 1-5/1-78/93

30 January 1993

- Dr. Ante Starčević Brigade, Gornji Vakuf
- Eugen Kvaternik Brigade, Bugojno
- Rama Brigade, Prozor
- To all units in the territory of Prozor,
Gornji Vakuf and Bugojno

- Taking measures in the units - Order -

On the basis of the order from the Chief of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ GS /Main Staff/ of the HZ-HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/ in Mostar, operative number: 01-185/93, dated 29 January 1993, and the discovery that certain men have failed to act like soldiers, and in order to demonstrate that the HVO is conducting a just fight in the territory of the HZ HB, to avoid comparisons to Chetniks and to develop a positive image for soldiers, officers and non-commissioned officers of the HZ HB HVO, I hereby

ORDER

1. Soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers of the HVO, you must prevent any actions that violate international war law. We are not Chetniks, we are not a gang, we are soldiers of the HZ HB HVO fighting a just war for our homeland, and you must not allow any actions that might diminish the importance of our fight and cause the international community to question the right of our people to survive in the territory where we have been living for centuries. Negative acts are more damaging than useful to our people and, in the eyes of the world, diminish the importance of our victims who died honourably for the sacred right of our people to live and remove any danger confronting them.
2. Soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers of the HVO, you must not succumb to base instincts. We have all been subsumed into a single HVO corps in the territory of the HZ HB, and have a military task which we have to carry out as soldiers, professionally and with our honour intact before the world.
3. Soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers of the HVO, while you are engaged in your combat missions, I forbid you to maltreat civilians and prisoners of war, to loot and appropriate property, destroy housing and other buildings unnecessarily, appropriate other objects of value and commit other dishonourable acts which are not - and must not be - acts characteristic of HVO soldiers.

Everyone shares this responsibility, but unit commanders in particular are responsible for their units, from squads upwards.

4. I hereby forbid any independent and wilful action that violates the orders of superior commanders at all levels, for which commanders of all units are responsible.
5. I hereby forbid all acts which are contrary to the just policies of our leadership, as such acts can only harm all our people and our homeland as a whole.

6. I forbid all men to inflict damage of any kind or to provoke incidents, as they are unnecessary, and all commanders must influence this. Do not respond to provocations, and open fire only in cases of direct attacks against our soldiers and positions.
7. At all positions and in bases, take rigorous measures for security and self-protection and for the protection of people and equipment, and reinforce surveillance and reconnaissance. This will be the responsibility of unit commanders.
8. All conscientious soldiers, and especially officers and non-commissioned officers, must continually monitor the situation in their units and react to any wrong acts in order to nip them in the bud.
9. Do not allow attacks of any kind or wrongful action against international institutions and the European Community, UNPROFOR, the International Red Cross, etc., because even the most minor incident can only harm our people as a whole.
10. All commanders must take action against any individuals in their units who are violating the orders and rules of combat. Unit commanders will be held responsible if they fail to do so.
11. The Military Police are to establish full control over people and goods entering and leaving the territory of Gornji Vakuf and are to deprive of liberty individuals and groups violating this Order and previous ones. They will take individuals from units to the Prozor Forward Command Post in order to impose disciplinary measures.
12. The organs of the SIS /Security and Information Service/ will make a plan for eliminating acts which violate this Order and the rules of behaviour for HVO soldiers. They are to impose these measures continually with the Military Police.
13. The SIS and Military Police will arrest any looters and will bring them in, confiscate and make a record of the stolen goods, and they will oppose any resistance to the implementation of this Order.
14. Engage in combat only on the orders of a commander and respect the rules of engagement in combat.
15. I strictly forbid the desecration and targeting of religious buildings.
16. Make a sufficient number of copies of this Order and forward signed /copies/ to each commander up to the level of a platoon. Commanders must inform all soldiers, individually or in groups, of this Order. Brigade commanders will inform me of this, and commanders subordinated to them according to the chain of command will inform them.

COMMANDER

Colonel Željko ŠILJEG

/signed/

/stamp:/ Republic of BiH, HZ HB, 1,
Gornji Vakuf, Ante Starčević Brigade,
Defence Department/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

NORTH-WESTERN HERZEGOVINA OPERATIONS ZONE COMMAND

Number: 01-5/151-2

Tomislavgrad, 21 April 1993

DEFENCE

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Rights and obligations of the Red Cross
Order

- *P. Krešimir* TV Brigade, Livno
- *K. Tomislav* Brigade, Tomislavgrad
- *Rama* Brigade, Prozor
- *A. Starčević* Brigade, Gornji Vakuf
- *E. Kvaternik* Brigade, Bugojno
- *H.V. Hrvatinić* Brigade, Tomislavgrad
- *R. Boban* Independent Battalion, Posušje
- 2nd Military Police Battalion

Pursuant to the order of GS HVO /Croatian Defence Council Main Staff/, number 01-659/93 of 20 April 93 and in connection with the rights and obligations of the Red Cross,

I HEREBY ORDER

1. Allow the ICRC free access to civilians in all areas.
2. Respect and protect civilian population caught up in combat operations.
3. Treat arrested civilians and soldiers humanely and give them adequate protection.
4. Report the identity of all captured and imprisoned persons to the ICRC and allow its representatives to visit them.
5. Bring together, look after and protect all wounded at all times and in all places, regardless of which side they belong to.
6. Allow the free passage and transit of humanitarian and medical aid convoys.
7. Acquaint all subordinate units under your command once again with this order.

Copies to:
- the above-named units
- archives

Deputy Commander
Ante GOVORUŠIĆ
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/
 HVO MAIN STAFF
 File number: 01-1583/93
 Mostar, 22 April 1993

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO ALL OPERATIVE ZONES
 TO THE COMMANDER, personally

Measures for the prevention of
 wilful action on the part of
 commanders and individuals

Having visited the HVO units, and /on the basis/ of your reports from the field, it has become apparent that certain low-ranking commanders and their units have been acting wilfully, failing to carry out the orders of their superiors, taking decisions on the basis of their own judgement, planning and carrying out their own actions, terrorising the civilians and obstructing UNPROFOR forces, etc. In order to remove these negative elements, I hereby

ORDER

1. All levels of command are immediately to issue a stern warning against such behaviour on the part of individuals and groups.
2. Establish full control over all organised units, and make commanders at all levels responsible for the behaviour and acts of soldiers.
3. Immediately start arresting individuals and groups who are completely out of control.
4. Use all means, including force, against the most extreme individuals and groups that are out of control, that do not protect civilians, that set fire to and destroy civilian buildings, and whose acts are quite simply terrorist acts.
5. Anyone who is obstructing the missions of UNPROFOR, the UNHCR and other international institutions is to be prevented /from doing so/ in the most energetic manner.

All these organisations are to be completely free to move and act, and they must be helped with carrying out their tasks.

6. All levels of command will be responsible to me for carrying out this Order.

CHIEF
 Brigadier
 Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

File number: 03-0337/93
 Mostar, 23 April 1993
 We are forwarding you the
 GS Chiefs Order for your
 information and in order to
 implement it.

For Commander
 Brigadier
 Miljenko LASIĆ
 /signed/

/stamp:/ Republic of BiH, Croatian Community
 of Herzeg-Bosnia, 1, Mostar, Operative Zone of
 Southeast Herzegovina, Defence Department/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 CENTRAL BOSNIA OZ /operative zone/ COMMAND
 FORWARD COMMAND POST VITEZ

/handwritten in the upper
 right hand comer- SB 108/

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

24 April 1993
 0920 hrs.

- to commanders of all units in
 Central Bosnia Operative Zone -

Prevention of uncontrolled conduct
 of commanders and individuals
 - Order-

After an inspection of the field, it has been observed that lower-ranking commanders and their units are acting in an uncontrolled way, failing to carry out orders of their superiors, making arbitrary decisions contrary to issued orders, planning and carrying out personal combat actions, exerting pressure on civilians and interfering with the activities of UNPROFOR, ICRC and the European Monitoring Mission which has negative consequences the HVO and the soldiers who carry out their assignments in a consistent manner.

In order to prevent such negative consequences and to fully carry out the order issued by the Chief of the HVO Main Headquarters no. 01-1583/93 of 22 April 1993,1 hereby

ORDER

1. Warn all levels of command of an immense harmful effect that such conduct of individuals and groups has, particularly in the international context.
2. Place all organised units under full control and hold commanders personally responsible for the conduct of their subordinates.
3. Arrest immediately individuals or groups that get out of line and submit a warrant of arrest to the Military Police unit commander.
4. You are responsible for stopping the most extreme individuals and groups who have got our of line, do not protect civilians, burn and destroy civilian facilities; this conduct is sheer terrorism. Use all means available, including force, to prevent it.
5. Take urgent measures against any individual interfering with the mission of UNPROFOR, UNHCR, European Monitoring Mission and the ICRC because this is a battle for the reputation and dignity of the HVO and the Croatian people in the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. All the aforementioned organisations have full freedom of movement and you must support their activities.
6. Immediate subordinate commanders and all levels of command and leadership shall be responsible to me for carrying out these assignments.

TB/VŠ

1 copy to the addressee
 1 copy to ONO /Operations and Training Body/
 1 copy to Records

COMMANDER:
 Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ
 /signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/
 KNEZ DOMAGOJ FIRST BRIGADE OF THE HVO

CLASS: 8/93-01/162-1

Number: 1100-01-01-93-482

/handwritten:/ 1st BATTALION

Date: 3 July 1993

Based on the newly-arisen situation in the zone of responsibility of the *Knez Domagoj* 1st Brigade of the HVO, and due to increased crime and irresponsible behaviour by some commanders and soldiers of the HVO 1st Brigade, and pursuant to unlimited powers conferred on me over civilian and military structures in accordance with the broadening of the zone of responsibility, I hereby:

ORDER

1. Prevent any theft or any other form of appropriation of personal and other property of people in our zone of responsibility. Arrest the perpetrators and institute criminal proceedings against them through this command.
2. I forbid members of the HVO 1st Brigade and units attached to it to camouflage and disguise themselves in any actions and operations. Should these cases happen at night, fire without warning, and by day detain them in the command.
3. Immediately prevent any violent behaviour and possible war crimes by members of the 1st Brigade and units attached to it and other people who happen to be in the brigade's zone of responsibility. Arrest all bullies, disarm them and institute criminal proceedings against them through this command.
4. Provide protection for the civilian population in the brigade's zone of responsibility in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Geneva Convention.
5. Previous disciplinary measures shall cease to be applied. Laws of war shall hereby enter into force, and sentences shall be served in the central prison in Mostar.
6. In their zones of responsibility, commanders must not allow any searches and detention of people without the military police and the SIS /Security and Information Service/ of the brigade.
7. Group the Muslim population in your zone of responsibility and secure them with your men.
8. Commands of all levels and all units, headed by their commanders, are responsible for combat readiness of their units (combat readiness must be 100%), and for /ensuring/ that all expected men are in position and that the complete command is at its command post.
9. Until further notice, I forbid commanders of all units and their commands to take leave of absence without my permission.
10. Make sure that all unknown and unwanted persons are arrested and expelled from your zone of responsibility.
11. All unit commanders are personally responsible for the carrying out of this order.
12. Should unit commanders fail to carry out this order and take measures accordingly, they shall suffer legal sanctions.

Inform all commanders and soldiers from your unit of this order.

To:

- | | | |
|----|--|----------------------|
| 1. | All units of the HVO 1 st br. /Brigade/ | |
| 2. | <i>Ljubuški</i> Company | COMMANDER |
| 3. | Chief of SIS | Colonel |
| 4. | ONO /Operations and Training/ | Nedjeljko OBRADOVIĆ |
| 5. | Files | /signed and stamped/ |

/round stamp/ Croatian State Archive

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council
 Defence Department
 Main Staff
 Number: 02-2/1 -01 -1642/93
 Mostar, 31 July 1993

Defence
 Military Secret
 Strictly Confidential

- OZ J/I H /Southeast Herzegovina Operations Zone
 Southeast Herzegovina/
- OZ S/Z / Northwest/ H
- OZ SB /Central Bosnia/
- OZ Bosanska Posavina

Order regarding the stopping and the controlling of UNPROFOR vehicles

I order

1. The HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ members (soldiers, non commissioned officers, officers) within their regular duty in the zone of responsibility, commanders and the commands on all levels have no right to stop, control or search the UNPROFOR vehicles.
2. UNPROFOR units are to be offered full protection and help and are to be guaranteed free movement in the previously approved directions and routes that will be promptly submitted to you.
3. The humanitarian aid convoys are not to be permitted to pass without full inspection of the loads. After the convoy is searched, it shall be allowed to pass in the previously approved directions, with the escort and occasional control.
4. I hold the commanders of all levels personally responsible for the execution of this order.

Entire unit is to be informed about this order.

SM /DS / as written/

GS HVO Commander
 Major General
 Slobodan PRALJAK

/round stamp:/ Croatian State Archive

/handwritten:/ PERMANENT VALUES

/handwritten:/ IZM /Forward Command

Post/ number: 01 - 2205

9 August 1993

Republic of BiH

Croatian Community of

Herzeg-Bosnia

OZ SZ H

Tomislavgrad

9 August 1993

ONO

1. Check whether all the units of the OZ /Operative Zone/ of SZH /Northwestern Herzegovina/ have received this Order
2. Write an Order to ensure that all levels of command, down to squads, are informed of this Order
3. Ask brigades and independent units for daily reports, in accordance with this Order, /signed/

Copy of order -

TO ALL OZ S/Z H BRIGADES

REPUBLIC OF BiH

HZ /Croatian Community/ of HB /Herzeg-Bosnia/

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/

HVO Main Staff

File number: 02-2/1-01-1782/93

Čitluk IZM /Forward Command Post/

9 August 1993

REPORTING

/signed/

Introducing order and discipline in the units

Very little attention is being paid to organisation, order, discipline and responsibility in our units.

In order to ensure that commanders at all levels of command finally understand the situation we are in, I hereby

ORDER

1. I demand that commands at all levels carry out tasks uncomplainingly and that they have full control over men who are not in command.

Time: immediately - continual task

2. I hereby demand that everyone, from squads to the HVO GS, urgently assume responsibility for fully carrying out the tasks assigned.

Time: immediately - continual task

3. Lower level commands (brigades and independent units) must have a work and activities plan aiming for the following:

- complete security in the zone (full combat readiness)
- work planned for the /next/ 24 hours
- full control over the men
- continual development of the zones of responsibility
- dealing with all those whose policies are anti-Croatian
- full respect for orders and assuming responsibility for carrying them out
- raising the men's morale and combativeness to the maximum level;

Time - immediately - continual task

4. I demand that punitive measures be consistently implemented in summary fashion (/Official Gazette/ 1/92, page 60-61)

Time: immediately - continual task (inform each soldier).

5. Carry out an urgent inspection of the commanders and make sure that replacements are made and criminal proceedings are instituted.

Time: by 20 August 1993

6. I will hold commanders at all levels responsible if the line of defence is not up to the required strength.

Time: continual task

7. I demand that you cease misinforming on strength, (pay lists and your requests for reinforcements).

Time: immediately - continual task

8. I demand that a system of command, from squads to brigades, be finally organised in many brigades.

Time: 15 August 1993

9. I demand that living and working conditions for the men be urgently established in the defence area.

Time: immediately - continual task.

10. Army and military units are to carry out the orders of superior commands, not those of civilian authorities.

This does not exclude co-operation with the civilian authorities, but means that responsibilities and tasks that are to be carried out will be divided.

Time: continual task

11. Take all measures to prevent theft, inhumane behaviour and wilful action on the part of your units.

Time: continual task

12. Urgently designate men in the brigades' commands who will be responsible to you in the battalions' zones of responsibility.

Time: immediately - continual task

13. Take all protective measures for military information. Establish total control over entry into and departure from your zone of responsibility.

Time: immediately - continual task.

14. I demand that your reports make military sense and have military content and that they contain information on the enemy and our forces.

15. Forward daily reports on the implementation of this Order to the HVO GS.

HVO Main Staff
Major General
Milivoj PETKOVIĆ
/signed/

/illegible stamp/

/round stamp:/ Croatia State Archive

/handwritten:/ ONO /Operations and Training Organ/

Republic of BiH
 /illegible/ OZ S/Z H
 Number: 01-2218
 10 August 1993

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 Strictly confidential

Conveying orders to
 lower units

To all OZ S/Z H units

On the basis of the Order from the HVO GS, number 02-2/1-01-1782/93, dated 9 August 1993, and in order to inform each soldier of this Order, I hereby

ORDER

1. Inform all HVO soldiers, through the commanders of lower units to squad commanders, of the Order from the HVO GS, number 02-2/1-01-1782/93, dated 9 August 1993. Make a sufficient number of copies of the Order and forward a signed copy to each lower commander and check whether all the soldiers have been informed of the order.
2. This Order is to be implemented IMMEDIATELY, and commanders of brigades and independent battalions will be responsible for its implementation.

Forward to:

1. Petar Krešimir IV Brigade
2. Kralj Tomislav Brigade
3. H.V. Hrvatinić Brigade
4. Rama Brigade
5. E. Kvaternik Brigade
6. Dr. A. Starčević Brigade
7. 6th VP Battalion
8. Tomislavgrad Anti-Aircraft Light Artillery Rocket Battalion
9. ŠČIT Reconnaissance Company
10. 2nd Light Assault VP Battalion, Livno
11. Posušje Brigade
12. Files
13. OZ S/Z H Tomislavgrad

COMMANDER
 Colonel
 Željko ŠILJEG

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

HVO MAIN STAFF

Ref. number: 02-2/1/01-2374/93

Forward Command Post Čitluk, 8 September 1993

Subject: Apprehension of soldiers and initiation of disciplinary measures

OZ Southeast Herzegovina

To: Commander, personally

According to the report of Colonel Zvonko Skender, for several days have soldiers from Knez Branimir brigade from Čitluk been refusing to carry out combat orders and have been deserting the positions on the line in the area Kičin-Gorica and the elevation point 199. Based on that, I hereby issue the following order

ORDER

1. Urgently, urgently... to undertake the following disciplinary measures:
 - to apprehend Company commander and to bring him to the Military Investigative Prison Ljubuški. Deputy Commander or another officer is to be appointed to the position of Commander.
 - to submit to the MP Administration, Mr. Valentin Ćorić, list of soldiers and other persons who abandoned defense line or who refused to carry out combat task, together with the request to apprehend them and bring them to the Military Investigative Prison Ljubuški in order to conduct investigation and to initiate criminal procedure.
2. To undertake immediately measures to reinforce defense line and to secure the defense qualitatively in the zone of Knez Branimir brigade.
3. You will be personally responsible for execution of this order and you are to inform me about it, by submitting a written report.

/seal/

CHIEF OF HVO MAIN STAFF
brigadier
Žarko Tole

/stamp: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA /HZ HB/
 /HZ HB coat of arms/
 Office of the President

Number: UP.00160/93
 Mostar, 15 September 1993

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Based on the authority determined by the provisions of Article 30, paragraph 1 of the Decree on the Armed Forces of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (*Official Gazette*, no. 6/92), as the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, I hereby issue the following:

ORDER

1. All units of the Armed Forces of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna must continue to conduct a purely defensive war, as they have done so far, in order to protect the integrity of the Croatian space, its population, material goods and all natural resources.
2. While carrying out all combat activities, members of the Armed Forces of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia must abide by the norms of International War and Humanitarian Law, for which I hold responsible commanders at all levels of command and control.
3. If there are detention centres for prisoners of war where not all conditions required by the International Law of War and the Geneva Convention are ensured, they should immediately be ensured and prisoners of war must be treated in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention and other humanitarian norms.
4. The International Committee of the Red Cross must be allowed free access to detention centres for prisoners of war.
5. Enable the free and unconditional movement of humanitarian aid by the UNHCR, UNICEF and ICRC throughout the territory of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.
6. As up to now, allow UNPROFOR representatives freely to carry out their mandate.
7. The HVO Main Staff shall inform all subordinated commands and units of this order and provide professional help in its implementation.

Forward to:

1. Defence Department;
2. Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia;
3. Files.

PRESIDENT OF THE CROATIAN
 REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

Mate BOBAN
 /signed and stamped/

/round stamp/ Croatian state Archive, Zagreb

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

MAIN STAFF /GS/ OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE HR HB /CROATIAN REPUBLIC
OF HERZEG-BOSNIA/

Order to: - all operative zones
from the President of the HR HB - all units subordinated to the GS
- Chief of the VP /Military Police/

Pursuant to the Order from the President of the HR HB, Mr. Mate BOBAN, which we have enclosed, and in order to implement the order consistently, I hereby

ORDER

1. Inform all units and commands at all levels of the contents of this Order.
2. The commands of operative zones and of brigades will offer professional assistance in consistently implementing this Order.
3. With regard to items 5 and 6 of the Order from the President of the HR HB, the VP and other officials at all checkpoints must receive instructions in writing (assigned specific tasks) before they take up their duties.
4. Operative zones, brigades, the Military Police Department and independent units will issue orders and instructions to unit and staff members.
5. Directly subordinate commanders are responsible to me for consistently implementing this Order.

COMMANDER OF THE HR HB
GS OS /Armed Forces/
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed/

/stamp:/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, 2,
Mostar, Main Staff, Defence Department

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

epređiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

WINSTON LEONARD SPENCER CHURCHILL:

“PEOPLE LIE MOST BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, AFTER THE HUNT AND IN A WAR”

1. **THE MINING OF THE JEWISH CEMETERY IN ZAGREB ON 19 August 1991**
2. **THE MINING OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN ZAGREB ON 19 August 1991**
3. **NATIONALITY OF Dr FRANJO TUĐMAN’S WIFE**
4. **FORTY (40) BUTCHERED BABIES IN VUKOVAR**
5. **THE AGREEMENT OF Dr FRANJO TUĐMAN AND SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ ON THE DIVISION OF BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ - KARADORĐEVO, March 1991**
6. **WHEN SERBIA DESERTED THE SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ - SEPARATISM OR WHO WAS THE FIRST TO LEAVE THE SFRJ?**

1. THE MINING OF THE JEWISH CEMETERY IN ZAGREB ON 19 August 1991 /

2. THE MINING OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN ZAGREB ON 19 August 1991

DOCUMENTS D - 1, D - 2a, D - 2b

D-1

The long arm of Serbian propaganda

Propaganda 1: **Terrorism - KOS /Counterintelligence Service/ mined Jewish objects**

To prove that the Croats have the so-called “Ustasha-character” was one of the basic Serbian strategies also in the preparation of international public for the attack on Croatia, as was attested during Milošević’s trial in The Hague.

At a hearing in The Hague on 11 November 2002 a former operative of KOS revealed that the explosions which resounded on 19 August 1991 at the Jewish Community in Zagreb and blasted the Jewish cemetery on Mirogoj, Zagreb’s main cemetery, were planted by the Counterintelligence Service of the JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/:

The Counterintelligence Service of the JNA within the scope of operations “Labrador” and “Opera” at the beginning of the 1990s tried to destabilize the Croatian government and create an animosity against Croatia with intensive propaganda and terrorist acts – this was testified on Monday in The Hague by the former KOS operative Mustafa Čandić.

Within “Labrador”, the counterintelligence agents’ network in Zagreb carried out a terrorist act of mining Jewish tombs on Mirogoj, said Čandić on the trial of the former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević.

In August of 1991 the joint Jewish gravesite on Mirogoj was mined. “The aim was to portray the Croatian state as pro-fascist and to create an animosity of the world Jewry” said Čandić, who spoke as the 12th witness of the prosecution in the Croatian part of the trial against Milošević.

A terrorist action against the Jewish Community in Zagreb was also planned, but the main actors were uncovered and had to flee to Belgrade, said the witness.

He testified that the counterintelligence operation “Labrador” was directed by the colonel Slobodan Rakočević from Zemun, and in Zagreb itself the persons in charge were lieutenant-colonel Ivan Sabolović and major Čedo Knežević.

Čandić worked in the Zemun central office of the Counterintelligence Group (KOG) of the air force and air defence, and he left the JNA in February 1992.

He said that the Counterintelligence service had a strong agent network inside the Croatian SDB /State Security Service/ as well as in the ranks of the officials of HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/.

The witness described how, within the scope of anti-Croatian propaganda, television was used within the operation “Opera” whose aim was to edit the footage of distressed Croats from Slavonia to make it seem that these were Serbian victims of Croatian crimes. “Opera” was an abbreviation of Department for Propaganda War.

He also described how, with the aim of inciting hatred against Croatia, the alleged “recording” was aired on Belgrade television, in which the top members of HDZ from Zagreb and Ilok order a mobilization of the Croatian population from the area of Vojvodina.

“The actors were actually Radenko Radojčić and Ivan Sabolović... I recognized their voices”, said the witness, naming two operatives of KOS who feigned the conversation. The aim of this action was to create a false explanation for the emigration of Croats who at that time were exposed to attacks by paramilitary forces led by Arkan and Šešelj, he explained.

The witness described how the recorded conversations were manipulated, quoting the example of the editing of the conversation between general Antun Tus and Mile Dedaković Jastreb.

“They took the segments and taped them together to make a conversation”, said the witness, describing that the editing created the impression that the commander of Vukovar’s defence Mile Dedaković asked general Tus an aid in armaments, whereupon Tus replied that Dedaković should cope as he can, not counting on any help.

He described how, at the beginning of the 1990s, KOS organized a sabotage of the railway track near Vinkovci, in order to attribute this to the order of the then president Franjo Tuđman, and due to the success of the operation, the military counterintelligence operative Radenko Radojčić couldn’t hide his satisfaction.

The witness said that the current military adviser of the Croatian president Imra Agotić was fired from his position in KOG by colonel Rakočević, then the head of the Department of security of the air force, because he refused to recruit the collaborators in the top echelons of political power in Zagreb (According to: Čandić, KOS mined the gravesites, edited tapes, HINA, 11 November 2002).

It is interesting to note that some Croatian media, in a repetitive fashion, analysed “*terrorist acts of nationalists in Zagreb*”, without publishing a single commentary after the discovery of the perpetrators of the terrorist actions against the Jews!

A trained mental code, built during the era of communism and institutionally carried over on to the younger generations by means of the educational system, was an easy target for the Serbian media template on the Ustasha character of the Croats. The roots of this social syndrome are truly deep.

D-2a

Excerpt from the testimony of Mustafa Čandić in Slobodan Milošević case, ICTY, 11 November 2002

Pages 12734-12735

Q. A couple of points of detail. The first point of detail may or may not relate to either of these operations. Was there action at the Jewish graves at a cemetery in Zagreb connected to either of these named operations?

A. Your Honours, it is true that within Operation Labrador, or, rather, when this network of collaborators was active in Zagreb, at the Mirogoj cemetery in Zagreb, a terrorist attack was launched and Jewish graves were mined at the Mirogoj cemetery, the object being that the Croatian authorities should be represented and shown as being pro-fascist or, rather, to create animosity, that the Jews should have animosity towards the Croatian authorities in Zagreb. Another terrorist act was also being planned on the synagogue in Zagreb. However, that was never carried out because the members of the Labrador operation had to flee to Belgrade because they were in danger of being arrested.

Q. Finally on Labrador, who was the officer in charge of Labrador and what, if any, part of the KOG detachments were involved or was involved?

A. The officer in charge for Operation Labrador was the head of the security department, Slobodan Rakočević, in Zemun, while the operative staff of the second detachment of the counter-intelligence group in Zagreb, first and foremost Colonel Ivan Sabolović and Major Čedo Knežević, were the people who had links with the collaborators in Zagreb and the persons in the field in the state security that actually launched these operations and sent in reports about everything that was happening in Zagreb and in the top leadership of the Republic of Croatia.

D-2b

Excerpt from the statement of Radenko Radojčić on 15 March 1994:

“ ... I said it would be good that during my absence the bag with the explosive is not in the premises of the “Templum” company.

Platiša asked is it something that goes “bang” which I confirmed. In spite of that Platiša took the bag and carried it into his car.

In connection with the bag which Platiša took, by the end of August, in the Čatež spa, when Platiša, Malobabić and I had a conversation, I asked Platiša to hand over the bag to Malobabić who offered on his own to place the bag somewhere safe.

Later in Belgrade, he told me he had put away the bag on a safe place, in the second storage on Jarun (Zagreb) which he showed me when we were hiding his sack.

Around 2 p.m. on that day, Malobabić and I took off in my car from Zagreb to Holland, into Emen, and stayed with Henk. I had a contact in Emen related to the business of my firm, and as for Malobabić, we arranged for him to buy an Opel Kadet on the name of the representative office of “Grafi-linea b.v.”

Connected to the stay in Emen, I wish to stress two other moments.

I don't recall the exact date, but on the morning news of Sky News, on the television, around 10 a.m. we heard that there were two explosions in Zagreb, on the Jewish cemetery and in the Jewish Community.”

3. THE NATIONALITY OF Dr FRANJO TUĐMAN'S WIFE

What was Dr Tuđman really saying about this on the pre-election rally of the HDZ in Zagreb, the municipality of Dubrava on 16 April 1990?

The author of this book was the counter-candidate to Dr Tuđman in the same electoral precinct, representing another political group – THE COALITION OF NATIONAL AGREEMENT – “COALITION”.

I was on that rally, I listened to Dr Tuđman's speech and I testify to the truth of what Dr Miroslav Tuđman writes about this.

It is with his consent that I quote from the book “*THE PROGRAMMING OF TRUTH*”.

Excerpt from the book of Miroslav Tuđman “THE PROGRAMMING OF TRUTH” (“Programiranje istine”), Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 2012, p.90-96

1. *An example of semantic inversion: Stigmatization of alternative definitions of reality*

In former chapters we tried to explain the emergence of super-knowledge from non-events and pseudo-knowledge as the representation of a pseudo-event. This typology of knowledge can be useful for the understanding of the construction of faulty information and disinformation, but it is not sufficient for the understanding of their entrenchment and duration in public knowledge. We can only understand why erroneous information and disinformation are a permanent component of public knowledge if we know the processes and rules of construction of public knowledge. Numerous examples can help us illustrate these rules, but I will use only several examples of disinformation and erroneous information known to the Croatian public, examples which (some nearly two decades) emerge again and again, repeat, present, advocate, portray themselves as facts, and refute as disinformation in the space of public knowledge.

It is the goal of the use of (dis)information to impose to the opposing party its interpretation and its vision of certain events. The conflict is essentially about whose interpretation will be accepted as an official definition of reality, i.e. which of the opposing sides will retain the status of official legitimizers of reality. If it were otherwise, then the majority of misunderstandings relating to erroneous information and disinformation could be resolved by collecting and assessing relevant facts and proofs. Therefore, it is a naïve presumption that evidence and facts are crucial for the destiny of disinformation and erroneous information in public knowledge. By contrast, the key role is played by the construction rules of organization and exchange of public knowledge.

* * *

“I am happy that my wife is not Serbian nor Jew“, i.e. “I am proud that my wife is not Serbian or Jew”¹⁹⁷ is one of the oldest and most frequently quoted statements attributed to Dr Franjo Tuđman for the purpose of his discrediting in the media. This statement is being quoted for more than two decades on every occasion when president Tuđman should be underestimated and his work de-legitimized. The statement serves to those who quote it as an irrefutable fact on national narrow-mindedness, anti-Semitism, intolerance, xenophobia, national exclusivity and hatred of the Serbs and Jews on the part of Dr Franjo Tuđman.

The statement was used in the early 1990s as a key proof that the person with such nationalist and xenophobic views cannot be the bearer of the national programme of an independent and sovereign Croatian state; i.e., the

¹⁹⁷ <http://www.klix.ba/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=63156>

programme of an independent and sovereign Croatia which starts out from anti-Semitic views and nationalistic exclusivity is a restoration of the Ustasha NDH /Independent State of Croatia/ and a recreation of Croatia on the foundations of crime or on the “Ustasha-like” principles.¹⁹⁸

After the emancipation and international recognition of the Republic of Croatia this quote is not used any more for the refuting of the programme of the Croatian state, but as a proof that president Tuđman is a “xenophobic autocrat, historical revisionist and collaborator of Slobodan Milošević”¹⁹⁹ This statement is used to prove that due to such views Croatia is, admittedly, recognized, but is not accepted by the international community, that this statement is the basis for understanding of the Croatian politics which had as its aim the ethnic cleansing of the Serbs in the final military and police operations which liberated Croatian territory in 1995.

The statement attributed to Dr F. Tuđman (“I am happy that my wife is not a Serbian nor a Jew”) is being repeated as a mantra, without any awareness of when, where and to whom Franjo Tuđman said it. These data are not unknown and are easily accessible. There exists, and it is accessible, the audio- and video-recording of the entire speech from whom it is clear that what is being quoted is not what was actually said, and what was said has a meaning contrary from what the speaker is accused of. The statement of the place, time and circumstances in which the alleged statement occurred would direct the reader to the original document in which such a statement doesn't exist.

Dr Franjo Tuđman gave a speech on 16 April 1990 at a pre-election central rally of the HDZ in Zagreb, for the municipalities of Dubrava and Sesvete, on which he didn't speak about the programme of the party, but spoke of his personal history. He spoke about himself in detail, in order to counter the lies spread by the ruling propaganda: “Here, this is the truth about the sinner which you have in front of you, when you have to choose him. This is why I told it to you.”²⁰⁰

Among other, he said:

“Nowadays all other kinds of lies are being spread, so I never know what else they will come up with. I heard that I am of Jewish origin, whereas I found out about my ancestors in Zagorje 350 years back, and I said maybe it would be good if I had something of these Jewish traits, probably I would be richer, maybe I wouldn't become a communist. Then, when this is not enough, they search my wife and at one moment she is a Jew, at another moment a Serbian. Luckily for me, she was never one or the other, as is the case with many others. And so on, and so on, they spread the lies...”²⁰¹

From this quotation it is apparent that the sentences attributed to him do not exist (“I am happy that my wife is not a Serbian or a Jew”, or “I am proud that my wife is not a Serbian or a Jew.”) The entire speech by Dr F. Tuđman is a response to slanders and lies with which they wanted to discredit him as a trustworthy advocate of the programme of the HDZ, the party which he represented on the elections.

¹⁹⁸ The outrageous dimensions acquired by the accusation of Dr F. Tuđman for anti-Semitism is illustrated by the following: In the book, or rather, a pamphlet, ‘Die Zerschlagung Jugoslawiens’ (The Breakdown of Yugoslavia, Ahriman Publications, 1994) the “Israeli journalist” Arnold Sherman, writes about an alleged war event in connection with the presence of president Tuđman at the opening of the Museum of the Holocaust in Washington in April 1993. Ahriman says: “For Tuđman, the invitation to this ceremony was no small victory. Contrary to this, for the Jews around the world and the defamed Serbs this was a humiliation beyond comparison. One of the first official acts of the invited head of state (Tuđman) in 1991 was the order to level the construction remains of the Jasenovac concentration camp, burn all the remaining documents and turn the former concentration camp into a protected bird sanctuary”. It was a known fact for everyone in Croatia, Serbia and the world that the insurgent Serbs at the very beginning of the existence of the Republic of Croatia occupied the Jasenovac area and transferred all the documents first to Belgrade and then to the Museum of the Holocaust in Washington. They completely neglected the Jasenovac monument complex which, after the liberation of western Slavonia, was renovated and modernized precisely according to the formerly mentioned Museum of the Holocaust (Gojko Borić: “How the Serbian lies reached the limits of absolute lack of conviction”, Hrvatski list, 3 January 2008)

¹⁹⁹ (<http://www.ezadar.hr/clanak/deseta-obljetnica-smrti-franje-tudmana>).

²⁰⁰ The speech by Dr Franjo Tuđman, Central pre-election rally of the HDZ in Zagreb, Dubrava – Sesvete, 16 April 1990

²⁰¹ The speech by Dr Franjo Tuđman, Central pre-election rally of the HDZ in Zagreb, Dubrava – Sesvete, 16 April 1990, further on: “When they removed me from public life in 1967 because I had created the spiritual climate for the Croatian declaration, and in 1972 in the clash with the alleged counter-revolution, I had to be punished most severely – 12, 15 or 20 years, this was the only matter of the debate, in the group for espionage... Therefore, as I continued to think in the Croatian way, and I testified before the world on Croatian history, on the Croatian truth, and I gave not only interviews and statements, but also wrote about the Croatian national issues and the European national issues, and then in 1980 I had to face a judge, and in 1981 they sentenced me for alleged false presentation of the position of Croatia and social and political state in Yugoslavia, to 3 years in prison and 5 years' ban of public activity. I was in prison from 1982 until 1984, and until 1987, i.e. 1989 I couldn't say a single word about my country”.

Dr Tuđman responds to anti-Semitic frauds of the legitimizers of the then still real communist setup²⁰², because he says “maybe it would be good” if he were of Jewish origins, because then “probably he would be richer, and maybe he wouldn’t become a communist”. It is apparent that in this statement there is no negative connotation directed against the Jews, nor is there any hidden meaning directed against the Jews or the Serbs. The statement is directed against the official definitions of reality and the ways in which the communist order functioned. More precisely, the message by Dr Tuđman is a critique of the official personnel policy which ensured the functioning of the communist Yugoslavia. What Dr Tuđman knew as a historical truth, and the audience present as a living truth and a bitter political experience, is the fact that to be a Croat in socialist Yugoslavia was sheer bad luck (in the words of Ranko Marinković), and to invoke the Croatian spirit was political suicide.

The data about the national structure of personnel in federal and republic institutions were at that time not publicly available, nor could they have been a matter of public debate. But, for all who lived in that system, it was an empirical fact and a political axiom: if they invoked their national affiliation, in that system they couldn’t hope to advance. Today’s insight into the analytic data about the national structure of the personnel confirm the fact that Croats were not equal in that system, i.e. that they were second-grade citizens.

The analytical data on the representation of Croats in state institutions confirm the above observation. Let me give an illustration: immediately before the war of 1991 the national composition of the command structure of the JNA was as follows: 0.6% Albanians, 6.2% Montenegrins, 12.6% Croats, 3.6% Yugoslavs, 2.4% Muslims, 2.8% Slovenians and 63.2% Serbs. (In relation to the population structure there were too few Albanians by 66%, Croats by 53%, Muslims by 78%, Slovenians by 66%; at the same time, Montenegrins were in excess by 148%, Yugoslavs by 45% and Serbs by 51%. In the Fifth military district in 1991, in the structure of the commanding personnel there were 57% Serbs and only 12% Croats)²⁰³.

In the commanding structures of the federal State Security Service in 1989 there were 61% of Serbs, 18% of Yugoslavs, etc., and only 1% of Croats, Slovenians and Albanians. According to official data in the 1980s in Croatian police there were 49.9% of Serbs, and in key positions this number rose to 67% (Z. Radelić, 2006, p. 573).

However, the Croats were not “neglected” as a matter of processing by the repressive apparatus. During the political showdown with A. Ranković in 1966, information was leaked that as many as 67% of working population (1,300,000) in the then Socialist Republic of Croatia had a file in the UDB /State Security Service/. For comparison, on the “suspicious” Kosovo the percentage of “processed” persons was 36%, in Slovenia 28% and in Serbia (without Kosovo) 8% (Radelić, 2006, p. 365).

Data on national representation in federal and republic institutions were not public and could not be publicly debated. These data on national discrimination were hidden, had the status of deviant knowledge and false representation of reality. Those who brought forward such data were usually persecuted and sentenced on grounds of nationalism. Only after the breakdown of SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ and the creation of the Croatian state, the vital data on the nature and functioning of socialist Yugoslavia became available to the public. So, for instance, in the Federal administration in Belgrade (statistics for the year 1978) there were only 6% of Croats, compared to 73.6% of Serbs, 7.2% of Montenegrins, etc. (Z. Radelić, 2006, p. 571).

The proportion of Croats among political officials in SR /Socialist Republic of/ Croatia was 69.8%, which is less than their proportion in the overall population.²⁰⁴ According to official definitions and interpretations of the political setup, socialist Yugoslavia was a mirror of national equality. That is why the system, at least on the outside, had to maintain the national structure of the population. In order to conceal national inequality and a discrimination of Croats in the Yugoslav community, the advantage was given to Yugoslavs and the cadres from mixed marriages. For this reason, the Croats who aspired to political, state or public functions were at an advantage if they lived in nationally mixed marriages.

When Dr F. Tuđman said “...then they find my wife to be Jewish at one moment and Serbian the next. Luckily for me, she was never one or the other, **unlike many who have such wives**” the message is contained precisely in

²⁰² The speech was held at a pre-election rally on 16 April 1990, i.e., in the wake of the first multi-party and democratic elections

²⁰³ Z.Radelić, 2006, p. 573

²⁰⁴ The proportion of Croats among political officials in SR Croatia was 69.8%, which is less than their proportion in the overall population, which was 75.1%; Z.Radelić, 2006, p. 569

the end of the sentence. That Dr Tuđman himself never built, nor could have built a military and political career in a political setup which manipulated in the public with the national affiliation of cadres, in order to ensure a domination of unitaristic and hegemonistic formation divorced from the people.

One of the rare persons who openly and clearly said what everyone knew was the writer Stipe Mijović Kočan: "I am not his 'lawyer', but for the sake of truth: when he said that he succeeded although his 'wife is neither Serbian nor Jewish', this sounded truly badly in the ears of those on-duty hunters who persecuted Croats as nationalists. It is possible that because of that they were especially ill-tempered against him in The Hague. The matter, however, is this: if a certain Croat married a woman of a different nationality, Serbian or Jewish, this in itself was proof that he is not a nationalist and all doors were open to him in times of socialism."²⁰⁵

The ideologues and watchmen of Yugoslavia kept an account of the "blood count" of political actors. For a positive political judgement and promotion of the actor of the Yugoslav formation it was essential that the person agrees with the option of the integral Yugoslav system, and one proof of loyalty to the regime was life in nationally mixed marriages. However, this "proof" was not effective for persons opposed to the concept of Yugoslavia. "Starčević's mother was Orthodox, the father of Juraj Bianchini Italian by origin, the unfortunate Franck was a Jew. I don't know where the surname Tuđman comes from, nor do I care – but I presume why it was important for him to stress that his wife is 'neither Serbian nor Jewish'. It was known that the mother of Josip Broz was Slovenian, Tito never hid this fact, nor emphasized it."²⁰⁶

Dr Tuđman is against the personnel policy and discrimination based on nationality. He criticizes the formation in which the Croats were second-grade citizens. He is accused of national intolerance and exclusivity in order to cover up the practice of national inequality and discrimination in staffing policy. That is why accusing Dr Tuđman of anti-Semitism, national intolerance and exclusivity is an example of semantic inversion: to attribute to the enemy the message which he refutes.

Semantic inversion is a known technology of media manipulation.²⁰⁷ The impact of this manipulation should have been efficient. In the public, this disinformation stigmatizes Dr Tuđman as a nationally intolerant and exclusive person, disqualifies him as the bearer of the HDZ programme, and ultimately criminalizes the programme of Croatian state independence itself. In addition, semantic inversion, or as it is popularly called, "the see-saw turned upside down" in this concrete case had the effect that the debate on national discrimination and inequality in multinational Yugoslavia was blocked.²⁰⁸

The speech of the president of HDZ Dr Tuđman in Dubrava on 16 April 1990 is indicative of another dimension. I quote his words: "why from the ranks of hegemonist, great-Serbian, imperialist, Yugoslavian, unitarist circles **they attack me today as Ustasha, fascist, neo-Nazi**, and why do they keep saying to their Zagreb clientele and why do they **brand me as Bolshevik**... And all of this along with my belonging to the Ustasha and bolshevism all at the same time, this is all the consequence of **authoritarianism, my unitarism, totalitarianism...**" (bolded by M.T.)²⁰⁹

²⁰⁵ The text continues: "Both Tito and Krleža and Šušar, etc. married Serbian women, whereas Tuđman, who was not free of vanity, managed to succeed without it! His grandson whom he dearly loved was Serbian, and his first minister of economy was a Jew... this suffices to make all such allegations unfounded." Stjepo Mijović Kočan, "Foreword" // J. Pečarić, "Razizam svjetskih moćnika" / Zagreb: personal edition, 2012, p.22

²⁰⁶ Predrag Matvejević, <http://www.most.ba/099100/008.aspx> (15.3.2012.)

²⁰⁷ "In the tendency of hiding the truth, our media used several deliberate linguistic tricks. The first and most frequent was semantic inversion – the use of words which, speaking about a certain event, gave to this event a meaning contrary to the real one" (REČI NEDELA, A call or instigation to war crimes in Serbian media 1991-1992/ Beograd: Centar za tranzicione procese, 2011, p. 418)

²⁰⁸ The issues of national equality and national representation in state and public offices in SFRJ and SRH /Socialist Republic of Croatia/ remained a topic of research of individual scientists, but not a matter of public debate.

²⁰⁹ This is the full quotation: "I have given you this small lesson in history in order for you to understand why from the ranks of hegemonist, great-Serbian, imperialist, Yugoslav, unitarist circles they attack me today as Ustasha, as fascist, as neo-Nazi, and why they keep saying to their clientele in Zagreb and why they brand me as Bolshevik. Therefore, there is logic here, and where is this logic, the logic is that they cannot reconcile themselves with any kind of Croatian idea. Because I remained a Croat which I was, because I thought, pondered and acted in the spirit of Croatian interests, because of that I am today on the carpet of all those who cannot think of such a Croatian Democratic Union, such as it is, such as it was a week ago on the Square of the French Revolution, such as it was yesterday in Split, in the cradle of Croatian statehood, where such a multitude of people gathered which Croatia could not conceive until now, and all of this, along with my belonging to the Ustasha and bolshevism, this is likewise the consequence of authoritarianism, my unitarism, totalitarianism, and I don't know which other sins which they accuse me of because of the Croatian Democratic Union, and because the HDZ has become such as it is, the strongest, the most powerful political party in the history of Croatia..." Dr F. Tuđman at the pre-election rally on 16 April 1990.

All the listed attributes (Ustasha, fascist, neo-Nazi, Bolshevik, authoritarianism, totalitarianism and the like) were attributed to Dr F. Tuđman before the elections, before HDZ came to power, before his election as president of RH /Republic of Croatia/, practically before he became a public figure – because it was only in 1989 that his ban on public appearances expired, the ban that was effective since 1972. Until 1989. And it cannot be disputable that all these attributions come from the same source: legitimizers and followers of official definition of reality of the Yugoslav communist order.

In the next twenty-odd years the number of these primary attributions of stigmatization and discrediting did not substantially increase. In the course of time these attributions were partly modified²¹⁰ because their authors changed the addresses from which these messages are being sent.

Therefore, twenty-odd years the same messages keep repeating themselves. One should answer the question why this is so, because apparently the facts which contradict the disinformation are not crucial for the destiny and persistence of this disinformation in the public sphere.

²¹⁰ *After the international recognition of Croatia, and especially after the end of the war, the Croatian official politics were not any more branded as “Ustasha”, but became “Ustashoid” instead.*

4. FORTY (40) BUTCHERED BABIES IN VUKOVAR

Excerpt from the book of Miroslav Tuđman “THE PROGRAMMING OF TRUTH” (“Programiranje istine”), Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 2012, p. 168-169

Third example.

One of the most successful media frauds and disinformation in the organization of “Opera” was “information” released on the day of the fall of Vukovar about “40 butchered babies in Vukovar”, a piece of news repeated even by the leading international news agencies. The aim of this disinformation was obviously to justify the destruction and occupation of Vukovar. Dr Vesna Bosanac believes that this “information” was deliberately released to incite anger and motivate Serbs to kill the Croats. Even if it wasn’t the intention, this disinformation obviously contributed to such consequences.

The disinformation about “40 butchered babies in Vukovar” entered the annals of propaganda fabrication and encyclopaedic illustrations of successful, albeit relatively quickly dismantled frauds.

„40 butchered babies in Vukovar“. One of the propaganda fabrications which left the deepest trace was the one about “40 butchered babies in Vukovar”. This lie was released during the battle for Vukovar. One day before the killing of 264 Croatian prisoners of war and civilians on Ovčara, Serbian media announced that in one cellar 40 slaughtered Serbian children were found. The main headline of Večernje novosti of 21 November 1991 which read “Butchering before surrender” carried alleged testimonies according to which the members of the Croatian national guard “cut the throats of children between five and seven years old and threw them into a cellar”...

... as for the corpses behind the Vukovar hospital the RTS /Radio and Television of Serbia/ said that they were “Serbian or mostly Serbian”, while for the surviving civilians within the hospital it was said that they were “Ustasha disguised as civilians”.

Although no one ever saw the killed Serbian children, the media expanded the story for several days on front pages writing about the “horrors which the Ustasha committed over Serbian frail children, with bizarre details, various “testimonies” about horrendous crimes, followed by editorial comments on inhumanity of the other side in the conflict.

When the news about the butchering of 40 Serbian babies in the vicinity of Vukovar was clearly denied on RTB /Radio and Television Belgrade/, after the forensic experts from Belgrade established that the whole story is a fabrication, the damage was already irreparable. In the same report, after the apology by the commentator of RTB, the story of a volunteer was broadcast, who said he is going to war “when he sees what is being done to Serbian children”. The daily paper POLITIKA which published leading stories about the butchered children over the entire front page, published a denial on the third page, at the bottom, in only three lines.

http://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uloga_srpskih_medija_u_ratovima_za_Veliku_Srbiju (access on 10 August 2012)

5. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN DR FRANJO TUĐMAN AND SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ ABOUT THE DIVISION OF BiH - KARAOĐORĐEVO, March 1991

THE KARAOĐORĐEVO MYTH

Excerpt from the book of Miroslav Tuđman “THE PROGRAMMING OF TRUTH” (“Programiranje istine”), Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, Zagreb, 2012, p. 97-106_

1. *Forgeries and manipulations with an aim or on the postulation of non-events as reality*

Disinformation comes into being by deliberate manipulation with one or more conditions which are the presuppositions of a quality and objective information. The quality of information is determined by the language of the exchange of information and completeness, objectivity, accessibility and reliability of the information. When some of these conditions are not met, an error in communication appears and we get a broadcast of false information or disinformation.

Completeness and objectivity are the criteria for the judgement of the information at its source: objectivity for the valuation of representation of the content of information, and completeness for the valuation of access to the information at its source. Manipulation with objectivity and completeness at the source of information has the consequence of an event becoming a pseudo-event. The result of such disinformation is the production of pseudo-knowledge. This is manipulation with the representation of reality by means of disinformation.²¹¹

Accessibility and reliability of information are criteria for the assessment of the information at its source. Reliability relates to the valuation of representation of the content of information, and accessibility to the valuation of access to information at its source. The consequence of manipulation with reliability and accessibility at the source of information is that an event is represented as a non-event.

The consequence of manipulation with information at its source is the production of supra-knowledge. The supra-knowledge postulates a (new) virtual reality by means of disinformation. Every virtual reality is fiction, construction, or as J.Baudrillard would say, a simulacrum. It is such by virtue of its creation, but not its consequences. The effects of virtual reality are almost material, because by its consequences virtual reality functions as a real social fact.

For more than twenty years the myth about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a central place in the media and is one of the key messages with which its proponents try to form public knowledge. The basic message of this myth is that presidents Tuđman and Milošević at their meeting in Karađorđevo in March 1991 agreed to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina, peacefully and at the expense of Muslims (the Bosniak people). Their agreement is being interpreted as a practical and political foundation for ethnic cleansing and aggression against BiH. For the proponents of this myth the Karađorđevo agreement is proof that Slobodan Milošević led the policy of creation of a Great Serbia and Dr Franjo Tuđman the creation of Great Croatia.²¹²

The myth on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina became a real fact in public knowledge although it is not based on facts, i.e. on complete and objective information about the event in Karađorđevo. The myth was created by manipulation of information at its source, and it got its material confirmation with the sentence in The Hague in the Blaškić case, because the Court accepted the false testimony of Stjepan Mesić as trustworthy:

105. At any rate, these strivings for division were manifested in confidential talks about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina which Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević held on 30 March 1991. [205] After Karađorđevo, Franjo Tuđman expressed an opinion that it would be very hard for Bosnia to survive and that Croatia will return on the borders of the Banovina and in addition include Cazin, Kladuša and Bihać.

²¹¹ More about this in: M.Tuđman, *Informacijsko ratište i informacijska znanost*, 2008, p. 119-132

²¹² During his official visits, S. Mesić, as president of the Republic, accused president Tuđman of annexational politics towards the BiH: “The Croatian president Tuđman was prone to believe that Milošević will succeed in his effort, that he will create a small “Greater Serbia” and believed this to be a good opportunity for Croatia to expand too, to annex parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” A lecture by president of the Republic Stjepan Mesić at the Diplomatic Institute in Beijing, China, 17 May 2002 – an official visit to the PR China (URL: <http://www.predsjudnik.hr>, 25.4.2008.)

[206] Secret preliminary negotiations were held on which geographic maps were used for the conclusion of the agreement with the Serbs on the division of Bosnia. [207] ...²¹³

The key confirmation of this myth is the testimony of Stjepan Mesić in The Hague in 1998. The first instance sentence of general Blaškić (March 2000) confirmed the trustworthiness of this myth. The facts nevertheless point to completely different conclusions. The Court couldn't even determine the exact date of the Karađorđevo meeting, because even in such a "detail" Mesić was an unreliable and unauthentic witness.²¹⁴

Everything which is objectively known about the source of information about the "secret" meeting in Karađorđevo are agency news released after the meeting was held.²¹⁵

News release by HINA /Croatian Information Agency/: "Today in the borderline area of the two republics the presidents of the Republic of Croatia and Republic of Serbia Dr Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević met. In a conversation lasting several hours the key issues of political and economic crisis were discussed, as well as the future relationships in Yugoslavia, the key issues of the forthcoming meeting of the presidents of the republics were analysed..."²¹⁶

The only participants of this meeting on several occasions denied any agreement on the "division of Bosnia" in Karađorđevo. President Tuđman repeated to the journalists in a number of interviews:

Franjo Tuđman: "As regards other matters, I repeat once and for all: there was never an alleged agreement on the division of Bosnia between Milošević and myself."²¹⁷

Slobodan Milošević said the same even before the conclusion of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, before he signed the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Alija Izetbegović in 1996. Moreover, Milošević is even more direct in his response on the meeting in Karađorđevo: "I tell you now, if we had decided that on that meeting, we could have immediately implemented it":

Slobodan Milošević: "Tuđman told me he wanted an independent Croatia. But we simply couldn't agree – he wanted to destroy federal institutions, and I couldn't agree to that. I proposed, as before, the change of Constitution which would allow self-determination. There was speculation that we agreed on the division of Yugoslavia. I tell you now, if we had decided on that, we could have also done it, immediately."²¹⁸

Presidents Tuđman and Milošević signed a joint statement in Geneva on 17 July 1993 about the "unfounded speculations on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia."²¹⁹

In order for the meeting in Karađorđevo to become a mythical place of "the division of Bosnia" between presidents Milošević and Tuđman, the creators of this myth first had to pronounce the meeting secret, because it is not convincing that secret deals are being agreed in an open meeting. It is much easier to accept the conspiracy theory that a "secret agreement" is conjured up on a "secret meeting" between two parties, at the expense of the third one, i.e. the Bosniaks (at that time still "Muslims") who were not present at the meeting.²²⁰ Even the prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal speaks about this "very important secret meeting".²²¹

The wrong date which Mesić quotes as the time of the meeting in Karađorđevo, as well as another wrong date used by the prosecutor, only support the myth of the "secrecy of the meeting" and a "secret agreement" of

²¹³ The verdict of general Blaškić, quoted according to M. Tuđman, 2006, p. 143-144

²¹⁴ For a detailed analysis of Mesić's testimony in the Blaškić case, see M. Tuđman: „Vrijeme krivokletnika“, 2006.

²¹⁵ This was reported by Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian, French and German media (see: M. Tuđman, Vrijeme krivokletnika, 2006, p. 139-141). In spite of that, the Court upheld the view that these were "secret preliminary negotiations" (quoted in previous section).

²¹⁶ HINA, Baza EVA, 25 March 1991

²¹⁷ F. Tuđman, Hrvatska riječ svijetu, Zagreb, Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1999, p. 451

²¹⁸ Laura Silber and Allan Little, 1996, p. 124

²¹⁹ "The speculation about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia is completely unfounded." Facsimile of the statement of the presidents Tuđman and Milošević, Geneva 7 July 1993 (M. Tuđman, Vrijeme krivokletnika, 2006, p. 440)

²²⁰ I described the representation of the myth about the "division of Bosnia" in Karađorđevo in detail in the book „Vrijeme krivokletnika“; on this occasion I present a summarized version of the development of this myth described on pages 139-192. (M. Tuđman, 2006).

