

Slobodan Praljak

**WHY AND HOW THE MUSLIM
A BiH ATTACKED THE HVO AND
THE CROATS IN BiH**

**THE CONFLICT OF A BiH AND HVO
IN USKOPLJE (GORNJI VAKUF)**

**HOW THE OLD BRIDGE WAS
DESTROYED**

**DESTROYED AND DAMAGED
CATHOLIC CHURCHES AND
OTHER RELIGIOUS OBJECTS IN
BiH DURING THE WAR 1991-1995
DESTROYED AND DEVASTATED BY
SOME A BiH TROOPS**

**CRIMES COMMITTED BY SOME
MEMBERS OF A BiH AGAINST THE
CROATS IN BiH 1991-1995**

**REFUGEES AND DISPLACED
PERSONS (CROATS AND BOSNIAKS)
IN BiH DURING THE WAR 1991-1995**

**CAMPS-PRISONS-DETENTION
CENTRES WHERE SOME A BiH
TROOPS AND OTHER STRUCTURES
OF MUSLIM AUTHORITIES KEPT
DETAINED CROATS**

**AGGRESSION OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA AGAINST THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA**

STUPNI DO

ENCLOSURE - DVD

Facts

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Comment

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h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

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vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

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te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
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s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
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mbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspap, 13. lap
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TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
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s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

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nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

**WHY AND HOW THE
MUSLIM A BiH
/ARMY OF BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA/
ATTACKED THE HVO
/CROATIAN DEFENCE
COUNCIL/ AND THE
CROATS IN BiH**

**Documents which show
the political and military
thinking, attitudes and
conduct of the Muslim
political and military
leadership structure in BiH
during the war 1992-1995
The same for the Croats in
BiH, as well as in Croatia**

FACTS

By reprinting some of the documents (along with many new ones) published in the previous book, I wanted to emphasize that all conflicts, especially the one in BiH, are not an issue of an individual, or a leader who then leads "stupid people", but are rather based on the ideas of domination, the roots of which are grounded in history, and they grow and ripen as genuine historical awareness of greater and special rights.

D-1

The "Islamic Declaration" was written by people who were locked up in Yugoslav communist prisons, not because they were fighting for democracy but because they were fighting for the Islamic state. The full text (also available in English) can be found on the web site www.slobodanpralj.com.

The first edition was printed in 200,000 copies, followed by several other editions. It was distributed to the members of the main Muslim party SDA /Party of Democratic Action/, free of charge.

This idea is the core of the attacks launched by the BiH – Muslim Army against the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/. Muslim soldiers were charging into attack shouting the name of Allah j.sh. and were fighting for BiH established under the principles of the "Islamic declaration".

D-2, D-3

In the interview before the elections in BiH in 1990, Alija Izetbegović was advocating a civil state of BiH and said: „you cannot be a Muslim if you are not defined in every aspect“, implying the identity of religion and state.

If you connect this position with the "Islamic Declaration" program you will end up with a "civil" state tailored only for the majority.

It's only necessary to cross the threshold of 51% of the population.

If this is not achieved, there will be a "civil war" – Izetbegović foretells.

And to structure the state in the way Switzerland is structured, doesn't even cross his mind.

For this reason, later in 1992, he will sign the plan of the international community, which Ambassador CUTILEIRO has pushed for nations of BiH to sign, he will sign it and only a month later revoke and derogate what he had signed.

This is the manner of Alija Izetbegović.

Based on the plan guided by the interests of all nationalities and by the civil rights, which made the Croats say yes on the referendum in the first place, BiH was recognized, Izetbegović has usurped all the power in BiH (the part not controlled by the Serbs), playing the role of the President of BH Presidency in front of the international community and quietly implementing the Muslim policy from the "Islamic Declaration".

D-4

The "Patriotic League" is a military organization of the Muslim population, and even their program testifies the "Islamic Declaration", showing that they, members of this military organization and the military wing of SDA, will defend Muslim people, not the citizens of BiH, and they swear a solemn oath not to a democratic and multiethnic state and its institutions, but to Allah j.sh.

And these are the reasons and grounds for the religious war (in addition to the aggression on the part of JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ and Serbia) which was going to last for four years.

And still lasts, only in different forms.

The siege of Sarajevo, the shelling, the crimes committed by the Serbs, made Muslims the victims of war, and more or less no one saw, or did not want to see what this "victim" was doing, what was the in the core of its policy and how this policy was implemented, especially towards the Croats. In the "SHADOW OF SARAJEVO", helpless against Serbian weapons, Muslims were realizing their plans by attacking Croats.

Knowing that victim cannot be blamed, along with the Serbs, Croats from BiH and Croatia were declared as the culprits.

As well as Franjo Tuđman and Mate Boban.

This is simply not true and that is why I publish these documents.

And I would like to note one more thing;

The First Corps of A BiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ numbered 70.000 soldiers (AND SARAJEVO-ROMANIJA CORPS OF VRS WHICH HELD THE POSITIONS AROUND SARAJEVO NUMBERED 24,000 SOLDIERS) has never even tried to break the siege of Sarajevo.

Why?

D-5

No comments. So much on the “civil state”.

D-6

Again only the Muslim people and the debate is in the BH Parliament.

Again “unitary”, “civil” but not “integral”.

Who are the Nazis?

Who are the “internal and external enemies“?

And which battles has the A BiH won, and which strategic offensive has it launched, they do not say.

Until October of 1992, it was mainly the HVO who had military success – liberation of left and right bank of Mostar, liberation of Stolac, blocking of Serbian penetration into Livno area, heavy battles in Posavina.

D-7

Muslims tried to reach an agreement with Serbs without the participation of Croats.

It’s true, in this “Historic agreement” it is acknowledged that Croats represent a nation, with equal rights and with their interests, and therefore it is best for them to remain in Yugoslavia.

This was not the best solution for Croats, and after the aggression on Croatia, this possibility was ruled out completely.

D-8

The document shows the full scale of the misery and amorality of Alija Izetbegović’s political thinking.

D-9

This is just one of a dozen of such documents of HDZ-Croats.

Yes - Bosnia and Herzegovina

Yes - integral

Yes - civil

Yes - respect and autonomy of national interests

No - Yugoslavia

And so the Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina signed all the proposals of the international community about the internal organization of BiH.

Signed and implemented what was signed.

They never formed an Assembly, they didn’t write the CONSTITUTION, they had no GOVERNMENT, and each document had “BiH” on it; laws and

regulations that sometimes had to be passed were explicitly stated as temporary, valid until end of the state of war.

And the Croats were to blame.

D-10

CROATS organized the REFERENDUM, and in the spring of 1992 they confirmed their desire and will for a free and democratic BiH in which Croats will be recognized as a constituent and sovereign nation.

Croats also had the same rights within the CONSTITUTION of the former Socialist Republic of BiH.

They enabled the survival, constituting and international recognition of BiH not only by military means but also by political will followed by the endless spins and games accusing Franjo Tuđman and Croats from BiH for wanting to split the BiH.

Some elementary logic is lacking here.

After the referendum, Izetbegović got hold of the power and never proposed the structure of BiH as a state with three constituent nations, double-crossing each and every suggestion proposing such a structure.

From CUTILEIRO to DAYTON.

Croats were deceived.

D-11

Doubts about the REFERENDUM question.

Once again, and again and again the issue of Croats in BiH is the issue of equality.

No more, nor less.

In a multinational community, citizens cannot be equal if the nation to which they belong is not free and equal.

No matter how many times has this axiom been proven as accurate and true there are still a large number of political illusionists, drivellers and ignoramuses who sell some different stories camouflaged as concern for the ordinary man.

D-12

On 7 May 1991, Croats from West Herzegovina (> 95% of population are Croats) halted the JNA tank brigade (150 TANKS) in the village POLOG moving from MOSTAR in direction of Kupres and Livno.

This convoy was stopped by the people - Croatian people.

Convoy was let through, at the request of Alija Izetbegović who wanted to stop the war and appease the JNA and Serbs with such actions.

He is not interested in the situation in Croatia, and the fact that Croatia is attacked from the BiH territory. The massacre in Croatian village RAVNO in BiH, also does not concern him.

This is not his war.

And on 25 February 1992 Sefer Halilović, a former JNA officer, communist and collaborator of KOS /the JNA counterintelligence service/ claims that the main strongholds for the disintegration of BiH are located in Western Herzegovina.

Communist, Great-Serbian, spy wits and ideas. Shortly afterwards, those same people enabled the establishment of BiH on the referendum.

To him, the two HVO brigades are extremist forces of the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Community/.

It remains unclear why his great army lost 70% of the BH territory, it remains unclear with which forces was he going to stop the breakthrough from East Herzegovina, if not with extremist forces of the HDZ (since he had no army of his own), it remains unclear with which neighbours was he going to “cooperate”.

That’s what happens when half-educated officer, a KOS informant, and a communist becomes an important person on an important position.

That is the BASIS OF FUTURE ATTACKS ON Croats and the HVO.

D-13

The document shows and confirms Alija Izetbegović’s deceit related to the CUTILEIRO PLAN.

He lied when he said: “The paper is not accepted”. For Izetbegović this plan is a “paper”, and he has not accepted that “paper”.

“Only the three-point statement is accepted”.

And this was accepted so that Croats would consent to vote on the REFERENDUM, “for us to put rings around Bosnia, to save it, to eliminate primary threats and inside, whatever agitation is going on, what can I do?”

Such “grand” deceits caused the war, destruction, blood,..., but always puzzled and amazed by the consequences we never question the causes.

Please read the document carefully.

D-14, D-15

The issue of how much and in what ways Croatia helped the Muslims in BiH is supported with hundreds of documents that I have published. Here are two more such documents.

D-16

On 22 April 1992 in the Republic of BiH, the Mostar Municipal Assembly in item I of its agenda entrusted the protection and the defence of the city to the HVO and the Ministry of Interior.

Item III states that “Muslims may form their own military formations which will be put under the unified command of the Croatian Defence Council”.

The Assembly talks about multiethnic composition of the army and of other authorities.

Why is that?

HVO is better organized, HVO understands both the national and civil components of the fight for freedom.

This document is signed by both Croats and Muslims.

How contrary is this to the views of Alija Izetbegović and Sefer Halilović?!

Little by little, the thinking of Alija Izetbegović was destroying this agreement and then, on 9 May 1993, the A BiH attacked the HVO in MOSTAR.

D-17

The same, similar document was signed by Croats and Muslims from the municipalities of Žepče, Zavidovići, Maglaj and Teslić.

And Item 3 states “Uniform markings of the HVO as well as those with the national crest of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be mandatory”.

Also, in many other locations in BiH, the HVO is better organized for the DEFENCE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

And why, in God’s name, would the HVO defend the BiH, if their plan was to divide it – as certain political charlatans claim.

D-18

Instead of Ministers, the HVO appoints Bureau Chiefs (because HVO doesn’t form a separate STATE).

On the same topic – in what way does the HVO perceive and relate to BiH – a letter from Jadranko Prlić is as “clear as a summer day at high noon”.

D-19

Where was the meeting of the SDA Executive Board held, the main party of the Muslim people, on 3rd, 4th, 5th October 1992?

Why and how come it was held in Zagreb, the capital of the “Tudman’s state”, who wants to tear BiH apart and create a Greater Croatia.

All these theories were made up later in order to hide and conceal their own responsibility for not doing all that could and should have been done, to hide and conceal their own illogical and immoral judgments and actions resulting from such judgments.

Since the “FATHER’S AUTHORITY” cannot be questioned, children must be blamed.

D-20

In addition to the HVO, on their own initiative and without the approval of the legally elected representatives of Croatian people the HOS Army /Croatian Defence Forces/ was formed in BiH.

Long lasting and substantial efforts were made to disband this not negligible group of soldiers and units.

Its political program is partially based on the idea of the former Independent State of Croatia – CROATIA ALL THE WAY TO THE DRINA RIVER.

The reason why this military formation was acknowledged by Alija Izetbegović, and why he acknowledged and affirmed its generals as generals of the A BiH remains a mystery only to those uninformed.

D-21

On 24 August 1992 from the Intercontinental Hotel in Zagreb, Mr. Alija Izetbegović, President of the BiH Presidency, authorizes three Muslims from BiH to talk with the representatives of the CROATS, CROATIAN PEOPLE FROM CROATIA – about the implementation of the AGREEMENT such and such.

And what about the Croats from BiH? Do only Muslims represent the BiH?

After the Croatian recognition of BiH, after Croatia (with 1/3 of its the territory occupied) received several hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced Muslims from BiH, after providing arms for the A BiH, after treating wounded soldiers of the A BiH, after...

It was then, if not earlier, that the Croatian representatives should have rejected resolutely such impudence and, once and for all, make Izetbegović understand that Croats also live in BiH, as a sovereign and constituent nation and that Mr. Izetbegović, as head of BiH, cannot act as though there were no Croats in BiH, and all of it in the centre of Zagreb.

Was this possible?

No!

Already accused for everything and anything that anyone could conjure up, Croatia would be threatened with sanctions, accused for non-cooperation, for nationalism, for USTASHA, for deepening the conflict and continuation of war, just to pick some from the arsenal of fake humanistic platitudes.

D-21-1

Pleasantly situated in the Embassy of BiH in Zagreb (an embassy without Croats, not to mention Serbs), in Croatia, the Muslim leaders write to Alija Izetbegović that they do not accept the 50%-50% division of power with the Croats in Mostar.

And there are not more Muslims than the Croats there!!!

Alija Izetbegović must emerge as a political winner. When that will not function, the war (attack) against the Croats of Herzeg-Bosnia will be an option.

D-22

And what is actually Alija Izetbegović saying?

That one day internal organizational structure of BiH will be made?!

One day.

At the time, the author of these lines also spoke with Alija Izetbegović in private about this topic, in an apartment in Mostar, for almost two hours, intimately, as two human beings.

Summary of the conversation:

Izetbegović: Let’s make a house (BiH) together, and then will talk about the property rights.

Praljak: Members of one nation are dying in this war (mostly as volunteers) only if they know what the reason for their death is, what the metaphysics of death is.

We need to know what property rights do Croats have regarding the house

(BiH) for which they have to fight in order to build. And this certainly is not a question of economic relations and the flow of people.

With subsequent attack on the HVO and the Croats, Izetbegović was not realizing and establishing economic relations, but was rather solving the ethnic problem of Muslims.

D-23

Unlike Mostar, where the HVO, after the liberation of the town, gave more of the JNA apartments to the Muslims than to the Croats, Mr. Izetbegović doesn't even mention the HVO in Sarajevo.

D-24

The military attaché of the Republic of BiH in Zagreb, Croatia, empowers and authorizes General Mate Šarlija to... - please read the document.

And Mr. Mate Šarlija is an active general of the Croatian Army.

Would it be possible for such a document to be drafted and written in United States, England, France, China, Russia, Germany,?

And is Croatian policy still trying to divide and annex a part of BiH? Certainly, despite the logic that offends even feathered animals.

D-25

One more document.

Cyrus Vance Peace Plan was not only rejected by the Serbs but also by Alija Izetbegović.

D-26

Please read.

D-27

An army of 150,000 soldiers lost 70% of the territory.

They cannot break the blockade of Sarajevo.

The rest was mostly defended by the HVO.

But Sefer Halilović cannot even utter the name of HVO except as extremists and Ustashas.

This little head was indoctrinated for too long in communist and Serbian JNA in order to change so fast.

D-28

No comment.

D-29

Failed attempt to terminate the blockade of Sarajevo.

Poorly planned, poorly executed, as though nothing was even wanted to be achieved.

HVO was not included in this action, this possibility was eliminated by the commanders of the action, and all of the commanders were Muslims.

So much for fair play and equality.

D-29-1

Therefore, after Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević in Karadžević "divided" and succeeded in "dividing" BiH, Jovan Divjak, the man No. 2 in the command chain of A BiH proposes to the head of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to issue an order – whereby the A BiH would set up its logistical centre in Rijeka.

The city of Rijeka is in the Republic of Croatia (second largest city, a port), a sovereign state which is not Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The President of the Republic of Croatia is Dr. Franjo Tuđman, who wishes to divide BiH – as asserted by the pundits of military analysis.

And the Croats, in the opinion of Sefer Halilović are mainly Ustasha or extreme HDZ which was established and is run by Dr. Franjo Tuđman.

So please, dear reader, try to ponder on this and understand it.

Question –

Were the logistical centres of A BiH in Croatia (Rijeka, Zagreb, Split) established?

YES! I published those documents.

D-30

No comment.

D-31a, 31b, 31c

How come?

The BH Presidency consisting of three members elects by and for itself two members, meaning that one member, President of the Presidency, elects at his own discretion two other members of the state Presidency.

That's how Mr. Izetbegović operates.

By the way, he also elects the President of the BH Parliament.

After he extended his own mandate as a member and the President of the Presidency of BiH, contrary to all constitutional provisions, having noted that the Parliament cannot meet, he elected for himself and by his own discretion, from the street, the highest officials of BiH.

Alija Izetbegović becomes the BH Constitution.

And all the democrats of the world, dealing with Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time, remain silent.

D-32

Thousands of Croats, who lived and worked in Europe, were helping the HV /Croatian Army/ and HVO, by purchasing the necessary equipment for the war.

Including uniforms.

We were under an embargo.

And black uniforms were a good excuse to accuse us of similarity with some ideologies.

Therefore, black uniforms had to be prohibited.

D-33a, D-33b

The world is reflected through details.

When the HVO was building the ROAD OF SALVATION, with extraordinary efforts, private funds and with private machinery belonging to good people, the way through which several hundred thousand Muslims escaped to Croatia, we could not obtain any dynamite from the factory in Vitez, because Muslims were opposed to that. When HVO was trying to expand the forest path from Fojnica to Prozor in order to bypass the Mujahedin base in Ravno Rostovo (where Croats were constantly harassed), commander Arif Pašalić requested for such actions to be approved by the relevant BH authority.

The same BiH in which one member of the Presidency elects for himself two members of the Presidency, bypassing any election process for that position.

In peace, when there is no war, in a polite society, such a document is usually called hypocritical.

In war, one would say: "Who is he screwing up?"

D-33-1

The document speaks on how the commanders of A BiH take over a political role and make political decisions.

D-34a, D-34b, D-34c, D-34d

Any person reading these documents will be able to see just in how many ways (for the umpteenth time) the Muslim side has betrayed signed international agreements.

D-35

Once "a false picture of the world" is created, with the intent and ignorance regarding the relationship between Croats and Muslims in BiH, (and due to Croatian behaviour) this picture will prevent the verification and understanding of the facts from this document.

This continues to this very day.

D-36

Again the BH Presidency.

It nominates the presidents and members of war presidency of municipal assemblies.

And what do these municipal assemblies do?

In a multiethnic BiH, out of 104 appointments, only 4 are not Muslims.

So much on the equality principles of Mr. Alija Izetbegović.

D-37

The commander of the Fourth Corps of A BiH, Mr. Arif Pašalić gives these commands to the 44th brigade of the A BiH:

Allow a part of UNPROFOR forces to.....

Meaning, don't let Spanish battalion leave Jablanica without my authorization.

No comment.

D-38 to D-46

I will not comment these documents, because I hope that any analyst will understand what is going on here and how two sides in this conflict behave – CROATIAN AND MUSLIM.

D-47

This document is saying that the Muslim army – A BiH stole tree howitzers from the joint company.

Unfortunately, there is no doubt that these weapons will be used against the HVO during the general offensive of A BiH on the HVO.

D-48

If anyone had any doubts, this can be verified.

This is just one of a dozen commands issued by A BiH proving that A BiH, a Muslim army was attacking HVO in Central Bosnia and in Herzegovina – Mostar, for several months.

D-49, D-49a

HVO was the only multiethnic army in BiH, up to the moment of complete treason of Muslims, when HVO soldiers – Muslims – turned against their Croatian fellow soldiers, killing and capturing many of them and occupying territory which was jointly defended in the past.

A flawless act of treason, encouraged, directed and implemented by senior officers of the A BiH.

D-50

No comment.

D-51

Deputy Commander of A BiH writes to Alija Izetbegović and the Supreme Commander of A BiH.

Please, read carefully.

D-52

The facts from the document D-52 are derived from the situation in the A BiH described in the document D-51.

D-53

Muslim A BiH forces were successful in “selling” their propaganda “goods” – how the HVO is getting ready to attack them.

HVO was holding 70-80% of defence positions in Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf against the VRS /Army of Republika Srpska/.

But the document states, loud and clear: „Occupy Kiseljak at the appropriate time...».

D-53a

HVO - Bugojno successfully defends this city from the VRS attacks both in 1992 and 1993.

Muslim army attacked the HVO in the city also from the rear of the defensive HVO line against VRS on Sunday 18 June 1993, when most of the Croats, both civilians and soldiers, were attending Mass in churches, and were not on their positions.

How can one answer this question to those who were deported and those from the concentration camps and to the relatives of those killed (27 corpses are still being sought):

“Why were we helping A BiH so much, and why weren’t allowed to attack them and why we didn’t attack them in 1992, when the HVO was practically the only organized army and why did we allow the formation of A BiH in Bugojno in addition to HVO?”

Such questions have no answer.

D-54

No comment.

D-55

This “state secret” of the Republic of Srpska Krajina reveals why in June of 1993 a document on cessation of hostilities between the VRS and the A BiH was signed, it reveals why the Serbs provided military support to the A BiH, especially artillery support in military actions against the HVO, particularly during the actions in Konjic and Mostar as well as the support in the implementation of the Muslim offensive “Neretva 93” whose goal was to occupy the port of Ploče in Croatia.

Behind the scenes, the plan was being forged to appropriate Croatian territory – territory from Ploče to Neum was supposed to be Muslim, from Neum to Prevlaka Serbian.

And Dubrovnik should have become the “Dubrovnik Republic.”

D-56, D-57

No comment

D-58

No comment

D-59

Please read item 3.

In the event of peace based on the principles of the Geneva Conference, what will happen?

The struggle for territory will continue.

Top officers of the A BiH present their view with crystal clarity.

What peace, what Geneva?

The war for territory will continue.

Therefore, as much territory as possible must be conquered.

And against whom?

Against Fascism, both Serb-Montenegrin and Croatian.

But weapons and money for weapons and logistics centres for the supply of weapons and other materials we will have in the fascist cities of Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, all in Croatia.

Observers and analysts of the international community have swallowed all this and have declared Croats as the guilty party. The HVO is attacking Muslims and Franjo Tuđman divides Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I was there, I was the HVO commanding officer and I tell you all - "Get lost!" - I'm not a member an anthropoid ape species.

Power is almighty, but you will not convince me.

D-60

17 September 1993 – the A BiH accepts the truce negotiated in Geneva and Stjepan Šiber, deputy commander to RASIM DELIĆ of the A BiH, issues a COMMAND regarding the cessation of hostilities between the Army of Republika Srpska and the A BiH (TRUCE BETWEEN THE VRS AND THE A BiH).

- a) And where has the A BiH attacked the VRS and liberated BiH in the period from June 1993 until 17 September 1993?
- b) Where and against whom were the IV Corps, VI Corps, III Corps and parts of I Corps of the A BiH engaged?

D-61

On 30 September 1993 a ceasefire was negotiated between the A BiH and the HVO.

The order of the A BiH was signed by Arif Pašalić.

D-62

The same Arif Pašalić, Commander of the IV Corps of the A BiH in Mostar, on 5 October 1993 signed the order "for the execution of the offensive operations ..." in order to "inflict losses to Ustasha forces"

For Arif Pašalić "Ustasha forces" were the HVO soldiers with whom, five days earlier he signed a ceasefire. This was common practice; this sneaky

practice was repeated after each ceasefire, with accusations that the HVO was violating it.

I would be grateful if anyone could show at least one document of this kind signed by a HVO commander.

D-63

Same as D-62.

On 5 October 1993 Budaković (TETAK), Deputy Commander of the IV Corps of A BiH, issues a command to attack the HVO on VRDI (NORTH OF MOSTAR), near Mostar.

And "Karadža will do everything" in order for the VRS artillery to "shell the Ustasha in depth".

D-64

Same as D-62 and D-63.

This time, Arif Pašalić issues a command to attack the HVO ("Ustasha"), "in the wider region of Dubrava" (south of Mostar), "with a purpose of inflicting losses to Ustasha in M/P and MTR...."

- a) M/P - MANPOWER
- b) MTR - Material-technical resources

D-65

On 22 October 1993 the same command to attack the HVO is issued by Esad Šejtanić.

Ceasefire my ass! It's a show for the international community. At home they continue with the "Neretva 93" offensive towards the "western borders of BiH and the Port of Ploče (Croatia)" as the goals of the offensive against HVO were defined by Sefer Halilović.

D-66

Alija Izetbegović was lying and cheating during the whole war, signing and then denying what he had signed.

He placed with the Croats (USTASHA) several hundred thousand of his Muslims, he placed his wife in Dubrovnik, the A BiH logistic centers in Croatia (Rijeka, Split, Zagreb) procured the weapons for him, and he sent 10,000 (ten thousand) of his wounded to Croatia for free treatment, ...,

How DEPLORABLE.

At the end, the HV /Croatian Army/ and the HVO saved BiH by liberating Bihać and by reaching all the way to Banja Luka.

D-67

One needs only to compare facts and documents of his commanders, his army, to see how pitiful his positions are, to see the nebulosity of his political opinions, in one word – lies.

But in the light of the siege of Sarajevo such a “world view” had many “customers”.

And why, for God’s sake, would someone continuously help the people and the army if his plan was to attack them?

D-68

This document is the reaction of the HSS /Croatian Peasant Party/ in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This party was in opposition to HDZ – to Franjo Tuđman and Mate Boban and was supporting Alija Izetbegović.

Even they could not “swallow” some statements made by Alija Izetbegović, who reluctantly admits that he cannot establish a Muslim state under the principles of the “Islamic Declaration”, “but there will be 80% of Muslims, and we shall see”, this is what he claims.

D-69

The meeting in Graz is another “spin” story and this document, the map and the layout of the units show that no agreement between Croats and Serbs has ever been reached in Graz.

D-70

No one in his sane mind has anything against peacemaking and reconciliation, but if such a quantity of lies is thrown on the table, as (in the writings of the Serb Orthodox archpriest Aleksa Zubac) the Muslims are doing in Mostar, then one becomes sick of this misery.

The VRS destroyed that town and banished all the Muslims from the eastern side and killed many of them (Sutina, Uborak). The HVO, under my command, liberated that town.

That was when they praised us.

After Manjača and Omarska, after and during the siege of Sarajevo, after Bihać and Bijeljina, before Srebrenica, after the killings in Mostar perpetrated by the JNA and general Perišić, after the URBICIDE in that town (URBICIDE of Mostar* at www.slobodanpraljak.com), Safet Oručević, one of the advocates of the Muslim politics, an intimate friend of Alija Izetbegović, the “Mayor” of Mostar, full of praise and admiration towards the officers and army of Bosnian Serbs asks the Serbian Orthodox bishop to help recover 270 (two hundred and seventy) dead bodies, which he did not recover yet, and many he already did recover.

He asks this from the army which keeps those bodies, because it was the same army which killed them. He regrets that the deal with general Mladić did not go through, they were 7 days late, otherwise they would be on the sea and Croats – the Ustasha – would be expelled, and Serbs saved 70% of Mostar...

It is impossible to imagine words which are more miserable, deplorable, disgusting, loathsome....

In a single word – a misery, both political and human.

Living death.

And please, don’t stop accusing the Croats, they are such a thankful material.

* See: S. Praljak, “Urbicid koji su počinile postrojbe JA pod vodstvom Momčila Perišića nad Mostarom u ljeto ‘92” /URBICIDE of Mostar, committed by YA units under command of Momčilo Perišić during summer 1992/, Zagreb, May 2007.

THE ISLAMIC DECLARATION
A PROGRAMME FOR THE ISLAMIZATION OF MUSLIMS
AND THE MUSLIM PEOPLES

OUR GOAL: The Islamization of Muslims

OUR MOTTO: Believe and struggle

BISMILLAHIRAHMANIRRAHIM!

We dedicate our message to the memory of our comrades who died for Islam.

Sarajevo, 1970

Jumada al-Oola, 1390

There is no peace nor coexistence between the "Islamic faith" and non-Islamic social and political institutions. Pretending to order its own world, Islam clearly excludes the right and possibility of activity of any foreign ideology in its area. Therefore, there is no lay principle, and the state must be an expression and support of the moral concepts of religion.

Printed in 200.000 copies

The Islamic movement should and is able to take over the government as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough not only to topple the existing non-Islamic government, but to build a new Islamic government.

YOU WON'T BE ABLE TO SAY YOU DIDN'T KNOW!

ISLAMIC DECLARATION

The Declaration which we today present to the public is not prescribed reading, intended to demonstrate to foreigners or doubters the superiority of Islam over any particular system or school of thought.

It is intended for Muslims who know where they belong and whose hearts clearly tell them which side they stand on. For such as these, this Declaration is a call to understand the inevitable consequences of that to which their love and allegiance bind them.

The entire Muslim world is in a state of ferment and change. Whatever form it eventually takes when the initial effects of these changes is felt, one thing is certain: it will no longer be the world of the first half of this century. The age of passivity and stagnation has gone forever.

Everyone is trying to take advantage of this time of movement and change, particularly foreign powers, both East and West. Instead of their armies, they now use ideas and capital, and by a new mode of influence are once more endeavouring to accomplish the same aim: to ensure their presence and keep the Muslim nations in a state of spiritual helplessness and material and political dependence.

China, Russia and the Western countries quarrel as to who among them will extend patronage and to which part of the Muslim world. Theirs is a pointless dispute. The Islamic world does not belong to them, but to the Muslim people.

A world of 700 million people with enormous natural resources, occupying a first class geographical position, heir to colossal cultural and political traditions and the proponent of living Islamic thought, cannot long remain in a state of vassalage. There is no power which can check the new Muslim generation from putting an end to this abnormal state of affairs.

In this conviction, we announce to our friends and enemies alike that Muslims are determined to take the fate of the Islamic world into their own hands and arrange that world according to their own vision of it.

From this point of view, the ideas contained in the Declaration are not absolutely new. This is rather a synthesis of ideas heard with increasing frequency in various places and which are accorded about the same importance in all parts of the Muslim world. Its novelty lies in that it seeks to promote ideas and plans into organized action.

The struggle towards new goals did not begin today. On the contrary, it has already experienced *shihada** and its history contains pages of the suffering of its victims. Still, this is mainly the personal sacrifice of exceptional individuals or courageous minor groups in collision with the mighty forces of the *Jahiliya*** . The magnitude of the problem and its difficulties, however, required the organized action of millions.

Our message is dedicated to the memory of our comrades who have fallen in the name of Islam.

Sarajevo, 1970
Jumada al-Oola, 1390

* * *

The Islamic order is a society freed of this conflict, a framework of relations in which the Muslim finds himself in complete harmony with his surroundings.

To the question: what is a Muslim society? We would say it is a community composed of Muslims, and we think that this says it all, or almost all.

The meaning of this definition is that there is no system of institutions, relationships and laws disparate from the people who are its object of which it could be said: this is an Islamic system. No system is Islamic or non-Islamic of itself. It is only so because of the people who compose it.

A European believes that society is ordered by the rule of laws. Since Plato's "Republic", and the various utopian idea which followed up to the most recent - Marxism - the European spirit has been searching for one scheme, one pattern, which, by simply altering the relationships between people or groups, would give birth to the ideal society.

In the Qu'ran, on the other hand, there are relatively few real laws, and much more religion, and requirement for practical action in keeping with this religion.

A multiplicity of laws and a complex legislature is usually, a sure sign that something is rotten in a society and that it should stop passing laws and start educating people. When the rottenness of the environment surpasses a certain point, the law becomes impotent. It then falls either into the hands of corrupt executors of justice, or becomes the subject of open or concealed trickery on the part of a corrupt environment.

Wine, gambling and sorcery - once widespread and deeply rooted vices throughout the entire Middle East - were eliminated for a lengthy period from an enormous region by a single Ayet of the Qu'ran, and by a single explanation: God had forbidden them. As soon as religion weakened, intoxication and superstition returned with unabated vigour, to which the incomparably higher level of culture by now obtaining offered no obstacle. America's Prohibition Law, proclaimed in the name of contemporary science and implemented with all the force of one of the most highly organized communities in the world, eventually had to be abandoned in the 'forties, after thirteen years of futile attempts, full of violence and crime. An attempt to introduce prohibition into Scandinavian countries ended in similar failure.

* *shihada*: martyrdom

** *Jahiliya*: the godless. Period of darkness prior to Islam. (Translator's note).

This and many similar examples clearly demonstrate that a society can be improved only in the name of God and by educating man. We should take the one road which surely leads to this objective.

While in principle confirming the spiritual, interior approach in all of its manifestations, Islam, however, did not content itself with that. It endeavoured to tear the devil's weapon out of his hands. If, in what concerns man's relationship with the world, Islam did not start with man, it would not be a religion; if it were to remain at that, it would be simply a religion, merely repeating Jesus's teaching on the ideal and eternal aspect of man's being. Through Muhammad, (peace be upon him) and the Qu'ran, Islam addressed the real man, the outside world, nature, in order to evolve as a teaching on the complete man and on all aspects of life. Faith allied itself to the law, education and upbringing to power. Thus Islam became an order.

* * *

.... spiritual and physical life, or more precisely, that he must willingly and in full awareness accept both these aspects of life as the human definition and meaning of his life on earth (Qu'ran 28/77). Translating this requirement into the language of everyday life, we could say: he who believes that life should be ordered not only by faith and prayer, but by work and knowledge, whose vision of the world not only allows but demands that temple and factory stand side by side, who considers that people should not only be fed and educated, but that their life on earth should be facilitated and promoted, and that there is no reason to sacrifice either of these objectives to the other - this man belongs to Islam.

This, together with faith in God, is the main message of the Qu'ran, and in it is all of Islam. All else is mere development and explanation. This aspect of Islam, besides containing the principle of the Islamic order, the conjunction of religion and politics, leads to other significant conclusions of enormous fundamental and practical importance.

First and foremost of these conclusions is certainly the incompatibility of Islam with non-Islamic systems. There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions. The failure of these institutions to function and the instability of the regimes in Muslim countries, manifest in frequent change and coups d'etat, is most often the consequence of their a priori opposition to Islam, as the fundamental and foremost feeling of the peoples in these countries. By claiming the right to order its own world itself, Islam obviously excludes the right or possibility of action on the part of any foreign ideology on that terrain. There is, therefore, no lay principle, and the state should both reflect and support religious moral concepts.

Every age and every generation has the task of implementing the message of Islam in new forms and by new means.

There are immutable Islamic principles which order relations between people, but there is no Islamic economic, social or political structure which cannot be changed.

This is only the first and most important conclusion in approaching Islam as an integrated order. The remaining three, equally important but less preclusive, are:

First: by opting for this world, Islam has opted for the best possible ordering of that world. Nothing which can make the world a better place may be rejected out of hand as non-Islamic;

Second: to be open to nature means to be open to learning. In order to be Islamic, any solution must fulfil two conditions: it must be maximally efficient and maximally humane. It must therefore reflect the reconciliation of religion and science in its highest form;

Third: by pointing to one link between religion and learning, morals and policy, the individual and the collective, the spiritual and the material - questions which divide the contemporary world - Islam regains its role as the intermediary of ideas, and the Islamic world as intermediary among nations in a divided world. By promising "religion without mysticism and learning without atheism". Islam can interest all people, no matter who they are.

* * *

ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE

Stressing the priority of the religious and moral renewal does not mean - nor can it be interpreted to mean - that the Islamic order can be brought about without Islamic governance. This means only that our way does not start by taking power, but by winning people, and that Islamic rebirth is first a revolution in education, and only then in politics.

We must therefore be first preachers and then soldiers. Our weapons are personal example, the book, the word. When is force to be joined to these?

The choice of this moment is always a tangible one and depends on a series of factors. There is, however, a general rule: the Islamic movement should and can start to take over power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough to be able to overturn not only the existing non-Islamic government, but also to build up a new Islamic one. This differentiation is important, because overturning and building do not require an equal degree of psychological and material readiness.

To act prematurely in this regard is just as dangerous as to delay.

To take power due to a fortunate set of circumstances, without sufficient moral and psychological preparation or the essential minimum of staunch and well-trained personnel, means causing another *coup d'état*, and not an Islamic revolution. (The *coup d'état* is a continuation of the un-Islamic policy on the part of another group of people or in the name of other principles). To delay in taking power means to deprive the Islamic movement of a powerful means of attaining its aims while offering the un-Islamic authorities the possibility of dealing a blow to the movement and dispersing its personnel. Recent history provides sufficient tragic and instructive examples of the latter.

* * *

...potential forces, into active ones. Loyalty to the Qu'ran should grow into determination to apply it: the Islamic community of emotions should turn into an organized, aware community, and folk humanism into clear ideas, which will become the moral and social character of future laws and institutions.

Who will carry out this transformation, and how shall it be done?

Every action taken in relation to events is social action. Every successful struggle can only be a joint, organized struggle. The younger generation will be able to carry out its task of transformation only if its inclinations and idealism are poured into an organized movement, in which the enthusiasm and personal value of the individual will be correlated with methods of joint, coordinated action. The creation of this movement with a single basic aim and programme is an irrevocable condition and starting point for rebirth in every Muslim country.

This movement will gather together what is built, raise the unbuilt, elevate and call on people, define aims and find a way to attain them. It will introduce life, thought and action everywhere. It will become the conscience and will of a world awakening out of a long, deep sleep.

In sending this message to all Muslims throughout the world, we wish clearly to state that there is no promised land, no miracle-workers or mahdis. There is only the way of work, struggle and sacrifice.

In times of trial let us always have in mind two things: behind us stands God's blessing and the consent of our people.


**YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SAY THAT YOU
DIDN'T KNOW!**

Elections 1990

"STRANKE, PROGRAMI, LIČNOSTI" /Parties, programs and personalities/

OSLOBOĐENJE, Sarajevo, October 1990

Page 19



Alija Izetbegović, President of the Party of Democratic Action

"Civil republic or civil war"

Aleksandar Zinovjev, Soviet dissident, claims that, in several years, mujezin shall be learned from the Eiffel Tower. He says this shall be a defeat of European-centric Christianity as well as the conflict that shall, after the death of classes and bolshevism, characterize the century in front of us. What is your comment to Zinovjev?

Regarding Islam itself, I would love to hear mujezin from the Eiffel Tower. However, I am not convinced about the accuracy of this theory, even though bearing in mind that Islam is indeed the only religion, being expanded.

You wrote a book "Islam between East and West". Why did, according to you, the horizon of Islamic world, from Kashmir, over Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Sandžak, all the way till Western Europe in time of bolshevism collapse, seek for the Quran? All these agitations, are they a part of one unique wave?

I think they could be envisaged as unique wave, among others, for the reason that Islam, as thought and philosophy, is indeed in the sign of renaissance. People that belong to Islam, belong to it entirely, for Islam is a thought that touches every field of life; you can't be Muslim, without being defined in every way. People in horizon of Islam were dominated by the foreign forces and when leading the battle for liberation, they do it regularly under the flag of Islam.