²²¹ The prosecutor Kehoe asks the question about the secret meeting "in Karađorđevo on 10 and 11 March 1991 between the president of Serbia Milošević and president of Croatia Tuđman" (according to M. Tuđman, 2006, p. 139).

presidents Tuđman and Milošević. In such a way, the myth gains in credibility, because if something is secret, it is difficult to be precise about it. From the viewpoint of media manipulation pointing to “secrecy” and “secret agreements” has the aim of covering up the lack of complete and objective information about the source event. In other words, the aim is to postulate an illusory, fictitious non-event as a fact of reality which is being proved by “reliable” and “accessible” information at the source – i.e. from the reliable users who, with their testimonies, “guarantee” a non-existent completeness and objectivity of information.

The history of the myth about the “division of Bosnia” is a story of construction of an event in information space with the help of disinformation. From year to year the number of “reliable” and “accessible” information grew, through a range of interested mediators, and at the same time the number of objective and complete information at the source of the event diminished. The myth became reality: not because something happened in the objective world in the past, but because the interpretations of this myth became real social facts. Mythic knowledge about the “division of Bosnia” in Karađorđevo has become institutionalized.

This myth has several “editions”, and in each of them the story is a bit changed, because the target audience also changes; the purpose of the myth is also changed, because new storytellers have different interests and different assignments. The carriers of the myth change, but the story of the “division of Bosnia” has cumulative effects in the corpus of public knowledge. It assumed the form of conviction which does not need proof nor evidence any more.

We will outline four different editions of the story of the “division of Bosnia”. The first “edition” of the story of the “division of Bosnia” was for the Yugoslav audience, the second “edition” was broadcast for the Bosnian and international audience, the third “edition” of the story of the “division of Bosnia” was broadcast by the Croatian opposition, and the fourth by the international community.

The Yugoslav edition of the myth about Karađorđevo. It is not known who was the first to launch the interpretation of the meeting in Karađorđevo as an agreement on “the division of Bosnia”. The information in the media overlapped, multiplied and created cumulative effects, until this story became a widely held view, whose source or truthfulness couldn’t any more be established. In the first round, when this story began to spread, Milošević was the key target of discrediting. Milošević “proposed the division of Yugoslavia”, he “offered the division of Bosnia”, but “Tuđman did not accept it”, i.e. they “didn’t make a deal”.

So Alija Izetbegović sends a fax to president Tuđman a day before the meeting in Karađorđevo: “I have a reliable information that he will in bilateral talks offer you some partial solutions, which would partly be at the expense of Muslims in BiH”.²²² Ciril Ribičić claims that he warned Alija Izetbegović in the spring of 1991 that “Milošević proposed to Dr Tuđman in Karađorđevo the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without participation and at the expense of the Bosniaks”.²²³ Mika Tripalo stated in an interview given on 24 May 1991: “I heard from reliable sources that Milošević and Tuđman were sitting in Karađorđevo beside geographic maps, were splitting up Yugoslavia, but couldn’t make a deal. I don’t want to compare them with Hitler and Stalin...”.²²⁴

At the time of the creation of the first round of information about the “division of Bosnia” in Karađorđevo, Slobodan Milošević and Ante Marković were two actual political options for the preservation of Yugoslavia, and JNA was the guarantor of its survival. But, Milošević was at the same time the main problem for the proponents of Yugoslavia and the possible culprit for her breakdown, because they feared that his politics of centralization of Serbia and homogenization of Serbs in Yugoslavia will result in the disintegration of SFRJ. President Tuđman was “only” the main accomplice of the possible breakdown of Yugoslavia, because he insisted on a confederation as a model of relations within Yugoslavia. The state, i.e. the Yugoslav option could resist this with various forms of force and coercion.

That is why the main benefactors of the story of the “division of Bosnia” were the military leadership of the JNA and Yugoslav reformists: Muslim leadership had to be frightened with a possible division of BiH and thus committed to Yugoslavia; Croatia had to be disciplined with the threat of cantonization of Croatia; Milošević had to be persuaded not to give up on “integral” Yugoslavia; Ante Marković had to be saved as the president of the federal Government.

²²² Quoted according to M. Tuđman, 2006, p. 439

²²³ Ciril Ribičić: *Geneza jedne zablude*; Zagreb, Jesenski i Turk Publications, 2001, second edition, p. 23.

²²⁴ NIN, 24 May 1991 „Preferans sa Tuđmanom“; quoted according to: Zdravko Gavran: *Kako su rušili Tuđmana*, Zagreb, Domovina TT, 1992, p. 94

Every story, every information, can be verified according to two criteria of objectivity: objectivity of the real world which is independent of the actual definitions of reality²²⁵, and the objectivity of the world-view, i.e. the consistency of the definitions of reality themselves. The first criterion refers to the objective event, and the second on the "reliability" i.e. usability and efficacy of existing definitions of reality.

The story of the "division of Bosnia" is not based on the objective representation of events. That is why the information on the "division of Bosnia" only a representation of the interpretation of an alleged event from a confidential and reliable source. It was launched by high officials, as credible witnesses and guardians of actual definitions of reality. According to its form, disinformation is launched as an objective and full information from the "first hand". As there are no witnesses of the event as such, the promoters of the myth of the "division of Bosnia" are only mediators who heard something from "reliable sources" and who dispose of "reliable information". In other words, the reliability of the myth of the "division of Bosnia" doesn't have its confirmation in the representation of events in the real world, but has the confirmation only in the fact that this real world fell apart and that the "logical" culprits for the breakdown of this world are the proponents of alternative definitions of reality.²²⁶

The second edition of the myth about Karađorđevo. The point of departure of the second round of the story of the "division of Bosnia" moves its focus onto the Muslim/Bosniak political scene at the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992, when it must serve new purposes: "The story of the division of Bosnia served to destroy the Croatian-Muslim alliance from pre-war times, but also for the homogenization of Muslims in BiH, and their full national profiling, i.e. for the realization of national interests. It served and still serves for the criminalization of every political option in BiH except the "civil" state which ensures the Bosniaks – Muslims full domination in BiH."²²⁷

In the second edition of the story of the "division of Bosnia" the formulations "they talked" become "they agreed", i.e. the formulation "they let it be known that an agreement has been reached" became the formulation "agreement on the division of Bosnia has been reached". These reformulations, for which no one gave any new proof or arguments, enabled the space for new interpretations of the "division of Bosnia".²²⁸ So the "agreement on the division of Bosnia" evolved into a story that Milošević and Tuđman in Karađorđevo "forged a military alliance",²²⁹ and the military alliance then turned into the "Agreed war", which is the cause of all the tragedies and horrors in BiH; this "evil was not created in Bosnia and Herzegovina...but is imported...the perpetrators of this evil in Zagreb and Belgrade are responsible for the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina still lives under the shadow of Karađorđevo and we must still fight for her survival."²³⁰

Today there is not a single proponent of a unitary arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina who will not support the thesis that in Karađorđevo the "division of Bosnia was agreed", without reservation. To argue for the thesis that Milošević and Tuđman agreed on the "division of Bosnia" had several advantages for the Bosniak politics: firstly, it is not necessary to enter into debates on (con)federal order, because it is only a ruse for the demolition of BiH into two or three parts; secondly, the Croats, with their agreement on the "division of Bosnia" are equally guilty as the Serbs, both for the war and all the calamities which poured down on BiH; thirdly, because there is an "agreement on the division of Bosnia" it is necessary, and justified, to undertake all political and military operations to prevent the realization of the "agreement on the division of Bosnia".

²²⁵ J.Lotman would have said "objectivity which lies beyond the limits of language" (J.Lotman, *Kultura i eksplozija*).

²²⁶ Belgrade film with the thesis of "agreed war" between presidents Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević is commented by M. Jajčinović in *Večernji list*: "The assertion that Tuđman agreed to war together with Milošević is equally stubborn as it is nebulous. Only the naïve and politically foolish can believe in it, and it can only be forced by the politically rotten. This thesis is stupid on the level of elementary logic. We all know that in everyday life every strife, enmity and conflict is the consequence of the lack of conversation, negotiations and agreement. When we cannot agree, then we enter into strife and we make war. Tuđman and Milošević are the only ones who do not behave according to this elementary logic, but contrary – they immediately agree to make war! It simply cannot be more logical. As if in history wars started by agreement, and not vice versa, because of the impossibility of agreement." (URL <http://www.vecernji.hr/kolumne/posljednja-podvala-tudmanu-kolumna-384182>; 13.5.2012.)

²²⁷ Ivo Lučić, „Karađorđevo, politički mit ili dogovor?“, *Motrišta, Matica hrvatska, Mostar*, 28 October 2003, p. 43

²²⁸ Both the *Oslobođenje* in Sarajevo and the *New York Times*, apparently synchronized, already on 6 July 1992 write about the division of BiH as a public secret. „Oslobođenje“: "It is a public secret that Milošević and Tuđman were meeting and discussed the division of BiH..." *New York Times*: "Last autumn Tuđman met in Serbia with the Serbian president Milošević, and the officials of the two governments let it be known that the agreement about the division of BiH has been reached." *New York Times (International)*, 6 July 1992, „Croats Claim Their Own Slice of Bosnia“. Quoted according to Z.Gavran, *Op. Cit.*, p. 113-114

²²⁹ See: Ivo Lučić, „Karađorđevo, politički mit ili dogovor?“, *Motrišta, Matica hrvatska, Mostar*, 28 October 2003, p. 33-35

²³⁰ Sejo Omeragić, *Dogovoreni rat*. Sarajevo: Proton, 2002, third edition, p. 7

In other words, the objectivity of the myth follows the logic of reliability and the efficacy of new definitions of reality, and not the objective representation of the (non)existent real event.

Third edition of the myth about Karađorđevo. In the third round of the spreading of the myth about the “division of Bosnia” the main promoter of this myth is the Croatian opposition which sees it as the “original sin” of Croatian politics: implicit guilt for the destruction of Yugoslavia; explicit responsibility for the Muslim-Croat war; guilt for the annexionistic intentions toward Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to create a Great Croatia within the borders of the Croatian Banovina.

The story served to weaken, or even more, politically disqualify and denounce the president of RH Dr Franjo Tuđman and the HDZ,²³¹ and it was also part of the campaign in presidential elections in Croatia in 1992 and 1997; it was the cause of the split in HDZ in 1994; after the change of government on 3 January 2000 it was an additional criterion of the ruling coalition and the president of the Republic for eliminating political opponents in the implementation of the politics of de-Tuđmanization.

Although the “division of Bosnia” is a frequent topic in Croatian media, there are no new facts about the agreement on the “division of Bosnia” in Karađorđevo. Therefore, for the illustration of the third edition of the myth about Karađorđevo it suffices to quote from the book by Miloš Minić *Dogovori u Karađorđevu o podeli Bosne i Hercegovine* (Agreements in Karađorđevo about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina). In his own words, Minić worked three years to gather and put in order...an acceptable documentation and established that there are 19 pieces of evidence which “make one unified document”²³² which is the proof that in Karađorđevo an agreement on the “division of Bosnia” was reached.

The structure of the “unified document” consisting of 19 pieces of evidence is the following: a) six (of 19) proofs were five Mesić's interviews and his statement to The Hague prosecutors; b) four proofs are one press release about the meeting of president Tuđman and Milošević in Athens on 8 August 1996 and three newspaper comments of that meeting on which the normalization of relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia was agreed; c) nine proofs are interviews or statements by Dr Dušan Bilandžić, Dr Smilja Avramov, Josip Manolić, Stjepan Kljuić, Warren Zimmermann, Lord Carrington, Paddy Ashdown, Slobodan Milošević, Dobroslav Paraga, Ivan Zvonimir Čičak and Ivo Banac.

The chronological “evidence” collected by Minić begin appearing in April 1994 in the statements by Mesić and Manolić, i.e. at the apex of their conflict and break-up with HDZ. They end with media appearances of Paraga and Čičak who in a synchronized fashion, Čičak in *Feral* of 11 August 1997, and Paraga in *Novi list* of 12 August 1997 announce the “recordings from Karađorđevo” as a new material evidence that president Tuđman and Milošević agreed the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Karađorđevo, which should be the crucial proof needed for their journey into The Hague.

M. Minić, the author of the book which analyses all available evidence on the “division of Bosnia” in Karađorđevo is justifiably enthusiastic with the statements by Čičak and Paraga, because these statements are something new, the first and only material evidence that an agreement in Karađorđevo has been reached. The announcement of Paraga's and Čičak's “new evidence” about the agreement in Karađorđevo Minić heralds as the apex of his efforts in gathering evidence in the story about the “division of Bosnia”.²³³

Minić refers to Paraga's statements from *Novi list* of 12 August 1997 and Čičak's statement published in *Feral* on 11 August 1997. Paraga calls once again “Dr Franjo Tuđman to resign ‘in the interest of Croatian people and the state’ from the post of president ... Paraga claims that he personally listened to the tape of the talks between Tuđman and Milošević in Karađorđevo, and that this tape, as well as a number of other documents have been in the hands of the Hague investigators for a long time.”²³⁴

Čičak also refers to the tape of the conversations from Karađorđevo: “Čičak ... is convinced that the general ... who listened to the tape of the talks in Karađorđevo on Tuđman's orders in a ministry of foreign affairs of another

²³¹ See: I.Lučić: „Karađorđevo, politički mit ili dogovor?“, p. 43

²³² M.Minić: “Dogovori u Karađorđevu o podeli Bosne i Hercegovine”, Sarajevo: RABIC, 1998, p. 101

²³³ M.Minić: “I attribute a special importance to this information, because it carries in it something new... This is a valuable piece of evidence. As the “secret” is not secret any more, we can hope that soon these tapes and other documents will reach the public.” *Op. Cit.*, p. 96-97

²³⁴ M.Minić, quoted by Belgrade daily paper *Blic* of 22 August 1997, and the article by Mira Babić: „Prijepis trake iz Karađorđeva u Hagu“, *Op. Cit.*, p. 95-96

country, will confirm in The Hague what he told him to judge by himself when it is necessary, and not Franjo Tuđman with who he parted ways long ago.”²³⁵

However, these “tapes from Karađorđevo” which for M. Minić are the crucial material evidence of the agreement in Karađorđevo, according to the statements of Paraga and Čičak, are travelling to The Hague since the 1990s still haven’t reached their destination.

The Croatian edition of the “story of the division of Bosnia” has no new argument on the basis of which we could conclude that in Karađorđevo the “division of Bosnia” was discussed and that an agreement was reached.²³⁶ However, Mesić and his like-minded circle didn’t proffer even one fact which could represent the meeting in Karađorđevo as a real event on which the agreement on the division of Bosnia was reached, the agreement which exists independent of their testimonies.

S. Mesić and other “witnesses” of the agreement on the “division of Bosnia” witness about this meeting as an agreement on the “division of Bosnia”, not starting with the facts. Their interpretation and definition of political reality is a construction according to which only an “agreement on the division of Bosnia” can explain the course of historical events. At the same time, only with such an interpretation and definition of reality they can procure for themselves the status of (official) legitimizers of reality.

Also on the basis of this example we can conclude that the nature of (dis)information is contradictory in itself. Because, its objectivity is subject to double valorisation: it can be assessed from the viewpoint of reality (the world of reality), i.e. it can be assessed from the viewpoint of language and definitions with which we describe reality. Disinformation is a forgery as a representation of the non-existing event, or as a false representation of the existing event. However, from the viewpoint of consistency of the world view with which a protagonist interprets reality, (dis)information is reliable if it interprets reality in a satisfactory way and ensures its protagonists the legitimization of their own social and political position.

The fourth edition of the myth about Karađorđevo. The fourth edition of the story about the “division of Bosnia” proceeds from the international editors, and the story had two tasks: a) to help the Serbs when they were in a difficult political and military situation, b) to discipline the Croatian political scene for West-Balkan integrations and plans. “Outside Croatia this thesis is more broadly accepted and augmented in 1994, from the centres which wanted to preserve, i.e. recreate Yugoslavia at any price, and it would emerge always when Serbs found themselves in a difficult political and military situation. Warren Zimmermann launched it immediately after the signing of the Washington agreement, with which the Croatian-Muslim war was stopped and the Federation established, and the Serbian politics received a serious blow. The English lords, Peter Carrington and Paddy Ashdown additionally strengthened it, especially Ashdown, with the construction of the map on the cocktail napkin in August 1995, immediately after the Croatian military and police operation Oluja (Storm), when Serbian politics lost the battle also on the military front.”²³⁷

Ashdown with his “proof” on the “division of Bosnia” appeared on the second day of the operation “Oluja”, claiming that this operation is part of the agreement on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, forged by Tuđman and Milošević in Karađorđevo. As a witness for the prosecution in the Blaškić case, he presented a thesis according to which, if it were true, the “division of Bosnia” in August 1995 would be a joint action of the forces of A BiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and HV /Croatian Army/. The story of “Tuđman’s cocktail napkin” to which Ashdown refers, was circling in the media for days.²³⁸

²³⁵ M. Minić, Op.Cit., p. 96

²³⁶ The only new piece of evidence, perhaps for The Hague Tribunal, not for the Croatian political public, is the fact that the editors of the Croatian edition of the story of the “division of Bosnia” are Mesić’s political friends and members of his parties: Josip Manolić, Vesna Pusić, Ivo Banac, Martin Špegelj, Petar Kriste and others. Mesić earned a leading position among them with his testimony in The Hague as a crown witness of the prosecution.

²³⁷ Ivo Lučić, Motrišta, 2003, p. 43

²³⁸ After the analysis of the documents and Ashdown’s testimony which were published in the book by M. Tuđman, *Priča o Paddyju Ashdownu i Tuđmanovoj salveti*, (Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić, 2002); the references to Ashdown’s story of the napkin were very rare, because it lost all credibility. However, just like Mesić, Ashdown also received an appropriate prize – he became the “governor” of Bosnia and Herzegovina: the High Commissioner of the international community with a four-year mandate (2002-2006). In the name of this international community Ashdown administered justice in BiH independent of the Constitution of BiH and all other institutions.

2. Review of 48 „absurd“ meetings between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević

The table herein below offers a review of „the 48 meetings“ between Croatia's President Franjo Tuđman and Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević. Some historians or analysts of that period and the developments in question might disagree as to the number of the meetings. Such differences are possible depending on the methods and criteria applied when analysing the meetings.⁴

For example, President François Mitterand talked in Paris with Presidents Tuđman and Milošević (in Paris on 28 August 1991), but these were separate talks about the same topic. There are no records in the media that Presidents Tuđman and Milošević personally met. How “to regard” the negotiations in Dayton? As a single meeting or according to the number of meetings that were held during the negotiations?

All this is irrelevant for this analysis. According to the information available to the public, the number of meetings is identical to the one given by Mesić. Possible corrections to the information will not significantly modify a type of the meetings, reasons for them or the period when the meetings between the two Presidents took place. In order to provide objective indication as to the nature of the meetings, we used the reports by new agencies adding no comments.

	Date and place	Type of the meeting	Sponsor
1	25 Jan 1991 Belgrade	Prior to the meeting of the federal SFRY Presidency, a meeting between the Croatian and Serbian delegations was held about the Yugoslav crisis: The Croatian side tried to avert a military coup prepared by the YPA. President Tuđman: “We were on the verge of civil war. The army has mobilised. Croatia defended itself by way of democracy”.	Talks on the Future of Yugoslavia: Serbia and the Republic of Croatia
2	30 Jan 1991 Belgrade	The second round of the YU-Summit. The talks on the political future of Yugoslavia resumed in Belgrade. Besides the members of the Yugoslav political leadership, the Presidents of all republics and provinces also attend the meeting of the Yugoslav Presidency. The representatives of Croatia and Slovenia required that the YPA's role in the resolution of the present political crisis in the country be considered. After a lengthy and, occasionally, painful discussion, the participants agreed that the inner Presidency would discuss the role and position of the YPA in the resolution of the crisis at its next meeting. (HINA)	Talks on the Future of Yugoslavia: YU – Summit Presidents of all republics
3	22 Feb 1991 Sarajevo	At the meeting between the Presidents of all Yugoslav republics in Sarajevo. Izetbegović presented the idea of “an asymmetrical federation”: “Serbia and Montenegro would be in a classical federation, Slovenia and Croatia in a confederation with the first two, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia would be equally close and distant to all of them”.	Talks on the Future of Yugoslavia: YU –Summit Presidents of all republics

⁴ The differences are possible because as criterion may be used a physical meeting itself, or a common statement or agreements made or reached during international negotiations without an actual meeting, but through go-betweens instead.

4	25 March 1991 Karadžorđevo	<p>HINA: "Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, met today in the border area between the two republics. During lengthy long talks on key issues relating to a political and economic crisis and the future relations in Yugoslavia, the Presidents considered the main issues to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the republics' Presidents. Despite well known differences in opinions about the basic issues concerning the interests of Croatia and Serbia, i.e. of the Croatian and the Serbian peoples, both Presidents took into account that the relations between Croatia and Serbia are crucial for the overall relations between Yugoslav republics and, as such, for the solution to the political crisis in the SFRY. Therefore, their efforts were aimed at eliminating the options that might endanger the interests of the Croatian and Serbian peoples alike and at seeking permanent solutions that would guard the historic interests of peoples. The following was concluded:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to determine the period for solving the existing Yugoslav problems of two months at longest, that will be submitted as a joint proposal at the forthcoming meeting of the republics' Presidents". <p>(HINA, Baza EVA)</p>	Meeting between Presidents Milošević and Tuđman
5	28 March 1991 Villa „Dalmatia“ Split	<p>The first meeting of the presidents of the six Yugoslav republics about the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis is held in Villa Dalmatia in Split. HINA found out from unofficial sources that, after an introduction by Croatia's President Franjo Tuđman, who presented Croatia's proposal for the union of sovereign states or separation, all Presidents took part in a two-hour discussion which followed thereafter. Slovenia's President Milan Kučan put forward Slovenia's proposal for separation.</p> <p>Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević repeated his previous proposal that the Federal Executive Council should be dissolved in order to avert the economic collapse. (HINA)</p>	Meeting between Presidents of Yugoslav republics
6	4 April 1991 Belgrade	<p>The second meeting between the Presidents of the republics was held in Belgrade. Topics: Referendum and the manner of separation; Tuđman and Gligorov proposed a union of sovereign and independent States.</p>	Meeting between Presidents of Yugoslav republics
7	11 April 1991 Brdo near Kranj	<p>The third presidential meeting was held at Brdo near Kranj (Slovenia). Topic: The elaboration of the separation model and the referendum. It was established that there are two opposing views thereon.</p>	Meeting between Presidents of Yugoslav republics
8	15 April 1991 Tikveš	<p>"The president of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, and the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, met near the Croatian border to resume the talks on the relations between the two republics and to discuss the results of the work of joint expert teams." (HINA)</p>	Meeting between Presidents Milošević and Tuđman
9	18 April 1991 Villa „Biljana“ Ohrid	<p>The fourth meeting between the Presidents of Yugoslav republics was held at Villa Biljana at Ohrid (Macedonia).</p> <p>HINA: "With regard to the fact that, at the last meeting at Brdo near Kranj, the agreement was reached to hold in each republic a referendum on its future status by the end of May, it is expected that the Presidents will define propositions for such referendum. They will also discuss mutual rights and obligations of republics and in particular of each republic with regard to the existing federal state. Finally, the Presidents will also discuss the functioning of joint bodies during the transition period until they reach an agreement about new relations or until the complete separation." (HINA)</p>	Meeting between Presidents of Yugoslav republics

10	29 April 1991 „Plavi dvorac“ Cetinje	<p>The fifth presidential meeting was held at Plavi dvorac at Cetinje (Montenegro). Topic: Separation.</p> <p>Izetbegović and Gligorov announced their joint compromise proposal for the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. The President of the Republic of Croatia left the press conference because of numerous insults from journalists who supported the creation of a “Great Serbia”.</p>	Meeting between Presidents of Yugoslav republics
11	6 June 1991 Vila “Stojčevac“ Sarajevo	<p>HINA: “The sixth meeting between the Presidents of the Yugoslav republics or the Presidents of the Yugoslav republic Presidencies was held in Sarajevo today. The participants of the meeting resumed considering the future Yugoslav system of government.</p> <p>They agreed on the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. All unsettled issues should be settled by mutual agreement in a peaceful and democratic manner and in the common interest. In doing so one should take into account the gravity of economic and social crisis in Yugoslavia and the appeal by the European Community. <p>The proposal by Presidents Alija Izebegović and Kiro Gligorov constitutes a solid basis to resume talks on regulating the relations between the Yugoslav republics. This should be discussed in each republic together with other proposals submitted at the meeting.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Since the troubled interethnic relations generate, among other things, the crisis in Yugoslavia, and since they manifest themselves in some republics in particular, it has been agreed to hold a special meeting soon between Presidents of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 3. The participants hold the opinion that the Presidency should resolve a crisis, caused by the failure to elect the President and the Vice-president of the SFRY Presidency, in accordance with the constitution and the Rules as soon as possible. 4. The Presidents agreed to “intensify their working meetings“. <p>(HINA)</p>	Meeting between Presidents of Yugoslav republics
12	12 June 1991 Split	<p>“In accordance with the resolution passed during the last week talks between the Presidents of the republics or the republic Residencies, a meeting between the Presidents of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and Alija Izetbegović, was held in Split today ...</p> <p>Since the proposals submitted at the Sarajevo meeting will be discussed in republics in the next few days, conditions will be met to define more quickly and precisely the elements needed to find a solution to the political and constitutional crisis, i.e. for just regulation of the relations between Yugoslav peoples and republics. The principle of national equality and the interests of all peoples should be taken as a starting point. “At the meeting ‘... there was much talk about Bosnia and Herzegovina and the possibility of introducing a cantonal system in that republic”.</p> <p>HINA, Baza Eva, 12 June 1991</p>	Meeting between Presidents Tuđman, Milošević and Izetbegović

13	19 June 1991 Belgrade	<i>The tripartite meeting of Split between Tuđman, Milošević and Izetbegović resumed in Belgrade. The topic of the meeting was keeping peace in the SFRY territory. Again, no agreement was reached.</i>	Meeting between Presidents Tuđman, Milošević and Izetbegović
14	28 Aug 1991 Paris	<i>French President François Mitterand discussed in Paris the peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis with Croatia's President Franjo Tuđman. The next day President Mitterand talked to Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević. (There is no information whether Presidents Tuđman and Milošević met).</i>	François Mitterand, F.Tuđman - S.Milošević
15	2 Sep 1991 Belgrade	<i>The President of the SFRY Presidency, Stjepan Mesić, the President of the Federal Executive Council, Ante Marković, and the leaders of the six Yugoslav republics signed a Ceasefire Agreement and a Memorandum on Extending the EC Monitoring in Yugoslavia one hour after midnight.</i>	President of the SFRJ Presidency Stjepan Mesić, President of the Federal Executive Council, Ante Marković and Presidents of the six Yugoslav republics
16	7 Sep 1991 The Hague	<i>HINA: „Members of the SFRY Presidency, the Federal Government of the SFRY, Presidents of all Yugoslav republics, the EC Council and representatives of the EC member states took part in the peace conference on Yugoslavia in the Hague.”</i> <i>„The peace conference ended by adopting a common statement that was signed by all parties. In it, the parties confirm that their common goal is “to achieve peace in Yugoslavia and to find a permanent solution that will be just and suit the legitimate interests and aspirations of all peoples“.</i> <i>For that purpose, they decided “to set up an Arbitration Commission within the framework of the Conference ... We promise to seek a peaceful solution based on the principles and obligations as agreed upon within the CESC. We are determined never to recognise a change of borders, unless this was done peacefully and by way of a mutual agreement.”</i>	Peace conference on Yugoslavia
17	17 Sep 1991 Igalo, Montenegro	<i>HINA: „The participants ... in the meeting with the Chairman of the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington, Croatia's President Franjo Tuđman, Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević and the Federal Secretary for the National Defence Veljko Kadijević, resumed the talks on the implementation of the agreement that was signed with Lord Carrington. They also agreed to secure an absolute ceasefire on 18 September 1991 at 12:00 ... According to the statement, the three of them agreed to immediately resume continuous talks in order to secure peace, so that they would contribute to the resolution of the Yugoslav political and constitutional crisis and the success of the Conference on Yugoslavia in the Hague“.</i>	Lord Carrington: Tuđman – Milošević – Kadijević

18	25 Sep 1991 Belgrade	<p>„As they resumed the talks about the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, that started at Igalo, the President of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, and the Federal Secretary for the National Defence, General Veljko Kadijević, arrived today at a joint conclusion, that it is necessary to maintain and secure peace in the country by way of a complete ceasefire. This is the first condition for finding just political solutions. They deemed that a political solution to the crisis is in the interest of all Yugoslav peoples and republics as a way of preventing bloodshed and conflicts. When resolving the crisis, one must take into account the interests of all Yugoslav peoples and their equal status. The meeting participants concluded the guidelines of the Hague Conference, which exclude that political solutions being imposed by force, will contribute to a peaceful and just solution to the Yugoslav crisis.”</p> <p>(HINA, Baza EVA, 25 September 1991)</p>	Lord Carrington: Tuđman – Milošević – Kadijević
19	04 Oct 1991 The Hague	<p>During the Peace Conference on the SFRY, Lord Carrington organised a meeting between Presidents Tuđman, Milošević and General Kadijević in The Hague. It was agreed to lift the blockade of YPA's army barracks in Croatia, to end all armed conflicts and to withdraw the YPA's troops from Croatia.</p>	Lord Carrington: Tuđman – Milošević – Kadijević
20	10 Oct 1991 The Hague	<p>At the meeting organised by Lord Carrington, Presidents Tuđman and Milošević and General Kadijević agreed that the YPA would pull out of the Republic of Croatia within 30 days.</p>	Lord Carrington: Tuđman – Milošević – Kadijević
21	15 Oct 1991 Moscow	<p>With Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev acting as intermediary, Croatia's President Franjo Tuđman and Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević signed a three-point memorandum ... Under the point one the signatories declared that it is “necessary to end all armed conflicts” in Yugoslavia. Under point two, the Serbian and Croatian Presidents must “within one-month period” start negotiating in order to settle all their disputes. These negotiations should be conducted “in interest of the Yugoslav peoples and should take into account the rights and the sovereignty of the republics to enable the establishment of good neighbourly relations and peace.” Under point three, Milošević and Tuđman “asked from the USSR, the USA and the European Community to provide services in organising negotiations”.</p> <p>(HINA, Baza EVA, 15 October 1991)</p>	M. Gorbachev: Tuđman – Milošević
22	18 Oct 1991 The Hague	<p>The Peace Conference on Yugoslavia was held in the Hague. “At the Conference, another ceasefire was agreed to. Franjo Tuđman and all members of the SFRY Presidency signed the relating document. Another document entitled Draft of the Resolution to the Yugoslav Crisis recognises the sovereignty of all Yugoslav republics ... All Presidents of the Yugoslav republics, except Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, accepted the document. Milošević emphasised that the draft ignores the fact that Yugoslavia still existed. Everybody was surprised at the fact that President of Montenegro Momir Bulatović raised no objections to the draft. Moreover, he accepted it entirely.”</p> <p>(HINA, Baza EVA, 18 October 1991)</p>	Peace Conference on Yugoslavia

23	5 Nov 1991 The Hague	<p>„The Peace Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague broke up after the communist leader of Serbia refused to change his views on the peace plan presented by the European Community”, reported US UPI agency. “Some 9,7 million of inhabitants of the greatest Yugoslav republic are now facing a threat of diplomatic and economic sanctions. The only outcome of the meeting that broke up after an hour is an agreement on a new ceasefire”.</p> <p>(HINA, Baza EVA, 5 November 1991)</p>	Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
24	23 Nov 1991 Geneva	<p>„Presidents Milošević and Tuđman and General Kadijević signed in Geneva this evening an agreement on the peace implementation in Yugoslavia and the preparations for the deployment of UN troops, Vance said (Cyrus Vance, a special envoy of the UN General Secretary). According to France Press, the agreement calls for an immediate lift of the blockade of all federal army barracks in Croatia as well as the withdrawal of the federal army from that republic and a ceasefire that is to take effect the following day. Both sides are bound by the agreement to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to victims of the armed conflict. Vance said that the details about the mandate, organisation and regions where UN troops are to be deployed had already been discussed. Both Presidents are of the opinion that this should happen “as soon as possible “.</p> <p>(HINA, Baza EVA, 23 November 1991)</p>	Cyrus Vance, a special envoy of the UN General Secretary, Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević YPA, General Veljko Kadijević
25	09 Jan 1992 Brussels	<p>In the resumption of the Peace Conference in Brussels, a conclusion was reached that the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia is a fait accompli. While trying to postpone the decision on the recognition. Slobodan Milošević, requested that the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia be transferred to the UN.</p>	Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
26	25 June 1992 Strasbourg	<p>„The Chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, Lord Peter Carrington, said after today’s talks with Presidents of Croatia and Serbia and the Minister of the foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina that he was “disappointed” with the results of his efforts to revive the peace process. Slobodan Milošević said that the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina depended on the new Yugoslav federation consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. He added that the three ethnic groups in Bosnia should first achieve consensus about the structure of the republic. “I hoped to hear from President Milošević today that he and Serbia are ready to recognise the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state.”</p> <p>(HINA, Baza EVA, 25 June 1992)</p>	Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
27	26/27 Aug 1992 London	<p>The International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia was held in London on 26/27 August. Representatives of over thirty countries and organisations, Presidents of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, the President of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Ćosić, and Prime Minister Milan Panić took part in the Conference. Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance were appointed Co-chairmen of the Conference. Conference bodies that will operate in Geneva were also set up. A special resolution on Bosnia and Herzegovina was not adopted because the Yugoslav delegation was against it.</p>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia

28	29 Sep 1992 Geneva	29 September: A new round of Geneva talks started. Alija Izetbegović will attend them for the first time. Presidents Tuđman and Čosić signed a joint statement condemning all actions related to ethnic cleansing.	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
29	10-12 Jan 1993 Geneva	The peace talks resumed in Geneva. They are widely regarded as “the last chance” for peace. For the first time Serbian President Milošević showed up in Geneva where he managed to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept the proposed constitutional solutions for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 12 January.	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
30	23 Jan 1993 Geneva	23/30 January: The Geneva talks, which began on 23 January, broke up on 30 January after the Serbs and Muslims refused to sign the crucial parts of the peace plan. Vance and Owen left for New York to seek support of the UN Security Council.	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
31	1-2 May 1993 Athens	<p>The International Peace Conference on the Resolution of the Crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina was held in Athens. Besides its host, Greek Prime Minister Constantin Mitsotakis. The Conference was attended by Presidents Franjo Tuđman, Dobrica Čosić, Slobodan Milošević, Momir Bulatović and the leaders of the three peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Radovan Karadžić, Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegović.</p> <p>The newly appointed Conference Co-chairman, Thorwald Stoltenberg, and American and Russian envoys Reginald Bartholomew and Vitalij Čurkin joined David Owen and Cyrus Vance who opened the Conference. At the end of the meeting, Radovan Karadžić signed the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina under condition that “the Assembly of the Republic of Srpska confirms at its meeting on 5 May the decision of its delegation that has been taken here in Athens on 2 May 1993”.</p>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
32	16 June 1993 Geneva	The first round of new talks about the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was attended by Presidents Alija Izetbegović, Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman started in Geneva. Presidents Tuđman and Milošević reached during the Geneva meeting an agreement about the principles to organise Bosnia and Herzegovina either as federal or con-federal state while respecting the interests of the three constituent nations.	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
33	23 June 1993 Geneva	The talks on the resolution of the crisis in the Bosnia and Herzegovina resumed. Besides the Conference Co-chairmen, Serbia’s President Slobodan Milošević, Croatia’s President Franjo Tuđman and seven members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, take part in them. Alija Izetbegović and Ejup Ganić do not attend them. The nine-point Constitutional Proposal for Con-federation was put forward during the talks. The seven members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina were introduced to the Proposal.	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
34	17 July 1993 Geneva	At the meeting of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in Geneva, Presidents Tuđman and Milošević made, in co-operation with the Conference Co-chairman, a statement by way of which they denied that there were plans to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Croats and Serbs. The statement also says that “the only way to achieve permanent peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to recognise the interests of all three of its constituent peoples and to reach an agreement to establish the three republics within a confederation”.	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia

35	27 July 1993 Geneva	<i>The new decisive round of the talks starts in Geneva. It is attended by the leaders of the three warring sides, Radovan Karadžić, Alija Izetbegović and Mate Boban, the Presidents of Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia, Milošević, Bulatović and Tuđman, and the international intermediaries, Owen and Stoltenberg. The Serbs and Croats supported a proposal by the intermediaries to form a new "Union", an association of the three ethnic republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</i>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
36	30 July 1993 Geneva	<i>During the Geneva talks, all three parties accepted a compromise proposal by international intermediaries Owen and Stoltenberg concerning the system of government of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a union of three constituent republics. Borders between the three republics will be established later. Izetbegović agreed to the constitutional proposal for the union of republics, but it is to be approved by the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina the talks focused on the maps again. Military leaders of the three sides signed a ceasefire on all frontlines in Sarajevo.</i>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
37	4 Aug 1993 Geneva	<i>The Co-chairmen of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, Lord David Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg, met at the Palace of Nations with Presidents Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and Momir Bulatović. Mate Boban and Radovan Karadžić also attended the meeting. The President of the Presidency of the Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović did not come. He sent a message to Owen and Stoltenberg: "I can attend the talks only if the Serbs withdraw from Bjelašnica".</i> <i>(HINA, Baza EVA, 4 August 1993)</i>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
38	20 Aug 1993 Geneva	<i>In order to bring the talks on the maps to an end, the international intermediaries called the Presidents of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro to Geneva to encourage all sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina to accept what has been proposed.</i> <i>UPI/HINA: "The leaders of the warring sides met in Geneva to start the crucial part of the negotiations about Bosnia and Herzegovina." The US agency also reported that Conference Co-chairmen Owen and Stoltenberg met during the morning with all negotiating parties separately, although they did not try very hard to gather all negotiators at the same table. The yesterday's discussion about the maps produced no results so that this issue will be discussed again. Lord Owen expressed hope that the negotiating parties would be more flexible than they were during previous days.</i> <i>(HINA, Baza EVA, 20 August 1993)</i>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia

39	31 Aug 1993 Geneva	<p>The Co-chairman of the International Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia met in Geneva with Presidents Tuđman, Milošević, Bulatović and Izetbegović. Conference diplomats and officials informed that the three sides from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia's President Milošević and Croatia's President Tuđman did not meet directly in the forenoon. Bilateral talks which David Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg conducted this morning were about the maps of the three future ethnic republics in Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p> <p>Reuter/AFP/HINA: "As reported from Geneva, Alija Izetbegović, President of the Presidency of the Bosnia and Herzegovina, said today to the international peace intermediaries that he could not accept a peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina based on compromise without considerable changes of the proposed map showing a division of the country. The reports also say that due to the practical rejection of the plan, the intermediaries tried to persuade leader fo the Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadžić to make some territorial concessions in accordance with Muslim demands. Muslim officials added that Izetbegović insisted on additional 6% of the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Muslim republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina."</p> <p>(HINA, Baza EVA, 31 August 1993)</p>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
40	20 Sep 1993 British Aircraft carrier „Invincible“	<p>British Aircraft carrier „Invincible“. The following attended the talks at the British aircraft carrier: Radovan Karadžić, Mate Boban, Alija Izetbegović and Presidents Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević and Momir Bulatović, Conference Co-chairmen David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, and the representatives of the USA and Russia, Charles Redman and Vitalij Čurkin. The purpose of the meeting was to accept a peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was not much progress during the negotiations, because the Muslims still insisted on Neum, although Metković and Ploče were mentioned more than once. Izetbegović said that it was up to the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take a final decision.</p>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
41	29/30 Nov 1993 Geneva	<p>The European Union organised in Geneva a new round of talks about peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides the twelve EU Ministers of foreign Affairs, the following also attended the meeting: the leaders of the three sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Karadžić, Boban and Izetbegović, Croatia's President Franjo Tuđman, the Presidents of Serbia and Montenegro, diplomatic representatives of Russia and the USA, the Co-chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Thorvald Stoltenberg and David Owen. The Geneva talks on Bosnia were followed by a meeting between the Serbs and Muslims. DPA reported that Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadžić, the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović, and peace intermediaries Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg participated in the talks. In the evening on 29 November, talks were held between the Serbs and Croats. After a two-month break these were the first official talks within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.</p>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia

42	21-23 Dec 1993 Geneva	<i>The presidents of Serbia and Croatia, Milošević and Tuđman, and the representatives of the three warring sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Karadžić, Boban and Izetbegović participated in the Peace Conference in Geneva. The participants agreed about the territorial concession to the Muslims, i.e. the Muslim republic should have 33% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muslim side agreed to it. However, they made objections with regard to the “quality of the territory offered to them”; in their view some towns were still questionable as well as the access to the sea and the Sava River for the Muslim and the status of Sarajevo. All three sides agreed to end the conflict during the Christmas or until 15 January 1994.</i>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
43	22 Dec 1993 Brussels	<i>EU Ministers and the Co-chairmen of the international Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia met with the Presidents Tuđman, Bulatović, Milošević and Izetbegović, as well as with Karadžić and Boban. The EU Ministers requested for the Muslim Republic in the Bosnia and Herzegovina at least 1/3 of the territory. “The Christmas ceasefire” is holding. The talks in Brussels produced no results, except that the three sided confirmed the Christmas ceasefire. (HINA, Baza EVA, 22 December 1993)</i>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
44	18-19 Jan 1994 Geneva	<i>The peace talks on the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina resumed in Geneva. They were attended by the Presidents of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro: Franjo Tuđman, Slobodan Milošević, Momir Bulatović and Alija Izetbegović, the leader of the Bosnian Muslims, Radovan Karadžić, President of the Republic of Srpska, Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić and Mile Akmadžić, the leader of the Croatian delegation from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Several bilateral talks between delegations were held, but no progress was made. After separate talks between the delegations of Yugoslavia and Croatia, that were attended by Presidents Tuđman, Milošević and Bulatović and the Foreign Ministers of these countries, Vladislav Jovanović and Mate Granić, a joint statement was signed about the normalisation of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia and opening of diplomatic missions between the two states in Belgrade and Zagreb. The Republic of Srpska and the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia signed in Geneva joint statement about permanent peace and the establishment of official relations between the two republics. Nikola Koljević, Vice-president of the Republic of Srpska, and Mile Akmadžić, the leader of the Croatian delegation from Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed the statement.</i>	International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia

45	1 Nov 1995 Dayton, Ohio	<p>Peace talks about Bosnia and Herzegovina started at Wright-Patterson air base in Dayton, Ohio. Croatia's President Franjo Tuđman, President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović and Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević take part in them together with representatives of the Contact Group and the EU. According to the US State Secretary, the conditions for permanent peace are the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a resolution of the human rights issue, including the responsibility for war crimes, a resolution of the status of Sarajevo and reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranya and Western Sylvania. The negotiators will be introduced to the draft of the general peace agreement consisting of separate documents on territorial issues, disengagement of forces, ceasefire, constitution and elections as well as the issue of refugees and reconstruction.</p> <p>(HINA, Baza EVA, 1 November 1995)</p>	Peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton, Ohio, USA
46	2 Nov 1995 Dayton, Ohio	<p>Serbia's President Slobodan Milošević and Croatia's President Franjo Tuđman met in Dayton, with US State Secretary Warren Christopher acting as intermediary. In their joint statement, both Presidents agreed to fully contribute to the normalisation of relations between the two countries. The normalisation of relations will be based on "the acknowledgement of the internationally recognised human rights of all citizens, the right of refugees and displaced persons in both countries to return to their homes, to restitution of property or to just compensation." The statement also says that the basis for the normalisation of relations will also be "the support to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Eastern Slavonia, Baranya and Western Sylvania that should take effect as soon as possible based on negotiations between the Croatian Government and the representatives of the local Serbs."</p>	Peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton, Ohio, USA
47	20 Nov 1995 Dayton, Ohio	<p>After 21-day negotiations held at Wright-Patterson air base in Dayton (Ohio, USA), Presidents Alija Izetbegović, Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević initialled a global peace agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Peace Accord on Bosnia and Herzegovina enables the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as integral state based on the full respect of its sovereignty by the neighbouring countries. The parties agreed about a constitution granting the establishment of federal institutions, a two-house parliament and a constitutional court consisting of nine judges, three of which shall be appointed by the President of the European Human Rights Court. Based on this Agreement, the country will have its central bank and a single currency. The central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have competence in foreign policy, foreign trade, customs policy, immigration policy, monetary policy, international law, communications, traffic and the financing of government operations and commitments. The two-house parliament shall consist of 15 members of the Council of Peoples and of 42 deputies in the House of Representatives. Two-thirds of all deputies in each Chamber shall be from the Federation. The Presidency shall consist of three members, one of which shall be a representative of the Republic of Srpska and the other two of the Federation. Besides the Presidency, the Council of Ministers shall also constitute executive power. The Federation shall govern 51% of the territory. Sarajevo has become united by way of the Agreement. It is within the Federation, but it shall be open to all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.</p> <p>(HINA, Baza EVA, 20 November 1995)</p>	Peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dayton, Ohio, USA

48	14 Dec 1995 Paris	<p>„The Dayton Accords signing ceremony began in the Elysee Palace in Paris as French President Jacques Chirac gave his welcoming address. Presidents Franjo Tuđman, Alija Izetbegović and Slobodan Milošević were the first to sign the general framework agreement. Presidents Chirac and Clinton, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, British and Russian Prime Ministers John Major and Victor Chernomyrdin, and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. On behalf of the European Union signed the document as co-signatories thereafter. After the signing ceremony, each of the signatories, including OIC, the UN and NATO representatives, delivered short speeches. According to the protocol, the first to speak was President Alija Izetbegović, after him President Milošević and finally President Tuđman. Speeches were then delivered by UN Secretary Boutros-Boutros Ghali, General Secretary of NATO Javier Solana, European intermediary Carl Bildt, Prime Minister of Morocco Abdellatif Filali, who is presiding over the OIC contact group and finally by Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin, Major and Gonzalez, Chancellor Kohl and President Clinton.“</p> <p>(HINA, Baza EVA, 14 December 1995)</p>	
----	----------------------	--	--

We can classify these meeting into two groups depending on their type and “sponsors”:

- a) before the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis and
- b) after its internationalisation.

Before the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis, i.e. before the international community became involved of in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, Presidents Tuđman and Milošević had 13 meetings:

- 1 meeting about the crisis in the SFRY between the Croatian and Serbian delegations in Belgrade;
- 2 meetings between the SFRY Presidency and the Presidents of the Yugoslav republics;
- 2 meetings between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević (Karađorđevo, Tikveš);
- 2 meetings between Presidents Tuđman, Milošević and Izetbegović (Split, Belgrade);
- 6 meetings between the Presidents of the Yugoslav republics.

After the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis Presidents Tuđman and Milošević met 35 times during the meetings organised by international intermediaries:

- 2 meetings on the initiative of Presidents of foreign states (President Mitterand in Paris and President Gorbachev in Moscow);
- 11 meetings organised by the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia which had a dual approach⁵: a political one, aiming to find a political solution and reach a political settlement (7 meetings), and the other, dealing with military aspects in the field (5 meetings);
- Presidents Tuđman and Milošević were invited to 7 meeting related to the political aspect of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia together with other Presidents of the Yugoslav republics and the federal leadership;
- Presidents Tuđman and Milošević and General Kadijević took part in the 5 meetings dealing with military issues together with Conference Co-chairman Lord Carrington (or Cyrus Vance);
- There were 18 meetings organised by the international Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia (Co-chairmen Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance; Thorvald Stoltenberg replaced Vance as of May 1993). The leaders of all Yugoslav republics and the SFRY Government participated in this Conference at first. As the Conference focused mostly on the crisis in the Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidents of Croatia and the Federal

⁵ See: M.Libal, *German Policy and Yugoslav Crisis 1991-1992, Golden marketing – Tehnička knjiga*, Zagreb, 2004, p.84

Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were also invited besides the three warring sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Presidents Alija Izetbegović and Slobodan Milošević did not always accept invitations for different reasons, unlike the Croatian side who never refused to co-operate with the international community;

- 4 meetings during the peace negotiations on Bosnia and Herzegovina in Dayton, Ohio. (We singled out the meetings at the beginning of the peace negotiations, 1 November 1995; a meeting between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević with US Foreign Secretary Warren Christopher acting as intermediary, 2 November 1995; a meeting where the agreement on the normalisation relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia /Serbia and Montenegro/ was reached; the end of the peace negotiations when the agreements were initialled, 20 November 1995; and the signing of the peace agreement in the presence of all participants and representatives of the international community in Paris on 14 December 1995).

This is a short review of the 48 “half-crazy” and “absurd” meetings between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević, during which “Bosnia was partitioned” without the Muslims being present. According to Mesić, everybody could see that on TV as well.

What the media also showed, were the following facts:

- Out of 48 meetings which Mesić is trying to describe as bilateral meetings between Presidents Tuđman and Milošević, only two were bilateral indeed, i.e. between the two of them only (at Karadžorđevo and Tikveš); all others were multilateral;
- All meetings prior to the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis were held on the recommendation of the SFRY Presidency in order to find a solution to the Yugoslav crisis. First, bilateral meetings took place with each delegation holding a separate meeting with every other delegation, and then joint meetings between the Presidents of all Yugoslav republics; this refers to the meetings between Tuđman and Milošević⁶ as well as to the tripartite meetings between Izetbegović, Milošević and Tuđman;
- All meetings after the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis were organised by the international community; it were Presidents Tuđman and Milošević who most frequently attended those meetings besides other representatives of the interested parties;
- President Alija Izetbegović⁷ participated in at least 31 of the 48 meetings where Presidents Tuđman and Milošević met;
- Out of 48 meetings at which, according to Mesić, “Bosnia was partitioned” by Tuđman and Milošević, Stjepan Mesić attended at least four;
- All 48 meetings were open to public to public and the public was well informed about them by means of joint communiqués, press conferences, agreements signed or other statements;

A serious politician and analyst would take on a task to present before the Hague Tribunal political options of the adversaries in the former Yugoslavia and their strategies and to assess what was going on at international conferences on the resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and Croatia, and later on in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 1991 until 1995. However, Mesić missed that chance. All he did say about these developments was that Milošević should be hanged and that Tuđman pursued “a dual policy” because he wanted “the partition of Bosnia”, and that their 48 meetings were “half-crazy” and “absurd”.

⁶ From January until the end of March 1991, all Presidents of the Yugoslav republics held meetings on the each-with-every-other basis. In this way, Izetbegović and Milošević also met at Karadžorđevo and Tikveš.

⁷ It is not quite clear from the available sources whether Izetbegović attended another three meetings; as irrelevant for an overall analysis, it remains to be checked subsequently.

6. WHEN DID SERBIA LEAVE THE SFRJ / SEPARATISM OR WHO WAS THE FIRST TO LEAVE SFRJ ?

D-3

Communists, completely convinced that SFRJ is eternal, never denied nor abolished Lenin's principles of the RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE "to self-determination, all the way to complete SECESSION".

This was a constitutional category.

Nevertheless, when Slovenia and Croatia, faced with an aggression from Belgrade, wanted to implement these rights, they were accused by the West for separatism and secession from their, so very dear, communist Yugoslavia.

The Slovenians could get away with their separatism (even in Belgrade), but the Croats – no way.

I enclose, dear reader, the document – CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, "OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA" No. 1/90, which plainly says that Serbia on 28 September 1990 left, separated itself from, dismantled SFRJ – three months before the "separatist" constitution of Croatia. Moreover, Serbia passed its constitution in a way which was not foreseen by the CONSTITUTION OF SFRJ, singlehandedly.

With THIS, the constitution of SFRJ was derogated, SFRJ as a state DEFINED BY CONSTITUTION from that moment exists no more.

Other decisions of that Constitution, please, read by yourselves.

But, who cares, if we wish and say that Croatia is RESPONSIBLE for separatism.

There is no point in quoting other decisions of the Serbian leadership which derogated the CONSTITUTION OF SFRJ.

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Publisher:
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia

For the publisher:
Dragoslav Kostić

Prepared by:
Dr. Vladan Kutlešić and Dr. Bogoljub Milosavljević

Reviewer:
Prof. dr. Ratko Marković

Editor:
Ana Marjanov

Layout and design:
Nikola Bogdanović

ISBN 86-7549-003-8
Circulation: 3000 copies

Printed by: GDP "Dimitrije Davidović" – Smederevo

On the basis of Amendment XLVII, point 7, of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia,
The Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, at a joint session of all the chambers, on 28 September 1990
adopted the

DECISION

ON THE DECLARATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia adopted by the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia at a joint session of all the chambers on 28 September 1990 is being declared.

RS number 1

In Belgrade, 28 September 1990

The Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia

President of the Assembly
Zoran Sokolović, signed

Starting from the century-old struggle of the Serbian people for freedom, its libertarian, democratic and state-building tradition, historical development and a joint life of all the nations and nationalities in Serbia,

determined to realize a democratic state of the Serbian people in which the members of other nations and nationalities will be provided the realization of national rights, founded on the respect of the freedoms and rights of man and citizen, on the sovereignty which belongs to all the citizens, on the rule of law, on social justice and equal opportunities for the advancement of individuals and society, the citizens of Serbia adopt

THE CONSTITUTION* **OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA**

I BASIC PROVISIONS

Article 1

The Republic of Serbia is a democratic state of all the citizens who live in it, founded on the freedoms and rights of man and citizen, on the rule of law and social justice.

Article 2

The sovereignty belongs to all the citizens of the Republic of Serbia.

The citizens realize sovereignty by means of referendum, people's initiative and through their freely elected representatives.

Article 3

In the Republic of Serbia everything is allowed which is not banned by the Constitution and by law.

The Constitution guarantees and acknowledges personal, political, national, economic, social, cultural and other rights of man and citizen.

Article 4

The territory of the Republic of Serbia is integral and unalienable.

About the change of the border of the Republic of Serbia the citizens decide by referendum.

Article 5

The Republic of Serbia has a coat-of-arms, flag and an anthem.

The coat-of-arms, seal and anthem of the Republic of Serbia are defined according to the procedure foreseen for the change of the Constitution.

The capital of the Republic of Serbia is Belgrade.

Article 6

Within the Republic of Serbia there are an Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, as forms of territorial autonomy.

* "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No. 1 of 28 September 1990

Article 7

The municipality is a territorial unit in which the local self-government is being realized.

The city of Belgrade is a separate territorial unit.

Territorial organization of the Republic of Serbia is determined by law.

Article 8

In the Republic of Serbia the language in official use is Serbo-Croatian and Cyrillic script, while the Latin script is in official use in a way determined by law.

On the areas of the Republic of Serbia where the nationalities live, their languages and scripts are in simultaneous official use, in the way prescribed by law.

Article 9

The constituent and legal power belongs to the National Assembly.

The Republic of Serbia is being represented and its united statehood expressed by the president of the Republic.

The executive power belongs to the government.

Judicial power belongs to the courts.

The protection of the Constitution, as well as the protection of legality in accordance with the Constitution belongs to the Constitutional court.

Article 10

The work of state bodies is accessible to the public.

The public nature of the work of state bodies can be limited or excluded only in cases prescribed by law.

II FREEDOMS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN AND CITIZEN

Article 11

The freedoms and rights of man and citizen are limited only by equal rights and freedoms of others, when this is determined by the Constitution.

Article 12

The freedoms and rights are being realized, and duties discharged on the basis of the Constitution, except when the Constitution foresees that the conditions for the realization of certain freedoms and rights are prescribed by law.

Law can prescribe the way of realizing certain freedoms and rights when this is indispensable for their realization.

IV RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Article 70

The rights and duties of the Republic of Serbia are carried out by the organs of the Republic, determined by the Constitution.

The freedoms and rights of man and citizen, equality before the law, independence and an equal position of companies and other organizations, are the foundation and measure of competence and responsibility of the organs of the Republic.

Article 71

The organs of the Republic, within the scope of the rights and duties of the Republic of Serbia established by the Constitution, determine the politics, pass and implement the laws, other regulations and general acts, carry out a constitutional and judicial and judicial protection of the constitutionality and legality.

Other organs and organizations within the Republic of Serbia can be entrusted with the execution of laws and other regulations and general acts within the scope of rights and duties of the Republic of Serbia, granting that the organs of the Republic are responsible for their execution.

Article 72

The Republic of Serbia defines and ensures:

1. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and its international position and relations with other states and international organizations;
 2. The realization and protection of freedoms and rights of man and citizen; constitutionality and legality;
 3. Defence and safety of the Republic of Serbia and its citizens; measures for the case of the state of emergency.
 4. Property and obligational relations and protection of all forms of property; the legal position of companies and other organizations, their associations and chambers; the financial system; system in the areas of economic relations with foreign countries, markets, planning, work relations, protection at work, employment, social insurance and other forms of social security, as well as other economic and social relations of general interest;
 5. The system of protection and promotion of the environment; the protection and promotion of plant and animal kingdoms;
 6. The system in the areas of health, social security, veterans' security, security for the disabled, social care about children and adolescents, education, culture and protection of cultural goods, physical education, social and public information;
 7. The system of public services;
 8. The control of legality of the disposal of means of legal entities, financial review of public expenditures and a means of unified organization of these tasks; gathering of statistical and other data of general interest;
 9. Basic aims and directions of economic, scientific, technological, demographic, regional and social development, development of agriculture and villages: organization and use of space; politics and measures for focusing and stimulating development, including the development of underdeveloped areas; commodity reserves;
 10. Financing of the realization of rights and duties of the Republic of Serbia defined by the Constitution and the laws;
 11. Organization, authority and work of the organs of the Republic.
-

President of the Republic

Article 83

The President of the Republic:

1. Proposes to the National Assembly a candidate for Prime Minister, after having heard the opinion of the majority in the National Assembly;
2. Proposes to the National Assembly the candidates for the president and judges of the Constitutional court;
3. Proclaims laws by decree;
4. Discharges duties in the area of relations of the Republic of Serbia with other states and international organizations, in accordance with the law;
5. Commands the armed forces in peace and war and the national struggle during war; orders general or partial mobilization; organizes preparations for defence in accordance with the law;
6. When the National Assembly is not able to convene, declares, upon receiving the opinion of the Prime Minister, the existence of imminent danger of war or proclaims the state of war;
7. At his own initiative or on government's proposal, during the state of war or imminent danger of war, passes acts on issues from the competence of the National Assembly, with the obligation to submit them for confirmation to the National Assembly as soon as it is able to convene. The acts brought during the state of war can limit certain freedoms and rights of man and citizen and change the organization, composition and competences of the government and ministries, courts and public prosecutors;
8. On the government's proposal, when the safety of the Republic of Serbia, the freedoms and rights of man and citizen and work of the state organs are threatened on a part of the territory of the Republic of Serbia, declares the state of emergency and passes acts for the undertaking of measures requested by such circumstances, in accordance with the Constitution and the law;
9. Grants pardons;
10. Gives medals and acknowledgements as determined by law;
11. Forms professional and other services for the execution of work from their area of competence;
12. Discharges of other duties in accordance with the Constitution.

Article 84

The President of the Republic proclaims laws by decree within seven days of their adoption in the National Assembly. In this time frame the President may demand that the National Assembly votes again on this law.

The President of the Republic is obliged to proclaim a law that has been adopted for the second time by the National Assembly.

Article 85

The President of the Republic can request from the government to explain its views on certain issues from its sphere of competence.

Article 86

The President of the Republic is being elected in direct elections, by secret voting.

The mandate of the President of the Republic is five years.

The same person can be elected for the President of the Republic on a maximum of two terms.

The election for the President of the Republic must be held at the latest 30 days before the expiry of the mandate of the current President.

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šibenik.

jerjaku vatrene podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mbr - Trebinjska, 10.
mbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspap, 13. lap
ob, 13.mtb, PZ Kude NK i PZO, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

epređiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

WINSTON LEONARD SPENCER CHURCHILL:

“PEOPLE LIE MOST BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, AFTER THE HUNT AND IN A WAR”

1. **THE BOBAN – KARADŽIĆ MEETING IN GRAZ**
2. **THE DESTRUCTION OF MOSTAR**
WHO, WHEN AND TO WHAT EXTENT DESTROYED MOSTAR
3. **TELEPHONES**
4. **THE SHELLING OF MOSTAR**
5. **THE ARTILLERY OF A BiH**
“UNARMED” MUSLIMS
6. **SNIPERS IN MOSTAR**
7. **THE OLD BRIDGE**
8. **THE SIEGE OF MOSTAR**
9. **ELECTRICITY**
10. **WATER**
11. **HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS**
12. **INFORMATION – RADIO, TV, NEWSPAPERS**
13. **LANGUAGE – THE CROATIAN LANGUAGE**
14. **PRESIDENTIAL TRANSCRIPTS**
15. **HV /The Croatian Army/ IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

1. THE BOBAN - KARADŽIĆ MEETING IN GRAZ

After that meeting the Serbs have attacked the HVO - **MAP 1:**

1. Livno – map: CONSTANT ATTACKS OF VRS
2. Posavina – map: CONSTANT ATTACKS OF VRS UNTIL FALL
3. Jajce – map: CONSTANT ATTACKS OF VRS UNTIL FALL
4. Travnik in a penetration toward Sarajevo - STOPPED PENETRATION VRS TO SARAJEVO
5. Bugojno – map: CONSTANT ATTACKS OF VRS


HVO attacks the JNA and VRS:

1. Right bank of Neretva, Mostar – map: June 1992, LIBERATED RIGHT BANK OF MOSTAR (**Map 3, Map 4**)
2. Stolac – map: early June 1992, LIBERATED STOLAC (**Map 5**)
3. Mostar – left bank of Neretva – map: June 1992, LIBERATED LEFT BANK OF MOSTAR (**Map 2, Map 3, Map 4**)
4. Operation “*Bura*” – I enclose the map – 8th November 1992 (**Map 6**)

The meeting in Graz was utilized by many domestic and foreign powerful groups in a further stigmatization of Croats, stigmatization which the Serbian side continuously and successfully performed in the Yugoslav power structure since 1945, or more precisely, since 1918.

MAP 1


Armed conflict between the HVO and VRS after the "Agreement" in Graz




- The list of HVO brigades outside of the territory of the provinces 3, 8 and 10, and within the provinces 1, 5 and 9
- HVO brigade "Zenička" - ZENICA
 - HVO brigade "J.Francetić" - USORA
 - 110th HVO brigade - BRČKO
 - 11th XP brigade - ŽEPČE
 - HVO brigade "Kotromanić" - KAKANJ
 - HVO brigade "Bobovac" - VAREŠ
 - 115th HVO brigade - TUZLA
 - 107th HVO brigade - GRADACAC
 - 108th HVO brigade - BRČKO
 - HVO brigade "Kralj Tvrtko" - SARAJEVO
 - HVO brigade - BIHAC
 - HVO battalion "Komušina" - TESLIĆ
 - HVO unit "Matija Divković" - OLOVO
- ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SRPСКА - VRS
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL - HVO

MAP 2

After the 'Agreement' in Graz, HVO undertook military offensive actions and liberated the surroundings of Mostar, the left and the right river bank in Mostar, and pushed the forces of VRS toward the east.







INDEX

- XXX
- HQ Division command
- Regiment
- Multiple rocket launcher
- Artillery
- 105Mm howitzer and higher
- 105Mm howitzer and lower
- 100 Mm gun and lower
- 100 Mm gun and higher
- 57Mm anti aircraft gun
- 120 Mm mortar
- 82Mm mortar
- Armour units

MAP 3

After the 'Agreement' in Graz, HVO undertook military offensive actions and liberated the surroundings of Mostar, the left and the right river bank in Mostar, and pushed the forces of VRS toward the east.





 Mostar Municipal Headquarters

 Regiment

 Anti-hail rockets

 VLR / Multiple rocket launcher

 Artillery

 130mm gun

 76mm gun

 PZO / 57mm anti aircraft gun

 88mm coastal gun

 120mm mortar

 82mm mortar

 Artillery scouts

 Main line of attack

 Additional line of attack

 KB / Two combat units of Convicts Battalion

 5 Part of 5th Ilički Battalion Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Mostar

 4 Part of the 4th Balinovac Battalion Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Mostar

 2 Part of the 2nd Rudnički Battalion Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Mostar

 PB Part of the PB /Poskok Battalion Široki brijeg


 4./4. Gmbr Part of the 4th Battalion of 4th Guards Motorized Brigade


 ZM 4./4. Gmbr ZM /Commanding Post of the 4th Battalion of the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade

 OK / Armoured / platoon of the 4th Battalion of the 4th Guards Motorized Brigade Armour Platoon (T-55) within 4th Battalion of 4th Guards Motorized Brigade.

MAP 4

After the 'Agreement' in Graz, HVO undertook military offensive actions and liberated the surroundings of Mostar, the left and the right river bank in Mostar, and pushed the forces of VRS toward the east.





-  Mostar Municipal Headquarters
-  Anti-hail rockets
-  Regiment
-  VLR / Multiple rocket launcher
-  Artillery
-  105 Howitzer and higher
-  105 Howitzer and lower
-  100mm gun and lower
-  100mm gun and higher
-  PZO/57mm anti aircraft gun
-  120mm mortar
-  82mm mortar
-  Armoured units
-  Artillery scouts
-  Main line of attack
-  Additional line of attack
-  1 Part of Bjelopoljska Battalion Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Mostar
-  5 Part of 5th Ilička Battalion Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Mostar
-  4 Part of 4th Balinovac Battalion Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Mostar
-  2 Part of the 2nd Rudnička Battalion Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Mostar
-  3 Part of Cimska Battalion Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Mostar

MAP 5

HVO and HV forces involved in liberation of Dubravka plateau and Stolac



After the 'Agreement' in Graz, HVO releases the pressure on Mostar and Stolac with an offensive operation against the VRS.

MAP 6

Plan of the offensive operation "BURA" on 8 November 1992



WHAT EXACTLY WAS “AGREED” IN GRAZ

Excerpt from the book of Franjo Boras: “THE BOSNIAN-HERZEGOVINIAN CHAOS 1990-1996” /Bosansko-hercegovački kaos 1990-1996/, Matica Hrvatska, Mostar, 2006

As already mentioned, the first interparty meeting was held in Brussels and next three meetings were held in Lisbon.

The fifth meeting was held at Konak in Sarajevo on 16th, 17th and 18th March 1992. At that meeting the principles of the constitutional arrangement of BiH were agreed, and for offered map, which was the based on absolute and relative national majority for each municipality, needed to be further discussed. The sixth meeting was held on 30th and 31st March, 1992. again in Lisbon. And at this meeting the map of the three constituent units remains controversial and needed to be discussed further until May 15th the same year. However, after returning from Lisbon, under pressure from his party, Alija Izetbegović renounced his agreement with Cutileiro’s plan. After that, the other two participants also withdrew their consent.

Soon after that the general conflict began across the country between the Serbian army on one side and Croats and Muslims on the other side. In regards with Izetbegović rejection of the Cutileiro’s plan in his later interview with the Belgrade Blic Cutileiro confirmed that leader of the Bosnian Muslims Alija Izetbegovic initially accepted the plan “just to satisfy Europe, then he withdrew his consent to satisfy the Americans who encouraged him to do so.” “He (Izetbegovic) believed that Washington supports his idea of a unitary Bosnia. Dayton has proved him wrong,” said a Portuguese diplomat, noting that European Union was also against unitary Bosnia.⁶³

Pursuant to conclusion from meeting of parties in Lisbon, on 31st of March, the talks on Cutileiro’s plan continued on 23rd of April among three party delegations on one side and European community delegation on the other side. The talks took place in the airport building Butmir Sarajevo, being surrounded by Serbian military forces. The European community delegation, consisting of three members was headed by the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs Pineiro, along with the members Cutileiro and Lord Carrington. The Serbian delegation was headed by Radovan Karadžić, the Muslim by Alija Izetbegović and the Croatian by Franjo Boras. I was in charge, because Mate Boban couldn’t come to the surrounded Sarajevo, whereby Miljenko Brkić, being at the time temporary President of HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), had some family affairs in Sarajevo. Mile Akmadžić was also with me in the delegation, being at the time the general Secretary of the War Presidency in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the talks with Croatian delegation were reaching its end, Lord Carrington addressed me with following words: “Mister Boras, if you do not reach an agreement, we shall allow to kill each other mutually and than we shall impose our solutions”. I responded him: “Lord Carrington, how and who with should we reach an agreement, the Serbian aggressor has everything at its disposal, it took all military equipment of JNA (Yugoslav National Army), you yourself can hear the repercussions of cannons and mortars from the surrounding hills. When we talk to them, that conversation is rather deaf. The representatives of the Muslim people are passive; they don’t do anything for defense of BiH and still hope to get some help from JNA.” After the talks were over, I came back through the rain of grenades, safe and sound to the Presidency building. At the end of talks, Cutileiro clearly pointed out that all three delegations should mutually agree upon the territorial fixing boundaries of three constitutive units within BiH without presence of the international communion representatives.

Talks in Graz

Related to Sarajevo conclusion, the meeting in Graz between the Croatian and Serbian delegation was held on 6th of May 1992. Mate Boban was heading the Croatian delegation, along with Vlatko Šantić and I, as members. Radovan Karadžić was heading the Serbian delegation, escorted by Momčilo Krajišnik and Branko Šimić. The talks took place in the airport building of Graz. The subjects of talks were three key issues: Kupres, Bosanska Posavina and the left part of Neretva, from Jablanica to Metković. The Serbian delegation proposed to take Kupres, (in order that Croats have some kind of bypass towards Bugojno), the left bank of river Neretva from Jablanica to Metković, including Mostar, along with the corridor through Bosanska Posavina, 20 kilometers wide.

⁶³ Dnevni list, Mostar, 19 July 2005, p. 5

The Croatian delegation proposed the opposite: the Croatian constitutive unit in BiH is entitled to Kupres, the South-East Herzegovina, along with Mostar, including the municipality of Stolac, in order to be able to discuss the narrow part of corridor through Bosanska Posavina. The held talks haven't been supported by any protocol. We agreed that both delegations shall meet the Muslim side. The talks began around 11 o'clock and ended around 16 o'clock. The Croatian delegation returned to Zagreb by car, while the Serbian took off by plane, as far as I know, in an unknown direction. Later on, some kind of public announcement on talks in Graz appeared which wasn't mentioned in the meeting at all. I found this announcement in Zdravko Tomac's book that I bring in whole:

"Determined that all issues, including the delineation of two constituent units - Croatian and Serbian in Bosnia and Herzegovina resolve through peaceful means and negotiations, representatives of Croatian and Serbian national community determined that in relations to the drafted map of delineations there are a discrepancies in the following cases:

1. In the city of Mostar Serbian side believes that the border is a river Neretva, and Croatian side considers the entire city of Mostar as Croatian national unit.

2. Croatian side considers that south of Mostar is part of Croatian national unit determined in 1939, ie the border of Croatian Banovina. Serbian side believes that the border between Croatian and Serbian units is river Neretva.

3. Both sides agree that the delineation of the two constituent units in Kupres, as well as in Bosnian Posavina (Doboj, Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Šamac, Odžak, Orašje, Modrica and Brčko) takes into account the compactness of space and communications.

4. Both sides are determined to persevere in the principles adopted at the conference of the European Community regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on which basis they agree that they will in the process of determination of disputed and other areas respect the established criteria for defining the national territory with the arbitration of the European Union.

5. With this agreement there isn't any reason for the termination of the Conference of the European Community regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina and both sides seek an urgent continuation of the conference.

It was insisted that the delineation through arbitration is performed in the an agreed period until May 15th, 1992.

6. According to the above agreements there are no more reasons for armed conflicts between Croats and Serbs throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Total and permanent ceasefire is announced under the control of the European Community, which shall enter into force on May 6th, 1992. at midnight.

Representative of the Serbian national community

Radovan Karadžić

Representative of the Croatian National Community

*Mate Boban*⁶⁴

No notes were taken during the discussions in Graz, nor was any protocol made. We have also agreed not to issue any press release. Nevertheless, after two or three days in the domestic and foreign public a statement appeared, to which I came across in the book written by Zdravko Tomac. This was followed by negative reaction from the world, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Political rivals and opponents presented this meeting as a secret meeting of Croatian and Serbian delegations to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is it possible from the statement, which was maliciously published by the Serbian side to read any kind of division of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

⁶⁴ Also p 36-37

A document, an extract from Franjo Boras' book, legally elected member of BH Presidency from the corps of Croatian people about another crime of the Croatian policy - talks between Boban and Karadžić in Graz.

At those meetings with the opposite side methods, similar to those used for proving the GUILT of WITCHES, were applied.

If a person accused of being possessed by devil, Satan or the Evil One does not admit guilt, a part of his body will be immersed into the hot oil, for example, the arm.

If a person, firm in his beliefs holds up the pain all the way and remains silent under that pain, he is GUILTY because no one can endure that kind of pain without help by the devil- as to judges and justice sharers.

If a person screams in pain and natural weakness of a human being, he is GUILTY because devil stated his statement through a screaming pain because, if the devil hadn't possessed a person, the person would have endured the temptation – as to judges and justice sharers.

It was the same situation with these meetings – if you don't go to a meeting you are not in favor of a peaceful solution, you are not working on establishment of peace, you merely want war and similar shit; if you do go to a meeting, it will be much worse, you talk to the enemy, you must be up to some monkey business and vague trading – it is all a fuss, same types and similar shit – as to judges.

It was necessary to participate at the meeting in Graz!

Nothing was arranged at the meeting in Graz and no agreement was signed, neither did parties agree upon a thing.

Desire and instruction were satisfied as well as a request of a powerful player, Lord Carrington, therefore in item 5 of the communication from the meeting the following is being stated: "This agreement erases reasons to interrupt the conference of the European Community about the BiH, and therefore both sides request an urgent continuation of the conference".

Then comes the moment of orchestrated shouting, lies, gibberish and nonsense.

The war between "agreeing parties" continued in Stolac, Mostar, Livno, Jajce, Bosnian Posavina, Bugojno, Rama, etc...you can check all that in the forthcoming documents and maps as well as in many other documents on the WEBSITE, all with the same topic – TO ESTABLISH THE FACTUAL TRUTH.

2. THE DESTRUCTION OF MOSTAR

WHO, WHEN AND TO WHAT EXTENT DESTROYED MOSTAR

In late autumn 1992 a book by a group of authors entitled “*MOSTAR '92-URBICIDE*”, (*Urbing-javno poduzeće za obnovu i izgradnju Mostara, Mostar, 2nd edition 1999*), was published in a circulation of 3,000 copies.

The book has many authors and you can read them on the pages which I copied from that book.

The number of Croatian and Muslim – Bosniak authors is roughly the same.

After the publication of the book, the authors organized two exhibitions of photographs on the *killing* of Mostar, one in Split, and the other in Paris.

But all of this, all these facts, all these photographs were not enough, and are not enough today to lift the blame for the destruction of Mostar from the HVO and the Croats.

IN 1992 MOSTAR WAS DESTROYED BY JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ AND GENERAL PERIŠIĆ.


After the attack of A BiH on the HVO many Muslim politicians, journalists from around the world and various other observers who came to Mostar later on and stayed there for some time, concluded simply: there is a conflict between A BiH and HVO, and everything that is destroyed is a consequence of this conflict.

Simple and untrue.

I therefore give to you, dear reader, the most important documents from the book “*MOSTAR '92-URBICIDE*” in order for you to deal with the facts as they are.

You can see the entire book on my web site, in three languages, i.e. with the English and German translation.





NAPOMENA ZA DRUGO IZDANJE URBICIDA

Prvo izdanje URBICIDA radeno je dok su još gorjele kuće, dok se dim sa zgarišta dimio, a neizvjesnost nad nama bila snažno prisutna - gotovo se može kazati u svemu. URBICID je bio krik otpora, glas protiv uništavanja i razaranja ljudskih života i ljudskih dobara. Kao krik, nije ostao neprepoznat, nije ostao bez odgovora! Oni koji su do tada zatvarali oči pred događajima na ovim prostorima, morali su prepoznati prijetnje i strahote proizašle iz njih: URBICID je knjigom, fotografijom i riječju posvjedočio ono zastrašujuće i uništavajuće, otkrio je sve strahote genocida činjene u ime jedne ideologije smrti, ideologije osvajanja tuđega, ideologije laži i uništavanja ljudskih prava.

URBICID - nakon sedam godina od njegovog pojavljivanja, bez ustezanja i bez pretjerivanja, može se kazati da svjedoči još jedanput da su u pravu bili oni koji su se zatiranju oduprli. Branitelji su sržište otpora, a knjige su samo trajni svjedoci njihove hrabrosti i žrtvovanja.

Listajući stranice URBICIDA, danas dok se događa obnova i liječe polagano rane rata, ponovno se doživljava sva ona razarajuća sila koja, ipak, nije mogla uništiti ljudsko srce i ljudski duh. URBICID ostaje, i ovim izdanjem, svjedočanstvom stradanja i kržnoga puta kroz koji je prošao Mostar, ali i druga mjesta u BiH i Hrvatskoj.

NOTA PER LA SECONDA EDIZIONE DI "URBICID"

La prima edizione di URBICID si faceva mentre le case ancora bruciavano, mentre dai luoghi dell'incendio ancora fumigiava, e l'incertezza era fortemente presente in tutti gli aspetti. URBICID era un grido della resistenza, una voce contro la distruzione, e la demolizione delle vite umane e dei beni. Questo grido era riconosciuto, non era rimasto senza la risposta. Colui che chiudeva gli occhi davanti agli avvenimenti che passavano nel nostro territorio, doveva riconoscere le minacce e gli orrori da essi risultati. URBICID, con il libro, la pfoto e la parola ha attestato le cose terribile e distruttive, ha scoperto tutti gli orrori del genacidio fatto in name dell'ideologia della morte, ideologia della conquista della proprieta altrui, ideologia delle menzogne e della distruzione dei diritti umani.

URBICID, sette anni dopo la prima edizione, attesta, si puo dire, ancora una volta senza riserve e senza esagerazioni che aveva ragione colui che aveva fatto fronte alla distruzione. I difensori presentano il nerbo della resistenza, mentre il libro rimane un testimoniao durevole di loro coraggio e sacrificio.

Scorrendo URBICID, oggi quando avviene la ricostruzione e quando si curano le ferite passa di nuovo tutta quella forza distruttiva che tuttavia non poteva distruggere il cuore e e'anima. URBICID rimane, anche con questa edizione, una testimonianza di calvario e di via crucis che passava Mostar e gli altri luoghi nella Bosnia ed Erzegovina e la Croazia.

BEMERKUNG ZUR ZWEITEN AUSGABE VON URBIZID

Die Erstausgabe von URBIZID wurde gemacht, während die Häuser noch in Flammen standen, während die Brandstätten noch rauchten, und eine schwere Ungewißheit uns bedrückte - eine Ungewißheit fast über alles, man könnte sagen. Das URBIZID war ein Aufschrei des Widerstandes, eine Stimme gegen Vernichtung und Zerstörung von menschlichen Leben und menschlichen Gütern. Als ein Schrei ist es nicht unerkannt, nicht ohne Antwort geblieben! Diejenigen, die bis zu jener Zeit ihre Augen vor den hiesigen Ereignissen zu schließen gepflegt hatten, mußten die daraus hervorgegangenen Drohungen und Greuel erkennen: das URBIZID hat mit Buch, Photographie und Wort das Grauenregende und Zerstörende bezeugt, und alle Greuel des Genozids bloßgelegt, die im Namen einer Ideologie des Todes, einer Ideologie der Eroberung, einer Ideologie der Lüge and Vernichtung von Menschenrechten gemacht wurden.

Von dem URBIZID - sieben Jahre nach seinem ersten Erscheinen - kann ohne Bedenken und Übertreibung behauptet werden, daß es noch einmal davon zeugt, daß diejenigen, die der Vertilgung Widerstand leisteten, Recht hatten. Die Verteidiger sind das Mark des Widerstandes, und Biicher sind nur dauerhafte Zeugen ihrer Tapferkeit und Sichaufopferens.

Indem man in dem URBIZa blättert, heute wenn der Wiederaufbau vor sich geht und die Kriegswunden langsam heilen, man erlebt von neuem all jene zerstörende Macht, die jedoch das menschliche Herz und den menschlichen Geist nicht vernichten konnte. Das URBIZa bleibt, auch mit dieser Ausgabe, ein Zeugnis von den Leiden und dem Kreuzweg, welchen Mostar und auch andere Orte in B&H und Krotien, gegangen sind.

NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION OF THE URBICIDE

The first edition of the URBICIDE was done while the houses were still burning, while the sites of fire were still smoking, and uncertainty was weighing heavy on us uncertainty about, one could say, almost everything. The URBICIDE was a cry of resistance, a voice against destruction and devastation of human life and property. As a cry it did not remain unnoticed, it did not remain without a response. Those who until then had kept their eyes closed to the events here had to recognise the threats and horrors resulting from them. The URBICIDE attested - through book, photography and word - to the horrifying and the destructing, it brought to light all the horrors of the genocide committed on behalf of an ideology of death, an ideology of conquering what belongs to others, an ideology of lies and violation of human rights.

The URBICIDE - seven years after its first appearance - may be said, without reluctance and exaggeration, to prove once again that those who offered resistance to the extermination were right in doing so. Defenders are the core of resistance, and books are only lasting witnesses of their bravery and self-sacrifice.

Turning over the leaves of the URBICIDE today, while the reconstruction is in progress and the war wounds are slowly healing, one experiences once again all that destructing force which could not destroy the human heart and the human spirit after all. The URBICIDE remains, with this edition, too, a testimony of suffering and the way of the cross that Mostar, and other places in B&H and Croatia, went through.

Krešimir Šego

MOSTAR '92 URBICID - II. izdanje

Izdavač: URBING, javno poduzeće za obnovu i izgradnju Mostara; Za izdavača: Radoslav Udovičić, dipl. ing. grad

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

**ORGANIZATOR IZLOŽBE
ORGANIZER OF THE EXHIBITION
ORGANISATOR DER AUSSTELLUNG
ORGANIZATORE DI MOSTRA**

HRVATSKO VIJEĆE OBRANE OPĆINE MOSTAR
JAVNO PODUZEĆE ZA OBNOVU I IZGRADNJU
MOSTARA
IPD OPĆINSKOG STOŽERA MOSTAR

CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL - MOSTAR
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
BUILDING OF MOSTAR
IPD - MUNICIPAL HEADQUARTERS MOSTAR

KROATISCHER VERTEIDIGUNGSRAT - MOSTAR
ÖFFENTLICHES UNTERNEHMEN FÜR
ERNEUERUNG UND AUSBAU VON MOSTAR
IPD - GEMEINDESTAB MOSTAR

CONSIGLIO CROATO DI DIFESA - MOSTAR
AZIENDA PER RINNOVAMENTO E RICOSTRUZIONE
DI MOSTAR
IPD - STATO MAGGIORE DELLA CITTA DI MOSTAR

**ORGANIZACIJSKI ODBOR
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
ORGANISATIONSAUSSCHAU
COMITATO DI ORGANIZZAZIONE**

Krešimir Šego
Marin Topić
Srećko Vučina
Borislav Puljić
Zijad Demirović
Ivanka Ribarević-Nikolić
Tihomir Rozić
Hamza Filipović
Vernes Hasanagić
Hilmija Skorupan
Dalibor Tatarević

**KONCEPCIJA IZLOŽBE
EXHIBITION CONCEPT
AUSSTELLUNGSKONZEPTION
CONCEZIONE DI MOSTRA**

DRUŠTVO ARHITEKATA MOSTAR
ASSOCIATION OF ARCHITECTS MOSTAR
GESELLSCHAFT DER ARCHITEKTEN MOSTAR
ASSOCIAZIONE DI ARCHITETTI DI MOSTAR

**VODITELJI PROJEKTA
PROJECT DIRECTORS
PROJEKTLIMITER
DIRETTORI DEL PROGETTO**

Ivanka Ribarević-Nikolić
Željko Jurić

**AUTORI FOTOGRAFIJA
AUTHORS OF PHOTOGRAPHS
FOTOS
AUTORI DI FOTOGRAFIE**

Vladimir Kolopić
Ćiro Raić
Vladimir Raić
Sanja M. Vuković
Grupa autora (Nedžad Čupina , Suad Dugalić ,
Dejan Ilić , Ervin Škobić)

**AUTORI SLAJDOVA
AUTHORS OF SLIDES
DIAS
AUTORI DI SLIDES**

Darko Minarik
Ćiro Raić
Zlatko Tulić

VIDEO

Emir Koso
Aner Kotlo

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

**AUTORI IZLOŽBE
AUTHORS OF THE EXHIBITION
AUSSTELLUNGSAUTOREN
AUTORI DI MOSTRA**

GRUPA AUTORA ZA CENTRALNE GRADSKE
SADRŽAJE
A GROUP OF AUTHORS FOR THE MAIN CITY MAT-
TERS
AUTORENGRUPPE FÜR ZENTRALE STÄDTISCHE
GEHALTE
GRUPPO DI AUTORI PER IMPIANTI CENTRALI DELLA
CITTA

Dalibor Tatarević
Marinka Bojanić
Zoran Bošnjak
Hamza Filipović
Edita Hasanagić
Senadin Jahić
Hilmija Skorupan

GRUPA AUTORA ZA STANOVANJE
A GROUP OF AUTHORS FOR HOUSING
AUTORENGRUPPE FÜR WOHNEN
GRUPPO DI AUTORI PER ALLOGGIO

INDIVIDUALNO STANOVANJE
INDIVIDUAL HOUSING
INDIVIDUELLES WOHNEN
ALLOGGIO INDIVIDUALE

Meliha Terzić
Almas Bavčić
Jasmina Čehajić

KOLEKTIVNO STANOVANJE
COLLECTIVE HOUSING
KOLLEKTIVES WOHNEN
ALLOGGIO COLLETTIVO

Nerica Eminović
Zoran Bošnjak
Hido Hasanbegović
Maida Ljubović

GRUPA AUTORA ZA GOSPODARSTVO
A GROUP OF AUTHORS FOR ECONOMY
AUTORENGRUPPE FÜR WIRTSCHAFT
GRUPPO DI AUTORI PER L'ECONOMIA

Nedžad Čupina
Suad Dugalić
Dejan Ilić
Ervin Škobić

GRUPA AUTORA ZA GRADITELJSKO NASLIJEDE
A GROUP OF AUTHORS FOR ARCHITECTURAL
HERITAGE
AUTORENGRUPPE FÜR BAUERBSCHAFT
GRUPPO DI AUTORI PER L'EREDITA
DELL'ARCHITETTURA

Tihomir Rozić
Spomenka Čadra
Tatjana Mičević
Darko Minarik
Ivanka Ribarević-Nikolić

**IZRADA KARTE GRADA
CITY MAP BY
AUSARBEITUNG DES STADTPLANS
ELABORAZIONE DI CARTA CITTADINA**

Željko Jurić
Darko Minarik

**SURADNICI
ASSOCIATES
MITARBEITER
COLLABORATORI**

Denis Loose
Nedžad Maksumić
Dajana Marović
Rijad Tikveša
Zlatko Tulić

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

SADRŽAJ CONTENTS INHALT INDICE

Krešimir Šego - MOSTAR '92 - URBICID 7, 24, 42, 58

Vrijeme građenja i vrijeme rušenja grada 9
The time of building and the time of tearing down the town 25
Zeit des Ausbaus und der Zerstörung der Stadt 43
Il tempo di costruzione e il tempo di distruzione della città 59

Borislav Puljić

Urbana slika grada **10**
Urban image of the city **26**
Urbanes Bild der Stadt **44**
L' immagine urbana della città **60**

Mostovi **11**
The Bridges **27**
Die Brücken **45**
Ponti **61**

Marinka Bojanić
Zoran Bošnjak
Edita Hasanagić
Hamza Filipović
Hilmija Skorupan

Javni sadržaji **11**
Public facilities **28**
Öffentliche Gehalte **46**
Oggetti pubblici **61**

Stanovanje 13
Housing 29
Das Wohnen 47
Abitare 63

Almas Bavčić
Jasmina Čehajić
Meliha Terzić

Individualno stanovanje **13**
Individual housing **29**
Individuelles Wohnen **47**
Abitare individuale **63**

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

Nedžad Čupina
Suad Dugalić
Dejan Ilić

Gospodarstvo **14**
Economy **30**
Wirtschaft **48**
Economia **64**

Zoran Bošnjak

Infrastrukturni sustavi **15**
Infrastructural systems **31**
Infrastrukturelle Systeme **49**
Sistemi infrastrutturali **65**

Hortikultura **15**
Horticulture **32**
Gartenbau **49**
Orticultura **65**

Graditeljsko naslijeđe 16
Architectural heritage 32
Bauerbschaft 50
L'ereditā architettonica 66

Ivanka Ribarević-Nikolić

Kroz povijest do Mostara **16**
Through history up to Mostar **32**
Durch die Geschichte bis Mostar **50**
Attraverso la storia fino a Mostar **66**

Spomenka Čadra

Kronološki razvoj grada osmanskog perioda **17**
The chronological development of the town during the Turkish period **34**
Chronologische Entwicklung der Stadt zur osmanischer Zeit **52**
Tabella cronologica di sviluppo della città nel periodo turco **67**

Tatjana Mičević

Islamska sakralna arhitektura **19**
The islam sacral architecture **36**
Islamische Sakralarchitektur **53**
Architettura islamica sacrale **68**

Ivanka Ribarević-Nikolić

Kršćanska sakralna arhitektura i graditeljsko naslijeđe austro-ugarskog perioda **21**
The christian sacral architecture and the architectural heritage of the austro-hungarian period **38**
Christliche Sakralarchitektur und Bauerbschaft der Österreichisch-ungarischen Zeit **55**
Architettura cattolica sacrale e monumenti del periodo austro-ungarico **71**

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

Ideja o prezentaciji urbanog genocida nad Mostarom rođena je u jeku najvećih razaranja našeg lijepog grada. Arhitekti, projektanti i graditelji iz prkosa i iz ljubavi prema svom gradu, ostvaruju ovu ideju kroz projekt "MOSTAR '92 - URBICID". Emotivno blokirani, ali prkosni i iskonskom ljubavlju vezani za svoj grad, mnogi naši poštovani sugrađani su nam nesebično ponudili fotografsku i drugu grad, na čemu im izražavamo poštovanje i zahvalnost. Također, zahvaljujemo svim kolegama čiji rad nije očitovan u ovom katalogu, a nezamjenjiv je doprinos realizaciji ove izložbe. Na žalost, u svom radu nismo mogli računati na pomoć naših prijatelja arhitekata gosp. Franju Aničića i gosp. Mehmeda Ćumuriju. Ljubav prema gradu vječno im je prekinula zločinačka horda. Pet stoljeća graditeljske i urbane kulture za nas je obveza i čast da naš Mostar, našu ljubav i naš dom izgradimo tako da budu još svjetliji i ljepši.

S poštovanjem, svom voljenom M O S T A R U
DAM
Društvo arhitekata Mostara

The idea of presenting the urban genocide against Mostar was born at the height of the most brutal destruction of our beautiful town. Out of defiance, out of love for their town the architects, designers and constructors realize this idea through the project called "MOSTAR '92. - URBICIDE". Emotionally blocked, but defiant and tied with primeval love to their town, many of our esteemed fellow townsmen have unselfishly offered us photographic and other material, for which we express them our respect and gratitude. We also thank all our colleagues, whose work is not recorded in this catalogue, but which makes an irreplaceable contribution to the realization of this exhibition. Unfortunately, in our work we could not count on the help of our fellow architect Mr. Franjo Aničić and Mehmed Ćumurija. The criminal horde has forever cut short their love for the town. Five centuries of architectural and urban culture is both an obligation and honour for us to rebuild Mostar, our love and our home, that it may be even more radiant and more beautiful.

To our beloved Mostar with compliments,
DAM
Association of the Architects of Mostar

Die Idee von der Darstellung des urbanen Genozids (des Urbizids) in Mostar wurde im Laufe der größten Zerstörungen unserer schönen Stadt geboren. Architekten, Projektoren und Baumeister verwirklichen diese Idee aus Trotz, aus Liebe zu ihrer Stadt durch das Projekt "MOSTAR 92 - URBICID". Emotional gehemmt aber trotzig und durch angeborene Liebe mit ihrer Stadt verbunden, boten uns viele geehrte Mitbürger uneigennützig ihren photographischen und anderen Stoff an, worüber wir uns ihnen dankbar erweisen. Wir danken auch allen Kollegen, deren Arbeit in diesem Katalog nicht sichtbar ist, deren Arbeit aber einen unersetzlichen Beitrag zur Realisierung dieser Ausstellung leistete. Leider konnten wir auf Hilfe von unseren Freunden, den Architekten Herrn Franjo Aničić und Herrn Mehmed Ćumurija nicht rechnen. Ihre Liebe zur Stadt ist durch eine verbrecherische Horde unterbrochen. Die fünf Jahrhunderte alte bauliche und urbane Kultur stellt für uns eine Pflicht und Ehre dar, so daß wir unser Mostar, unsere Liebe und unser Heim so auszubauen haben, daß sie noch heller und schöner werden.

Mit Hochachtung, für unser schönes Mostar,
DAM
Gesellschaft der Architekten aus Mostar

L'idea di presentare alcuni dettagli sul genocidio di Mostar è nata durante le più brutali distruzioni di nostra città. Ecco che gli architetti e costruttori per il dispetto e l'amore della loro città stanno realizzando questa idea attraverso il progetto "MOSTAR 92- URBICID". Sentendosi emotivamente bloccati ma dispettosi e cellegati alla loro città con un'amore primitiva tanti di nostri onorevoli concittadini ci hanno generosamente offerto le loro fotografie e gli materiali per che esprimiamo loro il nostro rispetto e gratitud. Ringraziamo lo stesso tutti colleghi il lavoro di cui non è presente nel questo catalogo ma è un contributo insostituibile alla realizzazione di questa mostra. Purtroppo durante il nostro lavoro eravamo privati dell'aiuto dei nostri amici ed architetti signori Franjo Aničić e Mehmed Ćumurija. L'orda criminale ha tolgiato loro per sempre l'amore per la loro città. Cinque secoli di cultura urbana e dell'architettura per noi vuol dire l'onore e l'impegno che Mostar, il nostro amore e la nostra casa siano ancor più luminosi e belli.

Alla noster Mostar, con il grande rispetto,
DAM
Associazione di architetti di Mostar

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

A five centuries old town, with recognizable strata built and bequeathed by the builders of the East and the West, was supposed to be reduced to its foundations - to nothing, and his inhabitants killed or exiled. Those who had been occupying the hills round the town for months setting them thickly with the most destructive weaponry, and who especially abounded in the starter of such destructive means - in hatred, were entering the bosom of the town, ready to destroy, to crush it and to build some other edifices on its foundations. Considering all that the aggressor had done in other towns, the barbarians are not as much of a surprise as those who used to live in Mostar but took such a delight in destroying it. Those who watched Mostar through the sight of the howitzers, mortars, multiple rocket launchers and other artillery pieces are probably not aware what the heritage or the modernity of the town mean, at least not more than they care for numerous human lives lost in destructions. A hearth, inscribed into every home, regardless of the floor - of course, I am referring to the symbol of a hearth and a home - destroyed in the aggression, is a wound that heals hard. Taking part in this wound inflicting as snipers, sightsetters or spotters were also those who have built their life's dream just and only into Mostar. Who know that the testimonies of the times past are in the museums, archives and libraries of this town; in schools, colleges and theatres; in factories and in the harmoniously mixed styles of buildings, public or residential ones. The bridges, built since the man exists, in Mostar with a special love, are an obstacle to them in realizing their aims; separation of the banks, of life, cutting through the tissue which cannot be cut up in any way and by any means, not even by the ideology of hatred, least of all by the conquering machinery. The watchtowers above the Old Bridge, a symbol of the building culture, were not a warning enough to the aggressor either. The towers, built in the place of the two previous bridges, watching the banks, have been wounded by the non-civilization of destruction.

The architectural manuscript of Mostar expresses an encounter of civilizations, into which the roads from the west and the east, from the south and the north were flowing. Islam and Christianity met here, achieving harmony without imposing it. Thousands of shells were fired into this harmony from all kinds of weapons, a knife cut into its human being with one single aim of exterminating the Croatian and Moslem being. How else to understand the shells and bullets fired at the fire-fighters of the St. Peter and Paul's church, or the mortar shells fired at the firemen in the Episcopal Residence which with fifty thousand books went up in ashes? How else to understand the bullets fired at the ancient statue, from close range? The destroyed minarets? It is somewhere here that a (possible) answer is hiding to the question: How can they lay claim to what they are levelling to the ground? or: Why are they destroying what they claim as their own? They are destroying it because it has never been theirs, no matter on the basis of what documents they might be encroaching upon it.

A town of one hundred and thirty thousand inhabitants, with distinctive architecture, with historic monuments, schools, colleges, theatres, hospitals, market places, printing presses, libraries, churches, mosques, hotels, railway and road connections, was destroyed, in the war from April to June, to such a degree as to be rendered unrecognizable even to those who spent all this time in the cellars. The urbicide - which in this context means total destruction of Mostar - left behind a wasteland of materials from which the town was built: glass, bricks, stones, tiles, beams. In such a wasteland the drivers do not observe the traffic rules, neither do so the ambulances, school bells cannot be heard, nor do local and long distance buses take people to work, to visits. Near Mostar mass graves are being discovered with the people, almost whole families, who once built this town. After that the draught in the destroyed houses becomes stronger, the darkness of the blackout deeper. Together with the town, the graveyards were destroyed, too. Now they are in the parks and in the gardens.

Fortunately, the city plans and the defenders have remained. The latter are a guarantee that those who destroyed the town shall never come back. But the children - the future builders - will return, and Mostar shall again be a town in which cultures meet, a harmony which remained visible even in the foundations.

Krešimir Šego

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

THE TIME OF BUILDING AND THE TIME OF TEARING DOWN THE TOWN

*There is an appointed time for everything,
and a time for every affair under the heavens.
A time to be born, and a time to die;
a time to plant and a time to uproot the plant.
A time to kill, and a time to heal;
a time to tear down, and a time to build.
A time to weep, and a time to laugh;
a time to mourn, and a time to dance.
A time to scatter stones, and a time to gather them;
a time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces.
A time to seek, and a time to lose;
a time to keep, and a time to cast away.
A time to rend, and a time to sew;
a time to be silent, and a time to speak.
A time to love, and a time to hate;
a time of war, and a time of peace.*

Ecclesiastes 3:1-8
NEW AMERICAN BIBLE, Catholic Book Publishing Co., New York, 1970

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

THE URBAN PICTURE OF THE TOWN -

by Borislav Puljić

Before the formation of the urban agglomeration, in the area of today's Mostar there have existed settlements and life in continuity since prehistory. In the 16th century at the mouth of the Radobolja river there emerged a town with all the characteristics of an Osmanli-Turkish settlement.

The urban structure of the town is made up of the contents whose main characteristic is the division of business and residential functions. One lived in the residential quarter - the mahalla, and did business in the business quarter - the bazaar. The basic feature of every mahalla is the grouping of apartment houses constructed according to all the principles of a traditional Islamic house, accommodated to the climatic and geographical conditions of Mostar.

Built of conventional building materials, the house is characterized by its being secluded from the street by the court-yard walls, while opening into the inner court, which is a reflection of the civilization and the outlook on life of those times. What makes a mahalla a residential quarter are the following ever present facilities: a mosque, a fountain, a graveyard and a Moslem primary school giving it the characteristics of a city microdistrict. The bazaar - the business centre of the town consists of a number of handicraft workshops and shops completely open to the street as well as of some public facilities such as: a mosque, an inn, a bath, a bakery, etc.

The urban form of the town was developing on the principle of irregular network of streets consisting of the main street parallel with the Neretva river and of a few winding narrow streets vertical to the main thoroughfare. The small streets usually end with a house oriented towards the river. As a result of the population increase and family divisions, the small street is filled with new structures which close with a wall towards the street forming a characteristic picture of an oriental street.

Some structures dipped in the greenery, with a special relation to the water cult, and the verticals of the mosque minarets, are the main characteristics of a town in those times. With the coming of the Austro-Hungarian administration to these regions, the former handicraft economy and the feudal social relations gave way to the industrial era and capitalism. The town once again experienced its bloom and building activity unrecorded before. The new way of state administration, new materials, constructions, new overall dimensions and increased number of storeys; a rental house, a villa in the spirit of eclecticism; industry, railway, roads, public illumination, waterworks, bridges, schools - all these are novelties characterizing Mostar at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries.

New urban forms appear, and so do new contents characteristic of a town of the Middle Europe at the end of the 19th century. The residential and business functions are now joined in the same building, the ground floor being for business and the first floor for dwelling.

Building a new urban matrix the Austro-Hungarian monarchy leaves behind the strongest stamp of its presence here. On the left bank of the Neretva it fits the existing structure into the orthogonal street network in the most successful way.

Over a number of years, through the corrections of the Main and the Middle Street, and through the definition of the existing small streets and cutting of new less important streets, the mahalla is gradually being transformed into a town residential block. On the

right bank the block system of construction develops freely on the already built surfaces, with an orthogonal street network. Apart from the river, the railway line with the railway station skirting the town was also a cut in the city structure. With further development of the town there comes to its passing the railway line and to the construction of an elite quarter with villas fit into the radial street system which meet at the pseudobaroque circular square - the Rondo.

Between the two world wars Mostar does not experience any significant economic or spatial development, or better to say it stagnates. The only city planning interventions were opening the view towards the Orthodox church and the final arrangement of the Musala Square by building the Islamic Community Building, as a contribution to the construction of the square in front of the Lakišića mosque.

In the postwar period there comes to a fast industrialization and to mass migrations of the population to the town. In the city planning sense, these phenomena are followed by the formation of the industrial zone in the south and the north of the town as well as by a faster housing construction. At the very beginning this construction is performed by interpolation into the town tissue, where wonderful accomplishments of modern architecture are achieved, as well as by building workers' colonies. On the one hand, the modern world achievements of that time are followed, for example the SOKO complex of the architect Romeo Tiberie in the town centre arranged according to the best specimens of the Corbusier construction and of the city planning principles; and on the other hand, the new construction is harmoniously fit into the existing urban environment, creatively respecting the existing architectonic values (the building in the Karadžobey's Street). The next construction wave on the new vacant lots creates a new urban matrix according to the principles of the Athenian Charter (Zgoni, Avenue) on the elements of a "Garden Town", which gives these settlements a peculiar quality.

The new economic prosperity of Mostar did not bring any progress to its city planning. As if the townbuilders had lost their bearing - building concrete dormitories, uncreative interpolations and city planning absurdities. Instead of the city planners, the town was being built by the building operational body following its logic. As a result, green surfaces disappear, traffic bottle necks disappear, the town infrastructure does not follow enormous growth of the housing fund, the business offices eat into the pavements. On the one hand bare dormitories are built without any appertaining contents; and on the other hand, by interpolations in the town centre, high individual standard is provided at the cost of the collective one.

The fall of the urban standard is a reflection of a socio-political system at its last gasp.

The war was imposed on these areas. An urbicide was committed against Mostar. The town, a reflection of time, a fruit of century-old sedimentation of all our civilizational achievements, of the living space and the people who make it, was being destroyed. It was being destroyed even by some of its inhabitants. In a short time, as a result of the shelling from the surrounding hills, whole quarters and streets disappear, homes are ablaze with fire, people flee before death. All the bridges have been destroyed except the Old Bridge; out of 14 town mosques only two have remained undamaged. The Catholic church at Potoci village, the Franciscan church in Mostar, the Episcopal Residence, the monastery of the Franciscan sisters at Bijelo Polje have been burnt, the cathedral of Mostar shelled. The Palace of Culture, the museum, the ar-

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

chives and the library have been damaged. The whole number of the Mostar hotels, schools, dormitories and colleges have been ruined. The town beauty the hotel "Neretva" is on fire. The "town houses" are ablaze: the bath, the court, the Town Hall, the cadaster.

The administration buildings of many companies do not exist any longer, hundreds of burnt and destroyed business offices gape. Destroyed or considerably damaged are the post office, all the major transforming stations, the water source "Studenac", many primary and secondary parts of the city infrastructural network. The people have descended into the cellars. Life is dead in what

THE BRIDGES

by Borislav Puljić

There has been a river here from time immemorial. There used to be a suspension bridge, and on the bridge its keepers - the bridgemen, by the bridge a settlement on the Neretva bank, then Mostar bazaar and Mostar town. Neither the clefts of the canyon nor the river could divide and stop the town extending and developing, because it had its bridges.

A river is a life source, but also a bulwark against aggressors. A river with a bridge stops being a "town wall". A bridge becomes a reference mark, a focus and a way of every town. The river and the bridges rendered this town readable. In our mental picture they represented the identity of the urban structure. All the epochs and many generations built the bridges and imprinted the strongest seals of their existence in these areas. Although they had not built them, the rulers scrambled for the names: "Franz Josef's Bridge - King Peter's Bridge - Tito's Bridge"...

The bridge is in the root of the name of this town. Namely, the Croatian word for a bridge is "most". That is why the words most (bridge), mostovi (bridges), mostari (bridgemen) and Mostar have a special meaning for us.

In this war, in his desire to destroy all our material and spiritual achievements, the enemy was systematically destroying our town, as the greatest civilizational product, and especially its consecrated places.

In Mostar bridges are also consecrated places. That is why the Serbs and the so-called JNA blew up 9 out of 10 bridges. The schedule of destruction is appalling: the Lučki Bridge was destroyed on May 24, 1992 at 05.15; the Tito's Bridge in the night between May 29 and 30; in one single day, on June 11, three bridges were blown up: the Carinski Bridge (Toll-Bridge) at 10.50, the Railway Bridge at Raštani at 12.30 and the Hasan Brkić's Bridge at 14.10; the next day, June 12, 1992, the Aviators' Bridge in the city industrial zone was destroyed. The Old Bridge, the only survived Mostar bridge, a monument of the world's cultural heritage with the UNESCO flag flying on it, was deliberately shelled during the months-long destruction of the town (cat. 1,2,65,66).

At the sight of today's Old Bridge there has existed a continuity of crossing the river ever since the pre-Turkish times, when the existence of a suspension bridge was recorded, as well as of the two towers on the Neretva and of a settlement near them.

Before the year 1481 the suspension bridge was replaced by a new wooden one, which in 1566 gave way to a new stone bridge with a 29 metres span and a 12 metres arch arrow. There is no knowing when this bridge was for the first time called The Old Bridge. The architect Hairudin, the disciple of the great Osmanli-Turkish architect Koca Sinan, created a masterpiece unique in construction and shape, which stands shoulder to shoulder with the greatest world's architectural achievements of the 16 cen-

once was a singing town. By destroying individual buildings, whole streets, squares and quarters were being destroyed; the urban form was disappearing in which the contents and the courses of life and business were doomed to die out.

Only the urban matrix remained intact on which one should continue building a new town and living a new life inheriting a new civilizational layer of this town, respecting all the existing values, but also affirming the greatest achievements of this time. Because of that, the townbuilders have an exceptional responsibility, but also an honour, to be both creators and heirs.

The stone parapet of the Old Bridge has been damaged (cat. 66), the Watchtower over the bridge gate burnt, the bridge tower Tara set ablaze (cat.3), the bridge tower Helebia damaged (cat.4). The constructional stability of the bridge is now threatened by frequent explosions in its vicinity.

The first destroyed bridge in the town, the Lučki Bridge or Mujaga Komadina's Bridge, as it was originally called, was built in 1913 according to the design of engineer Simić (cat.67, 68). This was the first reinforced concrete bridge in Bosnia and Herzegovina with stylistic details of belated secession in the architectonic design. This meant nothing to its destroyers. End May and in the first half of June of 1992 they destroy other Mostar bridges, too. The next bridge is Tito's Bridge in the Musala (cat.71, 72). At the Musala place in 1873 the Turkish authorities started and the Austro-Hungarian authorities continued and in 1882 finished the Franz Josef's Bridge, a steel bridge 94 metres long, on 6 piers (the maximal span being 35 m). The bridge was repaired and reconstructed several times, and in 1936 it was replaced by reinforced concrete King Peter's Bridge, or Marshal Tito's Bridge, as it has been called since 1945. Although on its beam ends, Austro-Hungary left us another bridge in 1917 - the Carinski Bridge (Toll Bridge) - built by the Russian prisoners of war. So, while departing some were still building, others were destroying (cat.69, 70).

The first Yugoslavia builds a bridge at Vojno (Potoci) in 1930s, also according to an Austro-Hungarian design (cat.76). This bridge was destroyed, too.

The bridges built after World War II have also been destroyed, the Aviators' Bridge, the first prestressed concrete bridge in the former Yugoslavia, the Hasan Brkić's Bridge, the bridge at Bijela, and two railway bridges: at Raštani and at Bačevići (cat. 73, 74,75, 77, 78).

With the destruction of the Mostar bridges all the infrastructural links with the town of the left bank have been cut. Due to the destruction of electrical, water and telephone facilities, every contact has been cut, the life stopped. The enemy tried to kill a part of the town.

The destiny of our bridges in this war caused Mr Džemal Čelić, a professor and humanist, to come to the following conclusion: "Studying the old bridges we shall experience and understand the whole history of our country where bridges appear as road signs of positive movements of culture and civilization in any span of the times passed. Therefore, we cannot accept their destruction in the latest war as a result of strategic necessity, but as a violence against the identity of our peoples. Likewise, we consider the struggle of rescuing what still can be rescued as a necessity in establishing ourselves on the cultural stage of this quarter of the world."

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

PUBLIC FACILITIES

by Marinka Bojanić, Zoran Bošnjak, Hamza Filipović, Hilmija Skorupan

In five centuries of its existence, Mostar has grown from the historical core at the mouth of the Radobolja river up to a size of 129,000 inhabitants filling up the valley with its building mass. It has become the economic, cultural, administrative, transportation, medical and educational centre of the whole Herzegovinian region, and the fifth most developed town in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The urban matrix has been extending from the original centre - the Turkish bazaar - along the both banks of the Neretva. During the Austro-Hungarian period a new centre was formed on the right bank. After World War II the already existing structures from the Austro-Hungarian period get new public functions appropriate to the exigencies of the town. The postwar construction in the city centre is mainly restricted to the interpolations into the existing tissue of the already defined central city directions.

The analysis of the town structure to date shows disunity and a dispersive character of the vital city points and a certain concentration of the contents which should have been more evenly distributed, such as: supplies, services, health care, administration. The longitudinal line Kujundžiluk - Marshal Tito's Street - Braće Fejića Street with the transversal of the Mostarskog Bataljuna and B. Brkića Streets is characterized by a degree of marked satiety with contents and traffic, which has produced this part of the town into the city centre, that is, into the central city zone. This is a space where all the values of the architectonic tradition of this area and the mentality of the inhabitants of this town meet and reflect themselves. However, the social and the humane role of this area, apart from some newly built structures which have impaired some environmental values, is constantly threatened by an inadequate follow-up of the growth rate of motorization with the corresponding space solutions of the traffic, both in movement and at standstill, as well as of the public city transport.

The local centres of the settlements are undeveloped and hierarchically undefined. As the most developed areal centre, the residential quarter Zgoni stands out with a number of buildings used for business, rendering services, education, culture and recreation. But in spite of that, this centre has no defined physiognomy and no character of a space in which the crystallization of spatial and functional relations could occur. In the settlements of Centre II, Zalik, Balinovac, Donja Mahala, Luka, Bijeli Brijeg II, Rodoč, Cim, Ilići and Raštani, in addition to schools and nurseries, there are also shopping and catering facilities, which is only the beginning of the future local centres which are to be developed further.

The available fund of buildings and business offices for the work of state bodies and organizations does not correspond to the needs of modern administration and it affects greatly the economy and the efficiency of their functioning, which has been the cause of frequent adaptations and movings out of these buildings. In contrast to this, only the bank system is accommodated in adequate buildings built for this specific purpose.

The corresponding supply level with telecommunication, and radio and TV transmitter networks used to satisfy the communicational and informational needs of the town and the region. The main telecommunication system centre is housed in the building of the Main Post Office, appropriated for these needs, while the Information Centre is accommodated in the residential/office building "Mostarka", the tallest building in the town. It is in Mostar that the health care facilities for the Mostar municipality and for the region of Herzegovina are concentrated.

The buildings housing the regional medical centre are mostly not connected constructionally, nor do they satisfy their primary ac-

tivities due to the increased complexity of certain functions within the spaces built before World War II. Apart from the two health centres in the town itself, there are several regional clinics, plant dispensaries, Public Health Institute and six pharmacies. The hospital capacities are housed in twelve buildings at four localities in the town. Further health care development is planned in the new complex of the Regional Medical Centre at Bijeli Brijeg, where certain specialized services have already been set up. In addition to preventive activities, there are also three institutions in the town: Social Work Centre, Children's Home and Medical / Social Institution for Adults.

With ten kindergartens, twelve elementary schools, ten secondary education schools, and a University with five colleges, the town is also an educational centre of the region. Within the framework of the university, and in conjunction with economic companies, several research centres have been formed: Mechanical Engineering Institute, Civil Engineering Institute, Economy Development Institute, Hydroelectric Power Plants on the Neretva Institute, Tobacco Institute, and Research and Development Centre HEPOK. Mostar has a century-old cultural tradition. The germ of the cultural institutions is to be found in the activity of the national cultural societies Preporod, Prosvjeta and Napredak. The tradition is continued by the said societies recently renewed.