Could you copy it to Bosnia and Herzegovina?

No! Our party stands for creation of civil republic; in Kladuša, I have just invited my fellow citizens, Serbs and Croats to join us in the battle for creation of civil republic. Nothing can connect us better but the civil republic because we cannot make a national state out of Bosnia. Let Serbia and Croatia proceed with creation of such states, we however, have no conditions for it.

We have got only the possibility to realize the ideal of civil republic or the civil war!

Secret known as Bosnia: speeches, interviews, letters

1989-1993/ Alija Izetbegović

/edited by Nermina Šašić, Bahrija Ćehović - Sarajevo:

Democratic Action Party, Center for Analysis, documentation and communication with the public,
2004- 354 p.; 25 cm /

Bosnia will not be part of Great Serbia

Pre-election rally SDA (Democratic Action Party)

Velika Kladuša, 15 September 1990

Dear brothers and sisters, dear Krajina people, Dear friends,

I begin my remarks with Bismillah and ask God to help us and to show us the right path.

* * *

Our ideal is a civil republic. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a civil republic. Therefore, not an Islamic republic, not even a socialist republic. Free and civil republic. This is a definite commitment of the Muslim nation. But this is not enough. That's why it needs the consent of both Serbs and Croats, and we invite them here to join us in the effort to build Bosnia and Herzegovina as a civil republic and democratic state.

* * *

I believe that I have approval not only by Muslim people but also by Serbian and Croatian people. Why do I have such an approval? Because what is the alternative to civil republic, which we proclaim here, the alternative is only civil war, and no reasonable man in Bosnia can stand behind such a decision. Therefore, there are only two ways: either to build civil republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina together in peace, or that we have a civil war ...


PATRIOTIC LEAGUE

Patriotic League had a historical role in organizing people in a nationwide resistance against the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressors, the former Yugoslav Army and the Chetnic's hordes. With the vision, League was the first who, in the wake of the attacks on Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and an unprecedented genocide against the Bosnian people was organized and stood in front of patriots to lead them in battle. PL's spirit can be felt today by most people and by large number of soldiers of the BH Army. This spirit should not disappear, it must be guarded and carried over to future generations. Our soldiers who gave their lives against a brutal enemy, our martyrs will not forgive us, if we do not continue the fight for free, independent and integral Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We pledge to them. We guaranty that PLs spirit will be nurtured and guarded forever.

FATHER OF PATRIOTIC LEAGUE




Mr. Izetbegović, despite the troubles at the time, managed to gather the Bosnians, by forming the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and through other forms to mobilize the resistance against the aggressor. Patriotic League was the nucleus of the first military formations.



MAN WITH HUGE MERIT

The future will show everything that was done by Hasan Čengić for the Patriotic League and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Patriotic League was formed, organized and armed by the Democratic Action Party. The League is the military division of the DAP, and emerged from a military-political organization formed on 31 March 1991, while its roots reach back to the DAP division of "Herceg-Bosna", formed in late 1990. Father of the Patriotic League is the founder and President of DAP, Chairman of Presidency of Republic of BiH, Mr. Alija Izetbegović. The man who has a huge merit in the organization and its operations is Mr. Hasan Čengić. When talking about the establishment and work of the PL one must mention the late Safet Hadžić. The name "Patriotic League" was created under the auspices of the DAP, in agreement of Mr. Hasan Čengić, Dr. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, and others. The first officer who left the JNA and came to the center of the DAP was Sulejman Vranje - Sule.



IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATION

Sulejman Vranje – Sule was the first officer who left the former JNA and put his service at the disposal of his people through the DAP


After the DAP victory in 1990 elections, the Bosnian people were allowed for the first time to get familiar with its past by studying its history, to assume what to expect, and to get organized as soon as possible. Before the attack on Slovenia, it was clear that Serbia and Montenegro have territorial aspirations towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nationalistic and chauvinistic settings of “Memorandum” SANU (Serbian Academy of Science and arts), displaying relics of Prince Lazar, recalling of the Kosovo battle, the events at Gazimestan, calling Serbian saints and heroes, excavation of common graves, public burials , public liturgy, singing of nationalist and chauvinistic songs , fiddle evenings and such, pointed to the great threat that hangs over Bosnia, and in particular against Bosnians.

PATRIOTIC LEAGUE IS A SECRET
ORGANIZATION WHOSE EXISTENCE AND
WORK WERE NOT EVEN KNOWN TO ALL
MEMBERS OF THE DAP

Former Yugoslav Army (JNA) carried out serious preparations for the realization of the plan of ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and creating conditions for a “Great Serbia”. Among other things, JNA significantly reduced the number of members in Territorial Defense, with a tendency to abolish it (the number of members has been reduced from 7 to 1.8 percent), while the weapons were placed under the control of the JNA in their warehouses. Also the command of the 7th Army Region, which was responsible for the units on the territory of BiH was abolished, while all command was concentrated in military centers located in Belgrade, under cover of form - P.10



Muslim worship in the Assembly of SR /Socialist Republic of/ Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 1991. Source: Vreme (Belgrade), February 4th, 1991, p. 17



Prayer in the Assembly: Deputies of SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ during break

There is no work without Allah

The session of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its committees and working bodies will not take place on religious holidays, neither on Fridays, except in extraordinary circumstances. This is the response to a question asked by the deputy Dževad Mlača in the Assembly of BiH. On every working day when the Assembly will be in session, upon the request of the deputies, a break will be given during prayer times and the transport of the deputies to one of the mosques in Sarajevo will be provided, so that they could perform their religious ritual undisturbed.

Is the prayer a break in the work of the Assembly, or is the work of the Assembly a break in the prayer, this could depend on the situation, on the subject matter of debate, on the need for God's (Allah's) help and on personal point of view. Maybe God (Allah) needs time for his presence to be reflected on the work of the Assembly, but for any case, we recall the advice of Oliver Cromwell to his soldiers: "Pray to God, but keep your gunpowder dry".

**During the first session of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on
8th October 1992, I stepped forward in the name of the BH Army:**

Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests,

We started with a defensive war with Patriotic League, the MUP (Ministry of Interior) and the organized and unorganized groups and individuals and we won the greatest battle –we stopped the aggressor's strategic attacks, saved the Republic of BiH and in particular rescued the viability and existence of the Muslim people in this area and thereof moved to the strategic offensive, since we started to further liberate new territories and win the first great battle. We will lose an occasional battle, but it has become clear to the Nazis that we will win this war, so in their offensive their crimes became even more brutal and unscrupulous.

All of this was possible because our citizen, our soldier, is the pillar of morality with political objectives which were clearly set at the beginning of the war imposed on us:

1. Contemporary, integral and indivisible Republic of BiH.
2. Republic of BiH as a democratic state of all citizens' who live in it. Therefore, we soldiers, have very precise military objective which is:
 - Liberation of the entire BH territory and definite military defeat of the internal and external enemies.

Miroslav Tuđman: The truth about Bosnia and Herzegovina; Documents 1991-1995

Serbian-Muslim «Historical agreement»:

Muhamed Filipović-Radovan Karadžić (2 August 1991), Chapter 5

Text of the Serbian-Muslim agreement

Confronted with the development of events, carrying inside bigger and bigger confrontation danger of our two nations, whose interest do not confront in a historical manner and never had any conflict of such kind, aware of their responsibility of nations that we represent and all nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Yugoslavia, in light of future cooperation and peace, we decided to establish and sign the following political Agreement:

1. Aware of inherited difficulties and those the prevailed political life led to, we decided, in spirit of sincerity and mutual respect, to pledge for realization of political and historical interests of our two nations. Hereby, this is not an agreement against any person whatsoever, but for all people and as such, it shall be open to everyone that supports the principle of common life in freedom and full equality.
2. We find that the basis of such life is due to a mutual recognition of sovereignty of certain nations as well as the enabling of full territorial integrity and political subjectivity of our Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its identical constitutional-legal position with other Republics of common state of Yugoslavia.
3. According to our opinion, Yugoslavia has got its full historical justification as common state of fully equal Republics and nations, therefore, we shall pledge to maintain and develop such community.
4. We agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be legally-politically unique as well as organized federal unit in a democratic manner, with legal interference within each part of its territory, under condition that the federal constitution and legislation create the base of the legal state system and a guarantee of the citizens, nations and Republics equality.
5. We express our interest that the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina live with us in full equality; therefore we invite them to approach this agreement. Regardless to the position of the Republic of Croatia within or outside of Yugoslavia, the Croats in BiH are fully equal nation in rights.
6. The mutual relationships among citizens, nations and Republics in Yugoslavia shall be established in a common constitution, involving the European standards.
7. We are aware that this agreement represents merely historical and political base for the permanent and peaceful common life of ours. However, such political agreement opens space for most constructive and most rational solutions on the platform of federal e.g. common organs functioning, including monetary system, unique market, unique armed forces as well as the foreign affairs.
8. In addition, we find that the optimal Yugoslavian community is the one that comprehends all six Republics and all nations that initiatively constitute such community. Each withdrawal from such community of those nations and Republics who are willing to do so, understands the achieving of agreement of this matter and provides guarantee for real interests of every member in relation to other members.

Miroslav Tuđman: The truth about Bosnia and Herzegovina; Documents 1991-1995 / Zagreb, Slovo M. 2005.

Sefer Halilović: Cunning Strategy

All our misunderstandings

Our first meeting in Hrasnica, on 2 December 1991 was actually our first misunderstanding.

The president encouraged me with his speech on that day, otherwise I was rather concerned: as Radovan Karadžić in late October publicly threatened that the Muslim people would disappear if the Parliament does not vote for the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the president himself took the Parliament stand and said: "I still wish to give the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina a message that there will be no war. My prognoses are based on tested facts. One should not be afraid, because there are two needed for a fight;" he promoted his position of neutrality even earlier, after destruction of Dubrovnik and aggression of the former JNA against Slovenia and Croatia and it reflected in a line of statements. In September 1991 he said: "This is not our war". Those days are over and now, apparently, everything is clear. Or, it at least seemed so to me. There will be no war if the bearers of the greatserbian policy estimate the possibility of loosing it. In the contrary, it can only become bloodier. "If we do not prepare ourselves, Karadžić's prognosis will come true" – I said to the president a day after.

* * *

I explained everything we did in the Sarajevo region and persisted on the claim that it is necessary to bring the organization procedure to the same level in all the regions, and then continue with the work even more intensely. The President looked at me and asked: "And what if the whole work is done in vain? In this way you will mobilize over 50,000 people. "Not 50,000, Mr. President, but at least 250,000. And if you want a sovereign state, the job is not in vain: you will gain the backbone of the Bosnian Army," I replied. Then he stated the historical: "Yes. Continue the work throughout the republic, the same way you did in Sarajevo". Shortly afterwards, while using a towel after ablution, he confessed: "Now, that I have heard and seen all of this, I feel safer. Until now, whenever I spoke with Karadžić and his people and when they were pushing me with threats, I had the feeling that even though I was sitting, the chair and carpet were slipping beneath me, as though the ground was sinking". He was not in this mood very long. He was persistent in his belief that there wouldn't be any war.

* * *

"Oslobođenje" released his statement for the New Year's Day 1992: "I think that the Army will not attack BiH, because it estimated that force "cannot do a thing"". The same newspaper, on 10 March 1992, transmits Alija Izetbegović's impressions from Brussels, given to the local "Soir": "Tormented by the tragic experience of the filthy war that ravaged throughout Croatia, the Yugoslav people are waking up from a nightmare." He also then claimed there would be no war in BiH. He repeated it even on 17 March 1992 in the interview for "Danas" newspapers: "Above all, what are you talking about? Do we discuss the same matter – the army is no longer what it used to be several months ago. It is neither better, nor worse; it is different, regarding its quality, quantity, psychology, as well as intentions and goals. The army will not occupy Bosnia; it will not execute a coup d'etat."

I read such Izetbegović's statement in "Oslobođenje", given on 5th March 1992: "Take a walk, socialize, and go out on the streets. I would like to invite the citizens to accept this in a cold-hearted way and prevent them from falling to rumours and stories. There are powers that wish to provoke chaos and panic-do not fall for it. The situation is under control, you can walk through town calmly."

* * *

Izetbegović later admitted this profound conviction and misconception. No argument could convince him that the preparations for the attacks were being carried and in front of everybody. He strongly believed that there will be no war. It's true he finally agreed to prepare for Defense and approved the project of organization, tactics and strategies of defense, but after that he was gone. As if this did not concern him.

Our second disagreement erupted about the acceptance of the Directive for the defense of the BH sovereignty. When we finished it, and after the data regarding numbers of Chetnic - Ustasha forces was checked several and conversations about Tuđman and Milošević intentions, evaluation of Karađorđevo, we looked for ways to inform the state leadership. Karišik stated all red in the face "Behmen will not even hear of it". I used the given opportunity and after a few days I asked Behmen for an opinion on the Directive. All the red in the face he slammed his fist on the table and snapped: "Get the hell out of my office. You too want a war here. " I stayed calm, politely apologized and told him that there will certainly be a war, and it is my obligation, and the people at the headquarters of the Patriotic League to warn and to suggest ways of defense. Those who do accept or do not accept will assume the responsibility. He fell silent, and then I went away.

* * *

The third and a rather serious misunderstanding concerned a role of the former JNA in BiH and its relation towards BiH. The last man in BiH could tell that it was in function of Belgrade's imperialistic and aggressor's policy, as its most forwarded and most dangerous part, everybody could say it, but not Izetbegović. As the war started in Croatia and as BiH practically became a base, apart from Vojvodina, for execution of operations against Croatia, Izetbegović simply wanted to believe that JNA is not a possible occupant of BiH, respectively, that its presence in BiH is even necessary.

As the Bosnian Croats in Lištica stopped the tank convoy, Izetbegović said: "You must trust me and Tuđman." Apparently, it was still his opinion, as well as after the revelation of the RAM plan, in which all tasks of SANU memorandum realization are emphasized, that is, creation of Great Serbia, or, as the former generals used to justify it then: Yugoslavia for nations and republics who want it. The former JNA, Chetnik units of SDS and paramilitary formations from Serbia and Montenegro were the instrument of realization of this plan which should destroy the Bosniak state and Bosniaks, respectively the Muslims as the political factor. Munir Alibabić – Munja and Dr. Ruzmir Mahmutćehajić testified on several occasions that the former Bosniak leadership talked about it in details, analyzed the condition and made an unambiguous conclusion: a severe war is in the store for Bosnia and Bosnian people. Nevertheless and besides, Izetbegović decided to make an agreement with the Army, further believing its alleged neutrality and possible transformation into the Bosnian Army. Till one established on 26th April that already more than 1000 people have been killed so far: hence, 20 days before the beginning of the bloodiest war. Yet then, in Skopje, along with the president of the inexistent presidency of the inexistent SFRY, Branko Kostić, in the presence of General Blagoje Adžić, chief of the main staff of already fascistic armada, the agreement on JNA's leaving from BiH has been signed.

According to Oslobođenje's release, he stated: "A process was initiated which will eventually lead to either the JNA's leaving from Bosnia and Herzegovina or to its radical transformation, therewith it should transform into the Bosnian army at the end of the process, respectively, the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

BH HDZ
CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

YOUR REFERENCE:

OUR LETTER DATED:

OUR REFERENCE: 335/91

DATE: 1 August 1991

Subject:

At the meeting in Sarajevo on 31 July 1991 on the issue of the current security and political situation in this country, the Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina made the following

STATEMENT

- a. The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been advocating from its inception an independent, sovereign, and indivisible Bosnia and Herzegovina in its existing borders within a six-member confederal Yugoslav community. We do not recognize any violent change of Bosnia and Herzegovina's borders nor a violent annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to some rump Yugo-Federation. The Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina can and will defend the territories they live in. Indeed, Bosnia and Herzegovina has for centuries also been the Croats' homeland, and nobody shall take away this homeland from us without our consent.

For us Croats the negotiations between some individuals regarding a so-called "historical agreement" between Serbs and Muslims means that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be dragged into a large-scale war. A peaceful Bosnia and Herzegovina may be preserved only by all of its nations together; however, peace can definitely not be preserved by means of an agreement of two nations behind the back of the third, namely the Croats.

- b. The Presidency of the BH HDZ demands that the BH Presidency, the BH Government, and the BH Assembly condemn the cruel and criminal attacks of

Chetnik renegades and parts of the so-called JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ on hospitals, schools, kindergartens, churches, Red Cross vehicles, and the savagery and killings of innocent civilians on the territory of the sovereign state of Croatia.

The Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina reassures the state leadership of Croatia and its president, Dr. Franjo TUĐMAN, of its unreserved support for the defence of the sovereignty and integrity of Croatia as well as for the defence of peace and democracy.

- c. The Presidency of the BH HDZ does not accept having the 14th Military Corps stationed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and will take all necessary steps to prevent this move. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there is already too much military potential; the arrival of new units would result in new costs and contribute to the creation of even greater tensions.
- d. The Presidency of the BH HDZ explicitly demands that the BH Presidency, the BH Government, and the BH Assembly defend and protect those citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who did not respond to the call by the so-called JNA to participate in mobilization exercises for the purposes of the Grand Serbian policy of conquests, and do everything to suspend proceedings initiated by the Army against those citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; after all, we have a civilian and not a military government in this republic.

- e. The Presidency of the BH HDZ condemns the frenzied anti-Croatian campaign constantly on display on TV Sarajevo, YUTEL, and in *Oslobođenje*, with its biased reports, out of place in modern, independent journalism.

The BH HDZ does not recognize the Croats who have been announced to be named to those newspaper agencies as their own, since decisions on personnel of Croatian nationality shall no longer be made by those appointed by the previous authorities, but rather by the Croatian representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which today is the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- cc. Presidency of the Republic of BiH
Government of the Republic of BiH
Assembly of the Republic of BiH
Media

/stamped/

CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF BiH
REGISTRY OF HDZ /CDU/ SARAJEVO

CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

BH HDZ CENTRAL BOARD

Your file:

Your correspondence of:

Our file: 38/92

Date: 9 February 1992

Re:

RECORD

of the 2nd session of the Central Board of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on 9 February 1992 in the *Dinara* Hotel in Livno

SESSION BEGAN AT: 1130 hoursIN ATTENDANCE: Attendance sheet attached

GUESTS: Perica JURIĆ, Vice President of the HDZ, and Ante BELJO, Deputy Minister of Information of the Republic of Croatia.

WORKING PRESIDENCY: Mate BOBAN, 1st Vice President of the BH HDZ, Vlado ŠANTIĆ, 2nd Vice President of the BH HDZ and General Secretary of the BH HDZ.

PRESIDING: Mate BOBANAGENDA: The following agenda was adopted:

1. Preparations for the referendum on a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina;
2. Various.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. It is confirmed that, according to the BH HDZ Statute, Mate BOBAN will preside over the 2nd session of the BH HDZ Central Board in his role as deputy of the resigning president of the BH HDZ, since the resigning president, Stjepan KLJUIĆ, did not attend the session due to illness.
2. It was confirmed that 147 of the 167 members of the BH HDZ Central Board were in attendance, and thus the quorum for reaching legally valid decisions had been reached.
3. The BH HDZ presidency recommends that the BH HDZ Central Board adopt the following question for the referendum on a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina:

"Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, a joint State of the constitutive and sovereign Croatian, Muslim and Serbian peoples in their ethnic areas (cantons)?"

YES

NO

This question shall represent the starting point for further negotiations with our partner parties, the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ and SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/, on the referendum that will be held on 29 February and 1 March 1992, as well as on the future structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which must be confirmed by a special constitutional act.

Justification:

The question of the BH HDZ Presidency represents the minimum sought by the Croatian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this question it wishes to guarantee the sovereignty and constitutive status of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the question adopted at the session of the Assembly on 25 January 1992, which reads as follows:

"Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, a State of equal citizens and peoples – Croats, Muslims, Serbs and other peoples who live in it?"

YES

NO

refers to the sovereignty of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the equality of its citizens and peoples, but not the sovereignty of those nations, i.e. the Croats, Muslims and Serbs, which is below the level of the existing BH Constitution of 1974.

The presiding officer put up both questions for a vote.

There were 4 votes in favour of the question adopted at the BH Assembly on 25 January, 140 against and 3 abstentions.

Then the presiding officer put up the motion for the question of the BH Presidency for a vote.

There were 140 votes in favour of the question, 3 against and 4 abstentions.

It was concluded that if the SDA and SDS do not accept the proposal of the BH HDZ Central Board to amend the referendum question, the political organs of the BH HDZ shall take their own position in connection with the decision of the Croatian people in the upcoming referendum.

5.

The session ended at 1705 hrs.

Record compiled by:

Anđelka STOJIĆ

Secretary
/signed/

Working Presidency:

1. Mate BOBAN
1st Vice President of the BH HDZ
2. Vlado ŠANTIĆ
2nd Vice President of the BH HDZ
3. Mr. Ivan MARKEŠIĆ
General Secretary of the BH HDZ
/signed and stamped/

Assembly of the municipality Grude
 HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ Grude

Grude, 19 February 1992

PRESIDENCY OF THE HDZ BiH

S A R A J E V O

SUBJECT: Taking position on the referendum

Aware of the importance of time in which we find ourselves, we feel the need for immediate, definitive and effective expression and taking a clear position regarding the scheduled referendum on the status of BiH.

Croatian Democratic Union, a political party through which the Croatian people of Herzeg-Bosnia explicitly expressed their will and true desire, at this time must, determined - through its highest authorities, clearly and timely express a final view on the referendum.

The overall activity of the parties regarding this issues, has given its clear expression on the proposed referendum question in Livno on 9th February this year. It is obvious that the content of this proposed issue is the result of a life and historical experience of the Croatian people of these regions of former Yugoslavia, as well as real and just a desire to such coexistence in BiH, which will protect national interests of all sovereign nations. Therefore, the proposed issue of the request provides a concrete and clearly defined sovereignty through the cantons. Given that this proposed issue is the result of continued political struggle of our people, i.e. its legitimate representatives, the deviation from it would also be the abandonment of the minimum requirements for the protection of national interests below which, here and now we must not go. Also, for the purpose of principles and the dignity of the party, almost unanimously adopted stand point cannot be doubted once defined.

Time flows inexorably, so we must now - in order to preserve the Croatian National Corpus and the Croatian area as a whole, clearly commit to the scheduled referendum.

Only this way can we expect, that in this occasion an unique and clearly expressed will of our people will, once again get an official confirmation which will / illegible / generations' perspectives who will live after us.

/Stamped: Croatian Democratic Union, the municipality of Grude/

Stamped: illegible /

President of the HDZ Grude

President of AOM Grude

/Signed/

/Signed/

/illegible/ Zorić

Jozo Marić

NOTE: This letter was sent to municipalities, Municipal Committee of HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) in BiH, the Central office of HDZ in Zagreb /illegible/ Croatian President, Election /illegible/, European observers, leadership of the SDA and church governments.

Sefer Halilović: Cunning Strategy

Chapter 34

Directive from Main headquarters of the Patriotic League of Bosnia and Herzegovina for defense of the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo 25 February 1991)*

“The enemies (forces of disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina) with their current military-political activities have for the most part managed to disrupt the system of government and create strongholds in certain areas. This have created conditions for the complete disintegration of the Bosnian government and splitting of the BH territory.

The main strongholds of the forces for disintegration are located in the Banja Luka region, eastern and western Herzegovina and the Doboj region, and the main actors are SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) with the Yugoslav Army (JA) and the extremist wing of the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union).

In their present activities they have managed to: attain full political unity of the SDS and JA (Yugoslav Army), to create parallel authorities throughout BiH, form commands, military headquarters and units, to partly establish their own information system and the relocation of materials to make provisions for their needs. By reorganization of JA throughout BiH there is a high concentration of JA and with the arrival of the Blue Helmets that concentration will be even greater.

Total enemy forces are:

- JA, six corps KOV (Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Bihać and Knin and parts of Titograd Corps), the likely strength of 2-3 corps KOV and one strengthened VAK.
- SDS manpower (from 80,000 to 120,000 people)
- HDZ extreme wing (one to two brigades)

The main objective of these forces is to divide the territory of BiH and to adjoin them with their nation states. They will try to realize this goal in two stages: in the first stage the creation of national confederation units within BiH, and in the second stage connecting them to Great Serbia and Great Croatia.

Expectations before the beginning of the general operations are: further intensification of psychological and propaganda activities in order to deteriorate the interethnic relations, conducting sabotage-terrorist operations, causing social unrest, sabotage, kidnapping and assassination of the most prominent people of the Muslim nation. Once the general operations start one should expect strong air and artillery-missile support to all regions.

2. Our forces are organized in the Patriotic League of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the formation of the squad, platoon and brigade, with a total strength of 120,000 people. With the start of combat operations the influx of more volunteers is expected as well as members of MOI (Ministry of Interior) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would increase the strength of our forces to about 150,000 people. The basic task for PL BiH forces is to protect the Muslim nation, preserve the integrity and totality of BiH in order to ensure continued and future co-existence of all nations and nationalities within the BH state territory. Once the combat operations start, to protect the population and simultaneously to close the main routes leading to the territory of BiH, with the mass deployment of destruction and obstruction, with rapid and vigorous operations to block and invade

* Sefer Halilović: Cunning Strategy, Sarajevo: Marshall, 1997, P. 164-169: “On 7th and 8th February 1992, in the village Mehurići near Travnik, a military conference was held that will later take the title of a historical, on which regional commanders of regional military headquarters and part of the staff of General headquarters of Patriotic League of Bosnia and Herzegovina met. The goal of the conference was the harmonization of plans by regions and division of tasks for the next period. Preparation of this gathering began in late 1991, when I have sent the instructions to all the staff in the field: RVŠ (regional military headquarters) Tasks. It was a document which, among other things, laid the foundations of a dedicated domestic industry. When we met, I made an introductory speech regarding the present military and political situation and the assessment and evaluation of future strategies. The basis of this presentation at the conference has been accepted and summarized in the first two paragraphs of the most important PL document: Directive to defend the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Presentation and report to the commanders, the immediate exchange of opinions and information, completed this document, which was finished on 25th February, in Sarajevo. Rifat Bilajac and Zičro Suljević, as advisors, helped in the preparation and implementation of the document, as well as with running the conference in Mehurići. However, the Directive is my hand work, the manuscript was copied, and later retyped distributed to commanders of regional headquarters.

military facilities within the republic and with certain number of forces (weapons warehouses, warehouses of ammunition and mines and military barracks) and then as soon as possible arm our formed military units, continue with the action plan, in order to free larger territory and secure functioning of the legal authorities. Special attention is given to redraw and to secure the population from the threatened areas.

3. Once the action plan is in motion to invite the people of Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia to show solidarity with our just struggle and start immediate action to combat binding enemy force and weaken its combat power on the BH territory. At the same time to establish contact, cooperation and coordination in joint activities with the Croatian people in Bosnia against the common enemy. In the international arena call on the progressive world public to protect Bosnia's sovereignty.

4. I decided, with the involvement of all Patriotic League forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation with the neighbors, to close the main routes leading to BiH with rapid and vigorous attacks, especially in the valley of the Drina and Sutjeska. At the same time obstruct and invade suitable locations within the internal routes, for defense of BH people, with a focus on the routes that lead from a wider region of Banja Luka and Eastern Herzegovina. With certain number of forces with fast and energetic attacks occupy JA warehouses of ammunition, mines and weapons and army barracks, to prevent the penetration and spread of hostile action on the entire territory of BiH. Once the favorable conditions are created, to start the wider offensive attacks aimed at breaking up, destruction and expulsion of the enemy from the territory of BiH. Deploy the main forces in central Bosnia and minor in Cazin-Prijedor region and Tuzla region ... “

Cutileiro's plan

19th March 1992

40. Cutileiro's plan: The text of the statement regarding the principles for the new constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo 18th March 1992)*

A. Independence

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a state consisting of three units, based on principles of nationality and taking into account the economic, geographic and other criteria.
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will retain its current boundaries and neither the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor its constituent units of government will not encourage nor support the aspirations of any part of its territory by neighboring countries.
3. Sovereignty rests with the citizens of the Muslim, Serbian and Croatian nationality and other nations and nationalities, exercising its sovereignty in civic participation within the constituent units and the central authorities of the republic.

B. General principles

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina and its constituent units will be managed in conjunction with the following constitutional principles, in the manner they are understood and generally implemented in the democratic countries of Western Europe, and in the way they are presented in convention draft discussed at the conference:
 - a. Respect for human rights as the highest standards required by the convention draft, respect for private property rights, market economy and free enterprise;
 - b. general and equal right to vote, free elections and secret voting;
 - c. Freedom for political and union activity;
 - d. The secular state system with full freedom of religion, separation of church and state, separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, with respect for the law and effective system of democratic control and protection of constitutionality and legality;
 - e. International oversight and jurisdiction over the protection of the rights and freedoms.

... They tell us - We know what is your goal - an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina - you have it. Their goal is the reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and you cannot dispute this. Keep in mind that the two nations are requesting this. I can tell you that this is the main argument for the two nations, because they didn't but we had in mind, the issue was a referendum.

I hereby present our motives and our way of reasoning, what we are motivated by. The later notification that was issued for us to accept it as something we have agreed to. Reluctantly, but we have agreed. I'll tell you later to what this notification relates, because it should not be confused with this paper, as the paper was not accepted. We only accepted the notification consisting of three points. The rest we did not accept, we said - these are the issues for future discussions.

In fact, I had in mind and please you should also have it in mind, also in future discussions we'll have. Keep this in mind. If the Croatian community does not come out to the referendum, the referendum will fail. Keep this thing in mind. Do not gamble with this no matter what. We need a pass on referendum, if we do not pass we will get stuck in the well and there will be no way out for another thirty years. Who knows? There would probably be a phase, we would plumb very deep, like when you push that stone, you know the one what they call it, you push it to the top of the hill and then it slips away again back to the valley, so you push it up to the hill again. A referendum must not be lost ...

Such Bosnia as it is today in the case of a successful referendum, even with 55 percent, we already have a serial of recognitions during the next week, and during the following another serial and we can definitely have a strong position here.

Our reasoning was this - well, let me put rings around Bosnia, to preserve it, to throw back the primary threat and inside let the situation get stormy, what can I do? Some transformations, and some regions, and some national ... So let the rings around the Bosnia be in place. That was our reasoning.

So, let's keep in mind in this debate what we will do now one thing. Don't, this morning I discussed with some people, very fine, prominent people and they only come to me with a wish list, we need this, we need that, a Muslim nation has a right to this and that and no one tells me how to realize this. So if you have any suggestions, tell me how to achieve them. Keep in mind one thing, that all of this must go before this Assembly. The Assembly must have the consent of the HDZ for any solution, otherwise we do not have a majority. Weight out this proposal, as they say twice two is four. The other day we barely pushed the referendum through. We had there this pure formula, are you for independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina? The delay was not only due to the refusal of the Serbs, I can tell it was also because of the HDZ. It took us another three or four hours of discussion, they did not want to go to a referendum. Then they came with the reformulation, so they created this issue, and they went to Livno and they reputed their own opinion, they disagreed with themselves so they threw in, if you remember those cantons. I think that with the above conditional acceptance, I think we got the Croatians for the referendum. Now they want to vote because they hope that in such Bosnia and Herzegovina they will get some sort of sovereignty, some kind of national recognition, some regions, etc., because it is a part of this agreement. And this agreement consists of three points. The first point, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains, guaranteeing the survival of intact historical and present borders. The second point - that Bosnia would be transformed Bosnia forming regions, the base of which would be the ethnic population, on the ethnic grounds, as they say. And the third point, that all this is implemented in the presence and with guarantees from the European Community. The first and third points are not in dispute, the second one is. The second one is the one that causes controversy and considerations should it be done this or that way, etc.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/The Croatian coat of arms/

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 ZAGREB

CHIEF INSPECTOR OF DEFENCE

Class: 822

Ref.No. 512-10-92-01

Zagreb, 7th April 1992

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Attn: Mr. G. Šušak

Minister

The emergent situation in BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ demands of us, apart from the measures already undertaken, additional measures. The Serbian aggressor and its aggressive politics on the Balkans should finally be annihilated on the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I toured the OZ /Operational Zone/ Rijeka, where I was given an insight into the possible assistance in the fight of the Croats and Muslims in BiH. The Rijeka OZ can set aside around 1,200 of its soldiers, mainly Muslims and Croats from BiH, who are willing to be recruited within one volunteer brigade and set out for BiH.

I am in agreement with the above and I ask of you to enable the realization of this idea in the way that this group, with all the military gear, arms and munitions, under the command of Major Mustafa Porobić and other officers sets out by an appropriate route to assist in the fight of Muslims and Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Likewise, I ask that the families of these volunteers (they are mostly permanently resident in the Rijeka area) continue to receive monthly financial support from the Croatian Army.

For the front which the OZ Rijeka keeps, the dispatch of this number of soldiers-volunteers doesn't represent a particular difficulty, especially in the light of the arrival of the units of UNPROFOR.

Major Mustafa Porobić is the organizer of this idea and he works in the Headquarters of OZ Rijeka. He is a very professional and dedicated officer.

This issue is one of urgency. I warmly recommend the realization of this idea. I am prepared to help on my own part.

Respectfully yours,

CHIEF INSPECTOR OF DEFENCE
 General M. Špegelj
 /signed/

/Round seal: Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Chief Inspectorate of Defence, Zagreb/

P.S. I kindly ask you to include in the assessment and realization of this idea also other sectors of the Ministry of Defence and the Headquarters.

Republic of Croatia
Ministry of Defence
General Headquarters HV

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
ENCRYPTED

Class: 8/92-01/23
Office registry no: 5120-03-92-9
Zagreb, 9 April 1992

OZ Rijeka
Attn: commander

The request of the Chief inspector of the defence, General Martin Špegelj, for sending a part of the soldiers and officers of OZ Rijeka, mainly Croats and Muslims ready to voluntarily go to BiH to help the struggle of the people of BiH, has been accepted by the top ranking military authorities.

The General Headquarters of Croatian Army concurs and supports this idea, with a suggestion that this group, for a start, numbers 300 - 400 soldiers and officers.

They are to be sent under the command of Major Porobić Mustafa and other officers, with different military equipment, weaponry and ammunition.

All who go retain all the rights of HV soldiers, including monthly salaries. They cannot wear HV insignia on their uniforms, nor can they hold other documents used by members of HV.

The task is an urgent one, and the execution of it is to be commenced immediately. Should the situation develop favourably, sending of other groups, ie reinforcement of this one, is not to be excluded.

Enclosure:

The request of the Chief inspector of the Defence

Deputy Chief of Staff of
General HQ of HV for combat sector
Major General Petar Stipetić

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 Assembly of the Municipality of Mostar
 Municipal Crisis Headquarters
 No: 427/92
 Date: 29 April 1992

DECISION

Pursuant to the Order of the Republic Headquarters of Civil Defense and the Resolution of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed on 4 April 1992 and 10 April 1992 and the Decision on Proclaiming the Immediate Threat of War in the Territory of the Municipality of Mostar No: 1/92 of 9 April 1992, and the Decision on the Withdrawal of the JNA Units from the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed by the Presidency of the Republic of BiH on 27 April 1992, the Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Mostar, proceeding from the fact that the Municipality of Mostar is under partial occupation by units of the so-called Yugoslav People's Army and the paramilitary formations which are cooperating with it in armed action against the civilian facilities and are, at the same time, looting commercial establishments and family homes and taking prisoner the inhabitants of this Municipality, as well as the fact that the so-called JNA and other paramilitary formations cooperating in action with it do not recognize the legitimate and legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of the Municipality of Mostar, passes the following

DECISION

I

The so-called Yugoslav People's Army and other paramilitary formations which are cooperating with it in action are proclaimed to be the enemy and occupation formations in the territory of the Municipality of Mostar.

II

The Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar and members of the Ministry of Interior - Mostar Center shall be entrusted with the protection and defense of the city of Mostar against the formations described in Article 1.

III

The Croat Defense Council shall consist of the members of Muslim and Croat peoples and the members of other peoples and minorities who recognize the legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and profess allegiance to them.

The Muslims may form their own armed formations which shall be placed under the unitary command of the HVO Municipal Headquarters Mostar.

IV

The ethnic structure of the command personnel of the Croat Defense Council shall match the ethnic structure of soldiers on active duty.

When forming new defense forces, the command personnel shall be represented on the parity principle. This provision shall apply to forces formed after 1 May 1992.

V

The task of the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall be the liberation of the entire territory of the municipality. In order to carry out the foregoing task, the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall coordinate with other defense forces from neighboring municipalities.

The Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall form and organize its armed forces which shall guarantee peace, freedom and security to the citizens.

The military police shall perform this function.

VI

In order to perform the judicial function in the domain of the Laws of War, the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall establish and form, and organize the work of the Military Prosecutor's Office and the Military Court for the territory of the Municipality of Mostar.

The ethnic structure in these institutions shall reflect the ethnic structure of soldiers on active duty.

VII

When the circumstances so warrant, the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar shall coordinate with the Municipal Crisis Headquarters, the Ministry of Interior and other legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to defend the Municipality of Mostar.

The questions of common interest shall be resolved at joint sessions of the Crisis Headquarters of the Assembly of the Municipality of Mostar and the Croat Defense Council, Municipal Headquarters Mostar.

All documents for movement of people and goods shall be issued by the Croat Defense Council - Municipal Headquarters Mostar.

VIII

The Crisis Headquarters of the Municipality of Mostar shall establish as soon as possible the temporary Executive Council which will ensure the functioning of the government bodies of the Assembly of the Municipality of Mostar.

IX

All other questions and political decisions regarding the competency of the decisions passed by legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be regulated after cessation of hostilities i.e. liberation of the Municipality of Mostar and creation of conditions for normal functioning of legal authorities.

MEMBERS OF THE CRISIS HEADQUARTERS:

- | | |
|-------------------------|-------------|
| 1. Milivoj Gagro | (signature) |
| 2. Ismet Hadžiosmanović | (signature) |
| 3. Zijad Demirović | (signature) |
| 4. Borislav Puljić | (signature) |
| 5. Josip Skutor | (signature) |
| 6. Mehmed Bahmen | (signature) |
| 7. Ilija Filipović | (signature) |
| 8. Fikret Bajrić | (signature) |
| 9. Jole Musa | (signature) |

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 MAGLAJ MUNICIPALITY
 MAGLAJ MUNICIPALITY CRISIS STAFF
 MAGLAJ

Number: 01-98-1/92
 Maglaj, 2 June 1992

A session of the Municipal Crisis Staff of Maglaj municipality held on 1 June 1992 regarding the latest security situation adopted the following:

DECISION

1. The HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ of the municipalities of Žepče, Zavidovići, Maglaj and Teslić, based in Žepče, are hereby entrusted with the defence of Maglaj municipality.
2. Territorial defence formations shall be placed under the command of the HVO and they will include the necessary number of commanding officers from existing TO /Territorial Defence/ formations of Maglaj municipality.
3. HVO insignia must be used as well as the coat-of-arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4. The HVO undertakes to provide the necessary material and technical equipment to formations in Maglaj as well as food and medical supplies.
5. This Decision does not prejudice a political solution.

PRESIDENT OF THE MUNICIPAL CRISIS STAFF

Aida SMAJIĆ _____/signed/

MEMBERS:

1. Idriz ALISPAHIĆ _____/signed/
2. Ismet MUSTABASIĆ _____/signed/
3. Mladen ŠIMČIĆ _____/signed/
4. Pero MARTINOVIĆ _____
5. Marko ZELIĆ _____
6. Sulejman DELIĆ _____

Chief of MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ Osman RAHMANOVIĆ

 /signed/

Commander of the TO Sulejman HERCEG

 /signed/

 /a stamp/

No. 1-22/92-R
Mostar, 12 September 1992

Attn. President of the Government of Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Please find enclosed the acts passed by the temporary executive and administrative body, Croatian Defense Council of Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia in the period of imminent war threat and in wartime, with the aim to normalize life and activities of legal system in the liberated areas.

In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated 2 May 1992, certain legal regulations have been inherited from former SFRY, while other regulations are declared null and void. By declaring those regulations null and void a legal vacuum has been created, the consequence of which is the fact that whole fields, especially in economy, remained unregulated.

Since the daily life in the liberated areas required that these legal vacuums be filled, the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia was forced to pass regulations in these fields, with the remark that all these regulations were passed as temporary regulations, and they are limited to the period of war and imminent threat of war.

In the mentioned acts, as you can see, we tried to be in consistency with the republic's regulations. Faced with continuous, enormous destruction, traffic and telecommunications blockade, lack of any kind of support by republic bodies, we were forced to take certain activities and draft certain acts with the aim of overcoming the chaos and total anarchy.

In accordance with the abovementioned, our opinion is that the mentioned activities and acts do not endanger the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we are often criticized, but on the contrary, it was and still is the only way to defend not only free and liberated territories, but the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The specific conditions under which these acts were passed, as well as the urgency of procedure, i.e. shortness of terms, created the need for further upgrading of certain regulations.

Therefore, should you have any remarks and suggestions as regards certain acts, please send them to us, and as soon as everything that is already created or is in the process of creation is normalized, we will make certain corrections.

With best regards

PRESIDENT OF THE HVO HZ HB
Dr. JADRANKO PRLIĆ
(signed)

PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC ACTION

SARAJEVO

A meeting of the Executive Committee of the Party of Democratic Action for Bosnia and Herzegovina was held on 3rd, 4th and 5th October in Zagreb. The following conclusions were adopted:

CONCLUSIONS:

Unpublished Documents

1. There have been brutal threats to basic human rights in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Muslim and Croat peoples have suffered ruthless attacks by against their ethnic, religious, cultural and other values. This makes it necessary for stronger ties to be established in the joint fight against the aggressor.
2. The agreement on friendship and co-operation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia is a document important for the establishment of relations between the two countries. It promotes relations between the Muslim and Croatian peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina and strengthens the fight against the common enemy.
3. Agreement on the basic principles of future organisation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an integral element of the fight for independence and for a sovereign and integral Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a democratic and decentralised state. Co-operation between the Muslims and the Croats, founded on equality and mutual respect, is a strategic commitment of the Party of Democratic Action. Solutions for the constitutional organisation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be imposed by force.
4. The draft conclusions from Međugorje constitute a proposal from the party Commissions of the SDA and HDZ BH /Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ for a political solution for the internal organisation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its positive elements should be applied.
5. The formation of Muslim National Councils in certain communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not an appropriate answer to the pressure exerted by the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/, their unilateral moves, the difficulties encountered in the functioning of state authorities and the inactivity of the Party of Democratic Action.
6. The Party of Democratic Action has to date been heavily engaged on the defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the provision of material and technical equipment required by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is the duty of members of the SDA to remain in the front ranks of the struggle against the aggressor.
7. Care of wounded soldiers and the families of killed soldiers shall remain a special obligation of the Party of Democratic Action.
8. Performance of religious ceremonies in the armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be allowed. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not a religious army. It is, however, an army where the faithful must be provided with an environment conducive to regular performance of religious ceremonies.
9. The activities of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be re-examined. Governmental ministers must immediately submit public reports on their activities.

10. The majority of refugees and people expelled from Bosnia and Herzegovina have found themselves in an extremely difficult position, many of them are on the brink of existence. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to carry out its obligations and use the opportunities it had to provide them with accommodation. The Party of Democratic Action, however, has contributed a great deal by providing assistance to displaced persons and refugees, and should continue to do so.
11. In order to provide the local and international public with better and more comprehensive coverage of the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, closer ties must be established among the media in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Official media in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been providing enough coverage of the humanitarian aid sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Islamic world, or, indeed, have failed to mention it at all.

The meeting was attended by those members of the SDA Executive Committee who were not prevented from attending by the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In Zagreb, 5 October 1992

V.D. /Acting/ President

Mirsad ĆEMAN

/Logo with inscription/:

HSP

1861 – 1991

CROATIAN PARTY OF RIGHTS

Starčevićev trg 3

41000 Zagreb – Croatia

Telephone: 041/431-002; 431-246; 430-324

Fax: 041/423-929

Account No. with SDK /Central

Clearing Agency/ Zagreb: 30105-678-75392

Foreign Exchange Account with

Zagrebačka banka: 23571-3468135

HOS /Croatian Defence Forces/ HEADQUARTERS

ZAGREB

Attn: Major Darko Kraljević

Zagreb, 21 August 1992

Dear commander!

I received the report on the state of affairs in the Lašvanska region from the HOS non-commissioned officer Mr Petar Mezei.

I must say first of all that I am sorry that due to my obligations, I didn't find the opportunity to visit you and thus gain a direct insight into the work of the HSP and HOS in the Lašvanska area.

I am extremely satisfied when I hear that HOS in the Lašvanska region, in spite of all the difficulties with which it is faced and, I must admit, only a modest support from Zagreb, became a strong and unavoidable factor of the overall defence of this area, and also a guarantor of the successfulness of the politics of HSP.

I see that you also have real or provoked problems in the relationship between HOS, HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and TO /Territorial Defence/ which are often manifested as military clashes, harassment and various incidents. In all of this HOS must keep a clean face.

We mustn't allow being on the receiving end of Boban's wrong policies. We are absolutely in favour of the unity of the Croatian people and for its common defence, but we are also in favour of the unity with the Muslim people.

We do not back away from our policy of a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. Croatia all the way to the Drina River. Every other policy would mean the breaking up of Herzeg-Bosnia and the creation of a new Serbian state on this side of the Drina, which would be a catastrophe both for the Croatian as well as the Muslim peoples.

We, as the most stable military and political force, must persevere until the end in the realization of our programme, without missing any chance of cooperation with the others.

We will persevere on the issue that HOS is a part of the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to be recognized as such.

In this we seek that our headquarters and our ranks are recognized and also to have a part in the Supreme Command of the OS /Armed Forces/ of BiH.

We believe that these issues will be resolved very quickly in the interest of everyone.

I repeat, you are showing goodwill on your part for the cooperation with the Muslims and TO units. To that effect, unless you have done it already, please place the official flag of the Republic of BiH alongside the Croatian flag in the HOS Headquarters.

It is of essence that we remain in a closer and more frequent contact to know what is going on at your side and to see how we can best help you.

It would be good if you could come into contact with Mr Dedaković who has been staying in Ljubuški since the death of major-general B. Kraljević.

In the meantime, we will try to help you in every way we can, including humanitarian aid for the people down there, which was suggested to up by Petar Mezei.

Please receive my heartfelt greetings and I wish you to persevere in your work.

GOD AND THE CROATS!

AT THE SERVICE OF THE HOMELAND!

Supreme Commander of HOS

Dobroslav Paraga
/signed/

Seal of the HSP

INTERCONTINENTAL
HOTEL
ZAGREB

Date: 24 August 1992

AUTHORISATION

I, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereby authorise the following gentlemen:

1. Ćamil SALAHOVIĆ from Mostar;
2. Dr. Ismet HADŽIOSMANOVIĆ from Mostar;
3. Muharem CERO from Sarajevo;

to prepare working materials to be presented to me, and conduct talks on my behalf with the authorised representatives of the CROATIAN PEOPLE regarding implementation of the Interstate Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

President of the Presidency:
/signed/
Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

41000 ZAGREB, KRŠNJAVOGA 1, CROATIA, TELEPHONE: 453-411, TELEX: 21732, 21742
FAX: 444-431

/handwritten document/

Zagreb

Date: 19 August 1992

Dear Alija,

I am writing this letter from our BH Embassy in Zagreb. This is the first time that I have managed to leave Mostar officially, accompanied by an official delegation made up of soldiers from the frontline, all of whom are, in addition, European intellectuals and devoted to your policies. They are:

1. Dr Ismet Hadžiosmanović
2. Ćamil Salaković, lawyer
3. Zijad Demirović, architect
4. Safet Oručević, businessman (he is Teofik's first cousin)
5. Kerim Hadžiosmanović, engineer

We have informed Hasan Čengić in detail ten days ago in Zagreb about these people's wartime contributions. We have informed Hasan about all the further work, with which we are very busy, and he has given us approval on your behalf. Today we completed the talks, but we still have scheduled meetings with Mariofil Ljubić, Alija Delimustafić, Jasmin Jaganjac and, in particular, with Jadranko Prlić, the Prime Minister Designate of Herceg-Bosna, who is also our personal friend. He has a predominating influence on Boban. We have had separate talks with Professor Trnka and Muratović. They told us their position and concept for the conference in London, which they will send you today. We recommend this concept to you and ask you to please agree to it, because it is realistic and we feel that is possible to achieve.

We would like ask to see you URGENTLY or, perhaps, speak to you. Our phone numbers are as follows: 088 22-203 - Ismet at home;

22-204 - SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ fax. The list contains two new names whom you have not had an opportunity to meet. Trust me, they are real fighters for our cause. They have a lot of credit with the Croats and in Herceg-Bosna and they are putting it at your service, so that we can realise the proposed London concept. Believe me, we have put in every effort to ensure that you, as a person, end up the political winner. We are prepared to give to you, and you only, the greatest reward, for which we fought bitterly in Mostar.

~~/crossed out/~~ agree to the proposed concept (Muratović-Trnka) is the key to salvation for us in Mostar. Please send us instructions on how to proceed ... we do not want part of the power that the Croats are offering us in Mostar (50%-50%) and proportionally at Herceg-Bosna level (30% of positions in the Government). We are awaiting further instructions - URGENTLY.

Your fellow fighters from Mostar send you many mahsuz selam /greetings/.

Zagreb,

Signature

/illegible/

Excerpts from the speech given by Alija Izetbegović at a news conference held in Mostar on 8 October 1992

Headline: Bosnia and Herzegovina - a Task for a Nobel Prize

Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ, yesterday you talked to Mr. BOBAN in Grude, yesterday and today to Dr. PRLIĆ in Mostar. Can you comment a little on these talks and on how cooperation between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be improved? (Marinko ČAVAR, HTV /Croatian Television/)

I think I'll first have to make a little circle in order to be able to definitely answer this question. Namely, I'll travel through this part of Bosnia here, although it's not advisable, as my people tell me, to say what my intentions are; my intention is finally to make a tour of Bosnia to give an answer to myself, above all, to the question they asked me, although a part of it can already be answered. Namely, our strategic orientation is cooperation between Muslims and Croats in building the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbs, of course. I don't think we have anything more to say to the Chetniks, ever. We will cooperate with the Serbs and build the state insofar as there are no Chetniks involved. Of course, the Serbs themselves will have to answer the question of what percentage of them are Chetniks. We can't do anything with the Chetniks but fight, it's us or them. I don't think all Serbs are Chetniks, of course they're not, thank God they're not, but this time the aim of my visit is to implement, to find a way of implementing our strategic goal, and that is cooperation between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina in building one state on the principle of equality. The Muslims should accord to the Croats all the rights they themselves have, and vice versa. It's the principle on which Bosnia and Herzegovina should be built. I don't think this principle is in dispute. And if this principle is not disputable, then this issue is slowly becoming a legal issue of how, in what way, what kind of mechanisms and what kind of organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will satisfy this principle. I don't think cooperation between the Muslims and the Croats is in dispute at any level, certainly not at the level of, well, ordinary people. People demand such cooperation, they demand that a solution be found. Problems certainly exist; they should not be kept hidden, because there is no good in hiding them. In order to resolve something, one should have an accurate diagnosis.

What is the problem then? We think that there's a little ... The problems stem from something that was in fact completely legitimate, and that's the organisation of the defence of the Croatian people. However, a step further was made towards the creation of something that was becoming a state, which is beginning to be bothersome. Up to that limit, to that point there was no dispute. It's clear to us that in a situation when the country was attacked, the day it was actually born, because some people calculate that the war began on the fifth or sixth of April, in your parts here I think it began on the third of April, so it's a couple of days before or after. As you know, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised as an independent state on 6 April. Therefore, the war is as old as the state. Clearly, one should not ignore the fact that prior to that there were attacks on Brod, attacks in the Kupres area and so on. But all-out, large-scale aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina began approximately in the first days of April, in some places a couple of days earlier, in others a couple of days later. In a situation like that the state could not respond appropriately. We were practically occupied, except for small parts that were free. At one point it was said to be the biggest barracks in the world. Occupied by a hostile army that became a machine for destruction, devastation of towns, for killing people. It was normal in a situation like this that the Croatian people and everyone else would defend themselves as best they could, because the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not able to organise this in such a short period of time. Anything the HVO has done with regard to defence here or elsewhere should be regarded as legitimate. We were bothered by the fact that later a further step was taken towards creating a state. If it's not a state and if it remains within the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all solutions are possible and there will be no problems at all. We have such statements, and if you ask me about the talks I had with Mr BOBAN and today with Mr PRLIĆ and their associates, we have clear statements that everything that is being done in that regard does not compromise the sovereignty, independence and integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If that is so, then there are no problems and there cannot be any. But if there are, then it's someone's fault and those who are obstructing the creation of a strategic alliance between the two peoples, particularly in these parts where Muslims and Croats live together, should be removed.

* * *

These issues include military cooperation and the coordination of military activities, in order to pre-empt certain things, to avoid such things as happened in Brod. It was only when I arrived in Zagreb that I heard about the alarming situation in Brod. I travelled to Brod in an open attempt to have something done to stop such developments. I arranged a meeting with Mr TUĐMAN and travelled to Zagreb all night. We met the next morning, agreed certain things, but it was already too late. Nothing could be done any more. So we tried to do something, and it was the first time we tried to do something together, but unfortunately we failed, because the news came late. I hope similar things won't happen again. Gradačac is again in a critical situation, and this time we'll try to do certain things with greater success to save Gradačac, to save Jajce and, of course, Orašje and Brčko.

* * *

The internal organisation of BiH will have to be completed one day. Many of us think the ethnic principle should not play the decisive role, but it should be included as one of the criteria. Our position will be that great importance should be attached to and emphasis placed on the future and on economic relations, possibilities of communication, to ensure an unimpeded flow of people and goods, and to avoid a situation in one of these future regions in which someone might say that injustice is being done to Muslims, so let's pay them back in areas where we are in the majority, and so on. I think this should be accomplished for the future. How to do it is a matter for wise people. It's proceeding with some difficulty.

And these European commissions, specifically the Cutileiro Commission, it has failed the test, because things obviously didn't work out. And now in Geneva, judging by the slowness, it's clear that there are a lot of difficulties to find a viable solution, which is not surprising because Bosnia is one complicated whole. Anyone who finds a solution for Bosnia should be given a Nobel Prize. But people will find some solution which is probably beyond the grasp of our reason, knowledge and experience.

Article 5

In Article 7, paragraph 3 is changed to read: "According to criteria from paragraph 2 of this Article it is regulated that vacated apartments of the former JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ from Article 4, paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Ordinance, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command allocates for temporary use to the members of the Army of the Republic and families of fighters who died in the struggle against the aggressor on the Republic."

Article 9

This Ordinance enters into force on the day of its publication in the Official Gazette of RBiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/.

No. 1321/92, 11 September 1992 in Sarajevo

President of the Presidency of RBiH Alija Izetbegović, signed

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

/Coat of arms/

OFFICE

OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Zagreb, Savska St. 41/XI

Tel. 041/537-161, 537-160, Fax 536-702

Zagreb, 12 October 1992

Our No.: 572/92

Your No.:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE A BiH
/Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/

OFFICE OF THE R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

SECTOR FOR MILITARY ISSUES AT THE OFFICE OF R BiH IN
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

A U T H O R I Z A T I O N

Whereby the General Mate Šarlija – DAIDŽA- is authorized to conduct storage and safekeeping as well as transport of arms and military equipment into the logistical centres in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The storage and transport of material and technical equipment should be done according to the schedule of the Supreme Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Military attaché in the Office of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia.

The equipment can be transported from the location where it is stored to the logistical centres only with the authorisations signed by the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia or the Military attaché in the Office of R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ in Croatia.

Military attaché of the Republic of BiH

Hasan Efendić, colonel

/signed/

/round stamp: REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME
COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES – SARAJEVO, OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BiH IN THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA – ZAGREB, Sector for Military Issues at the Office of R BiH in CROATIA/

The President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr Franjo TUĐMAN,

proceeding from the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia of 21 July, and following talks between the delegations of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia which were held on 21 September 1992 in New York during the 47th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Mindful of the importance of the mutual interests of their countries in the protection of their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, seriously concerned about the continuation of aggression by the remainder of the Yugoslav People's Army of the former SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ and Serbian and Montenegrin military regular and irregular forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and considering that the remainder of the so-called JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ of the former Yugoslavia is still occupying territory of the Republic of Croatia to the south of Dubrovnik, that Serbian forces are attacking territory of the Republic of Croatia from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that a part of the Serbian irregular detachments in Croatia, disguised as local police, are offering resistance to UNPROFOR which is implementing the peace plan of Cyrus VANCE;

Proceeding from the basic principles of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations which guarantees the legitimate right to self defence of sovereign states;

Welcoming the peace operation and humanitarian efforts of the United Nations;

Welcoming Resolution 777 of the Security Council of the United Nations and Resolution 47/1 of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the cessation of membership of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

Prepared to continue to implement the conclusions of the London Conference and the relevant Resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, and to actively promote the Geneva peace processes:

have agreed to sign this:

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT
ON FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
AND THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

1. The diplomatic, political and humanitarian efforts of the international community have so far failed to stop the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, sovereign members of the UN. Neither did they alleviate the sufferings of the civilian population to any great extent. Hence the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia demand of the international community to take vigorous action to protect it from the aggression, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
2. Once more we underline the need to increase efforts in order find a political solution to end the war and to further the principle of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an equal and integral community of three constituent peoples.
3. In keeping with the right to self-defence and to joint defence from aggression, a joint Committee will be set up in order to harmonize defence efforts, until the aggression stops completely.
4. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia will jointly seek the lifting of the embargo on the import of arms into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, prescribed by Resolution 713 of the Security Council of the United Nations.

5. We will consistently and faithfully promote the policy of protection for human rights, seek out and punish war criminals, in particular the perpetrators of genocide, in keeping with customary and codified international law.

In New York, 23 September 1992

PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

/signed/
Dr Franjo TUĐMAN

PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ
/signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
GOVERNMENT
OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT

Strictly confidential number: 47-25/92
Sarajevo, 26 September 1992

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ZAGREB
Republic of Croatia

Dear Sirs,

On the basis of the Agreement on Friendship and Co-operation with the Republic of Croatia dated 21 July 1992 (items 8 and 10) it was decided that our states would initiate and develop co-operation on the manufacture and sale of weapons and military equipment. Since this co-operation both possible and urgent, we propose that you examine our initial suggestion so that we may draw up a specific agreement regarding this co-operation at our next meeting.

Representatives of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are encouraged to attend an urgent meeting in Zagreb at which we would jointly examine the attached proposals and those we expect to receive from you.

Please urgently inform us of your position.

Yours faithfully,

ATTACHMENT: as above.

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(Chairman of the Commission for
Weapons and Military Equipment)

Hakija TURAJLIĆ
/signed/
/stamp: illegible/

71000 Sarajevo, Đure Pucara Square bb /no number/, tel: 33-410, fax: 276-233

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 ARMED FORCES SUPREME COMMAND STAFF
 SARAJEVO

MILITARY SECRET

Strictly confidential number: 02/340-1904

Strictly confidential!

Sarajevo, 6 October 1992

After six months of the war, the first war council was held in the Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 30 September 1992 on the subject of "Organisational and establishment-related changes in the Armed Forces aimed at strengthening combat readiness".

In attendance were:

- Mr Ejup GANIĆ, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and member of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- Mr Rusmir MAHMUTĆEHAJIĆ, minister in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- Mr Sefer HALILOVIĆ, Chief of Armed Forces Supreme Command Staff,
- Mr Stjepan ŠIBER, Deputy Chief of Armed Forces Supreme Command Staff,
- members of the core Armed Forces Supreme Command Staff,
- commander, deputy commander and chief of Sarajevo Corps Staff,
- commander of the Sarajevo District Defence Staff,
- brigade commanders,
- commanders of Sarajevo municipal defence staffs,
- commander of the Special Units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
- Military Police commander, and
- chiefs of combat arms and support services.

The meeting was opened by the Chief of Supreme Command Staff, Mr Sefer HALILOVIĆ. He welcomed all those in attendance and made a brief introductory speech.

The introductory speech was followed by a discussion during which 22 speakers presented their view of the problem at hand, based on which the following conclusions were made:

CONCLUSIONS

1. The war against the independent, indivisible, free and democratic state - the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - is being waged by Serbian and Montenegrin Nazi-indoctrinated forces amply supported by the former JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/. The purpose of the war is the disappearance of the Muslim people from this area, the destruction of all things not Serbian and the eventual annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to a "Greater Serbia". The Patriotic League is the only organised force to have offered resistance to this unheard-of violence and it has, to some extent, awakened the sluggish awareness of the Muslim masses, alerting them in time to all the dangers and organising them for an armed struggle.

After the six months of warfare, the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina very quickly evolved from numerous groups of patriotic citizens into a respectable armed force of some 150,000 fighters armed mainly with light infantry weapons. The classic genocide of the Muslim people had a substantial impact on the composition of our army, in which 80% of soldiers and officers are Muslim.

As the war was increasingly taking on the form of pogroms against innocent Muslim and Croatian people.

The officer corps of the district staffs should form the backbone of corps commands. In that way the operational function of the district staffs will cease, while commanding of all brigades will become the responsibility of the corps commands.

4. The Air Force groups fully rely on the corps for logistical support, except the air technical services branch. The use of aviation falls within the authority of the Supreme Command Staff.

- 4 -

Only a disciplined army, inspired by patriotism and high combat morale, confident of the righteousness of the goals of our liberation war, through its behaviour, proper interpersonal and soldierly relations, and through the civilised and equal treatment of all people, can be the guarantor of their security and the confidence of citizens in its final victory over the aggressor.

All commanding officers of our army should be informed of these conclusions, and the corps commands (district staffs) and departments of the Supreme Command Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be responsible for their implementation.

MV/SČ

CHIEF
ARMED FORCES SUPREME COMMAND STAFF
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Sefer HALILOVIĆ

/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 /coat of arms/ CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HEADQUARTERS

No. 01-2331/92

Date: 12 October 1992

Report on the talks

in Sarajevo

To Mr Mate Boban

President of the HZ H-B /Croatian
 Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/

Personally

We received the invitation from the UNPROFOR Headquarters in Sarajevo for a trilateral meeting in Sarajevo. On this meeting the commanders of HVO /Croatian Defence Council/, A BiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ and Serbian forces were supposed to be present.

Our delegation was led by:

Milivoj Petković – Chief of Headquarters of HVO

Tihomir Blaškić – Commander of the Central Bosnia Operational Zone

Žarko Keža – member of the Headquarters

Ignac Koštroman – Chief Secretary of the HVO of HZ H-B /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/

Ivan Bandić – member of the Headquarters

According to information from the UNPROFOR in Sarajevo our reception was supposed to be in the Kiseljak barracks by the French Battalion and we were supposed to be taken with full guarantee for our security to the location of the meeting of the three sides, which is the UNPROFOR Headquarters on the Sarajevo airport.

In compliance with the given time, at 7.30 a.m. on 7 October 1992, I met Colonel Sartre, the commander of the French battalion in front of the Kiseljak barracks and declared our readiness to go to Sarajevo.

Colonel Sartre informed me that we have to talk before leaving, because some new circumstances have arisen in relation to the talks.

Among other, I was told:

- When the Muslims (Government of BiH and Headquarters of A BiH) learned that we were also invited, they were surprised with the invitation sent to us (HVO) and because of our presence they asked for a change in the plan of the meeting, which is supposed to look like this:

1. Croats and Muslims should meet first in the building of the Presidency of BiH.
2. Joint meeting of Croats, Serbs and Muslims on the airport.

Although this change (especially point 1. looked like humiliation for us, we decided to accept the changed conditions and go to Sarajevo. The reason for this decision is your attitude that in order to stop the war we should talk to everyone (even with the devil himself).

Likewise, we knew that the commander of UNPROFOR general Morillon invested a lot of effort in the organization of this meeting, that a meeting in this composition is certainly important as a contribution to the resolving of the crisis in BiH and finally, this is a meeting on which for the first time the military part of the HVO has been invited, whereby surely other parties were let to know that HVO is an equal and important factor without whom there is no true resolution of the crisis (war) in BiH.

Mr President, I am sure that you are curious to know of my opinion relating to their agitation, and I would even say uneasiness with our presence and meeting face-to-face.

They know well that Croats stopped with their bare bodies the tanks of the Yugo-army which were moving toward Western Herzegovina (Kupres) and Croatia, they also know who sat on the head of the tank column and led them over our barricades, they also know for our burned and destroyed village of Ravno and the casualties there, but they were not perturbed, they know who was the first to take the gun to defend the Croats and the Muslims, they know about Kupres and rocketed Herzegovinian places (before any other), they know that where the HVO is, both Croats and Muslims are free, they know about HVO and myself, but they preferred HOS /Croatian Defence Forces/ and their former commander, their general, they know about the power of HVO and how much this disturbs them, they have known about us for a long time, and therefore they didn't want to recognize us, and when they finally did, they were very shy about it.

I could go on an on about what they know, and pretended not to or didn't want to know, and even less recognize.

Still, at the end I have to say – THEY KNOW WHAT A MEETING OF TWO PARTIES FACE TO FACE MEANS (God help the third party) and due to everything that they know and do not recognize I decided that we meet face-to-face, and after that proceed to the meeting of three parties.

I ask you to make a judgement whether I did right or not.

Upon our arrival in Sarajevo we met briefly with general Morillon who greeted us and said:

1. That Mr. Ganić wishes to talk to us before the joint meeting and asks our decision to accept this or not (we accepted).
2. The content of the talks was given to us:
 - a) Creation of conditions for normal life in Sarajevo – electricity and water supply (he seeks protection for civilian workers who work to normalize the supply; he seeks the freedom of movement for them under the protection of UNPROFOR, about the demilitarization of Sarajevo)
 - b) The guarantee of the air bridge, consistent with conclusions from Geneva (withdrawal of the anti-aircraft defence from the flight route)
 - c) The assistance to humanitarian convoys of the High Commission for Refugees (they will demand an open route Sarajevo – Mostar)

After this statement we went for talks to the Presidency of BiH, understandably, escorted by the UNPROFOR.

There we were met by Mr Ganić and Mr Šiber with three other officers, and later Mr Kljujić also joined us.

After the greeting by Mr Ganić, they said they do not wish to talk before the Serbs allow the supply of water, electricity and gas for Sarajevo. They demanded of us not to go to the talks until these conditions are met and until we synchronized our views in all matters.

As they allegedly didn't even know what to talk about I presented an agenda for discussion and warned them that the refusal to talk will not force the Serbs to fulfil their demands (I quoted the case of Zadar which to this day doesn't have the water from the Zrmanja River, and the problem of Peruća which is still not completely resolved).

Looking at the agenda for discussion I informed them that we will support the demands of general Morillon and that as far as point 2 was concerned we already gave the guarantee to the Working Group in Geneva, but under the condition that they guarantee that Serbian aircraft will not fly.

At this point Mr Šiber presented the problems of Sarajevo and informed us of the artillery attack on the city which occurred yesterday night and this morning, leaving around 30 dead.

We expected, and it happened, that they mentioned the talks Tuđman – Izetbegović stating that they respect the success of the HVO and that there is a place for us in the joint command.

I told them I knew of the agreement, but that there is a level higher than us who should implement it and that he (Šiber) and I cannot discuss these issues, nor do I have these competencies, and this is not why I came to Sarajevo.

On their regret why we couldn't meet much earlier due to conditions around Sarajevo, I drew their attention to the following:

- That they from the Presidency and the military Command had direct contacts with HOS and Kraljević (and they were in my immediate vicinity)
- That they sent 12 officers to join HOS and didn't find it necessary to send them to me.
- That they have daily contacts with Mr Pašalić who is only 300 metres away from me, and if they had had the desire, they could have contacted me as well.
- That we were even perceived as a paramilitary formation although we were created before the A BiH.
- That they are taking the Muslims from our units and from the positions and forming some brigades of their own.

Exactly at 11.00 hours general Morillon entered the meeting room and we went over to the realization of his plan.

The delegation of HVO gave its consent and guarantee that it will abide by all the agreements with UNPROFOR.

We supported the requests that water, electricity and gas supplies be secured for Sarajevo.

I asked general Morillon to help Jajce which is 140 days without water and electricity.

We gave guarantees for unobstructed and safe flight for the planes with humanitarian aid. General Morillon had copies of our documents which we sent to Geneva. As regards land corridors, we informed general Morillon that we don't have the authority to determine these corridors, but they will have our full support and guarantee for a free pass on those routes which will be determined. For safety reasons we proposed that humanitarian aid uses the current route by which aid is now being delivered into Central Bosnia.

Conclusion: As regards the demands of UNPROFOR we gave our full guarantee, we will abide by all our obligations and we will assist them in all aspects. General Morillon had a word of praise for the HVO, for the humanitarian aid so far and our readiness to cooperate.

At 12.00 hours the meeting ended and after a brief statement for the Sarajevo TV (which they didn't broadcast until now – probably due to my statement) we came back to the Sarajevo airport.

The representatives of UNPROFOR invited us for lunch, which we accepted.

However, the Serbian delegation was waiting for us there, headed by Mr Koljević. After the introduction of the two delegations I asked general Morillon to respect the principle of the level of delegations, which means if the commanders are invited then they should be present, otherwise I reserve the right not to be present at the meeting. General Morillon accepted my request.

Mr President, this is a summarized report of our first meeting in Sarajevo.

Chief of Headquarteres of HVO
Brigadier Milivoj Petković
/signed/

/round stamp – CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL – HEADQUARTERS/

PRESIDENCY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Office of the President

In accordance with the demonstrated need, and pursuant to the responsibilities and powers I have as the President of the National Defence Council and the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I issue the following

ORDER

1. The armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the BH Army and the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/) shall immediately begin preparations for the operation to lift the blockade of Sarajevo city by military means (in all further documents: the Sarajevo operation, shortly: operation "S"). The operation shall be prepared and carried out as soon as possible.
2. Jasmin Jaganjac is appointed commander of the operation with full powers, and Mirsad Ćatić his deputy. Other members of the operation staff are: Zejnil Delalić and Ferid Buljubašić.
3. The troops and material and technical equipment needed for carrying out the operation, as well as the zones of authority and responsibility, shall be established in a separate order. The operation commander shall prepare a draft order within seven days.
4. All activities aimed at carrying out this operation are considered urgent and priority, and all commands and staffs of the OS /armed forces/ of Bosnia and Herzegovina are ordered to assist in this operation as much as required.

Konjic, 16 October 1992

President
of the Presidency of BiH
Alija Izetbegović
/signed/

*/in handwriting/
 Receipt confirmed on 12 November 1992 at 19.30 hours
 A BiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/*

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
 OF THE ARMED FORCES OF RBiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
 DATE: 12 November 1992

MILITARY SECRET
 CONFIDENTIAL

TO MR SEFER HALILOVIĆ
 S A R A J E V O

Sefer,

I propose that the following order be issued

Jovan Divjak

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Headquarters of the Supreme Command
 of the armed forces of RBiH
 Number:
 Sarajevo:

FORMING OF A TEMPORARY LOGISTICAL CENTRE
 OF A BiH IN RIJEKA

O R D E R

Pursuant to the position taken by the Presidency and Government of the Republic of BiH in connection to the need of forming a logistical centre for the procurement of military and non-military needs of the Republic of BiH and growing needs to provide military and non-military material means for the Army of the Republic of BiH, and with the purpose of more efficient procurement of means for the Army of BiH,

I H E R E B Y O R D E R:

1. The formation of a temporary logistical (rear-echelon) centre for support of the Army of RBiH (hereinafter: PLC) – Rijeka.

The purpose of the PLC is to realize, in cooperation with Hasan Efendić, Military attaché of A BiH in the Republic of Croatia, Hasan Čengiđ, chief procurement officer of material and technical means for the A BiH, in the name of the Presidency of BiH and Lagumdžija Zlatko, Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of BiH and President of the Committee for humanitarian aid to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the following tasks:

- Planning and organizing the procurement of arms, military equipment and food for the needs of A BiH, on the basis of the plan of equipping which it gets from the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Republic of BiH

- Executing the receipt and distribution of arms, military equipment and food to headquarters and units of A BiH, according to the plans and orders of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Republic of BiH
- Organizing the receipt, care and treatment of a higher order of wounded and diseased members of A BiH, according to plans and orders of the Headquarters of the armed forces of the Republic of BiH
- Organizing the receipt, equipping and directing the volunteers whose origin is BiH on the territory of the Republic of BiH, into the ranks of A BiH, on the basis of the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of BiH.
- Carrying out the financial and bookkeeping tasks, legal and general duties, on the basis of regulations in force in the Republic of BiH in war circumstances
- Keeping computerized records of the receipt and distribution of arms and military equipment to headquarters and units of A BiH, wounded and diseased members of A BiH received via PLC and accepted and directed volunteers into the units of A BiH.
- Submitting fortnightly and monthly reports to the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Republic of BiH on organisation of tasks
/illegible/

/illegible/

- Head of the logistical centre
- Officer in charge of plan and analysis, also the deputy Head of the Centre
- Officer in charge of the technical and material means
- Officer in charge of the procurement of quartermaster, medical, military-technical and other supplies
- Officer in charge of general and legal affairs
- Officer in charge of material and financial affairs
- Officer in charge of records and computer management
- Administrative clerk and typist of first A class

The Head of the Centre is Vinko Tondini

Deputy Head is Rasim Imamović

With the aim of efficient functioning of the logistics for the needs of A BiH, to form departments outside of the territory of the Republic of BiH, in Ljubljana and Split. Manpower of these departments should not exceed 4 persons.

The Head of the PLC is obliged within 5 (five) days to write the instruction on the work of the PLC and description of jobs and tasks of the officers.

3. PLC will be situated in the premises of the "Vitari trade" company from Rijeka, at the address Cernik 202 (Čavle), the premises which this company places at our disposal free of charge. The warehouse of arms and military equipment will be in the premises of the branch office of "Agrokomerc", Rijeka, Đure Strugara st. 10.
4. Acknowledge the previous activities of the Headquarters for the support of BiH – department "O" Rijeka, in the period from 1 August 1992 until today with the submission of orderly material-financial documentation, within the scope of work of the PLC. Expenses incurred outside of the task contained in this order will not be accepted.

Head of PLC Rijeka will compile and send to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of RBiH – Sarajevo a complete report on the activities of the Headquarters for the support of BiH – Department "O" Rijeka including the material-financial report.

5. The status of persons working in PLC Rijeka and departments in Ljubljana and Split (work contract, health insurance, monthly wage and other expenses) will be dealt with the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of RBiH, according to regulations in force in the Republic of BiH. The Head of PLC will submit the necessary documentation to the Department for personal and mobilization affairs of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of RBiH, Sarajevo, as soon as possible, in order to regulate the status of the persons at work in the PLC of the A BiH in Rijeka.

6. To plan, organize and continuously carry out security measures for the protection of work done at the PLC, its employees, arms, military equipment and food from the moment of receipt to the moment of handing over to the user (i.e. Headquarters or command of a unit of A BiH) in cooperation with commands of Military police and commanders of the Ministry of the Interior, especially through the territory over which the arms, military equipment and food for the needs of the members of the Army of RBiH is transported.

In the protocol on the work of the PLC elaborate in detail the security tasks and the measures of protection of persons working in the PLC and its departments., as well as the means of contacting with military and civilian security organs on the territory on which the PLC and its departments are active.

7. The Head of the PLC is directly responsible for the implementation of this order. He is obliged to constantly improve the work of the PLC and secure a planned full supply of the units, commands of headquarters of the Army of RBiH with military equipment and food on the basis of regulations in force in the Republic of BiH and in accordance with the plans and orders of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of RBiH.

Head of the Headquarters of the Supreme
Command of the armed forces of RBiH
Sefer Halilović

Military delegation of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in BiH
Date: 25 November 1992
Archive No. 31-2-03-302-7/4-44/99

Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of RBiH
/Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
(For the commander Rasim Delić)
V I S O K O

Re: Request

Dear Mr Delić,
Salam alykom.

I would like to visit the region of Mostar and to make a tour of the front lines in order to get a first hand insight into the situation in this region, particularly the situation connected to the recent operations of the armed forces of RBiH under the code name "STORM".

Please give us all the necessary help which we shall need in the realization of this task (the necessary permits, passes, escort, etc.)

Military delegation of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in BiH
Krem Rezaji
/signed/

Monday, 28 December 1992 Sarajevo

569

Pursuant to Amendment LI, Item 5, paragraph 3 to the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at a session held on 24 December 1992, adopted the following

DECISION
TO ELECT A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

I

Dr TATJANA LJUJIĆ-MIJATOVIĆ is hereby elected member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

II

This Decision shall be published in the *Official Gazette of the RBiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/*.

Number 02-111-921/92

24 December 1992

Sarajevo

President of the Presidency of the RBiH, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

Monday, 28 December 1992, Sarajevo

568

Pursuant to the Amendment LI point 5, paragraph 3 on the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the session of 24 December 1992 takes

THE DECISION
ON THE ELECTION OF A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

I

Mr MIRO LASIĆ has been elected as a member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

II

This decision shall be published in the "Official Gazette of RBiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/".

No. 02-11-920/92

24 December 1992,

Sarajevo

President of the Presidency of RBiH, Alija Izetbegović, signed

Monday, 28 December 1992 Sarajevo

570

Pursuant to Amendment LI, Item 5, paragraph 3 to the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at a session held on 24 December 1992, adopted the following

DECISION
TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

I

MIRO LAZOVIĆ, a deputy of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is hereby elected President of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

II

This Decision shall be published in the Official Gazette of the RBiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/.