The theatrical activity is realized by the work of the National Theatre, the Puppet Theatre and a few amateur theatre groups. The exponents of the musical life in the town are Musical School of degree I and II and the Symphonic Orchestra, without a concert hall unfortunately. The only appropriated exhibition space is possessed by the Art Gallery (a branch of the B&H Art Gallery) and a few spatially inappropriate private galleries. In the field of museum, archives and cultural monuments protection activities, there are the Museum of Herzegovina, the Archives of Herzegovina and a service for the protection of monuments. The library activity is manifested through the work of the National Library and the University Library, which is at the same time the Deposit Library of the UNESCO, as well as through that of the libraries of the Franciscan province and the Episcopal Ordinariate, which are more or less of a closed type.

Mostar, the centre of the region, is at the same time a commercial centre with two department stores and a number of stores and shops in the social or private ownership. The department store Razvitak, built in 1970, was the first department store in the region, and four years later the department store HIT was built. Owing to the private initiative the offer in the close city centre is modernized and enriched, which entails adaptation and opening of new business premises with larger offer. The planned construction of new city quarter, where business offices are an integral part of residential buildings, creates the possibility of a richer and more specialized offer outside the narrow city centre as well.

In the last decade, the development of the religious tourism at Medjugorje increases the importance of the town as a tourist centre. As early as in the Austro-Hungarian times, several luxurious hotels for that time were built - Neretva, Bristol and Mostar. With their subsequent adaptation and the construction of new hotels, the most important being Ruža and Pensioner's Home built in 1978 and 1989 respectively, the tradition of enriched hotel-keeping offer continues.

In the period between April and June 1992 an urbicide was committed against Mostar. All his vital functions have been destroyed. All the bridges have been blown up with the exception of the Old Bridge (cat. 65 - 78).

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

The administration and court buildings have been destroyed or damaged, especially on the left bank of the Neretva (cat. 50 - 52, 57-60,107).

The banks and post offices, the catalysts of the economic life in the town, have been damaged (cat. 53, 84, 86, 103).

The offices of the Information Centre on top of the Mostarka building have been damaged and put out of function.

Even the buildings of medical care and social welfare, as well as almost all the pharmacies, were either destroyed or damaged (cat.94-96, 100, 118).

Out of 11 primary schools only 3 have remained undamaged, even the kindergardens and nurseries were shot at. The secondary education school buildings, the university campus, the Students' Home and the Pupils' Home suffered great damages (cat.49, 55, 61, 97 - 99).

The modern institutes for personal training and production advancement have been ruined and plundered.

The National Theatre and the Puppet Theatre buildings were damaged.

The Music School building underwent heavy damages, and the Symphonic Orchestra building was burnt down (cat. 49, 63, 64,

99).

The buildings of the Museum of Herzegovina and of the Archives of Herzegovina have been considerably damaged, while the building of the JP " Prostor " was consumed by fire (cat. 57, 58, 62, 105, 107).

The building of the Youth Centre, which houses several institutions such as the National Library, the Art Gallery, the Children's Embassy, suffered major damages during the permanent shelling of the town (cat. 106).

The University Library building was damaged, while the Episcopal Residence with the whole library burnt up (cat. 35-37).

Both department stores have burnt up (cat. 85 - 87).

Due to the damages during the destruction of the town, most buildings of the servicing activities have been rendered unfunctional (cat. 54, 88 - 93, 114, 117, 120, 122 - 124, 131, 140). Totally destroyed are the hotels Neretva, Bristol and Ruža, while the hotels Mostar and Pensioner's Home suffered minor damages (cat. 45 - 47, 79 - 83).

In two months the town was reduced to an urban ruin. A horrible crime against the man and the town, against history and tradition. Mostar has by no chance deserved that.

HOUSING

Individual Housing

by Almas Bavčić, Jasmina Čehajić, Meliha Terzić

The beginnings of the urban culture of Mostar, together with the culture of individual or private housing, date back to the coming of the Osmanli Turks, whose already mature architecture came under the Mediterranean influence. The meeting of these two gave characteristic architectonic forms and constructions in all fields of architecture, and so did in the concept of individual housing. Through the development of the mahalla, as the urban-housing nucleus and the centre of the family life of an oriental provincial town (kasaba), we can follow the development of the housing architecture. A mahalla has, as a rule, 40 to 50 houses and a mosque, as the centre of sacral and secular assembling.

The mahallas of Mostar are formed along the Neretva river, which gives a peculiar quality to their urban shaping. The mahallas bear the names of their mosques - pious endowments. As early as at the beginning of the 16th century, the mahallas of Carina and Brankovac were formed, while the Karadžoz-bey's mahalla came to be in the middle of the 16th century, and the Šarića mahalla (Luka) at the beginning of the 17th century. Parallel on the right bank the mahallas of Cernica and Donja Mahala are formed. At that time Mostar has 35 mahallas (around the year 1660). The already formed housing districts of Cim, Ilići, Rodoč, Zalik, Zahum and others gravitate towards Mostar, and with their further development they become an integral part of the urban tissue of the town. The mentioned parts of the town are exceptionally important for the development and the continuity of the individual housing in these areas.

The Osmanli-Turkish residential house of Mostar is accommodated to the Mediterranean climate of the town, but keeps its space and shape characteristics. The concept is dominated by the inner court-yard with ever present water and greenery, which makes the exterior and interior elements of the house form an unseparable whole. - The house consists of the ground floor, with no openings to the street, and the first floor. The formative characteristics are given by wall structures of quarry stone and by a low roof truss under slates. The ground plan is playful, often dif-

ferent on the ground floor and on the first floor. Originally, the house used to be located far from the street facing the inner courtyard and the garden. With later development the house was drawing closer and closer to the street so that in the 19th century it would overhang it with its oriels.

The end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century bring great changes in the development of the town and consequently in the sphere of individual housing. Namely, with the annexion of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austro-Hungary there comes to a remarkable penetration of European influences in all spheres of life including, of course, architecture which changes the oriental physiognomy of the town introducing new forms of European architecture and city planning.

The individual housing of that period in the development of Mostar is represented by building ground floor villas or more frequently two storey villas and rows of individual houses situated in a park surroundings. In contrast to a Turkish house, these structures open up widely towards the street, often with landscaped causeways embellished with a garden. The roofs get more daring designs and in the panorama of the town there appears the red colour of the roof cover - the roofing tile.

The ground-plan designs disclose the so-called hall or corridor system of construction, which manifests itself also on the facade through the rhythm and the size of doors and windows.

After World War II the individual residential houses construction is characterized by more or less successful interpolations, additions and adaptations of structures at first exclusively conceived under the influence of modern European movements using new building materials. This brings about a partial disturbance of the existing balance within the old city quarters and a temporary interruption of the continuity in the architectonic activity in these areas.

The modern tendencies of the city development were accompanied by an accelerated urbanization and an abrupt increase of

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

the number of inhabitants.

A major development of the individual residential house is more obvious in the suburbs which with time have lost their rural appearance melting with the urban tissue.

Cim, Ilići, Jasenica, Bijelo Polje are the residential districts that came to be quite spontaneously with abundant greenery. With the housing culture level they are inseparably linked with the town. In this war everything was destroyed, even the objects that have never served any military purposes. Whole quarters of the old urban structure of the town have been brutally destroyed: the mahallas of Carina (cat. 132, 133), Luka (cat. 125 - 127), Donja Mahala (cat. 128), Karadžoz-bey's mahalla (today Fejića Street) (cat. 135 -138) on the left bank; as well as the residential districts

Collective Housing

by Zoran Bošnjak, Nerica Eminović, Maida Ljubović

The Austro-Hungarian administration brings new materials, new constructions, a different way of understanding the housing culture. The concentration of housing asked for a maximal exploitation of the ground surface available and this, in its turn, asked for the construction of multistorey buildings and rental houses with a larger number of flats furnished with all the elements of the technical standard of the time. The houses were built of a quality material with a lumber room for every flat in the cellar or in the yard, and every house had a janitor or care-taker.

After World War II the modern industrialization and urbanization brought about changes in the physiognomy of the city quarters which assume the structure of modern city agglomerations. Ever greater inflow of the rural population into Mostar whose elementary need for accommodation had to be satisfied, entailed finding out of new spaces for the extension of the town. One started a hasty construction of the non-urbanized right bank. The intensive housing construction did not contribute to the development of an authentic style and urbanism of the microregion. Tradition and cultural heritage were not taken into consideration at all, but the emphasis was put on the constructional achievements of the modern architecture and on the relatively well understood functionalistic aspect of a housing unit. This way of building as many flats as possible, often with miniature housing units, low housing standard and a large number of storeys created a number

ECONOMY

by Nedžad Čupina, Suad Dugalić, Dejan Ilić

Mostar, the economic centre of Herzegovina, a city of considerable industrial potentials, with its economic power supported over 129,000 of people. That is how many live in the Mostar Municipality. As a traffic crossroads of the whole region, as a road transport port, the town connects the industrial zones of the coastland and the inland.

The development of industry in this region began in the Austro-Hungarian period. The building of the railway line Metković-Sarajevo in the 1885-1901 period created necessary conditions for the economic development of the whole region and for its industrialization. Austro-Hungary, as administrator of this region, justified the results of its rule with concrete moves, which resulted in the planned development of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the first time in history. The only industrial capacity in those times was the Tobacco Factory. Timber industry and coal exploitation were developing gradually; more attention was paid to vine growing and processing. With the building of the electric

of Podhum, Zahum, Balinovac (cat. 139), Cernica (cat. 134). Likewise, the more recent urban structures of the individual housing, the residential districts of Cim (cat. 140); Ilići, Jasenica (cat. 142), Zalik, Bijelo Polje, Buna, Hodbina have suffered equally heavy destruction and damage.

According to the rough estimations, out of the total of 17,500 buildings of individual housing 6,500 have been destroyed or damaged. Out of the latter number, 4,300 structures have minor damages of the roof construction, roof cover, faade and joinery that can be relatively in a short time repaired. About 2,200 individual residential houses show major damages, or are completely burnt down or totally destroyed.

of negative urbosociological factors and the appearance of public welfare settlements. These housing projects - dormitories - with a minimum of non-housing functions are far and separated from the town, often also with overstepped allowed housing density and storeyage. They broke the urban matrix of the town and its spatial dimensions (Djikovina, Panjevina, Zalik, Bijeli Brijeg, Bakijina Luka, Tekija, Kolonija ...). All these buildings were exposed to the aggression and were either completely or partly destroyed. The housing districts on the very bank of the Neretva suffered the greatest destruction: Čekrk, Tekija (cat. 119, 123), Semovac (cat. 116, 117), Rodoč, Centar I and II, Bakijina Luka (cat. 115), Mahala (cat. 121, 122), residential buildings round Marshal Tito's Bridge (cat. 89, 90) ... In terms of the damage degree they are followed by the residential buildings at Balinovac, Panjevina, Djikovina, Avenue (cat. 120), Bijeli Brijeg. The damage intensity in the collective housing construction is diverse. On the left bank, in addition to destruction, the aggressor also set the buildings on fire so that the constructive stability of the buildings was ruined (cat. 108 -111, 114, 118).

Where the enemy could not burn, he destructed by shelling (cat. 119 -121). It can be said, there is practically no collective housing building which has not suffered some kind of damage be it the damage of the roof, faade, of an individual flat, or of vital parts of the construction and installations.

power plant in 1911 the town got the public electrical lighting. The Austro-Hungarian administration laid the foundations for the later development of the Mostar region, of all mentioned industrial plants.

The interwar period (1918-1941) was a period of stagnation of economic growth. The exception is the development of the bauxite ore exploitation, which was going to be the skeleton of the economic growth of Herzegovina in the future.

After 1945 the whole of Herzegovina found itself in a very difficult situation. The war destructions and the loss of human lives were extremely high.

Considerable natural resources of this region could be exploited only through planned investments. Thus, during 50s and 60s there started to spring up the first big industrial complexes in the northern and the southern city zones, which were to bear the development of the whole Herzegovina.

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

The Aircraft Industry "Soko" introduces immediately the high technology of the world level and employs a large number of workers. New plants of the Tobacco Factory grow one after another; so do those of the Cotton Industry. Hydroelectric power plants are built on the Neretva. The production of agricultural products also experiences expansion, with the Hepok company as its bearer. In 70s and 80s Mostar introduces new industries: the industry of electronics carried by Unis company, the powerful industry of aluminum processing, and automobile industry carried by Herzegovina auto. Owing to this, the industrial zones of Mostar expand very fast and grow into the city tissue making a whole which extends for kilometres along the Neretva valley.

In the brunt of the savage aggression against Mostar the industrial city zone was being ravagingly destroyed, burnt and pitilessly looted. Such barbaric act of the Serbo-Montenegrin army meant killing the heart of life of Herzegovina. Dozens of production halls, laboratories, and scientific and educational institutions within companies disappeared in flames, while a large part of the industrial equipment was taken to Serbia and Montenegro.

In the "Aluminij" company, the power plant chimney and the water tower were totally destroyed, while the whole laboratory building of the "Electrolysis" along with all the equipment was burnt down (cat. 151, 152). The greatest part of the Company's property was plundered or destroyed, including the motor pool with special vehicles, the plants of all services, complete computer equipment, most offices and the complete stocks of finished products.

The Aircraft Industry "Soko" suffered even greater immediate damages. The hall of composite technologies was destroyed, and apart from the tools of the home partners, those of the foreign ones were also looted: AIRBUS, DORNIER, BOEING, AEROSPATIALE, MC DONNELL DOUGLAS, MBB and others. About a hundred of different machines were taken from the machine working hall. In the AIRBUS assembly line 10 machines were mined. All other plants have also suffered great destructions and so has newly built administration building which was partly burnt down (cat. 147 -150). The complete computer equipment

was transported to Serbia and Montenegro. Only the Aluminijum Company and the Aircraft Industry "Soko" employed about 8,000 workers. Secondary damages, such as impossibility of carrying out agreements with foreign partners and the standstill of production during the war period, have not been assessed yet. The lumber industry complex "Šipad", consisting of the Sawmill, the Door Factory, the Plywood Factory, Forestry and Transport was almost totally destroyed (cat. 156-160).

The Bosnia-Herzegovinian giant UNIS from Sarajevo had the following enterprises in Mostar: Telekom, UTP, DD Electronics and ELPIM. The war damages are enormous here, too. Two buildings of the DD Electronics with equipment and documentation were completely destroyed. As for the UTP Enterprise, the production and stocks were completely destroyed, only the boiler room remained. The ELPIM Enterprise was partly damaged, while the Telekom building was least damaged in the whole complex (cat. 143 - 146).

The Tobacco Factory was looted; the storehouses and the production hall roof truss were destroyed, while the machine depot was partly damaged (cat. 153).

The brutality and cruelty of this was also reflected in the frenzied attacks at the bakery of Mostar. Grain silos, mills, bread making plants and the appertaining facilities have been damaged. Only on the mill building, besides other damages, 1,500 square metres of glass were broken (cat. 154, 155).

All other economic collectives in the town underwent considerable war damage. The Hydroelectric Power Plants on the Neretva, Hekom, Energopetrol, Hepok, Feroelektro, Apro, Velmos, Intersped, Autoprevoz, Airport, Hercegovinaauto, Mehanizacija, Slavijapromet - are only a part of the destroyed overall economic potential of the Mostar region (cat. 161, 162, 163).

Apart from the large industrial facilities, considerable damage was suffered by small economy facilities, too. Thus, the inhabitants of Mostar, in addition to their destroyed and burnt homes, were deprived of their elementary human need - the need for work.

INFRASTRUCTURAL SYSTEMS

by Zoran Bošnjak

The town functions as a unitary system through its subsystems: infrastructural, transport, social and other ones which make the armature of space. The network of these systems covered the existing city structure on the banks of the Neretva and passed from one bank to the other by means of bridges. Now that the bridges have been destroyed, the eastern side of the town has, for the foreseeable future, remained without water, electricity and telephone. Mostar is supplied with water from the Radobolja and Studenac springs. During the war devastations the Studenac spring, the city water pipe-line at Raštani and the pump station of the left bank were damaged. The city waterpiping network was also partly damaged, and with the destruction of bridges, all the city quarters on the left bank remained without water.

Explosions damaged the city sewerage network, 60 km long, as well as the main fecal and rainwater collectors. The structures and the equipment of the electricity producing plant were damaged as well as the HE (Hydroelectric Power Plant) Mostar, although still in the function of electricity production (cat. 163).

The main distribution transformer station of 400 kV at Čule was totally destroyed (cat. 164), as well as the 110 kV transformer stations at Rodoč, Opine and Raštani (cat. 165). The 35 kV ring with 7 transformer stations has mainly minor damages of the plants and the equipment, while the majority of the 10/0.4 kV city transformer stations with the equipment was destroyed.

Great damages were suffered by the building of the "Elektro-Hercegovina" company (cat. 112), by its motor pool, its workshop and service-rendering premises. More than a half of electricity transmission lines were destroyed, as well as the greatest part of the city low voltage power grid. Thanks to everyday repairs, often under the enemy fire, Mostar was tolerably supplied with electricity even in the days of the severest shelling.

The telecommunication facilities will be hard to repair. Among the first to be hit was the PTT communication building, so that about 35,000 telephone subscribers remained without telephone (cat. 103). The transmission system devices were damaged, and especially the radio-relay and cable installations of the local and long distance telephone traffic. Mostar has remained without a telecommunicational connection with the world. Six out of 8 city PTT units were damaged or destroyed.

The traffic lights at all the 14 city crossroads are mostly destroyed. Total road furnishings were damaged: lanterns, control devices, voltage cables, mirrors, traffic signs, road signs, street clocks, as well as the road markings, carriageways, curbs and road equipment.

Mostly rocketed was the only way out of the town during its siege and destruction, the Goranci road, called the "Road of Salvation" (cat. 166).

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

All the four petrol stations were located on the left bank and all the four were vandalically destroyed, so that the town remained without petrol and other fuel supplies (cat. 162).

The public city and suburban transport is no longer functioning. The whole motor pool does not exist any more; garages, terminals and service-rendering plants were also damaged. Apart from the destroyed bus and railway terminal with the whole equipment, both railway bridges, the freight railway station at Bačevići and the station at Raštani, powerfeeding plants and networks and railway signalization were destroyed (cat. 77, 78, 104).

HORTICULTURE

by Zoran Bošnjak

Mostar has always been committed to greenery, both from functional and ecological aspect. A positive effect of greenery on the mesoclimate of Mostar is reflected on soothing the climatic extremes, purification and increase of air and soil moisture, prevention of erosion and washing away of humus from the surrounding Karst and with it the pollution of recipients, creation of the pleasant shade, and decrease of reflection and dispersion of light from the surrounding rocky ground.

By introducing trees and bushes, started by the Turks and continued by Austro-Hungary on a larger scale, then by introducing new species in the interwar period and after 1945, Mostar acquired a very developed tradition of greening the city surfaces.

During the Turkish rule it was only private gardens and the greenery around the sacral structures that were cared for, while no attention was paid to building public parks. In horticultural/architectonic designs the oriental influence becomes manifested according to which the house is supposed to provide as pleasant a stay as possible for its tenants and to make, together with its surrounding, an intimate whole secluded by a high wall.

The court-yard is covered with a vine espalier which provides dense shade, and against the walls there is the horticultural part of the garden with flower compositions, rose gardens, and fig-pomegranate-, and mulberry-trees.

Upon the arrival of Austro-Hungary the developing town gradually ate into the numerous gardens and orchards, but at the same time there appeared first landscaped parks around the public

The Mostar airport is out of use. Besides the totally destroyed runway, entire navigational equipment as well as safety signalization and the aircraft supply plants were either destroyed or stolen.

The entire infrastructure of Mostar has been split up into its parts, systems and subsystems which, in addition to the bridges, should have priority in the reconstruction of the destroyed town and in restoring normal life conditions, especially on the left bank of the Neretva.

buildings and industrial facilities. The works on building the alleys were started, which become one of the features of the town. The well-known plane-trees alley and the Rondo Square were made following a starlike model. They connect the city greenery with the landscape of the near surroundings, and are a work of the engineer Miloš Komadina.

The city greenery system is still unfinished. In addition to the afforested ring round the city with an area of 360 ha, green wedges are planned from north and south reaching to the very centre. With the resorts of Buna and Bunica and the future Sports and Recreation Centre of the HE Mostar, the optimal 25 square metres of green surfaces per head will be provided. In the very town there is an uncultivated wood on the White Hill and several parks.

The greenery was not spared war devastations either. The belt of young wood on Hum, Galac, Brkanovo Hill and in Podveležje burnt completely. The eternal alleys of plane-trees were mutilated and thinned out. Years of planting, growing, maintaining and even curing these giants of Mostar have gone in vain. The greenery of the city parks and squares is not recognizable any more. The exuberant gardens of Mostar have remained without their traditional decorations. Cherries, apricots, peaches, instead of being stolen by mischievous children, were picked up by shells of a large caliber. And in the small Liska park, for generations a lover's lane, in the shade of century-old pine trees, a graveyard with dense graves sprang up (cat. 167).

Chronicler of war devastations. Unpardonable !!!

ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE THROUGH HISTORY UP TO MOSTAR

by Ivanka Ribarević - Nikolić

Mostar is a town on both banks of the Neretva. It is the centre of Herzegovina once a part of the Roman province of Dalmatia and of the ancient vast Illyria. The vicinity of important developed urban centres and the Neretva as naturally conditioned transverse of the coast and the hinterland of this part of the Illyric, favoured an early expansion and adoption first of the Greek and then of the Roman culture. Along its valley various civilizations and their influences from the north and the south would pass, clashing and fructifying each other through the contrast and symbioses.

Throughout the history the Neretva valley has been a merchant road on which only the place would change to which ships reached and from where the merchandise would continue its journey by land routes towards the inland. In prehistory and in antiquity the fathermost port for ships was Naron, in the Middle Ages Počitelj, further upstream, then Gabela, and today it is Metković. The in-

habitants of the future Dalmatia, the Roman province, at the time of its beginnings about the middle of the 2nd century B.C., were represented by the autochthonous population of that area smaller groups, peoples and tribes, whom the ancient writers mainly call by the common name of Illyrians, although they are known to us under individual names, too.

The oldest traces of life in Mostar area date back to prehistory. They are manifested as the remains of hill-forts - fortified Illyrian settlements or as stone mounds - tumuluses. Tumuluses have mainly a circular base and have been preserved in the form of a calotte.

With the exception of the tumuluses in the fortifying function, when they, as limit structures, form a part of the defence system of a hill-fort, or are in the function of a cult structure, they can be generally considered as sepulchral monuments, that is, as grave-

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

mounds with one or more burials. The finds of tumuluses and hill-forts are numerous. Situated in outstanding places which offered a certain degree of safety against a sudden attack and the possibility of observing and controlling the surrounding area as well as the conditions for organizing the defence, these monuments are even today some kind of reference marks of the hilly surroundings of the Mostar valley.

Among these fortified prehistoric towns is also the hill-fort at Orlovac (Razlomište), with three concentric defensive walls. It dates back to the Bronze and Iron Ages. At Orlac, in the northern part of the town, next to the prehistoric fortified settlement there is also a cult place - sanctuary shaped like a staircased pyramid. This cult place dominates the Neretva valley in which the town of Mostar will later emerge.

Another important find from prehistory is the hill-fort Zvonigrad (Polog) with the remains of a bastion and of fortification stone-work dating back to the Old and the New Iron Age - Hellenistic Age.

A large number of tumuluses was registered in the area of today's suburbs of Ilići and Cim. In the northern city zone at Bijelo Polje there was an important Illyric settlement, while in the southern region, at Malo polje, there is a hill-fort above the source of the Bunica river. In the same surroundings there is a prehistoric hill-fort Kičin. The agglomeration occupies the top of a round hill. Almost a regular circular stone wall defends the central part also circularly girdled, while the outer slopes are additionally fortified with semi-circular ramparts. In the central part and on the western slope the remnants of some smaller structures have been preserved, which probably served for housing purposes. The numerous finds of ceramics are indicative of the period of the formation of the hill-fort in the early Bronze Age and of its long duration all way up to the Roman times. In order for the epichoric settlements erected at dominating points and fortified as centres of territorial communities to be replaced by the settlements of the Roman type at the foot, it was necessary to act upon the consciousness and on the way and organization of life, that is to say, on the material and spiritual culture of the population.

The precondition of urbanization was the romanization of the Illyric population, for a town could spring up only from a native ethnic substrate. At the same time, the basis for a successful romanization was the construction of a road network. First the basic road communications between major urban centres were built and then, analogous to the process of new settlements formation and to the economy build-up, smaller local roads as well.

In some places it seems possible to assume that the Roman roads followed the routes of the prehistoric road communications and even had the continuity in the Middle Ages and all way up to our times.

The broader surroundings of today's town were connected with the most important Roman centre Naron (Vid near Metković) and Salona (Solin near Split) by a ramified network of Roman roads. Moreover, climatic and geomorphological amenities favoured the development of a larger number of settlements whose remnants are confirmed at Bačevići, Jasenica, Kosor, Hodbina (Negočine), Gnojnice, Mukoši, Cim, and in the north at Bijelo Polje where at the foot of Gradina, on an epichoric substrate, an important Roman settlement was erected.

At Kosor, the river Buna was bridged over by an imposing 57 metres long and over 4 metres wide bridge with 8 supports connected with semi-circular vaults. The remains of this bridge, although mainly under the water, are clearly outlined.

An intensive and early romanization was carried out in these areas almost one century earlier than in deeper hinterland. So already at end of Caesar's or at the beginning of Augustus' reign,

but not later than the year 14, when Tiberius brought his veterans near today's Ljubuški (pagus Scunasticus), a camp was formed at Gračine (Humac). At the same time land was allotted to the veterans, colonies were founded (missio agraria). Building of urban settlements was one of the most marked forms of romanization. Notable settlements were developed at Gradac near Posušje, Vinjani, Gorica and Sovići near Grude. Of special importance are certainly the famous architectonic complex Mogorjelo and Stolac - the ancient Diluntum.

At Tasovčići, on the left bank of the Neretva, a honorary inscription devoted to Octavianus was found dating back to the year 36 B.C. It is the oldest written Latin monument in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The intensity of trade in the area of today's Mostar and its surroundings is confirmed by numerous numismatic finds. The most common are those from the 2nd and 3rd centuries, while the oldest discovered coins belong to the end of 2nd and the 1st centuries B.C.

The presence of the Roman culture within the frame of today's narrower city area in addition to the finds at Cim, is corroborated by finds of Roman graves in the area of Vukodol, from the 3rd century.

Arts and crafts confirm especially the high level of urbanization, manifested by the use of new building materials and adoption of quite new architectonic forms, in other words of everything that essentially defines the Roman ancient culture.

The sculptural works in stone of master Maximin have an exceptional value. Two of his signed works are known, found in the border area between today's Croatia and Herzegovina. The tombstone - stela of a twenty year old girl Lupa is in the Mostar museum today. It impresses by the excellence of its workmanship. The relief came to be in the period between the 3rd and 5th decade of the 2nd century when Maximin's workshop was active. (This cultural monument of high artistic value was devastated in a Vandalic way by direct hits at close range. The greatest damages are in the region of the face and the torso of the figure.)

All the new streamings were not equally accepted by the local population, and religious cults have the most conservative character. The Illyrians kept their cults and worshipped their indigenous epichoric gods almost up to the moment of the predominance of Christianity.

The role of religion in society has always been exceptionally important, no matter whether the common place of worship was a bond of ethnic cohesion or whether it was only sign of belonging to the same community. The official Roman cult of the Capitoline triad (Jupiter, Juno and Minerva), supported by the Emperor's family, along with the worship of the gods of Roman pantheon, was gradually more and more giving way to the new religious views. As polytheistic belief formerly represented an outward manifestation of sovereignty, so now, in the spirit of its monotheistic principle, Christianity takes over this role. Consequently, Christianity gives the basic ideological and cultural stamp to the whole period of the late antiquity; in the field of architectonic construction, it is the early Christian monuments.

The institutionalization of the Church, as the only exponent of the state religion, made the representatives of the clergy central figures in the field of the spiritual, or better to say in all fields, for Christianity becomes an integral part of everyday social life. The bishop is an indisputable leader of Christian parish-town in all its life forms. He keeps watch over the purity of faith, proper performance of liturgy, manages the everyday caritative activity of the parish and organizes emergency relief measures in time of crisis. Thus, in fact, the bishop becomes the supreme authority of the late antiquity civitas.

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

At the Second Christian Council, held in 533 in Salona, the metropolitan seat of the Roman province Dalmatia, a decision was taken to establish the diocese Sarsenterum. The diocese was undoubtedly established on the Herzegovinian territory, and its location is more and more associated with the area of today's Mostar, or more exactly of today's Mostar suburb of Cim, where ruins of an early Christian church from the late 5th and the 6th century have been excavated.

The early Christian sacral structures in the city area were observed in its northern part (Sutina) and in the northern outskirts (Bijelo Polje). Throughout Herzegovina numerous early Christian sacral structures confirm the intensity of christianization. Some of them have already been explored, namely those at Klobuk and Doci (Borasi) near Vitina, Vinjani Gradac near Posušje, Bare near Konjic, Mogorjelo, Žitomislčići, Mokro near Široki Brijeg, Nerezi (Tasovčići), and especially important finds from Livno (Rešetarica) and Duvno ancient Delminium. The number of indicative but not yet explored early Christian localities is also very large, especially four of them at Stolac. Only the future researches will make possible a full knowledge of the early Christian horizon in this area.

THE CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOSTAR DURING THE TURKISH PERIOD

by Spomenka Čadra

The origin of the future town was the bridge with fortifications on the Neretva erected in the Middle Ages. Most probably they came under the Osmanli rule in the period between 1466 and 1468 when the formation of the settlement started as a result of military needs with the beginnings of spiritual and economic activities which, in the oriental context of a town formation, make an independent segment, physically and functionally separated from the residential part of the town.

In the period of Mehmed Faith's rule (before 1481) the existing bridge over the Neretva was replaced by a new wooden one. Great military and commercial traffic could be satisfied only by the stone bridge built by the architect Hajrudin in 1566 between the two medieval towers which were reconstructed at the same time. After that all communications leading to the stone bridge were secured with towers which were connected by ramparts thus forming a system of fortifications with a bazaar within the fortress wads.

The bazaar was originally formed on the left bank of the Neretva. Starting from the bridge the bazaar was extending, in a few continuous and parallel rows of structures, from behind the Tara and Herceguša Towers in the south up to the Sahat Tower (Clock Tower) in the east and the Sinan-pasha's mosque in the north. Along the upper main street, the Royal Road, there developed Velika Tepa and, parallel to it, along the Koski Mehmed-pasha's mosque, Mala Tepa, in extension of which, towards the stone bridge, there sprang up Kujundžiluk (Goldsmiths' quarter). On the right bank of the Neretva, from the Old Bridge to the Tabačica mosque, there extended the Priječka Bazaar and Tabhana (the Tannery Bazaar). Between these two a number of water mills emerged on the branches of the Radobolja river. The physiognomy of the bazaar was gradually assuming a firm and harmonious structure. The bazaar constitutes the centre of commercial, productional and social activity of Mostar of the Osmanli period. It is in the bazaar that most of economic activities are performed. The town core on the river and at the road junction, defined by fortifications, accentuated by mosque complexes, public baths and inns formed the continuity of the street runs by a row of shops and stores.

The development of the Mostar bazaar reached its climax in the period between 1520 and 1570 when some thirty different

The continuity of life in these areas in the Middle Ages is manifested mainly in the finds of mobile inventory related to necropolises, such as the ornaments of the Dalmatian/Croatian cultural group from the necropolis at Cim, the luxurious ornaments found at Potoci, and the sword of the Franconian make found at Vukodol and dating back to the 9th century.

Medieval sacral structures in the city area have not been discovered yet. The stećaks, the tombstones of the late Middle Ages, recognizable characteristic of Herzegovina, bear witness to the wealth and diversity of the cultural history of this region and of the very city area.

The town came into being in the 15th century around the bridge and the fortifications referred to in historical documents as "castelli al ponte di Neretua". The name of Mostar was for the first time mentioned in 1474.

For more than five centuries now Mostar has been a town on both banks of the Neretva. In 1452 the banks were spanned over by a bridge flanked by towers. In 1992 the banks are again linked by a bridge fortified by the same, five centuries old towers.

handicrafts existed in the town. In 1762 there were eleven craft-guilds, the most prominent place belonging to the leather guild. The tanners even had their own mosque, the shops in their bazaar were most solidly built, and the red leather (saffian) they produced was the best in the Orient.

Notable architectural monuments appeared in Mostar now. During the period of the greatest ascent of the Empire, the Turkish architecture stabilizes certain spatial, constructive and esthetic principles.

The Old Bridge, built in 1566, is a masterpiece of architectural designing and building technique. The Bridge, together with the vertical accents of the minarets, inns and baths with an indented disposition of the ground-plan and cupolas, between which, in the continuity of streets, there develop freely rows of shops and stores (which constitutes a peculiar compositional and city planning ambience), within the framework of the inherited and reconstructed fortificational system, marks the starting point of the town, and with the bazaar erected around it, it defines the historical town core by a number of authentic preserved structures and by the functions which follow the continuity of the development through centuries up to the contemporary city centre.

The rapid economic development of the town about the middle of the 16th century is accompanied by a corresponding growth of the population. Originally, the town quarters developed on the left bank of the Neretva in the immediate contact with the bazaar extending to the north and the south, then on the right bank alongside Hum on the right side of the Radobolja. About the middle of the 17th century Mostar started to spread to the left bank of the Radobolja. The mahallas are primarily residential quarters freely formed around the mosque complex as the centre. The constitution of the mahalla generally depends on the natural conditions, in the first place on the configuration of the terrain which provides safety, free horizons and insolation along with the use of the existing water resources.

Close to the city walls on the left bank of the Neretva, on the steep slopes of Stolac, there emerged a considerable number of mahallas, which, thanks to the configuration of the terrain, realized the basic principles of oriental architecture respecting the right to horizon and insolation.

On the right bank of the Neretva a number of mahallas was formed

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

at the foot of Hum, and later along the branches of the Radobolja, along the Neretva to the north. Stretching along the river courses the residential microregions - mahallas - made an ample use of the natural water potential.

The roads which make the skeleton of the mahalla follow contours and allow the growth of the quarters, their mutual connection and permeation. The relief of winding roads ramps street stairs, fountains, defined by walls made of quarry stone with gates, porches, attics of the buildings with lattice window-grille, with a protruding corner here and there, greenery on the courtyard walls represents the mastery of spatial landscaping plastic.

The common interests of the population become manifest in the construction of public structures in which standardized elements of the Osmanli architecture permeated with the influence from the west appear, while residential buildings are a world for themselves, a closed family system orientated inwards, with a number of functionally indispensable facilities.

The mosque complex, in the principle, is the centre of the microdistrict of the mahalla which varies in size, according to how much the respective complex is able to offer. It is a common practice for appropriate facilities for supplying the microdistrict to be erected next to the mosque complex.

The religious complex is the nucleus of a typical Turkish town. The mosque with appertaining structures - a school, a graveyard and a fountain - provides for cultural, social and judiciary needs of the local population.

The favourable position of Mostar contributed to a speedy expansion of the town along with versatile development of handicrafts and trade. The town was gradually becoming the centre of culture and education.

Mostar had been developing until the end of the 17th century when it reached its maximum with more than 10,000 inhabitants, over 30 mosques, 7 medreses (Moslem religious secondary school), two graveyards...

Diseases natural disasters rebellions and wars, along with decline of the Osmanli Empire, impaired the economic potential of Mostar and the life in the town in general. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy occupied Mostar on August 5, 1878. New time brings new relations in the economy and social life, as well as new principles of construction and special development of the town. Mostar becomes the county and district centre. The harmony of the oriental building concepts manifested in the visual permeation with the natural Karst environment and scanty vegetation, achieved by using materials from immediate surroundings, is now accentuated by introducing new building materials, colour, new overall dimensions. But most of the building activities are carried out outside the borders of the historical core.

By forming a new city centre on the right bank of the Neretva around the newly built railway station, the interest in the activity and the construction within the former centre of the economic life of Mostar diminishes. The old part of the town begins to die away. It was in this period that the levelling of the Old Bridge was carried out to make it usable for vehicular traffic. The level of today's Stari Most Street had to be raised which entailed the reconstruction and elevation of the entrances of shops and stores.

The main street, the Royal Road, is enriched with the contents of the new time and assumes a defined urban physiognomy. The parts of all development epochs composed into a unitary whole are present in it even today.

The old town parts below Hum, and partly the residential districts of Cernica, Brankovac, Carina ... remained unaffected by the European influences. However, as the time passed, the tissue of the old mahallas became marbled with residential buildings with

the characteristics of new European trends in terms of concept and form.

In the 1918-1945 period there are no significant building projects in the historical core zone. The life of the bazaar comes almost to a complete stop.

Immediately after World War II (by 1949) a considerable number of individual buildings was pulled down as well as some parts of residential and business quarters of architectural heritage after which, through a great engagement of individuals and institutions for keeping and maintenance of cultural monuments, activities were intensified at restoring the historical core of Mostar, especially the structures of top value (The Old Bridge with its towers and Kujundžiluk). The historical core on the left bank of the Neretva in the continuity of activities on the protection of architectural heritage got a defined physiognomy with flexible possibilities of reviving various structures.

After 1977 the intensity of the activities on the active protection of the monumental fund shifts its focus to the right bank of the Neretva. The Priječka bazaar in its basic points of reference from a partly scattered and undefined urbanological structure inherited through centuries, assumes, through a more or less successful interpolation of structures within the existing tissue, a clearly structured sequence.

In the period between the beginning of April and the mid-June 1992 the historical core of the town was destroyed.

In the permanent destruction of the town the Old Bridge suffered a considerable shake of its overall constructional system, especially of the foundations, as well as surface damages of the facing and a breach in the parapet on the southern side of the bridge (cat. 1,2,65,66).

The Halebinovka (Čelovina) Tower with the western bridge gate and the Watchtower underwent considerable damages of the primary constructional system of the massive stonework and the roof cover.

The western gate shows damages of the surface layer of the stone arch while the Watchtower above it burnt down completely (cat. 4). The Tara Tower on the left bank of the Neretva by the Old Bridge was set ablaze so that its interior together with the ceilings and the roof cover was completely destroyed (cat. 3).

The most precious buildings of the historical core of Kujundžiluk were totally destroyed, especially those having a wooden primary structure (cat. 5-9).

More than a half of the buildings of the historical core of the Priječka Bazaar were completely destroyed. Other buildings suffered damages of a varying degree from partial destruction to surface damage of the constructional system and the covering (cat. 10-13).

The Tabhana (Tannery) complex on the right bank of the Neretva has mainly surface damages of the facing and roof surface damages (cat. 10, 11).

Hamam (the public bath) in the immediate vicinity of the Tabhana has damages of the primary constructional system - breaches of the cupola.

The residential microdistricts - mahallas - in less than two months of intensive destruction of the town were faced with destruction of the town were faced with destruction of varied intensity.

The oldest residential quarters of Luka and Donja Mahala, both in the southern part of the town were destroyed most. Especially devastated was Luka, destroyed almost totally by shelling and intentional arson (cat. 14,15,125-128,130).

Other mahallas (Podhum, Zahum, Cernica, Carina, Brankovac, Mazaljice...) suffered a varying degree of destruction to the total destruction in certain segments (cat. 132-134).

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

ISLAMIC SACRAL ARCHITECTURE

by Tatjana Mićević

Islam, the faith in Alah and in the word of his preacher Mohammed, comes to the area of Mostar and Herzegovina with the Turks about the middle of the 15th century. For the fulfillment of religious duties, five daily prayers (namaz) being the most important duties for the Moslems, it was necessary to provide certain conditions, that is, to build places of worship, mosques or masjids, in which the faithful would assemble and listen to their imam.

As early as in the 15th century the first mosque in Mostar - the Sinan-pasha's mosque was built (1474/75). In the 16th century, the period of the greatest development of the town when the town gets its identity, great donors, the people known and appreciated far from Mostar, such as Mehmed-bey Karadžoz or Dervish-pasha Bajezidagić, donated to the town and its inhabitants their endowments, mosques being the most important among them. The building of the houses of worship was very intensive in this country. Ten of these were built: eight mosques and two masjids. Two of these mosques have cupolas: hadji Mehmed-bey Karadžoz's mosque, the most beautiful and the most famous in Herzegovina, the Nesuh-aga Vučjaković's mosque. Other mosques are smaller and simpler, and instead of a cupola they are covered with a hip roof.

Such mosques are: Čejvan-Čehaja's, Dervish-pasha Bajezidagić's, Nezir-aga's, Mehmed-čehaja's, hadji-Kurt's (Tabačica) and hadji-Memija Cernica's mosque. The two masjids are also from this century: masjid of Sultan Selim Javuz and Čurči Ahmed's masjid.

As the town was further expanding in the 17th century, the number of mahallas was also increasing and more and more mosques and masjids were built. In this century 23 Islamic houses of worship were built. Out of that number there were 15 mosques and 8 masjids. The most important mosque from this century is that of Koski Mehmed-pasha, the only one that is covered with a cupola.

Other mosques are those of Ibrahim-aga Šarić, Sevr-hadji Hasan, Roznamedži Ibrahim-effendi, Čose Jahja-khoja, Ahmed-aga Lakišić, hadji Ali-bey Lafo, Baba Basir, hadji-Balija, Hafiz-khoja, Fatima-kadun, Memi-khoja, Tere hadji-Jahja and Ali-khoja. As for the masjids, we know that those of Jahja-khoja, hadji-Husein Kotlo Ziraja, hadji-Salih Temim hadji-Ahmet-aga Kudrić Bajezid-khoja, hadji-Velija and hadji-Ibrahim Čevro were built during the 17th century.

After the 17th century the construction of the Islamic sacral buildings comes to a sudden stop. The only exception is the mosque of Ahmed-effendi Kotlo from the 18th and the masjid of Ali-pasha Rizvanbegović from the 19th century. So, when Austro-Hungary came to Mostar in 1878, it found 37 Islamic houses of worship in the town, out of which 24 mosques and 13 masjids.

The Mostar mosques followed the pattern which in the Osmanli architecture was known as the standard pure design. Mosques of this kind consist of pure geometrical solids: the cube of the main body with small windows, the octagonal tambour and cupola in the form of a hemisphere, and finally, the polygonal high minaret. In front of the mosque there is an open porch, generally divided by four columns into three traves vaulted with small cupolas. This indented elegant porch is a contrast to the main body of the mosque. But the minaret is the biggest contrast to the mosque cube, and it also gives a vertical accent to the whole massive structure. Searching for the best proportions of these

elements: closed cube, open porch and high minaret, was the basic problem of architects.

All the mosques of Mostar imitate this design. But there is a difference in designing the upper structure in smaller, so called mahalla mosques. These are not vaulted with a cupola. They are usually covered with a flat wooden ceiling, but there is also a cupola-shaped roof realized by circularly laid boards. The open porch in these mosques is also divided by columns into three traves, only the columns are of wood not of stone, as is customary with cupola mosques. The porch is covered with a steep roof, which, like the hip roof of the mosque, is under stone tiles.

The architectonic plastic in the exterior is most richly distributed on the surfaces on the minaret. The parapet of the minaret gallery is usually most beautifully ornamented, and so is the part below the very gallery bearing a rich, stalactite-shaped ornament. Then, architectonic plastic embellishes portals and window openings with the profiling performed. On the windows, the most richly embellished is the lunette framed with a broken Islamic arch. Plastic is also to be found on the bases and the capitals of the porch columns.

In the interiors of mosques, architectonic plastic embellishes the obligatory mosque furnishings: mihrab, mimbber and mahfil. The mihrab, the mihrab niche, is the only symbolic form in a mosque, and is positioned in such a way as to point to Mecca. The upper part of the mihrab, the part above the mihrab niche, is raised above the wall level and richly embellished with a bas-relief dressed stone decoration of a geometrical, less frequently vegetable, character. The hemicalotte of the mihrab niche is filled up with a stalactite-shaped ornament. The mimbber is a pulpit, from which Moslem weekly sermon (hutba) is given, and is positioned to the right of the mihrab. It consists of two portals, a staircase, a railing and a pyramidal octagonal part on top. All over its surface it is decorated with a bas-relief ornament, mostly of geometrical character. The mahfil, better to say its railing, is also decorated with geometrical bas-relief or perforated ornament. The interior of mosques, mainly of the most important ones, used to be painted. The cupola (calotte, tambour, trompas) and the walls were painted with geometrical and vegetable motifs. The quotations from the Koran (levhas) were also often painted in calligraphic letters. The painted decorations in the interiors of mosques were supposed to present the Garden of Paradise.

All the Mostar mosques were built of stone. Depending on the skill of the architect and on the means invested into the building of a mosque, the stone could be more or less dressed, aligned in more or less regular rows. Mosques were seldom built of quarry stone, and even more seldom were outer faades plastered. As a rule, the minaret was most precisely built. The way of using stone suggests strong streamings between the Dalmatian and Herzegovinian region in which, in those times, the early Gothic and Renaissance styles prevailed. This Dalmatian influence on Mostar, and on Herzegovina in general, spread through the architects who built for their Turkish employers and who would come from the Coast, mostly from Dubrovnik, where they had matured on the traditions of Romanic art and, for the contemporary, Gothic and Renaissance. They managed to accommodate themselves to the requirements of their Turkish employers, especially regarding the spatial design, but their basic understanding of architecture, acquired on the tradition of western art, manifests itself in less essential details, especially in architectonic plastic. The presence of elements which are under the influence of the western

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

art is constant on the mosques in Herzegovina, and it was the strongest in the 16th century.

In their century-old history the Mostar mosques, like the town itself, have passed through different periods. In the period of Turkish rule they were kept and appreciated, which is quite normal, as sacral buildings of the Moslem population. There were no needs for any major repairs at all. The only alterations performed on them in this period are extensions of mosques and masjids, and additions of minarets to already existing masjids. In the period of Austro-Hungarian rule several important reconstructions of mosques in the town were carried out. This tells us of the attitude of the official authorities the Islamic houses of worship as well as to the Islamic and other found cultures in general. The sacral structures were respected from the aspect of their sacral as well as from the aspect of their cultural and artistic value. The most important intervention from this period is the reconstruction of the Čejvan-Čehaja's mosque in 1885. The outer mahfil was pulled down, one door and one window in the northern wall were walled up, and a minaret, which had a rectangular base like Dalmatian church towers, was pulled down and rebuilt in its today's form. A thorough adaptation of the oldest mosque in the town, Sinan-pasha's mosque, was also carried out in 1906. An intervention was also done on the Karadžoz-bey's mosque, when in 1909 the painted wall decorations were restored.

In the period between two world wars less and less care was taken of the Islamic sacral monuments so that some of them came into a very bad repair. Because of this, some mosques were closed down and later torn down. In 1932 Nezir-aga's mosque and in 1934 Ahmed-effendi Kotlo's mosque were closed down. Due to the negligence Ali-khoja's mosque at Raljevina burnt down completely in 1922, and the mosque of Hafiz-khoja was pulled down in 1932.

After 1945 the attitude toward religion changes considerably, and consequently to sacral buildings as well. Their cultural and historical importance is forgotten, and so is their artistic value. The new authority identifies sacral structures with religion. Such an attitude is best manifested in the fact that in the years after World War II eight mosques and five masjids have been torn down in Mostar. First in 1947 the mosques of Husein-khoja and Fatima-kadun were pulled down. The mosque of Fatima-kadun was significant because of apparent costal influence visible in the rectangular form of the minaret and because its donor was a woman, which was a rarity in whole area of the Turkish administration, and especially in the provincial areas such as Herzegovina. In 1949 Sinan-pasha's mosque was pulled down, the oldest mosque in the town and the only one built in the 15th century, and one of the oldest in Herzegovina. The next year, 1950, two more mosques were torn down: hadji-Balija's and Nezir-aga's mosque. The Nezir-aga's mosque was the oldest mosque on the right bank of the Neretva, and was situated in the very historical core. The mesjid of hadji-Velija was pulled down in the same year. In the 1951 two mosques and one masjid were torn down: Mezi-khoja's and Mehmed-Čehaja's mosque and the masjid of Čurči Ahmed. In 1954 Tere hadji-Jahja's mosque burnt down, and even much later, in each of the years 1960 and 1961 one masjid was pulled down. Ten years ago the masjid of Ali-pasha Rizvanbegović at Tekija was torn down to make room for a residential building. In this way, some of the city quarters on the left bank of the Neretva, such as Carina, Brankovac, Bjelušine, have remained without a single Islamic house or worship.

When the war started in April 1992, Mostar had 14 mosques and 5 masjids. Only two mosques came out of the war undamaged. These are Čejvan-čehaja's and Roznamedži Ibrahim-effendi's mosque. The mosques were being destroyed deliberately and systematically. Most severely damaged were at the same time

the most precious ones, as well as the mosques in the oldest parts of the town: in the historical core, in Luka, Donja Mahala and Podhum.

All three cupola mosques suffered great damages. The mosques of hadji-Mehmed-bey Karadžoz from 1557/58 represents in the best way the beauty and harmony of the architecture of a single-section cupola mosque. Its builder was certainly in a close connection with Istanbul so that this mosque is a representative monument of the Islamic art in architecture, architectural plastic art and in painting in our area.

The most seriously damaged part by shelling is the minaret. It was cut off as low as the gallery (cat. 16). The gallery parapet is totally devastated, and on the southern side of the minaret, below the gallery, there is a breach. The western part of the porch roof truss is also severely damaged (cat. 17).

The mosque of Nesuh-aga Vučjaković built in 1564 is very interesting because of the obvious influence of the western art, not only in the building method but also in the proportions, size and form of the window openings and portals, and especially in the architectonic plastic art. Of all the three cupola mosques this one was least damaged. The minaret remained intact, except for a through hole above the gallery (cat. 18).

The whole architectonic mantle and the plastic decoration suffered surface damages from bullets.

The heaviest consequences of destruction are visible on the Koski Mehmed-pasha's mosque from 1618/19 (cat. 19). This mosque is in the very historical core of the town, some 150 metres north from the Old Bridge. It is of a special significance because of its well preserved original wall painting which is now threatened due to the four breaches in the cupola caused by shelling (cat. 21). The minaret of the mosque was completely torn down, and the porch roof suffered considerable damage (cat. 20).

From the mahalla mosques the most heavily damaged are those in the oldest mahallas in the southern and the western part of the town, in those parts where the Moslem population prevails. By far the heaviest damage was suffered by the Sevri-hadji Hasan's mosque in Donja Mahala, built before 1620 (cat. 22). It is almost completely levelled with the ground. The minaret was pulled down to the ground, the roof structure was totally destroyed, and all the four faades were devastated. Especially heavy devastations are visible on the southern faade of the mosque where the wall was torn down almost to the half of its height.

Opposite the Sevri-hadji Hasan's mosque on the other left bank of the Neretva is the mosque of Ibrahim-aga Sarić from 1623/24. It is one of the most beautiful mosques without a cupola in Mostar. It was also heavily damaged.

The minaret was torn down to below the gallery level (cat. 23). Greater part of the roof covering and of the roof structure was destroyed which causes further devastation of the interior (cat. 24).

In the Podhum mahalla there is the mosque of Dervish-pasha Bajezidagić from 1592. The minaret of this mosque suffered minor breaches (cat. 25), while the roof structure and the roof covering both of the mosque and of the mosque porch were remarkably damaged by shells. Because of that the interior suffered devastation (cat. 27).

Hadji-Kurt's or Tabačica mosque, located in the very historical core and built before 1600, is an interesting monument of the Islamic sacral architecture. It is the only mosque in Mostar, and one of rare ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that has both an inner and outer mahfil. It is also interesting that it was built on a branch of the Radobolja river bridged over by a vault. This mosque was considerably damaged, too. The minaret shows minor damages above the gallery, while the gallery parapet is partly de-

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

structed (cat. 27). The roof covering is devastated and so is the interior in consequence.

Čose-Jahja khoja's mosque built before 1620 and reconstructed several times later so that it lost its original appearance is also considerably damaged. The minaret was completely torn down, and the cupola shows a through hole (cat. 28).

The youngest mosque in the town, the mosque of Ahmed-aga Lakišić from 1650/51 underwent roof damages, while the gallery parapet is partly destroyed.

The mosques of poorer architectonic qualities suffered minor major damages. So the mosques of hadji-Memija Cernica, hadji-Ali-bey Lafo and Baba Bešir sustained minor damages, mostly of the roof structure.

The masjids, except the two most important ones, went without major damages. But the only, until today preserved, masdjid with small minaret, the masdjid of hadji-Husein Kotlo, was completely devastated by shelling and fire, and the oldest Islamic sacral monument completely preserved to date, the masdjid of Sultan-Selim Javuz by the Old Bridge underwent major damages from

the southern side. It should be pointed out that, in the course of shelling the enemy had quite clear intentions regarding the monuments of the Islamic sacral architecture. He wanted to destroy all Islamic houses of worship, especially those on the left bank of the Neretva, which he claimed for himself. In this way he wanted to erase the Islamic element which has been present here for centuries and is one of the peculiarities of Mostar. Likewise, on the basis of consequences, it can be concluded that he knew quite well the artistic, cultural/historical and practical value of individual monuments, for most severely damaged were just those structures which, from any of the above aspects, are the most significant.

The degree of damage of the Islamic sacral monuments, generally speaking, is so high that the usual damage evaluation criteria, applied for the monuments of such high value have been totally changed. It means that the qualification "minor damage" does not mean the damage in question is neglectable but only less serious in terms of repair, compared with the highest degree of destruction.

CHRISTIAN SACRAL ARCHITECTURE AND ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN PERIOD

by Ivanka Ribarević-Nikolić

Towards the end of the Turkish rule the construction of Christian sacral structures was intensified, which at the same time creates conditions for a greater and stronger cultural and educational activity of the Catholic Church. Thus, about the middle of the past century, Mostar becomes the seat of the Diocese, and in 1852 the Herzegovinian Franciscan custody was formed, which in 1892 becomes a Province.

The first testimonies of the Christian history go further back into the past. The origins of Christianity in the area of Herzegovina and, analogously of the town itself, are considered in the light of historical and social conditions which contributed to its being established within the Roman Province of Dalmatia. First, its coastal centres became the stages of development of Christianity from where it was penetrating, with varied intensity, inland gradually growing into the prevailing element of religious conviction.

The confirmation of the existence of the earliest, already developed Christian community in the broader area of today's Mostar is manifest in the finds of the remnants of early Christian churches from the 5th and the 6th century in the city suburb of Cim, in the northern urban zone of Sutina and in Bijelo Polje. The early Christian triapsidal church in Cim has a special monumental and historical value. Although with a dose of salt in the scientific public more and more prevails the opinion that the seat of the Sarsenterum Diocese was just here. The Diocese was founded in 533 at the Second Christian Council in Salona, today's Solin near Split. The historical confirmation of the existence of a Christian sacral structure was found a thousand years later, in 1553. Written source-materials mention the existence of a Franciscan monastery of St. Mary at Zahum, the western part of the town which was mainly inhabited by Christians up to the end of the 16th century. During the Turkish persecutions of the Franciscans during the 16th century the monastery was destroyed. In the following period of almost three centuries we do not possess information about the existence of Christian sacral buildings in the town area.

In 1847 a modest structure of the episcopal residence with a chapel was built at Vukodol, the southwestern part of the town.

Through the engagement of the bishop, Franciscan father Rafo Barišić, the building of the Catholic church of St. Peter and Paul was finished in 1866. Built in the spirit of eclecticism, its front is early Baroque, while other architectonic elements suggest Neoromanesque style. The statues of St. Peter and Paul, the patrons of the church, placed high at the fathermost opposite points of the main faade are the work of the contemporary Mostar sculptor F. Mićković. Soon after the construction of the church was completed, one proceeded building the monastery. In 1872 Franciscan printing press was founded which, in seven decades, printed 400 books, which clearly speaks of the value of the cultural and educational activity of the Franciscans towards the end of the 19th century. Even today the Franciscans, possessing the most valuable archival materials from the Osmanli period, an extraordinary collection of works of art, and an especially valuable and rich library, promote enlightenment and culture. One hundred and twenty-six years after the building of the church, at the end of the 20th century, this sacral monument was totally destroyed by maniacal shelling (on May the 9th) which caused fire (cat. 29 - 33). The Franciscan church of St. Peter and Paul, up to 1980 also the minster of the bishops of Mostar, now with destroyed sanctuary and roof, cannot serve the faithful any more.