Number 02-111-922/92

24 December 1992

Sarajevo

President of the Presidency of the RBiH, Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

R E P U B L I C O F B O S N I A A N D H E R Z E G O V I N A
/coat of arms/ CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

D-32

D E P A R T M E N T O F D E F E N C E
106. ORAŠKA BRIGADE
ORAŠJE

No: 02-10/8-77/93-2

Date: 30 January 1993

TO ALL UNITS

ORDER on the ban of
wearing black uniforms

Pursuant to the Order of the 4th Operational Zone "Posavina"
No. 01-01/93-843 of 30 January 1993,

I O R D E R

1. In the zone of responsibility of the 106. Oraška Brigade the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ bans the wearing of "BLACK UNIFORMS" and with such uniforms it is not possible to enter the REPUBLIC OF CROATIA.
2. The order enters into force IMMEDIATELY.
3. The unit commanders are responsible for the compliance with this order.

C O M M A N D E R
Ivo Oršolić
/signed/

/stamp:/
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
16 October 1992
01-I 59/92

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
HZ HERZEG BOSNIA

16 October 1992

GOVERNMENT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

- President Jure Pelivan

Subject: Put spasa ("Road of Rescue"), section "PAVLOVICA" - reimbursement for expenses for explosive, detonating cord and capsules RK-8

We think that it is not necessary to describe the importance of the construction of the so called "Road of Rescue" which is the only safe link between BOSNIA and HERZEGOVINA, and enables the further connection to the world. In order to carry out the construction works on the very difficult section Novi Travnik - G. Vakuf via PAVLOVICA it is needed as follows:

- 122 t of plastic explosive (4200 DM/t)
- 32000 m of detonating cord (0.85 DM/M)
- 5000 capsules RK-8 (1.2 MD/item)

Most of these materials have already been used, but they were not paid for to the manufacturer, "VITEZIT" company.

The representatives of Vitez municipality informed us that the President Jure Pelivan, when visiting the municipality, had promised that the Government of BiH would pay for the explosives needed for the section of the road via PAVLOVICA.

Since we have really exhausted all financing possibilities for this expensive project, we are sending you the invoice for the explosives, hoping that you will give your contribution for the construction of the "Road of Rescue" pursuant to given promise. We mention that "Vitezit" company would agree to receive the payment on goods, especially in fuel and food.

We are fully confident that you would act in accordance with given promises.

With best regards,

PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF HC "HERZEG-BOSNIA"

Dr. Prlić Jadranko

4th corps command
Strictly confidential, number
05-764-1/93
1 February 1993

Pursuant to the act of the Supreme Command, strictly confidential, no. 02/187-1, dated 31 January 1993, in relation to construction of Fojnica-Prozor route, I hereby

ORDER

1. To disallow the construction of Fojnica-Prozor communication.
2. As far as the contractor is concerned, bring to his attention that the disallowance is valid till the necessary documentation is collected. Also direct him to obtain the aforementioned documentation from the authority bodies of R BiH.
3. In case of violent conduct or resistance, notify this command.
4. The commander of the brigade "Neretvica" /handwritten Konjic Parsovići/ is responsible for execution of this order to me.

AH/AR

/handwritten OC/

Commander

Arif Pašalić

/signed and stamped/

PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC ACTION OF BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/
REGIONAL COMMITTEE FOR HERZEGOVINA

A n n o u n c e m e n t

Mostar, 23 February 1993

With regard to ever more frequent practice that the commanders of military units meddle into political affairs and the process of taking political decisions, the president of the Regional Committee of SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ for Herzegovina Mr Zijad Demirović pointed to an unacceptable and illegitimate nature of such behaviour of key persons of defence units.

Irrespective of the state of war or peace, in every democratically structured state the government and political decisions are in the hands of political organs, in accordance with the Constitution and electoral verification, while the issues of defence are delegated to the military commanders, likewise in accordance with the Constitution and political decisions of the competent political organs. This is how it should be also in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the region of Herzegovina, irrespective of the constitutional-political crisis and aggression which our country is going through.

However, individual army commanders are more and more involved in politics and less and less with the military. They become the creators, agents or persons in charge of realization of particular political options, give precepts for the organization of government and economic life, using in this process abundantly the public media. The more they become politicians, the worse their military leadership is. It will be best for all that the soldiers-turned-politicians from the lowest to the highest level of command return to their original task and their sole responsibility – strengthening of the defence capabilities of their units for the definitive banishment of the Serbian-Chetnik aggressor from the territory of the independent, sovereign Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, says the announcement of the president of the Regional Committee of SDA for Herzegovina, Mr Zijad Demirović.

/round stamp – PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC ACTION SARAJEVO, Regional Committee for Herzegovina
MOSTAR/

/signature illegible/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

No. 13-42-14/93
Sarajevo 25 February 1993

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
SARAJEVO

SUBJECT: Setting up of Mostar and Livno districts

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 19 of the Decree Law on formation and activities of districts ("Official Gazette of R BiH, no. 12/92, 14/92, 18/92 and 21/92), the assembly of a district forms the presidency of the district. At the same time, the Article 60 of this Decree Law stipulates that the Presidency of RBiH appoint the republic commissions for districts whose basic task is to prepare and organize the constitution of the district assembly. In accordance with the mentioned provisions, the Presidency of R BiH passed the Decision on formation and activities of districts ("Official Gazette of RBiH" no. 16/92 and 19/92) which, among other things, states that the republic commission for a district performs the function of the presidency of that district until the presidency of the district is formed.

In accordance with the latest information from the districts, obtained until 25 February 1993, the district organs had been formed in the following districts: Bihać, Goražde, Tuzla and Zenica; in Banja Luka, Doboj, Sarajevo and Travnik districts republic commissions were formed for these districts, and this commissions perform the function of the presidencies of these districts.

Mostar district for the territories of the following municipalities: Bileća, Čapljina, Čitluk, Gacko, Grude, Jablanica, Konjic, Široki Brijeg, Ljubinje, Ljubuški, Mostar, Neum, Nevesinje, Posušje, Stolac and Trebinje; and Livno district for the territories of the following municipalities: Glamoč, Kupres, Livno, Prozor and Tomislavgrad are not in function yet.

Because of the familiar reasons that are in the first place of political origin and that relate to the setting up of the authorities of so-called "Herzeg-Bosnia", the constitution of Mostar and Livno districts did not begin immediately, in accordance with the positive regulations of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

However, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the aim to set up these districts, sent a letter to Mr. Mate Boban on 27 September 1992, in which, when speaking of the issue of setting up of these districts, the following was said among other things: ".. At the beginning of the war, in very complex situation in Mostar and Livno regions the temporary organs of Herzeg-Bosnia were formed.

The Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated 21 July 1992 defines that the temporary authorities of Herzeg-Bosnia would be harmonized with the legislation of RBiH. Therefore we propose that with the aim of harmonization of practice of organization of war organs in the whole territory of RBiH you should instigate the proceedings of renaming of temporary organs of Herzeg-Bosnia for Mostar and Livno regions into the district organs of Mostar and Livno districts, in accordance with the mentioned decree". At the same time, it is requested from Mate Boban in this letter that he proposes the candidates for the most responsible functions in the organs and bodies of these districts.

As far as this Ministry is informed, so far there has been no formal reply or opinion received from Mr. Mate Boban. Therefore the Ministry of Defense again starts the initiative that the Mostar and Livno districts are put into function, and it proposed to the Government of RBiH that it forwards to the Presidency of RBiH, in accordance with Articles 56 and 60 of Decree Law, the Draft Decision:

1. Mostar and Livno districts are in function as of 1 March 1993;
2. With the aim of constitution of the assembly of Mostar and Livno districts as well as other organs, the Presidency of RBiH appoint the republic commissions for the mentioned districts, each consisting of three members from among the representatives in the Assembly of RBiH from the territories of these districts.

DEPUTY MINISTER
Munib Bisić
/signed/

Round seal (illegible)

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The Government, Ministry of Energetics, Mining and Industry
Sarajevo, 3 March 1993

Mr. Zijad Demirović
MOSTAR

Dear Mr. Demirović,

Please find enclosed the letter we sent today to Mr. Pašalić, Mr. Masleša and Mr. Prlić on the setting up of Mostar and Livno Districts. We firmly believe that these documents might be of interest for you, having in mind your political activities. Please forward the attached materials to Mr. Prlić, after you make copies of all materials for your use.

With best wishes for you, Mr. Oručević and all others,

MINISTER
Prof.dr. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić
/signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The Government

Sarajevo, 3 March 1993

No:

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
4th CORPS COMMAND
Mr. Arif Pašalić, Commander
MOSTAR

Dear Mr. Pašalić,

We are sending you the Conclusion of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the urgent implementation of activities with the aim of setting up of Mostar and Livno districts. We are asking you to establish, in cooperation with the Center of Security Services Mostar and other political factors in that area, contacts and reach agreement on the election of three commissioners in each district from among the representatives in the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the list is enclosed), so that these commissioners might implement activities necessary for activation of Mostar and Livno districts.

Besides from the abovementioned conclusion and list, we are also sending you the Instructions on the implementation of regulations on organization and functioning of the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the war conditions.

With best regards,

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF R BiH
Dr. Zlatko Lagumdžija
/signed/

Round Seal: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevo

Copy sent to:

- CSB (Center of Security Services) Mostar (Mr. Ramo Masleša, head)
- Mr. Jadranko Prlić
(Plenipotentiary of the Government of R BiH)

MINUTES

of the XXX session of HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ of HZ H-B /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/ held on 13 March 1993, beginning at 10.00 hours

The session was held in the HVO HZ H-B building in Mostar.

Present at the session were: Dr J. Prlić, president and chairman of the session, V. Šoljić, N. Tomić, I. Žuljević, I. Šarac, S. Božić, K. Sesar, Z. Perković, M. Bukvić, D. Tadić, S. Nussbaum, D. Marić and M. Džidić

The following AGENDA was proposed:

1. Analysis of the execution of the tasks given on the sessions and working meetings of HVO HZ H-B;
2. Analysis of the conclusions of the Government of R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/

Concerning item 2:

Following the analysis of the conclusions of the Government of R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ on the implementation of actions with the aim of putting into function the so-called districts also on the areas of Mostar and Livno, it was observed that the foundation of districts, as separate social-political communities which should function during the state of war is not foreseen by the existing Constitution of R BiH, neither is it in accordance with the Vance-Owen peace plan, or the agreement which the Muslim and Croatian delegations signed on the negotiations in New York.

The very fact that the implementation of the decision on districts is put in charge of the Command of the so-called 4th Corps of Army of BiH and the Centre of Security Services of the Ministry of the Interior of BiH in Mostar, and that the instruction for the implementation of this decision is signed by the Deputy Minister of Defence in the Government of BiH Mr Munih Bisić, and not the Minister of Defence Mr Božo Rajić or the Governments in the title, points to the illegitimacy and justifies doubts that this might be another attempt at establishing the territorial division of BiH from the standpoint of interests which, at least on the declarative level, the Muslim side does not support in the peace talks, just as it is not accepted by the Croatian delegation, nor by the co-chairmen of the Conference Mr. Vance and Mr. Owen.

Apart from being illegitimate and unacceptable, the decision on the districts is practically unrealisable. To give an example, the district of Mostar includes, according to this decision, also the municipalities of Bileća, Gacko, Ljubinje, Nevesinje and Trebinje, and they are almost a full year now fully under the occupation of the aggressor. On the other hand, the list of tasks and responsibilities of the administrative bodies of the districts reveals a division of BiH on a unitarian principle, whereby the central authority of the Republic would strengthen, repeating, only in a different form, the concept similar to former Yugoslavia. The Croatian people and its delegations can never accept this.

In the decision about the implementation of the so-called districts of Mostar and Livno, it is evident that the existence of the HVO of HZ H-B is ignored.

Likewise are ignored the enormous results in the organizing of defence and the already implemented functioning of the temporary executive government on the area of HZ H-B. It is an irrefutable fact that the HVO of HZ H-B organized a very efficient resistance against the Serbian aggressor, and that this is a significant portion of BH territory. Furthermore, only on the area of HZ H-B all the important segments of executive government are in function: the armed forces, police, the judiciary, postal service, financial transactions, largely also the schooling system and the economy, and other. At the end it was concluded that there is no constitutional foundation for the above decision, and that the forthcoming activities of the HVO of HZ H-B will be based on the concept and practical solutions from the Vance-Owen plan, which is not at all recognizable in the decisions and initiatives of the bodies of the central authorities of the Republic. Due to all that was said, the HVO of HZ H-B shall deem every attempt to implement the so-called districts on the part of the Government of R BiH illegal and will undertake most decisive measures against it.

Minutes taken by
Miroslav Džidić, signed

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 Mostar, 27th February

STATEMENT REGARDING THE EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF HZ-HB HVO
 /Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna/

At its extraordinary session held on 27 February 1993 the Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia discussed security-related and military situation that arose as result of the recent incident provoked by the members of ABiH in the area of Central Bosnia, which are likely to cause new armed conflicts between Croats and Muslims and also aggravation of the general conditions in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Consistent in its policy of fighting the Serb-Chetnik aggressor, HZ HB HVO estimates that the Muslim forces provoke incidents in the areas in which they make no combat contacts with the aggressor's units. It is indicative that such situations take place precisely in the areas in which their forces are highly concentrated, both in manpower and materiel, so that, for example, there are about 25,000 members of Muslim forces in Central Bosnia, whereas there are not enough soldiers to defend Sarajevo and the whole of Eastern Bosnia, nor are secured the towns in the valley of the Bosna River that the Serb forces have either already occupied or keep under constant fire.

Having estimated the situation in its entirety, HZ H-B HVO concludes:

1. In view of the incidents provoked by ABiH, certain ministers of BH Government, independently or in collaboration with part of ABiH Command, have been willfully taking over the competence of the legal state organs and act by using methods that objectively contain elements of a classic coup d' etat, i.e. they use lower levels in the chain of ABiH command and uninformed citizens with intention to establish parallel and absolutely illegitimate bodies of civil government in some parts of BiH.

The scope of such efforts includes establishment of parallel authorities in the areas in which provisional governmental bodies already exist, as is the case on the territory of Herzeg-Bosnia. By doing so, the initiators of such attempts go around the leadership of SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ in the field, particularly in the areas where it has already accomplished some kind of cooperation with the representatives of Croats, and in which some kind of provisional executive authority has already been established, as is the case in Mostar and a number of other places on the territory of Herzeg-Bosnia. The same is being done regardless of the obvious fact that such co-operation has resulted in a successful resistance to the aggressor.

2. HZ-HB HVO warns the entire community and Muslim people together with their political leaders that, as a rule, such attempts of coup-plotting forces within the legitimate government of R BiH emerge whenever the President of BiH and the leader of Muslim people, Mr. Alija Izetbegović, is out of the country, i.e. when he participates in negotiations, under international supervision, related to finding a peaceful solution to the crisis in BiH. This fact speaks a lot for itself.

In view of the common objective of the Muslim and Croat peoples of BiH, as regards freedom and sovereignty of the Republic of BiH, HZ H-B HVO is of opinion that the legitimate authorities of R BiH in the first place, and then all other factors with political influence on the Muslim people, as well as Mr. Alija Izetbegović, should disclose their personal attitude towards the following:

- is there a coup d'etat underway? - a coup d'etat that has been attempted on several occasions by certain individuals at the top of ABiH and those like-minded from certain governmental bodies.
- is it possible to prevent the incidents and behavior of members of certain ABiH units, who have been evidently breaking down the joint efforts of Croats and Muslims and creating acute tension between these two peoples (the last such incident took place on the 26th of this month near Bugojno, when ABiH members - in spite of the mixed Croat-Muslim escort of the transport, seized a large amount of

food supplies, costly equipment, arms and 80 million HRD /Croatian Dinar/ in cash, intended for the defenders of Central Bosnia?

- how long will the media from Sarajevo, primarily RTV BiH /BH Radio and Television/ keep ignoring the fruits of the common battle of Croats and Muslims and each successful move directed at reaching consensus of national parties and political leadership of the two peoples?
3. HZ H-B HVO estimates that it is essential to make some changes within the R BiH Armed Forces Main Staff in order to increase efficacy of the common fight against the aggressor and also to further improve the Croat/Muslim relations. It is, therefore, suggested to the Minister of Defence in R BiH Government to suspend Sefer Halilović, the Chief of Main Staff.
 4. HZ H-B HVO concludes that it has been some time now that R BiH Government enacts illegitimate decisions, because these decisions are being made without the participation of the Prime Minister and the ministers of Croatian nationality. Consequently, HVO and the Croatian people do not accept decisions reached by the incomplete BiH Government. An additional reason for such attitude of HVO is the recent address of Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, Minister of energy supplies, mining and industry in BiH Government, cosignatories -Jusuf Pušina, Minister of the Interior, and Sefer Halilović, Chief of BiH Armed Forces Main Staff, to the ABiH 4th Corps Commander in Mostar. This letter in particular clearly shows all elements of a classic coup d'etat, as military units are requested by the unsuspecting economy-related addresses to establish new bodies of civilian government and appointment of leading staff in enterprises.
 5. HZ H-B HVO estimates that attempts of such forces to put the blame on Croats, or to divide the guilt equally between the Serb aggressors and Croats, are extremely harmful and dangerous in view of the well-known contribution of Croats and HVO, not only to the joint freedom fighting operations, but also to the assistance they have been providing to the Muslim forces while liberating certain parts of the Republic. A proof for that could be the fact that a considerable assistance for defense has been recently forwarded to the ABiH Tuzla Corps Command, which has been lately faced with difficulties in advancing through the central Bosnia.
 6. In accordance with the latest developments, HZ H-B HVO has decided to close down passages in the areas bordering the Republic of Croatia for all cargo and persons involved in ABiH activities. This decision has been reached and will be revoked in agreement with the leadership of the Regional SDA board in Mostar.
 7. Due to the ever present blockade of the reports issued by HZ H-B by the Sarajevo media and also to the positive results of the collaboration between the Croats and Muslims in the area of Tuzla, Mostar and Usora, HZ H-B HVO requests from the republic media a professional treatment of these reports and also that this very statement be disclosed in its entirety.
 8. The aforementioned viewpoints and measures of HZ H-B HVO are aimed at encouraging those forces within the Muslim community that are in favour of co-operating with the Croats. At the same time, they are intended to neutralize those who stir up disputes and tend to support intolerant political options which, it is our belief, will never be accepted nor given support by the international community.

HZ H-B HVO is taking this opportunity to stress out once again its readiness to take part in multilateral co-operation and in finding solution to any debatable issue in agreement with other parties. It, therefore, invites all humanitarian and other organizations of the two communities to instigate peaceful activities and restore confidence.

HZ H-B HVO

Jadranko Prlić, President

/stamped and signed/

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Pursuant to Amendment 51, item 5, paragraph 3, to the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 1 of the Decree Law Amending the Decree Law on the Establishment and Operation of Districts, at the session of 13 March 1993, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the following

DECISION

ON RELEASE FROM DUTY AND ELECTION OF PRESIDENTS AND MEMBERS OF WAR
PRESIDENCIES OF MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLIES

I

Presidents and members of war presidencies of the following municipal assemblies are hereby released from duty: Prijedor, Banja Luka, Ključ, Mrkonjić Grad, Sanski Most, Skender Vakuf, Šipovo, Kotor Varoš, Bosanski Novi, Čajniče, Rudo, Srbac, Gacko and presidents of the War Presidency of Jablanica Municipal Assembly and Konjic Assembly.

II

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Prijedor Municipal Assembly:

1. Anes MEDUNJANIN - President
2. Muhamed BEŠIĆ - Vice President
3. Hasan MAKIĆ - Secretary
4. Fikret ĆUSKIĆ - Municipal Defence Staff Commander
5. Husein MUJAGIĆ - Civilian Protection Staff Commander
6. Drasko POPOVIĆ - member
7. Hava SEJMENOVIĆ - member
8. Ferid CRLJENKOVIĆ - member
9. Anto BJELANOVIĆ - member

III

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Banja Luka Municipal Assembly:

1. Atko HUSEINBAŠIĆ - President
2. Senad MAGLAJLIĆ - Vice President
3. Dr. Amila OSMANČEVIĆ - member
4. Dr. Denis TRTO - member
5. Zijad BILIĆ - member

IV

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Ključ Municipal Assembly:

1. HADŽIĆ - President
2. Mustafa SALIHOVIĆ - Vice President
3. Emir OMANOVIĆ - member
4. Grozdana MARUNČIĆ - member
5. Amir AVDIĆ - member
6. Milenko PANIĆ - member
7. Dedo BAHTIJARAGIĆ - member
8. Kemal DEDIĆ - member
9. Ismet HRNČIĆ - member

V

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Mrkonjić Grad Municipal Assembly:

1. Sulejman CERIĆ - President
2. Dževad ZAHIROVIĆ - Vice President
3. Ramiz KUNIĆ - Secretary
4. Rasim HAGAROVIĆ - Municipal Staff Commander
5. Mirsad PEHLIVANOVIĆ - Civilian Protection Commander
6. Mujo SORO - member
7. Omer SARAJLIĆ - member
8. Rezek PRAŠALIĆ - member
9. Asim HEGANOVIĆ - member

VI

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Sanski Most Municipal Assembly:

1. Azemir HRNČIĆ - President
2. Mirzet KARABEG - Vice President
3. Mehmed ALAGIĆ - member
4. Faruk NALIĆ - member
5. Nisveta KARABEGOVIĆ - member
6. Enes KARIĆ - member
7. Mesud BEČIREVIĆ - member
8. Esad KURBEGOVIĆ - member
9. Aida AGANOVIĆ - member
10. Mustafa FERHATOVIĆ - member
11. Mirko VRANIĆ - member
12. Suad KURBEGOVIĆ - member
13. Kemal KURSPAHIĆ - member

VII

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Skender Vakuf Municipal Assembly:

1. Sulejman ŠUŠIĆ - President
2. Nazif KRKIĆ - Vice President
3. Osman ČORBIĆ - Secretary
4. Himzo IMAMOVIĆ - member
5. Zijad ŠUŠIĆ - member
6. Irfan REVLJIĆ - member
7. Salko BAJRAKTAREVIĆ - member

VIII

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Šipovo Municipal Assembly:

1. Sakib RIBIĆ - President
2. Ermin VELIĆ - Secretary
3. Rijad ŠABIĆ - member
4. Husein MEDILOVIĆ - member
5. Ismet ČUNJELO - member
6. Salem SEFER - member
7. Mediha BAHTIĆ - member

IX

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Kotor Varoš Municipal Assembly:

1. Nedžad MUMINOVIĆ - President
2. Nikola ARSENOVIĆ - Vice President
3. Muris HADŽISELIMOVIĆ - Secretary
4. Muhamed SADIKOVIĆ - Municipal Defence Staff Commander
5. Said PAŠIĆ - Civilian Protection Staff Commander
6. Rifet PLANINČIĆ - member
7. Zijad KOVAČEVIĆ - member
8. Hazim SKOPLJAK - member

X

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Bosanski Novi:

1. Mirza MUFTIĆ - President
2. Izet MUHAMEDAGIĆ - member
3. Mustafa TANKOVIĆ - member
4. Emin PURIĆ - member
5. Ante MILINOVIĆ - member
6. Hasan MURATAGIĆ - member
7. Hajrudin ČERIĆ - member

XI

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Čajniče:

1. Jusuf MOČEVIĆ - President
2. Hamed HURIĆ - Vice President
3. Munever NURIĆ - member
4. Dževad ČOLAK - member
5. Ekrem MEŠEVIĆ - member
6. Jakub ČEHAJA - member
7. Izet ALIHODŽIĆ - member

XII

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Rudo:

1. Abdel BRAJANAC - President
2. Dževad PLJETO - member
3. Hajrudin LAGUMDŽIJA - member
4. Ahmed MEHANOVIĆ - member
5. Sabit MURATOVIĆ - member
6. Nedžad ZUKO - member
7. Šaćir DŽIHANIĆ - member

XIII

The following persons are elected president of the War Presidency of Srbac:

1. Dr. Atif ABU SAFIJA - President
2. Senad ČAUŠEVIĆ - member
3. Adem HADŽIĆ - member

XIV

The following persons are elected president and members of the War Presidency of Gacko Municipal Assembly:

1. Dževad MEMIĆ - President
2. Izet ŠKOBALJ - member
3. Sejdo DŽAKO - member

4. Safet GREBOVIĆ - member
5. Suljo FAZLAGIĆ - member
6. Džemil SARIĆ - member
7. Faruk FAZLAGIĆ - member
8. Derviš BAŠIĆ - member
9. Miralem ČAMPARA - member
10. Ismet FAZLAGIĆ - member
11. Ahmo GREBOVIĆ - member
12. Šućrija ŠAKOVIĆ - member
13. Edhem DIZDAREVIĆ - member

XV

The following person is elected president of the War Presidency of Jablanica Municipal Assembly:

Dr. Safet ĆIBO

XVI

The following person is elected president of the War Presidency of Konjic Municipal Assembly:

Dr. Safet ĆIBO

XVII

For the purpose of providing ethnic representation in war presidencies of municipal assemblies, a war presidency shall propose electing the necessary number of Presidency members from among the Serbs and the Croats.

XVIII

War presidencies of municipal assemblies shall exercise their function under the provisions of Article 273 of the Constitution of the Republic of BiH until conditions are met for the election of a presidency by municipal assembly legal organs.

XIX

A war presidency must exercise its functions as briefly as possible in the free area of its municipality and ensure operation of other state organs, organisations and institutions.

XX

When this decision becomes effective, decisions on the election of presidents and members of war presidencies of municipal assemblies under item I of this decision shall cease to be valid.

XXI

This decision must be published in the "RBiH Official Gazette".

Number 02-111-130/93

13 March 1993

Sarajevo

President of the

RBiH Presidency

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ

/Handwritten document/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Army of R BiH
Command of the 4th Corps
No. 02/1-966-132/93
Mostar, 16 April 1993

MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
URGENT

To the Command of the 44. Mountain Brigade

Re your act Strictly Conf. No. 02/70-1-72/93 of 16 April 1993 take steps as follows:

1. Allow a part of the forces of UNPROFOR from Gornji Vakuf to go towards Mostar.
2. The Spanish Battalion must stay in Jablanica. I received confirmation of this yesterday from colonels ZORZO and MURALES.

In other words, do not allow the Spanish Battalion to leave Jablanica without my permission.

Commandeer

Arif Pašalić

/signed/

/round stamp: ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,
Headquarters of the 4th Corps, MOSTAR/

**Members of the BH Presidency, President and members of the BiH
Government (Croatian side): Statement
(Mostar, 21 April 1993)**

**Statement of BH Presidency members: Franjo Boras and Miro Lasić
and the President of the BH Government Mile Akmadžić**

At the meeting of the Presidency members, President of the Government and the BH Government members from the Croatian side, held yesterday in Mostar, in relation to the aggression of the Muslim units, that is, the BH Army units to the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a following statement, which we reproduce in its entirety, is accepted:

"1. Herewith we notify the Croats in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who we represent as legitimate power bodies, as well as all relevant international factors that, due to the behaviour of the Muslim side, we are disabled and prevented in equal participation within the state power, which denies our right to homeland and state of BiH, in which the Croats are constituent nation.

2. The plan on Bosnia and Herzegovina as the exclusive Muslim state is realized under the demagogic propaganda platitude on the so called unique, integral BH state of citizens, which denies the rights of all three constituent nations to this state. The Muslim side issues decisions, which proclaims as state decisions without participation, consulting and even informing the legitimate representatives of the Croats within the power bodies, which are often directly in conflict with the Croatian interests as the constituent part of the state, such as the example of the open aggression of the Muslim units to HVO and the civil population in the Croatian areas. The idea of BiH as the exclusive Muslim state is directly confirmed by equalizing Croats with the Serbian aggressor and continuous media discrediting of the legal Croat officials.

3. By narrowing the constitutional-law frame, the proclaimed equality of the Croats in the Republic of BiH is entirely discredited, which actually becomes interest of the Muslim people only. The fact that the President of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegović after the expiry of the second mandate on 20 December 1992 usurped the function contrary to the Constitution and without holding session of the Presidency, at which the agreement of all three constituent nations to such precedent would be demanded, shows the degree of denying right of the Croats in the BH Presidency.

The Muslim side prevented the Croatian officials in power from insight into the financial matters, which results in uncontrolled help from the international community for the entire BiH, however exclusively reserved for the Muslims. The parastatal establishments are formed as pure Muslims powers without participation of the Croatian representatives in the Presidency of the Republic which is in function of the BH Assembly - so called districts in the territory of the entire BiH and, eventually, the military aggression is carried out to Croats in BiH, along with devastation of civil, cultural and religious buildings, massacre, arrestment and expel of the Croatian civil population, which indisputably expresses the rejection of the Vance-Owen plan for the peaceful solution of conflicts in BiH.

4. The Croatian nation, represented through us in power does not consider legitimate all diplomatic-consular officials of the Republic of BiH, because they were appointed without agreement and participation of the Croatian side, which once again infringed the equality of Croats in BiH.

5. We officials of the Croatian nation within the power bodies of the R BiH Government neither abandoned nor we rejected the participation in the state power, but for all the above cited we request that the equality of Croats as the constituent nation that makes the Republic of BiH is guaranteed and enabled, if necessary through the arbitrage of the international factors - it is said in the statement that was signed in Mostar by the members of the BH Presidency, Franjo Boras and Miro Lasić, as well as the President of the BH Government, Mile Akmadžić.

(Source: Večernji list, 23 April 1993)

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Command of 3rd Corps
 Strictly conf. nr. 02/33-957
 Zenica, 22 April 1993

Defense of the Republic
 Military secret
 Strictly confidential

Activities to be undertaken in case of
 violation of the agreement by HVO -
 Order

In case of violation of agreed cease of conflicts between A RBiH and HVO forces and in case of open attack at A RBiH units or population, and with objective to prepare units beforehand, to prevent surprise as well as protection of population against persecution and massacre, based on the directive and command by Headquarters of Military Command of R BiH Armed Forces:

I ORDER:

1. On all levels of RIK /Command and Control/ to immediately undertake all measures of organizational, morale and material preparations with objective to increase combat readiness and energetic and decisive prevention of the attacks and provocations by the HVO units.
2. On all attained lines to undertake measures of complete engineering organization of defense positions. To completely organize defense fire system with precise determination of positioning for heavy fire equipment and blocking of no mans land and routes capable to support tank traffic.

3. Versions of forces engagement

3. 1st Version:

In case of conflicts in certain areas from attained lines, by using favorable ground objects, to commence with energetic attack with the objective to destroy and disarm the enemy in the close area of endangered territory where conflict was provoked and to secure the operation of legal government authorities.

3.1 Tasks for the units

3.1.1 Operational Group "Lašva" with: 1st strengthen troop of 314th Motorized Brigade, unit from Operational Group "Bosnia", unit from independent Commando Battalion, 1st Battalion from 7th Muslim Brigade, 303rd Mountain Brigade, Battalion from 305th Mountain Brigade, from attained line with necessary regrouping to commence with the attack against HVO forces in the mentioned area of Busovača and Vitez with objective to destroy or disarm HVO forces in mentioned areas.

Upon completed objective to regroup forces and in joint action with Operational Group "East" to destroy HVO forces in Kiseljak area.

3.1.2 Operational Group "East" along with completely securing the defense line towards Chetniks, by regrouping the available forces, to block off HVO "Kiseljak" forces with objective to prevent interventions towards Busovača and then in joint action with Operational Group "Lašva" to destroy and disarm HVO Forces in the area of Kiseljak. Portion of forces has to be ready for intervention in case of coordinated, joint attack by HVO and Chetniks.

3.1.3 Operational Group "Bosnia" without strengthen troop, with portion of their forces to organize defense and protection of population and with other portion to block roadways towards Zenica and Kakanj with objective to prevent intervention towards Zenica and Kakanj.

Portion of forces has to be ready for intervention in case of coordinated, joint attack by HVO and Chetniks.

3.1.4 Operational Group "West" has a task to use portion of their forces to organize defense and protection of population and to use other portion to block the roadways Bugojno - Ravno Rostovo --- N. Tavnik as well as all other roadways going from Herzegovina towards Central Bosnia.

3.1.5 Operational Group "Bosanska Krajina" without 305th Battalion and 7th Muslim Brigade Battalion to use part of their forces to block roadway Travnik - Vitez and N. Travnik - Vitez with objective to prevent intervention by HVO forces towards Vitez and Busovača.

4. 2nd Version

I decided to use portion of forces to hold the defensive lines towards Chetniks by the way absent defense, and to use available forces to commence energetic attack against HVO units at Busovača, Vitez, Kiseljak, Kakanj, Travnik and N. Travnik, to use blockade to prevent arrival of HVO forces from Vareš, Žepče, Zavidovići, Bugojno and by the way of persistent defense to prevent overtaking of G. Vakuf by HVO forces with objective to destroy and disarm HVO forces at the 3rd Corps responsibility zone.

Majority of forces to engage in holding the defense lines towards Chetniks and destruction of HVO forces, and portion of forces to engage in blockade and defense of liberated territory. Readiness and upon my command.

1. Operational Group "Lašva" with forces from 7th Muslim Brigade without one battalion, OpŠO Zenica, Independent commando battalion, 1/303rd/Mountain Brigade, 1/305th Mountain Brigade to hold defense lines towards Chetniks and to commence with energetic attack against HVO forces with objective: to destroy and disarm HVO forces at the areas of Busovača, Vitez and Kakanj, and then in joint action with Operational Group "East" and Operational Group "Igman" forces to destroy and disarm HVO forces at Kiseljak and to be ready for action towards Travnik, Vareš and Žepče.
2. Operational Group "Bosnia" to use majority of forces to hold the lines towards Chetnik's by the way of absent defense, and portion of forces to prevent intervention by HVO forces towards Zenica, Busovača, Vitez and Kiseljak. And upon reaching the conditions, in joint action with Operational Group "Lašva" to undertake the offensive action, destroy and disarm HVO forces in the area of Žepče and Zavidovići.
3. Operational Group "East" - majority of forces to organize the defense of liberated territory and to conduct the interruption of communications Kiseljak -Busovača and to prevent intervention by HVO forces from the direction of Kiseljak towards Busovača, and portion of forces to block HVO forces at Vareš, and upon reaching the conditions, in joint action with Operational Group "Lašva" 303rd Mountain Brigade and 314th Motorized Brigade to destroy and disarm HVO forces at Vareš municipality.
4. Operational Group "Bosanska Krajina" - portion of forces to hold defense lines towards Chetnik's and majority of forces to commence with energetic attack, destroy and disarm HVO Travnik units, to extend battle operations and conduct joining with Operational Group "West" forces and in joint attack with 308th Mountain Brigade to destroy HVO units at Travnik.

7th Muslim Brigade without one battalion is going to be subordinate to Operational Group "Lašva".

5. Operational Group "West" to organize defense of liberated territory and with portion of their forces in joint action with Operational Group "Bosanska Krajina" to commence with the attack, destroy and disarm HVO units at N. Travnik. And upon reaching the conditions to destroy HVO forces at Bugojno municipality and G. Vakuf.

Portion of forces to be in the area Ravno Rostovo prepared for strong holding the wider area of R. Rostovo.

6. 314th Motorized Brigade and 301st Mechanized Brigade to be in reserve at the current deployment area and to be ready for action according to my command.

5. 3rd Version

In case of conflicts of smaller intensity and sporadic conflicts at the same time with defensive actions, with smaller forces, coordinated on the level of Operational Group to commence with the attack on individual enemy's objects, fire points with objective to overtake objects in order to improve tactical position and capturing the weapons, materials and equipment and military equipment.

6. Logistics support to be conducted by relying on logistical base of the Corps as well as by relying on own forces and sources.

JV/AA

/round seal/

Commandant
Enver Hadžihasanović
/signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

CENTRAL BOSNIA OZ /Operations Zone/ COMMAND
VITEZ IZM /Forward Command Post/

NUMBER: 08-4-541/93

Date: 23 April 1993

Time: 2140 hours

BH Army incidents against the HVO before the conflict

4 January 1993, in Zenica, Dario Jurešić was killed by members of the BH Army.

- 24 January 1993, in Busovača, a member of the Military Police and a civilian were killed by members of the BH Army.
- 27 February 1993, at the Vjetrenica checkpoint, Zenica Municipality, goods were confiscated from a Caritas convoy.
- 28 February 1993 on the Visoko - Kakanj road, an HVO tanker with fuel was confiscated at a checkpoint.
- 7 March 1993, in Vitez, there was shooting from the Muslim-inhabited village of Ahmići, at the building where the AT /transport/ platoon of the HVO Military Police was housed.
- 9 March 1993, in Zenica, five members of the BH Army forced their way into the house of Milko Krišto in Višnjica, ill-treated, beat and robbed him.
- 16 March 1993, in Dolac, Travnik Municipality, mujahidin killed Zoran Matošević and Ivo Jurić, members of Travnik HVO.
- 17 March 1993, the houses of Milorad Poletan and Vlatko Tvrtković were broken into and looted.
- 17 March, in Kakanj, a young girl, Gordana Radoš, was wounded having been fired on from BH Army positions.
- 17 March 1993, in Kakanj, HOS /Croatian Armed Forces/ commander Ivo Vuletić was killed by a member of the BH Army.
- 17 March 1993, members of the BH Army threw a hand grenade into the premises of the Travnik Military Police.
- 16 March 1993, a member of the BH Army threw a hand grenade into the entrance to the Donja Večerska HVO Command.
- 22 March 1993, at all the checkpoints in Zenica, members of the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ /and/ BH Army removed registration plates from vehicles with HZHB insignia.
- 23 March, in Kačuni, Busovača municipality, members of the BH Army confiscated humanitarian aid for Brestovsko.
- 23 March 1993, in Kakanj, at the Bilješevo checkpoint, members of the BH Army took down two flags of the Croatian people, ripped them up and set them on fire.
- 24 March 1993, members of the BH Army arrested and detained two HVO military police officers.
- 24 March 1993, in Donja Večerska, Vitez municipality, members of the BH Army fired on Croatian houses with PZO /anti-aircraft weapons/.
- 24 March 1993, members of the BH Army threw a hand grenade into the entrance of the church of St Elijah, Busovača municipality.

- 26 March 1993, members of the BH Army fired firearms on the school in Čajdraš village, Zenica municipality, and caused major material damage.
- 28 March 1993, two HVO military police officers were killed by members of the BH Army.
- 5 April 1993, mujahidin in Travnik beat up two civilians of Croatian ethnicity.
- 6 April 1993, in Travnik, members of the BH Army killed Dario Meljančić, a member of the HVO.
- 8 April 1993, in Travnik, members of the BH Army took down and set on fire 10 flags of the Croatian people, and the same evening six buses and five trucks of members of the BH Army, mujahidin, the Green Legion, arrived in Travnik.
- 10 April 1993, in Vitez, Ivo Sučić and Slavko Marić, members of the Vitez Command, who were returning from church in civilian clothing, were ill-treated and beaten up.
- 10 April 1993, in Zladnica, on the Bugojno - Novi Travnik road, two bodies of members of the Kakanj HVO were found; investigation confirmed that they had been killed by members of the BH Army.
- 11 April 1993, in Travnik, infantry weapons fire was opened on all vehicles with HVO insignia.
- 12 April 1993, in Travnik, a round from a hand-held launcher was fired by members of the BH Army at the building where the HVO Military Police Brigade is housed.
- 13 April 1993, in Kruščica, Vitez municipality, an attempt to kill the commander of the Vitezovi PPN /Special Purpose Unit/ and his escort was made by members of the BH Army.
- 25 March 1993, in Zenica, Brother Stipan Radić, the parish priest of the Church of St Elijah in Zenica, was ill-treated.
- 17 January 1993, Srećko Veber, a member of the Military Police, was killed by a member of the BH Army.
- 13 April 1993, in Novi Travnik, three officers and a driver of the Stjepan Tomašević Brigade were kidnapped by members of the BH Army. They have not yet been located.
- 15 April 1993, in Zenica, the commander of Zenica HVO, Mr Živko Totić, was abducted, and four of his escort were killed.

Between 1 January 1993 and 15 April 1993, 290 members of HVO units were captured, ill-treated and released (in the municipalities of Central Bosnia).

- Since 1 January 1993 41 convoys, the property of the HVO, have been looted (most of the goods have not been returned).

NOVI TRAVNIK

- nine soldiers have been killed and nine seriously wounded (disabled) in clashes with the BH Army, and 41 HVO soldiers have been wounded.
- Three residential buildings, the municipal Staff command building, the communications centre and the equipment of the radio station have been completely destroyed and burned.

BUSOVAČA

- 745 facilities have been destroyed and burned.
 - a) burned 139,
 - b) damaged and not fit for habitation 56
 - c) damaged but habitable 271,
 - d) looted 314,
 - e) burned cowsheds 55.

KISELJAK

- a) 73 facilities burned
- b) 96 looted.

CURRENT CONFLICTS WITH THE BH ARMY (SINCE 16 April 1993)

- HVO soldiers killed 145,
- civilians killed 270

Please note that the data are not final since the conflicts are still continuing.

ZENICA municipality (Croatian villages); according to International Red Cross reports the following have been destroyed:

- a) completely, Kozarci, Dobriljeno and Janjac, Žalje villages,
- b) in other villages 47 family houses have been burned,
- c) 459 family houses have been looted.

NOTE: The data are not complete.

The course of events (aggression by Muslim forces against the HVO since 16 April 1993):

16th APRIL:

- At 0545 hours the Muslim forces attacked the town of Vitez itself using all available weapons. The following were hit: the SB OZ Command building, the municipality building, the post office, and many residential buildings. Croatian families are being taken away from Počulica, Krčevine, Nadioci, women and children are being ill-treated and taken away to an unknown destination.
- Muslim forces are advancing from Zenica, Kakanj and Visoko. Fierce fighting is raging in the town. At 0900 hours an UNPROFOR personnel carrier burst into the churchyard in Vitez and fired on Croatian houses, with the explanation that there were Muslims in the church who were shooting (P.S.: please find attached a statement by the parish priest of the church about the slander expressed). On the same day UNPROFOR refused to transport wounded HVO members.

17th APRIL:

- the attack on Vitez continues. Snipers nests located throughout the town. Five civilians killed by their fire.
- Early in the morning a fierce artillery and infantry attack was mounted on Busovača municipality. Six Muslim Brigades, from Zenica and Kakanj, participated in the attack. Sixty Croatian civilians were mutilated in Kuber and Putiš.
- Čajdraš and Podbrežje were attacked in Zenica. Croatian houses in Gornja Zenica were burned and destroyed. Croats are being captured and taken away. There are tanks on the streets of Zenica, and Croat prisoners are being thrown beneath them.
- A meeting was held in Nova Bila between representatives of the BH Army and the HVO. Muslim snipers wounded both members of the delegation to the negotiations, members of the SB OZ Command, when returning from the meeting.

18th APRIL:

- The Muslim forces in Vitez are surrounded. UNPROFOR is evacuating them in personnel carriers.
- At about 0530 hours in Zenica a general attack was launched on the headquarters of the "Jure Francetić" Brigade, and a massacre of the Croatian inhabitants.
- Zenica has been blockaded by the BH Army.
- At 1900 hours shelling of Kiseljak municipality from Visoko began. The church, post office, municipality building, were targeted. Seven civilians were killed as a result of the shelling. The situation in other municipalities has deteriorated, most of all in Travnik, Novi Travnik and Kakanj.

19th APRIL:

- The town centre of Vitez was shelled. The municipality building and the SB OZ Command building were hit again.
- The Muslim forces used a T-34 tank in the attack. Women and children were taken away from Grbavica.
- In Zenica, civilians and soldiers were shot in front of the church in Čajdraš.
- Four hundred and twenty-six HVO soldiers were arrested, imprisoned in the KPD /Penitentiary/ and the mine.
- Busovača was shelled throughout the day.

20th APRIL:

Vitez was shelled. Ten or so shells were fired. The hiking hut at Zabrđe was set on fire.

- A meeting of the military and civilian sections of the HVO and the Vitez municipality BH Army was held.
- There was gunfire in Travnik on the building of the Travnik Brigade command, and on facilities where HVO units were accommodated.
- Muslim forces broke into Croatian apartments, looted and evicted Croats.
- Two Croatian women were killed in their apartments.
- In Kakanj, Muslim forces wrecked that HVO Presidency building, one member of the HVO was killed
- At 1600 hours, in Zenica, a meeting was held between Mr Milivoj Petković and Sefer Halilović.
- During the negotiations Muslim forces shelled the Command and the centre of Vitez, and in Zenica itself they sounded the general alert, without any reason.

21st APRIL

- At 1030 hours Muslim forces attacked all the defence lines in Busovača.
- The town centre was shelled.
- Vitez and Kiseljak were shelled.
- Two ethnically Croatian surgeons were arrested in Travnik.
- In the War Hospital in Bila 110 wounded were admitted.

22nd APRIL:

- At 1000 hours the coordination team commenced work.
- The attacks on Kiseljak and Busovača continued. Snipers were most active.

23rd APRIL:

- In Orahovo village, Kiseljak municipality, the bodies of Kata and Ivo Bošnjak were discovered with their throats cut.
- Powerful infantry attacks in Kiseljak and Vitez.
- In Fojnica, more precisely in Jesenik, Muslim forces attacked ZVO /as printed/ units.
- In Travnik Frano Piliškić was killed by a sniper shot. He was hit by a dum-dum bullet.
- Thirteen shells were fired on Vitez.
- At about 1810 hours, in Kiseljak, 152 mm howitzers started shelling from Visoko.

NOTE: /Neither/ the mixed commission nor members of the HVO have access to the Croat-inhabited villages in Zenica municipality: these data are not yet final.

In other municipalities, attacks by Muslim forces are still in progress, so we have no collective information.

- In Zenica there are 506 male Croats in the KPD, who are ill-treated, beaten. Slavko Miletić, the first President of the HDZ for Zenica, died today from such a beating.
- So far 113 Croats have been killed in Zenica (masacred).

MT/SV

Typed in three copies.

To:

- Chief of the HVO GS /Main Staff/ Mostar
- HZHB President
- Defence Department, IPD

OFFICE FOR INFORMATION
HVO OZ
/signature/

CONCLUSIONS OF THE ČITLUK MEETING

(Press release from the joint meeting of all Croatian bodies in BiH held in Čitluk on 29 April 1993)

At the joint session of the highest political bodies of the Croatian people in BiH/Bosnia and Herzegovina/ (BH HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ Presidency, HZ H-B Presidency, members of the HZ H-B HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and representatives of the Croatian people in the R BiH Presidency and Government) held in Čitluk on 29 April 1993, the joint statement made by Mr Mate Boban and Mr Alija Izetbegović on 25 April 1993 and the current political and military climate were examined. The session was presided over by Mr Mate Boban, the president of the BH HDZ and the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia.

The following announcements have been made to the public concerning the topics examined.

1. The joint statement of 25 April 1993 and the principle set out therein are consistent with the policy followed to date by the BH HDZ and the HZ H-B and with the interests of the Croatian people.

Support was expressed for all the action taken by the Croatian delegation led by Mr Boban during the peace negotiations so far conducted on the future structure of the R BiH, while the senior officials present committed to implementing the joint statement and the core document, the Vance-Owen plan, in a consistent manner on a municipal level and beyond.

2. The will was expressed to see the coordination body established pursuant to the above statement meet as soon as possible. The Croatian representatives on the body must put to the Muslims any outstanding relations-linked issues that need discussing and agreeing.
3. Following reports from the areas under attack of Konjic, Jablanica, Zenica, Travnik, Busovača and Vitez, extreme concern has been expressed at the continued aggression of Muslim units upon the Croatian population. Such conduct conflicts with the statement that was signed and the peace plan agreed upon.

A message is being sent to the Muslim people, to its leadership, and in particular, to Muslim army units to get them to cease the aggression at once. If they fail to do so, all available measures will be taken to suppress the Muslim attacks.

In this regard, all defence structures must provide total protection to the Croatian people and the regions they live in, which they have been effective in doing so far.

Much praise is to be accorded to the HVO's military units for the achievements they have marked up so far in defending and liberating parts of the R BiH.

4. In accordance with point 5 of the Statement, which sets out that both parties are responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, a commission has been set up to establish the facts without delay and independently of the agreed international commission.

Deeply concerned by the reports of murder and crimes in Central Bosnia and Northern Herzegovina committed by both sides, the commission that is appointed will resolutely hunt down the perpetrators from our side who will be uncompromisingly brought to account.

Citing reasons of vengeance for committing crimes is unacceptable. All members of HVO units are bound to act humanely towards civilians. In this regard, accepting orders to carry out such acts will not afford any defence in court.

5. The world's media must be provided with proven instances of violations of international humanitarian law committed by Muslim units. We are asking UNPROFOR, the International Red Cross and other international organisations to provide international and local journalists with unfettered access to Croatian settlements in the Konjic, Zenica, Busovača, Vitez and other areas immediately.
6. The active presence of UN forces is being sought in areas which it is already known might be targeted in further Muslim attacks.

UN forces are also being asked to supervise effectively the cease-fire and truce at those locations where fighting is currently ongoing (Kiseljak, Busovača, Vitez, Konjic and Jablanica).

7. Decisions made by the R BiH Presidency and Government without the involvement of the elected Croatian representatives are deemed illegal.

Similarly, R BiH diplomatic and consular representatives around the world have not been recognised because they were not appointed in conjunction with the Croatian representatives and because they are working to undermine Croatian interests.

The competent institution in the countries where these delegations are working will be so informed.

Appointments of senior Croatian officials to the republic's governmental bodies without the approval of the BH HDZ Presidency are considered invalid.

8. It is unlawful to present and legally recognise Mr Alija Izetbegović as President of the BH Presidency. The Croatian people only consider Mr Izetbegović the official representative of the BH Muslims.

Likewise, the BH Army can only be legally recognised as the armed force of the Muslim people.

9. The Muslims' civilian and military representatives are being urged to behave correctly and honourably towards Croatian people in keeping with international humanitarian law. This implies that we will behave likewise towards the Muslims.

On this point, the Muslims remember that, in the area defended by the HVO against the Serbian aggressor, more than 150,000 Muslim refugees and expellees from occupied areas of BiH have been taken in to date, that the lives and property of over 180,000 locals have been protected and transit provided for all of the Muslim refugees to the Republic of Croatia and other western countries.

10. All senior Croatian officials of the R BiH must carry out their assignments selflessly and unquestioningly. All of the Croatian people are urged to maintain the unity that has been achieved.

We call upon Croats throughout the world and upon political parties and associations to obtain first-hand information about the real and historic struggle for freedom that the Croatian people are fighting in BiH before voicing criticism, passing judgment and making comment.

Every other school of thought is inconsistent with the reality of the situation faced by the Croatian people.

11. It has been suggested to the media that they report events in BiH in an objective, accurate, timely and professional manner and journalists are being urged not to incite a media war.

Čitluk, 29 April 1993

/coat of arms/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Mr Alija Izetbegović
SARAJEVO

10 May 1993

My positive reply to your memorandum of 10 May 1993 in which you proposed the start of the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan to the extent to which it is possible at the moment is an obligation stemming from the Joint Statement signed on 25 April 1993. The presidents of all HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ municipal boards in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been authorised to start negotiations with legitimate representatives of your people on the formation of provisional municipal government on the basis of proportionality and in accordance with the system of provincial government.

Unfortunately, the feedback information is negative, because your people are not accepting it. I personally believe that you must grant the same powers to all legitimate politicians from your people because they mostly cite lack of authority when denying the offered agreements.

I also propose that you immediately set a date for a meeting of the Coordinating Body founded on the basis of the Joint Statement and, in view of the limitations regarding your travel options, we propose that it be held either in Split or Zagreb. There are many problems with regard to the establishment of joint government and the Body has to give instructions about it to those who are to implement it. In this connection, we have prepared a list of the most urgent issues that have to be discussed and decided on.

I avail myself of this opportunity to suggest to you once again to be sincere in your attitude to the Statement and I can assure you that the Croatian side is completely so.

Yours sincerely,

TO:

PRESIDENT of

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

Messrs OWEN
STOLTENBERG

/a signature/

Mate BOBAN

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
 The Travnik Brigade

/coat-of-arms/

No. 01-360/93

Date: 10 May 1993

PRO MEMORIA

STATE, CIRCUMSTANCES AND RELATIONS BETWEEN HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ AND A BiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ AND THE MUSLIM AND CROATIAN PEOPLES IN THE ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HVO "TRAVNIČKA" BRIGADE

With a good intention to make your mission easier, and in order not to burden our working contacts every time with deeper relation, we decided to send you this pro memoria containing our basic views of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. This will, we hope, enable our more efficient cooperation and prevent misunderstandings around the key issues from our domain.

I – WHY THERE WERE NO GREATER CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE HVO AND A BIH IN TRAVNIK

HVO as a whole, and especially the "Travnička" Brigade, perseveringly avoided all possible motives, incident situations, current problems and misunderstandings which could lead to a smaller or greater conflict.

EXAMPLES:

- a) On 20 October 1992, the FIRST COMMANDER OF HVO Mr IVICA STOJAK was perfidiously killed while on a peace mission to prevent conflicts in Novi Travnik. On that occasion, another member of the HVO Headquarters was also wounded. The perpetrators and formation to which they belong are reliably known (7th Muslim Brigade of mujahedin-fundamentalist provenance), but it will be close to seven months in which the A BiH and Muslim institutions never even tried to bring the killers to justice. Neither was there even a protocol condolence expressed from anyone of that side. It is very interesting that this murder was committed 10 days before the fall of Jajce and it is certain that it had an impact on the mutual trust and steadfastness of the defence from the common aggressor also on the Travnik battlefield.

At that time, HVO did everything in its power to avoid any military or revenging actions toward the A BiH and the Muslim side as a whole. And it this it succeeded.

To make the story short, no one paid any price for the murder of the Commander of the HVO.

- b) Since that day, HVO is practically in continuous defensive and giving in to the more and more aggressive drives, especially of the 7th Muslim and mujahedin formations. Not less threatening are the private police forces of criminal provenance ("Mečet's babies", Nane's group) as well as the official civilian police of the Muslim side, full of repeatedly convicted criminals. A series of dynamite attacks on the private property of Croats (shops, handicraft stores, coffee shops and the like), a series of break-ins, theft of vehicles and property of the HVO and the Croats – pushed HVO and civilian Croats from the town;
- c) Continuous provocations by setting up the so-called "flying" control points on both eastern exits from the town (Šarena mosque and Malta), body-searching, physical harassment of soldiers, including the members of the Headquarters, and frequent videotaping (with VHS cameras) of all Croats who enter or leave the town;

- d) By yielding to these pressures day in and day out, all with the aim of avoiding the conflicts and maintaining a common defence towards the Chetniks – HVO found itself in a completely subordinate role, practically pushed into a small number of their buildings in the town. Civilian and Military police, and especially the units of the Brigade practically couldn't appear on the street and other areas of the town. At the same time, the town, especially after the fall of Jajce, was literally packed with the soldiers of A BiH.
- e) After the massacre of the escort, and arrest of Mr Totić (commander of the HVO Brigade in Zenica) and the ensuing offensive on HVO and Croatian villages of Zenica – the terror in Travnik grew in proportion.

Before the great Christian festivity of EASTER HVO places national flags of Croats of BiH on the city streets, along with the flags of BiH (lilies). Before Easter there was an important Islamic festivity of Ramazan, which ends with a Bajram. The whole month the town was full of Islamic religious flags, both in the streets and on civilian buildings – i.e. outside of the places of prayer where they belong.

No one of the Croats DIDN'T EVEN TOUCH these flags! However, 13 Croatian national flags were set aflame immediately after they were put up. To this very day, in spite of the promise of the Muslim side and Mr Thebault they were not returned where they stood. It was and remains a lasting offence and humiliation both of the HVO and Croatian population.

- f) After the burning of flags we witness continuous attacks (with infantry weapons and hand rocket launchers) on the objects of the Military police (Hotel, the Music school), on the HVO Special forces (JESUIT HIGH SCHOOL) and also the Headquarters of the Brigade (buildings along the transit road). These attacks were carried out from the premises of one of Travnik's hospitals. At the same time, harassment of members of HVO and civilian Croats grew in number. Immediately after Easter, in the middle of the town four members of the Brigade Headquarters were arrested and severely beaten.

2. Following all of the above, along with reflections of bloody clashes on the Zenica area, Busovača and especially Vitez, and with immediate threats of an overall attack on the HVO units in the town and information on the intentions to arrest the entire Brigade Headquarters – THE COMMAND TOOK THE DECISION (19 April 1993) ON URGENT RELOCATION OF ALL UNITS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POLICE AND A GREATER PART OF THE HEADQUARTERS FROM THE TOWN TO A SAFER PLACE.

We see this decision as the key for avoidance of the attacks on HVO and conflict between HVO and A BiH in Travnik. By moving to another place we disabled any possible alibi (excuse) of aggressive Muslim extremists to cause a conflict. This factor is not sufficiently appreciated by international factors. But this is, at the same time, another step in a line of yielding to the armed units of the Muslim side.

Avoiding the conflict, however, had its price: the arrest and detention of 30 respected Croats, civilians and members of the Brigade Headquarters, break-in in around 50 Croatian apartments in the town (their owners were expelled, apartments occupied, property stolen), and the killing of a wife of a member of the Brigade Headquarters (because they thought that he was in the apartment). At the same time, all the objects of belonging to HVO were taken. The analysis of their destruction, theft of equipment and demolishing still needs to be made. Here, for the sake of truth, we ought to stress a correct conduct of A BiH in Travnik, but all the dirty stuff and extremist actions were done by units which, at first sight, were not under the control of the above Army Command, but without their silent consent or "hint" this crimes could not have been committed in continuity.

Not even today (second decade of May), with the exception of joint patrols and check points, many of the common conclusions of the Commands have not been realized: the return of Croatian apartments, return of stolen goods and property belonging to Croats, return of good and arms confiscated or seized from the "Travnička" Brigade. Finally, but not the least, in the town the presence or movement of soldiers with HVO markings is not desirable nor safe, and especially the armed units of the HVO. The town is filled with units (with or without weapons) of A BiH, as well as the 7th Muslim and mujahedin formations.

This is happening to HVO in the town and municipality where it was organized militarily 15 months ago, when there wasn't a trace of A BiH, when HVO practically single-handed defended these territories from

the Chetnik aggression., when it initiated, pleaded, convinced, begged the Muslim side to organize itself, when it provided weapons and persuaded the Muslims to take the weapons, etc. We came to the point that HVO on its own territory, in its town, is treated as unwanted foreigners.

FINALLY, be it as it may, THE RELOCATION OF HVO, THE AGREEMENTS OF BOTH COMMANDS (and especially the practical behaviour of the HVO) ENABLED A CONTACT OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AND AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THERE IS NO SHOOTING AND IN WHICH THE FIRST STEPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VANCE-OWEN AGREEMENT CAN BE MADE IN PEACE.

II – CIRCUMSTANCES AND KEY REASONS WHICH CAN LEAD TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN HVO AND A BiH IN TRAVNIK

1. a) In spite of the signed V-O /Vance-Owen/ agreement (which is, in effect, a strategic rapprochement of the HVO and the Muslim side) in practice the Muslim side very openly advocates the unitary option – from the level of BiH as a state to the municipality level.
Therefore, two contradicting policies still exist in practice. The Croatian side expects the implementation of the V-O plan /illegible/ as soon as possible, while the Muslim side wishes to establish the so-called “legal” government and wants it to last as long as possible. Looking as a whole, the V-O plan is not perceived by the Muslim population and its leadership as a serious UN document which implies responsibility and obligations.
- b) in so far, therefore, as the politics of the two nations – allies in the struggle against the aggressor – are opposite (one accepts the V-O plan de jure and de facto, and the other only de jure) their military units, as the carriers of these policies, are logically pitted against each other. This confrontation goes to the point of serious and bloody clashes WITHOUT EXCEPTION IN THE 8th and 10th PROVINCE WHICH HAVE A DISTINCT CROATIAN MAJORITY ACCORDING TO THE CENSUS FROM 1991.
- c) Who initiates conflicts and undertakes aggressive military actions?

From the first indications of the V-O plan the Croats in BiH accepted it, and were the first to sign these documents. This means that they see in the V-O plan the conditions for the realization of their national interests within BiH as a state. Therefore the HVO (civilian and military structure) has no reason (political, military or other) (1) to create problems, (2) to express political or military unrest, (3) to plan or begin military aggressive actions on a smaller or larger scale toward the Muslim side, BECAUSE IT REALIZED EVERYTHING FOR WHICH IT FOUGHT IN THE MILITARY, BUT ABOVE ALL IN THE POLITICAL SENSE.

2. a) With the ethnic cleansing of Muslim and Croatian territories under the Chetnik occupation in Central Bosnia, and especially in Travnik – the demographic structure of the population is seriously disrupted at the expense of the Croats.
As a rule the expelled Croats found accommodation in parts of BiH closer to Croatia, or in Croatia itself, and a large part of exiled Muslims split into two. Some went into Croatia, and other remained in these territories. There are many indications (statements of refugees, for instance) that their SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ leaders persuaded them to stay in this area as a “promised land”. As the overall ceasefire, an overall peace is not at hand and is not a realistic prospect – a mass of Muslim refugees are staying here. Even if the aggression would end soon and the peace established – their return to their land is a matter of years (the exiled Cambodians started to return to their homes after 15 years).
Now, as in the days to come, maybe even years, Muslim families will need houses, a piece of land, a job, school, part of this air and – all in all a living space. If this house, this piece of land, this job in the factory or elsewhere, this living space is in the possession of a Croat – misunderstandings are unavoidable, and conflicts inevitable. Long-lasting and bloody.

WHEN THE REFUGEES START TO CONQUER THE SPACE TO WHICH THEY WERE EXILED THEN WE ARE NOT SPEAKING ABOUT REFUGEES ANY MORE, BUT ABOUT USURPERS AND AGRESSORS.

Therefore the implementation of the V-O plan (as soon as possible in the entire BiH) which foresees the return of the refugees and displaced persons into their homes, represents the first and most essential condition to stop the current and avoid future conflicts between the Muslims and Croats in Central Bosnia, and especially in Travnik.

- b) Together with Muslim refugees and displaced persons, a whole array of Muslim armed formations descended into Travnik. They represent various orientation – from sincere patriots to frustrated fundamentalists who, according to the “Vietnamese syndrome” from the martyrs under the Serbs in Bosanska Krajina and elsewhere become the torturers of Croats in Central Bosnia and elsewhere. We ought to stress that – on the one hand – not a single formation of the HVO from occupied territories remained in Travnik, but, without arms and in the status of real refugees ended up in border areas with Croatia, or in Croatia itself, and on the other, a large number of Muslim military formations in their retreat remained in Travnik. Although it is forbidden by the international conventions on refugees, a large number of civilians – Muslims capable of carrying weapons was armed here (as a rule with the arms of the HVO) and organized into the units of the Muslim army. Therefore, in Travnik we have four Muslim Brigades, which call themselves the A BiH: 7th Muslim Brigade, 306th Mountain Brigade, 17th Krajina Brigade and 312th Motorized Brigade. Only parts of the 306th Brigade and this last one was organized in Travnik, along with a battalion of Travnik residents in the 7th Muslim Brigade. Three quarters of this huge mass of soldiers of A BiH are not from Travnik. It is logical that in the situation where we have one, formation-wise incomplete HVO brigade – the “Travnička” (the forming of the “Frankopan” brigade is under way and it consists practically of the manpower from the “Travnička”) this mass of Muslim units stationed mostly inside the town, creates an extraordinary imbalance and a constant psychological, political and factual military pressure on the Croatian population and the HVO. This concentration in Travnik and Central Bosnia, and activities which accompany it, is going on while the Muslim towns and territories are falling one after another, as for instance in Eastern Bosnia.

It is urgent and imperative: the relocation of all non-Travnik formations of the Muslim army from Travnik. (either into the provinces with Muslim majority or to the front facing the Chetniks with the aim of liberation of their domicile territories – this is their choice). It is particularly important to relocate from Travnik the units of the 7th Muslim brigade, which, with its pro-Iranian fundamentalist option and practice represents a lasting threat for HVO, the Croats, as well as the implementation of the V-O plan. Of course, all the foreign nationals (mujahedin) must leave the area of Travnik and entire BiH urgently. They came from Arab and other Islamic countries and sparked the flame of a culture and civilization irreconcilable with European traditions and concepts.

III – THE CAUSES OF LOWER RANK WHICH CAN LEAD TO CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE HVO AND A BiH

Already in Chapter II we outlined possible key causes.

1. Some respected members or heads of missions of various world organizations here believe that the key causes are checkpoints, criminal groups, etc. For instance, the head of ECMM Mr Thebault sees the key cause of the situation in Central Bosnia in one checkpoint (on the crossroads Travnik – Novi Travnik – Vitez, held by HVO). With all due respect for the reputation which Mr Thebault enjoys in the world and here, and taking into account his own bad experience on this checkpoint – it is simply not realistic to proclaim one checkpoint the key cause of misunderstandings and possible conflicts between the Muslims and Croats. At any rate, even if it were so (and it isn't) a more dangerous checkpoint for the people (soldiers and civilians) and the goods is the one on Rostovo (the road Novi Travnik – Bugojno) which is held by one of the extremists Muslim units. On this stretch of the road dozens of people and thousands of tons of goods and equipment vanished so far. The most recent: a Croatian officer, colonel Andrić, the first in rank Croatian officer in the joint Headquarters of HVO and A BiH was recently harassed and

robbed there, but no one mentions it!!! Therefore, and in spite of everything, the checkpoints are only a consequence of deeper reasons. They are not reasons in themselves, especially not the key ones.

2. Threatening (but not crucial) possible cause of conflicts are the criminal gangs who, under the guise of A BiH or HVO, have been committing for several months extortions, robberies, even killings. HVO is not immune from such individuals and groups. This phenomenon is characteristic of almost any war situation.

When we speak of the HVO “Travnička” Brigade, every well-intentioned observer will see that the Brigade has begun to control such groups, or discourage them. The brigades will bring order into their ranks for sure. Looking into this follow-up of the war circumstances generally and the conflict between A BiH and HVO in particular, the “Travnička” Brigade is prepared to go public and openly face the A BiH on the issue of preventing crime and banditry in the town and municipality of Travnik.

IV – THE ROLE OF WORLD ORGANIZATIONS, MISSIONS, MILITARY UNITS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONFLICT BETWEEN A BiH AND HVO

1. Since the first, last year’s conflicts between A BiH and HVO in parts of Herzegovina and Central Bosnia, to the most recent ones – various missions (ECMM, UNPROFOR, UNMO and other) have been in charge of joint committees of HVO and A BiH, one of the tasks being the determination of the causes or causative agents of the bloody clashes.

It will be almost a year since the first lighter or more severe incidents and clashes have occurred, and these committees in charge of the ECMM and others have not produced a single document which, in a reasoned and explicit manner, determines the causes or perpetrators of the conflicts between the two allies facing the Chetniks.

It is logical that in such a situation every side forces its own truth, while the population and the army remain confined to their sources of information (press, radio and TV).

It is logical that in such a situation HVO is a dramatic loser, because, by contrast to two other nations and armies, it doesn’t have its own newspapers, its own radio or TV station – not in the governmental sense.

It is logical that the lack of impartial information caused mistrust, even hatred, greater than that which the armed conflicts themselves can create.

THE CONTINUATION OF THIS STATE IS UNBEARABLE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT HVO IS READY TO AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS AND ITS PUBLICATION WITH FULL AWARENESS THAT FOR EVERY CONFLICT (on the basis of arguments) IT CAN BE PUBLICLY NAMED AS THE CULPRIT.

In any case we are sure of it when the HVO and the “Travnička” Brigade is in question.

We are prepared to a comparative analysis of all incidents - from sporadic armed clashes, over criminal acts to the acts of ethnic cleansing in the Travnik Municipality.

2. The foreign media often disregard the complexity of the relations, causes and consequences, and very often inform their public in a nebulous and partial way about the conflicts between the Croats and Muslims. We know that on this basis the public and world opinion is formed. But, we are not in the position to influence that.

HOWEVER – IT SHOULDN’T HAPPEN THAT FOREIGN MEDIA CREWS, REPRESENTING BIG MEDIA COMPANIES GO, IN THE ACCOMPANIMENT OF UNPROFOR ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY INTO MUSLIM AREAS DESTROYED BY WAR, WHILE THE CROATIAN VICTIMS ARE TREATED IN A “BY-THE-WAY” FASHION. LET UNPROFOR ENABLE A ROUNDED AND BALANCED INSIGHT, AS IT IS ALREADY THE MEDIATOR IN MEDIA AFFAIRS.

3. Or, it shouldn’t happen that the respected commander (Lt. C. STEWART) of one excellent unit (The Cheshire Regiment) utters directly into the camera of a world-renown TV company the words: “Bloody HVO”. No one has ever said such words for the two-year old Serbian criminal aggression on Croatia and BiH. Especially not on camera.

These words: “Bloody HVO” toured the world in a split second and sat in the ears of millions throughout Europe and America and logically, with the authority of a respectable British officer, caused immeasurable damage not only to the HVO, but the entire Croatian people.

This is how opinion is created in the world. In the Muslim population in particular, we already have a firm conviction that:

- HVO has, without exception, provoked or openly attacked Muslim armed forces and the area under their control;
- HVO has, without exception, committed criminal acts and acts of banditry – robberies, killings, burning of houses, all the way to massacre and genocide over the Muslim people.

AND THIS SIMPLY ISN'T TRUE AND CANNOT BE TRUE!!!

In the HVO “Travnička” Brigade we can understand the emotional charge of the respected commander Stewart, after what he had seen in Ahmići (Vitez). In the “Travnička” Brigade, and we are sure in the entire HVO no one will justify crimes committed by the Croatian side, but we cannot accept that an officer of such authority utters such a curse and a final judgement of the entire HVO and the Croatian people as well. At the same time, this officer remained silent on the massacre, arson and ethnic cleansing of Zenica and Croatian villages around Zenica (which happened before Ahmići); the fate of the majority of two Zenica Brigades of the HVO, left leaderless (a terrorist act over commander Totić), and the Brigades suddenly attacked with many killed, or taken prisoner at best (which happened before Ahmići); massacre and arson in other parts of Vitez (which happened before or at the time of the Ahmići incident); massacre and ethnic cleansing in the Croatian villages of the Travnik Municipality, e.g. Miletići on the part of the mujahedin (which happened before or at the time of the Ahmići incident), etc, etc.

We don't know whether Lt. C. STEWART (aware of the consequences of his public appearance in front of the world) said in the face of this world the same, or even a much milder curse which would describe the crimes of Muslim formations. And we know, and he also knows, he has had arguments and possibilities to know. An innumerable number of arguments and opportunities – unfortunately. This should have been done for the sake of objectivity, for the sake of truth and finally, for the sake of good manners and fair relations. Otherwise, HVO and the Croats view this statement and some other practical behaviour as favouritism without comparison. It doesn't have to be that, but people latch on to the indications, and they exist.

V – RELATIONS: THE HVO “TRAVNIČKA” BRIGADE – INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

1. It is our mistake that we didn't approach more forcefully our relations with UNPROFOR and other international missions. We thought it impertinent to call and burden them with every individual opportunity or incident. We didn't want to disturb the work and plans of the UNPROFOR Commanders, the ECMM and others – with some of our demands. By letting all these respected organizations know that we are at their disposal 24 hours we were convinced in their impartial treatment of HVO and A BiH in every time and space.

Oftentimes this was not so, and we ourselves are mainly to blame. We waited for our turn to speak and for good opportunities, where we should have been more direct and with more initiative in our complaints, comments, proposals. Also in other ways we should have cultivated our relations.

2. It often happened that e.g. UNPROFOR holds meetings and analyzes agenda of joint meetings only with the A BiH, in order for our Headquarters to learn about this from the A BiH, which we do not see as correct. This created anger in the Brigade and people say that HVO is looked upon as an “unofficial” partner. Alongside with that, there were cases that the information on the time and place of a meeting we get half an hour before – where there is no time to prepare, or some planned Brigade job had to be pushed aside, or it happens, as it happened the last time (meeting in the Department Store) that the Commander is not present, because he also has his set plans, obligations, terms to keep.
3. We suggest: to propose important meetings at least 24 hours ahead, and to define the time and the agenda of the talks directly with the Brigade commander, or his liaison officer, or jointly with the gentleman from the A BiH.

We also suggest: every visit of protocol nature announce at least a couple of hours earlier, so that the delegation can be received by the commander, deputy commander or their liaison officer, where other planned duties can be set aside.

4. It is nice and certainly makes an impression to have friends in the missions of the UN, EC or in the UNPROFOR, people who become emotionally attached to this region or people or express sympathies for one or the other political option. But, if this is one-sided, then objectivity is lost on the part of these world missions in very delicate relations in BiH, especially now in Central Bosnia, in the relations between the Muslims and the Croats.

We consider it unguardedly to organize or go to receptions and the like in private arrangements and in private premises. We also consider it reckless to visit on a daily basis only one (any one) party in conflict. This is how the criteria of objectivity are easily lost. And the people here (of any nationality) are hypersensitive. They see and feel everything, especially what they consider (rightly or not) a partiality at the expense of their people, their civilian or military organization.

5. We suggest: try to refresh your esteemed ladies and gentlemen with the best English language interpreters and translators that we have, and, what is not irrelevant, try to balance their national composition, in accordance with the situation here.

SUMMARY OF THE PRO MEMORIA

1. In Travnik:

- Conflicts between the A BiH and HVO avoided due to permanent giving in on the part of the HVO and passing over severe incidents and attacks on the HVO
- The key reason why the latest conflict was avoided is the relocation of the units and Headquarters of the HVO Brigade from Travnik.

2. Key reasons for possible conflicts:

- The rejection of the V-O plan by the Muslim side in practice,
- An ethnic and demographic imbalance at the expense of Croats and fight of the refugees for life and space here. The return of the refugees in their homes is indispensable.
- Concentration of the Muslim armed forces in Travnik (four brigades).

Three quarters of them are not from Travnik, and many of the refugees are organized into military formations, which is contrary to international rules. The relocation of non-Travnik military formations is indispensable, especially the 7th Muslim Brigade, and the removal of foreign nationals (mujahedin) from BiH.

3. Urgent:

- Joint commissions under the supervision of the EC and other factors should inform their domestic and international audience (and readership) in a reasoned and holistic way on the causes and agents of all conflicts between the A BiH and the HVO so far.

4. If:

UNPROFOR enables the journalists and TV crews work in the field, let this be done in a balanced way on every area where conflict exists, in order to achieve an objective rendering of both sides in the conflict.

5. We suggest: The dignitaries of world missions shouldn't proclaim their personal, and especially not emotional and partial judgements and condemnations of the participants in conflict.

6. The HVO "Travnička" Brigade:

Is ready for an objective analysis of the second line of factors which can lead to conflicts (checkpoints, criminals, bandits) and making the findings of such analysis public

7. We suggest:

- Joint meetings of HVO and A BiH Travnik with international missions should be planned with both sides in parallel and announced at least 24 hours in advance.
- Protocol visits and field tours should be announced at least 2 - 3 hours in advance.
- Avoid private arrangements and forcing of one side in the contacts.
- To refresh the team of interpreters and translators with the best English speaking professionals, and balance their national composition in accordance with the situation here.

With my respects and best wishes

IS/ML

SENT TO:

1. UNPROFOR, Commander Alistair Duncan
2. ECMM, Mr Thebault
3. UNMO
4. OZ /Operational Zone/ HVO Central Bosnia, col. Tihomir Blaškić
5. HZ HB, vice-president Dario Kordić
6. a/a

C O M M A N D E R

Jozo Leutar

/signed/

/round stamp: illegible/

Saturday 15 May 1993

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Pursuant to Articles 201, paragraph 1, item 29 and 207, paragraph 1, item 22 and paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Revised Text ("Official Gazette of the RBiH", number 5/93) and Articles 113 and 157 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at a joint session held on 11 May 1993 in Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać, adopting the Decision Accepting the Documents of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Assembly issued the following

CONCLUSIONS

ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOCUMENTS OF THE VANCE-OWEN PEACE PLAN FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

I

The Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, expressing its strong support for and firmly abiding by the principles of peace, accepted with its Decision the documents of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus respecting the will of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the peaceful coexistence of all its citizens and peoples in a democratic, independent and sovereign Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, expressed at the republican referendum of 29 February and 1 March 1992. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is determined to implement the documents of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina consistently, efficiently and within the set time limits.

The Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the highest organ of government in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, emphasizes that the primary task of government organs and the people of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is to stop the aggression on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, preserve its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and unity, and stop the suffering of its people and destruction of material goods, and that the organs and bodies of the United Nations and broad international community have an obligation to protect the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an internationally recognised state and member of the United Nations, against aggression.

II

1. The Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is asking that organs of the United Nations and broad international community start implementing all the documents of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately and efficiently, the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular.

The Assembly particularly requests that the United Nations thoroughly and consistently implement all the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council to prevent the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Assembly stresses that the failure to implement the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council so far has largely contributed to the continuation of the aggression accompanied by the gravest crimes and genocide. The indecisive and inefficient reaction of the international community has had disastrous consequences in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - more than 200,000 of its people have been killed or have disappeared, even more have been wounded and more than two million are displaced persons or refugees.

2. The Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina urges the United Nations and broad international community to implement the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina decisively and efficiently and use all available means, including military intervention and lifting the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, to stop the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

III

The Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina entrusts the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and other state organs in the Republic, in accordance with their rights and obligations, with taking immediate action and adopting necessary measures to implement the documents of the Vance-Owen Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Assembly points out that in the transitional period, until a new Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is adopted and the next democratic parliamentary elections, the continuity of the legal organs of government and the current level of parliamentary and democratic life in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be fully respected, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the documents of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The state organs in charge shall submit regular reports to the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on programmes, initiatives by deputies and activities to implement these documents and conclusions of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from this session.

IV

These conclusions shall be published in the "Official Gazette of the RBiH" and the media, and shall be sent to the United Nations Security Council and the European Parliament.