The Mostar cathedral of the Mother of the Church is another Catholic sacral structure, also devastated by shelling first on the 14th of April and again on the 6th of May, with considerably heavier consequences. The sanctuary area, the ambo and the altar are covered with scattered building elements (cat. 38, 39). Only the crypt that is a chapel of St. Joseph with the tombs of bishops Petar Čule, D. Ph. and Marko Perić, D. Ph., is still in function.

The designers of this modern architectonical structure are I. Franić and H. Franić. The stained glass windows, fit into tapered surfaces are the work of Ivo Dulčić (The Holy Family) and M. Gajšak (The Way of the Cross), while the statue of the Blessed Virgin Mary is the work of J. Poljan.

The cathedral is located in the city quarter of Balinovac next to the "new" episcopal residence built in 1906. The Episcopal Residence, located on elevation above the road and built in the spirit of Neorenaissance, impresses with its front with lateral risalites

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

and its portal accentuated with columns. The access to the building, solved by staircase with two opposite flights, contributes to the monumental appearance of the building. The Palace was designed by Max (Maximilian) David in 1902, an architect who made designs for several public buildings built in the 1890-1907 period.

In Herzegovina there is a large number of sacral structures built according to the designs of this architect, but the largest part of the creative opus of Maximilian David is related to the sacral monuments of the Catholic Church. The Episcopal Residence, one of his monumental works, was shelled on the 6th of May with 17 shells causing a fire and destruction of a library with 50.000 volumes, and heavy damages of this culture-historical structure (cat. 35 - 37).

The frequent constructions or reconstructions of Christian sacral buildings started already towards the end of the Turkish rule, gained in strength with the coming of the Austro-Hungarian rule. In the spirit of eclecticism, which makes the basis of the architectonic stylistic expression of the 19th and of the first decades of the 20th century, certain historical styles become popular. The most common historicisms of Neoromanesque and Neogothic stylistic expression are to be found on Christian Catholic sacral buildings.

Thus, besides the Neoromanesque Franciscan church of St. Peter and Paul in the town, in the northern suburb of Bijelo Polje, the church of the Heart of Jesus was built according to a design from 1909, in the spirit of Gothic, together with a monastery of Franciscan sisters (cat. 40, 41). The design for the church at Potoci was made in the atelier of Anton Moller from Wansdorf. The harmony in the proportions of the church elements is still readable in spite of the devastation of the structure (cat. 40). The remnants of the newly built chapel at Orlac clearly testify to the vandalism aimed at the Catholic sacral monuments (cat. 42). The majority of the Catholic sacral monuments in Herzegovina was shelled, and the consequences are various degrees of their damages. Mostar, the centre of Diocese and the centre of Franciscan Province, has no single sacral building today in which it would be possible to celebrate Holy Mass. Likewise, the sacral structure of the Serbian Orthodox Church were built in the same period when the Catholic ones. The old Orthodox church was built in 1838, partly below the ground level, manifests Dalmatian influences in the forms of the tower, while the interior contains typical Islamic art embellished with stalactites, and lattice window-grilles on the gallery for women. The structure has no damages. The new Orthodox church, the work of the Macedonian architect, stonecutter and painter Andrej I. Damjanović, was built in 1873 in the spirit of the tradition of Post-Byzantine sacral architecture with stylistic characteristic of the belated Serbian Baroque.

The architectonic plastic art of the portal, as well as the wood-carving works in the interior are the work of the same master. The new church was set on fire in the final operations while the enemy was retreating from Mostar, and some time later the church was destroyed by the self-willed act of unknown perpetrators (cat. 43).

The construction conditioned in the first place by the needs of new authorities manifested itself first in adaptations and repairs of the already existing major buildings. This is how the residences (konaks) - the seats of central, regional and local administrations - which at the beginning serve also as the apartments of the heads of authorities and army, came to be totally renewed only to be devastated today, a century later (cat. 109).

Intensive building of residential and business premises in the

commercial parts of the town changes the traditional picture of the bazaar with shops and stores. In some places, respecting the autochthony of the already existing, or fitting, with more or less success, "the modern" into the traditional, the Austro-Hungarian architecture leaves a strong and recognizable trace.

Maybe the most impressive example of the touch, but not of interlacing, of different stylistic expressions of the autochthonous commercial centre of the historical city core with the "new" residential string is manifested between the buildings in Kujundžilik and the buildings opposite it in the western side of M. Tito's Street.

Although burnt down and devastated, these buildings are a testimony to a meeting of two civilizations and at the same time witnesses of a brutal endeavour to erase their traces (cat. 7, 9). The extended building activity brought about, already in 1890, formation of a Civil Engineering Department of the Land government with the centre in Sarajevo, and of technical departments in administrative districts. One of these was established in Mostar.

Generally, in the early 1890s regulation was carried out, streets and boulevards were designed. Also, some of the representative buildings were built which, in terms of their size, overall dimensions and number of storeys, would serve as a model for future construction.

Remarkable contribution, even basic form-relevant guidelines for the urbanization of individual town parts, partly respected by the modern architects, was given to Mostar by two distinguished persons.

They are an engineer educated in Zurich and Vienna - Miloš (Stefan Philip Franz) Komadina, and Mujaga (Mustafa) Komadina. The latter was a business man in the first place, investor of many a building and a politician besides. Mujaga Komadina was the last mayor of the Austro-Hungarian times, elected for this function in 1909.

The most important city planning project of Miloš Komadina on the right bank of the Neretva is the design for the traffic network at Rondo, where from a round central greened surface six streets extend radially. While the wall canvas of the Main Street (Hauptstrasse, today M. Tito's Street), the thoroughfare north-south on the left bank (cat. 50), is made mainly by a continuous row of multistorey residential/business buildings, Rondo is surrounded by alleys of lindens and plane-trees (Stefania allee, today Lenin's Boulevard, or Linden Street today Save Kovačevića Street) with private representative villas. One of them is the villa of Mujaga Komadina built in 1900, today the University Library, also remarkably damaged by shelling.

The European influences and modernization, manifest in all fields of social activities, are integrally woven into tissue of the culture of living. The construction of rental buildings had a considerable effect on the quality of housing. At the same time, the house-owners become the most important owners of capital, multiplied by investments into new buildings.

In view of the importance of Mostar as an administrative, cultural, educational centre as well as the centre of the spiritual culture of Christianity and Islam, one of the five formed administrative districts in the Republic, the interest of the Monarchy in its development is understandable. The best known architects and civil engineers are engaged. The city reflects the morphology of an European metropolis, but with a specific spirit of the oriental heritage of the Osmanli epoch, which makes it exceptionally, even romantically attractive in the eyes of European writers of travel. The basic stylistic characteristic of the Islamic heritage the eclecticism of the 19th and less frequently of the 20th century skillfully

MOSTAR '92 URBICID

transforms in the architecture of the pseudomoorish stylistic expression in Mostar, exclusively present on the important public buildings. The elements of a broken saddle and horseshoe arch are used, often with a twisted top head in whose ending there is a loop or a node sometimes shaped as a rosette. The faade is coloristically revived by horizontal two-colour lines made in mortar as a pendant to the courses of two-colour stones and bricks of the original Moorish style. The architectonic plastic decoration implies stalactite and stalagmite crystal forms, vegetable and geometrical motifs as well as ceramic medallions which have been preserved on the buildings in spite of their having been exposed to flames (cat. 58).

The most representative structure with pseudomoorish characteristics is the hotel Neretva built in 1892 whose two-colour faade is embellished with an extraordinary geometrized arabesque performed in the stucco (cat. 47). As a cultural monument the Hotel Neretva is an important factor of the identity image of the town, which we must save by reconstructing this devastated building (cat. 45, 46).

The building of the Big Grammar School, still in the same function, was built in 1897 according to the design of Franc (František) Blažek. It underwent relatively minor damages (cat. 61). Of the same stylistic expression is the building of the Čejvan-čehaja's elementary school, "a school in which it is learnt how to write" built in 1899, today the Museum of Herzegovina (cat. 62), as well as the Moslem elementary school built in 1902, today the building of the Symphonic Orchestra (cat. 63). In the place of the Karadžoz-bey's Moslem elementary school and the inn, a representative structure was built in 1894 known as the "Vakufski Court", today the building of the "Prostor" enterprise (cat. 57). The faade of this building, in addition to some recognizable Moorish elements, is decorated with ceramic medallions. None of these buildings was spared from shelling and arson. What was left over from the Symphonic Orchestra Building after fire is only the architectonic mantle (cat. 64).

The spirit of historicism still pervades the architecture at the beginning of the 20th century but together with new secessionist stylistic expressions which were gradually being accepted along with recognizable elements of traditional styles. Thus, at the turn of the century, in 1900 we meet the first expressed forms of secession. The project of Josip Vancaš - the Military Command Building in the Main Street (Hauptstrasse, today M. Tito's Street), today the Town Hall with business premises of the People's Department Store - reflects his interest in the secessionist stylistic expression although historicism prevails in his works (cat. 50, 51, 52). The same architect makes the design for the building of the Land Bank Branch in Mostar in 1910 (cat. 53). These buildings were devastated by arson. As is case with many valuable buildings of the Austro-Hungarian architecture, nothing was left of this structure except the architectonic mantle.

Valuable accomplishments of secession are met on the private residential houses, such as villa "Zahumka" and "Neretvanka", rare structures from the Austro-Hungarian architecture that have not been remarkably damaged. Commonly, the interior details, especially the staircase railings, such as we meet in the fire-devastated school at Luka (cat. 56), as well as the portals of buildings were carried out with much care and artistic invention in the spirit of floral or geometrical secession found equally on private and public buildings.

At the same time the spirit of historicism remains present, even predominant on some buildings from the first decades of the 20th century. An example of this is the Public Bath - Banja - designed in 1912 with recognizable elements of the pseudomoorish style and heralded spirit of the new time manifested in reduction of the wall canvas surface and in the specific gradation of window openings.

The building is an architectonic project of M. Loose, probably in cooperation with Rudolf Tonnies (cat. 48). Built as last big public building in the Musala Square (cat. 44) opposite the Neretva Hotel in pseudomoorish style, it reflects a certain stylistic identity.

The Musala Square in the very centre of the town, on the left bank of the Neretva next to Tito's Bridge, was exposed to constant artillery attacks. All the buildings in it - the Public Bath (cat. 48), the Musical School (cat. 49) - bear the evidence of destruction, and the most imposing building among them - the Neretva Hotel - was devastated by arson (cat. 45 - 47).

Numerous representative buildings from the Austro-Hungarian period, including those whose faade does not possess a rich architectonic plastic but only window and door frames of simple profilation and general metric appropriateness (cat. 59), are a reflection of the time when the town was being shaped in the spirit of European streamings in the 19th century and are an inseparable part of the architectural heritage of the identity of Mostar. Their historical and artistic value is indisputable, which calls for their repair and revitalization at all costs.

Mostar today - July 1992 - has got destroyed mosques, burnt and shelled churches, the most beautiful buildings from the Austro-Hungarian period burnt, libraries and historical documents in ashes, the bridges in the river... An attempt was made to destroy all that is the product of the civilization of Islam and of the civilization of the West. But the criminal aggressor could not understand that vandalism cannot destroy tradition, culture and spirituality, because: "The town originally came to be as a house of God: a place where eternal values are kept and divine possibilities revealed. Although the symbols have changed, what remains behind... The mixture of divinity, power and personality which gave life to the ancient town should now be appraised in terms of the ideas and the culture of our time and fit into new frames of the town, region and of our whole planet." (L. Mumford)

To be universal, but remain on one's own.



4. Halebinovka (Čelovina) Tower, the middle belt of the historical core, (the right bank of the Neretva) before the year 1566



12. Priječka Bazaar, the belt of direct contact with the Old Bridge (the right bank of the Neretva), continuity from the 16th century



13. Priječka Bazaar, the belt of direct contact with the Old Bridge (the right bank of the Neretva), continuity from the 16th century



16. Haji-Mehmed-Bey Karadžoz's Mosque, the middle city belt (the left bank of the Neretva, Braće Fejića Street) year 1557/58 (965)



22. Sevri Hajji-Hasan's Mosque, Southern city belt (the right bank of the Neretva, Donja mahala), before the year 1620



23. The Mosque of Ibrahim-Aga Šarić , southern city belt (the left bank of the Neretva, Luka), year 1623/24 (1033)



31. Tower and the Apse of the Franciscan Church of St. Peter and Paul's, western part of the town (Podhum), year 1866



32. Interior of the Franciscan Church of St. Peter and Paul, western part of the town (Podhum), year 1866




39. Sanctuary of the Cathedral of the Mother of the Church, western part of the town, Balinovac, I. Franić & H Franić year 1980



40. Church of the Hearth of Jesus, Bijelo Polje, Atelier of Anton Moller, Wansdorf, year 1909




42. Catholic Chapel, Orlac, Mostar



45. Hotel "Neretva", the middle city belt (the left bank of the Neretva, Musala Square), year 1892



63. Moslem Religious School (today the Building of the Symphonic Orchestra), the contact belt of the historical core-Bašćine, year 1910



68. Mujaga Komadina's Bridge (Lučki Bridge), the right bank, Jovo Simić, year 1913




70. Carinski Bridge (Toll Bridge or I. L. Ribar's Bridge), year 1918



71. Emperor's Franz Joseph's (Tito's Bridge), years 1882 and 1935




73. Hasan Brkić's Bridge, year 1890




75. Aviator's Bridge, souther part of the city




77. The Railway Bridge at Sutina, northern part of the city, year 1966




78. The Railway Bridge at Bačevići, southern part of the city, year 1966



81. Villa "Neretva", the middle city belt (the left bank of the Neretva, Musala Square), Nedim Džidža and Sulejman Džapo, year 1978



83. Hotel "Bristol", the right bank of the Neretva, Mostarski bataljon Street, Romeo Tiberio, year 1958



85. Department Store "Hit", the right bank of the Neretva (the middle city belt), Safet Galešić, year 1974




101. Building Enterprise "Hercegovina", Office Building, the right bank of the Neretva, Cernica Street



104. The Railway Station, interior, the left bank of the Neretva, M.Tito's Street, Nedim Džudža, year 1968



105. The Archives of Hercegovina, the left bank of the Neretve, Mejdan, year 1884



107. Vakufski Court (today PE "Prostor"), interior, the middle city belt (the left bank of the Neretva, Braće Fejića Street), year 1894



125. View of M. Tito's Street, southern city belt (the left bank of the Neretva), residential district of Luka




126. Residential quarter Luka, southern city belt (the left bank of the Neretva)



127. View of the left bank of the Neretva, residential district of Luka




129. Private house, southern city belt (the left bank of the Neretva), the First of May Square



149. AI Soko in Mostar, Aircraft assembly hall, southern industrial zone (the right bank of the Neretva)



150. Al Soko in Mostar, Composite technologies hall, southern industrial zone (the right bank of the Neretva)




152. Aluminium Works in Mostar, the destroyed power station chimney, southern industrial zone (the right bank of the Neretva)



153. Cigarette Factory in Mostar, the destroyed warehouse, southern industrial zone (the right bank of the Neretva)



155. "Žitopromet" in Mostar, grain silos in Raštani, northern industrial zone (the right bank of the Neretva)



156. Šipad, the Door Factory, Production hall, southern industrial zone (the right bank of the Neretva)



163. Hydroelectric Power Plants (HE) on the Neretva, dam of the hydroelectric power station Mostar, northern industrial zone

3. TELEPHONES

In the spring of 1992 the artillery of the JNA under the command of general PERIŠIĆ destroyed the post office in Mostar. Together with the post office the telephone exchange was also destroyed.

JNA also destroyed, by explosives placed there earlier, all bridges on the Neretva River north and south of Mostar, and those in Mostar, except the *Old Bridge*, which it damaged.

Together with the bridges all utility installations that were fixed below those bridges were destroyed.

The Republic of Croatia donates one small telephone exchange (approx. one hundred numbers), a coaxial cable of a length from Mostar to Široki Brijeg, over its repeater on Biokovo it enables a wireless transmission of the signal to Split and further into the world.

These hundred numbers were distributed according to need – both to Croats and Muslims – SDA BiH, individuals and institutions.

This same and only connection via Split was used for communication with the world by Tuzla and Zenica and Travnik and Bugojno and anyone else from the non-occupied part of BiH who could find a hill and any kind of repeater to achieve a wireless connection toward Split.

Are you aware of a single bill that someone paid to the Croatian Post and Telecommunications for these services?

And the prosecutors claim that it was all done in order to attach "*Banovina*" (a part of BiH) to Croatia with this area code for Split (021).

And Zenica, and Tuzla and Visoko...all of this is "*Banovina*" according to the logic of those who accuse us since 1993 until now.

Such meets their claim, but not proofs.

The proof of innocence by facts is the duty of the accused.

4. THE SHELLING OF MOSTAR

The logic of various observers who came to look and observe in 1992 and 1993 this tragic theatre show in Mostar (in which, since the beginning of mankind, it is mainly the walk-ons who get killed) was, as usual, simplified to the point of banality.

They had two premises:

- a) **THERE IS A VISIBLE CONFLICT BETWEEN A BiH AND HVO**
- b) **THERE IS A VISIBLY DESTROYED TOWN – EASTERN PART MORE THAN THE WESTERN PART**

CONCLUSION:

HVO destroyed the town.

Although he has had all the documents, the prosecutor claims the same.

According to the same logic, the same ignorant observers, by the same sequence of reasoning which they arrogantly claim to represent logic, the same prosecutor could have claimed, had he found himself in the battle for Rome in the Second World War, that the Americans had destroyed the Colloseum.

Facts:

The book "MOSTAR '92 - URBICIDE" and exhibitions, witnesses, general Perišić's orders (and not only his) about the shelling of MOSTAR clearly speak about who, when and how much destroyed that town.

JNA and VRS incessantly shelled the whole town in 1992, 1993 and 1994, with greater or lesser intensity.

Unselectively.

At the time of the attack of A BiH on the HVO in the second half of 1993, the members of SPABAT were physically present on the left coast of Mostar 24 hours a day and dutifully numbered the shells (explosions), both east and west of the line of conflict.

From their reports we counted these explosions on the eastern side and I enclose this Table.

ENCLOSURE 1

REVIEW OF EXPLOSIONS IN EASTERN MOSTAR REGISTERED BY SPABAT IN 1993

Document No.	Date of report	Date of event	Number of registered explosions
P2572	30.05.1993.	30.05.1993.	20
P5416	27.09.1993.	27.09.1993.	5
P5537	30.09.1993. (SITREP 312)	30.09.1993.	25
P5629	05.10.1993.	04./05.10.1993.	91
P5680	04.10.1993. (SITREP 317)	04.10.1993.	11
P5899	15.10.1993. (SITREP 326)	15.10.1993.	54
P5921	17.10.1993. (INTREP 328)	17.10.1993.	40
P6113	25.10.1993. (INTREP 336)	25.10.1993.	20
P6149	26.10.1993. (INTREP 337)	26.10.1993.	35
P6452	05.11.1993. (INTREP 347)	05.11.1993.	4
P6872	25.11.1993. (SITREP 367)	25.11.1993.	18
P6894	26.11.1993. (INSUM 368)	26.11.1993.	29
P6957	29.11.1993. (INSUM 371)	29.11.1993.	36
P7114	11.12.1993. (INSUM 68)	10.12.1993.	51
P7119	11.12.1993. (SITREP 383)	11.12.1993.	39
P7137	13.12.1993. (SITREP 385)	12.12.1993.	34
P7176	14.12.1993. (INSUM 386)	14.12.1993.	31
P7118	15.12.1993. (INSUM 387)	15.12.1993.	39
P7241	18.12.1993. (SITREP 389)	18.12.1993.	20
P7283	20.12.1993. (INSUM 392)	20.12.1993.	43
P7335	25.12.1993. (INSUM 397)	24./25.12.1993.	86
P7338	25./26.12.1993. (SITREP 398)	25./26.12.1993.	40
P7362	28.12.1993. (SITREP 400)	27./28.12.1993.	20
TOTAL			cca 791

* 285 EXPLOSIONS HAVE BEEN COUNTED IN EASTERN SIDE OF THE NERETVA RIVER IN THE PERIOD WHEN SLOBODAN PRALJAK WAS THE COMMANDER OF THE HVO MAIN STAFF (24 JULY 1993 to 8 NOVEMBER 1993)

These soldiers could not differentiate the shells fired by the HVO from those coming from the positions of the VRS, and according to a realistic assessment of the HVO of that time 25% - 30% of the shells counted in that way were fired at the town by the artillery of the VRS.

They were provoking and inciting in such a way A BiH and HVO to a further conflict.

Every artillery sergeant knows that the number of around 600 shells which the HVO fired on military targets on the eastern side of the battle front in Mostar in the period of 5 – 6 months, the beginning with 30 June 1993, suffices as an artillery preparation of a military offensive action of one battalion of any modern army.

(791 listed explosions minus the number of shells fired by VRS)

One should look at the artillery tables (enclosed) about how many shells (and of which calibre) should be fired on a military target in order to achieve a certain military effect. All of this points to the fact that the use of HVO artillery in the defence from A BiH in Mostar during the second half of 1993 was absolutely minimal.

During the offensive of A BiH on the HVO, with the aim of breaking out on the western borders of BiH towards Republic of Croatia (Neum – Ploče), the Fourth Corps of A BiH, positioned on an area from Drežnica to Mostar numbers more than 8000 fighters without attached units.

Their artillery positions were immediately alongside the War Hospital and on other densely populated parts of the town (civilian residents), they were driving anti-aircraft guns and mortars on trucks through populated areas of the town and opened fire toward the positions of the HVO.

The Command of the Fourth Corps, Command of the First Mostar Brigade, Command of the Military Police, kitchen for the A BiH, radio station, ammunition depots and other logistics as well as the commands of battalions were in the very centre of the eastern part of Mostar.

The intermingling of soldiers from the A BiH and civilian residents was a routine, everyday affair, easily observable. A large number of civilians were wearing military clothes, children were carrying arms. All of these are, according to the valid war law, legitimate military targets.

The right and duty of the Command of the HVO – the other side in the conflict, was to destroy these military targets. For the realization of that aim it is allowed to fire a proportionate number of artillery shells. Law relating to a war conflict does not define precisely the word "*proportionate*", which is a legal avoidance of precision. "*Proportionately*" in war means to achieve an aim – destroy, incapacitate an enemy bridge, connection, headquarters, etc.

If the commanders of HVO, with me as their leader, upheld that right and duty the number of artillery shells fired on the area of East Mostar should have been at least 1000 times greater than the number counted by the members of SPABAT, even without subtracting the artillery shells of the VRS.

The commanders had clear instructions that they are allowed to target only military targets, and they did not even do that, by way of command, if the enemy military target was in a densely populated part of the town. The commanders in the zone and artillerymen, I am deeply convinced, obeyed that order.

IN THE PERIOD WHEN I WAS THE COMMANDER OF HVO MAIN STAFF - 24th JULY to 8th NOVEMBER 1993 - 285 EXPLOSIONS HAVE BEEN COUNTED IN EASTERN SIDE OF THE NERETVA RIVER .

THIS NEED TO BE REDUCED FOR 20-25% OF THOSE PROJECTILES FIRED BY VRS AND ALL THAT DURING THE PERMANENT ATTACKS OF A BiH - "NERETVA 93" !?!

Finally, three hypotheses:

- a) It is not permissible to keep so many military objects and so many artillery positions in the town, among civilians, which A BiH was doing constantly and incessantly, unless they deliberately want to cause civilian casualties.
I fear that by deliberately causing civilian casualties they wanted to achieve propaganda and political aim.
- b) It is completely certain that it is hard and nauseating for civilians to listen to explosions whose sound between the buildings is amplified, and it is absolutely certain that any number is too much for them.
- c) Likewise, you cannot exclude the possibility of an occasional error in targeting. As a statistical mistake, it is unavoidable.

I CLAIM:

AND THE NUMBER OF FIRED ARTILLERY SHELLS AND THE SELECTIVITY OF TARGETS AT THE TIME OF MY COMMAND ABSOLUTELY SATISFIES THE TOUGHEST DEMANDS AND JUDGMENTS.

ENCLOSURE 2.

Section 1.2. *Basic categories of persons and objects*

Heading A *Fighters*

47. *Definition*
G. III, 4
G. P. I, 43
48. *Distinguishing from civilians: rule*
G. III, 4
G. P. I, 44
49. *Distinguishing from civilians: exceptional situations*
G. P. I, 44
- Fighter** is every member of the armed forces except the paramedics and religious personnel.
- During participation in combat activities or in preparatory military operations, the fighters must distinguish themselves from civilian population.
- The members of regular and associated armed forces usually differentiate themselves by their uniforms.
- The members of other armed forces carry prominent signs of recognition and openly carry arms.
- In situations in which due to the nature of enmity an armed fighter is not able to distinguish himself, he keeps his status of a fighter if he openly carries arms;
- a) during any kind of military engagement;**
- b) as long as the enemy can see him while he is engaged in military placement, which means every movement towards the area from which or on which combat activity will take place.

Heading D *Main categories of persons and objects*

208. *Protected persons*
G. P. I, 51
209. *Protected objects*
G. P. I, 52
210. *Unprotected persons*
G.P. I, 43
211. *Unprotected objects*
G. P. I, 52
- Civilian persons must not directly participate in combat activities.
- Civilian persons must not be attacked, unless they directly participate in combat activities.
- Civilian objects must not be attacked, unless they become military targets.
- Fighters can directly participate in combat activities. Fighters may be attacked.
- Military objects may be attacked.

Heading E Specially protected persons and objects

212. Persons in general

G. I, 24

G. II, 36, 37

G. IV, 20

H. CP, 15

G. P. I, 15, 62

Specially protected persons must not directly participate in combat activities and must not be attacked. They will be allowed to carry out their duties, unless the tactical situation obstructs it (e.g. due to combat activities, due to safety of civilian medical personnel or persons in civil defence and their transports).

ENCLOSURE 3.

Norms of expenditure of missiles

Combat task, sort and character of target and units of norm		Heavy artillery weapon and mortars at 10 km distances						VLR in all distances				
		76 and 90	100 and 105	122 and 130	152 and 155	203	MB 120	128 M67	128 M77	262		
1 A	Destruction of Launching weapon of tactical (operative) destination - to the target	800	520	300	200	70	300	500	360	240		
2 B	25% neutralization to the target*	Platoon on of self moving armoured weapon (MB)	100 0	720	450 400	270	120	450	560	400	200	
3 C			540	360	210 220	180	100	240	400	320	120	
4 D			250	150	90	60	30	90	150	120	30	
5 E			250	200	150	100	60	150	300	200	70	
6 F			420	280	180	120	60	180	300	240	80	
7 G	25% neutralization at 1 ha*	Live force, fire and other instruments outside of the shelter	50	30	20	15	5	8	10	8	4	
8 H			400	250	150	110	50	140	240	180	40	
9 I			450	320	200	150	60	200	320	240	60	
10 J	One-minute projectiles expenditure in 1 ha of target surface - PKV	9	5	4 3	3	2	3					
11 K	Fast fire hit and one minute projectiles expenditure for neutralization of convoys, NZV and PZV - to weapon	6-8	5-6	4-5	3-4		4-5	one cannon fire shot				
		In the day of fire 2 to 4 projectiles at arms										
12	Destruction in shooting distances of 4 kilometres**	10 meter long trench		60	45	30	20	34	-	-	-	
13		Observers		-	120	90	30	20	60	-	-	-
14		Shelter for the fire point		-	50	40	30	-	34	-	-	-
15		Easy bunker		-	140	110	45	25	170	-	-	-
16	Hasting of 100 meters of front by arms per minute, wind, up to 5 m/s	Longitudinal		8	4	2	1	-	3			
		lateral		6	3	1	1	-	2			
Average zone of successful geler act		30 m	35 m	40 m	50 m	60 m	60 m	35 m	40 m			

* For shooting distances over 10 kilometres, the norm increases 20% for each kilometre

** For km of increasing/decreasing the further norm increases/decreases for one third

For neutralization effects different from 25%, the norm, specified according to the shooting distance is multiplied by a coefficient, responding the neutralization degree

5%	0,14	10%	0,24	15%	0,51	20%	0,74	25%	1,00	30%	1,30	35%	1,64	40%	2,03
45%	2,50	50%	3,04	55%	3,67	60%	4,38	65%	5,27	70%	6,43	75%	7,78	80%	9,65

ENCLOSURE 4.

Neutralization of targets 25%

Fire task, sort, character of target and units of norms		Heavy artillery and mortars at 10 kilometres distances						VLR at all distances			
		76 and 90 mm	100 and 105 mm	122 and 130 mm	152 and 155 mm	203 mm	MB 120 mm	128 M67	128 M77	262	
1A	Destruction of Launching weapon of tactical (operative) target destination	800	520	300	200	70	300	500	360	240	
2B	25% neutralization to the target	Platoon of self-moving armoured vehicle (MB)	1000	720	450 400	270	120	450	560	400	200
3C		Platoon of non-armoured weapon in shelter (MB)	540	360	210 220	180	100	240	400	320	120
4D		Platoon of non-armoured weapon outside the shelter	250	150	90	60	30	90	150	120	30
5E		Rocket platoon PZO	250	200	150	100	60	150	300	200	70
6F		Electronically instruments on vehicles	420	280	180	120	60	180	300	240	80
7G	(25% neutralization in 1 ha)	Live force, fire and other instruments outside of the shelter	50	30	20	15	5	8	10	8	4
8H		Tanks and OT outside of the shelter; ž/s and v/s in incomplete shelters; ZM in incomplete shelters or at vehicles	400	250	150	110	50	140	240	180	40
9I		ž/s and v/s; tanks and OT, ZM in complete shelters or at OT	450	320	200	150	60	200	320	240	60

ž/s – living force
v/s – military equipment
OT – Armoured transporter

ZM- Command post
PZO–Air Defence
VLR –Multiple Rocket Launcher

ENCLOSURE 5.

Neutralization of targets 80%

Fire task, sort, character of target and units of norms		Heavy artillery and mortars at 10 kilometres distances						VLR at all distances			
		76 and 90 mm	100 and 105 mm	122 and 130 mm	152 and 155 mm	203 mm	MB 120 mm	128 M67	128 M77	262	
1A	Destruction of Launching weapon of tactical (operative) target destination	7720	5018	2895	1930	676	2895	4825	3474	2316	
2B	80% neutralization to the target	Platoon of self-moving armoured vehicle (MB)	9650	6948	4343 3860	2606	1158	4343	5404	3860	1930
3C		Platoon of non-armoured weapon in shelter (MB)	5211	3474	2027 2123	1737	965	2316	3860	3088	1158
4D		Platoon of non-armoured weapon outside the shelter	2413	1448	869	579	290	869	1448	1158	290
5E		Rocket platoon PZO	2413	1930	1448	965	579	1448	2895	1930	676
6F		Electronically instruments on vehicles	4053	2702	1737	1158	579	1737	2895	2316	772
7G	(80% neutralization in 1 ha)	Live force, fire and other instruments outside of the shelter	483	290	193	145	48	77	965	77	39
8H		Tanks and OT outside of the shelter; ž/s and v/s in incomplete shelters; ZM in incomplete shelters or at vehicles	3860	2413	1448	1062	483	1351	2316	1737	386
9I		ž/s and v/s; tanks and OT, ZM in complete shelters or at OT	4343	3088	1930	1448	579	1930	3088	2316	579

ž/s – living force
v/s – military equipment
OT – Armoured transporter

ZM- Command post
PZO–Air Defence
VLR –Multiple Rocket Launcher

5. THE ARTILLERY OF A BiH

“UNARMED” MUSLIMS

In the first book I published a sufficient number of documents which give a clear picture on how and how much Croatia helped A BiH and Muslims – Bosniaks in BiH.

Here I publish only one document with which I want to show that the “story”, the “fairy tale” which was the basis of almost all reports from BiH (official and media) how A BiH is unarmed and has no artillery, while the HVO unselectively and excessively targets unprotected civilians is simply not true. It is precisely what I called it – a “story” and a “fairy tale”.

It is not the truth.

The document says that on 29 September 1992 the commander of the 1st Mostar Brigade of A BiH and Bajro Pizović, the commander of the “*Bregava*” Brigade of A BiH, according to the agreement with HVO (Drago Poljak) request munitions for mortars of 120 mm, 82 mm and 60 mm and cannon-balls for howitzers of 155 mm and 122 mm and for the 130 mm cannon.

And other equipment in addition.

It is true that Muslims – Bosniaks were victims in many ways in relation to the VRS /Army of the Republic of Srpska/, but it is unfortunately also true that the butchering of Sarajevo obstructed the vision of the observers of the war in BiH in the aspect which relates to the relation of A BiH (Muslims) toward the HVO (Croats).

And where did they (A BiH), dear reader, get the artillery pieces from?

One ought to mention that the “*Bregava*” Brigade of A BiH from Stolac was formed after HVO liberated Stolac from the VRS, after expelled Muslims returned (from Croatia and from Herzegovina) to Stolac, after the majority of fighters of this brigade passed through at least some military training, whether in Croatia or in BiH (under the control of HVO) and after they received entire armaments from the Croats.

We ought to mention that this army will attack us (HVO and the Croats) 6 months later.

ENCLOSURE:

Document A BiH

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
1st MOSTAR BRIGADE

COMMAND
1st Mostar Brigade
Strictly confidential no. 656-1
Date: 29 September 1992

Your ref:
Our ref:
Mostar,

In accordance with an agreement between Mr Arif Pašalić, Commander of the 1st Mostar Brigade, Mr Drago Poljak, Commander of the Southeastern Herzegovina Operations Group, and Mr Bajro Pizović, Commander of the Bregava Brigade, Stolac, to undertake offensive operations aimed at mopping up the territory towards Nevesinje, we hereby ask you to grant the following equipment:

MORTAR SHELLS:	120-mm	1,000
	82-mm	300
	60-mm	200
ARTILLERY ROUNDS:	155-mm howitzer	300
	122-mm howitzer	200
	130-mmgun	300
AMMUNITION:	7.62-mm for AP/PAP /automatic rifle/semi-automatic rifle/	250,000
	7.62-mm x 51 for M-84 machine-gun	20,000

COMMANDER, 1st
MOSTAR BRIGADE

Arif Pašalić

COMMANDER, JI
/southeastern/
HERZEGOVINA
OPERATIONS GROUP
Drago Poljak

COMMANDER,
BREGAVA BRIGADE,
STOLAC

Bajro Pizović

6. SNIPERS IN MOSTAR

Those examples which the prosecutor has put forward and the explanations by the expert, simply speaking are not true.

A sniper is every military rifle with optics.

The reach can be greater or lesser, depending on the calibre and gunpowder filling, optics can be of a greater or lesser quality.

A militarily trained sharpshooter is a specialist chosen from among a thousand candidates.

Sharpshooters wait for their target, sometimes for days, eliminate the opponent's sharpshooters.

HVO did not have any of this.

Some soldiers had sniper rifles, but the ban on shooting at civilians was always repeated.

This, of course, does not exclude the possibility that in a town in which more or less everyone walked about in a military uniform or part of a uniform, in a town in which more or less everyone was armed, even children, someone fired from his apartment, room, through an open or slightly opened window outside of the scope of the war law.

Such possibilities were few, regarding the configuration of buildings and lines of separation. During the conflict between A BiH and HVO I never got information from anyone about the existence of a sniper position.

Those general stories that are repeated for years about snipers shooting at personnel carriers while someone was driving inside are only one additional confirmation on an unacceptably easy conclusion-making about things about which nothing is known in fact.

7. THE OLD BRIDGE

All relevant data about the Old Bridge in Mostar are presented in my book “How the Old Bridge was destroyed”.

It was significantly damaged by the shelling of the JNA and VRS in 1992/93.

How much, how, and by whom the town of Mostar had been destroyed is described clearly and unambiguously in the book “MOSTAR ’92 - URBICIDE” written by a group of authors, Croats and Muslims, printed in autumn of 1992.

In the operation of the liberation of the left and right coast of the town of Mostar and surroundings in June 1992, an operation which I had prepared and in which I was commander, the Old Bridge was protected.

- a) I ordered the protection of the Old Bridge at the moment when the military bridgehead in that area was not deeper than 150 metres of air line from the Old Bridge;
- b) On the Old Bridge it was necessary firstly to place a steel tube construction, and then on this construction fix the wooden planks 7 cm thick;
- c) This was supposed to be a relatively good protection from the mortar shells which were continuously falling on that area during fights against the JNA and VRS;
- d) With respect to the intensity of the conflict, the depth of the bridgehead, situation in the town, it was very demanding to find a steel construction, transport it, place it on the Old Bridge, fix it and plate it with wooden planks;
- e) HVO – some 30–40 lads, executed the order;
- f) To risk the lives of 40 men for the protection of a bridge which at that moment had only minimal military purpose, strictly militarily speaking is an unreasonable and irresponsible act of the commander Slobodan Praljak;
- g) Justification can only be found in the symbolic-cultural level of meaning – not the military one.

At the time of attacks of A BiH on HVO in 1993, and at the time of the offensive of A BiH “Neretva 93” HVO commanders of the operational zone, brigade commanders and the artillery they commanded had clear orders and instructions not to shoot at civilian targets, and also to avoid those military targets which the A BiH placed among civilian population.

HVO never fired at the Old Bridge.

The Old Bridge could have been destroyed by using artillery from the Hum hill with a maximum of three cumulative grenades in 1 minute maximum.

Artillery of the VRS since the spring of 1992 until the end of 1993 (as far as I know) unselectively shelled the town of Mostar and the Bridge itself with greater or lesser intensity.

At the time of the attacks of A BiH on the HVO in Mostar from 9 May 1993, and especially after 30 June 1993 the Old Bridge was used on a daily basis as a military means.

Thereby it became a legitimate military target.

Not only that bridge, but also the hanging bridges which A BiH mounted were not shelled, although they were easily accessible military targets.

The Old Bridge was destroyed on 9 November 1993.

The way in which the Old Bridge was destroyed has been determined by experts.

HVO – not a single commander on any level of command ever gave a written or verbal order to do such a thing. The started investigation about the tank crew which fired on the Old Bridge, in spite of my requests was never completed by any authority of BiH or Federation of BiH.

A perpetrator was produced and a lie became the “truth”.

This confirms Goebbels’s axiom on repetition.

The Old Bridge had no markings of a protected cultural monument.

Militarily speaking, I as a commander had the right and duty to destroy the Old Bridge, because by continuous use in military purposes, the transfer of soldiers and arms, it had ceased to be a protected object.

The commander of the operational zone in the rank of the division commander and myself, the commander of the Headquarters of HVO had the right to determine that the Old Bridge as a cultural monument (and it had not been under special protection) became a military target not only due to its military use by the A BiH, but the Articles 223 and 226 gave us the right of judgement on what is an “imperative military need”.

Maybe a psychological blow on the enemy as a military act of breaking its offensive toward Neum, Ploče, and the “western borders”.

The best experts have clearly, with scientific precision, determined the way in which the Old Bridge had been destroyed.

From these findings it is transparent that HVO has nothing to do with the act of destruction.

If I had done what, by military logic, as a commander I should have done, if I had ordered the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, by which legal provisions would I be judged?

Maybe as Monte Cassino, as the bombing of London, Rotterdam, Dresden, Hamburg, Hiroshima, maybe as the destruction of more than 50 bridges in Serbia by the NATO forces in 1998/99.

The reasons for destruction can be detected from the way of destruction, the filming of destruction and a subsequent media harangue against me personally and the HVO.

But this, unfortunately, cannot be proven. Too big were the players who played that game.

By the way, as an ending point to this story, the Bridge was destroyed on 9 November 1993 at 10.30, and I had then not been the commander of the Headquarters of HVO for three hours.

ENCLOSURE:

Excerpt from the “Handbook on the law of war for armed forces” by Frédéric de Mulinen, published by ICRC, Geneva, 2000-2007

Heading C	Military targets	55	p. 12	book 1
		56	p. 13	
Heading D	Civilian targets	57, 58	p. 13	
Heading E	Specially protected persons and objects			
		219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227	p. 48, 49	

Heading C Military targets

55. Definition

H. IX, 2

G. P. I, 43, 52

Military targets are:

- a) armed forces, except the paramedics and religious personnel and facilities;
- b) institutions, buildings and positions of the armed forces or their material (e.g. positions, barracks, warehouses);
- c) other objects:
 - which by their nature, location, purpose or use give an efficient contribution to the military action, and
 - whose full or partial destruction, conquering or neutralization, in circumstances prevailing at the time, provide a certain military advantage.

56. Civilians within a military target

H. IX, 2

G. P. I, 50-52

A military target remains a military target even when civilians are found within it.

Civilians within such a target or in its immediate vicinity expose themselves to danger to which the target is exposed.

Heading D Civilian objects

57. Definition

G. P. I, 52

Civilian objects are all objects which are not military.

58. Exception

G. P. I, 52

Objects which are usually civilian may, in accordance with the military situation, become military targets (e.g. a religious building, house or a bridge used tactically by the defenders) and therefore the aim of the attacker.

Heading E Specially protected persons and objects

219. Objects generally

G. I, 19, 35

G. II, 22, 23, 27

G. IV, 18, 21, 22

H. CP, 4, 8

G. P. I, 56, 60, 62

Specially protected objects cannot:

a) become military targets;

b) be used otherwise for military purposes;

c) come under attack.

220. Sufficient distance of the objects: The Rule

G. I, 19

G. IV, 18

H. CP, 4

G. P. I, 12, 56

Specially protected objects shall be at a sufficient distance from military targets, unless the tactical situation demands otherwise (e.g. because of a monument located in the vicinity of a main road in a mountainous area or an unavoidable vicinity of ambulances and military vehicles during the transferring of the wounded or medical material).

221. Sufficient distance of objects: cultural goods under special protection

H. CP, 8

Cultural goods under special protection must be at an appropriate distance from every major industrial centre under special protection monuments under or an important military target which represents a special protection vulnerable point (e.g. airport, TV station, institution involved in national defence, harbour or a railway station of relative importance, main line of communication).

222. Sufficient distance of objects: hospital zones and localities, demilitarized zones.

A military operation shall be conducted at a appropriate distance from hospital zones and localities and from demilitarized zones.

- G. I, Annex I
G. IV, Annex I
G. P. I, 60
224. The ending of protection: Rule
- G. I, 21
G. I, Annex I
- G. II, 34
G. IV, 19
G. IV, Annex I
G. P. I, 13, 23, 56, 60, 65
225. The ending of protection: cultural monument under general protection
- H.CP, 4
226. The ending of protection: cultural good under special protection
- H. CP, 11
227. The ending of protection: buildings which contain dangerous forces
- G. P. I, 56
- Therefore, such zones and localities shall not be situated in areas in which, by all judgements, they can become important for the execution of military actions.
- The requests relating to cultural goods under special protection must be applied analogously.
- Specially protected persons and objects shall not lose protection to which they are entitled, except if they are used to commit acts damaging for the enemy. The protection can be lost only after a warning has been given, i.e. after such a warning remained without effect.
A reasonable deadline shall be given.
- A cultural monument under general protection can lose immunity only in case of an imperative military need.
Monuments under the competencies for determining such a military need general protection must be regulated.
- A cultural good under special protection can lose immunity only in exceptional cases of unavoidable military need and only as long as such a need lasts. Such a need can be determined only by the commander of a division or a greater unit.
- The enemy side will be informed in advance, within a reasonable deadline, on the decision to withdraw the immunity.
- A dam, levee or a nuclear power plant loses its status only if:
- a) it provides regular, significant and direct support to military operations;
 - b) this support differs from their usual function;
 - c) the attack on such a building or installation is the only means of stopping such support.

8. THE SIEGE OF MOSTAR

A town or a territory considers itself besieged when it is surrounded in an unbroken line by soldiers of the opposing – enemy side or allied enemy forces.

Until 9 May 1993 HVO and A BiH together held the lines facing the VRS on the Herzegovinian battlefield from Konjic to Stolac and Neum.

After the attack of A BiH on the Croats in Konjic, expulsions, capturing and killings, A BiH takes over the line of defence on this area facing the VRS.

On 9 May 1993 A BiH attacks the HVO in Mostar, and after the calming down of the situation and the signing of a ceasefire, the separation line remains in Mostar, and outside of Mostar – to the north and south – the units of HVO and A BiH remain on their positions facing the VRS.

On 30 June 1993 A BiH, i.e. Muslims in the ranks of HVO attack and disarm HVO soldiers on the joint lines and from that day the line of conflict of HVO and A BiH goes from the north towards the south, mainly along the river Neretva to Blagaj.

From Blagaj toward Stolac and further on toward Neum the confronted sides are HVO and VRS.


1. A BiH, therefore, keeps its positions facing HVO and facing VRS
2. VRS and HVO are not allied forces, but enemy sides in a conflict
3. A BiH negotiates with VRS joint military actions against HVO
4. A BiH controls the main road from Mostar toward Jablanica and Konjic
5. A BiH controls the *Bijela Bridge* all the time until they destroyed also the second traffic lane in autumn 1993. After that, they could go by macadam road around the inlet of the lake.
6. The reasons for this destruction are militarily unclear, unless they feared that their army would flee in case of a counter-offensive by the HVO, as a response to their attack known under the name of “*Neretva 93*”

All of the above is visible in the enclosed maps.

Mostar was never besieged.

Mostar was never and in no way besieged by the HVO.

MAP 1.
SITUATION ON 9 MAY 1993



MAP 2.
SITUATION AFTER 30 JUNE 1993




MAP 3.
SITUATION AFTER 30 JUNE 1993



MAP 4.

Topographic map 1:25 000

Mostar 2-1
Moksha (Gore)



9. ELECTRICITY

Having destroyed in 1992 the electric power plant in Raštani and Čule, the mine, having destroyed 400kV, 220kV, 110kV, 35kV power lines and transformers which enable the distribution of electricity toward Mostar, Jablanica, Konjic, Stolac, Čapljina, Čitluk, Široki Brijeg ... JNA and VRS caused damage of several hundred million euros.

With great, but successful efforts of HZ-HB and HVO, with every possible help of Croatia the damages were partly repaired.

With understandable difficulties, connected to the electric distribution system of Croatia, the power system was kept functioning not only in the Electric Power Industry of HZ-HB, but in the Electric Power Industries of all areas of BiH not occupied by JNA and VRS.

With instructions received from France, thanks to the skill of engineers and courage of soldiers of the HVO in the summer of 1992 the functioning of the electric furnace in the "ALUMINIJ" factory in Mostar was successfully put out.

The damage thus prevented would be close to a billion euros.

When by the betrayal of Muslims in the ranks of the HVO synchronised with the attack of A BiH on the HVO in Mostar and the Neretva Valley the Muslim side took all the electric power plants on the Neretva River, HZ-HB was getting electricity only from one small reversible electric power plant south of Čapljina and from Croatia.

Why the eastern part of Mostar does not have electricity is a complex technical and financial issue, but one thing is certain – HVO, civilian and military, has nothing whatsoever to do with that fact.

This, however, it does not mind all those wizards who for years are singing unison the same song:

The eastern part of Mostar has no electricity, HVO is culpable.

And nobody wants to present the evidence to support this claim.

E.g. when the disconnection of electricity to East Mostar was ordered and executed, in which way, by the disconnection of which power plant, the disconnection of which transformer, redirection on which distribution facility, the suspension of which power line?

The accused must prove their innocence.

This is not the way things are done in any legal system of the countries which they come from – the prosecutor, the honourable judges, the accused, the lawyers of the accused.

The valid war law says, however, that the supply of electricity to the opposing side in a conflict can be cut, its power plants, power lines and transformers may be incapacitated, and under certain conditions, also its dams, power plants and levies.

HVO did nothing of that.

Only general Slobodan Praljak, the Commander of the Main Staff of HVO gave the order to destroy one key on a dam above Mostar, because with the closing of all floodgates, of all dams north of Mostar, A BiH began flooding Bijelo Polje.


Because there was a real danger and threat of A BiH to flood, by simultaneously opening all outlets on the dams north of Mostar, the entire area south of Mostar, including the territory of Croatia.

Such an act would have catastrophic consequences for the people and material goods.

See the attached two photographs of destroyed electrical plants, through which Mostar supply itself with electrical power, destroyed by JNA artillery of General Perišić in 1992.

Source: "MOSTAR '92 - URBICIDE"


I ALSO ENCLOSE A MAP THAT SHOWS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DESTROYED ELECTRICAL AND SWITCHYARD PLANT IN ČULE.



Transformer Station at Čule (Mostar 4), western industrial zone



Transformer Station at Raštani (Mostar 1), northern industrial zone



10. WATER

The prosecutor says simply: the eastern part of the town of Mostar has no water in the town water supply since 30 June 1993.

The accusation: HVO is culpable.

Who deliberately to a large degree disabled in 1992 the sources Radobolja in Mostar and Studenac in Raštani, sources which supplied water to the town of Mostar? - JNA.

Who controls the source in Raštani and until when (A BiH until 24 August 1993)?

Who destroyed the bridges in Mostar and the water pipelines which connected the sources (right bank of Neretva) and the eastern part of the town?

Who and on which points and how, damaged the water pipeline network, how old is it and what was its technical condition?

How big was the loss of water due to a bad state of the main pipelines before the artillery attacks of the JNA on Mostar in 1992?

What was the pressure of water in the pipelines and why did they have to have compressors for pumping the water to the floors of the buildings?

Who, why and with what purpose took the generator-pump which was supposed to pump water into the higher floors on the eastern side of Mostar? - A BiH.

Why, in the period between June 1992 (when with the destruction of the Railway Bridge – the northern entry into Mostar – the main pipeline in East Mostar from the source Studenac-Raštani was cut) and August 1993 a replacement of this pipeline was not made over the dam which is close by?

Why the authorities in East Mostar, after the attack of A BiH on 9 May 1993 and ceasefire which was concluded afterwards, did not ask for an inspection and repair of the main valves on the Bulevar, why did they not arrange a pipeline over the Old Bridge?

Why, after the attack of A BiH and the betrayal of Muslim members of the HVO on 30 June 1993 the authorities from East Mostar never brought up the problem of water by means of UNPROFOR (as they did with the problem of the wounded)?

Why did they not ask for the procurement of a dozen pumps which, with the use of fire hoses, could regularly and in sufficient quantities pump the water from Neretva to a sufficient number of locations. Neretva at the time was clean enough to provide drinking water.

The prosecutor is not interested in that.

He is also not interested in how the water pipelines are being filled after having been empty, what is the technical and what is the health care procedure.

The prosecutor is also not interested if there is some Decision on exclusion of the water supply to the eastern part of the town of Mostar, who implemented this decision, nor if that is even technically feasible.

Nothing of all of this.

HVO is culpable – the military or civilian or both; unless you can manage to prove your innocence.

Without anyone wondering what was the water supply like at the same time in the western part of Mostar (HVO) - such questions are science fiction.

We have a "victim" so we must have bad, evil guys as well – so teach us the Law of COMPLEMENTARITY.

11. HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS

All humanitarian convoys reached their destination.

All humanitarian convoys for Muslims, Croats and all others who lived in non-occupied part of BiH passed through HZ-HB with permission, all were loaded in one of Croatian ports, organized by some of the 270 registered humanitarian organizations in Croatia.

As representatives of these humanitarian organizations, five thousand fighters from Islamic countries passed through Croatia and HZ-HB, including Westerners who converted to Islam, all with regular international passes of humanitarian workers.

No one was ever hungry in these areas – except the people in Sarajevo part of the time.

The smuggling of arms, smuggling of food, smuggling of medicines whose validity expired, smuggling of narcotics, smuggling of cigarettes and alcohol, depositing of hazardous waste, all of this, understandably caused the disapproval of the fighters and occasional unauthorized stopping of the convoy.

Every such case was resolved and the convoy reached its destination.

This is also true of the eastern part of Mostar at the time of attacks of A BiH on the HVO.

And the international war law says:

GENEVA CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

Article 23 (Geneva Conventions IV)

Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.

The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the free passage of the consignments indicated in the preceding paragraph is subject to the condition that this Party is satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing:

- (a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination,*
- (b) that the control may not be effective, or*
- (c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required for the production of such goods. The Power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated in the first paragraph of this Article may make such permission conditional on the distribution to the persons benefited thereby being made under the local supervision of the Protecting Powers.*

Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible, and the Power which permits their free passage shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which such passage is allowed.

Neither we, the HVO, nor the Republic of Croatia which, by Constitution, must take care of the interests of Croats in the BiH, used that right.

Convoys that were transporting food also for the A BiH, were transporting arms for the A BiH, oil for the A BiH, production materials for the military production of the A BiH.

Excerpt from the testimony of Peter Galbraith in case Prlić et al., ICTY, 13 September 2006

Q:...I'm sure you'll be able to confirm that in fact all the humanitarian aid, except for a negligible portion brought in on planes from Sarajevo, that all the humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina from the beginning of the Serb aggression right up to the Dayton Accords went through exclusively, exclusively went through the Republic of Croatia, that is to say the transport routes for humanitarian aid went by Croatia, at least from the port of Ploce to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, passing by many ports and airports. Is that true? Would that be correct?

A: That would be -- yes, that would be substantially correct. I think the air-lift into Sarajevo was not insignificant. I mean, it was very important, but overwhelming the humanitarian assistance that came to Bosnia came through Croatia. It was -- without Croatia, Bosnia would not have survived.

Q:....and please confirm that - that Croatia, the Republic of Croatia, on its own territory never, not at any single point in time, stopped any humanitarian aid convoys going to Bosnia-Herzegovina, did it?

A: I think that statement is correct.

12. INFORMATION – RADIO, TV, NEWSPAPERS

In the summer of 1992 Sarajevo was attacked, besieged, shelled and destroyed by JNA and VRS.

The Post Office and telephone exchange were destroyed, the building of the *Sarajevo TV* was badly damaged, there was no electricity, repeaters on surrounding hills were in the hands of the VRS.

All coaxial cables towards Sarajevo were out of function for numerous military and technical reasons.

The main TV repeater on Velež above Mostar (covers the area of Herzegovina) was destroyed by JNA and VRS in the summer of 1992.

Outside of Sarajevo one can – to an extent – listen to *RADIO SARAJEVO* (middle and long wave) and people are listening to it.

Radio amateurs are also communicating.

If, therefore, people in Mostar and Herzegovina watch *HTV* (Croatian TV) which they watched also earlier, via the repeater on Biokovo above Makarska, if they listen to *Radio Split* and *Zagreb*, than it is a choice and not a media occupation.

And we are also accused for the media occupation of Muslims.

The same is true of the newspapers printed in Croatia, the same is true of all other papers printed in the West, the same is true of all TV and radio stations whose signal can be received by means of a satellite of any other antenna.

This includes the *BBC*, *Chanel 5*, *ZDF*, *WDR*, *CNN*, *RAI UNO*...

I cannot understand why these countries were also not accused for an information occupation of BiH.

In the eastern part of Mostar since autumn 1992 *Radio Mostar*, *Radio A BiH*, was continuously on the air.

Their location was not seen as a military target by the HVO.

After the attack of A BiH on the HVO – 9 May 1993, and especially later, the legitimate military targets are and I am now copying from International War Law:

TARGETS

1104. Attacks should be directed only against military targets.⁴

Definition of a military target

1104.1. As regards the objects, military targets are limited to those which by their nature, location, purpose or use efficiently contribute to the military action and whose complete or partial destruction, overtaking or neutralization in the conditions offers a certain military advantage.⁵

1104.2. Definition is limited to objects. Enemy fighters can also be attacked, though they are not objects, as well as the land, if they efficiently contribute to military action due to their tactical or strategic importance.

Examples of military targets

1104.3. Military targets are not only the objects of military nature, such as tanks and military aircraft, but also objects of civilian nature which efficiently contribute to the military action, e.g. communications and electric power installations, and they extend to the targets in the background, far from battle lines.

⁴ DP I, Article 48

⁵ DP I, Article 52, par. 2 and 3

- 1104.4. A civilian building becomes a military target if it is used in military purposes, e.g. if a building with offices is used as a military command post, or if a house is used as a sniper's nest or if military vehicles are being hidden in the barn.
- 1104.5. Facilities where civilians perform jobs of military nature, such as ammunition factories in which civilians are working, can also be a military target.
- 1104.6. Geographical areas, such as high ground or passages can also be a military target if they should be taken in order to prevent them from being used by the enemy.
- 1104.7. These are the examples of possible military targets (we should bear in mind that this is not an exhaustive list, and the very fact that an object is on the list does not imply that it is necessarily a military target. In order to qualify as a military target, the target must give an efficient contribution to military action and its neutralization, in given circumstances, must offer a definite military advantage. Neutralization does not necessarily mean destruction, but it means that all necessary steps are undertaken to render the object incapable of fulfilling its function. What is a military target today, does not have to be a target tomorrow, because in the meantime circumstances have changed):

military personnel and persons taking part in battles, who are not members of armed forces; military facilities, military equipment, including military vehicles, ammunition and ammunition depots, places where military works are under way, including defensive works and fortifying, military depots and plants, including the production or development of military supply material and other material of military value, including metal, machinery and chemical industry which supports the war effort; geographical areas of military importance such as hills, passages and bridgeheads; railway tracks, ports, airports, bridges, main roads, tunnels and channels; oil plants and facilities for the production of electricity, communication installations, including radio and television, as well as telegraphic stations used in military communications.⁶

⁶ A. P. V. Rogers, *Law on the battlefield*, Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 37

13. LANGUAGE – THE CROATIAN LANGUAGE

"IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE WORD"

"LANGUAGE IS THE HOME OF HUMAN ESSENCE"

The statements about language are important.