S number 169

11 May 1993

Sarajevo

President of the Assembly of the R BiH, Miro Lazović

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

CENTRAL BOSNIA OZ /Operations Zone/ COMMAND
 VITEZ IZM /Forward Command Post/
 3rd OPERATIONS ZONE INFORMATION OFFICE

NUMBER: 08-5-283 / 93

/handwritten: STOJIC 79/

Date: 12 May 1993

Time: 1120 hours

- Mostar Defence Department (Mr Veso VEGAR)
- All SB /Central Bosnia/ OZ
Assistant Commanders for IPD
/Information and Propaganda/
- All SB OZ press services
- All HZ HB /Croatian Community of
Herzeg Bosnia/ media
- BH RTV /Radio and Television/
- Večernje Novine /newspaper/
- ZETEL /Zenica Television/
- Radio Zenica -UNHCR
- HINA/HTV /Croatian news agency-
Croatian television/

PRESS RELEASE

During the evening Muslim forces staged provocations at almost all defence lines.

In Vitez, Muslim forces opened mortar fire.

At about 2000 hours they fired 92 mm mortars in the Krčevine and Grabak sectors, with a few shells being fired.

At 2300 hours Muslim forces attempted an infantry breach from the Grbavica sector, which was repelled.

Mirko Petraš was wounded by infantry weapon fire and provocations in the Zabilje sector, and fire was opened from Klajci, Travnik municipality, and two Croatian houses were burned last night.

In Kiseljak, MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ attempted two infantry attacks, one in the Badnja sector and another in the Kazagići sector. HVO units successfully repelled both attacks. One of our soldiers was killed and one was wounded.

In Travnik municipality, members of the Muslim forces fired a few shots at PZO /anti-aircraft protection/ positions and members of the Travnik Brigade. In Guča Gora they staged provocations from the Umovi sector against Čukle using infantry weapons. Fortunately, there were no consequences.

In Busovača there was Browning /anti-aircraft cannon/ fire on Strane from Merdani village, and infantry fire was opened along the entire defence line.

There were no major combat activities at the defence lines facing the Serbian Army. Sporadic firing was noted in the zone of responsibility of the 111th xp Brigade, but there was no combat activity at the Turbe battlefield near Travnik.

The falsehoods and campaign against the Croats and the HVO on the part of the Muslim army and Muslim representatives continue.

While Mr Alija Izetbegović calls upon the Croats and Mr Mate Boban to implement the Vance-Owen plan as soon as possible, the same one that the representatives of the Croats were the first to sign, showing the world and the Muslims that they were in favour of a peaceful resolution and always ready for an agreement, all the same their soldiers stage provocations and violate the agreement in almost all the municipalities in SB/Central Bosnia/ and the HZ HB.

During the war, Muslim politics and its representatives have shown their hypocrisy, their double game, into which they have now drawn the Muslim people, bringing them suffering, peril, death.

And while the towns of Eastern Bosnia are lost one by one, while Žepa, Goražde, Srebrenica fall, so the bearded criers of Allahu akbar slaughter and mutilate Croats.

The Croats who armed them, the Croats through whose lands they have delivered and still deliver food, have delivered and still deliver weapons.

Yesterday they were disgusted by ethnic cleansing, and now Zenica is being cleansed of all but the "fundamental" people.

Mujahidin from Iraq, Egypt, Syria, will turn out to be fundamental people too... Maybe even those Muslims from the Sandžak, Serbia...

Yesterday the bodies of three missing HVO soldiers from Busovača were exchanged: they had gone missing in the Kula sector on 25 April 1993. They were Željko Akrap, Ante Lovrić, and Marko Tomčić.

The bodies of the dead soldiers had been mutilated. One of them had been decapitated, their throats had been cut and they were earless.

In the name of what battle, in the name of what truth, in the name of what God are such things done?

O Muslim people, perhaps you at least can give an answer to this question, if your leaders do not know how to.

MT/ŠV

Three copies typed.

To:

1 x Addressee
1 x CB OZ Information Office
1 x files

HVO CENTRAL BOSNIA
INFORMATION OFFICE
/signed/

On 25 May 1993 The Presidency of HDZ BH Republic held a meeting, presided by Mr Mate Boban.

On this occasion we issue the following

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

Actual events were taken into a consideration, especially the obligations on the basis of Common Statement signed by Mr Boban and Mr Izetbegović on the 25 April 1993 in Zagreb, including concrete implementation of Vance-Owen Plan, concluded on 18 May 1993 in Međugorje.

The Presidency nominated, according to its authorities representatives from the Croat population, who will carry out duties in the inter-in province government. The Presidency was also discussing about nomination of representatives from Croat population for the Central government.

According to the agreement about establishment of the interim province government (Annex IV, Article D), representatives have been nominated in the provinces number 8, 9 and 10.

A) The Province number 8 :

Mr Pero Marković, M.Eng. – Governor

Members of the Interim government are:

Mr Jozo Marić, prof.

Mr Vlado Šoljić, M.Eng.

Mr Valentin Ćorić, M.Eng.

Mr Mijo Jozić, prof.

Mr Karlo Sesar, LL.M

B) The Province number 9 :

Mr Perica Jukić, M.Eng. – Vice-governor

Members of the Interim government are :

Mr Ivo Lozančić, M.Eng.

Mr Franjo Bratić, M.Ec.

C) The Province number 10 :

Mr Vlado Šoljić, M.Ec. - Governor

Members of the Interim government are :

Mr Anto Valenta, M.Eng.

Mr Pero Skopljak, MS

Mr Dario Kordić, LL.M.

Mr Ivan Šarac, PhD

Mr Zoran Perković, LL.M.

D) On the basis of provision point H for **Public Attorney** to Co-chairmen was proposed:

Mr Ivan Tomić, LL.M. – from Mostar

With this nomination, Croat side have carried out their duties, and after nomination of representatives from the Muslim population, in the Provinces number 8, 9 and 10 can begin peaceful life, life of protected human rights and stronger defence from the aggressor.

Mostar, on 25 May 1993

President of the Executive HDZ BiH

Srećko Vučina

/circled 51/
/circled 395/

/handwritten/ ONO/Files

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
3rd corps command
Strictly confidential, no. 02/33-1340
Zenica, 3rd of June 1993

Defence of the Republic
Military secret
Strictly confidential

Exception of howitzers from BMT /factory/

Attn: commander of the 308th brigade

You have to immediately execute activities in order to create conditions for pulling out 3 howitzers that are to be found in the factory "BMT".

Try to pull out weapon imperceptibly for other side, using all means and deploy them to the positions of fire according to your decision.

Report regularly on the executed activities.

MM/VA

Commander
Enver Hadžihasanović
/signed and stamped/

TG /Tactical Group/ COMMAND
 1700 hours, 5 June 1993
 Zenica

MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/stamp/
 7th MUSLIM BRIGADE
Strictly Confidential, 720/93
5 June 1993

ORDER FOR ATTACK

Section 1:25000, sheets Zenica 2-3 and Zenica 4-1, 1978 edition

1. Along the TG axis of attack, the enemy has mounted a two-battalion strong (around 400 soldiers) defence according to the following disposition:
 - one company in the Čukle sector
 - one company in the Novo Selo sector
 - one company in the Grahovčići-Strmac sector
 - one reserve company in the Grahovčići sector and a 120 mm CMB /mortar company/ at Grahovčići (strip mine)
 - a 82 mm mortar with VP /firing position/ in Čukle (Studenac source)
 - a howitzer by the school in Grahovčići

The probable objective: by mounting a sustained defence to prevent the advance of our forces along the Stranjani-Rebrovac-Novo Selo-Han Bila axis and create conditions for a counter-attack with its reserve forces.

They are hastening to construct fortifications and there is also a sense of restlessness among the population of the Ovnak sector.

2. The TG composed of:
 - 3 detachments of the 7th Mbbr /Muslim Mountain Brigade/
 - a detachment of the 314th mtbr /Motorized Brigade/
 - a company of the "Manevar" detachment
 - a company of the Zenica 2nd OŠO /Municipal Defence Staff/ PDO /Anti-Sabotage Detachment/
 - BrAG-314 /Brigade Artillery Group/

will launch an attack in the following area: Crni Vrh-Čukle-Han Bila on the right, and Stranjani-Gornja Osojnica-Kljaci on the left, with the following task:

In a simultaneous attack from the frontline and encirclement from the left to break up enemy forces along the Crni Vrh-Ušice-Novo Selo, Kljaci-Strmac-Grahovčići and Konjevići-Milike-Grahovčići axes and take control of the Ovnak sector as soon as possible, repel the enemy's counter-attacks from the direction of Han Bila-Novo Selo and Vrbice-Grahovčići-Milike, and create conditions conducive to taking control of the Novo Selo-Hrvatska Bila-Nova Bila communication.

3. Lateral contact units: on the right, along the Zaselje-Jezerci axis, the 1/306th bbr /mountain brigade/, and on the left, in the Pecarnice sector, parts of the 325th bbr forces.
4. I have decided to launch an attack with the main battle force along the Vrselje-Crni Vrh-Ušice-Čukle-Brajkovići axis, and the auxiliary forces along the Kljaci-Zadanj (trig point 878)-Strmac (trig point 940)-Grahovčići, with the following objective:

The immediate task is to take control of the Čukle-Novo Selo-Milika-Strmac line, and the next task is to take control of the Brajkovići-Plavčići-Vinište-Grahovčići-Vrbice line.

Combat disposition in two echelons, artillery support forces, PO /anti-tank/ combat forces, logistical support forces, command and communications forces.

Made in 7 copies

TG COMMANDER
Amir KUBURA

Forwarded to:

1 x 3rd Corps Command
1 x TG Commander
1 x 2/7th Mbbr Commander
1 x 314th mtbr Detachment Commander
1 x "Manevar" Detachment Commander
1 x 2nd PDO OŠO Zenica Commander
1 x 7th Mbbr ONO /Operations and Training/

/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

HUMAN RESOURCE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE

Number: 02-3/1-44/93

Mostar, 9 June 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONF.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF HZ H-B

SUBJECT: Overview of the national structure of the members of the HVO -delivered-

On your request, enclosed to the letter we deliver to you the "Overview of the national structure of the members of the HVO".

(appendix num. 1)

Records were made based on the condition with the clay of 08 June 1993 for the units under ordinal numbers: 14, 15, 16, 17, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 and for the remaining units based on newly made military identification cards.

Note: For the part of the units from OZ "Central Bosnia" due to known reasons we are not able to deliver the required records.

CHIEF
signature
Jure Brkić

HQ OF THE OZ /Operational Zone/ NW HERZEGOVINA
 No. 01-5-260/93
 Tomislavgrad, 8 June 1993

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONF.

Report on the filling
 of the brigades, submitted by

DEPT. OF DEFENCE OF
 HZ HB
 Personnel office
 Mostar

On the oral request of the head of the Personnel office of the Department of Defence we submit to you the state of filling and national structure of the brigades:

1. "RAMA" Brigade, Prozor
 Manpower total.....2023
 Croats.....1552 or 76,7%
 Muslims.....471 or 23,3%

2. "KRALJ TOMISLAV" Brigade, Tomislavgrad
 Manpower total.....3054
 Croats.....2745 or 89,89%
 Muslims.....296 or 9,69%
 Serbs.....2 or 0,06%
 Other.....11 or 0,36%

In the above manpower of the Brigade, we included the battalions:

Kupres
 Manpower total.....249
 Croats.....244 or 97,99%
 Muslims.....5 or 2,01%

Posušje
 Manpower total.....266
 Croats.....266 or 100%

3. "PETAR KREŠIMIR IV" Brigade, Livno
 Manpower total.....3086
 Croats2312 or 74,92%
 Muslims.....767 or 24,05%
 Other.....7 or 0,23%

On the territory of the Livno Municipality there are no units formed from several municipalities, but there are soldiers from the Jajce Municipality which are included in the brigades and they number a total of 185 soldiers.

Submitted to:
 - Department of Defence
 - OMK
 - Archive

COMMANDER
 colonel
 Željko Šiljeg

/square stamp: ECV, Name of the organ: HQ HVO
 Sent-received telegram No. 3527
 Day 8 June 1993 at 19.50 hours
 Operator – signed, illegible/

SARAJEVO

Date and time:

24 June 1993 Thursday 00:13

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Supreme Command Headquarters - IKM

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confid. 106/39-1

Zenica. 23 June 1993

Delivers an Information on the exchange of civilians at the Travnik area-

TO THE SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS - SARAJEVO
FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE R BiH PRESIDENCY

The Commission for liberation of imprisoned individuals, based on the Agreement from 10 June 1993, on this day visited a village Skradno (Busovača County) and village Mehurići (Travnik County).

1. At the village Skradno there are approximately 45 domestic plus about 90 refugees from the village V. Bukovice - all of Muslim nationality. At first sight they have normal living conditions, but all of them are scared for their lives. They are practically living in the ghetto and they are not able to obtain living necessities, they do not have medical assistance and they are convinced that they are going to be murdered soon, if they are not immediately transferred to a safer place. They are desperately asking for our help.
2. At the village Mehurići there are 247 civilians of Croatian nationality and they are situated at the one school gymnasium. They are under the protection by 306th Brigade Military Police, but they are also exposed to mortal danger from so called "Brigade of death" which is consisted mainly of mujahedin - foreigners who are located in immediate vicinity. We were informed, by Mr. Salko Bebo from Operational Zone WEST, who was in our escort, that one day before our arrival these mujahedins shot approximately 50 civilians at the near bye village. Single civilian managed to survive this execution and he is currently among these 247 civilians at Mehurići. One member of 306th Brigade at Mehurići told us in confidence that mujahedins are also abusing local Muslim population and that they are robbing and murdering. During our stay a group of mujahedins aimed their anti armor and infantry weapons at the UNPROFOR forces and they were just restrained from armed conflict.

We are of the opinion that mujahedin problem is complicating already tense relation between Muslim and Croatian people, at the responsibility zone of the 3rd Corps, in such measure that President of the Republic of BiH Presidency together with ARBiH Commandant should come to Zenica or invite the 3rd Corps Commandant to Sarajevo for urgent consultations regarding the solution of this problem.

Between Mr. Salko Bebo and Mr. Petar Skopljak, representatives of HVO it was agreed that the exchange of civilians from village Skradno with civilians from village Mehurići will be conducted tomorrow on 24 June 1993. Even though we are aware that this is classic ethnic cleansing, but since we are not able to protect said civilians from direct destruction in any other way, we, members of the commission, have agreed that this exchange should go forward, even though this is out of our mandate which was determined by the Agreement. We are urgently asking for your approval.

Members of the Commission for liberation of imprisoned individuals

Ivan Negovetić
Fadil Alihodžić

/Handwritten: BH Army - 303/

ŠVK/Supreme Command Staff/
Communication Centre - Cryptographic Protection Department
SARAJEVO

Source file: FAFGP60C
Act received and filed by
/handwritten:/ Hari

Date and time:
25 June 1993, Friday, 2323 hrs

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMED FORCES SUPREME COMMAND STAFF
FORWARD COMMAND POST
Str. conf. No. 102/03-67

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
VERY URGENT

Zenica, June 25th 1993

/handwritten and circled:8/

Attn: PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY OF RBiH, personally
RBiH ARMY SUPREME COMMAND STAFF COMMANDER, personally

Pursuant to note str. conf. no. 102/03-51 which I sent you on 15 June 1993, I take the liberty to insist again on your visit to Zenica. Here are some additional reasons I have not cited in my note of 15 June 1993.

1. On 23 May 1993 the Supreme Command Staff Chief Sefer Halilović said in the presence of Delić and Karić and before going to Sarajevo, that he had ordered the following:
 - the 3rd Corps must find and appoint to its Command several Croats within the next 24 hours;
 - within 48 hours illegal groups and formations (everyone knows who they are) must leave Zenica through Igman. (Responsible person: Delić assistant: Mahmuljin);
 - the 3rd Corps must mobilise additional units;
 - the 3rd Corps must introduce 24-hour working, like in the Supreme Command Staff and other corps.

So far, nothing has been done.

2. On 26 May 1993 the president of municipal government, Ramiz Džaferović, said in the presence of Šiber, Karić and Vranj:
 - as a citizen, I am disappointed with the 3rd Corps, and its commanders are involved in looting and crime;
 - there are officers who liquidate people after looting;
 - "I will not do anything in the name of the government for the army until there is order and discipline in town".
3. On 23 June 1993, Hodžić the district president, and Haračić the president of the district government, said the following:
 - Merdan is the main organiser of religious units: Šuvalićs, Purićs, the 7th mbbr /Muslim Mountain Brigade/, etc.;
 - Hadžihasanović has been summoned to the session of the county assembly several times, but has never come;
 - Zenica and the soldiers of the 3rd Corps are ruled by commanders who are hardened criminals, who do not want victory over the Chetniks, but at the same time profit from conflicts with the HVO.
4. On 20 June 1993 I had a private talk with Hadžihasanović and asked him the following questions:
 - do you know that the anti-sabotage battalion is under Merdan's command and that Zenica knows that it is his own private unit, not the 3rd Corps'? Answer: Yes, but not just him.

- do you know that part of certain units are planning to secede and form the 8th Muslim Brigade?
Answer: Yes, but it will not happen.
- Do you know that preparations are being made to create a Muslim Corps, and the 3rd Corps command will be liquidated if it opposes? Answer: Yes, but that is just someone's wishful thinking. It will not happen.

In the meanwhile:

- On 8 June 1993, 35 Croats were executed in the village of Bikoši. Four witnesses were wounded but survived. They were shot by Mujahedin.
- On 10 June 1993, over 30 Croats were executed in the village of Šušanj near Ovnak by "some soldiers".
- On 22 June 1993, members of the Commission for the release of prisoners, Alihodžić and Negovetić learned from Salko Beba from Operations group West, that on the previous day the Mujahedin executed about 50 civilians in the vicinity of the village Mehurići near Vlašić. Salko Beba's unit is guarding 247 civilians in that village against the so-called "Death Brigade", which is mistreating even the local Muslim population, looting and killing. On the same day Mujahedin from that "Death Brigade", who are attracting our soldiers with money, almost shot at UNPROFOR vehicles carrying the Commission members with Zolja and Osa /hand-held rocket launchers/.

I emphasise: looting and crime prevail. Soldiers from the "positions" are carrying bags full of goods through Zenica, and I have received information that some refuse to go to positions unless there is something to loot (the 309th bbr /Mountain Brigade/). The police of certain brigades are still arresting and beating up civilians in basements. The MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, that is, the Security Services Centre, and the 3rd Corps security service are not cooperating whatsoever, as was seen by Mr. Ganić during his meeting at the 3rd Corps on 15 May 1993.

On the basis of the above, I ask you again to react urgently, since personnel changes in the 3rd Corps Command are essential. I have specific suggestions regarding this matter. I have asked from the 3rd Corps commander to replace the assistants for morale, security and organisational, mobilisation and personnel issues, but he has not reacted.

Please appoint to the Joint Command, together with Karić and Šiber, someone like Karišik, Vranj or Najetović instead of Merdan, since Merdan is a member of the 3rd Corps and because of what has been said about him above.

Best regards,

SŠ/AČ

DEPUTY COMMANDER
Stjepan Šiber, M.Eng.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG BOSNIA
 MAIN MEDICAL STAFF
 INFORMATION AND INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT
 Number: 02-5/2-68/93
 Mostar, 26 June 1993

HELSINKI WATCH

To Mrs Ivana NIZICH n/r /personally/

SUFFERING OF CROATS IN THE TERRITORY OF ZENICA MUNICIPALITY

GENERAL INFORMATION

According to the 1991 population census, the population of Zenica municipality was 145,577. There were 22,651 Croats, (15.6%), 80,377 Muslims (55.2%), 22,592 Serbs (15.5%), 15,651 Yugoslavs (10.8%) and 4,306 others (2.9%). We enclose a map of the ethnic structure of Zenica municipality showing each area based on the 1981 census and the corresponding population listing.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

There were no major clashes with the Serbs in the territory of Zenica municipality. For this reason, Zenica as a relatively safe zone became the centre for Muslim refugees from Sarajevo, eastern Bosnia, Kotor Varoš, Banja Luka, Jajce and other parts of the "Bosnian Krajina".

At the same time, a strong fundamentalist faction of the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ is active in Zenica which, having realized that it cannot fight the Serbs because they are too strong, seized municipalities in Central Bosnia with a predominantly Croatian population (Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovača, Kiseljak, Kreševo, Fojnica, Gornji Vakuf, Bugojno, Prozor, Kakanj and Vareš) and expelled Croats from those areas as well as from municipalities where they are a significant segment of the population (Konjic, Jablanica, Zenica, Žepče, Maglaj, Zavidovići, Tuzla, Živinice and Banovići). It is now trying to create an area for Muslims to live in, that is, where it could create a Muslim state.

JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1993

In January 1993, the Muslim forces tried to seize the Zenica - Vitez -Busovača road in order to sever communication between Vitez and Busovača. On that occasion, they torched Croatian houses in the villages of Lašva and Dusina and massacred the Croat inhabitants.

4 January 1993 - a civilian, Dario Jurišić, was killed in Zenica by members of the A BiH;

27 February 1993 - goods were seized from a Caritas convoy at the Vjetrenica checkpoint.

MARCH 1993

9 March 1993 - five BH Army soldiers burst into the house of Milko Krišto in Višnjice village, abused him, beat him up and looted the house;

22 March 1993 - BH Army members removed HZ H-B licence plates from vehicles at all checkpoints;

25 March 1993 - Abuse of Fra Stipan Radić, the parish priest of the Sveti Ilija /St. Elias/ Church in Zenica;

26 March 1993 - BH Army soldiers fired at the primary school in Čajdraš, causing considerable material damage;

28 March 1993 - BH Army members killed two HVO Military Policemen.

APRIL 1993

In mid-April, the Muslim forces launched a large-scale synchronized offensive on Croatian settlements in Central Bosnia, Konjic and Jablanica.

15 April 1993 - kidnapping of the Commander of the Zenica HVO Živko Totić in Zenica, during which four of his escorts and one civilian passer-by were killed.

16 April 1993 - the Muslim forces took away Croatian families from the villages of Počulica, Nadići and Krčevine (Croatian villages which are in Vitez municipality, but are located on the border with Zenica municipality on the Zenica - Vitez - Busovača road), abused women and children and their whereabouts is unknown.

At the same time, strong Muslim forces advanced from the direction of Visoko, Kakanj and Zenica to the southwest, where the Croats are located.

17 April 1993 - the Croatian villages of Čajdraš and Podberezje were attacked. Croatian houses in Gornja Zenica are torched and demolished and Croats were arrested and taken away. BH Army tanks came out onto the streets of Zenica.

In the villages of Kuber and Putiš (a village on the border between Zenica and Busovača municipality), 60 Croatian civilians were massacred.

18 April 1993 - All-out attack on the headquarters of the Zenica HVO Jure Francetić Brigade started in the morning, together with a massacre of Croatian civilians. Zenica is completely cut off by the BH Army.

19 April 1993 - Execution-style killing of Croatian prisoners, soldiers and civilians by the Muslim forces and the mujahidin in front of the church in Čajdraš.

Four-hundred and twenty-six members of the HVO were taken prisoner and taken to the KPD /Penal and Correctional Facility/, the Music School and the mine. These camps are held by the mujahidin who beat people with spades and force them to cry out Allah-u-akbar. There are elderly men among the prisoners, but they are not spared from the abuse.

A large number of HVO soldiers had to surrender because the Muslim forces used women and children as a human shield to walk in front of them, thus forcing the soldiers to surrender.

The Muslim forces did not let medical vehicles take wounded Croats to Zenica hospital.

23 April 1993 - According to information obtained, 113 Croats (soldiers and civilians) were killed in the clashes in Zenica.

The figure is not final because the Muslim forces are not permitting access to many populated areas, even to international organizations.

According to a report by a commission of the ICRC, all Croatian inhabitants of the villages of Janjac, Dobriljeno and Stranjani have been expelled. Twenty-five houses have been torched in Zeljan village, where bodies of 12 Croats have been found.

There are 506 Croats in the Zenica KPD alone, where they are beaten and abused.

25 April 1993 at 1400 hours - Mrs. Danica Gaso, the mother of a member of the Chess national team, was killed in her flat;

Elizabeta Štrbac was thrown out of Zenica hospital. Her newborn baby died because of negligence on the part of the doctor;

The following civilians were arrested at Počulica checkpoint: Ivo Sirić, Florijan Sirić, Antun Sirić, Vinko Marić and a nun, Sister Pava Marić. They were robbed, their vehicle was seized and then they were beaten up (they did not even spare the nun) after which they were released.

According to available information, around 18,000 Croats continue to live the territory of Zenica municipality. They are practically hostages who do not have freedom of movement as the BH Army has blocked all exits from Zenica.

CAMPS

Most detainees are held in the Zenica Penal and Correctional Facility and the Music School, while 450 detainees are working at the Rudnik /mine/ in Zenica as slaves.

MASSACRES

The biggest atrocities against Croatian civilians and captured Croatian soldiers, were committed by the Muslim forces and the mujahidin in the following areas: Dusina, Lašva, Kuber, Putiš, Čajdraš, Podbrežje, Dobriljeno and Stranjani.

The survivors are in Central Bosnia and we cannot get in touch with them.

TORCHED VILLAGES

According to available information, the following Croatian villages have been torched either partially or completely: Janjac, Podbrežje, Čajdraš, Lađice, Miklići, Raspotočje, Milići, Vjetrenica, Dobriljeno and Višnjica. The fate of the other Croatian villages is not known.

Houses of Croats in settlements where Muslims were the majority /population/ were torched, i.e. in the villages of Stranjani, Kozarci, Lašva, Dusina and Gomja Višnjica.

Enclosed is an ethnic and topographic map of Zenica municipality with marked locations of the massacres, destroyed villages and camps, according to information gathered by the Department for Information and Investigation of the Main Medical Staff.

Department Head

Dr. Marija BRAJKO - BRNČIĆ

/signature and stamp/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES
 SARAJEVO

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
 MILITARY SECRET
 Strictly confidential

Strictly conf. No.: 02-810-1
 Sarajevo, 28 June 1993

- TO THE COMMAND OF THE 3rd CORPS

The continuous trend of the worsening of relations between the Army of RBiH and extreme parts of HVO on the greater area of Kiseljak, and their growing cooperation with the Chetniks in the attacks on the forces of the Army of BiH points to the possibility of larger offensive actions on the Kiseljak – Visoko and Lepenica – D. Koščan lines.

The situation in the area of Gornji Vakuf and Bugojno is also worsening and there are signs of the preparation of the HVO forces which already possess dominant objects in view of attack on our forces.

Concerning the above assessment

I ORDER

1. Plan the execution of military actions on the Kralupi – Kiseljak line, for the purpose of improving our tactical position. Work out the plan for the taking of Kiseljak at the propitious moment if the opportunity appears.
2. Execute the taking of key positions on the area of G. Vakuf and Bugojno towards the forces of HVO, prevent possible surprises, be in constant battle-readiness for the repelling of attacks with the aim of protecting the population and defence of the free territory.
3. Report about the measures taken to these Headquarters by 1 July 1993

MV/JA

C O M M A N D E R
 OF THE HQ OF SUPREME COMMAND
 OF ARMED FORCES OF RBiH

/round stamp: illegible/

/handwritten/:

CV ŠVK OS RBiH

/communication centre of supreme command staff of armed forces of R BiH/
 department of KZ /cryptographic protection/
 sent: 28 June 1993 at 22:20
 signature

The battle for Bugojno between HVO and Army of BiH was short. A general attack of the Army of BiH began on 18 July 1993 and everything was completed by 28 July 1993. In heavy fighting the members of Army of BiH took one by one the parts of the town. In this battle around 90 members of HVO were killed, and many Croatian soldiers were taken prisoner and confined in camps. From Bugojno and the entire territory of the Bugojno Municipality begins an unparalleled exodus of around 13,000 Croatian civilians. They flee from the Bosnian units over an area under Serbian control to the territory under the control of the HVO. The refugees make their way through the minefields and there dead and wounded there. Around 3,000 Croats stayed in Bugojno. The members of the Army of BiH arrested around 350 Croats who were fiercely tortured, some of them killed. The Army of BiH set up torture points and camps throughout the town.

This is the text from Wikipedia, and **18 July 1993 was Sunday**.

http://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bo%C5%A1nja%C4%8Dko-hrvatski_sukob:_Prozor-Rama,_Uskoplje_i_Bugojno

CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
 OPERATIONAL ZONE CENTRAL BOSNIA COMMAND
 IZM-VITEZ

Information Bureau

Internal nr.: 08-7-401/1/93

Day: 23 July 1993

Time: 14.00 hours

HVO Main Headquarters MOSTAR

Mr. Veso Vegar

Information Bureau HZ HB

INFORMATION

33 Croats were killed during the aggression by Muslim military at Fojnica:

- 212 Croats are imprisoned in the city
- 80 people ill with nearsightedness are at the special hospital at Fojnica
- 22 Croatian villages are completely ransacked and emptied of population

22 July 1993 Muslim Armed Forces have cut the water pipe which supplies villages Bakovići i Gojevići. By doing so, they also cut water to the Institution for mentally retarded individuals, which hold 520 patients.

MT/VS

1 x title

1 x administration l x a/a

Information Bureau 3rd Operational Zone HVO

/signature/

/round seal/

CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
 OPERATIONAL ZONE CENTRAL BOSNIA COMMAND IZM - VITEZ

Information Bureau

Internal nr.: 08-7-41/2/93

Day: 23 July 1993

Time: 14.00 hours

Information Bureau
 KISELJAK

QUERY

Please let us know what is going on with Fra Stipan Buljan from Kreševo and /illegible/ from Bakovići and Ilija Trogrančić from Fojnica.

Prof Gamulin from Split is inquiring about them.

Information Bureau
 Central Bosnia
 /Signature/

/round seal/

/coat-of-arms/

THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRSKnin, Kralja Petra I Oslobodioca 27
Tel. 011-235-16-72
0780-60-126 / 079-719-023
FAX: (011) 235-16-72
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINAOFFICE IN BELGRADE
TERAZIJE No. 3/I
TEL: (011) 3221-325, 3226-778, 3227-346
FAX: (011) 3224-573
YUGOSLAVIA

No.: DT-1/93

STATE SECRET**THE CHOICE OF CURRENT WAR AIMS OF THE RSK /Republic of Serbian Krajina/
and RS /Republic of Srpska/
- one of the possibilities -**

The war has been going on for the third year. Many things are clearer now than in 1991 and 1992. The world is getting accustomed to the statehood of Serbs west from the Drina River.

The alliance between the Muslims and the Croats cannot be renewed.

The Muslims don't have a corridor with the world. Apparently their aim is to have access to the sea, a much broader one than is currently offered to them. By the way, they wish to take Mostar and rule the Neretva Valley. If they succeed in that, it will be a death blow to the Croats. This would, at the same time, relieve the Serbs of their most dangerous enemy.

Therefore, we should help the Muslims to realize this strategic concept. The Croatian stubbornness and attack on the RSK, use it and tie as many as possible of their units in the war zones around Maslenica, Gospić, Drniš and on Peruća. As a sign of solidarity, the RS could bring back to life the battlefields around Grahovo, Glamoč and Kupres.

The Muslims would then easily break the last line of defence of the Croats in Bosnia on the Gornji Vakuf – Konjic line and threaten Croatian positions around Trebinje. Thereby the Serbian Herzegovinian Corps could liberate the Serbian parts of Herzegovina and reach the borders of the AVNOJ /Antifascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia/ Croatia. With the exit of the Muslims on the Adriatic, all the Croats south of the Neretva River would seek refuge fleeing towards Montenegro or would be forced to seek protection of the Serbian forces.

At that moment, the Serbian army would stop the Muslim spread along the coast and leave them with 50 km of the coastline. Politically, we could immediately grant the permission to the citizens of Dubrovnik to declare independence, along with partial decline of hospitality to the refugees from the Ustasha areas: Imotski, Livno, Duvno, etc.

With the conquering of the coast on the part of the Muslims Europe will rise on its feet, because it will be against it. Against them will be, of course, the Arab capital and the USA.

This would be an excellent situation for the Serbs. Then we could activate our historical right to the Adriatic, by recalling the Medieval Serbian states in Dalmatia.

Russia would, finally, have to stand behind the Serbian side, because it couldn't ally itself neither with Europe, nor with the USA.

It is difficult to predict the events, especially in the circumstances of war, so I propose that these ideas be discussed in the leadership and among the officers of the RSK and RS.

The Serbian vision of the war situation only 30 days before the operation "Pocket-93"


Belgrade, 10 August 1993

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

Slobodan Jarčević
/signed/

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ANNIVERSARY



THE IZETBEGOVIĆ – KRAJIŠNIK AGREEMENT

Croatia successfully carried out the operation "Pocket-93" and the enemy was pushed back from Gospić. International community is pressing Croatia to withdraw their troops from the Medak Pocket. While the operation "Neretva-93" is going on, in which the Army of BiH tries to occupy Mostar and proceed further towards the sea, the president Dr Franjo Tuđman and the head of Bosnian Muslims Alija Izetbegović signed in Geneva on 15 September 1993 a common declaration in which they obliged themselves to ensure the "immediate cessation of all hostilities between the units of Army of BiH and The Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia at the latest until 18 September at 12.00 hours."

On 16 September 1993, only one day after this declaration, under the auspices of the international community in Geneva a "Common Serbian-Muslim Declaration" was signed. The head of the Muslim side, Alija Izetbegović and the president of the Assembly of Bosnian Serbs Momčilo Krajišnik signed an agreement whose constituent part was the provision which enables the Serbs to detach the territory under their control from the composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and annexation of the same to Serbia, on the basis of a referendum. Likewise, without the consent of the Croats they agreed that the territorial delimitation will be made "taking into account on the natural right of access to the sea of these two republics". This agreement was signed by Alija Izetbegović and Momčilo Krajišnik, and co-signatories were the "peace mediators" Lord David Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg.

This Serbian-Muslim Declaration, as well as the role of international representatives in it everyone is trying to push under the carpet these days and forget it. Instead of an objective valorisation, some Croatian politicians are launching even today the theses on alleged criminal organization headed by Dr Franjo Tuđman, attempts at splitting up the BiH, ethnic cleansing, etc. However, the Izetbegović-Krajišnik agreement about which the public knows little, at the time of the operations "Pocket-93" in the Medak Pocket and "Neretva-93" of the Army of BiH around Mostar, throws a completely different light on these events.

*source: HRVATSKI TJEDNIK, 5 September 2013, p. 32

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 SUPREME COMMAND STAFF
 OF THE ARMED FORCES
 SARAJEVO

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly Confidential no: 14/75-86

Sarajevo, 13 August 1993

Subject: formation of "ELMUDŽAHIDIN" unit
 in 3rd Corps zone of responsibility, order.-

To: 3rd CORPS COMMAND

Pursuant to the Decision by the Presidency of the Republic of BiH on the organisation of the armed forces of the Republic of BiH number 02-011-461/92 of 4 July 1992, and to 3rd Corps Request Strictly Confidential no. 05/900-90 of 12 August 1993,

I HEREBY ORDER

I ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES

1 FORMATION

In the 3rd Corps zone of responsibility FORM the "ELMUDŽAHIDIN" detachment in accordance with a proposed establishment which you are required to submit to this Staff for approval. The newly formed detachment shall be assigned the number T-30030, the military unit (VJ) number shall be 5689, duration of mobilisation shall be 12 hours, and the mobilisation plan shall be conducted by the 3rd Corps Command.

II MOBILISATION PREPARATIONS

Recruit the "ELMUDŽAHIDIN" detachment from the personnel, i.e. the foreign nationals - volunteers, who are in the territory of the 3rd Corps z/o /zone of responsibility/. These personnel shall bring with them the weapons and other MS /material supplies/ they have currently been issued.

/handwritten: OS¹ ŠVK² CV³ - KZP⁴
 sent to 3rd Corps
 14 August 1993 at 1639 hours
 Hari /

III LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

1. Logistical support of the RJ /wartime unit/ in item I/1 of this Order with all combat and non-combat requirements shall be conducted by drawing upon the 3rd Corps Logistics base.
2. Financial support for the RJ in item I/1 shall be conducted by a letter of credit with the 3rd Corps financial organ.

IV FINAL PROVISIONS

1. Commence execution of the tasks in this order IMMEDIATELY, and complete them by no later than 31 August 1993.
2. Enter the newly formed unit into the Army of the Republic of BH Schedule of the Basic Mobilisation Plan, 3rd Corps Section.

¹ OS - Armed Forces

² ŠVK -Supreme Command Staff

³ CV - Communications Centre

⁴ KZP - cryptographic data protection

3. Appoint officers to establishment posts in accordance with the regulations in force.
4. Enter the order in the list of mobilisation documents.
5. Submit a written report on the implementation of this order to this Staff no later than 5 September 1993.

NF/MA

COMMANDER
OS SUPREME COMMAND
STAFF OF ARMED FORCES
Rasim DELIĆ
/signed and stamped/

To:

- 3rd Corps Command
- files

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
3rd corps command
No: 01/2414-1
Date: 28 August 1993

/01/
29th August 1993 /signed/
DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
/POORLY LEGIBLE STAMP/
01/780-1
29th August 1993

ORDER to resubordinate units, to be submitted

Attn: command of the OG "Bos. Posavina" Command of the 306th brigade
Independent squad "El Mudžahid"

Pursuant to indicated need and in order to maximize the RTK /abbreviation unknown/ to units for carrying out combat activities, herewith I

ORDER

1. The unit, independent squad "El Mudžahid" with entire manpower and MTS /material technical resources/ is to be resubordinated to 306th brigade for carrying out combat activities.
2. The commander of the 306th brigade and the commander of "El Mudžahid" unit are responsible for the joint preparation and for planning further combat activities.
3. The deadline for execution of this Order is; immediately.

Commander
Enver Hadžihasanović
/signed and stamped/

Jovan Divjak
Deputy ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ Commander
Sarajevo, 28 August 1993

Objection with regard to my involvement
in the work of the R BiH
OS /Armed Forces/ ŠVK

To R BiH OS ŠVK Commander
Mr Rasim DELIĆ

With regard to the responsibilities and duties of the ŠVK Deputy Commander and your assurances that you would fully include members of the Commander's inner collegium in the management of the R BiH Army, I would like to lodge my objection against my inadequate inclusion in the work of the R BiH OS ŠVK.

Regardless of your resolute position that the involvement of the deputy in the ŠVK activities shall be aimed at our joint contribution to the management of the R BiH Army, in my opinion this is not being realised to the advantage of the R BiH Army, our joint struggle, the responsibility and unity of the R BiH Army. I will outline only a few, in my opinion, important activities in which I should have been included.

1. I would like to remind you that I offered to join you or the NŠ /Chief of Staff/ from Sarajevo when going to the free territory to carry out tasks together. It seemed to me that you willingly accepted this. I did not even know that you went out of Sarajevo, maybe as deputy I ought not to have known this, but I asked myself a number of questions, the worst being whether it was yet another proof of the lack of trust in my former, current and future work in the R BiH Army. I ask you whether you felt like a real R BiH Army commander when representatives of only one people sat with you at the briefing in Zenica - and you advocate a multiethnic army?! I believe that you would have been more persuasive, stronger and prouder had there been one of your deputies at the talks with the representatives of authorities and religious institutions on the free territory.
2. You were visited by General Briquemont (several times), the US Ambassador in the R BiH and others recently. Probably on these occasions too it would have been necessary for deputies to be with the commander because of the already mentioned assertion that the R BiH Army is multiethnic.
3. Your meetings with brigade commanders in Sarajevo or with those who come to Sarajevo are opportunities for deputies to learn about the situation in those units, as well as directly contribute to seeking favourable solutions to remove flaws and participate in managing the R BiH Army.

Your appointment to the duties of the R BiH Army Commander has to a degree improved the work of the ŠVK and I am convinced that it will be increasingly efficient. However, I believe that the following issues should be solved as soon as possible:

- organisation and staffing establishment of ŠVK administrations;
- determining establishment positions for Mr Karić and Mr Bilajac because their present job is at deputy level (if this is to ŠVK's benefit, - *aferim* /I applaud it!);
- the issues of commands and the following units: *Delta* (to my knowledge they did not become part of the 1st Corps) *Zulfikar*, the 9th and 10th brigades etc. should be resolved;
- complete organisational, staff and materiel establishment of the ŠVK bVP /military police battalion/ as a basis for fighting breaches of discipline, criminal activities etc. successfully;
- establishment of the OS ŠVK headquarters administration;
- make the newly formed housing organ fully operational (I know that the inner collegium agreements are not being implemented!)

I am determined to remain in our common struggle for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, irrespective of how I am treated in the OS ŠVK. But it must be accepted that R BiH OS ŠVK deputy commanders have somewhat different responsibilities, rights and obligations from those in other armies, because they are here to represent the multiethnic composition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not a statistics detail.

DJ/SO
/handwritten initials: DJ/

DEPUTY COMMANDER R BiH OS ŠVK
Jovan DIVJAK

THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
 SARAJEVO

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
 Copy No. 1

Strictly confidential No. 1/297-230
 Sarajevo, 29 August 1993
 File No. 31-2-03-302-7/6-42/99

Conclusions and tasks adopted at the meeting of senior officers of the Main Staff and Corps Commanders, held in Zenica on 21 and 22 August 1993

On 21 and 22 August 1993 in Zenica a meeting was held with the topic "The most prominent achievements, problems and development perspectives in the armed struggle of the Army of RBiH".

Those from Supreme Command Main Staff present:

Commander Rasim Delić, Chief Sefer Halilović, Chief of Operative Command Centre Zičro Suljević, SSC /Staff of Supreme Command/ member Rifat Bilajac, SSC member Vehbija Karić, deputy chief of combat arms administration Zaim Backović, chief of logistics administration Rasid Zorlak and chief of personnel administration Sulejman Vranj.

Those from Corps present:

Commander of the 1st Corps Vahid Karavelić, Commander of the 2nd Corps Hazim Šadić, Commander of the 3rd Corps Enver Hadžihanović, Commander of the 4th Corps Arif Pašalić and Commander of the 6th Corps Salko Gušić, Commander of the Tuzla VG /military garrison?/ Mevludin Bešić, Esef Nurkić from Zenica HE /?/, Chief of combat arms administration Mustafa Polutak.

The first day of the meeting, Minister of the Interior of BiH Bakir Alispahić was also present.

After an introductory speech by the Main Staff Commander, Corps commanders reported on their Corps' personal achievement and the situation regarding combat activities in their respective responsibility zones.

I. CONCLUSIONS

1. The war we have been waging for the last 17 months against the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressor and the former JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ has been in essence a liberation war, deeply humane and founded on the awareness and choice of the people of BH that they must defend their country with dignity and earn the right to bare survival. The war imposed on us by the extreme faction of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ is actually a knife in the back of the RBH Army, and its brutality is even worse than the war waged by Chetniks.

The HVO attack has seriously slowed down the impetus of our liberation struggle.

2. The goals of our Army's fight remain the same: a struggle for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, indivisible and within recognised borders.
3. The war for territories will continue, even if peace on the basis of Geneva Agreement is reached. The continuing war will be aimed against both types of fascism, Serbian-Montenegrin and Croatian, either individually against each of them or against the joint forces of both aggressors.
6. The loss of free territory in Drina river valley, on the territory of Trnovo municipality, Bjelašnica and Igman is not the result of the aggressor's strength, but more due to rather unsuccessful command in our units and individual cases of treason and cowardice in certain Army units in those areas.
7. The units of our Army are hampered by a lack of discipline, both individual and group, and general military lack of structure. Training of senior officers at all levels (KO /detachment commander/, KV /platoon commander/ and KČ /company commander/) is incomplete, which has a negative impact on discipline and successful execution of combat actions.

8. Logistical support of the Army may continue along existing lines. Weapons supply will concentrate as before on war booty and local production. Purchase of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, despite complicated delivery across the aggressor's territory, may be effected through the involvement of all available factors and methods - from friends to enemies, from patriots to war profiteers and traitors from the aggressor's armed units.
9. Collection of financial resources has, up to now, been extremely disorganised, open to question, and uncoordinated with actual needs. There are also suspicions about people handling these issues for their own profit. These resources were not reaching the state budget, and their amount remained a secret. There is no doubt that larger sums of money have been collected and that the major part of that money is now in Zagreb. To get hold of that money and to use it in the most efficient way for equipping the RBH Army would be one of the most important tasks of the Main Staff of Supreme Command in the near future.
11. The organs of state authority of the RBH Army have, throughout the period of armed combat, been out of touch with the general directions of the armed forces. State authorities have only partially switched to wartime functions, which has resulted in inadequate logistical support of the armed forces.

In certain areas, state authorities were acting in a destructive way, detrimental to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by siding with separatist forces, especially the HVO.

II. TASKS

8. The Centre of Operative Command shall present to all Corps Commands and the Main Staff of Armed Forces administrations a new method of marking military maps with symbols: blue for our forces, red for Serbian-Montenegrin forces, blue on a yellow background for the HVO.
9. By a special order of the Main Staff, the previously independent units "*Zulfikar*", "*Crni labudovi*", "*Silver fox*", "*Akrepi*", "*Muderiz*" and other independent units shall be attached to Corps. If necessary, Corps Commands shall put forward a plan of reforming and enlarging the units in question.
15. Corps Commands and administrations of the Supreme Command Staff shall regularly report on the execution of tasks discussed at this meeting.

/illegible/ /JD

COMMANDER
OF THE STAFF OF SUPREME
COMMAND OF ARMED FORCES OF RBiH
Rasim DELIĆ
/signed and stamped/

Copied in _____ copies and delivered to:

Commands of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Corps (KZ)
Command of the 1st Corps
Deputy Commanders of Supreme Command Staff (3)
Education administration
Morale, information and propaganda activity administration
Combat arms administration
Operative Centre of Staff of Supreme Command
Organisation and mobilisation administration
Security administration
Intelligence administration
Personnel administration
Legal administration
Files

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Armed Forces Supreme Command Staff

R BiH OS /Armed Forces/
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF

Office of the Commander

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/handwritten: 267/

No. 02/1594-214

01 March 1994

No: 1/297 - 298

Sarajevo, 17 September 1993

Accepting the principles of the London Conference and determined to cease hostilities and create conditions for peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, convinced that the solution of this crisis must be achieved by political and not military means, and ready to begin the normalisation of relations with the Croatian people, the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, the President of the so called SR Yugoslavia /FRY/, Slobodan Milošević, the President of Montenegro Momir Bulatović and the President of the so called Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić signed a JOINT DECLARATION in Geneva on 16 September 1993, With a view to its realization, I hereby

ORDER:

1. R BiH Army units shall cease all combat operations against the Serbian paramilitary aggressor formations in keeping with the Agreement of 30 July 1993, immediately and no later than 18 September.
2. R BiH Army units can open fire only in case of violation of this Agreement by Serbian paramilitary formations or joint forces of Serbian paramilitary formations and HVO units, i.e. it is necessary to open fire when unit positions and R BiH Army members' lives or the territory and features under their control are at risk or if the population on the territory controlled by the R BiH Army units is at risk from the Serbian aggressor paramilitary formations or joint forces of these formations and HVO units.
3. All prisoners from collection centres and R BiH Army detention centres should be released with the mediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross /MKCK/, except for individuals subject to criminal proceedings and those who have been sentenced. The deadline for the realisation of this task is 1200 hours on 21 September of 1993.
4. Movement of humanitarian convoys and humanitarian organisations' activities shall be unimpeded on the territory under the R BH Army control.
5. Corps commanders shall specify the obligations of subordinate commands and units in their orders, with a view to the realisation of this Order.
6. Corps commands shall forward daily reports on the realisation of this Order to the OS /Armed Forces/ ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ OCK /Operations Centre Command/.
7. Unit commanders who violate this Order shall be relieved from duty, and court action and appropriate measures shall be brought against them.

Corps commanders are responsible for the realisation of this Order.

The Order shall be implemented – immediately

SM/FH

To:

- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Corps
- Ministry of the Interior (for information)
- Ministry of Defence (for information)
- OS ŠVK OCK

Standing in for the COMMANDER
DEPUTY
Stjepan ŠIBER
/signed and Stamped/

COMMAND OF THE 4th CORPS

Top secret Number: 03-36

Date, 3 October 1993

Delivered:

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC

MILITARY SECRET

TOP SECRET

TO ALL UNITS

Taking into consideration previous obligations on the suspension of military activities, i.e. Declaration of general Delić on the unilateral ceasefire of 30 September 1993, and on the basis of the Memorandum signed by the representatives of the R BiH Army, HVO, representative for civil affairs of the Spanish battalion and the Chief of UNPROFOR in Međugorje 2 October 1993, I hereby

ORDER

1. Comply with the agreement on the full ceasefire and suspension of combat activities between the Army of BiH and the HVO from 30 September 1993, respecting the obligations pursuant to Geneva Conventions and additional protocols, in particular pursuant to 4th Geneva Convention concerning the protection of civilians in the time of war.
2. Parties will re-establish a joint working commission for evacuation of all wounded persons, exchanging and releasing prisoners of war, aid to the hospitals and other essential issues.
3. Parties undertake to make special efforts to protect c/s (civil population) in Mostar.
 - a) military objects will be moved away at a reasonable distance from hospitals, residential buildings as well as other inhabited public buildings.
 - b) ICRC (International Red Cross) will be informed on the location of hospitals and the Red Cross sign will be visibly displayed on the hospitals. Displaying flags or signs of international organizations is forbidden.
 - c) Hospitals, residential buildings and other inhabited and public buildings will not be targets of attack.
 - d) Intentional or accidental shelling and sniper activity against c/s (civil population) will stop.
 - e) Pursuant to Article 3 of 4th Geneva Convention nobody will be exposed to any violence against life, including expelling from their homes and territories.
4. Military observers from the UNPROFOR and the Spanish Battalion will supervise the signing of this Memorandum. Ensure full liberty of movement to the UNPROFOR, including issuance of written permissions for permanent access to these areas.
5. Any violation of this Memorandum will be immediately reported to the military observers of the UNPROFOR and the Spanish Battalion.
6. This Order becomes effective IMMEDIATELY.
7. Commanders of OG brigades and the commander of VP (Military police) battalion are responsible to me for execution of this Order.

AP/ZP

Made in 11 copies and DELIVERED to:

OG (Operative Group) Centre

OG South-1

OG South-2

OG North-1

OG North-2

MP battalion

War hospital

R MUP (Ministry of Interior)

CZ (Civil Protection)

War Presidency

Command of the 4th Corps

COMMANDER

Arif Pašalić

/signed and stamped/

4th CORPS COMMAND
 Strictly Confidential ref. num. 03-39
 5 October 1993

REPUBLIC DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Order -

To: Commander of Operational Group NORTH-1

In order to meet the needs and for the purpose of as successful execution of combat activities as possible, I am issuing the following

ORDER

1. IMMEDIATELY establish the unit of reinforced squad comprising of 40 soldiers and sent it to wider region of Raška Gora at routes leading to Vrde, Đubrani and Čordina kula, with the task of executing offensive activities in collaboration¹ with the forces of Operational Group NORTH-2 operating from North, and for the purpose of inflicting losses in manpower and material/technical resources on ustasha's forces positioned in regions of Đubrani-Čordina kula-Vrda behind enemy lines.
2. Deadline for fulfillment of this order is 5 October 1993 at 08:00PM.
3. For any unclear issues refer to operative officer of 4th Corps of Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at telephone number 21-36.

AP/ZP

Created in two copies and

DELIVERED TO:

- COMMANDER OF OPERATIONAL GROUP NORTH-1
- Archive

COMANDER
 Arif Pašalić
 /signed/

/Stamp:/

ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 4th CORPS
 /coat of arms/
 MOSTAR

¹ Handwritten comment- 'in collaboration'

ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE

Department of cryptographic

SARAJEVO

Date and time:

Tuesday, 5 October 1993, 0416 hours

Original file: FACASAVA

Document received and processed by:

Please forward urgently

REPUBLIC OF BiH

ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF BiH

COMMAND OF THE 4th CORPS

Strictly confidential no: OV-578-10/93

Date: 5 October 1993, 0230 hours

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC

MIITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

VERY URGENT

To: ŠVK IKM /Forward Command Post/ Jablanica

Sefer HALILOVIĆ, personally

Zulfikar ALIŠPAGO, personally

Submits: -

Twenty soldiers from the 47th bbr /Mountain Brigade/ and 20 from the Zulfikar unit will attack towards the hills from the direction of Salakovac-Jedrinje towards you (at this moment I do not know the exact direction of attack, but it is roughly as I said).

/?Soko/ and the remainder of the troops who had been in Bijelo Polje set off towards you yesterday morning.

I ordered Karadža to do everything possible to fire artillery from the hill in the Ustasha depth south of Vrde and outside the area of our units. We will also send a DG /sabotage group/ south (Dubrave) to draw out the Ustashes. I will see with A.P. tomorrow morning what else could be done.

UNCLE

/stamp:/

ECV, Title of organ: Jablanica C Ob. /?Reporting Centre/
Sent-received telegram no. 1164/MBFR5101
Date: 9 October 1993 at 0422 hrs
TLP, TGR, TLF, __, RRV, ZV, /circled:/RV
Processed by: signed
(signature)

ECV = electronic communications centre

TLP = teleprinter, TGR = telegraph, TLF = telephone, RRV = radio-relay communications, ŽV = wire communications, Rv = radio communications

4th CORPS COMMAND
Strictly Confidential Ref. Num. 03-40
5 October 1993

REPUBLIC DEFENSE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Order -

To: Commander of Operational Group SOUTH

Due to necessity and for the purpose of executing coordinated combat activities, I am issuing the following

ORDER

1. Send one unit from Operational Group SOUTH to wider region of Dubrava with the task of active operations in that area, for the purpose of inflicting losses in manpower and material and technical resources on ustasha's forces, and to bring confusion among enemy ranks in the depth of their territory.
2. Deadline for fulfilment of this order is 5 October 1993 at 08:00 PM.
3. For all questions refer to operative of 4th Corps of Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at telephone number 21-36.

AP/ZP¹

Created in two copies and delivered to:
Commander of Operational Group SOUTH
Archive

COMMANDER
Arif Pašalić
/signed/

/stamp:/

ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

4th CORPS

/coat of arms/

MOSTAR

¹ Initials of document creator and typist

ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 MILITARY UNIT 5093
 Ref. num. 01-153/93-42
 22 October 1993

MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

COMBAT ORDER No. 4

1. Forces of "Knez Domagoj" Brigade maintain the same deployment after taking possession of Dubrava region in the past combat activities. Majority of their forces are grouped in the region of Trijebanj-Jasoč-Rotimlja-Gubavica-Buna-Malo polje. They are intensely entrenching themselves in p/k¹, and build barriers as well. Civilians are intensely coming in as settlers in Stolac Municipality, and they are also partially populating Čapljina Municipality in the region of Počitelj. There are occasional activities of long-range artillery against civilian objects in local district of Blagaj, and everyday activities of Anti Aircraft machine-guns and other weapons against p/k of our defense. There are intense activities of mass media aimed at members of Army of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (A RBiH) and civilians.
2. Sabotage group comprising of 25 soldiers is assigned with the task of getting deeply behind ustasha's lines, observe the situation in the depth of the territory, and based on assessment of group commander carry out multiple assaults in different regions against facilities and ustasha's manpower. Upon completing the task retreat to present resting region of Military Unit.
3. Prior to beginning the action perform all necessary preparations for successful operations in the field and assess, one more time, members of the action group. Provide supply with necessary priority supplements.

DELIVERED TO:
 Commander of Sabotage Group
 Archive

COMMANDER
 Esad Šejtanić
 /signed/

Stamp:

ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 42nd Mountain Brigade
 Stolac – Čapljina
 /coat of arms/

¹ Original acronym (might stand for achieved positions)

TAPE RECORDING
STATEMENT
by
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY OF
THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
14 NOVEMBER 1993

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ:

The beginning itself was not recorded.

It cannot be like that anymore. It can be like this, but not like that as ... a Serbian-Croatian-Muslim Bosnia as a joint state, with joint governments, joint Presidency to which these would delegate Chetniks, those would delegate Ustashas, to the government that we have been trying to maintain because of some legitimacy, it is impossible. That is my conviction after all hardships that we have experienced with them. This is only a detail. Listen, we are forming the government and they say - here minister of finance is this person, he is a true Bosnian etc. Then he comes and we have obstruction after obstruction, Pelivan, then the bank governor Andrijić. A state in which there is no loyalty of a large, a huge number of people cannot exist, it cannot function. This is not only about loyalty; this is about the fact that a whole series of people homed in on this state. Those who should protect it have gone to the mountains and started shooting, destroying. And there is still insistence that this is possible. I am telling you that it is impossible. A new Bosnia and Herzegovina is possible, one day, a different one. But with them it is impossible. I was for a year-and-a-half in peace-time and a year-and-a-half in war-time and my experience, and I think it is also your experience, you have to be honest to yourselves, is that such a state is impossible. Here, I would like to take this opportunity to tell you how I think it is possible. I do not think that we should give up on BiH, god forbid. When we made such sacrifices, when we experienced all that suffering, we should continue to fight to have BiH finally as a state, we have a right to it. We have paid a very high price for it. I think that we should wage that battle in two phases. In the first phase we should secure the military liberation of the areas in which a majority Muslim population resides. Because that is the people that suffered most, after all, it is most interested in that kind of BiH. The people that is definitely loyal, as it does not have another homeland and the people that paid the highest price for that BiH.

The second part of the battle for BiH, because of BiH's integration, should be fought, in my opinion, by political means. I am not sure whether we shall be able to capture Drvar, Banja Luka, Trebinje etc by military means. I am not sure. Maybe we shall be able to. I am even sure that we would be able to if we had weapons. However, if the same international situation, better to say adverse situation, continues, we shall most probably have to wage this second part in a way, taking into consideration a factor that is called time, in the same way as West Germany for example fought for the reintegration of Germany. Not by military means, but by the supremacy of the political model that was in place there. Now, when we look at Bosnia, we have the so-called bright and dark parts. Those dark ones, they are under fascism, one or the other, does not matter, Serbian or Croatian fascism. Here we have what is controlled by our army and our government, that part in which... not with complete result, but a certain result to maintain some level of democracy, civilization, a level of human liberties which naturally is subject to the same limitations because of the objective war conditions, but in which attempts are persistently made /to prove/ that it is possible to build a civilized life. In Vareš, despite the fact that they evicted that population, not we, but they, they drove the population away. I will tell you why. There are 1,000 Croats there. A number of Croats are returning there. Nobody will be hurt. We would not be what we are, we would not be the democratic government if we evicted these people. We shall try, in the liberated part of BiH, never giving up on the remaining part, we shall try to organize a government which will be dignified and which will respect a minimum of fundamental, elementary standards of civilization, a civilized way of living. That means, translated into political jargon, that we have a Bosnia and Herzegovina in which nobody will be persecuted because of their religion, because of their ethnicity or their political affiliation. Nobody will be persecuted because of these three things. That could be the constant nature of it. Everything else can perhaps change here and there and be somewhat differently defined, but I think that this will remain and I think that this, coupled with the principle of a free market and what it can produce, because we hold the most industrialized part and the most developed part of BiH, can defeat that darkness in which parts of Bosnia live nowadays. This is approximately the reasons to tell you that we cannot live like that.

Because, to have that kind of BiH again, because what does a Muslim-Serbian-Croatian BiH or a Bosnia of three constituent nations mean today; we are not those who will appoint the Serbs who will be part of it, they will determine it. They will appoint Chetniks. Others will appoint Ustashas. How can you have a democratic government with Ustashas and Chentiks who will then either directly destroy that state, or obstruct it every step of the way. Drill holes wherever they can. And you will they take pains to fill up that bottomless pit. You will never be able to create a relatively normal level of life there, a standard, because that will constantly be stolen, obstructed etc. I think that we have to, as a very good journalist of ours has said, unfortunately we have to burn down some dear illusions. If we fail to do so I am afraid that we shall continue to pay a high price. We have to /give up/ some illusions, no matter how dear, finally look reality in the face and I think that we do not owe anything to anybody. We do not owe anything to anyone.

Because of our own principles, in that part of BiH which will be ruled by the BiH authorities, the BiH Army, we shall try to set up a system which will be ruled by the principles of democracy, human freedom and what I have said, somewhat negatively defined, where nobody will be persecuted for belonging to one religion or nation. Let's try to achieve that. I think that this is something that is within reach, what is realistic, what is possible. Now, if we combine this with the fact that we in BiH will in that territory, in that territory, that corner which corresponds to the most developed part of BiH along the Bosna river, along the Neretva river, then perhaps with the fact that we shall be those that the world will help leave this trouble and raise from the ashes. We will definitely get help both from the East and the West. They are planning to do so. The West because they have a guilty conscience for not giving us military aid, for preventing our self-defence. They are preparing some programs for BiH's reconstruction and that will probably give us the initial impetus, will give us capital to leave this trouble here behind. I think that the Islamic world will also help. It was not able to help militarily. There is good will to help us. The balance of power and the forces in power here etc make it impossible for the Muslim world to help significantly at present, but it is completely certain that it will be a very important player in the future reconstruction of BiH. Taking into consideration all these facts I think that we can, naturally on condition that we survive these hard six months ahead of us, to leave this crisis behind, I think that we have a reason to look to the future with hope.

BiH TV - Zenica District TV

X: The aggressor has unleashed a great war machine against Bosnia and Herzegovina. The world never gave us a chance, but we survived, because we are putting up great resistance, says President Alija Izetbegović, while reminding us of Lord Carrington's words that we don't stand a chance against a force like that.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ:

He told us we have to make peace directly with the Chetniks. When I told him we can't and won't do that, he asked: "All right then, what ARE you going to do?" I told him we were going to fight. He said: "Mr. President, do you know what you are saying? How do you think... what are you going to fight with? Because you do know who you are dealing with, don't you? They have huge weapons arsenals. You can't deal with that. So, don't play with your lives, don't risk the fate of your people, they'll destroy you, they'll crush you. Our troops can't enter here, we can't put up resistance by deploying our troops here, because we think it would be a war in which hundreds of thousands of our troops would die. You don't stand a bit of a chance. What are you going to fight with?" So there is some logic to what he was saying. It isn't irrational, because that's what it looked like at the time, even today, when I occasionally meet those foreigners, they shake their head in a way acknowledging our efforts, to tell you the truth, they are surprised we've been able to hold out until now. We've been fighting for 20 months. Even under the circumstances of this unfortunate second front that we tried to avoid by all means.

* * *

X: President IZETBEGOVIĆ devoted a significant amount of time to discussing the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina by the other side and the short-sightedness of Croatian politics, because of which the Krajina areas are now facing a crisis resembling a Bosnian one. He announced our reciprocal view of autonomist developments in Croatian territory.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ:

This might be a chance for me to explain our actions towards Croatia, which were at times misunderstood by some people who asked why we keep going to Zagreb, why we haven't yet denounced them as the aggressor, why we haven't openly stated that they were also involved, etc. We simply wanted to avoid... as any smart person would in those circumstances... to avoid ... fronts. We believed that if politics had any brains... so far all politicians in all wars tried to avoid fighting on two fronts, one is enough. What could possibly be worse than another front like the one we already had. They constantly tried to force another front upon us, that was being planned for us in Belgrade, and we should tell anyone who was behind that second front: hats down to you, working for yourself, of course. Whoever was behind that, did himself a big favour. Now they are laughing at us over there, we are fighting in Fojnica, while they are rubbing their hands, and, of course, they are behind it. Very smart, I need to acknowledge that. They couldn't have done a better thing for themselves than to get us involved in a war with Croats. We are bleeding in Žepče, but they managed to get this done. We, of course, as much as they tried to push us into that war, we tried to avoid it, because we knew what it meant. Having two fronts, that means closing down the vital roads between Split and Sarajevo and Split and Zenica, having no petrol, no food, everything we're dealing with now. We were aware of the situation, and tried to avoid getting into this trap as much as possible. Then we negotiated, signed agreements, everything to avoid having two fronts if at all possible. However, it was unavoidable, because Croatia acted to its own detriment, which one can't always predict. If you are walking down the road and somebody crosses over to your side, it's not your fault. How could we have known that the Croatian driver would cross over to our side and collide with us? How could we have predicted that? The driver crossed over to the left side, they crossed over to the left side. That's not something one can predict, because they are smart enough to see that doing that was absolutely against their best interests. We knew that they would lose the war in Bosnia, that we were going to crush them in Bosnia, but that we were going to make the situation more difficult. Because we simply can't fight against the other guys, the ones who attacked us first. With their own situation they caused a misfortune for the Croatian people, the Serbs up in Krajina are not giving up as the Croats thought that they would, as some stupid people in Zagreb believed that by sacrificing us in Bosnia the Serbs in Krajina would decide, ok, we are going to give up on a republic here. On the contrary, their claims are even louder now, they are saying: "We

want a republic in Krajina." And that's what they're going to get in the end, and one day we'll be able to say, most likely at the first international meeting, we'll say that they are entitled to a republic just as they told us that they are entitled. That's what we'll say. Because they created all this trouble for us and are still creating it today.

X: The insincerity of the Croatian side is best demonstrated by the attack on Fojnica, while Mate Granić was in Sarajevo; until Zagreb is prepared to give up Boban, we cannot speak about good will on their part, says President Izetbegović.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ:

The Chetniks gave them a few more tanks, either for money or for free, I don't know, but they did give them tanks they are using to destroy a town up there. We, of course, undertook some countermeasures. I believe we will resolve the situation, but you see, what we have worked ourselves into, a trap that we knew was being set up for us in Belgrade or God knows where else. Once when the archives are opened we might find out about all that was being done. But the smartest move the Chetniks could make, the smartest thing of all, the most intelligent thing was this conflict between us and Croatia. We and the Croats are now doing their job for them. We against our will, the Croats by virtue of their own decision. We didn't want it. We tried to avoid it as much as possible. We're still trying to avoid it. You see, Silajdžić met with Granić yesterday, we're trying to find a way out. Now they want it, of course, now Granić came to Sarajevo. They refused to come for a long time. Now he did come. I don't think much will come out of it, because we said that for us Boban's departure from the scene was the test of their good will. As long as he remains, there is no good will on their part, as far as we are concerned. So for us that's the litmus test, to make it simple, seeing Boban over there is the same as for a chemist, abracadabra, let's see if it's acidic or not. Whether anything is improving there or not. As long as Boban is there, we told them a long time ago, we don't see any signs of good will. That would be a way for them to show us that there is good will on their part to improve the situation, but they won't do it. Him, and several other criminals who have entered the scene there fully aware. They did worse things to us than the Chetniks, I have to say. There are some elements up here... all kinds of things, but over there, ethnic cleansing has been conducted in an entirely systematic manner, in Mostar. A plan was drawn up to do it. Boban thought, why would I have Croats scattered all over the place from Neum to the River Sava with the ones in Central Bosnia and the ones in the Sava valley refusing to listen to him, if he can corral them like this, get a stick and chase them all to Herzegovina. He did it before in Bugojno and he did it recently in Vareš, in a very obvious manner. Everything was clear about Ahmići. It was a planned operation. Not Ahmići, but Stupni Do. Then they shouted - here come the Bosnians, slaughtering everybody they come across. Gather your belongings, you have an hour, the poor people, our Bosnian people, I am sorry they got into this mess, but what can you do, people don't know. The wish to create down there, down there they first emptied out Muslim houses in Stolac and Mostar, they also chased everybody out of Počitelj, you should know, everybody to the last person. Now, according to Boban's plan, Croats should move in there. You know that they have destroyed a mosque that was 400 or 500 years old. So that's what they call a crime with criminal intent, although the other crime was with criminal intent as well. But this is a crime committed in cold blood, a cold-blooded murder.

X: The President then elaborated on some dilemmas and quandaries regarding the future concept of BiH and the issue of whether or not Serbian and Croatian appetites will reawaken in a newly-established Bosnian and citizen's republic.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ:

We need to create a civilized state here or we don't stand a chance. In other words, not an ethnically pure Muslim state. We should not do this, although, factually, this is what it's going to be, because it simply cannot be any other way. It will still be a state in which 80 percent of the population are Muslim, a state that will be as Muslim or Bosniak, if you wish, as France is French, despite the fact that three million Arabs live there, etc, it's still a French state with a French Prime Minister and a French President of the Republic, a state in which all the ministers are French as well, and it cannot be any other way. Because of this, I think that the fact that they, Croats and Serbs, will account for 10 percent of the population, does not change the fact that the people who have fought for that state will have all the rights that... without choosing... while respecting the rights of others as minorities.

X: The Bosnian people will be guided by their own interests, which means that a different constellation of relations in this war should not be excluded: the proposed Bar-Sarajevo corridor is the first confirmation of this.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ:

Now they think that we cannot with it. But we can. We will not allow ourselves to be blocked. They ask me if I will agree to a corridor between Bar and Sarajevo. Why not? If the Split-Sarajevo road is open. I don't think they are any worse than those over there. We will do it, and if we can we will open these corridors, we have no prejudices in this regard. I believe we have matured as a people. Because unhealthy nations have overly high moral standards, failing to understand what is politics and what is morale. Such nations are too unhealthy. Healthy nations are not that scrupulous. They have criteria to suit their interests. I believe our nation has matured somewhat in this sense. We have matured. But we were not mature in the beginning.

X: You have been listening to the views of the President of the RBiH Presidency, Mr. Alija Izetbegović, regarding the political future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The President of the RBiH Presidency, Mr. Alija Izetbegović, who is at the head of a delegation visiting Central Bosnia, will continue his tour of the free territories.

BiH TV - Zenica District TV

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE HSS BiH /Croatian Peasant's Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina/

The content and messages of the statement given by Mr Izetbegović, the President of R BiH Presidency, on 14 November in Zenica, and in the interview that followed on BHTV on 18 November, caused a great deal of mistrust and even serious fear among the members of the HSS and a large segment of the Croatian population. The assessments and statements uttered by Mr Izetbegović on these two occasions have been interpreted by the HSS and the Croatian population as advocating the continuation of the war, primarily against the Croats, but also as a serious about-turn in the defining of the BH state and legal system.

Not only did Izetbegović's statements dwell on mere explanations of the organisation of power in the Bosnian (Muslim) republic, they also expressed a number of opinions on individual peoples without necessarily separating wheat from the chaff. He thus did not merely imply but spoke explicitly of the "most interested" and "most deserving" peoples, excluding others and their rights to and interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a common and democratic community of equal peoples with indivisible collective and individual rights and freedoms.

Members of the HSS are wondering what it means to advocate a "reduced" Bosnia and Herzegovina and whether, once reduced, it will still be Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is Mr Izetbegović denying other people the benefit and the right of building Bosnia and Herzegovina as their own state - because he wonders what a Muslim-Serb-Croat Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of three constitutive peoples, means today, but the answer he provides is not in keeping with the position he occupies. He says, you see, that "it cannot be that".

This may be inappropriate, but the HSS must warn the President of the Presidency that Bosnia and Herzegovina can only exist as a unity of three equal peoples, three constitutive peoples, because the right of the Muslims to their own state is equal to the right of the two other peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact that the leaders of this or that people "went to the mountains and started shooting" does not mean that the people no longer have the right to and interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina being their homeland and their state.

The HSS qualifies Mr Izetbegović's persistent use of terms such as "we" and "they", i.e. his failure to refer to the Croats and the Serbs by their real names, as offensive. Mr Izetbegović has the right to represent the interests of the Muslim people but the position he fills still obliges him to protect the rights of the other two peoples. Particularly unacceptable are his imputations that the Croats and the Serbs would "appoint Ustashas and Chetniks" to the future bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shows that the President is unable to distinguish between normal people and degenerates. Members of the HSS and Croats in general are wondering whether this reveals his intention to have somebody else, somebody who is not a member of these peoples, determine who is suitable to represent the interests of the Croats or other peoples.

In our view, Izetbegović's opinion that "we will break them in Bosnia" encourages further war against the Croats and a definitive settling of accounts between the Croats and the Muslims. Even when Mr Izetbegović says that he will regain the majority Muslim territories by war, he is still not referring to Zvornik, Foča, Kozarac or Prijedor but the Croat enclaves in Central Bosnia. If we add to this his claim that the Croats have "committed worse acts than the Chetniks" we cannot but notice that he has crudely falsified facts on the number of the killed, auctioning off victims and forgetting statements he has given but a month or so ago.

Mr Izetbegović's claim that "everyone owes us" leads one to conclude that the "debt" has to be collected, which instills additional fear of revenge and persecution that will not flinch even from repeating what happened in Fojnica. At the same time, his "attempts" to create "a degree of democratic civilisation" and respect for "minimal" civilisational standards in the Bosnian (Muslim) republic provide no comfort at all. A president should not attempt but guarantee human and ethnic rights and freedoms, and not just minimal ones - those we already have!

At best, we consider the President's comparison of the position of the Croats and the Serbs in the future Bosnian (Muslim) Republic to the position of the Arabs in France inappropriate because the Muslims cannot and must not have such rights in the future two states. The Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not, nor will they ever be, an ethnic minority but a people, regardless of whether they are a statistical minority.

Mr Izetbegović has shifted his positions many times so far. What is new this time is that for the first time ever, he has fully declared himself a Muslim leader, announcing the organisation of the future central republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a purely Muslim one, without other peoples sharing in the power. This not only imitates the Boban-Karadžić model, but could have far-reaching political consequences too. This orientation obliges the HSS to adopt a position and decide whether it is useful for HSS representatives to remain in the bodies of authority, and to launch an initiative in the international community for the protection of Croat interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The HSS cannot but notice that Mr Izetbegović has promised democracy to the Croats who remain in the Bosnian (Muslim) republic, telling them that "not a hair on their heads will be harmed". At the same time, we have information that the Croats are being persecuted, robbed and detained in Travnik, Kakanj, Zenica, Bugojno where not even the International Red Cross has managed to enter, let alone any foreign journalists.

We do not what the simplified story of Chetniks, Ustashas and Partisans, or the statement that "we will not kill women and children", means. Does it mean that it is open season for hunting men, i.e. other civilians like, for instance, the shooting of civilians in the villages around Zenica, the case of the Franciscans in Fojnica, the cases in Bugojno.

The global media have already reacted to the President's visit to the "El Jihad" unit, the UNHCR is pointing to "Merhamet's" inappropriate behavior, the Bugojno Croats are not receiving humanitarian aid (they are being told to go to their Caritas!), and we are linking all this to Mr Izetbegović's statements that the Croats in Bosnia are in the same position as the Arabs in France. How can we otherwise explain that the discussion on the legal regulation of the Sarajevo HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ took place only after /the HVO/ had been abolished? Is somebody here privileged or above the law?

Unfortunately, the HSS would like to point out many cases where behavior in practice coincided with the most recent statements of Mr Izetbegović, seriously restricting the rights, and consequently also the safety, of the Croats in Bosnia. The interview where Mr Izetbegović plays down certain issues but does not even try to refute others, proves that things that were said in Zenica were not mere lapses or accidental imprecisions. We have observed that he has given such statements in Zenica but not, for instance, in Tuzla, which in all probability indicates a new political philosophy of the ruling party and its leaders.

All this has forced us to make serious conclusions and rethink our overall position. This is our duty, not only because of all the Croats who have died for this country as members of the HVO, the BH Army and the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, but also because of all those who are still fighting for these ideals, because of all those religious, cultural and political institutions which have invested all their authority and moral credibility on behalf of this country, and last, but not least, because of our history, for the Croats have been living in this area for more than 1,300 years, much longer than anyone else.

HSS MAIN BOARD

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PROSECUTION WITNESS STJEPAN KLJUIC - WAS A MEMBER OF THE BH PRESIDENCY AND THE LEADER OF HDZ BiH

CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS BY ACCUSED GENERAL SLOBODAN PRALJAK – ICTY, case Prlic et al., 09 October 2006, trial transcript pages 8008-8013

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. I'd like to clarify something with regard to the consequences of the meeting in Graz. Josip Manolic, a witness, testified before this Chamber that, after the meeting in Graz, hostilities between the Croats and Muslims -- sorry, Serbs ceased. Please have a look at the map you have in front of you. My question is as follows: After the 6th of May and the so-called agreement on division, did the following events take place: First of all, in Bosnian Posavina, from May until June, did the army of Republika Srpska, after intensive fighting with the HVO, take over Derвента, Modrica, and Bosanski Samac? You can see that on the map. You can see the lines of attack of the Serbian army on Bosnian Posavina. Did this take place in 1992, from May to October, up until Bosanski Brod fell?

A. Yes, that's correct. But can't you see how absurd that agreement is?

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Q. Well, this is what I'm discussing, this is what I'm talking about. Did you know that the army of Republika Srpska launched an attack on Livno on the 23rd of -- from the 23rd to the 25th of May, 1992? They wanted to break through Livno and get to Split.

A. Yes, I know about that. I don't know the details, but I remember the operation.

Q. Thank you very much. Do you know that after that meeting, the Republika Srpska army broke through to the Neretva River, took the municipality of Stolac, most of the municipality of Capljina, and the eastern part of Mostar?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that in mid-June, 1992, HVO forces, with some assistance from the ABiH that wasn't fully fledged at the time, liberated Stolac, Capljina, et cetera, those territories?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Do you know that Jajce fell after heavy combat on the 29th of September, 1992, and the army of Republika Srpska drove back the forces of the HVO and the ABiH and took the town and municipality of Jajce?

A. Yes, but there was no heavy fighting, unfortunately.

Q. Very well. We'll discuss that later. Do you know that during 1993, continuously with varying intensity, there were artillery attacks by the Serb army on the Mostar-Stolac area?

A. Yes.

Q. That the army of Republika Srpska attacked the municipalities of

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Tomislavgrad, Livno, Tomislavgrad and Bugojno?

A. Yes.

Q. That the army of Serbia attacked Orasje, Posavina?

A. On a daily basis, yes.

Q. And the HVO units -- and the HVO units were defending Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo, Bihac, Usora, Zepce, Vares, Gradacac, Brcko, Tuzla, those areas. Do you know about that?