The older ones may remember that the shepherds 60 – 70 years ago were often deaf-mute and were frequently therefore retarded.

Psychology has studied many cases when a newborn baby was reared by a she-wolf or a chimpanzee. These were retarded persons who would die before they turned 30.

But if we leave a newborn without any communication, completely isolated and with a good care, it cannot live.

What constitutes the brain, without communication – language in the narrower sense, cannot structure itself and therefore cannot take over the functions of the body necessary for life.

We cannot think outside the language, we cannot exist outside of the language, even if it be the language of a wolf or an anthropoid monkey.

Thousands of people have survived long decades of worst prisons and exiles, *Gulags*, concentration camps, incredibly difficult conditions of the French prisons in Guiana, but a strictly isolated solitary cell leads to a complete disorder of the human mind in a much shorter time.

After having been torn to pieces for 118 years between Russia, Austria and Prussia, by the end of the First World War, the Polish state re-emerged.

Language was one of the key reasons why the Poles didn't disappear. And religion.

Therefore the language of an individual and a people is an essential determinant, the meaning of existence and a way of survival. I cannot elaborate here about the history of the Croatian people, but I can say that the axis of this history is the fight for the Croatian language – against the imposition of Italian, German, Hungarian, Turkish, Serbian.

If there were laws which prescribed the language to be called Serbo-Croatian or Croatian-Serbian, whenever it depended on me I did not obey those laws, I ignored and despised them.

I am a Croat, I speak the Croatian language and I consider it my natural right.

Let the French speak French or whatever they want, let Serbians speak Serbian or whatever they want, let the Bosniaks speak Bosnian or whatever other language they want, let them print books in Bosnian language, sing, swear, write grammar and syntax and orthography on their language and for their language.

All these rights are beyond question.

In 1993 Muslims still did not have the language which they spoke, and the prosecutors claim that they were or could have been offended because the Croats wanted to call their language Croatian in the schools which they financed.

They should have spoken and written in Serbo-Croatian as they did in Tuzla and Zenica, they should have spoken a language which is not theirs at the time when this language is spoken by the aggressor, the one who shells them, kills, expels.

It is simply speaking morbid.

The right can be limited by the right of another, but not by feelings of another.

Such logic could justify the attitude of the Germans towards the Jews in Hitler's time.

And this would not be good, no good at all.

14. PRESIDENTIAL TRANSCRIPTS

Although the integral reading of the texts which we call "*Presidential transcripts*" does not reveal anything mean, dishonourable, politically unacceptable, we should still add:

"PRESIDENTIAL TRANSCRIPTS" – TRANSCRIPTS OF CONVERSATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, DR FRANJO TUĐMAN, WITH MANY PEOPLE.

- 1) Discussions on these sessions were taped mostly secretly, the participants did not know they were being recorded.
- 2) What was said was often abbreviated in the transcription from speech into text.
- 3) There was the possibility of a wrong matching of a person who said certain words and the name attached to a transcribed text.
- 4) The transcribed texts, recorded in such a way, had to be and were the private property of dr. Franjo Tuđman – the historian.
- 5) They came to the court in a legally unallowable way, by a private decision of Stjepan Mesić who first gave them to the journalists.
- 6) Speech within a family, speech on closed sessions, speech on free seminars of free universities, speech in editorial rooms of newspapers, speech on carnivals, speech on closed sessions of judges, etc. – all that is speech which carries in itself the freedom of what is said as a thesis, a possibility, contrary to the real thinking as a means of seeking the truth, examining all the possibilities, speech as a possible provocation, speech as a game.

Therefore, such speech is not the expression of that what we bring into the public and what shapes our acts.

- 7) This is not the place where we can start a major discourse on language and speech and the theories of Saussure and Chomsky, but it suffices to say that there is a huge difference in meaning between what has been said – word accompanied by intonation, accentuation, gesture, word accompanied by laughter and ironic smile, sarcasm, flattery, word spoken with a feigned anger, word of imitation, and all of that transcribed into a text.
- 8) If this were not so, theatre would not exist, all dramatic texts from Aeschylus to this day would be interpreted in only one possible way.

In how many different interpretations (in terms of meaning) we saw the "The Miser" and "Don Juan" and "Hamlet" and "King Lear", "Iphigenia" and "Vishnik"?

15. HV /The Croatian Army/ IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

JNA attacked Croatia.

The entire Yugoslavia is a battlefield.

The insurgent Serbs – army of the so-called Krajina together with JNA attacked Croatia – the battlefield is the territory of entire Yugoslavia where these soldiers and arms come from.

JNA, the soldiers of the Krajina, VRS attacks Croatia – the battlefield is the entire territory where these attacks come from, territory from which the participating soldiers come from, territory on which military means for these attacks are being produced, and all the territories and paths by which these means are being transported.

JNA and all other Serbian armies did not just attack Croatia, but all the territories and peoples living east of the border Karlobag – Karlovac – Virovitica, as this is the imagined border of the Greater Serbia. On the entire territory of the attacker, on the territory which is defined in international war law as "*battlefield*", Croatia was allowed to respond with military force. If it could.

BiH, both as territory and as a state, attacked the Republic of Croatia. Croatia, according to international war law, was allowed to respond by sending its troops to any part of the battlefield.

If it could.

On a referendum, held on 19 May 1990, more than 93% of the voters voted for an independent Republic of Croatia. On multi-party and democratic elections held in the spring of 1990 the members of the Croatian Parliament /Sabor/ were elected.

On 25 June 1990 they pass a constitutional decision on the sovereignty and independence of Croatia and a Declaration on the proclamation of the sovereign and independent Republic of Croatia.

This is the legal constitutive act by which Croatia was created.

International recognitions are an important political declarative act of support to the new state, but the state comes into being by the will of the people.

On 30 July 1991 the Parliament of Lithuania passed a Resolution by which the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia was recognized.

The recognition on the part of France, USA, Britain, Germany is politically more important, but to me personally the recognition by Lithuania, and a bit later by Iceland, is morally incomparably more important than those that followed – when Croatia, in spite of predictions that it will be defeated, held its ground. Everyone else except Lithuania and Iceland waited first to see the predictions fulfilled.

Was Alija Izetbegović, the President of the Presidency of BiH able or not, did he want or not:

- a) to prevent the attacks on Croatia from the territory of BiH
- b) to prevent the taking away of captured Croatian soldiers from Hrvatska Kostajnica into Serbian camps in BiH
- c) to prevent the taking over of Unište – territory of BiH, by Martić's troops
- d) to prevent the massacre in Ravno – or for him → "*THIS IS NOT OUR WAR*"
- e) to prevent the attacks on Dubrovnik, Slavonski Brod, Okučani, etc.
- f) to prevent the recruitment of citizens of BiH into the JNA.

All of the above is unimportant for the question where HV is allowed to go, by the war law definition of the "*battlefield*". HV could have entered the territory of BiH, because from this territory the aggression on Croatia was launched.

From the position of Croatia, this is a battlefield.

And Mr. Alija Izetbegović does not want to sign a military agreement with Franjo Tuđman in order not to upset the Serbs too much – he cannot or does not want to protect Croatia from the aggression of a state

over whose collective ruling body he presides, he cannot or does not want to protect the Croats in BiH, he cannot assure protection even for the Muslims, he, Alija Izetbegović does not have the power over 70% of the territory of the state which he heads, as President of the Presidency, but he behaves like a ruler and signs the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation with Croatia – by which HV is allowed to intervene in the border zone.

And at the same time he negotiates about a "Historic Agreement" with the aggressor.

HV did not cross over into the territory of BiH except in the campaign to free Dubrovnik, as this was indispensable due to a narrow strip of land on which the military actions were taking place.

Volunteers from HV – and in HV there were around 15.000 volunteers from BiH – were returning to help the defence of BiH.

Unfortunately, their number was too small – the figure never exceeded 500–600 really engaged volunteer soldiers – at least until 9 November 1993 while I was commander of the HVO Headquarters.

EXAMPLE:

KILLINGS AND WOUNDING IN SLAVONSKI BROD (CROATIA) – FROM THE TERRITORY OF BiH

Killed children		Wounded children		Killed in the Slavonski Brod Municipality		Wounded in the Slavonski Brod Municipality	
Age	Number of children	Age	Number of children				
0 – 6	5	0 – 6	9				
7 – 10	7	7 – 10	11	Army and police	242	Army and police	993
11 – 14	9	11 – 14	22	Civilians	150	Civilians	633
15 – 17	6	15 – 17	23	TOTAL	392	TOTAL	1626
TOTAL	27	TOTAL	65				

QUESTION: WHAT WOULD AMERICANS DO? WHAT WOULD BE THEIR RESPONSE? WOULD THEY SEND THEIR SOLDIERS TO THE TERRITORY OF THE STATE FROM WHICH AMERICAN CHILDREN ARE BEING KILLED?

Excerpt from the book "International law 3" ("Međunarodno pravo 3"), J. Andrassy, B. Bakotić, M. Seršić, B. Vukas, Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 2006

§ 101. Battlefield

V. Kolb, *Battlefield, Theatre of War and Zone of Conflict (in Croatian)* JRMP, 1956, No.3 – *The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea*, 1994 – *Helsinki Principles on the Law of Neutrality at Sea*, International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Eight Conference, 1998 – *The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict*, UK Ministry of Defence, 2004.

According to the classical war law, battlefield is the entire area on which the warring parties can prepare and carry out hostilities. It primarily includes the area of the warring states (land, interior sea waters, territorial sea and air space above them). But acts of war can also be done on all the areas which do not fall under the sovereignty of any state. Therefore, the battlefield according to the classical war law includes open seas and no man's land (terra nullius).

The battlefield does not extend to the area of neutral states and neutralized areas, as well as to the air space above them. Nevertheless, the military bases which a warring state has on the territory of a neutral state are also included in the battlefield.¹

¹ For example, the air bases of Great Britain and USA on the Azores, while Portugal remained neutral until the end of the Second World War.

It is then a battlefield, but not enemy territory.

The battlefield, along with the parent country, included also the colonies and protectorates. British dominions once shared the war state with the parent country, but at the beginning of the Second World War, Canada and South Africa entered war by their own independent decision.

Battlefield should be differentiated from the area of war operations (theatre of war). This is the area on which the operations are actually carried out.

Neutralized areas are created by agreement. The consequence of neutralization is that on that area hostilities may not be carried out, although the state to which it belongs is at war.

*The Geneva Conventions from 1949 and the Additional Protocols from 1977 do not contain provisions on their application of *ratione loci*, but only on *ratione personae*, and they do not contain provisions about the battlefield, i.e. area on which armed conflicts may be prepared and carried out. We should therefore presume that the above mentioned customary rules are still in force, but we should also analyze how the changes in international sea law influenced the notion of the battlefield, i.e. the area on which armed conflicts may be prepared and carried out.*

According to traditional war law the battlefield of a maritime war includes the entire sea and waters accessible to sea ships, with the exception of interior sea waters and territorial sea of neutral states and neutralized parts of the sea. It, therefore includes the interior sea waters and territorial sea of the warring states and the open sea, except the neutralized parts.

Today we could add that the battlefield includes the waters belonging to the archipelagos of warring states.

A question is being raised does the area in which armed conflicts on the sea may be prepared and carried out include the exclusive economic zone or the epicontinental belt?

The Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982 does not answer that question and opinions on this issue differ. The predominant opinion is that the hostilities at sea can be carried out in the epicontinental belt and the exclusive economic zone of conflicting states, but also in the epicontinental belt and the exclusive economic zone of neutral states, taking account of the rights and duties of neutral coastal states in these belts.

This is determined by the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea which was produced by a group of experts in 1994² and the Helsinki Principles on the Law of Neutrality at Sea from 1998, produced by the International Law Association.³ The above manuals are not obligatory documents, but their provisions reflect opinions of renowned experts and institutions which drafted them and for this reason we are taking them into account. The same is prescribed by the Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict of the U.K. from 2004.⁴

The determination of a defined area where armed conflicts at sea may be carried out is important because the rules of armed conflicts at sea apply on sea areas on which the hostilities may be carried out. It is therefore necessary to know the border between the maritime and land battlefield, i.e. the theatre of war, in order to determine whether a certain act is subsumed under the rules on maritime prey or the rules of armed conflict on land.

Similarly to the open seas, in principle also the space, but excluding the Moon and other celestial bodies, can be considered a potential battlefield.⁵

² Paragraph 10, 34. See – R I C R, No. 309, 1995.

³ Article 4, See – International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Eight Conference, Taipei, 1998

⁴ See – The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of Defence, 2004, par. 13, 6.

⁵ See – B. Bakotić, Outer Space-Region of War? Proceedings of the Thirtieth Colloquium on the Law of outer Space, 1988, p. 12-14.

THE NOTION, AREA AND LEGAL POSITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Battlefield

It has been a long time since a rule has been accepted in the war law that war operations take place on the territories and areas which are under the sovereignty of the sides in the conflict, or are under their factual rule, from which the war operations are being prepared and carried out. Except that, the areas which are not under the sovereignty of a certain state (open seas and air space above them) belong to the battlefield, unless their status has been defined by special norms of international law for the purpose of excluding war operations on them.

In international war law literature a difference is made between the territory on which the conflicting sides may carry out operations and territory on which these operations are effectively carried out. In many military manuals the terms battlefield and theatre of war are being used in parallel. These terms have been accepted and are differentiated in authoritative works of international law.⁸⁶

The battlefield is a territory of warring states in a conflict, as well as other territories which are not under the sovereignty of the states, but may become a battlefield according to international law, on which war operations are being prepared and carried out. *This territory includes land, sea and air over which the state has sovereignty as well as territories which are under the rule of the warring parties, although none of them has sovereignty over them. It means, we are dealing with territories of conflicting sides, land, sea and air, whether these are the parent territories or dependent territories (colonies), protectorates, if they are used for war means, sometimes the condominiums of warring parties and occupied territories. The stated territories are since the beginning of war operations **subsumed under the notion of battlefield**. In addition, a battlefield can become the territory of a neutral state on which neutral states allow the installing of military bases in peacetime, which are the property of one side in a conflict. The territory is usually limited around the base, on a designated area which is under the military management of the country which uses the base.*

In recent times, it is thought that a neutral territory can also become a battlefield. Such territory is not thought to be enemy territory although the operations of conflicting parties may take place on it. Examples quoted in favour of this thesis are Korea and Manchuria in the Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905.

Namely, Korea was an independent state, and Manchuria a Chinese province. In the war from 1st October 1915 until 29th June 1917 the northern part of Greece became a battlefield before Greece entered the war, as the battles spilled over to this part of its territory because the Allies transferred the front line. In the Second World War military activities were going on of the territory of Egypt.

Certain parts of the territory may be excluded from the battlefield, although they belong to one of the sides in a conflict. These are the so-called demilitarized zones and neutralized territories. Thus, the Aland Islands in the Baltic Sea were neutralized as far back as 1856 on the Paris Congress. The Versailles Treaty from 1919 envisioned the demilitarization of the Rhine region, and in recent times, a well known example is the demilitarization and neutralization of Antarctica in 1959.

From the point of view of international law on all of these territories included in the battlefields military operations may be carried out, although this does not necessarily have to be the case, the reasons for that being political or military.

Theatre of War

The theatre of war is distinguished from the battlefield. This is an area on which military operations are taking place, and it is usually called the battle zone.



⁸⁶ Andrassy – Battlefield, op. cit. 338; Radojković – Theatre of War, op. cit. p. 57, Guggenheim, – Le théâtre de la guerre – Traité de Droit Int. Public, t. II. p. 344; Rousseau op. cit. p. 64 – Théâtre de la guerre, théâtre de region de la guerre; Oppenheim – Theatre of War, Region of War, op. cit. 236; Avramov – Battlefield, op. cit. 389, 393.

Although the battlefield in terms of law is very broad, in many wars the theatre of war, actually included only a few territories. In the Russian-Japanese War in 1905 only Manchuria and Korea were theatres of war. In the first Balkan War the theatre of war was south of Niš – Sandžak, Kosmet and Macedonia, as well as the sector of Skadar. In the Second World War, 53 countries of the worlds were against the Axis, and the battlefield included all their territories.

However, the theatre of war was the Eastern Front, part of North Africa, Southern and Western Europe and Balkans and parts of the Far East, while on the territories of many countries that were in war there were no military operations (the American Continent). In the Korean War in 1950, the territories of all the states which took part in the conflict were the battlefield, but the theatre of war was only Korea. In the tripartite aggression on Egypt in 1956, only Egypt was the theatre of war, although the battlefield included the territories of Great Britain, France and Israel. In the military conflict on the Falkland Islands, in 1982, the continental territory of Argentine was spared. It means, numerous military and political circumstances may determine that operations are carried out only on a part of the battlefield, greater or smaller, so that this territory becomes the theatre of war or the war zone.

War waves across a continent

In the war in North Africa there were three phases. The first one started in the September of 1940 when the huge Italian Army under the command of marshal Rodolfo Graziani broke out from Libya into Egypt. Until December there were a lot of battles. Then, in two months' time, the British Army on the Nile, under the command of general Archibald Wavell drove away the Italians 800 kilometres back into Libya. The other period began in the spring of 1941. Hitler sent into Africa his Africa Corps and general Erwin Rommel who fought with the British in the Libyan desert, winning and losing, until he came to within 110 kilometres of Alexandria. Then came the spring of 1942. The British returned the blows decisively, Rommel's supply was limping, but, in spite of that, Hitler and Mussolini every day expected the news that the Nile valley had been taken. The third period began in the autumn of that same year when the British and Americans penetrated into Morocco and Algiers and when the British Eighth Army, at that time under the command of general Bernard Montgomery, attacked the armies of the Axis at El Alamein and sent them fleeing. This flight turned into one of the deepest withdrawals in history. In 80 days Rommel retreated 2800 kilometres, the distance between Paris and Moscow. After him, he left a desert strewn with burnt tanks and thousands of dead and wounded. At the end of his retreat he faced the British First Army and Americans coming from the West. The lower map shows this third period. On the right picture is the battle in the Kasserine Gorge where Rommel with the support of new armoured units shoved a wedge into the Allied lines. The strong attack caught the Allies by surprise; around 2400 inexperienced American soldiers surrendered. Americans, however, learned fast and later fought well and determinedly.



h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i isključenjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
liniju sa pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mbr - Trebinjska, 10.
mbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspap, 13. lap
ob, 13.mtb, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

epređiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izvesti na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

1. **WAR CRIME, CRIME IN A WAR**
2. **QUID PRO QUO**
3. **WISHES, INTENTIONS, ACTIONS AND POWER**
4. **POSSIBLE METHODOLOGICAL ERRORS IN UNDERSTANDING**
I KNOW THAT I AM REPEATING MYSELF, BUT UNDERSTANDING IS A PAINFUL ISSUE
5. **THE PEOPLES' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION**
6. **THE POLITICIAN WHO KNOWS AND UNDERSTANDS – BARONESS MARGARET THATCHER**
7. **HUMAN BEHAVIOUR UNDER CONDITIONS OF STATE UNREST**
8. **STATISTICAL DATA ON CRIME IN SOME COUNTRIES AT PEACE:**
USA, GERMANY, ENGLAND AND WALES, ITALY
HOW TO DETECT A CRIME AND PUNISH THE PERPETRATOR – PERCENTAGES

1. WAR CRIME, CRIME IN A WAR

When in Croatian language we turn the noun "WAR" (*RAT*) into an adjective "PERTAINING TO WAR" (*RATNI*) we get an assembly consisting of a non-inflect able adjective and a noun - "WAR CRIME" (*RATNI ZLOČIN*).

The non-inflect able adjective *ratni* determines the essence of the concept of the noun "rat" in front of which it is placed.

Likewise:

"Croatian orthography", "Croatian literature", "French wines", "Swiss watches".

In this manner a special meaning is given to the subset of *orthography, wine* and *watches*.

Likewise, to every crime in a war a special cognitive content is being given – it is pulled out from the individual and transferred and directed to the structural part of the war – the political and military commanding set.

I do not agree with this. Why would crime in a war be different from crime in peacetime.

"*War crime*" is the crime which proceeds from a foundation (in the words of Husserl), i.e. a political idea which is being realized by the war, by ways and means which include crime, a political idea that can be realized only by crime.

This is e.g. the idea of the Nazi German political thought, this is the idea of the Communist – Stalinist thought in Poland and the killing of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest and many other similar examples.

I will not here explicate the Serbian political thought which led to the aggression on Slovenia, Croatia and BiH, and whether what happened in that war confirms the founded war crime, I will also not dwell on the "*Islamic Declaration*" nor will I explore whether the goals contained in that document can be realized without war and war crimes, but I do know, beyond any reasonable doubt, that Croatian political and military structures in Croatia and Croatian political and military structures in BiH never and nowhere had as a goal something that could be realized only by some form of war crime.

War by itself is favourable ground for an increased number of criminal acts (by contrast to the social state of peace), for a number of reasons, too many to be listed here.

As Croatia and BiH, concomitantly with aggression created their states and changed the political system, they were partly occupied with a destroyed utility, economic and social structure (BiH more so than Croatia), then the number of problems and difficulties is difficult to imagine for those who have never been through such a thing.

That is why the crimes committed by the members of the Croatian people in Croatia and BiH are – crimes beyond doubt, but also it is beyond doubt that these are crimes in a war. They did not happen due to foundation in an idea or a political wish, inclination, intention of those who managed and commanded but in spite of the foundation, wish, inclination, intention and action.

Just as we do not use the syntagm "*Parisian crimes*" for the crimes that happen in Paris or "*American crimes*" for all criminal acts committed in the course of a year in America, or generally "*civilian crimes*" for everything that happens in all civilized states in peace, so I think that it is necessary to differentiate the sense (or better – nonsense) of crimes committed in war and only then classify them into "*war crimes*" or "*crimes committed in war*".

On the contrary, and taking into account the number of criminal acts, we could easily be tempted to accuse of a *JOINT CRIMINAL UNDERTAKING* the governments and ministers of police and mayors of Western countries because they do not succeed in reducing, in spite of all the resources at their disposal, the number of such acts below a certain, and not such a low, limit.

And the number of those they manage to bring to court is not really satisfactory – for some forms of serious crimes, it is under 15% of the total number of cases.

2. QUID PRO QUO

The attack by JNA on Croatia and BiH, helped by the organized and armed formations of local Serbs, sent hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from burning villages.

Concentration camps, killings of civilians, destruction, rape were all a part of that aggression.

As in social relations there exists nothing else but a law of causal relationship (the law of *action and reaction*), when in individuals or smaller, organized groups, outside of the control of the already weak government on all levels, the pain and despair makes them cross the threshold of what is legally permissible, revenges occurred. This is true of both attacked peoples, Muslims and Croats alike. This is how it was in every war until the present day, in a greater or lesser degree.

With the passing of time and due to mixed population, the war in BiH began, by the course of its own logic, to also assume the characteristics of a civil war, more precisely, the characteristics of war without determined demarcation lines between parties in conflict.

Muslims, pushed to the brink of extinction by Serbian conquests, expulsions and other acts, along with the international denial of the right of defence by the introduction of the embargo on the import of weapons, accepted the help of the fighters from the Islamic world – the Mujahedin.

Mujahedin introduced into that war chaos elements of religious war and substantially contributed to the idea of attacking the Croats.

It is self-understood that a commander on any level (including others who hold any kind of office in that chaos) cannot take decisions contrary to the international war law. This is indisputable.

What is disputable is the thesis of the prosecutor (and I fear that many others might reduce the entire system in a similar way) that the impossibility of managing all the parts of that chaos is guilt.

Such a thought occurred to many who call themselves humanistic intellectuals.

One of them says that in 1992 he came to Mostar to help, but, when he saw the chaos he returned home.

People with such a mind set, full of fictitious intellectuality and humanism remain to relate these stories in salons, stories about the people who remained, and if there is something they don't like in that phenomenology of war, they will put the blame on them.

They could have, they say, if they wanted.

I personally despise the role of war theatre audiences and observers and irrespective of acts which must be sanctioned, for 98% of the boys (and girls) over whom I had authority I say:

"GLORY BELONGS TO THOSE WHO DECIDED TO DEFEND THE THERMOPYLAE"

(KAVAFIS)

I respect their death, wounds, courage, freezing in the trenches, poor clothes and boots, poor food, despair when they would think what will happen to their families if they get killed, poor arms and very often an unclear aim and sense of this struggle, which had too many unprincipled and immoral conductors.

Unprincipled proposals of international community adapted to a war state about how BiH should be ordered, oftentimes took away the only possible sense from those deaths – what will be the position of the Croatian people in the state for which they fight.

Because states are created by peoples, and not the other way around.

Finally, for the sake of the truth, we should remark that even the international war law in some cases accepts this QUID PRO QUO logic, though, no one from the HV nor the HVO never, ever did apply such logic.

CHAPTER G. REPRISALS

Reprisals as a means to force the enemy conduct his operations correctly were known already in wars of antiquity. In the literature of international law it is usually pointed out that this is an illegal means, which implies the breach of the law and customs of war. Reprisals are a "breach of the law and customs of war on the part of one state, as a response to the breach of the same laws and customs by another state". States resort to reprisals also in peacetime, as a response to the same or similar acts of another state, and for the purpose of satisfying their interests. Reprisals in war are a way to bring the enemy to his senses and force him to respect law.

Reprisals are used very often in armed conflicts. The fear of reprisals is in many cases the force which makes the states restrain themselves, as much as is possible, from the excessive use of force, irrespective of how violent the armed conflict may be.

Although reprisals create many problems in international war law, on the basis of fact that they are "in the service of law" and only if they fulfil that function, international law tolerates them under certain conditions.

However, the following problems arise in connection with their use: which are the criteria of judgement and who is called to judge which side was the first to breach a war law in order to resort to reprisals. Further on, if this is left arbitrarily to every state, on the basis of experience, there exists the possibility that counter-reprisals cause even greater reprisals, so the entire system of war law may come into question. In one part of the theory a question is being asked, with regard to the fact that aggression is the crime number one, whether the rules of war should be applied towards the aggressor. A special problem is whether the system of retaliation "eye for eye and tooth for tooth" should be applied in reprisals, and how to achieve this proportionality. Finally, who and when is authorized to decide on the use of reprisals. Therefore, there are numerous problems which are still not completely differentiated.

Surely, reprisals are not a part of the legal system of international law, although they are being used in all armed conflicts.

In the First World War both the Germans and Allies justified their use of poison gas as a response to the opposing side. The known actions of "rastellamente" of Italian troops and massive raids which the Germans carried out in Yugoslavia were also justified as reprisal measures.

Still, what should qualify reprisals and make the war law tolerate them are: proportionality, spatial and temporal limitation and humanity.

HEADING G REPRISALS

231.	Definition	<p><i>Reprisals represent the breach of war law as a response to the breach of this law on the part of the enemy, whose purpose is the cessation of this breach.</i></p> <p><i>Reprisals consist of warnings and pressure on the enemy in the form of revanchist action so as to stop further illegal war activities and to respect the war law. Reprisals represent the only direct procedure of the application of law.</i></p>
------	------------	---

Likewise, in investigations, as well as in punishments for criminal acts, the exploration of MOTIVES plays a significant role.

3. WISHES, INTENTIONS, ACTION AND POWER

If we were to interview people and ask them if they wish the problems of hunger, diseases caused by poverty, wars, killings ... to disappear, the answer would be "YES".

Why then do we not succeed in solving these problems?

Why Baroness Thatcher needed several years to successfully solve the problem of rampage of English football fans?

Why the French Minister of the Interior Sarkozy needed several months to solve the problem of rampage of French citizens, the arson, killings, demolition of shops and cars in the suburbs of French cities? How come these responsible people in France couldn't prevent the burning of cars for the New Year – 1,200 in New Year 2013, and in the last 10 years the number of burnt cars is over 30,000?

How come the Greek Government couldn't stop the diluvial violence of its citizens in Athens which is going on for months?

How come the U.S. Army cannot stop the killing of several hundreds of thousands of civilians in Iraq, a country from which four million Iraqis have fled or were forced to leave?

Is this ethnic cleansing, expelling or flight to save dear life?

Who is responsible and how can it be prevented?

Why did Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland fight in such a bloody manner for decades, all in such a civilised world?

Are we not hurt by a fact that China 20 years ago destroyed one whole civilization and culture in Tibet and continues to do so taking one whole people to the very edge of survival?

And what is it that we can do and why is there nothing that we can do?

Further examples are unnecessary, the list would be too long.

And when in the end in this huge sea of evil and atrocities which floods the world we find out about the events, how often and in which way do we get to the perpetrators?

Isn't it a hard way between the realization that something has happened and knowing who did it?

What do we need to have technologically and organization-wise, and in which ways do we have to work in order to uncover the perpetrators in such situations?

The impotence to do something to prevent or uncover a crime is a terribly wretched feeling, but it is not a crime.

4. POSSIBLE METHODOLOGICAL ERRORS IN UNDERSTANDING

I KNOW THAT I AM REPEATING MYSELF, BUT UNDERSTANDING IS A PAINFUL ISSUE

In countries which change the political system,

in countries which, along with the change of the political system emerge, come into being, constitute themselves, in countries which, along with the change of the political system and a simultaneous coming into being, must wage war against the aggressor, in such countries neither the President of the state of Croatia, nor the Presidency or the President of the Presidency of BiH, nor the Government, nor the ministers, nor the army which by its voluntary nature enables the creation and existence of the state, nor the commanders of this army, nor the military police or any other structure of society represent what these names mean in countries which the honourable judges and the prosecutor come from.

This is a very frequent mistake of distorted nominalism – to include into the content of a notion meanings of the state – culture – civilization which the observer comes from.

In such a way we come to a communication error, an error in understanding – the same word denotes largely different contents, and the interpretation of the system can be largely or completely erroneous.

I have seen and heard a lot of this from all the observers which were hanging around our areas at the time of the war.

Too little knowledge about the country into which they are coming, and too many cultural, civilizational, political patterns valid in the countries from which the moderators of the crisis come from. For instance, the pattern or matrix about the army – as an ordered structure including training, law, troop tradition, finances, the social aspect, positive selection, education, psychological support, sufficient redundancy of human and material resources, continuous control and checking of every segment, communication, etc..., then the matrix about the democratic society which starts functioning with the act of the passing of the law on free elections, then the matrix about the rule of law which appears when good laws are passed, on about the police which does its job well when a group of citizens puts on certain uniforms and gets certain badges.

It is not all that simple. More precisely, it is all much harder and complicated and usually takes decades.

With respect to the fact that sociology is a difficult science, and everyone is dealing with society and everyone usually knows all about it – the most frequent mistakes are:

- a) Reduction of a system to the level of one's own ignorance,
- b) The introduction of wrong assumptions whenever we need an explanation of a certain phenomenon.

I don't want anyone to think that this means that those who do not have it, have the right to commit any kind of crimes, certainly not, but a disorder of every social system necessarily leads to an increased number of those who, with the time, for a number of reasons, cross the threshold of the permissible.

This, of course, depends also on the effort, work, behaviour of those who lead such systems in the making.

I therefore think that only an all-encompassing and thorough analysis of individual cases can give the answer to whether criminal acts were incited, enabled through lack of punishment, keeping secret, tacit approval, or they fall into the usual statistical distribution of adverse phenomena which every war and every chaotic social situation brings with it.

Hereby, I enclose to you, dear reader, two pages of text about the war and the army.

The allied solution of a problem: Plan D

There was, however, another possibility: that the allied forces cross the Belgian border and wait for the Germans in Belgium. This third plan has been accepted, which, in the opinion of its creators, had two big advantages: by its implementation the French industrial and mining areas along the border would remain deep in one's own background, and Luftwaffe would be denied prominent airports for the attacks on Paris and London. However, then the question was raised where in Belgium should one wait for the enemy. The Belgians had, even before this plan was enacted, dismissed their own Chief of Staff only because he closed the barricades on the border crossings in the night of 13th January 1940, due to panic caused by the rumours on a German invasion, and made him apologize to the German Ambassador for this "non-neutralist" act. French and British commanders did not even meet their Belgian colleagues, let alone organize joint exercises or manoeuvres. Likewise, the sectors were not divided, the communication networks were not prepared, the supply lines of the British and French Army in Belgium were not organized, the warehouses of material in the open were not put up. All of this was supposed to be done only after the Germans strike: it was defined that the allied armies begin to build the necessary fortifications only after they come to their designated positions.

Taking into account that because of that the Allies found themselves faced with a monumental task, a conclusion is drawn that it would have been better and smarter for them not to have entered Belgium at all, but to fortify themselves on the Belgian border and wait there for the German attack. But that would mean to leave to the Germans air and maritime bases along the English Channel, and besides, it would force the French-British Army to sit idle behind their fortified line and watch the Belgian Army of only 20 divisions fight the Germans alone.

One thing was clear: whatever they did, whatever game they choose to play, the Allies will have a bad time and will find themselves in a quagmire – only due to an obstinate refusal of the Belgians to cooperate in their own defence. This attitude of the Belgians was finally confirmed when the Belgian Ambassador in London, several hours after the intrusion of Germans into his country, visited the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs and handed an official protest note of his Government, sent because the British Army crossed the French-Belgian border to fight against the aggressor without an official Belgian invitation.

The Anglo-French plan of bringing troops to the defence line, which followed the course of the rivers Meuse and Dyle (Plan D) meant that the entire allied army will have to rely as a bypass axis on the French 9th Army whose commander was general André-Georges Corap.

Corap's army, which due to that had to conduct a complicated manoeuvre of redeployment, was not only more sparsely distributed in its front than other allied armies, but was far below full formation strength with respect to the supply with anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. It also lacked vehicles necessary for the assigned move, and when the time for this move came, the large majority of its soldiers had to march on foot to new positions. Because of that, some units marched up to 120 km, which was a killing effort for an army about to face battle, especially if we take into account that the majority of the manpower were middle-aged reservists lacking in physical fitness.

This is what a British officer wrote upon returning from the inspection of a unit of the vitally important 9th Army: "Rarely does one have the opportunity to see such a disorderly, dirty and shabby unit. Almost all its soldiers were unshaven, their horses ungroomed, on the faces of the soldiers one could not see a trace of pride with oneself or the unit to which they belong. Still, what upset me most of all was the expression on their faces – sullen, frowning, dissatisfied, disobeying. Although an order was given: "Salute to the left!" they passed beside us with hardly anyone making an effort to obey."

Inaction, propaganda and alcohol are usually stated as the main reasons of the demoralization of the French Army in 1940. Within several months of almost complete inaction, drinking binges of soldiers became so common that the French State Railways had to set apart special rooms on all the major stations for the sobering of the dead drunk soldiers. To be fair to the truth, we must say that there were many first class divisions – with a high morale and first class equipment and arms. The low level of the value of reservists is primarily an indicator of the scope of the French mobilization (every eight adult man was mobilized), then an indicator of the state of regular formations.

5. THE PEOPLES' RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The peoples' right to secession from the community of states – THE FEDERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA!?

These rights are worthless if they are not in accord with the political interests of e.g. Britain, USA or France, or, or.

So Baker proclaims Slovenia and Croatia as countries which aim at separatism, (although Serbia has already left Yugoslavia), and with respect to the fact that he wishes to preserve Yugoslavia, he therefore tells the already prepared military troops of the JNA and armed Serbs to move on.

And when the JNA, armed Serbs and Serbian political leadership did not succeed in breaking an almost unarmed people, the Security Council proclaims the embargo on the purchase of weapons.

It is difficult to imagine a more shameful, miserable, deplorable, amoral decision, decision which runs against of every natural law on the self-preservation of an individual or a people, decision against every proclaimed legal principle on the right of the individual and people to self-defence.

And this unquestionable strength and power, pure and simple, mighty, strong, normal, causing a pure, authentic nausea. The existential nausea of Jean Paul Sartre.

And so this army, JNA force was killing us from the air, from the sea and on the land with weapons more powerful than ours, several hundreds of times, it killed both us and our towns and villages, religious objects and buildings, factories, by choice and without choice.

Then they forced us (like the Slovenians) to let the weapons, blocked in the barracks of the JNA, pass into BiH. Our weapons, weapons of our peoples' army, weapons that we have bought.

Because, in the words of the Western humanists, JNA and the Serbs will probably plant flowers in BiH with these weapons. And so it was.

And when this long announced diabolical banquet continued in BiH, the embargo was not cancelled.

Because this would probably evoke a war crisis. It is hard to trust one's intelligence.

Now, along with Croatia and the Croats, they were killing Muslims too. But, what more can one reasonably say about it. This decision had one additional devastating level of impact – the crumbling of state authority and crumbling of the entire structure of social life and institutions.

Weapons could have been bought only on the black market, and this game involved in an open, half-open and secret way state authorities, banks, customs officials, transport operators and hundreds and thousands of individuals, Croats and Muslims, and hundreds more from the Ukraine, Slovenia, Hungary, East Germany, Turkey, Iran, Argentina, France, Switzerland who wanted to help and make money or only to make money.

And when all of this is engrafted upon an absence of any moral social feeling which communism leaves behind as its basic sign, when you add to all this a network of communist secret services on all the levels of state and society, you get a hardly imaginable chaos. And this was it.

Because dad must not be guilty, because dad is impeccable, the children should get a beating.

Because someone must be guilty.

The so-called international community modelled the war on the areas of former Yugoslavia also by giving the green light to the preservation of Yugoslavia by war against Slovenia and Croatia, by the embargo for the import of weapons, by the request that the weapons of JNA, blocked in the barracks in Slovenia and Croatia be free to go into BiH, by the proposals for the solution of the crisis in which the aggressor is always rewarded with territory, by protected zones which they did not protect, by stopping of the Croatian (HV + HVO) and Muslim (A BiH) offensive in 1995 in front of Banja Luka.

Finally, by awarding the Serbs with 49% of the territory of BiH in Dayton and creation of RS /Republic of Srpska/.

It is true that they were giving humanitarian aid so as to be able to continue the *dance macabre*.

True, they also had observers observing it all.

I had a friend who would end up on the psychiatric ward, better to say the lunatic asylum every spring, when the nature's fluids are waking up. Fenced off by wire, he was explaining to me once when I visited him: "*You know Praljak, we are here because we are a minority.*"

Not to speak in the name of others, I also say to all of you here:

I ALSO ENDED UP WHERE I DID ONLY BECAUSE I AM WEAK AND I AM IN THE MINORITY.

Baker comes to Belgrade



Support to the preservation of Yugoslavia
James Baker

Belgrade, 18 June

Referring to unnamed American officials, the agency UPI reports that "the American administration is prepared to support a limited autonomy of six Yugoslav republics, in an attempt to motivate federal units to preserve the unity of the country", and that this subtle turn will be presented by the Secretary of State James Baker to the Yugoslav side during his visit to Belgrade.

Radio France International on this occasion states that the pressure of the West, until now directed exclusively on Serbia, is now at least evenly distributed, or even greater toward the northern republics. Transmitting the warning of the head of Italian diplomacy de Michelis – that the world will not allow the creation of new states in Europe and that every secessionism will be punished – the French radio points out that the Yugoslav side will hear the same viewpoint from Baker, Support to the preservation of Yugoslavia James Baker who will speak very tough with his hosts and discourage separatism which, in one way or another is the basic platform of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia alike.

In a letter dated 14 November 1991¹⁸² the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General as follows:

"I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 12 November 1991¹⁸¹ concerning an addition to the Member States contributing military personnel to the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia has been brought to the attention of the Council members. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter."

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF HUNGARY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Decision

At its 3009th meeting, on 25 September 1991, the Council decided to invite the representative of Yugoslavia to participate without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled:

"Letter dated 19 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23052)."²²

"Letter dated 19 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23053)."²²

"Letter dated 20 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23057)."²²

"Letter dated 24 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23069)."²²

Resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991

The Security Council.

Conscious of the fact that Yugoslavia has welcomed, through a letter from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council¹⁸³ the decision to convene a meeting of the Security Council.

Having heard the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁴

Deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia, which is causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage, and by the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in the border areas of neighbouring countries.

Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Commending the efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, through, *inter alia*, the implementation of a cease-fire including the sending of

observers, the convening of a conference on Yugoslavia, including the mechanisms set forth within it and the suspension of the delivery of all weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.

Recalling the relevant principles enshrined in the Charter, and in this context taking note of the declaration of 3 September 1991 of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that no territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable.

Taking note of the agreement for a cease-fire concluded on 17 September 1991 in Igalo, and also that signed on 22 September 1991.

Alarmed by the violations of the cease-fire and the continuation of the fighting.

Taking note of the letter dated 19 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.¹⁸⁵

Taking note also of the letters dated 19 and 20 September 1991 from, respectively, the Permanent Representative of Canada¹⁸⁶ and the Permanent Representative of Hungary¹⁸⁷ to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

Taking note further of the letters addressed to the Secretary-General dated 5 and 22 July, 6 and 21 August and 20 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands¹⁸⁸ the letter dated 12 July 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia,¹⁸⁹ the letter dated 7 August 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,¹⁹⁰ and the letter dated 19 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Australia¹⁹¹; as well as the letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 7 August 1991 from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Austria,¹⁹² and the letters dated 29 August and 4 and 20 September 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland¹⁹³ to the United Nations.

1. *Expresses its full support* for the collective efforts for peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia undertaken under the auspices of the member States of the European Community with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe consistent with the principles of that Conference;
2. *Supports fully* all arrangements and measures resulting from such collective efforts as those described above, in particular with regard to assistance and support to the ceasefire observers, and to consolidate an effective end to hostilities in Yugoslavia and to assure the smooth functioning of the process instituted within the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia;
3. *Invites* to this end the Secretary-General to offer his assistance without delay, in consultation with the Government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the efforts referred to above, and to report as soon as possible to the Security Council;
4. *Strongly urges* all parties to abide strictly by the ceasefire agreements of 17 and 22 September 1991;
5. *Appeals urgently to and encourages* all parties to settle their disputes peacefully and through negotiation at the Conference on Yugoslavia, including through the mechanisms set forth within it;
6. *Decides*, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Council decides otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia;
7. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Yugoslavia, which would permit all Yugoslavs to decide upon and to construct their future in peace;
8. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

Adopted unanimously at the 3009th meeting.

“The Geneva Agreement” on the withdrawal of JNA from Croatia

(Geneva, 23rd November 1991)

- a) Croatia will immediately end the blockade of all the barracks and facilities of JNA in Croatia;
- b) JNA will immediately start the withdrawal from Croatia of the manpower, weapons and military equipment from the above barracks and facilities, and complete the process of withdrawal in accordance with the existing mutually agreed schedule;
- c) both sides will immediately order to all the units under their command, control or political influence to observe the unconditional ceasefire, starting from tomorrow, 24th November, and will see to it that the paramilitary units which are not under their command, control or political influence, also observe the ceasefire starting from this date;
- d) both sides will facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to persons who suffered in recent clashes.

Lord Carrington will see to it to secure that the international Observer Mission does all in its power and competencies that the ceasefire lasts.

Geneva, Switzerland, 23rd November 1991

Signed:


Dr. Franjo Tuđman, President of the Republic of Croatia

Slobodan Milošević, President of the Republic of Serbia

general Veljko Kadijević, Federal Minister of Defence

Cyrus Vance, special envoy of the UN Secretary General

SOURCE: ***Glasnik***, Croatian political journal, No. 93, 17 February 1993, p. 24.



POLITICAL EVENTS

- Peace Conference on Yugoslavia: Opinion Nr. 1 of the Arbitration Commission:
“SFRY is now in the process of desintegration” (7-12.1991) - source: Vladimir Đuro Degan, Hrvatska država u međunarodnoj zajednici (The Croatian State in the International Community), Zagreb, 2002, p. 334-336
- **“Arbitration Commission came to the following conclusion:**
 - **that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is now in the process of its desintegration.”**

POLITICAL EVENTS

- Peace Conference on Yugoslavia: conclusion Nr. 3 of the Arbitration Commission (Paris, 11.1.1992) - source: Ministry for Information with the Republic of Croatia: Survey of Events, January, 1992.
“Second - The demarcation between Croatia and Serbia or between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, or, possibly, between other independent states with a mutual border, may be changed only subject to a free and mutual agreements.
Third - Lacking any agreement to the contrary, the previous borders will now be considered as the borders with the characteristics protected by the international law.”

POLITICAL EVENTS

The Republic of Croatia Parliament: Conclusion on Aggression committed Against Republic of Croatia (Zagreb, 8.10.1991) - source: Narodne novine, Nr. 53, 8, 10/1991:

“1. An armed aggression has been committed against the Republic of Croatia by the Republic of Serbia and the so-called JNA. Republic of Croatia is forced to defend itself against this aggression with all means at its disposal ...

4. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Montenegro are called herewith not to allow its state territory to be used for the war against the Republic of Croatia.”

6. THE POLITICIAN WHO KNOWS AND UNDERSTANDS – BARONESS MARGARET THATCHER

Excerpt from the book of Margaret Thatcher “Statecraft-Strategies For a Changing World”, Harper Collins Publisher Ltd., 2002, London

The Czech Republic has been one of the more successful post-communist countries, thanks mainly to the visionary economic policies of its former Prime Minister, my old friend and Hayekian extraordinaire, Vaclav Klaus. But he could not have succeeded as he did had the Czechs not retained an instinctive understanding of how to make a civil society and a free economy work. They gained these insights through the historical memory ingrained in their culture – it is, after all, worth remembering that before the Second World War Czechoslovakia enjoyed an income per head equal to that of France.

Mr Havel and I, though, agree entirely, I think, about what was wrong with communism – a system which (to quote him again) was “based on lies, hatred and coercion”.

Mr Gorbachev is lively, engaging and a great talker – a subject on which I am a good judge (on this occasion he spoke for about a third of the conference). But his remarks in Prague seemed to me, to say the least, of doubtful validity.

Yet nor should they be lightly dismissed. They represent the articulation of a strategy, common to the left in many countries, of seeking to escape all blame for communism and then going on to take credit for being more pragmatic, modern and insightful about the world which those who actually fought communism have created. It is a pressing necessity to expose and defeat both distortions.

I still find it astonishing that even the left should try to deny all this. It is, of course, not a crime to be wrong. But it is not far short of criminal to behave as some of them did when they thought that the Soviet Union was on the winning side. These people were blind because they did not want to see, and because they were intoxicated with the classic socialist fantasy of believing that state power offers a short-cut to progress. Thus the American journalist Lincoln Steffens observed after visiting the Soviet Union in 1919: “I have seen the future; and it works.”

At the height of the famine of 1932, the worst in Russia’s history, the visiting biologist Julian Huxley found “a level of physique and general health rather above that to be seen in England”. Similarly, George Bernard Shaw wrote that “Stalin has delivered the goods to an extent that seemed impossible the years ago, and I take my hat off to him.” H.G. Wells was equally impressed, reporting that he had “never met a man more candid, fair and honest ... no-one is afraid of him and everybody trusts him”. Harold Lask considered that Soviet prisons (stuffed full of political prisoners in appalling conditions) enabled convicts to lead “a full and self-respecting life”.

The establishment of the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (by UNSC Resolution 827 on 25 May 1993) and that of the tribunal for Rwanda (by UNSC Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994) were both admissions of defeat by the West and the wider international community. In the countries of the former Yugoslavia – Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia – Slobodan Milošević and his agents had used the Yugoslav army and gangs of extremist Serb paramilitaries to wage war against non-Serbs. He had done this in a manner that was so barbarous and so shameless – and so close to the West – that it was impossible for Europe and America to overlook it. Yet for reasons which need to be examined more closely in a different context he had been allowed to get away with it. Indeed, at various stages he had been given what appeared in Belgrade to be a “green light” to continue his efforts. Having made the wrong decisions when the conflict started in 1991, and having assiduously sought to place the blame equally on victim and aggressor, the greatest world power, America, had to find a way to respond to mounting horror around the world.

Balkan Wars

A SUITABLE CASE FOR INTERVENTION

Bismarck, it is alleged, once remarked: “The Balkans are not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.” In this opinion, the iron Chancellor has found many adherents.

Those of the “Bismarckian” school believe that the United States and/or the countries of Europe have no significant interests at stake in the region and that the inhabitants had better be allowed to sort themselves out – or, more likely, not sort themselves out. For those who favour a non-interventionist approach because of lack of strategic interest usually also assume that the region is a political morass. Its history is thus viewed as baleful. Its leaders are understood to be irrational. Its peoples are regarded as frankly impossible. In such circumstances, it goes without saying that ordinary strategies and moral criteria do not apply. We may lament what happens, but ‘twas always will be – thus. This is only a slightly over-simplified description of the sort of views that were widely expressed in the media in the early 1990s, as the Balkans began to hurtle into genocide.

There is, however, another view, almost equally widely held, particularly today when Balkan non-interventionism tout court is less respectable. This is the belief, which is particularly prevalent on the liberal-left, that the Balkans are a litmus test, and that events there offer lessons which apply far beyond the region. These people are convinced that the only way to stop nationalism creating wars and atrocities is – to put it bluntly – to banish nationhood itself. They think that it is only international bodies – political, military and judicial – that can be relied upon to maintain acceptable standards of conduct. And just as they seem to want to turn the Balkan region into a kind of quasi-protectorate involving NATO, the UN and the EU, so their ultimate ambition is to extend the multinational approaches developed there and apply them to more and more of “global village”.

I have already, I hope, explained why I believe that this second group’s brand of utopian internationalism is unrealistic and indeed harmful. Whether at home or abroad, the task of statesmen is to work with human nature, warts and all, and to draw on instincts and even prejudices that can be turned to good purpose. It is never to try to recreate Mankind in a new image. And, more practically in this case, attempting to build a perfectly just and permanently peaceful Balkans could lead the West into a disproportionate and unacceptable diversion of effort and resources.*

The trouble is that the first, “Bismarckian”, approach to the region was a terrible failure when it was pursued in the early 1990s. Actually, there was never a policy of complete non-intervention. “Pure” isolationism would probably have been less harmful than the policies that were in fact then adopted. The West, after all, did intervene to try to keep old Yugoslavia together and put heavy and public pressure on those who had the temerity and want to leave it. Western nations, among others, imposed an arms embargo which gave the aggressor an overwhelming advantage and which thus encouraged aggression. Finally, the West brokered numerous ceasefires (which were not heeded) and issued numerous threats (which were ignored). So it would be better to describe the Western attitude at that time as ineffectual interference rather than true disengagement.

In any case, it is a very short-sighted view of national and strategic interest that fails to take account of the indirect along-side the direct impact of crises.

Allowing flagrant aggression to succeed is always dangerous, even if the immediate consequences seem limited, because of the precedent it sets. That is doubly so when such aggression occurs in a region that is historically part of Europe, that adjoins NATO, and that is itself deeply unstable.

It is nowadays sometimes forgotten just how many countries risked being dragged into Slobodan Milošević’s wars. His suppression of ethnic Hungarians and others in Vojvodina risked conflict with neighbouring Hungary. His brutalities towards ethnic Albanians in Kosovo outraged neighbouring Albania and inflamed Macedonia’s Albanian minority. Serbia’s traditional ambitions to seize, or at least partition, Macedonia suggested that this new state also was lined up for destruction. And this in turn would undoubtedly have brought in Serbia’s old ally, fellow Orthodox Greece, which regarded Macedonia with predatory hostility. Nor were the Greeks the only NATO

* See pp. 34-5, 262-7.

members who could have been drawn into the maelstrom. Turkey, whose links with the Bosnian Muslims rest on history, culture, religion and indeed the presence of some two million ethnic Bosnians still living on Turkish soil, was rightly furious at the abandonment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Clearly, any conflict which threatens to involve so many nations, some of them the West's closest allies, cannot fail to involve our own national interests too.

There is, though, another reason why a sensible strategy in the Balkans required diplomatic toughness, credible threats of force and, as matters worsened, effective military action: and this was the nature of the enemy himself. Any properly informed assessment of Slobodan Milošević, the goals which drove him, and the means he possessed to achieve them, would have shown that he had to be stopped – and, equally important, that he could be stopped.

The aims which he and his collaborators had set themselves were well enough known. The Serbs, though capable of great duplicity in negotiations, enjoy a certain amount of crude but frank bragging about their ambitions. In a manner that most of us would find astonishing, Milošević spoke like this even on the very eve of his mass ethnic cleansing of the Kosovars. General Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, gave the following account of one conversation:

He [Milošević] said to us, "I will solve the Kosovo problem once and for all in spring 1999" ... We asked him, "How will you do it, Mr President?"

"We will do to them what did to the Albanians in Drenica in 1945." So we said to him, "Mr President, we do not know what you did to the Albanians in 1945. Would you be so kind as to elaborate?"

"It is quite simple. We got them together and we shot them."

That was his answer.*

Yet the other side to the question is equally important. The Serbian war machine was never as strong as the Serbs made out, or as most international observers thought. A great deal of silliness was talked about how Tito and the Partisans had held down between twenty and thirty German divisions during the Second World War.† But this apparent parallel overlooked the enormously important consideration that Milošević's forces were up against numerous and highly motivated, if initially poorly armed, forces of Croats, Bosnians and Kosovars. It was the Serbs who were in this case the occupiers of other nations' territory and were thus in the equivalent position of the wartime German forces. Moreover, while it is true that by some measurements the Yugoslav army began the conflict as the fourth largest army in Europe, it was rapidly affected by desertions, poor morale and loss of weaponry which was either captured, destroyed or disabled. The Serb paramilitary organisations – known as Chetniks – upon which the regular forces increasingly relied were more highly motivated because of their visceral hatred of non-Serbs. But they too were generally more adept at raping and slaughtering civilians than at confronting well-disciplined military opponents.

I would, though add a further reason why action was required to stop Milošević. In circumstances where great evils – and genocide is indeed such an evil – threaten, the West has a moral duty to prevent them if possible and to stop them if that is manageable. This assertion too could probably be justified on grounds of broad national interest. But the truth is that countries whose populations and political leaders once stop being indignant about wickedness on such a scale cease to be fully human. In some cases – and one such case was, surely, Bosnia – we know in our conscience that the situation which thousands of innocent men, women and children face cannot be endured and must no longer be ignored.

VUKOVAR

It is important for all of us, particularly perhaps for political leaders, to come up at least once in our lives against the physical reality of evil. We know – or at least we should know – that evil exist. But it is only when we can see, touch and smell it, as I did on a visit to Vukovar in Eastern Croatia in September 1998, that it adopts a presence that is so real that one can never forget it.

* Fourteenth Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence: *The Lessons of Kosovo*, 23 October 2000.

† Professor Norman Stone has comprehensively demolished this and other myths, writing in the *Sunday Times*, 16 August 1992.

CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS IN THE BALKANS

1987 – 2001

1987

- *April-December: Slobodan Milošević gains control of Serbian Communist Party*

1989

- *27 February: Yugoslav troops sent to suppress unrest in Kosovo*
- *8 May: Milošević becomes President of Serbia*
- *28 June: Milošević addresses mass rally of Serbs at Kosovo Polje, on the six hundredth anniversary of Battle of Kosovo*

1991

- *May: Beginning of Croatian-Serb rebellion*
- *25 June: Slovenia and Croatia declare independence*
- *27 June: Yugoslav army attacks Slovenia*
- *25 September: UN imposes arms embargo on all of former Yugoslavia*
- *19 November: Fall of Vukovar to Serb forces*

1992

- *2 January: UN mediator Cyrus Vance negotiates ceasefire for Croatia*
- *15 January: EC recognises Croatia and Slovenia*
- *21 February: UN sends fourteen thousand peacekeeping troops to Croatia*
- *29 February: Bosnia-Herzegovina declares independence. Bosnian Serbs proclaim separate state*
- *5 April: Bosnian Serbs begin siege of Sarajevo*

1993

- *2 January: Cyrus Vance and David Owen unveil plan at Geneva peace talks to divide Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous provinces*
- *22 February: UN sets up war crimes tribunal (ICTY) for former Yugoslavia*
- *6 May: UN declares six “safe areas” for Bosnian Muslims: Srebrenica, Žepa, Sarajevo, Bihać, Tuzla and Goražde*
- *15 – 16 May: In a referendum Bosnian Serbs vote for an independent Bosnian Serb state*

1994

- *5 February: Sixty killed and two hundred wounded in mortar attack on Sarajevo*
- *18 March: Bosnian government and Bosnian Croats sign US-brokered accord*
- *13 May: Five-nation Contact Group announces new plan and eventual partition of Bosnia*
- *20 July: Bosnian Serbs reject peace plan*
- *21 November: NATO launches major air strike on Serb airfield*
- *25 November: Serbs detain fifty-five Canadian peacekeepers*

1995

- *1 May: Ceasefire expires. Croatia launches offensive to retake Western Slavonia (“Operation Lightning”)*
- *26 May: Serbs take more UN peacekeepers hostage. Eventually 370 sized*
- *28 May: Aircraft carrying Bosnian Foreign Minister Irgan Ljubijankić shot down by Serbs over Bihać; US, Britain and France send thousands more troops to Bosnia*
- *15 June: Serbs step up shelling of Sarajevo and other “safe area”*
- *11 July: Serbs overrun Srebrenica “safe area”*
- *12 – 13 July: Thousands of Muslim men detained (later murdered), while twenty thousand Muslim women, children and elderly are expelled to Tuzla*

- 25 July: Serbs take Žepa; War crimes tribunal indicts Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić for genocide in Bosnia. Croatian Serb leader Milan Martić charged with war crimes for missile attack on Zagreb
- 4 August: Croatia launches assault on rebel Serbs in Knin (Serb "Krajina"), recapturing most Serb-held territory in four days (Operation "Storm")
- 28 August: Bosnian Serb shell kills thirty-seven in Sarajevo market. UN secretly pulls peacekeepers out of Goražde
- 30 August: NATO launches major air strikes on Serb guns around Sarajevo. Serbs retaliate by shelling Sarajevo
- 1 November: Bosnian peace talks begin in Dayton, Ohio
- 21 November: Dayton Accords signed. Fifty-one per cent of Bosnian territory granted to Muslim-Croat federation, 49 percent to Serbs
- 22 November: UN Security Council suspends sanctions against Serbia
- 23 November: Karadžić accepts peace plan
- 30 November: UN votes to end peacekeeping mission by 31 January 1997
- 1 December: NATO authorises deployment of sixty thousand troops to Bosnia
- 14 December: Serbs, Bosnians and Croats sign peace plan. Bosnian and Serb governments agree to formal diplomatic recognition
- 20 December: NATO takes over command of Bosnia peace mission

WAR AGAINST SLOVENIA AND CROATIA

When Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991, they could be said from one point of view to be taking a step that had been logical ever since the creation of the first Yugoslavia – more accurately the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – in 1918. Multinational states are always inherently unstable. They can only work in one of two ways. The first is if each of the constituent peoples respects the others, and the state then functions as some kind of confederation. The second is if there is an authoritarian central power able to enforce its will. In Yugoslavia it was the second option that was applied, originally under the royal dictatorship and then under communism. Indeed, since its foundation Yugoslavia was under authoritarian or totalitarian rule for nearly all of its existence. Once the central power was weakened, the country suffered the same fate as that other artificial unit knitted together by communism, the Soviet Union.

This analysis contains part – but only part – of the truth. Tito's death in 1980 and the creation for a "revolving" federal presidency certainly did allow the inherent contradictions of Yugoslavia to become ever more obvious and the fissiparous tendencies to grow apace. But the drive of Slovenia, followed by Croatia, followed by Bosnia, for full independence can only really be originating from Serbia. Historians of the Balkans often trace the rise of an aggressive Serb nationalism aimed at the creation of a Greater Serbia, incorporating (as the phrase has it) "all Serbs everywhere" in one single Serb state, to developments in the nineteenth century. But in modern times it was the resurfacing of this programme in the form of a notorious Memorandum by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the mid-1980s which signalled the beginning of the madness that was to come. As communism lost its grip on the masses, hard-line nationalism offered a substitute for those who wanted power. Yesterday's Marxists in much of Eastern Europe suddenly became born-again patriots. But no one performed this chameleon-like self-transformation with greater cunning or more deadly consequences than Slobodan Milošević in Yugoslavia.

Milošević remains in some ways a mystery. Was he always just an opportunist? Or did he from the start subscribe to the hate-filled doctrines which his troops and the Serb paramilitaries put into practice? In any case, from the time that he used the ethnic disturbances in Kosovo in 1987 to oust his rivals and become the champion of the Greater Serbian dream, his whole existence depended upon the oppression, expulsion and when necessary murder of non-Serbs.

Without Milošević, the wars against the other constituent nations of Yugoslavia would probably not have happened at all. And if they had happened, they would have been far less bloody and prolonged. Milošević was able to give effect to the wildest and most terrible fantasies of the Balkan mind precisely because he was not

himself just a frenzied bigot. As a communist boss, he could use all the resources which the Party provided. As a smooth-talking negotiator, he was just the man to persuade a string of vain and gullible Westerners that he was part of the solution rather than the root of the problem.

Milošević had performed his own coup in the Yugoslav Communist Party, and Serbia had performed its coup within Yugoslavia, even before Slovenia and Croatia decided they had to leave. The Slovenes were able to escape and the Yugoslav army's attempts to crush them were ignominiously defeated. But when it came to Croatia, there was a substantial Serb minority whom Milošević and his friends were determined to unite with Serbia. Belgrade thus incited and armed Croatian Serbs to rise up against Zagreb and then sent in the Yugoslav army to "restore order" – which meant assisting the rebels and driving all non-Serbs from their land.

Faced with this challenge, Western leaders made, as I have mentioned, three key errors. First, they tried to keep Yugoslavia together when it was clearly no longer possible to do so. This gave the Yugoslav army the impression that there would be no outside opposition to its trying to suppress the separatists by force. Second, the international community imposed an arms embargo on all the component parts of the former Yugoslavia. This deprived the Slovenes, Croats and Bosnians of the means to defend themselves and left them heavily outgunned by the aggressor. Third, the attempt at even-handedness in assessing blame for what was occurring, when the truth was that one side was the aggressor and the other the victim, led the West into something approaching complicity with the crimes being committed. Far from being "the hour of Europe", as Jacques Poos (the then Foreign Minister of Luxembourg) proclaimed, it was the hour of Europe's shame.

In January 1992 Slovenia and Croatia finally received international recognition. This is still sometimes declared an error and even blamed for the outbreak of the war in Bosnia. But that is nonsense. International recognition of Croatia at least meant that there were now limits to what Belgrade could hope to achieve. The war in Croatia accordingly gradually ground to a halt. And as for Bosnia, the Serbs had begun their campaign of creating Serb enclaves there before the Bosnians declared independence in October 1991. The Serb war in Bosnia was not provoked – it was planned.

In any case, by February 1992 when the UN despatched fourteen thousand "peacekeepers" to Croatia, about a third of the country was in Serb hands. The UN force then presided over continued ethnic cleansing of Croats from Croatian territory and, as Croatia grew stronger, began to act as a force protecting the Serb aggressors. Meanwhile, Milošević and the army chiefs who had obligingly been permitted by the international negotiators to withdraw their heavy weapons from Croatia to Bosnia were now able to set them to work against the non-Serb inhabitants there.

The lessons of the conflict in Croatia were not to be learned for several more years. But they were already clear if anyone had been honest enough to deduce them.

- **There should have been no attempt to keep Yugoslavia together, once the constituent nations showed they wished to leave it**
- **The right to self-defence by those under attack should have been respected**
- **And the early stages of aggression against Slovenia and Croatia should have drawn condemnation, followed by an ultimatum, followed by military action – air strikes, combined with the supply of arms to the besieged, would undoubtedly have saved Vukovar and other Croatian cities.**

WAR AGAINST BOSNIA

Looking back at the history of this war, one sees that the real causes of Bosnia's destruction have come from outside Bosnia itself, and have done so twice over: first in the form of the political strategy of the Serbian leadership, and then in the form of the miscomprehension and fatal interference of the leaders of the West.*

This judgement by Noel Malcolm, the soundest and wisest commentator on Balkan affairs today, seems to me to be precisely right.

The background to the Bosnian genocide was provided by the same odious doctrine as lay behind the slaughter at

* Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (London, 1994), p.251.

Vukovar, but whereas towards the Croats it manifested itself in hatred, towards the Muslims it spoke the language of contempt. Anyone who wants to read the evidence for this need only consult Professor Norman Cigar's profound and disturbing volume, *Genocide in Bosnia*.*

This kind of Greater Serbian racist thinking was summed up in the words of the West's one-time heroine and now indicted war criminal Mrs Biljana Plavšić about the Muslim Bosnians, whom she described as "a genetic defect on the Serbian body".†

But the outside world also played its part in what followed. In particular, the attempt at "even-handedness", which robbed the West's approach towards Croatia of both moral integrity and practical effect, continued in Bosnia. Thus the international community deprived the Bosnian Muslims of the chance to arm themselves. Yet it did not itself afford them any serious protection from Bosnian Serb forces, which had been provided with a well-stocked arsenal by the Yugoslav army. The West's equivocation damaged our own interests too. It outraged the Muslim world, which claimed – not without reason – that atrocities on this scale would never have been permitted if they had been perpetrated against Jews or Christians. By the end of the conflict, Islamic extremists had begun to appear in Bosnia, an area where there had traditionally been exemplary tolerance and where Islam had always had a distinctly European countries which wavered till the end – recognised these dangers and acted upon them. But by then some two hundred thousand people were dead.

The siege of Sarajevo began in April 1992 and continued until February 1996. During that period the suffering of the population was enormous. But arguably what was happening elsewhere in Bosnia was still worse. Far away from the television cameras, campaigns of violence and terror, involving mass rape, unspeakable torture and concentration camps, were employed by the Bosnian Serb leadership, with the support from Belgrade, to achieve the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs from what its proponents claimed was historic Serb territory. All in all over two million people (out of a pre-war population of 4.3 million) were driven out of their homes.

An estimated nine hundred thousand people took refuge in neighbouring countries and in Western Europe, while 1.3 million were displaced within Bosnia.‡ In Croatia and Bosnia, particularly, the burden of caring for these people was crushing.

These refugee flows were destabilising, and were intended to be so. The arrival of thousands of Muslim refugees in Central Bosnia, shifting the ethnic balance between Muslims and Croats, was an important contributory factor to the open warfare which broke out in March 1993 between the two.§

During this whole period international conferences were held and international mediators were appointed in order to try to bring what were called the "warring parties" to the negotiating table. I have no doubt that the mediators did their best. But mediation could be no substitute for reversing aggression, and without the West summoning up the will to do that the mediators found themselves sucked into a process which steadily entrenched and legitimised the ascendancy of aggressor. Indeed, sometimes the negotiators unwittingly created the conditions for more bloodshed.

In reality, by the end of 1992 the Serbs had seized most of the territory that they thought they could hold. Although constituting just 31 per cent of the population they had thus gained control of over 70 per cent of the land. From that point on, their main purpose was to expel the non-Serbs from it so as to remove all trace of them, their cultures and their religions. The Serbs needed time to proceed with this, particularly in areas where there were large numbers of well-established Muslim and Croat communities to dislodge. The international community gave them that time.

Even as the Bosnian Muslims recovered and regrouped, forming a better-trained army and acquiring more weapons, the Serbs were able to hold the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, to ransom, shelling its population whenever they chose. And the international community's responses were largely ineffectual, and sometimes worse.

* Norman Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing* (Texas A&M University Press, 1995). Professor Cigar and Dr Malcolm were among those who provided me with invaluable briefing during the Bosnian crisis.

† Quoted by *The Times*, 12 January 2001.

‡ UNHCR figures.

§ Information has also surfaced since the death of President Tudjman confirming Zagreb's involvement in these matters, and more revelations are possible.

What the West should have done was to work out and put into effect a coherent programme to defeat the aggressor and reverse the aggression. Of course, this was never going to be easy. It would have taken time. It would also have entailed abandoning the pretence that “peacekeeping” was the West’s objective. The arms embargo against the Bosnians would have had to be lifted. The Russians would have had to be marginalised and their objections ignored. And the only global power – America – rather than the deeply divided Europeans, would have had to take the lead.

In fact, above all, necessary to shift the balance of power against the Serbs on the ground. This meant bringing together the Muslims and Croats. In March 1994 the conflict between them was ended by an agreement brokered in Washington. A Muslim-Croat Bosnian Federation was established and at the same time a con-federal agreement between Bosnia and Croatia. The new alliance was also strengthened by the provision of training and weapons for the Croatian army, which was thus turned into an extremely effective force.

Seeing the way the tide was beginning to turn, Slobodan Milošević decided that the time had come to settle. The practical limits of Greater Serbia had been reached. Milošević must also have known that the ill-organised gangsters who controlled the so-called Serb Krajina area of Croatia and the Bosnian Serb “Republic” were a good deal weaker than the West thought. Consequently, in the summer of 1994 he tried to induce the Bosnian Serbs to accept what would have amounted to a partition of Bosnia highly favourable to the Serbs, who would have received 49 per cent of Bosnia, while the Muslim-Croat federation received 51 per cent.*

The Bosnian Serbs, however, were confident enough of their own position and contemptuous enough of the West’s threats to refuse the deal and to carry out new offensives. NATO accordingly responded with air strikes. The Serbs then retaliated by seizing more than four hundred international peacekeepers. The consequences of past follies were never more evident. Western forces in Bosnia were by now not an asset, they were a liability, because they were potential hostages.

1995 was the year of decision- in May the Croatian army retook Serb-held West Slavonia. The Serbs in retaliation fired rockets at Zagreb, killing six and wounding two hundred civilians. But the rapid success of the Croatian campaign had openly exposed just how weak the Serb rebels in occupied Croatia now were. The Serbs in Bosnia imitated the tactics of their counterparts in Croatia by attacking civilian targets. Thus in June they stepped up the shelling of Sarajevo and, worst of all, in July they overran the so-called UN “safe haven” of Srebrenica. For the West this was perhaps the most humiliating and disgraceful episode of the whole crisis: and for the Muslim inhabitants of the town it meant expropriation, expulsion and – for about seven thousands of them – death.

There has been much rewriting of history about what now happened. The truth is that Croatia, with support from the largely Muslim Bosnian army and from Bosnian Croat forces, acted to do what the international community for four long, shameful years had failed to do. Croatia and her allies won back much of their land from the Serbs and by their victory created the circumstances for a return to some semblance of peace and order. On 4 August the Croatian army retook Knin and quickly swept through the Krajina area. Having insufficient heavy weapons – because of the West’s foolish arms embargo – the Muslims were not able to achieve comparable successes. But the fact remains that had it not been for a new intervention by the West – whose leaders were as always keen to snatch at least partial defeat from the mouth of complete victory – the main Bosnian Serb-held city, Banja Luka, would also have fallen. Had this happened, Bosnia would have been rescued as a united country in which there was some prospect of different ethnic communities eventually being able to live together under a democratically elected central authority. Banja Luka, we should note, had itself been the scene of massive ethnic cleansing by the Serbs who had burnt down the hated mosques and Catholic churches which might serve to remind them of the multi-faith and multiracial past. If anywhere deserved to be liberated from the ethnic cleansers it was Banja Luka.

It is not possible, particularly after years of such brutality, to conduct even just wars without loss to civilians. The Serbs who now streamed out of the retaken areas were some of them fleeing retribution. Some were doubtless intimidated. Many more were falsely persuaded by their leaders that they risked wholesale massacre. There were indeed within the reconquered Krajina area episodes of killing, looting and burning by the incoming Croats.

But these culpable incidents do not detract from the fact that the defeat by the Croatians and Bosnians of the Serbs in 1995 was immensely beneficial for the region and indeed for the West. Without that defeat, Balkan

* I was told this myself at this time by a Croatian and a Bosnian General, and, of course, they were proved right.

genocide and Western humiliation would have continued. To try, as some have done. To equate the operation launched to retake Croatian land with earlier acts of Serb aggression is a travesty.

NATO air strikes against Serb artillery around Sarajevo at this time also provided valuable support for the Croat and Muslim forces. Disproving all the learned nonsense emanating from military sources, it was shown that air strikes could indeed work without large-scale deployment of ground troops. The task on the ground could be left to local not international forces – as long as the former were sufficiently armed. And just in case anyone imagines that this analysis is merely hindsight, perhaps I could quote myself three years before the event:

It is argued by some that nothing can be done by the West unless we are prepared to risk permanent involvement in a Vietnam – or Lebanon-style conflict and potentially high Western casualties. That is partly alarmism, partly an excuse for inertia. There is a vast difference between a full-scale land invasion like Desert Storm and a range of military interventions from lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, through supplying arms to Bosnian forces, to direct strikes on military targets and communications.

I went on to argue that in the event of continuing support for Bosnian Serb aggression by Serbia itself:

*... military retaliation should follow, including aerial bombardment of bridges on the Drina linking Bosnia and Serbia, of military convoys, of gun positions around (the besieged) Sarajevo and Goražde, and of military stores and other installations useful in the war. It should be made clear that while this is not a war against the Serbian people, even installations on the Serbian side of the border may be attacked if they play an important role in the war.**

What happened in 1995 showed that such tactics work. But it was only during the latter stages of the Kosovo campaign in 1999 that my prescription was applied – though still, as I shall describe, with insufficient commitment.

The Dayton Accords which were signed in the autumn of 1995 still provide the framework within which Bosnia functions – or does not function. Like all the previous partition plans they represented an excessive concern for the (now defeated) Bosnian Serbs who had caused the whole problem at the first place. The Serbs were given a separate autonomous entity, the Republika Srpska. It was to be part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the names of the institutions themselves betrayed the thinking: while the Serb entity was called a “republic”, Bosnia-Herzegovina itself lost that title.

The Dayton Accords are enormously detailed, and this also is significant. Different and contrary trends and tensions were involved. The Muslims stressed those aspects which reinforced the territorial and institutional integrity of the state. The Serbs and to a lesser extent the Croats emphasised those which devolved power locally. The undertaking which was fundamental to the whole settlement, though, was that the refugees should be allowed to return to their homes. If this did not happen Dayton meant partition and victory for the ethnic cleansers and their sponsors in Belgrade.

And that is exactly how it has so far turned out. While progress has been made in returning refugees to the territories of the Muslim-Croat Federation, the authorities in the Republika Srpska have remained determined to prevent members of the minority communities coming back to the homes from which they were driven. Thus of the 715,000 refugees who have returned, 80 per cent have gone back to the Federation and only 20 per cent to the Serb-controlled areas.† It is sometimes argued that these figures do not matter. “You cannot force people to live together if they don’t want to,” the saying runs. And that much, of course, is true. But it is not acceptable that people who do want to return should be stopped from doing so.

In fact, the position is worse than that. While it is certainly true that the years of war will leave deep and enduring scars on Bosnian life, a Bosnia which does not have an intermixture of faiths and ethnicity is one which will some time explode again. I am not one of those who sees our goal in Bosnia as the creation of some ideal multicultural state. But I do believe that political arrangements which are based upon violence, intimidation and theft will eventually break down – and will deserve to do so.

* My article in the New York Time, 6 August 1992. For an account of my involvement in attempts to rescue Bosnia, see *The Path to Power*, pp. 514-17.

† Bosnian government figures, as of 30 January 2001.



Human behavior in civil unrest and war

- Examples:
 - Hurricane Katrina
 - New York blackout
 - Theo van Gogh
 - Riots in Paris
 - Massacre in My Lai, Vietnam



Table of contents

- **Theory:**
 - Ochocracy
 - Looting
- **Examples:**
 - Hurricane Katrina
 - New York blackout
 - Theo van Gogh
 - Riots in Paris
 - Massacre in My Lai, Vietnam
- **Conclusion**
- **References**

Theory

Ochlocracy - Mob rule

- **Definition:**

- Ruling of unorganized groups of people. This term implies that formal authority does not exist in the state. 'Ochlocracy' is different from term anarchy because anarchy is a state of complete chaos, while in 'ochlocracy' behavior, smaller groups exist and operate. These groups function on principal "the stronger one rules", until the stronger groups comes and take over the control. These groups are for that reason very local and temporary.

- **Ochlocracy and crime:**

- Term 'mob' is sometimes used for organized crime. As it is relatively easy crime takes advantage of situation where law enforcement lacks and general public is confused, the term "mob" is also used for ruling of those people which purposely create groups (mobs) and lead them to violent behavior.

Looting (connected to robbing)

- **Definition:**

- Taking goods by using force as a part of military of political victory, or during natural disaster, war, terrorist attack, riots etc. Term looting was in the beginning only used for taking goods as a result of military victory, not only by the winner army but as well as domestic population which has used the situation for their own personal benefit.

- **Reasons:**

- Lack of government ability to protect its population from violence has different reasons – being paralyzed during terrorist attack or natural disaster, as well as lack of communication channels. In some cases of natural disaster taking property of others is necessary for survival. But in most cases looting has an opportunistic character, as criminals believe that the crime will go unpunished and that committing crime in such conditions is "not so bad" as everyone is doing it. Sometimes looters believe that if they don't steel it, someone else will.

- **Punishment :**

- Due to almost impossible conditions to punish all looters, even in western democracies death penalties can be undertaken. By using death penalty (allowing police to shoot at looters), the damage to economy can be somewhat decreased.

- **Looting in history:**

- After death of Valentiniana iii in 455, vandals destroyed Rome.
- Looting was spread out in Moscow before Napoleon troops went in the city.
- In 1992 during time of Rodney King riots, due to severe looting some shop owners defended their shops with fire arms.

Examples

Hurricane Katrina – August 2005 (part 1)

Number of killed and dead persons, crime statistics:

- It is impossible to come up with the correct number of crimes during natural disaster due to several reasons:
 - Small number of victims report the attack as they don't believe that criminals in such conditions can be found.
 - In conditions where there are lot of deaths, it is difficult to determine direct and indirect causes of death (some died because the tree fell on their head, some as the hospital did not have enough medicines, and some were homicide victims or committed a suicide).
- On Columbia University /The Earth Institute, J. Mutter has conducted a research on number of dead after Katrina, as it was an issue to determine number of dead due to hurricane Katrina. He posted the complete list on the web page <http://www.katrinelist.columbia.edu/> :
 - Total number died due to Katrina: 1887 people.
 - Out of this number 93 unidentified persons, 595 disappeared, 1292 died.

Hurricane Katrina – August 2005 (part 2)

New Orleans Police Department still does not have data about crimes committed several days/weeks after hurricane Katrina

Offen sa	Djelo	1999	2000	Promjena 1999-2000	Offen sa2	2001	2002	Promjena 2000-2001	Stupao4	Offen sa7	20032
Murder	Ubistvo	159	203	27.67%	Murder	212	257	21.23%	Murder	Murder	274
Rape	Silovanje	280	225	-19.64%	Rape	209	162	-22.49%	Rape	Rape	213
Armed Robbery	Oruzana pljacka	1981	1810	-8.63%	Armed Robbery	2139	1517	-29.08%	Armed Robbery	Armed Robbery	1533
Simple Robbery	Oblčna pljacka	752	611	-18.75%	Simple Robbery	639	477	-25.35%	Simple Robbery	Simple Robbery	536
Assault	Prileskup	2760	2304	-16.52%	Assault	2677	2142	-19.99%	Assault	Assault	2033
Violent Crime Total	Našini zločini total	6932	6163	-11.19%	Violent Crime Total	6876	4666	-32.14%	Violent Crime Total	Violent Crime Total	4689
Burglary	Razbojsko	5626	5230	-7.04%	Burglary	5261	4759	-9.54%	Burglary	Burglary	4864
Theft	Kradja	17086	15575	-8.84%	Theft	16178	14325	-11.50%	Theft	Theft	12702
Auto Theft	Kradja auta	7118	7866	10.51%	Auto Theft	8751	7566	-13.54%	Auto Theft	Auto Theft	6869
Non-Violent Crime Total	Ukupan broj nenašinih zločina	28830	28871	0.14%	Non-Violent Crime Total	30189	28860	-4.37%	Non-Violent Crime Total	Non-Violent Crime Total	24436
Total Index Crimes	Total Indeks Zločina	36762	33824	-8.01%	Total Index Crimes	38076	31206	-18.05%	Total Index Crimes	Total Index Crimes	29024

Source: New Orleans Police Department, Technical Services Bureau, Information Systems & Services Division



Hurricane Katrina – August 2005 (part 3)

- Even police officers were involved in looting in New Orleans (different films on Internet available).
- National guard had a permission to shoot as looting got out of control.
- Police officers shot at what they thought were looters and fatal incident of "Danzinger Bridge" occurred – 6 contractors out of total 14, members of Army Corps of Engineers were traveling across the Danziger Bridge under police escort when from the other side police officers opened fire.
- Police officers had to put barricade around police stations in order to avoid sniper shots.
- It was shot at the helicopter.
- American government and president did not react in time: buses and trains were not used for evacuation, Red Cross was not granted access to the city, government did not know the location of the hungry refugees to send help
- Journalists had number of rape stories but few victims reported to the police.
- Witness Justice, organization which offers psychological help over the phone, received hundreds of calls from rape, attack or robbery victims after Katrina.



New York blackout - 1977

- The blackout lasted 25 hours – the lights went out at 21:30, burglaries started at 21:40.
- 3776 – number of arrests when the police stopped arresting looters and focused on keeping crime within reasonable limits.
- 418 police officers were beaten and wounded.
- 2000 – shops and workshops were destroyed – the material damage were approximately 1 billion dollars.
- Hundreds of persons reported to hospitals and emergency rooms.
- 44 fireman were injured.
- 4 people were killed.
- 1037 fires – 6 times more than the usual number.
- 20 millions dollars were financial damages as the shops remained closed the day after.
- Majority of robbed stores were owned by white people, mostly Jewish, while shops whose owners were black, were spared.



Theo van Gogh – (July 1957 – November 2004)

- Dutch Film director, Film producer, Columnist, Author and Actor.
- Well known for his Criticism of Islam, particularly after the 11 September 2001 attacks.
- Working from a script written by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, in 2004 van Gogh created the 10-minute Anti-Islam movie Submission.
- The movie deals with the topic of violence against women in some Islamic societies; telling the stories of four abused Muslim women.
- Mohammed Bouyeri murdered Van Gogh in November 2004 (shot him eight times, then cut his throat, and stabbed him twice in the chest).
- Following the murder, violent incidents had started: The Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism recorded a total of 106 violent incidents against Muslim targets in November.
- The National Dutch Police Services Agency (KLPD) recorded 31 occasions of violence against mosques and Islamic schools between 23. November and 13. March 2005.
- Report of Anne Frank Foundation and the University of Leiden counted a total of 174 violent incidents between 2.-30. November - mosques were the target of violence 47 times, and churches 13 times.



Riots in Paris – September 2005

- Started at 17:20 on September 27th 2005 in Clichy-sous-Bois as policeman attacked three boys of different nationality – Arab, black and a Turkish boy.
- Lasted for 20 nights.
- 274 riots were happening in 274 cities.
- 8,970 destroyed vehicles.
- €200 millions of material damage.
- 2,888 arrests.
- 1 death (Jean-Jacques Le Chenadec).
- 126 policeman and fireman were wounded.



My Lai Massacre – March 1968 (part 1)

Key facts:

- The My Lai Massacre was the mass murder of 347 to 504 unarmed citizens in South Vietnam, entirely civilians and some of them women and children, conducted by U.S. Army forces on March 16, 1968 during the Vietnam war
- Many of the victims were sexually abused, beaten, tortured, or maimed, and some of the bodies were found mutilated
- Charlie Company landed following a short artillery and helicopter gunship preparation. The Americans found no enemy fighters in the village on the morning of March 16. Many soldiers suspected there were NLF troops in the village, hiding underground in the homes of their elderly parents or their wives. The U.S. soldiers, one platoon of which was led by Second Lieutenant William Calley, went in shooting at a "suspected enemy position".
- After the first civilians were killed and wounded by the indiscriminate fire, the soldiers soon began attacking anything that moved, humans and animals alike, with firearms, grenades and bayonets.



My Lai Massacre – March 1968 (part 2)

Covering up the Investigation:

- Word of the atrocities did not reach the American public until November 1969, when journalist Seymour Hersh published a story detailing his conversations with a Vietnam veteran, Ron Ridenhour. Ridenhour learned of the events at My Lai from members of Charlie Company who had been there. Before speaking with Hersh, he had appealed to Congress, the White House, and the Pentagon to investigate the matter. The military investigation resulted in Calley's being charged with murder in September 1969 -- a full two months before the Hersh story hit the streets
- Three U.S. servicemen who made an effort to halt the massacre and protect the wounded were denounced by U.S. Congressmen, received hate mail, death threats and mutilated animals on their doorsteps. Only 30 years after the event were their efforts honored.
- Of the 26 US soldiers initially charged with criminal offences for their actions at My Lai, only William Calley was convicted



My Lai Massacre – March 1968 (part 3)

Quotes of the horror happening:

- BBC News:
"Soldiers went berserk, gunning down unarmed men, women, children and babies. Families which huddled together for safety in huts or bunkers were shown no mercy. Those who emerged with hands held high were murdered. ... Elsewhere in the village, other atrocities were in progress. Women were gang raped; Vietnamese who had bowed to greet the Americans were beaten with fists and tortured, clubbed with rifle butts and stabbed with bayonets. Some victims were mutilated with the signature "C Company" carved into the chest. By late morning word had got back to higher authorities and a cease-fire was ordered. My Lai was in a state of carnage. Bodies were strewn through the village."
- Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident
"He fired at it [the baby] with a .45. He missed. We all laughed. He got up three or four feet closer and missed again. We laughed. Then he got up right on top and plugged him."



Conclusion

- With several examples - hurricane Katrina, electricity shut down in New York, case of Theo van Gogh and violent events in Paris - is shown that police and army was not capable to react adequately and prevent crime, even in peaceful countries when the riots and natural disasters happen
- Also it was shown on example of My Lai, Vietnam how even professional army can easily go out of control and conduct a massacre without orders from superiors
- It took more than one year for a My Lai crime to reach public as American army did everything in their power to hide it – the question which must be asked here is: how may similar situations happened to Americans and the cover up succeeded?

References

- Ochlocracy
 - [Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn](#) (under [pseudonym](#) Francis Stuart Campbell), *The Menace of the Herd*, The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, 1943.
 - www.wikipedia.com – internet enciklopedija
- Looting
 - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/136582.stm>
 - <http://counterpunch.org/henderson09012005.html>
 - <http://counterpunch.org/floyd09012005.html>
 - <http://www.museum.upenn.edu/new/iraq/update.shtml>
 - Theo Van Gogh - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4008781.stm>
 - www.wikipedia.com – internet enciklopedija
- New York
 - Newsweek 27.7.1977.
 - Time 25.7.1977.
 - Daily News 06.07.1977.

References

- Francuska
 - [ABC News](#) via [Associated Press](#) (29 October 2005), "[Youths Riot for a Second Night in Paris](#)"
 - Durand, Jacky [Libération](#) (29 October 2005), "[Pompier façon légion romaine](#)" (Firefighters à la roman legion)
 - [New Straits Times](#), p. 28 (8 November 2005), "[Fatwa against riot issued](#)"
 - [New Straits Times](#), p. 28 (8 November 2005), "[French violence rages on](#)"
 - Rousseau, Ingrid [Associated Press](#) (31 October 2005), "[France to Step Up Security After Riots](#)"
 - Gecker, Jocelyn [Associated Press](#) (2 November 2005), "[French government in crisis mode](#)"
 - Gecker, Jocelyn [Associated Press](#) (2 November 2005), "[Seventh Day of Violence Erupts Near Paris](#)" by
 - Keaten, Jamey [Associated Press](#) (3 November 2005), "[French residents can only watch amid riots](#)"
 - [Sky News](#) (4 November 2005), "[Disabled Woman Set Ablaze](#)". .
 - [ABC News](#) (4 November 2005), "[Paris Riots in Perspective](#)". .
 - [New Straits Times](#), p. 24. (5 November 2005), "[Riots spread to suburbs](#)".
 - Heneghan, Tom [Reuters](#) (5 November 2005), "[Paris seeks 'hidden hands' in riots](#)"
 - [Libération](#) (5 November 2005), "[Il faut que Sarkozy s'excuse ou démissionne](#)" ("Sarkozy must apologise or resign")
 - [Reuters](#) (6 November 2005), "[France's Chirac says restoring order top priority](#)"
 - Bouteldja, Naima [Red Pepper](#) "[Paris is burning](#)" (9 November 2005)
 - Sciolino, Elaine [New York Times](#) (10 November 2005), "[Chirac, Lover of Spotlight, Avoids Glare of France's Fires](#)"
 - [Neue Zürcher Zeitung](#) (11 November 2005), "[Die Banlieues kommen nicht zur Ruhe](#)" ("The suburbs do not get quiet")
 - [BBC News](#) (17 November 2005), "[French violence back to normal](#)".
 - [French Riots: A Failure of the Elite, Not the Republic](#), JURIST

References

- Katrina
 - http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/hurricane_katrina;_ylt=AuMEcGUKzaA0k_o5kA8EiW0s0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTA2Z2szazkxBHNIYwN0bQ-
 - <http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/katrina/KATRINA0000.HTM>
 - http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20050906/ts_nm/police_dc_1
 - http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20050906/ts_nm/police_dc_1
 - http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-na-rumors27sep27_0_5536446.story?track=hpmostemailedlink
 - <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9208195/>
 - <http://www.komotv.com/news/mnewsaction.asp?ID=39002>
 - <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9356608/>
 - http://www.nola.com/newslogs/tporleans/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_tporleans/archives/2005_09_26.html#082732
 - <http://www.snopes.com/katrina/photos/looters.asp>
 - <http://robertlindsay.blogspot.com/2006/01/katrina-death-toll-creeps-towards-1400.html>
 - <http://stbnews.com/>
 - <http://www.sbgp.net/cannizaro121705a.html>
 - <http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/12/06/katrina.dna/>
 - <http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20050913.html>
 - <http://www.modbee.com/local/story/11196519p-11948351c.html>
 - <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-6G8BRX?OpenDocument>
 - http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-na-levees22oct22_1_7439213.story?ctrack=1&csset=true
 - <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4393852.stm>



References

- Theo van Gogh
 - <http://www.thevangogh.nl/>
 - Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, p. 78 (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia)
 - Golf van aanslagen sinds dood Van Gogh (Brabants Dagblad)
 - Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, pp. 78-79
 - Muslims in the EU: Cities Report, The Netherlands. Preliminary research report and literature survey, p. 7 (Open Society Institute - EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program)
 - Ontwikkelingen na de moord op Van Gogh, p. 3 (Anne Frank Stichting; Universiteit Leiden)
 - Netherlands opposing immigration (The New York Times)
 - Free speech fundamentalist on a martyrdom operation (Index on Censorship)
 - Censor and sensibility (The Guardian)
 - Letters to the Editor - Free to Speak (The Guardian)
- My Lai
 - "Murder in the name of war — My Lai". BBC. July 20, 1998.
 - Summary report from the report of General Peers.
 - Department of the Army. Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident (The Peers Report), Volumes I-III (1970).
 - (PDF)Moral Courage In Combat: The My Lai Story, 2003, http://www.usna.edu/Ethics/Publications/ThompsonPg1-28_Final.pdf
 - My Lai Pilot Hugh Thompson
 - My Lai was one of four hamlets associated with the village of "Son My", Americal Division Veterans Association.
 - The My Lai Massacre: Seymour Hersh's Complete and Unabridged Reporting for the St. Louis Post Dispatch, November 1969 /Candide's Notebooks
 - "Peers Inquiry: Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident". http://www.loc.gov/ir/frd/Military_Law/Peers_inquiry.html.
 - "Neo-fascism and the religious right". By John M. Swomley. Humanist (magazine). Jan-Feb, 1995.
 - "Report of the Department of Army review of the preliminary investigations into the My Lai incident, Volume III, Exhibits, Book 6 — Photographs, 14 March 1970". From the Library of Congress, Military Legal Resources.[1]
 - "My Lai: A Question of Orders". Jan. 25, 1971. Time (magazine).

**8. STATISTICAL DATA ON CRIME IN SOME COUNTRIES AT PEACE:
USA, GERMANY, ENGLAND AND WALES, ITALY**

HOW TO DETECT A CRIME AND PUNISH THE PERPETRATOR – PERCENTAGES

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Crimes recorded in criminal statistics										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Grand total of recorded crimes	24.537.600	23.677.800	11.605.751	11.876.669	11.877.218	8.922,76	8.517,19	4.124,00	4.162,61	4.118,76
Intentional homicide, completed	14.276	12.658	15.517	16.037	16.204	5,19	4,55	5,51	5,62	5,62
Unintentional homicide	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intentional homicide, intent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intentional homicide, committed with a firearm	9.257	8.259	8.493	8.890	9.669	3,37	2,97	3,02	3,12	3,25
Major assaults	976.580	916.380	910.744	909.023	894.348	335,12	329,63	323,62	318,60	310,14
Assaults	2.315.380	2.238.480				841,96	805,21			
Rapes	93.140	89.110	90.186	90.863	95.136	33,87	32,05	32,05	31,85	32,99
Robberies	447.190	409.670	407.842	423.557	420.637	162,61	147,36	144,92	148,45	145,87
Thefts	7.376.300	6.957.400	6.965.957	9.824.498	9.847.621	2.682,29	2.502,66	2.475,27	3.464,38	3.414,94
Automobile theft	1.242.800	1.147.300	1.165.559	1.228.391	1.246.096	451,93	412,70	414,17	430,53	432,12
Burglaries	2.332.700	2.099.700	2.049.946	2.116.531	2.151.875	848,25	755,19	728,42	741,81	746,22
Frauds	394.600	371.800	-	-	-	143,49	133,74	-	-	-
Embezzlements	17.100	17.300	-	-	-	6,22	6,22	-	-	-
Drug offences	1.559.100	1.557.100	-	-	-	566,95	560,11	-	-	-
Bribery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kidnappings	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Persons arrested										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total arrested	10.225.920	8.352.161	8.166.560	8.465.363	8.505.348	5.502,39	5.240,17	4.969,19	4.767,08	4.738,35
Intentional homicide, completed	12.318	8.096	7.489	8.680	8.515	6,63	5,08	4,56	4,89	4,74
Unintentional homicide	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intentional homicide, intent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Major assaults	358.506	291.601	289.072	303.711	300.953	192,91	182,95	175,89	171,03	167,66
Assaults	943.293	762.680	763.221	813.792	812.891	507,57	478,51	464,40	458,27	452,86
Rapes	21.646	16.609	16.017	17.225	17.539	11,65	10,42	9,75	9,70	9,77
Robberies	86.926	66.663	64.985	67.093	66.523	46,77	41,82	39,54	37,78	37,06
Thefts	933.285	739.051	698.667	734.476	737.112	502,18	463,68	425,13	413,60	410,65
Automobile theft	106.607	80.616	81.576	85.125	88.449	57,36	50,58	49,64	47,94	49,28
Burglaries	232.545	178.527	172.447	183.009	184.162	125,13	112,01	104,93	103,06	102,60
Frauds	267.447	200.239	198.595	198.552	198.718	143,91	125,63	115,36	111,79	110,71
Embezzlements	12.199	10.979	11.682	13.341	12.601	6,56	6,89	7,11	7,51	7,02
Drug offences	1.104.934	909.925	914.400	940.129	941.842	594,55	570,89	556,39	529,41	524,70
Bribery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kidnappings	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-


* For table "Crimes recorded in criminal statistics", UN source was used for 1998 and 1999 in order to show difference between FBI statistics and UN statistics

Source: Total recorded in criminal statistics: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems, for year 2000, 2001, 2002 - FBI report: Crime in United States

Persons arrested: FBI report: Crime in United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

All crimes										
	Count					Rate per 100000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total recorded in criminal statistics	24.537.600,00	23.677.800,00	11.605.751,00	11.876.669,00	11.877.218,00	8.922,76	8.517,19	4.124,00	4.162,61	4.118,76
Total arrested	10.225.920,00	8.352.161,00	8.166.560,00	8.465.363,00	8.505.348,00	5.502,39	5.240,17	4.969,19	4.767,08	4.738,35



* For crimes recorded in criminal statistics UN source was used for 1998 and 1999 in order to show difference between FBI statistics and UN statistics
 Source: Total recorded in criminal statistics: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems, for year 2000, 2001, 2002 - FBI report: Crime in United States.
 Persons arrested: FBI report: Crime in United States

Important note about the USA crime statistics:

Only about 20% of arrests in USA result in solving a crime.

For all other countries, used in this analysis, predominantly United Nations sources were used as a credible source; Only USA data about solved crimes do not appear in UN data, but are shown as “Total arrests”. In this respect, data about solved crimes (crimes cleared by arrest) are taken from FBI sources and are given in this separate table.

Year 1998

Table 25												
Percent Cleared by Arrest ¹ by Population Group Offenses Known to the Police, 1998 [1998 estimated population]												
Population group	Crime Index total	Modified Crime Index total ²	Violent crime ³	Property crime ⁴	Murder and non-negligent man-slaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson ²
TOTAL ALL AGENCIES: 11,95 agencies; population 211,102,000 Offenses known	9,583,738	9,653,945	1,178,388	8,405,350	13,134	71,040	350,937	743,277	1,789,652	5,631,272	984,426	70,207
Percent cleared by arrest	21.3	21.3	49.1	17.4	68.7	49.9	28.4	58.5	13.6	19.2	14.2	16.3

Source: FBI, Crime in the United States – Unified Crime Reports, page 201 Year 1999

Year 1999

Table 25 Percent Cleared by Arrest ¹ by Population Group, 1999 [1999 estimated population]												
Population group	Crime Index total	Modified Crime Index total ²	Violent crime ³	Property crime ⁴	Murder and non-negligent man-slaughter	Forcible rape ⁵	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson ²
TOTAL ALL AGENCIES: 11,910 agencies; population 230,476,000												
Offenses known	9,659,727	9,729,837	1,164,380	8,495,347	12,266	72,809	330,601	748,704	1,751,332	5,787,112	956,903	70,110
Percent cleared by arrest	21.4	21.4	50.0	17.5	69.1	49.5	28.5	59.2	13.7	19.1	14.9	17.2

Source: FBI, Crime in the United States – Unified Crime Reports, page 203 Year 2000

Year 2000

Table 25 Percent Cleared by Arrest ¹ by Population Group, 2000 [2000 estimated population]												
Population group	Crime Index total	Modified Crime Index total ²	Violent crime ³	Property crime ⁴	Murder and non-negligent man-slaughter	Forcible rape ⁵	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson ²
TOTAL ALL AGENCIES: 11,639 agencies; population 222,654,411												
Offenses known	9,366,936	9,440,108	1,131,923	8,235,013	12,291	72,453	319,078	728,101	1,669,364	5,598,789	966,860	73,172
Percent cleared by arrest	20.5	20.4	47.5	16.7	63.1	46.9	25.7	56.9	13.4	18.2	14.1	16.0

Source: FBI, Crime in the United States – Unified Crime Reports, page 207

Year 2001

Table 25 Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means ¹ by Population Group, 2001 [2001 estimated population]												
Population group	Crime Index total	Modified Crime Index total ²	Violent crime ³	Property crime ⁴	Murder and non-negligent man-slaughter	Forcible rape ⁵	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson ²
TOTAL ALL AGENCIES: 11,475 agencies; population 214,806,053												
Offenses known	8,884,332	8,952,060	1,024,134	7,860,198	11,982	67,907	304,077	640,168	1,585,074	5,329,949	945,175	67,728
Percent cleared by arrest	19.6	19.6	46.2	16.2	62.4	44.3	24.9	56.1	12.7	17.6	13.6	16.0

Source: FBI, Crime in the United States – Unified Crime Reports, page 222 Year 2002

Year 2002

Table 25 Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means ¹ by Population Group, 2002 [2002 estimated population]												
Population group	Crime Index total	Modified Crime Index total ²	Violent crime ³	Property crime ⁴	Murder and non-negligent man-slaughter	Forcible rape ⁵	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson ¹
TOTAL ALL AGENCIES: 12,862 agencies; population 240,070,262												
Offenses known	10,121,721	10,192,984	1,184,453	8,937,268	13,561	80,515	343,023	747,354	1,842,930	6,014,290	1,080,048	71,263
Percent cleared by arrest	20.0	20.0	46.8	16.5	64.0	44.5	25.7	56.5	13.0	18.0	13.8	16.5


Source: FBI, Crime in the United States – Unified Crime Reports, page 223

GERMANY

Crimes recorded in criminal statistics										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Grand total of recorded crimes	6.456.996	6.302.316	6.264.723	6.363.865	6.507.394	7.874,39	7.676,39	7.621,32	7.729,42	7.888,23
Intentional homicide, completed	976	1.005	960	868	914	1,19	1,22	1,17	1,05	1,11
Unintentional homicide	-	-	-	876	825	-	-	-	1,06	1,00
Intentional homicide, intent	1.921	1.846	1.810	1.773	1.750	2,34	2,25	2,20	2,15	2,12
Intentional homicide, committed with a firearm	402	414	384	331	269	0,49	0,50	0,47	0,40	0,33
Major assaults										
Assaults	110.227	114.516	116.912	120.345	126.932	134,48	139,48	142,23	146,17	153,87
Rapes	7.914	7.567	7.499	7.891	8.615	9,65	9,21	9,12	9,58	10,44
Robberies	64.405	61.420	59.414	57.108	58.867	78,54	74,81	72,28	69,36	71,36
Thefts	3.388.394	3.194.838	3.042.683	3.028.835	3.149.021	4.132,19	3.891,40	3.701,56	3.678,76	3.817,23
Automobile theft	112.717	93.745	83.063	75.408	70.617	137,46	114,18	101,05	91,59	85,60
Burglaries	-	-	-	1.028.325	1.055.812	-	-	-	1.248,98	1.279,85
Frauds	815.749	833.349	895.758	926.202	926.903	994,82	1.015,04	1.089,73	1.124,95	1.123,59
Embezzlements										
Drug offences	216.682	226.563	244.336	246.518	250.969	264,25	275,96	297,25	299,42	304,22
Bribery	-	-	-	3.900	3.230	-	-	-	4,74	3,92
Kidnappings	-	-	-	90	88	-	-	-	0,11	0,11
Persons arrested										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total arrested	554.127	545.444	-	660.489	688.443	675,76	664,37	-	802,22	834,53
Intentional homicide, completed	234	175	-	214	138	0,29	0,21	-	0,26	0,17
Unintentional homicide	685	640	-	966	922	0,84	0,78	-	1,17	1,12
Intentional homicide, intent	102	88	-	99	113	0,12	0,11	-	0,12	0,14
Major assaults	18.518	18.567	-	33.409	35.284	22,58	22,62	-	40,58	42,77
Assaults	47.548	50.465	-	81	87	57,99	61,47	-	0,10	0,11
Rapes	1.873	1.917	-	2.451	2.613	2,28	2,33	-	2,98	3,17
Robberies	10.875	10.076	-	11.745	12.274	13,26	12,27	-	14,27	14,88
Thefts	147.964	140.440	-	159.127	163.517	180,44	171,06	-	193,27	198,21
Automobile theft										
Burglaries	22.021	18.973	-	18.675	19.229	26,85	23,11	-	22,68	23,31
Frauds	105.359	108.018	-	125.636	122.335	128,49	131,57	-	152,59	148,29
Embezzlements	7.809	7.916	-	12.346	12.885	9,52	9,64	-	15,00	15,62
Drug offences	42.377	45.033	-	53.478	52.836	51,68	54,85	-	64,95	64,04
Bribery	427	395	-	458	461	0,52	0,48	-	0,56	0,56
Kidnappings	-	-	-	246	183	-	-	-	0,30	0,22

Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems

All crimes										
	Count					Rate per 100000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total recorded in criminal statistics	6.456.996	6.302.316	6.264.723	6.363.865	6.507.394	7.874,39	7.676,39	7.621,32	7.729,42	7.888,23
Total arrested	554.127	545.444	-	660.489	688.443	675,76	664,37	-	802,22	834,53




Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems

ENGLAND and WALES

Crimes recorded in criminal statistics										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Grand total of recorded crimes	5.109.089	5.301.187	5.170.831	5.525.316	5.899.450	9.744,98	1.061,11	9.766,73	9.398,52	10.034,93
Intentional homicide, completed	750	766	850	891	1.048	1,43	1,45	1,61	1,52	1,78
Unintentional homicide	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intentional homicide, intent	676	750	708	857	818	1,29	1,42	1,34	1,46	1,39
Intentional homicide, committed with a firearm	49	62	-	96	-	0,09	0,12	-	0,16	0,00
Major assaults	14.006	15.135	15.662	16.556	17.882	26,71	28,72	29,58	28,16	30,42
Assaults	383.722	439.285	450.865	490.332	640.100	731,90	833,72	851,60	834,05	1.088,81
Rapes	7.636	8.409	8.593	9.720	12.293	14,56	15,96	16,23	16,53	20,91
Robberies	66.835	84.277	95.154	121.370	108.045	127,48	159,95	179,73	206,45	183,78
Thefts	1.723.875	1.769.115	1.724.637	2.267.063	2.365.535	3.288,09	3.357,60	3.257,52	3.856,26	4.023,76
Automobile theft	391.807	374.686	338.796	328.147	317.184	747,33	711,12	639,92	558,18	539,53
Burglaries	953.184,00	906.968,00	836.027,00	878.547	888.951	1.818,09	1.721,33	1.579,10	1.494,40	1.512,10
Frauds	279.503	334.773	319.324	314.927	330.128	533,12	635,36	603,14	535,69	561,55
Embezzlements	-	-	-	17.129	17.416	-	-	-	29,14	29,62
Drug offences	135.945	121.866	113.458	121.377	141.116	259,30	231,29	214,30	206,46	240,04
Bribery	-	-	-	1.074	1.325	-	-	-	1,83	2,25
Kidnappings	-	-	-	2.792	3.187	-	-	-	4,75	5,43
Persons arrested										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total arrested	1.934.338	1.866.683	1.423.700	1.339.729	1.412.202	3.689,52	3.542,77	2.422	2.278,87	2.402,15
Intentional homicide, completed	624	629	-	290	326	1,19	1,19	-	0,49	0,55
Unintentional homicide	100	115	-	262	299	0,19	0,22	-	0,45	0,51
Intentional homicide, intent	431	418	35.300	46	65	0,82	0,79	60,05	0,08	0,11
Major assaults	8.120	7.883	-	1.595	1.699	15,49	14,96	-	2,71	2,89
Assaults	125.128	129.820	-	71.182	76.368	238,67	246,38	-	121,08	129,90
Rapes	2.185	2.169	3.900	522	655	4,17	4,12	6,63	0,89	1,11
Robberies	10.450	10.321	5.900	6.822	7.711	19,93	19,59	10,04	11,60	13,12
Thefts	126.965	134.067	128.000	108.617	108.730	242,17	254,45	217,73	184,76	184,95
Automobile theft	24.041	24.689	-	13.835	14.208	45,86	46,86	-	23,53	24,17
Burglaries	48.114	46.141	26.200	24.802	26.691	91,77	87,57	44,57	42,19	45,40
Frauds	23.871	24.827	19.200	15.892	15.574	45,53	47,12	32,66	27,03	26,49
Embezzlements	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Drug offences	56.347	56.646	44.600	45.623	49.046	107,48	107,51	75,86	77,60	83,43
Bribery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kidnappings	-	-	-	347	387	-	-	-	0,59	0,66

Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems except for Persons convicted in 2000 - source Home Office

All crimes										
	Count					Rate per 100000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total recorded in criminal statistics	5.109.089	5.301.187	5.170.831	5.525.316	5.899.450	9.744,98	1.061,11	9.766,73	9.398,52	10.034,93
Total arrested	1.934.338	1.866.683	1.423.700	1.339.729	1.412.202	3.689,52	3.542,77	2.422	2.278,87	2.402,15




Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems except for Persons convicted in 2000+A24 - source Home Office

ITALY

Crimes recorded in criminal statistics										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Grand total of recorded crimes	2.426.000	2.374.000	2.205.782	2.163.826	2.231.550	4.210,00	4.120,00	3.822,85	3.749,81	3.868,17
Intentional homicide, completed	876	805	746	709	644	1,52	1,40	1,29	1,23	1,12
Unintentional homicide	1.607	1.501	1.871	506	361	2,79	2,61	3,24	0,88	0,63
Intentional homicide, intent	1.653	1.639	1.399	1.454	1.555	2,87	2,85	2,42	2,52	2,70
Intentional homicide, committed with a firearm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Major assaults	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Assaults	26.732	29.942	29.068	30.693	28.699	46,41	51,98	50,38	53,19	49,75
Rapes	1.846	1.904	2.336	2.447	2.543	3,20	3,31	4,05	4,24	4,41
Robberies	37.782	39.401	37.726	38.056	40.006	65,59	68,40	65,38	65,95	69,35
Thefts	1.478.221	1.480.775	1.367.216	1.303.356	1.305.245	2.566,36	2.570,79	2.369,53	2.258,65	2.262,52
Automobile theft	309.113	294.726	243.890	235.946	232.564	536,65	511,68	422,69	408,88	403,13
Burglaries	-	-	-	183.496	169.430	-	-	-	317,99	293,69
Frauds	56.952	63.796	33.564	38.934	54.328	98,88	110,76	58,17	67,47	94,17
Embezzlements	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Drug offences	43.014	45.038	34.800	36.045	37.965	74,68	78,19	60,31	62,46	65,81
Bribery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kidnappings	"	"	"	113	124	-	-	-	0,20	0,21
Persons arrested										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total arrested	303.000	279.000	308.000	239.174	221.190	530,00	480,00	530,00	414,48	383,41
Intentional homicide, completed	398	475	551	715	795	0,69	0,82	0,95	1,24	1,38
Unintentional homicide	4.167	3.859	3.473	-	-	7,23	6,70	6,02	-	-
Intentional homicide, intent	298	256	284	374	331	0,52	0,44	0,49	0,65	0,57
Major assaults	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Assaults	4.820	4.742	4.659	6.466	7.093	8,37	8,23	8,07	11,21	12,30
Rapes	1.390	1.310	1.291	1.482	1.567	2,41	2,27	2,24	2,57	2,72
Robberies	7.377	6.623	6.970	7.624	7.089	12,81	11,50	12,80	13,21	12,29
Thefts	49.207	50.698	55.850	45.629	36.996	85,43	88,02	96,79	79,07	64,13
Automobile theft	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burglaries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Frauds	4.560	3.798	3.824	3.450	3.608	7,92	6,59	6,63	5,98	6,25
Embezzlements	1.625	1.637	1.552	1.562	1.690	2,28	2,84	2,69	2,71	2,93
Drug offences	20.715	18.134	17.849	23.538	21.286	35,96	31,48	30,93	40,79	36,90
Bribery	963	723	717	633	419	1,67	1,26	1,24	1,10	0,73
Kidnappings	-	-	-	420	434	-	-	-	0,73	0,75

Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems

All crimes										
	Count					Rate per 100000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total recorded in criminal statistics	2.426.000	2.374.000	2.205.782	2.163.826	2.231.550	4.210,00	4.120,00	3.822,85	3.749,81	3.868,17
Total arrested	303.000	279.000	308.000	239.174	221.190	530,00	480,00	530,00	414,48	383,41



Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

jerjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

D-1

Dissenting opinion of the Presiding Judge on the public decision on the order to admit evidence relating to the testimony of Slobodan Praljak-23 February 2010.

D-2

A dissenting opinion of the honourable Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti to confidential decision on Slobodan Praljak's motion for admission of written evidence pursuant to Rule 92bis-public-16 February 2010.

D-3

A dissenting opinion of the honourable Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti on the time limit ordered by the Chamber for filing 20 written statements or transcripts of evidence pursuant to Rule 92bis of the Rules-public-17 March 2010.

D-4

Reasons for which I, Slobodan Praljak, refused to take part in the court proceedings - Letter to Honourable Judges-23 February 2010 .

On the recommendation of honourable judges that, due to the economy of the trial, we encourage as many witnesses as possible to give written statements, I collected 220 written testimonies.

Mainly on WHAT I DID IN THE WAR AND HOW I BEHAVED IN THE WAR.

THE ENTIRE TIME OF THE WAR.

On the recommendation of the honourable Judge Antonetti, I reduced this number to 155 testimonies. Then they refused it and set a limit – 20 testimonies.

I was neither able nor wanted to be in the court room any more.

I REMAIN BY MY VIEW THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES GIVE A FULL AND CLEAR PICTURE OF THAT WAR, ABOUT THE ORDER OF THE SYSTEM AND ABOUT ME.

NOT TO READ THESE TESTIMONIES MEANS NOT WANTING TO KNOW.

UNITED
NATIONS

IT-04-74-T
D5 - 1/58445 BIS
02 March 2010

5/58445 BIS
SMS



International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991

Case No.: IT-04-74-T
Date: 23 February 2010
Original: ENGLISH
French

IN TRIAL CHAMBER III

Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, presiding
Judge Árpád Prandler
Judge Stefan Trechsel
Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua

Registrar: Mr John Hocking

Order of: 23 February 2010

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Jadranko PRLIĆ
Bruno STOJIĆ
Slobodan PRALJAK
Milivoj PETKOVIĆ
Valentin ĆORIĆ
Berislav PUŠIĆ

PUBLIC

**DISSENTING OPINION OF THE PRESIDING JUDGE ON THE PUBLIC
DECISION ON THE ORDER TO ADMIT EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE
TESTIMONY OF SLOBODAN PRALJAK**

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr Kenneth Scott
Mr Douglas Stringer

Counsel for the Accused:

Mr Michael Karnavas and Ms Suzana Tomanović for Jadranko Prlić
Ms Senka Nožica and Mr Karim A. A. Khan for Bruno Stojić
Mr Božidar Kovačić and Ms Nika Pinter for Slobodan Praljak
Ms Vesna Alaburić and Mr Nicholas Stewart for Milivoj Petković
Ms Dijana Tomašegović-Tomić and Mr Dra' en Plavec for Valentin Ćorić
Mr Fahrudin Ibrišimović and Mr Roger Sahota for Berislav Pušić

The majority of the Chamber rejected scores of documents whose admission was sought by the Praljak Defence.

Among the documents that were not admitted, there was a large number put forward by the Praljak Defence (3D), yet there were also documents coming from the Prosecution (P 05366, P 00336, P 00524, P 09538, P 10936, P 10980, P 00598) or from the other Defence teams (1D 02252, 1D 3137, 1D 03139, 1D 03141, 1D 03142, 1D 03145, 2D 00197, 2D 00960, 2D 01251, 2D 1541, 2D 01542, 2D 1543, 2D 1544, 2D 1545, 2D 01546, 2D 01547, 2D 01548, 2D 01549, 2D 01550, 2D 01551, 2D 01552, 2D 01553, 2D 01554, 2D 01555, 2D 01556, 2D 01557, 2D 01558, 2D 01559, 2D 01560, 2D 01561, 2D 03036, 2D 03041, 2D 03042, 2D 03043, 3D 01870, 4D 01297, 4D 01299).

In its Annex, the majority of the Trial Chamber gives the reasons for which they were not admitted: Not admitted (Reason: the Praljak Defence failed to establish through Slobodan Praljak's testimony a sufficiently relevant link between this document and the Indictment).

With regard to document 3D 00897, for example, I fail to see why a sufficiently relevant link was not established between this document and the Indictment.

If the Praljak Defence considered that it had to present this document so that it could be discussed in court, it is normally because it must have thought that there was a relevant link.

The non-admission of over 100 documents may lead one, therefore, to question **the professional competence** of the Accused's attorneys who seem to be defending their client any old how, which is something I find hard to believe knowing how much experience these attorneys have in international trials.

If this is not the case, why then were **so many documents** rejected?

The reply may be obvious: the majority performed a selective sorting of the documents in order to admit only the **most** relevant ones and reject the others.

To take an example, document **3D 00443** which was admitted must be more relevant than document **3D 00903** ...

I cannot get into this way of reasoning because at this stage of the proceedings, I am unable to **assess** all the documents in order to determine those **most** relevant and reject the **least** relevant documents by taking into account the "**sufficiently relevant link**" specification.

In the manner of an investigator at a crime scene photographing it from all angles and collecting all possible material clues, **the criminal Judge** also has a duty to get a comprehensive view of all the evidence, and especially that put forward by the Defence, in order to reach definitive conclusions at the time of the deliberation.

Judges have no way of knowing everything and may make mistakes during this delicate phase as the parties present their evidence.

If the Judges do not admit a document which may form the basis of the Defence's argumentation, they must do so **at the time of the judgement** providing a detailed motivation.

Refusing a document **before** Judgement should require an **extremely** detailed motivation and not the simple **all-purpose** comment used to reject a document.

I am not going to examine all the documents to explain why in my point of view, they are relevant but I am going to take two typical examples which are documents 3D 01077 and 3D 01078.

These documents are comparative analyses showing the losses that occurred in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina correlated to French and American population numbers.

It appears that the same events, if they had taken place in France or in the United States, would have resulted in a significant **collective trauma** for the populations involved.

That being the case, a **reasonable trier of fact** could come to that conclusion by relying on these two documents that the population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, be it Croat, Serb or Muslim, was profoundly affected by the conflicts.

Similarly, it would be important to consider that this trauma could have influenced the civil or military leaders in their way of managing difficulties because they had to face extremely delicate situations where the pure and simple application of the rule of law does not always resolve the situation.

International justice has a duty to **understand** situations, and in order to understand, it has to have the means to do so ...

The issue of producing evidence before international jurisdictions was raised before the ICJ in the opinion of Judge MAHIQU on the *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro Case*. This leading magistrate wrote: /unofficial translation/ “One can, therefore, only note or deplore the faintheartedness and the refusal of the Court to give itself, quite legally and fairly, a means amongst others to ensure the truthfulness of an allegation in a case where the search for truth is particularly expected and necessary. An excessively rigid position in this domain can only lead to unreasonable and unfair results ...”

This reasoning may be applied **here** in its totality.

This eminent jurist, in the circumstances of his case, also specified: /unofficial translation/ “... By not intervening, either to the request from another party or by *proprio motu* when the search for truth requires such an intervention, the Court risks creating a disturbing and worrying precedent”.

Here, by rejecting scores of these documents we are facing the same situation.

One party has requested their admission because it considers that the search for truth requires this admission, and so in the name of what principle should these documents be rejected? The notion of **relevance** is raised in Rule 89 (C) of the Rules: “A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.”

It can be concluded, therefore, that the proffered evidence must also have **probative value**.

1/58445 BIS

Is this to be found in the reasoning of the Chamber’s majority in this respect?

At no point in the Annex is there any mention of **probative value**.

In certain cases, there may be situations where the link to the Indictment may not be sufficient whereas the document may have **an extremely high probative value**, which on account of this might reinforce the issue of a “sufficient link” to the Indictment.

The “bulletins of the Croatian soldier” (3D 01278, 3D 01281, 3D 01283, 3D 01284, 3D 01286, 3D 01289, 3D 01240, 3D 01291 etc.) were not admitted on the ground that there is not a sufficiently relevant link to the Indictment. This is difficult to understand because the Indictment mentions an international armed conflict with the intervention of the Croatian Army in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and at least the arrival of Croatian Army “volunteers” into the HVO.

This “bulletin of the Croatian soldier” may explain the military context, indeed, the **motivation** of the volunteers, as well as the real threat from Serbian forces.

I do not understand this logic.

/signed/

Jean-Claude Antonetti
Presiding Judge

Done this twenty-third day of February 2010
At The Hague
The Netherlands

[Seal of the Tribunal]

UNITED
NATIONS

IT-04-74-T
D5 - 1/58341 BIS
01 March 2010

8/58341 BIS
SMS



International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991

Case No.: IT-04-74-T
Date: 16 February 2010
Original: ENGLISH
French

IN TRIAL CHAMBER III

Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, presiding
Judge Árpád Prandler
Judge Stefan Trechsel
Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua

Registrar: Mr John Hocking

Order of: 16 February 2010

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Jadranko PRLIĆ
Bruno STOJIĆ
Slobodan PRALJAK
Milivoj PETKOVIĆ
Valentin ĆORIĆ
Berislav PUŠIĆ

PUBLIC

**DISSENTING OPINION TO CONFIDENTIAL DECISION ON SLOBODAN
PRALJAK'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF WRITTEN EVIDENCE
PURSUANT TO RULE 92 *BIS***

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr Kenneth Scott
Mr Douglas Stringer

Counsel for the Accused:

Mr Michael Karnavas and Ms Suzana Tomanović for Jadranko Prlić
Ms Senka Nožica and Mr Karim A. A. Khan for Bruno Stojić
Mr Božidar Kovačić and Ms Nika Pinter for Slobodan Praljak
Ms Vesna Alaburić and Mr Nicholas Stewart for Milivoj Petković
Ms Dijana Tomašegović-Tomić and Mr Dra`en Plavec for Valentin Ćorić
Mr Fahrudin Ibrišimović and Mr Roger Sahota for Berislav Pušić

Case No. IT-04-74-T

16 February 2010

The Trial Chamber decided **by a majority** to deny the motion and the additional motion and ordered the Praljak Defence to file a maximum of 20 written statements or transcripts that are consistent with the admissibility criteria.

I do not share the point of view of the majority and I wished to express my dissenting opinion publicly without mentioning any names that may be confidential.

The main reason for the denial is explained in paragraph 47 of the Decision.

The majority believe that the size, length of submitted exhibits, the repetitive nature, the lack of relevance, the noted formal requirements, confusion between the acts and conduct of the Accused as charged in the Indictment and those not charged in the Indictment prevent the Chamber from making a case-by-case analysis. I do not agree with this reasoning.

It is quite enough just to read a statement and make a selection on a case-by-case basis.

For example, statement 3D 03639 is four pages long.

This witness explains that he was a reporter for the magazine GLOBUS and that he went to Gabela and Dretelj.

He explains that his magazine is independent and that in September 1993 he wrote an article on Dretelj with photographs, specifying that 1,478 Bosnians were being detained in inhuman conditions, that he had interviewed soldiers from the HVO army and met with General Praljak in order to obtain authorisation which, to his great surprise, was given to him, and he specified that, during their conversation, General Praljak expressed his clear objection to the existence of the camps and to the inhumane conditions.

Consequently, why were these four pages included in the reasoning set out in paragraph 42?

6/58341 BIS

It is not necessary to perform this exercise with the other statements that the Judges have had for five months.

With regard to the list of **20** statements, I cannot see on what basis this number has been specified.

I notice that when the Prosecution prepared its requests, no limit had been fixed and the Trial Chamber had admitted over **100** statements or transcripts.

One might have wondered about the need for these 100 statements in view of the criteria defined in paragraph 47 of the present Decision.

It is also dangerous to set limitations before deliberating on the Defence case.

The Defence case must be presented by its witnesses and its documents until the presentation of its final brief.

This case will be examined during the deliberation by checking it against Prosecution witnesses and documents (over 5,000).

Therefore, I cannot see why the figure of **20** should be fixed ex abrupto.

I would like to recall that the Praljak Defence file its Motion on 14 September 2009 and that the Chamber had **five months** at its disposal to read the statements and carry out the work related to the criteria under paragraph 47 ...

According to the **orders** issued by the majority, the Defence will have to make a selection from the 15 statements in order to keep only 20, which will require additional time for the Defence to examine the situation.

The Motion of the **Praljak Defence** pursuant to Rule 92 bis must be examined in accordance with the criteria defined hereinafter:

- the content of the statement is **cumulative** in relation to similar facts
- the content of the statement relates to the historical, political or **military** background (92 bis (A)(i)(b))

5/58341 BIS

that have already been given by other witnesses (92 bis (A)(i)(a))

- the content goes to the character of the Accused (92 bis (A)(i)(e))
- the content relates to factors to be taken into account in determining sentence (92 bis (A)(i)(f)).

The case law of the Chambers and, in particular, the Appeals Chamber has expanded the scope of this Rule¹ by specifying the broad lines of its application, without being exhaustive.

The **Praljak** Defence submitted **156 statements** to the Trial Chamber, which involved considerable work **on my part** to assess on a case-by-case basis the statements with respect to the factors against admitting the written statements into evidence (acts and conduct of the Accused and factors defined in Rule 92 bis (A)(ii)).

Each statement must therefore be examined from this perspective.

4/58341 BIS

After **personally examining** each statement, I have come to the conclusion that I should reject the following statements: 3D 0370, 3D 03681, 3D 03688, 3D 03692, 3D 0364, 3D 03650.

On the other hand, I am in favour of admitting all the other statements since they have evidence that is, either cumulative with facts already presented by other witnesses (in particular, testimony from the Accused himself), or relates to the historical, political or military background at the time (as an example, all the statements that refer to the SUNJA area relate to the military background at the time, namely, the Croatian and Muslim joint defence against the Serbian offensive), or attests to the character of the Accused (it is not necessary to expand on this point because the character of the Accused can be deduced from the evaluation made by an informed witness), or relates to evidence to be taken into account when determining sentence.

This last case deserves a more detailed explanation to be able to understand the benefit of having this type of statement at one's disposal.

Of course, this evidence can only be taken into account if the Accused has been found guilty, which is not the case since the trial is ongoing and the Judges have not, among the **three** of them, discussed the criminal responsibility of the Accused.

I note that the present Chamber has accepted, without a moment's hesitation, the Prosecution's **103 92 bis statements** in addition to **158 viva voce** witnesses ...

In these circumstance, how can we not treat the two parties **fairly**, even if it means making a selection at the time of deliberations.

I do not subscribe to the reference in paragraph 32 of the Decision: "... The Chamber immediately notes that the figure of 155 is *prima facie* disproportionate and excessive." The same comment could have been applied to the Prosecution's requests, but this was not the case. Why should there be two weights, and two measures? In fact, are the 103 92 *bis* statements from the Prosecution not a little disproportionate and excessive?

¹ *The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević*, Case No. IT-02-54-T, "Decision on Prosecution's Request to Have Written Statements Admitted under Rule 92 bis", 21 March 2002 ("Milošević Decision"), paras 8, 22 and 27. Decision of the Appeals Chamber in *Galić*, paras 9, 10, 11 and 14-15. *The Prosecution v. Ante Gotovina et al.*, Case No. IT-06-90-T, "Decision on Defendant Ivan Čermak's Motion for Admission of Evidence of Two Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 92 bis and Decision on Defendant Čermak's Third Motion for Protective Measures for Witnesses IC-12 and IC-16", public, 11 November 2009 ("*Gotovina* Decision"), paras 8 and 11. *The Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin and Momir Talić*, Case No. IT-99-36-T, "Decision on 'Objection and/or Consent to Rule 92 bis Admission of Witness Statements Number One' Filed by Brđanin on 16 January 2002 and 'Opposition du Général Talić à l'admission des dépositions recueillies en application de l'article 92 bis du Règlement' Filed by Talić on 21 January 2002", 30 January 2002, confidential ("*Brđanin* Decision"), paras 16, 28 and 30. *The Prosecution v. Vujadin Popović et al.*, Case No. IT-05-88-T, "Decision on Nikolić's Motion Pursuant to Rule 92 bis", 28 July 2008, public, paras 8-9; *The Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al.*, Case No. IT-05-88-T, "Decision on Pandurević's Motion for Admission of Written Evidence Pursuant to Rules 92 bis and 92 ter", 17 December 2008, public, p. 4. *The Prosecutor v. Astrit Haraqiija and Bajrush Morina*, Case No. IT-04-84-R77.4, "Decision on Astrit Haraqiija's Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 bis", 5 September 2008, confidential, *see in particular* para. 15. *The Prosecutor v. Ljube Bošković and John Tarčulovski*, Case No. IT-04-82-T, "Decision on Tarčulovski Defence's Motion Pursuant to Rule 92 bis", 22 February 2008, confidential para. 15. *The Prosecutor v. Milan Babić*, Case No. IT-03-72-A, "Judgement on Sentencing Appeal", 18 July 2005, public ("*Babić* Decision"), para. 43. *Babić* Decision, para. 55: "Even when personal factors or circumstances – including prior good character – have been considered as mitigating circumstances, they have been given little weight in mitigation."

It is something of a surprise to note that the majority ventures to state the following in paragraph 34: “... The Chamber recalls in this respect that although the Chamber has definitely admitted 101 statements or transcripts of testimonies for the Prosecution, pursuant to Rule 92 *bis* of the Rules, this does not justify the Defence teams seeking the admission of the same number of witnesses under this measure, or indeed more as the Praljak Defence requests ...”

The majority relies on an interpretation of a Decision of the Appeal’s Chamber in which the Accused does not necessarily have the right “to the same amount of time and the same number of witnesses and that a principle of proportionality should therefore be applied ...”

This principle of proportionality must be applied strictly here. Would there be proportionality if in relation to 92 *bis* witnesses we had:

Prosecution – 101 statements or transcripts

Defence – 0 statements or transcript

Taking into account that the **six accused** would normally have the right to a **separate trial** rather than a joint trial, the principle of proportionality would require at least that all the accused have the same number or approximately the same number of 92 *bis* witnesses as the Prosecution.

This is not an insignificant issue, as it is tied to the question of the overall time allocated to the Prosecution.

The Prosecution requested initially a disproportionate amount of time in order to present its case; considering the allocated time, the Prosecution then resorted to Rule 92 *ter* and to Rule 92 *bis*.

Consequently, the **principle of proportionality** must take into account all the factors.

2/58341 BIS

It is true that, when deciding on the amount of time to be allocated to the Praljak Defence, the Chamber took into account the list of witnesses in order to allocate **55 hours**.

This period included, to my mind, the time potentially dedicated to the testimony of all the witnesses on the list (*viva voce*, 92 *ter*, witnesses contested under Rule 92 *bis*).

Therefore, if it turns out that a 92 *bis* witness needs to be cross-examined, I would be inclined to reject a statement by this witness since the Praljak Defence should have known in advance if this witness was likely to be subject to cross-examination, and I completely agree with paragraphs 33 and 34 of the Prosecution’s submission quoted in footnote 23.

Because of their position or their closeness to the Accused, witnesses should not testify through written statements.

The redundant nature of some testimonies does not in itself justify its rejection, since the Rule itself envisages this possibility by mentioning the term “cumulative” in Rule 92 *bis* (A)(i)(a).

During a deliberation it would be enough to keep one or several cumulative items of evidence and to mention the others for the record in a footnote, or even not mention them at all, because a Judge does not have to refer in a Judgement to **all** the evidence; it is incumbent upon him to make a selection to support his decision. Of course, if a 92 *bis* statement is explicitly mentioned in support of their case in the submissions of the Prosecution and the Defence in their final brief, the Trial Chamber must refer to it in its Judgement.

I do not at all agree with the following sentence in paragraph 35: “... In this respect, the Chamber stated in its Decision of 25 April 2008 that both witnesses that the Praljak Defence wished to call under Rule 93 of the Rules and those called to testify on humanitarian aid supplied to Muslims, on the cooperation between Croats and Muslims in 1991 and 1992, on Serbian aggression, on the mujahidin, and many subjects taken up by the Praljak Defence in Annex 3 of the Motion, were concerned

1/58341 BIS

by the redundant nature, the insufficient relevance or even an absence of a link to the Indictment.”

I believe that all these subjects could enlighten the Chamber on the Joint Criminal Enterprise and should only be raised during the deliberation, that is, after the closing arguments and not **before**, as mentioned above.

In conclusion, the denial of the Motion after **five months** seems to me to go against our obligation to consider motions **personally** and conscientiously.

I find that, in any case, the Trial Chamber had at its disposal all the necessary factors to take a final decision and could have done so a long time ago.

This dissenting opinion was filed with a slight delay due to technical difficulties.

/signed/

Jean-Claude Antonetti
Presiding Judge

Done this sixteenth day of February 2010
At The Hague
The Netherlands

[Seal of the Tribunal]

Excerpt from Order on request of Praljak Defence seeking a stay on the time limit ordered by the Chamber for filing 20 written statements or transcripts of evidence pursuant to Rule 92bis of the Rules

2/58672 BIS

The Trial Chamber has decided by majority to reject more than 100 witness statements pursuant to Rule 92bis of the Rules.

In the majority decision, the Trial Chamber asked the Praljak Defence to file **20 written statements**.

I am then led to conclude that the request for certification to appeal and the request for a stay of time limit now form **an undivided whole**.

If the Trial Chamber certifies the request to appeal, it will then fall to the Appeals Chamber to **uphold or invalidate** the majority decision.

What advantage could there possibly be in forcing the hand of the Defence prior to judicial consideration of the appeal, unless it is a foregone conclusion that no certification to appeal shall occur and the majority is already persuaded of a sound basis for its decision?

Underlying this dissenting opinion one observes the boycott of the Accused Praljak, who refuses to attend hearings on grounds that his trial is unfair.

In his submissions, his Counsel has elaborated the Accused's position as follows: "Slobodan Praljak hopes that the Honorable Judges will appreciate his *bona fide* critique with an open mind and a spirit of good will. Slobodan Praljak has endeavored throughout the proceedings to be of maxim assistance to the Trial Chamber in its quest to finding a fair outcome of this extraordinarily long and complex trial. Having come to the conclusion however that the proceedings are fundamentally flawed and having lost confidence that the proceedings will improve to the extent that he will ultimately enjoy his fair-trial rights as purportedly guaranteed by the ICTY Statute, Slobodan Praljak mere seeks to put on record his decision to halt his participation in the trial as well as his views of the situation that caused his decision to withdraw from the trial."

The absence from the courtroom of an accused party raises a grave problem for International Justice.

Several issues must be considered:

1. Is the accused mocking his Judges?
2. Does the accused have reasons for boycotting his hearings?
3. Have the Judges done as much as they can to ensure tranquil proceedings and the effective participation of the Accused in his own trial?

In this trial, this is not the first time that a defendant has manifested his displeasure by leaving the courtroom, however, it is the first time that a defendant has expressed his desire in writing to no longer attend and to place his future destiny in the hands of the Judges, stating in black and white that his trial is rigged.

As for me, I cannot accept these terms, for I have personally insisted that the defendant be allowed to produce evidence and to express himself as desired.

1/58672 BIS

The **majority decision denying** the request to stay the time limit while awaiting the certification to appeal and the decision of the Appeals Chamber evidences **closed**, rather than **open**, reasoning.

It seems unavoidable, in my view, that the Appeals Chamber be seized by the Defence of the key issue of its refusal to admit more than 100 instances of testimony or statements, especially inasmuch as the Judges are of one mind on this issue and that the Appeals Chamber **alone** holds the solution by upholding or nullifying the decision.

The Judge, in his role, must otherwise expect to be censured via appeal should the parties contest his ruling.

This is not simply a matter related to the admission of a document that can in any case be shown to a witness right until the end of the trial, but rather, **a definitive, "watershed" decision**, deserving of an appeal.

A failure to certify could substantially violate the rights of the Defence.

The Praljak Defence, in its submissions, has indicated the relevance of these testimonies and statements in respect of the Indictment as well as the reliability thereof.

The entirety of this testimony completes and corroborates the testimony received until this time and meets the requirements of Rule 92*bis*.

It is evident, in my view, that a unanimous decision ordering both the certification to appeal and the stay of the time limit would have allowed the Chamber to demonstrate "**an open mind and a spirit of goodwill**".

/signed/

Jean-Claude Antonetti
Presiding Judge

Done this seventeenth day of March 2010
At The Hague
The Netherlands

[Seal of the Tribunal]

To the Honourable Judges

Jean-Claude Antonetti, Àrpád Prandler and Stefan Trechsel

Den Haag, 23rd of February 2010

To the Honourable Judges

Jean-Claude Antonetti, Àrpád Prandler and Stefan Trechsel

Den Haag, 23rd of February 2010

Out of three basic questions which determine us to the greatest extent:

- a) what is
- b) what are we able to know
- c) what should we do

as philosophy student and professor, as well as later, regardless of the activity I was active in, I dedicated the most of the time to the basic question of every ethics:

“What do have to do/What do I have to do?”

I quote Nikolai Hartmann “Ethics”, Berlin, 1938

“ ‘What to do’ is the question we find ourselves in every moment. Each new situation poses that question over and over again; we have to respond to it as we make ever step in our lives; it is inevitable and there is no such power which could lift our burden and release us from its necessity. To every new question, our activity, our actual behaviour brings a new answer. Because the act always contains a decision that has already been made. Wherever that decision was not conscious, we could still comprehend it subsequently in our activity, perhaps in the form of repentance. Whether in pro and contra a right has been chosen, it neither exists in question nor the situation; there is no necessity for it, no guidance by other man’s arm. Everybody depends on their own, one alone makes a decision. Subsequently, if one made a mistake, he alone bears responsibility and guilt.

Who observes the range of his activity? Who is familiar with the chain of consequences and who measures the quantity of responsibility?

An act which happened once, belongs to the actuality and cannot be undone. No matter which mistake one made in it, remains irrevocably mistaken and it is irreparable in the strict sense. The situation happens once, it does not come back and it is individual just like all what is real.”

The question of activity, act, deed is especially important in the course of certain social structure collapsing; how to act in the French revolution, in the time of growing Nazism, fascism and communism; how to act in war?

How to restrain from “COMMITTING A SIN THROUGH OUR OWN FAULT, IN OUR THOUGHTS AND IN OUR WORDS, IN WHAT WE HAVE DONE AND WHAT WE HAVE FAILED TO DO” that we confess during the mass.

Due to complexion of this question, once I cited the conversation between Heisenberg and Planck before this Chamber, in which young Werner Heisenberg describes an answer of the great Max Planck to the question what should he do in the time of Nazism growth.

Basics and origin of law are in the indivisible connection with such questions therefore I have right to talk about law as researcher and human being.

Ever since the time when Anitus and society crushed Socrates (he was spoiling youth and questioned Gods on Olympus), as well as Cicero and Giordano Bruno, throughout the history (especially in social systems of the 20th century) various judges condemned hundreds of millions of people – always in the name of justice.

I think I read all the relevant literature regarding the topic and this literature says that each individual decides on his own action when three variables come into the balance – courage, unbearableness of own passiveness against the system in which the individual is in and expected punishment.

Hence – when and in what way is one to react and express discordance and what is the price to be paid for what has been done?

Even nowadays I have doubts whether such *modi operandi* are the act of free will of the individual or merely a statistic variable of the major number of individual values.

Why am I saying all this?

I am saying it because the cumulative growth of **small bad procedures** in this trial reached the point of my nonagreement.

I shall cite some of that:

A – the books by C. del Ponte “Mrs. Prosecutor” and “Peace and punishment” by Florence Hartmann testify about the practice of this tribunal. In many cases indictments are written to satisfy the political goals, whereby remain unclear for whose interests and the behind-the-scenes manoeuvrings bring the sense of the institution in question.

B – I was searching for an answer by sending a letter to many important addresses to the following question; has the indictment against me been written pursuant to position that “Croats are perfidious bastards” (unlike Serbs who are merely “bastards”) as it is written in the book by C. del Ponte. I asked whether such statement is racist and how many years of prison with hard labour would I get if I spoke about Serbs and Muslims – Bosniaks in that way in war.

Nobody even made an effort to send a courtesy reply.

C – The judges don’t have a possibility to examine the factual basis of the whole or only parts of the indictment before they confirm it.

A word “professional judges” was quite often mentioned in this courtroom.

I have no idea what the content of the word “professional” would mean in other languages but in Croatian there are two important meanings for the term “professional”:

1. It is a man who performs his work for money – unlike the amateur.
2. A professional is a man who knows his job – unlike a dilettante.

All orthopaedists agree on the method how to put together a broken bone; the physicists do not argue about wave and corpuscular nature of photons or the existence of quarks and leptons; all electronics engineers have no doubts about the usage of RC combination in the transistor base or the way of making an assembly for amplitude or frequent modulation of signal, mathematicians have no dilemmas on multiplication table, adding up in binary system or what is the correct solution of the equation $\int x dx$ – integral $x dx$.

It is the same situation with all fields of activities which have at least something in common with the normative science.

When forming a judgement, professionals agree in 99% of the cases.

The judges at this Tribunal, especially in this Trial Chamber, Jean-Claude Antonetti, Àrpàd Prandler and Stefan Trechsel mostly do not agree.

Whether someone is to be released home, under which conditions, does an accused have right to examine, in which way should a piece of paper be delivered to the judges and in which way to other Counsel; by new decision a Chamber derogates the previous, rules change on daily basis, certain rules apply for the prosecution and others for defence. I would like to see this Tribunal administer justice to French, Brits, Americans, Chinese, let's say for Tibet.

Such justice can be administered to inhabitants of the Balkans and Africans. Experiments on androids have always been allowed. To put the most charitable interpretation on it, such way of work is frustrating, whereas accepting such procedure by coming to court expresses hope that the judgement will be righteous after all. **However, hope must be limited by ratio, a clear cognition that mistakes in conclusion might be distributed by chance, without having any clearly expressed direction.**

And then, in "Order on admission of evidence in relation to the witness 4D – AB" dated 14th of January 2010, judge Antonetti, in one of his numerous dissenting opinions says:

- 1) "However I find that the Trial Chamber, faced with an avalanche of documents, could have accepted all of them, having a possibility at the end of the trial to request from the parties to do a triage through their final briefs so that one can have a purpose-serving debate on some of admitted materials of evidence.

Most of the judges of this Chamber did not choose this commonsense solution, inspired by decades of the professional law practice."

- 2) "I find that rejection of documents of this kind equals one-side approach of the conflict."

Therefore I would like to say something on logic and method of the scientific cognition. Discussions on traditional logic (Aristotle's "Organon"), discussions on general logic and cognition (Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason, Moris Cohen, Ernest Nagel's "An introduction to logic and scientific method", London, 1934) or the mathematical logic (Russel's and Whitehead's "Principia Mathematica") clarified that in each correct argumentation a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. One of the most significant authors dealing with this topic, Karl Popper in the "Logic of scientific revelation" says:

"However, it is understood that I would accept a certain system as empirical or scientific only if it can be tested through experience. These contemplations suggest that, as a criterion of demarcation, one should not take a possibility of verification but a possibility of falsifiability. In other words; I will not demand from a scientific system to be such it can be isolated in positive sense once for all but I will demand that his logical form be such it can be isolated through empirical examinations, in negative sense; it must be possible that one empirical system be refuted by the experience."

Nobody however is challenging that the basic characteristic of a scientific principle is a **public possibility of examining** the results which are obtained by this method on the basis of **used** facts – premises.

All what is a natural or a social system or phenomenon can be explored; even to law, which is one of the aspects of the human experience, all rules of logic and scientific approach methods can be applied.

All of us (even the judges) bring logical conclusions and make methodological cognitions proportionally to our knowledge (to put it in better words, proportionally to our own ignorance), proportionally to analytic and synthetic force of our reason, our conclusions depend on physical and mental energy that we dispose of and that we invest into the cognitive process, as well as time that we dedicate to the revelation of conclusions.

However, it is absolutely not allowed, not at any costs to drop, neglect or reject those facts or premises which might question our conclusion, cognition or judgement. Once I quoted Schiller; "Abundance contributes to clarity".¹

I shall present couple of examples:

¹ Author's remark: "Abundance leads to clarity and the truth abides in abyss."

Once as Aristotle's theses were accepted as social norms, understanding that the cognition is possible only as a form of speculative opinion and that truth cannot be reached by measurements, experiments or in any other similar way, as well as his postulate about heavier objects falling faster than light objects, physics was dead for the next 2000 years all the way till Galileo Galilei.

Democritus' books were destroyed and everyone who had doubts about scholastics being the only proper science leading to the truth was decapitated.

If Galileo hadn't fought, in the hard way, for the right to measure speed and time of various ballots which he was then dropping down the steep, it is questionable whether Isaac Newton would have written his "Philosophie Naturalis Principia Mathematica".

Would Johannes Kepler have established his laws on movement of planets, if somebody had hidden remarkable measurements of Ticho Brahe?

Is it allowed to hide evidence on wave nature of photons in order to leave only the truth that the photons are merely corpuscles?

Would there have been a war in Iraq (several thousands of dead people, several millions of expelled persons) if reports of French intelligence (and not only French intelligence) had been published about Saddam Hussein not being in possession of chemical weapon?

When saying the abovementioned, I don't want to say whether this war should have been waged for humanitarian reasons, and especially I don't want to say anything how this war should have been waged.

Hence, I can relatively calmly accept the fact of possible mistake in judges' conclusion on my guilt because the wrong interpretation of each and especially the one of social phenomenon is sui generic built into every reasonable man, but I cannot accept, just like the judge Antonetti, the rejection of those facts which could serve the rebuttal of conclusion made or arbitrated punishment.

As far as I understand, due to a possible mistake, there are few degrees of trial assessments of facts and conclusions, respectively, the judgement – all the way till some supreme, constitutional or appeal levels.

In the case in which a relation between some criminal offence and mens rea of some other individual in the social hierarchy should be established in the conditions of war, respectively in the conditions of a complete de-compensation of all state systems and subsystems, to reject from the trial the following evidence; the third party in war – the Serbs, to throw out Mujahedins and all elements of religious war which was brought by those combatants into the territory, to throw away from evidence all refugees and expelled persons, as well as all the elements of civil war with them, all this followed by an explanation it is TU QUOQUE. And so on and so forth.

How is this possible and why is this happening?

How to solve accurately hundreds of related non-linear differential equations through which the society is described if we throw out the basic constants by reduction?

Politics, economy, law, sociology, philosophy, social psychology and many other sciences have trying to solve those equations for centuries, more or less, without success.

The results, as the reality is testifying about them aren't brilliant, exactly because the complicated systems are reduced to one or two variables, which is inadmissible.

Isn't it?

The war even more makes the entire system of complicated causal social relations more complicated by many fractions of curves, points of singularities and iterations of small changes which explode into the determined chaos.

I quote "The war and the society" by Ozren Žunec, Zagreb, 1998:

"The causes of war can still be explained sociologically, however the war per se eludes the sociologic inspect. Hobbes's "natural condition" is not a subject appropriate for science, in which the central concepts are order,

continuity, institutions, socialisation and similar. Accordingly the war is a point of discontinuity for the social mainstream, respectively a point in which something ends and something else starts. All before and after this “big bang” is liable to sociological analysis. The mere point of breach, however is not.

It is pre-social (or extra-social) and as such incomprehensible.

.....

Due to lack of interest as well as due to undeveloped cognitive and methodological preconditions for sociological investigations, war remained the subject matter of other sciences, particularly military theory and political science. Significant empirical investigations of the parameters of war which were undertaken in the U.K. by David Singer, Malvin Small et al (Singer et al, 1979; Singer and Walance, 1979; Small and Singer, 1982; Singer and Stoll, 1984; Singer and Diehl, 1990) remained without appropriate sociological response. Generally speaking, sociology hasn't devoted attention to war corresponding to an extraordinary social relevance, as well as a great and constantly rising incidence of this phenomenon. One of the basic difficulties here is the lack of a sociologically usable definition of war. In military theory, for nearly two decades the classical Clausewitz's definition has been used as a standard definition. This definition says that war “is an act of force used to coerce the opponent into fulfilling our will” (Clausewitz, 1993: 83), “an act of mutual destruction” (Clausewitz 1993: 253) or alternatively, “an act of force which has no limits” (Clausewitz 1993: 84). The application of this definition in the organization of armies and in the conduct of war seems to leave, due to its sectional exclusivity, no connection to sociology. Instead of the use of the notion of war which is relevant in practical warfare (in strategy, operation and tactics), sociology has been left with philosophically derived concepts which either condemn or idealize war and which, being extraordinarily value-laden, actually do not speak about real wars, but are primarily an expression of the social valuation of war and the derived social correlates of wars and their consequences.

On the other hand, when in the 20th century there came about a substantial change in the nature of real wars, and when the classical Clausewitz's concept of war as a conflict of armed forces organized by the states, began to give ground to a new type of war in which social groups enter into armed conflict with the aim of changing basic characteristics of the society (system of values and norms, social structure, identity of the elites, etc.), it was shown that the exclusive use of purely military means in this new type of war (revolutions or “low-intensity conflicts”) is insufficient, even counterproductive. As the British experience in Malaya and American experience in Vietnam have shown, each in its own way and with opposite outcomes, for the victory in war which has no classical military-political goals (e.g. conquest of enemy territory, change of the relation of forces and the like), but goals such as a change of society, in addition to the military force, the application of a number of measures based on the understanding of the social nature of this conflict is also necessary. Although at the moment of decline of the classical paradigm of war (“it is time we kept a vigil in order for the strategists to give respect to Clausewitz and leave him to the historians”, Matz 1995: 22) sociology, together with other social sciences, was offered, almost by itself, as a solution to the aporia of the new type of war, this opportunity has been wasted. The idiosyncrasy of sociology towards war or towards what is essential in war, namely the principle and use of concrete violence in a large proportion, remained in force even when war in the 20th century became, by its internal nature, more a sociological than a military fact.

Why do the judges Prandler and Trechsel refuse the evidence?

Do the judges Prandler and Trechsel wish to reduce the system to the measure of their own understanding?

Or they reduce the system to the measure of provability of a foregone conclusion. To use sports as a metaphor, isn't the result of a match with such an approach fixed in advance?

Isn't it more just to leave all the exhibits within the case, and to ignore them by means of concluding, if this is the judges' chosen logic, and in such a way enable other court instances in the future to check the method by which the verdict was reached.

In the books I read as well as from personal experience it became blatantly clear to me that ideology and politics can shape all the cognitive fields (including the field of legal science) in a way that the words morality and justice at the time in which these fields are being applied have no meaning and no sense.

From the case file you deleted the testimonies of witnesses, statements which speak about me, my opinion, my speech, my deeds and my omissions – if there are any. It took you six months for the decision, whereby you also harmed other defence cases.

You pushed me to the very brink of my dignity and therefore I do not accept further participation.

This is all I can do: “I spoke and I saved my soul”, and you do as you please.

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostar i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mbr - Trebinjska, 10.
mbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.mtb, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

I

Your Honours, the training of police officers from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Croatia, who were sent by the SDA as early as 1991, the training of pilots of the BH Army in the Republic of Croatia, the training and equipping of entire BH Army units in Croatia, the taking up of hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees in Croatia, the organization of ex-territorial education and schooling for Muslim refugees in the Republic of Croatia in the Bosnian language, which at the time didn't even exist, the uninterrupted supply of weapons to the BH Army, ammunition, oil, medication, food, and other necessary logistics for the BH Army in order to wage a war, the medical treatment of more than 10.000 wounded BH Army combatants in Croatian hospitals, enabling thousands of Mujahedin to come and join the BH Army, regular logistic bases of the BH Army in Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, Samobor, throughout the war, and so on and so forth, and all of this for free, never in the history of war has one people, the Croats, provided so much help to another people, the Bosnian Muslims, even when the latter turned their army, the BH Army, against the Croats, the HVO, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Never in the history of war has the commander of one army, the HVO, let convoys with armaments and other equipment pass through to another army, the BH Army, even when that army, the BH Army, used those armaments and all the rest to attack those who let them receive it. And what about the referendum of Croats for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was a precondition for the existence of that state, the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Republic of Croatia, the appointment of the ambassador of the Republic Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the signing of all propositions made by the international community on the internal structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the first ones to sign were the representatives of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna and the Republic of Croatia. That was the policy of Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia. It was the policy of the Government of Croatia, the Parliament of Croatia and the Ministry of Defence of Croatia. It was the policy of the HVO. To the Prosecution of this Tribunal, all these are elements of a joint criminal enterprise. Such an indictment uses logic that is offensive even to the cognitive system of a pathogenic virus.

I-1

What kind of opinion and which positions precede such an indictment?

Firstly, Simon Leach, a former police constable in Great Britain, member of the OTP team who investigated crimes committed by Croats in the Lasva Valley, at some meeting in the Prosecution in 1996, produced a piece of paper with names, the names of Franjo Tudjman, Gojko Šušak and Vice Vukojević. He interpreted and explained that these were the goals that his investigation was led to.

Secondly, I quote from Willem Montgomery's book, "After the Cheering Stops," page 114:

"The US special ambassador for war crimes, Pierre Prosper, invited three American ambassadors from the region, from Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia to come to The Hague in order to meet with the representatives of the ICTY. There are two memories rather impressive. The first one refers to the fact that we heard directly from Carla Del Ponte that the official approach of her office is based on the position that all war leaders of all parties are guilty of war crimes, and, further on, that she considers which these specific crimes are and how their guilt can be proved. At that moment, it seemed, and it still seems to me, that such a position is false for several reasons."

Is Mr. Montgomery a credible witness? What was the reaction of the other three? The positions of Carla Del Ponte are not false for many reasons. Her position is imperial arrogance, a degradation of law and its reduction to Communist purges and Nazi pogroms.

Thirdly, in her book "La Caccia: Io e Il Criminali Di Guerra," Carla Del Ponte says, on page 254:

"One of the Prosecutors of the Tribunal, a Canadian, well known in his circle for his wit and anecdotes, had an aphorism that did a good job capturing the difference between the Serbs and the Croats who attempted to obstruct the work of the Tribunal. The Serbs are bastards, he used to say. In contrast, the Croats are perfidious bastards."

This Prosecutor of the Tribunal, the Canadian, is using hate speech. Del Ponte uses the phrase "he used to say," which means that it was not a one-off witty remark, but a habitual chauvinistic and racist characterisation of the Croats as perfidious bastards. Carla Del Ponte relays the words of one of the Prosecutors of the Tribunal without any restrictions, which means that she completely agrees with that opinion; on an ongoing basis, too, which we can infer from the language and the phrase "he used to say." The lack of any reaction to such a pro-fascist manner of speech about one nation is something I cannot comprehend. I'm interested to know whether the indictment against me may have been drafted under the impression of such an opinion. If, by any chance, I, Slobodan Praljak, had written or said anything like that, anywhere, at any time, about any people or nation or group during the war in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, I would have been sentenced to five years of imprisonment only for that.

I really would like to know whether the saying "quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi" is something that is a valid rule here in this Tribunal. I really would like to know whether the international organisations, which established the Tribunal and which ensure that it is fair, support the position mentioned in the book, this book.

II

The Prosecution has compared me to the Nazis and my activity to the Holocaust.

Well, let me then describe the role of Goering, which character, according to the Prosecution, I compare. This Goering placed his Jews - actually Muslims - in his country cottage and took care of them. He put his Jews in his apartment in Zagreb. He fed them and gave them medical treatment. He exposed himself to sniper fire in front of the JNA barracks at Grabovina in order to save the wives of his enemies.

He protected the captured JNA soldiers with his own body and saw to it that they make it to their homes safe and sound. He pulled out captured Serb civilians from the Dretelj Camp, although he was being threatened with weapons; not alone, though. The camp was held by HOS members, who were mostly Muslims. He evacuated wounded Jews - actually Muslims - from the hospital in East Mostar; not alone, of course. He organised the evacuation and accommodation of 15.000 Jews - actually Muslims - from Stolac and the Dubrava Plateau, across the Neretva, and 3.000 of their cars. He didn't do that alone, either. He transported a wounded Jewish women - actually Muslim woman - by helicopter from East Mostar to split; not alone. He received a Jewish - actually Muslim - family with a child suffering from leukemia near Uskoplje and transported them to Split to be treated. He helped them to get Croatian citizenship in order to travel to Switzerland and be treated medically at the expense of the Croatian state budget; not alone, though. He organised that the Salvation Road for Jews - actually Muslims - be built in order to be able to leave to another country, Goering's country, Croatia. He didn't do it alone, though. He guided them and fought with the Jews - actually Muslims - defending and liberating Mostar and Čapljina and Travnik and Konjic and other places. He didn't do that alone either. He, of his own accord, let the captured Jews - actually Muslims - go who were captured after the conflict in Rama or Prozor, and he prevented retaliation after the Jews - actually Muslims - committed crimes in Uzdol. He didn't do that alone, and the same applies to Doljani and Grabovica. When necessary, he personally let through convoys transporting food for the Jews - actually Muslims - as well as

convoys with armaments, even when the 3rd Corps of the BH Army, the 4th Corps of the BH Army, the 6th Corps of the BH Army and parts of the 1st Corps of the BH Army launched an attack against Goering, against the western borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the port of Ploče, after they had signed a truce with the Serbs. He didn't do that alone either, and so on and so forth.

I'll skip Goering's - that is Praljak's - behaviour in the courtroom, but that behaviour makes one a war criminal according to the logic applied by the OTP.

The Prosecutor quoted Goethe's Faust about the mirror that we should look -- that you would use to look at ourselves. My actus reus are my mirror, my point and my very essence, because they follow from the mens rea of that one who we call Slobodan Praljak.

Unfortunately, Judges Prandler and Trechsel refused to accept my 150 witnesses who were supposed to testify about the activities and deeds of the accused Praljak, and about the general situation in which such deeds were necessary, but, unfortunately, not always sufficient, and I really fail to understand the legal procedure that forbids me to testify about Mladić's diaries.

III

Do I regret the victims?

Yes, I regret all innocent victims of all wars.

I especially regret the victim of those 500 wars or so after 1945 that have taken place and still go on, despite all moralists' speeches that we hear daily. I especially regret every child that, in reality, dies of hunger every four seconds.

Peace in dictatorship is a preparation for war. The longer and the worse the dictatorship, the more negative energy builds up and the more blood and evil will follow later. It doesn't matter whether we're talking about Tito or Saddam. And those who bring down a dictator and who later try to diminish the evil that occurs according to the force of the laws of physics, but those who made possible the dictatorship and by their silence made it last longer. The same applies to Yugoslavia after Tito as well as to Iraq after Saddam.

What the Prosecutor calls nationalist is something the Croats felt a necessity for freedom, both the freedom of the people and citizens' freedom. In this sense, I am a Croatian nationalist.

I do not renounce the policy of Dr. Franjo Tudjman because that policy created the Republic of Croatia and made possible the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state. I do not renounce the inherent sense and point in the legal establishment of the HZ-HB, the expression of the will of the Croats in BH to become and remain a sovereign and constitutive people in that state. The HZ-HB, by its frail organisational structure, made possible the creation of the HVO, which in 1992 was able to defend the BH and the south of Croatia in 1993, prevented the implementation of the aggressive plans of the BH Army. The Muslim policy and the BH Army, unable to regain the territories that were occupied by the JNA and the VRS, and that was due, to a large extent, to the weapons embargo that is incomprehensible to an ethical human mind, moved to launch a counter-offensive against the HVO. By liberating areas from Croats, they committed crimes at Konjic, Čapljina, Doljani, Bugojno, Grabovica, Uzdol, and elsewhere. The facts are plain to see for the killed, expelled and detained Croats.

Social relations are an area where the laws of cause and consequence apply, whereas the spiral of evil, once initiated, does not justify crime, but it does significantly reduce the possibility to implement the law, whoever's task that is on paper. It is always like that, and everywhere. The HVO defended itself from an aggression in 1992, in 1993, and 1994, and a commander's duty is not to lose the war.

My conscience is clear.

IV

Legal proceedings are the interpretation of laws and facts in a trial proceedings, as rhetoric, and, as such, does not seek to find the absolute truth.

It seeks to find a probable truth beyond all reasonable doubt, which can be contradicted hardly or not at all. In an attempt to discover such truth, knowledge is not enough. One needs to ponder, one needs to apply logic, one needs to apply rational and logical argumentation, data, facts, statements, and statistics do not mean a thing if they are not in a logical relationship with assertions. Through connecting various types of knowledge can we get closer to the truth. In these proceedings, one requires knowledge from the field of sociology, sociology of war, knowledge about societies in which state and social structures are completely destroyed, in which individuals return to their natural state. One needs to apply knowledge from the field of war psychology as well as the knowledge of war skills, armament, and the understanding of the real term of the military, and so on and so forth. Possible mistakes in the interpretation of facts are probable and just as well fatal. Exaggerated and false reduction of terms and of logical connections, making conclusions on the basis of false presumptions, avoiding comparing similar systems and phenomena, arbitrary equalising of terms "power" and "desire," which is so dear to intellectuals, arbitrary accusations because the world is not how one wishes or conceives it to be, these are all fields of possible logical errors in the final assessment of facts.

I sincerely hope that the honourable Trial Chamber will adhere to scientific methods and notions.

IV-1

In the last century, millions of people were convicted in trial proceedings pursuant to racial laws, for example, in the USA and Pretoria, dictatorial, religious and Nazi laws in Germany, Serbia, Slovakia, the independent state of Croatia, fascist laws which were applicable in Italy, Communist laws which were applicable in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and so on and so forth. The court rhetoric has been under the influence of unreasonable social and political powers for too long, and that is why it has been criticised; unfortunately, not loudly enough. In order to not end up in moral desperateness, it is high time for it to become what it has to be, a moral and reasonable process.

Do I have the right to hope?

IV-2

Laws of this Tribunal may be what they are. However, they do not apply to the Americans. For other peoples, laws of the Permanent Court apply, and those laws again differ from the laws applied here at the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, laws which are applied to me. This abolishes a significant condition of the court rhetoric, which is the principle of the equality of arms among the participants in the trial proceedings.

And now I quote Perelman:

"In a relation where inequality is a significant and characteristic of relations among people, there is no foundation for a reasonable and judicious process."

V

And for the end, I'm not guilty, and I'm not referring here to the feeling of guilt, coldly, rationally, with a logical analysis that has been critically examined dozens of times. I know I'm not guilty.

Your Honour Judge Antonetti, if your judgement is the opposite of my conclusion, I will respect the general principle of challenging every opinion, conclusion, or attitude. I shall reconsider my position on my own responsibility openly and courageously. If I recognise a mistake after that, I shall serve my time because you are righteous. I will know what I could have done better, how I could have done it better, where I could have done it better, and when I could have done things better, in my thoughts and in my words, in what I did and in what I failed to do.

If, however, you do not convince me and if your interpretation of facts is not a good-enough or a falsely application of sum of social sciences, and what is not possible thus becomes possible, what is not simple thus becomes simple, and the power to do something thus becomes just a substitute for a desire or a wish, then I will be in jail only because the Tribunal is might, and this wouldn't be anything new under the sun, really.

My half hour is finished.

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostar i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

jerjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, namo
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izvesti na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

I was born on January 2nd, 1945 in Čapljina.

Primary and high school education (Realna gimnazija) – 4 years – Rama, 6 years Široki Brijeg – 2 years Mostar.

University of Zagreb:

I have graduated the eight-semester studies from the following fields:

- a) Faculty of Electrical Engineering – profession, MS in Electrical Engineering (weak current – telecommunications).
- b) Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences – Professor of Philosophy and Sociology.
- c) Theatre and Film Academy – profession, Director.

Professional experience:

- As a student I worked in Stockholm company „Akla“ and I was washing dishes in restaurants, and during my student years I have worked for five summers as a waiter in Germany, Titisee.
- Head of laboratory for electronics – Technical high school “Nikola Tesla”–Zagreb.
- I taught “Fundamentals of electrical engineering”, “Theory of electrical engineering”, “Theory of automatic regulation” to Associate students.
- In 1973 – I became “Freelance artist“, living on honorarium.
- I worked as a director in theaters in Croatia and BiH, I have directed two TV movies, a serial for children, one feature film and documentaries.
- I participated in establishing HDZ (political party – Croatian Democratic Union).
- I was a General Secretary of HDS (political party – Croatian Democratic Party).
- In spring of 1991, I withdrew from political activities.
- As a volunteer soldier I went to Sunja (near Sisak) and on September 5th, 1991 I was appointed Defense Commander of Sunja.
- November 26th, 1991 – I received the rank of Colonel of Croatian Army (HV).
- March 10th, 1992 – I was promoted to Brigadier of Croatian Army (HV).

- March 14th, 1992 – I left Sunja to become an Assistant Minister of Defense of Croatia for IPD – Informative–psychological activities.
- April 3rd, 1992 – I received the rank of Major General.
- From April 11th, 1992 to May 07th, 1992 I went to BiH (Herzegovina) as a volunteer and performed a duty of the Commander of Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina – Čapljina – Mostar – Jablanica –Konjic.
- On October 27th, 1992 I've been appointed at VONS – (Vijeće obrane i nacionalne sigurnosti RH) Croatian Council of Defense and National Security.
- June 1st, 1993 – I requested to be released from Croatian Army due to my transfer to BiH.
- June 15th, 1993 – I was released from my duties in Croatian Army.
- July 24th, 1993 – I was appointed Commander of HVO – (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane) Croatian defense council.
- November 9th, 1993 – I withdrew from my duties as a Commander of HVO.
- I returned to Croatian Army.
- Later I performed various functions in Croatian Army, including the Head of the Military Cabinet of the President of Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tuđman.
- As a volunteer I participated in military action „Oluja“/Storm/ on route Hrvatska Kostajnica – Dvor na Uni.
- At my personal request, I retired on December 1st, 1995.
- After my retirement, I worked as a director (manager), and later as Chairman of Supervisory Board in the factory „Chromos boje i lakovi “– cooperating with “Sigma” from Amsterdam (marine paints).
- In early April of 2004, I was in custody in The Hague, accused for many atrocities.
- On May 29th, 2013, by the first instance verdict, I was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Slobodan Praljak

CONTENT OF THE WEB PAGE www.slobodanpraljak.com:

- Slobodan Praljak's opening statement at the beginning of the main hearing of the criminal proceeding before the ICTY on April 27th, 2006.
- War documents – overview of war documents by monographic units (100 monographic units published so far, with 55 000 authentic documents which can be searched via search engine by title, author, place of origin and date of origin).
- 3 video galleries: war videos, video of General Slobodan Praljak's testimony, videos of cross-examination of General Slobodan Praljak's witnesses.

Total duration time of video materials exceeds 1,400 hours with over 8,000 pages of description and content of war videos with associated transcripts of video galleries related to the trial before the ICTY.

- Statements about Slobodan Praljak and wartime events – 188 statements, with English translations, published so far.
- Testimonies and expert findings of professor Slobodan Janković regarding the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, prof. Vlado Šakić regarding the socio-psychological aspects of war and prof. Josip Jurčević regarding the historical aspects of war.
- Trial documents – court decision, judges' opinions, trial transcripts, final filings (submissions), documents presented to defense witnesses of dr. Jadranko Prlić.
- Slobodan Praljak's letter against Carla del Ponte, selection from books and press publications, transcripts, 58 audio recordings.
- Publications on war – monographic overview of major war events in BiH and their consequences.

WEB PAGE STATISTICS

Until November 2014 web page was visited by more than 7 350 000 page visits from over 170 countries, reviewing more than 11Tb of web content in over 60 000 different files (documents, video materials, photos, texts...).

A BiH / BH Army	Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Allah dž.š.	Allah j.sh. /Jalla Shanuhu/
AP ZB	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
AVNOJ	Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia
B/D	Combat Activity
bbr	Mountain Brigade
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
br	Brigade
CLoB	Central Logistics Base
CZ	Civil Protection
DM	Deutsch Marks
DŠK	Degtyaryov-Shpagin Calibre
DVD	Volunteer Fire Department
EC	European Community
ECMM	European Community Monitor Mission
EEC	European Economy Community
Gbr	Guards Brigade
GS	Main Staff
GS HVO	Croatian Defense Council Main Staff
HOS	Croatian Defense Forces
HR-HB	Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
HRM	Croatian Navy
HRSS	Croatian Peasant Workers' Party
HRT	Croatian Radio and Television
HRZ	Croatian Air Force
HTV	Croatian Television
HV	Croatian Army
HVO	Croatian Defense Council
HZ-HB	Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IFOR	Implementation Force
IO	Executive Committee
IPD	Informative Political Activity / Informative Propaganda Activity / Informative Psychological Activity
IZM	Separate Command Post
KOS	Counterintelligence
KOV	Land Army
KPJ	Communist Party of Yugoslavia
LoB	Logistics Base

LRL	Lightweight Rocket Launcher
M/V	Motor Vehicles
MB	Mortar
mbr	Mechanised Brigade
MKBJ	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
MKCK / MCRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MO	Ministry of Defense
MORH	Ministry of Defense of The Republic of Croatia
MOS	Muslim Armed Forces
MP	Military Police
MRUD	Directed Fragmentation Mine
MTBR	Motorised Brigade
MTS / TMS	Material and Technical Equipment / Technical and Material Equipment
MVP	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MZ / IC	International Community
NDH	Independent State of Croatia
NŠVK	Supreme Command Chief of Staff
OG	Operative Group
Okb	Armored Battalion
OkŠO	District of Defence Staff
OpŠO	Municipal Defense Staff
OSMP / OSPP	Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan
OZ	Operative Zone
PAT	Anti-Aircraft Gun
Pdo	Anti-Terrorist Squad
PZO	Air Defense
RBiH	Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
RH	Republic of Croatia
RPG	Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
RSK	Republic of Serbian Krajina
RZ	Working Group
SANU	Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences
SAO	Serbian Autonomous Region
SAO Krajina	Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
SDA	Party of Democratic Action/Democratic Action Party
SDAH	Party of Democratic Action-Croatia
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party
SFRJ / SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SIS	Security Informative Service
SKC	Split Clinical Center

SKH	Alliance of Communists of Croatia
SKJ	Alliance of Communists of Yugoslavia
SKOJ	Yugoslav Communist Youth Association
SO	Assembly of Municipality /AOM/
SPABAT	Spanish Battalion
TO	Territorial Defense
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Forces
Vb	Vitez Brigade
VBR	Multiple Rocket Launcher
VEP	Military Economic Mission
VOMP / VOPP	Vance-Owen Peace Plan
VONS	Council of Defense and National Security
WEU	Western European Union
ZNG	Assembly of National Guard
Ž/S	Living Force/Manpower