A. Of course.

Q. Thank you. Now, on the map we see 11 HVO brigades and one HVO battalion which were established

and were located outside what we later referred to as the provinces of - provinces 3, 8, and 10, which were in provinces 1, 5, and 9, in actual fact. Are you aware of that? Do you know about those brigades?

A. Yes. You were referring to the provinces according to the Vance-Owen Plan.

Q. Yes. Now, would you agree with me that all those 11 brigades and the HVO battalion that was there, that they were established and that they fought on the territory which was outside what is mentioned here as the banovina of Croatia within Bosnia-Herzegovina? Take a look at the map, please.

A. I helped one of the Defence counsel explain what "banovina" meant last time. Banovina is not fact; it is fiction. On the other hand, everything you say is quite correct as far as the fighting was concerned, that the Croats made their contribution to the defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (redacted) If, after

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his agreement, everything went counter to it. And the second point is that we in the Presidency reached a decision to form armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which meant that all those defending Bosnia-Herzegovina - and that was the greatest problem I personally faced - was how to incorporate the HVO and the BH army and HOS at that point in time. Now, the problem arose with the behaviour of the different commanders. Now, this contribution by Croatia to the defence of BH was very important and indubitable. It was much more than just being an active defence. It was helping logistics in the different regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, logistical support for Gradacac and Tuzla, for example, where the commander of the 2nd BH army corps was located and that was Zeljko Knez; and the town of Gradacac, Mejacevic. So you're just pointing out the positive features which we can accept. However, the conflicts arose on an interpersonal level, political level, outside the system and the institutions.

Q. Mr. Kljuic, there's no doubt about that. We're not challenging that at all.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Kljuic, it's just because of the time constraints that I can't enter into those -- into a debate of that kind and we can't go into the

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details. Otherwise, rest assured that I'd be happy to clear up the interpersonal relations and how many commanders of the BH army had previously been in the Yugoslav army during the aggression against Croatia. There are a lot of details of that kind. But I'd like to ask you to restrict yourself to certain facts, that there were 11 brigades fighting for Bosnia-Herzegovina outside areas which we, here, conditionally refer to as "banovina"; is that right? Would that be right?

A. Yes.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] May we move on to the next exhibit. 3D 00431 is the number.

Q. Now, while we're waiting for the document, look at the red lines on the map, please. After the fall of Jajce, was it the intention of the army of Republika Srpska to break through to Sarajevo?

A. Well, they kept laying siege to Sarajevo but they weren't very good soldiers and didn't succeed in taking control of Sarajevo.

Q. I don't mind about Sarajevo. That's not the point. But to try and break through the corridor up to Jajce and Travan /Travnik?/. Now, look at the Bosanska-Posavina corridor on the map now, please.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Yes, I will slow down. Yes, yes, yes.

MR. KARNAVAS: Just for the record, Your Honour, it may be good to identify the map with a number, and it would also be good, when Mr. Praljak -- General Praljak is referring to the map and lines, to sort of have the witness exactly point to the particular map so we can get it on

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the record.

MR. SCOTT: And in a similar fashion, Your Honour, it would also be helpful if specific dates were used. We're generally skipping around continually from 1990 to 1994 and 1995. Could we also have Mr. Praljak give the specific dates of the questions he puts to the witness.


JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, bear that in mind, please.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The exact dates of the individual operations, and I state them, I give the months and dates: Jajce, Posavina, Livno, all this is in 1992. And you have that enumerated, the exact dates when what happened after the meeting in Graz.

Q. Now, sir, point to the corridor that the Serbs were defending on the map, please.

A. Well, I can get up and show you. This was the corridor which linked Banja Luka to Belgrade.

Q. Thank you. I have finished with the map. But would you now take a look –



LEGEND:

HVO BRIGADES:

1. HVO br. "ZENIČKA" - ZENICA
2. HVO br: "J. FRANCETIĆ" - ZENICA
3. 110. br. HVO - USORA
4. 111. XP brigade - ŽEPČE
5. HVO br. "KOTROMANIĆ" - KAKANJ
6. HVO br. "BOBOVAC" - VAREŠ
7. 115. br. HVO - TUZLA
8. 107. br. - GRADAČAC
9. 108. br. - BRČKO
10. HVO br. "KRALJ TVRTKO" - SARAJEVO
11. HVO br. BIHAĆ
12. HVO battalion "KOMUŠINA" - TESLIĆ

These brigades remained under A BiH command after the attack of ABiH on HVO in Central Bosnia and Neretva valley.

➔ Direction of VRS attacks after, so called, agreement in Graz

March/1994

VIDOSLOV - PUBLICATION OF THE EPARCHY OF ZAHUMLJE AND HERZEGOVINA

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Archpriest Aleksa Zubac

**A VISIT TO THE DESTROYED SERBIAN HOLY OBJECTS IN THE CITY OF MOSTAR
ON THE DAY 21 JULY 1994**

Since the expulsion of the Serbian population from the city of Mostar and the withdrawal of the JNA (by the end of May 1992), Mostar remained without its Orthodox population of Serbian nationality, with an exception of a small number who stayed for various reasons. I, the Superior of the Cathedral was among the last to leave Mostar, on the eve of 15 June 1992, when the Serbian part of the city was shelled and burnt, and the Cathedral hit several times and set on fire. Since then there was no return for the Serbs back into this town. The desire to return is great, and the desire to pay homage to the destroyed holy places even greater.

Mr. Atanasije, the Bishop of Zahumlje, Herzegovina and the Littoral, from the first day of his arrival into Herzegovina wanted to visit the Serbian holy places in Mostar and the Neretva Region, as the Archpriest in charge. Having arrived in Herzegovina (inaugurated on Vidovdan 1992 in the Cathedral in Trebinje) he visited all the churches on the free Serbian territory of Herzegovina and immediately after continued to look for the opportunity to visit those which are under enemy rule. Having learnt in conversation with Mr. Atanasije that he is seeking an opportunity to visit Mostar, I asked to accompany him, as I had been the archpriest in Mostar and the superior of the church for full 18 years.

Bishop Atanasije invested enormous effort, as well as the competent authorities of the Republic of Srpska, and thank God, on the day of the Great Martyr Procopius (21 July 1994) our wish was realized. As all the preconditions for the visit of Serbian holy places in the city of Mostar were fulfilled, on the left bank of Neretva, on that morning, His Excellence Mr. Atanasije, archimandrite Simeon and my humble self (Archpriest Aleksa Zubac) set out from the Tvrdoš Monastery toward Stolac, where the UNPROFOR was supposed to take us over. Our communication men got in touch with the point of Herzeg-Bosnia in Stolac, but for unknown reasons we waited two hours until the communications were established and the permission to go finally granted.

After two hours of waiting, the UNPROFOR car arrived, and then, behind the transporter another car from the direction of Stolac. It was only then that we were sure we were going to Mostar. One of the transporters returned to Stolac, and when it came back we finally set out on our way. One small car went in front of us, than the military transporter, and behind us a military jeep with 4 armed Spaniards and another military transporter. The Spanish officer pointed out to us to keep as close to the transporter as we can, and in case of attack to switch to the transporter (what we didn't ask for). In this formation we reached the Croatian check-point at the entry into Stolac. Croatian police came by car and one of them came to us and said in an official tone: "We are going forward in our car, and you follow the transporter, but no photographs are to be taken, and no stoppings through our territory." Their police went ahead. We passed Stolac, Masline, Domanovići, then descended into Tasovčići on the main road. Then we passed through Počitelj, Žitomislić, Buna, Ortiješ

and arrived on the Muslim check-point near the former “Mehanizacija” where UNPROFOR, Muslim police and two Serbs, representatives of the Serbs under Muslim rule were waiting for us. These were Obrad Lozo and Ratko Pejanović (one of them is married to a Muslim, and another to a Croat).

Driving our jeep, I watched around myself all the time and saw that the Serbian villages are plundered and torched, especially from Tasovčići until Buna and towards Mostar. The land and vineyards from Stolac to Žitomislić were occasionally cultivated, but towards Mostar almost nothing. We passed the Muslim check-point, then went on foot to the Spanish UNPROFOR post where we were received very kindly, and offered coffee and juices. The Spanish officers took the blessing of Bishop Atanasije, which pleasantly surprised me. Present among them was their military priest who greeted Mr. Atanasije very kindly and presented him with the New Testament in Spanish. Bishop Atanasije gave to the officer home-made drink, and to the others small crosses and icons of Christ and the Virgin Mary, which they received with pleasure. Then we again set out on our way in our cars along the main road toward Mostar, behind the tobacco factory below Šarić Haram, along the former Tito’s street to the theatre, where we left the vehicles in charge of Spanish soldiers.

This is how we arrived in our martyr city of Mostar, where sheer sadness was waiting for us when we saw the destruction. We went on foot along the Serbian Brankovac along Bajatova Street, into the house of the late Džemal Bijedić, where the Islamic religious community is situated. We were received by the imam and Fatima Leho, who is the contact person for the Muslim part of Mostar. To Bishop Atanasije’s question whether he could meet with the mufti, the imam answered that he is away, but there is the possibility of his return quite soon. It later turned out that mufti was not in the city at all, but away travelling.

Mrs. Fatima telephoned the Muslim Mayor Safet Oručević, who came soon after. His meeting with the Bishop Atanasije and all of us was so open that it surprised us. In the conversation Mr. Oručević said: “Mostar is a Muslim city and a Serbian city and this is how it should remain. Mostar is the city of Aleksa Šantić and Osman Đikić. We know who destroyed our Cathedral. I keep it in my office on the wall, you can come to me and see it. The Cathedral must be renovated. Please submit the request and I will grant you the permission for renewal right away. Mostar is not Mostar unless the Serbs will live in it. He then turned to historical facts, historical objects, mentioning Žitomislić, the Cathedral and the Old church and other Serbian cultural and historic monuments in Mostar. “You, Bishop, he added, should come into Žitomislić which is in the Mostar Municipality and renovate it without delay”. He mentioned that Šantić’s monument was ruined, as well as Đikić’s, only because he wrote approvingly of the Serbs. “Šantić’s bust was pulled out from the Neretva, where the Croats had thrown it, and we are keeping it.” He gave the promise that the bust will be returned to its original place. He thanked the Serbian army, saying that the Serbs preserved 70% of Mostar, and the Muslims 30%. He was mentioning their meeting with the Serbian general Mladić, saying that they were seven days late and this prevented them to reach Neretva and even Neum with their joint forces. He added that he was also with G. Konjević, and mentioned a meeting with the commandeer Novica Gušić and major Samardžić who helped him in the combat against the Croatian Ustasha “who butchered you Serbs in 1941, and at that time dragged us also into it, and now, in May 1993 they butchered us, so none of the Muslims wants to go with the Ustasha... We cannot get along with the Croats, but with the Serbs we want and can live together.” He and the Muslims of Mostar are greatly thankful to the Serbs, because if it weren’t for the Serbs, there would be no Mostar nor Muslims in it. He clearly invited the Serbs to come to Mostar.

He asked us to thank in his name the Serbian government and military personnel for everything they did, saying that a Herzegovinian region of Serbs and Muslims must be created and that the Muslims of Mostar are not the same as those in Bosnia, which he mentioned even to Alija Izetbegović. On departure, the Bishop gave him a litre of drink and 1000 Deutsche Mark for the orphans of Mostar who remained without parents. Oručević handed the money to the imam saying he should give it to the mufti. The Muslim priest (hoxha) and Fatima Leho invited us to lunch, after the tour of the churches.

We then descended into the town for lunch with the Muslim priest, where they asked the Bishop to mediate with the Serbian authorities regarding their 270 missing persons, whose names were sent to the Serbian government. They also asked the Bishop to mediate that the Serbian authorities permit the mufti from Banja Luka to visit Mostar, and expressed mufti’s desire to visit Eastern Herzegovina.

During lunch the Spanish commander of UNPROFOR also came, a certain colonel Pedro Luis Brana, to greet the Bishop who heartily thanked him and gave him a bottle of Serbian wine and a small cross. After lunch we

had a tour of the Old Town and the Old Bridge. Truly, a lot of buildings are damaged, but only a small number was torched. On the return, we went through the former Tito's Street until Zalik, and then by the main road to the Muslim check-point.

In this part of Mostar it is visible that the Serbian houses were deliberately set on fire after our expulsion, not during battles, as illustrated by the following: Džemal's house and others on the right side are untouched, while near the Sat kula on the left side the houses of Jagoš Muatović, Simo Mrav, Vlatko Radić and other Serbian homes were torched. A settlement of houses, from Zalik towards the Muslim area is not torched, while the Serbian houses near the church were torched. The same situation is in Bjelušine and along the entire main road. It is with anguish that I stress that everything which is Serbian was destroyed, irrespective of value, apart from the objects which the Muslims used for their purposes. The park above the theatre is turned into a cemetery.

This is my humble report of the past event.

On the day of the Great Martyr Procopius, 21 July 1994

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, namo
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom sa
kovec, s. Klepci, sa sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

epređiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

**THE CONFLICT OF
A BiH AND HVO IN
USKOPLJE
(GORNJI VAKUF)**

**The way in which A BiH
provoked the conflict with
HVO**

FACTS

A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF THE PROVOKING OF CONFLICTS ON THE PART OF A BiH.

I singled out a certain number of documents both from A BiH and the HVO, a representative sample, as well as the testimony of the HVO commander in Uskoplje (Gornji Vakuf) at the court in The Hague.

I wish to draw the attention of the reader to the answer of Enver Hadžihasanović (commander of the 3rd Corps of A BiH) to the Bugojno Command and the 307th Mountain Brigade in Uskoplje-Gornji Vakuf, on January 20th, 1993:

“It is too early for confrontation in all the towns of the HZ /Croatian Community/ of Herzeg-Bosnia, although this option is also on the table”.

So much about the intentions and plans of ABiH towards the HVO and the Croats.

Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Zrinko Tokic.

A. Greetings, General.

Q. Would you please open that set of documents that you received from me, and it's document 2D00211, 2D00211. Have you found it?

A. Yes.

Q. Although there's no signature there, do you remember the document and did you draft it?

A. Yes, I remember this document, and, yes, it was drafted in my headquarters.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Now, could the witness be provided with a map? Here you are.

Q. And I'd like to draw your attention to the following: You've been provided with a document, so tell Their Honours now, please, whether that was the first conflict between the BH Army and the HVO.

A. Yes, it was, General, sir.

Q. Now, did you make a special plan or concrete plan of armed conflict with the BH Army at the time? And I'll ask you about later on later.

A. In my command, we never drew up a plan according to the requirements of the BH Army.

Q. Furthermore, on the basis of the Green Berets' conduct, you say here that their behaviour towards civilians, in buildings and on the streets, had elements of the Chetnik way of behaving. Do you still maintain that parts of the BH Army, that is to say, the Green elements, behaved in similar fashion to the Army of Republika Srpska, or the Chetniks, as you refer to them?

A. General, let me explain. In this conflict, the Green Berets blocked the entrance at the fire brigade tower. All Croats moving around were placed in the basin, and all the Croat population they placed in basements and cellars, and then somebody shot above their heads.

Q. Now, this man, Hanefija Prijic, nicknamed Paraga, did he, until the end - well, I don't know when - 1993, 1994, continuously cause conflicts and that this resulted in killings not only of Croats but Italians, too, and that he was beyond anybody's control, or appeared to be?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Tokic, look at the map, please. It's a map that we have drawn, and it shows the dispersion of forces at the end of June 1992. Let's start from the left-hand side. The red is the Army of Republika Srpska, the blue is the HVO, the green is the BH Army. Now, from the border towards Croatia, in the area of Livno, we have the Petar Kresimir the 4th Brigade there, and then in Tomislavgrad the Kralj Tomislav Brigade, and then the Rama Brigade, and then the Eugen Kvaternik Brigade. Did they hold 80-odd per cent of the territory facing the Army of Republika Srpska?

A. We can see that from this map, yes.

Q. Do you have any other information that would deny and challenge the correctness of this map?

A. No, General, sir, I do not.

Q. Now, in the area of Uskoplje, we have the green and the blue, but that is not the deployment of forces; it denotes the majority and minority population, although the population was mixed. But look at that general area, and do you agree that this is what the situation looked like, roughly, that the population was like that, the Muslims and Croats, in those villages, as indicated on this map here?

A. Yes, I agree with that, General, sir, and this is on the basis of the 1991 population census.

Q. Mr. Tokic, on the 20th - or between the 20th and 21st of June, 1992, during the conflict in Vakuf, did the BH Army leave the line, the green arrow there, leave the line at Raduski Kamen, facing the Army of Republika Srpska, and quickly moved into town?

A. That is a fact, an established fact.

Q. Tell me, please, Mr. Tokic, the HVO, regardless of future conflicts and the January conflict, but this attack by the BH Army in 1993, after the fall of Bugojno, did the HVO ever leave its positions up at the front-line facing the Army of Republika Srpska in your area, Raduski Kamen, towards the south?

A. The Dr. Ante Starcevic Brigade never left its positions up at the front-lines facing the Army of Republika Srpska.

Q. Regardless of how difficult the situation was, say, in 1993, when the BH Army, after Bugojno, launched an all-out attack towards Gornji Vakuf? Did you hold the line then, too, at Raduski Kamen, facing the Army of Republika Srpska?

A. Yes, I kept my units up at the Raduski Kamen facing the Army of Republika Srpska even then.

Q. Would you sign the map and place today's date there, please?

*** PROCEDURAL MATTERS***

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Before you look at this map, Mr. Tokic, tell me, as of June, based on your knowledge, were there not two vectors all the time, one that was trying to cause a rift between the BH Army and the HVO, and the other trying to keep this conflict from occurring?

A. General, sir, before I answer this question, if I may be allowed a clarification. Your Honours, the Dr. Ante Starcevic Brigade units, in early April 1992, were at this position, constantly talking to Musa, Fikret, the BH Army commander, but it wasn't before the 2nd of June, 1992, that I had managed to persuade the BH Army units to go out and reach these lines. Having left these lines, they started doing fortifying work within their own villages and set up their own defence in these villages behind my back. Therefore, I was in a position where I had to travel through their villages, and I often saw my motor vehicle, my Caterpillar, taken away from me, and then as talks continued I tried to get these back and send the engineers back to the Logistics Unit, where their work was required.

Q. To follow up on that question and in relation to the map that we're about to look at, what about the HVO, the Ante Starcevic Brigade, and you, as its commander; did you ever, anywhere, dig trenches behind the lines facing the VRS? Did the HVO, at any point in any village inhabited by Croats, dig trenches or, indeed, set up any sort of defence line facing anyone at all?

A. General, the answer is no.

Q. As early as 1992, when, if at all, did trenches begin to be dug behind the lines far away from Radusa? By the way, what is the distance between Uskoplje and Raduski Kamen, the positions facing the VRS, as the crow flies?

A. In my opinion, about 15 kilometres, sir.

Q. When did this begin, when did this continue, and when was the pace sort of stepped up in terms of the trench-digging done by the BH Army in predominantly Muslim villages and at the elevations around the area?

A. This began in June 1992, and continued on an ongoing basis for the duration of the clashes between the HVO and the BH Army.

Q. Were there not ongoing talks between the BH Army and you, as the initiator, about this, how to put a stop to this, saying that, in a way, this was leaving the HVO in an entirely impossible position, with lines behind their backs, behind their own positions? Were there talks, and on how many occasions?

A. There were dozens of occasions where this was discussed. We failed to convince the BH Army members, but then we tried to get UNPROFOR in on these talks. Major Jones appointed Captain Nick to mediate and have the trenches filled, but it was because of UNPROFOR and security reasons that Captain Nick was unable to carry out this mission.

Q. Based on your information, in December 1992 did those talks not become stepped up to the effect that digging up these trenches was an act of aggression against the HVO, and so on and so forth?

A. Yes, certainly. A basic plan was there, and we had begun preparations to reconnoiter in the direction of Kupres, and we did not like to see the situation in the town, itself, de-stabilised like this.

In my capacity as a commander, each of my soldiers have families and they're are afraid both - for the destiny of their families. At the same time, I am putting their life - their lives in harm's way along the front-line facing VRS.

Q. Mr. Tokic, do you not know that during those talks in December, there were you, there was Siljeg, there was Andric, but do you know that I was in the area, too, and do you know that, particularly in relation to these two men, I drove them on to have further talks in order to resolve that situation?

A. Yes, I do know about that, General. I even received an order to get in touch with the Bosniak side in order to try and convince them to work with us in order to neutralise this engineering work that was being done and to join forces to work against the Serbs and advance on Kupres.

Q. Do you agree with me that the repeater and Krč were two essential elevations, two important hilltops, and whoever had them under control had Uskoplje, itself, under a degree of total military control?

A. Speaking of the town, itself, these are features that provide anyone in possession of these features with an enormous strategic advantage. If there was someone on these hilltops with a weapon, it was impossible to move about freely in any part of town.

Q. So who dug the trenches, when, and what quality were those trenches? I'm talking about these two elevations.

A. General, sir, the trenches were prepared by the BH Army. They were simply dug up and then certain approach paths were cemented. Bunkers were built, too, in order to make sure the fortifications could not be penetrated by the enemy's 120-millimetre mortar shells.

Q. During the clashes that I refer to as a necessary defence - what's the word, active defence - in January 1993, did the HVO units take these two prominent elevations, and a number of others, too, previously occupied by the BH Army?

A. On the 18th and the 21st of January, both these features were under the control of the HVO.

Q. Even so, on the 23rd, or the 22nd, the evening of the 22nd, was there a definite agreement that the HVO would at no cost be taking Uskoplje, but rather that they would comply with the orders that had arrived from Geneva?

A. Most certainly, that was the case, General, sir.

Q. Mr. Tokic, was this a simple communication to make to the HVO units at the time who had both suffered under all forms of mistreatment for months before, and many of them had been killed and wounded by the BH Army? You, as a commander, and me, as the mediator, was this a simple thing to achieve, regardless of an order actually being written?

A. This was not a professional army. They weren't active-service soldiers. Hence, it was very difficult to explain a thing like that to the soldiers there, to explain that the combat was now over and that the situation on the ground meant we would all be going back to our barracks and continuing our mission vis-a-vis the VRS.

Q. Mr. Tokic, following the cease-fire, when did the BH Army go to the trenches at Krc repeater again?

A. General, sir, this occurred in April 1993.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: A technical question. Could you allow the witness to sit down again? I think it would be more normal, and he's not working with the map anymore. You need him on the map? Okay, then, maybe you don't forget that it's also better for the microphone when he's sitting. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour. The person before us is a soldier. He can remain standing for as long as you like.

Q. Mr. Tokic -

JUDGE TRECHSEL: I don't think that that is the decisive criterion. Normally, our witness sit there, and if it's necessary that he stands, let him stand as long as it's necessary, and then he should sit again.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would prefer to remain standing, Your Honours, if that's all right.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: No, you will have to sit again because of the microphone and everything. Witnesses sit.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Tokic, after Bugojno, when the offensive got off the ground - well, in Bugojno, too, ongoing, did the BH Army - were they not just there, but also deeper into the territory?

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not get the name of the location.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. - and so on and so forth?

A. General, sir, the BH Army fell out somewhere in that area, so they took the general Mačkovac area, including Sivanska Livadar [phoen].

Q. Quite right, there was this insistence on the cease-fire, and you allowed for all of this to happen without fighting back; is that right?

A. Yes, that's right, General. I had to shift the focus forward to the lines. I was facing problems taking people there, who were feeling unsafe after the clashes, taking them through the Muslim territories to Voljice and Gračac.

Q. Thank you very much. Can we now go back to the map, please. It was based on P01102. While we're waiting for the document, I'm not going to be showing you any photographs with the trenches that were filled up, because we have already shown the Chamber those photographs and the Chamber knows about those. Please look at the map now. To the best of your knowledge, was the BH Army - well, it's green and the HV is blue, and then was it -

A. General, sir, let us just take a minute to find the map.

Q. No, no, the document. The map is right there. Look at the map first.

MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, while they're searching for the document, perhaps I should use this opportunity. This is 3D03764. You have it in the folder.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters could not hear counsel. There are too many microphones on all the time. Thank you.

MR. KOVACIC: [No interpretation] [Interpretation] 01102. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. The map was based on that document, and this is how the conflict evolved, which began - well, actually, even before - well, in actual fact, the 11th of January, 1992, and kept evolving until the 22nd, when it came to a final stop. Do you agree, therefore, that - well, then, back in 1993, that the BH Army was at Makljen, that it actually was at Crni Vrh, that it infiltrated and that it had the desire to infiltrate the Neretvica Brigade along this access towards our artillery positions, and were these, roughly speaking, the confrontation lines early in January 1993?

A. General -

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note, the interpreter cannot hear the witness. There is far too much background noise and the witness is standing far too far away from the microphone. Thank you.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, the interpreters can't hear you, so please try and speak between the two microphones that are lit up in front of you.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll try to oblige, Your Honour.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Can you repeat my answer - can you repeat your answer?

A. General, this was the disposition before the clashes in January 1993.

Q. Can you please look at the map first and look at the location of the artillery positions marked to the left, where the Neretvica Brigade of the BH Army emerged near Dobros, and then answer, to the best of your knowledge? And down there, you can see some markings in the lower left corner, the 130-millimetre gun positioned. Is the map accurate, to the best of your knowledge? Is this what we - what the HVO, after the outbreak of clashes, dragged over into the area, so to speak, in order to defend from the territory of Uskoplje that was under full military control by the BH Army by then?

A. General, the artillery was there, and at the beginning its only purpose was to coordinate with our forces along the defence lines facing the VRS. Therefore, the artillery pieces were not moved towards Gornji Vakuf.

Q. All right. So can you look at this 120-millimetre mortar at Dobros? What about this mortar right there? Does it have a range that is sufficient to target Vakuf and Uskoplje town?

A. General, sir, there is no way Gornji Vakuf could be within its range from this position.

Q. What about the T-55 tank that's marked to the left and the 120-millimetre mortar at the very top of Makljen? What about their range, what about a visual line of sight? Could they target Uskoplje in any way?

A. General, from this location there is no open line of sight. You can't see the town, nor can you use these weapons to pound the town from this position.

Q. What about the T-30 gun, what about its position? Was it not supposed to be targeting the VRS or some of its units, as opposed to being part of the preparations to do anything about Uskoplje further down to the left?

A. General, sir, although the range happens to be 30 kilometres for this gun, if you see its position, it becomes perfectly clear that Gornji Vakuf and Uskoplje are much further up.

Q. Mr. Tokic, could you please tell me whether it is obvious, based on this, based on the positions of the artillery, that at no point during the attack or back then was there any military desire or activity to use the artillery and the guns to pound the town? The only thing that was there was - yes, I'll reformulate that question.

MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, yes, I'm objecting to the forms of these questions.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I'll reformulate that.

Q. So the artillery deployed in that way, and you're a professional so you know about these things, does that mean that they wanted to target the town or does it mean that they wanted to target the axis along which the BH Army units were coming in to reinforce and assist the others?

A. General, this deployment does not ensure targeting the town because it's out of the range, but what they wanted to target, the people who deployed the artillery know about that. They can target the axes into town, but they cannot reach the town, itself. That would be beyond its range.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Tokic. Now, despite this, Your Honour, despite the fact that we have these maps in this particular form, when we want to look at - when you want to look at something on them, I'm not sure you'll be able to find your way on small maps, so I would like both maps to be signed by Mr. Tokic so that you can have them at your disposal, because you can't have a small-scale A4 format map if you want to see the lie of the land properly.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If the Trial Chamber needs these maps, we shall return to them, but I have said for a long time already now that we should have had on the walls of this courtroom large-scale maps, like this was the case during the Nuremberg trial, because a lot of these cases involve military issues, and working on these matters without these military maps is rather difficult. So we do as best we can. The people that designed this Tribunal, unfortunately, did not think of that at the time. Please proceed.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The next map is - well, shows both sides in 1993, on the 22nd of January. It's map number 3. I still think that it would be a good idea for the witness to sign the maps.

Q. Mr. Tokic, take a look at this map, please, and put right anything that needs to be put right on the map. It's for the 22nd of January, 1993, so it's what I managed to compile based on the documents I had at my disposal and what I knew about.

A. Your Honours, I need a felt-tipped pen in order to be able to do that, please.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Yes, he'll correct the map and sign it.

MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] During this break, perhaps we can observe that it is number 3D03766 that we're dealing with here, and obviously the witness will be making certain markings, and then we'll ask for it to be tendered with an IC number.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When it comes to this map and deployment on that particular day, there is an error made in this area [indicates], Dolac and Hrasnica, because the BH Army forces had taken complete control of the main road, the M-16-2 main road, but also the local road when the railway line was abolished and a macadam road constructed, so that to Pavic, Polje, and Humac, the road there was cut off.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Could you mark that on the map, please?

A. [Marks]

Q. And sign your name there, sir. Put the date and your signature.

A. [Marks]

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Since this map bears something in writing by the witness, we shall give it an IC number.

THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. The document, the map – the map, the version of 3D0376 as just marked by the witness, shall be given Exhibit 1060. Thank you, Your Honours.

MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, for better understanding of the witness's testimony, I think we ought to correct something that I think was a mistake in the record, in the transcript, at line 11. The localities the witness mentioned wasn't correctly noted, when he said that the road was cut off in that area, so could you tell us the names of the locations again?

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, can you please give us the exact names of these localities?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the place names that we used as defence positions and as blocking the areas were Duradbegov Dolac settlement and the Hrasnica settlement. And there were two roads, and one was a main road and is referred to even today as M-16-2, it's an asphalt road, and the other is the old railway line that was abolished in 1971. It's a macadamised road surface which the locals use as an alternative road to take them from Gornji Vakuf and Uskoplje to Voljice Polje or Humac.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Q. Open document 4D00351 now, please.

A. May I ask for the usher's assistance? I can't find the document.

Q. It's 4D00351, but you have it on your screen.

A. Yes, I can see it on my screen.

Q. Sir, do you know who the head was, Ivan Majic?

A. General, sir, Ivan Majic was the head of the Intelligence Department in the Command of the Operative Zone of North-West Herzegovina.

Q. Tell us, please, sir, lowering the flag, was it an insult against the dignity of a nation, whether Bosniak or Croat?

A. Absolutely correct. And if I may be allowed to explain, General, sir. In 1990 and 1991, the flags were connected, the Muslim and Croatian people's flag. The Croatian flag, the historical Croatian flag, with the Croatian coat of arms, and the other flag with the golden lily or lilies, we linked them up, and - or, rather, we

displayed them together and adorned the town that way in 1990 and 1991, and it never happened that one ethnic group took offence to the other ethnic group's flag being raised. And this, what happened - this is something that happened for the first time. On the 26th of December, the police returned three of the flags and one flag was set fire to, was burnt.

Q. Another question. So there was a conflict in Rama. Now, the BH Army units -

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It took me a few seconds to analyse all of this, but I believe you just mentioned an important event. You said that in 1990 and 1991, i.e., two years prior to that, in Gornji Vakuf the Croatian flag and the Bosniak flag were side by side and there was no problem. These two flags were there for a number of years. Is this what you've just said?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said it - put it a little differently. What I said was this: I said that at certain festivities, those two flags would appear together, and that in town, the Bosniaks, for Bajram, would raise their own flag, and for Christmas, we would raise our flag.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I understand correctly, these flags had a religious connotation?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Why do you say, "No," when you have just said that these flags were hoisted when there were religious festivities for Christmas and during Bajram?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, because the Croats, for the most part, were Catholics, 100 per cent, and for them Christmas and Easter are their greatest - biggest religious holidays, and so these were festivities and a ceremony, and for those festivities they wanted to have the best they could offer to their people, which was the symbol of their nation, of their people, in the place where they live, hung up on the family home or some other vantage point. So in addition to the Christmas tree and the lights, there was the flag, too.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Tokic, but the Croatian people or the Bosniak people, did they have at the time any state holiday to celebrate?

A. General, sir, at the time we didn't have any state holiday, no.

Q. Well, there was state holidays of the former state that nobody wanted to observe; right?

A. Yes, the holidays of the previous state were left behind, and there was no law on new state holidays.

Q. And what about the flags, the flags of the Bosniak and Croatian people? They were linked together and displayed together as a mark of communality and togetherness, vis-a-vis the cataclysm that was being prepared; is that what you wanted to say?

A. Yes, precisely, that's what I wanted to say.

Q. Thank you. Now let's look -

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] How much more time do I have, Your Honour, so that I can make a selection of all this vast material that I have here in front of me?

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I don't know, something like 20 minutes. The Registrar will tell us. You have had 34 minutes so far, so you should have 11 minutes left. I was generous when I talked about 20 minutes. You should have 11 minutes left.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Oh, dear, oh, dear.

Q. Now, let's look at this document. Well, we've seen that document. Let's look at 5D0116 [as interpreted], please, 5D01126. It's a document dated the 11th of January, 1993. Is that your document, Mr. Tokic?

A. Yes, yes, it's my document from my headquarters and command.

Q. Right. And you say here that they captured the deputy commander of the 1st Battalion, a captain or commander of a company, and that the situation at present is calm, that communications have been blocked. Now, at that point in time, were efforts still being made to calm the situation down?

A. Just an explanation, General, sir. On the 11th, when I went to work, they captured two cooks, female cooks, working in my headquarters, and a quarter-master working with meat. Now, after the morning meeting, my officers came back – were coming back from the meeting and were captured, but the problem is that I went by that way, too, and they tried to capture me, too; that is to say, the members of the BH Army. But they knelt down on the road, cocked their rifles, and I had to make a decision. I had to decide whether to stop or to continue. I decided to continue, and they didn't shoot at me.

Q. Let's look at 5D01124 now, please.

A. Can someone please give me a hand? I'm trying to find this document.

Q. Look at the screen, Mr. Tokic. It's right there in front of you.

A. All right, I have it on my screen now.

Q. Mr. Tokic, first of all, and this is something that can be checked in your documents, you keep writing "Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, the Croatian Defence Council," and so on and so forth. All the time you are the commander of that brigade, did you believe yourselves to be the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. General, sir, we believed ourselves to be the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then and after.

Q. Just like your soldiers, did you not believe yourself to be defending Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Croats there, as well as all the other ethnic groups and citizens?

A. Yes, absolutely. That was our mission, and we were honoured to do it.

Q. Look at this document that you sent both to Siljeg and on to Mostar. Siljeg says: "Can I please have an urgent reply on what to do next?" Rather, you're asking him about any further actions to be taken. This is probably Siljeg's handwriting over there. He wants to know what this is about, and so on and so forth. At this point in time, are you still preparing any sort of offensive against the BH Army at all or, on the 11th, you are still trying to bring the conflict to an end?

A. General, the mission of a commander is such that he has to try everything out to prevent a conflict from erupting, and all our work was about that, trying to keep the clashes from happening.

Q. Can we look at 3D00525, please. Have you got that?

A. Yes.

Q. This is the 12th of January, 1993. You say here as follows: "The forces were spontaneously alerted, and our forces, too." There was shooting. Communications broke down. And then you say the municipality was shelled by the Chetniks. Is it not true that at the time the VRS, too, was targeting Uskoplje?

A. Yes, that's true, General.

Q. But you had some information, and you go on to state this: You had received warnings that there would be shelling, and you conveyed this to the BH Army Command. On the 12th of January, 1993, you are still forwarding information regarding the intentions of VRS to the BH Army Command; right?

A. Yes. That's because the situation in the town was not very good, and we did not want it - we did not want to leave them in a situation where they might draw the wrong conclusion.

Q. Based on that, can we infer that on the 12th there was still attempts being made to put an end to the clashes, and there were no plans to attack Uskoplje or the BH Army?

A. Certainly, that is the correct inference. We were doing everything within our power to keep the clashes from erupting.

Q. You also state here that there was sporadic shooting by individuals and groups on both sides. Was it possible to control something like that? Someone opens fire somewhere and then there is an exchange. Was this something that the brigade commander or the operative zone commander could possibly have control?

A. General, sir, had this been a professional army, perhaps that would have been possible, but all we had there was recruits who happened to be there, and an army was built up over a very short period of time during the

homeland war. It wasn't always possible to make sure orders were followed. Quite simply, platoon commanders and squad commanders sometimes had a very hard time establishing effective control over their units.

Q. Look at 3D00513, please. The date is the 13th of January, 3D00153 [as interpreted]. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You signed this. Is this your document?

A. I haven't got it yet.

Q. 3D00513. Look at the screen, please.

A. All right, I see it.

Q. Is this one of your documents?

A. Yes.

Q. In the last sentence, you say: "The material damage at this point is unestimatable. The city and some villages are on fire, since certain buildings are burning." Does this apply to both sides, both then and later? Whenever there was shooting on both sides with incendiary bullets and all that, was it possible for you to ascertain at the time who exactly set fire to a particular house in the town?

A. General, this would have constituted mission impossible. When you use incendiary bullets, the first thing you target was the stables, and then uninhabitable houses. Sometimes the windows were hit or the curtains caught fire, and then there would be a huge fire all of a sudden.

Q. Thank you very much. Now, towards the end, 3D00796, it's an exhibit.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, let me tell you that you've run out of time.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I have two or three documents left, Your Honour, which I can't afford to skip. If I may have a couple of minutes, please.

Q. Were you at this meeting mentioned in this document?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Mr. Tokic, what about the problems raised at this meeting? Is this not something that we discussed all the time over the previous months at meetings and briefings that I held when in Rama?

A. Yes, that's right.

Q. Who initiated this meeting?

A. It was you, the reason being we, the commanders, asked to have a meeting like this convened simply because the soldiers were slowly draining away.

Q. And now P02451 - P02415, the 16th of May, 1993. You've got that on your screen, Mr. Tokic. It's on the screen, so let's just try to use these two minutes to the best effect.

A. Yes, I see it, General.

Q. This is a letter that you wrote to the 2nd Brigade of the Croatian Army to leave your officer, Mate Kunkic; is that right?

A. Yes, General, that's right.

Q. What about Mate Kunkic; was he not a native of Uskoplje or a village nearby?

A. Mate Kunkic was from Uskoplje, born at Palic, near Uskoplje. He went to university in Zagreb and then he reported for duty to the 2nd Guards Brigade. He came to me as a volunteer, and he was the commander of Visnjica Sapnija [phoen].

Q. So here you're actually asking a favour. It's not that you can issue an order for them - for the brigade to leave him there, because you needed him; right?

A. Yes, that's right. I produced this entire document and signed it.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, to help you, the Trial Chamber will stop at 20 to 1.00. You have three minutes left.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honours.

Q. What about the Uskoplje area while you were there; to your knowledge, were there any regular soldiers of the Croatian Army present in the area or were they just volunteers?

A. In the zone of responsibility of my brigade in Gornji Vakuf and Uskoplje, there were only men there Uskoplje who volunteered to me or other persons I assigned to be there, men who volunteered to become a part of my unit. I can point out the example of Chris Wilson, who was a British man and for a while was in command of my reconnaissance company.

Q. The second-to-last document is 3D03067, 3D03067.

A. Yes, I see it on the screen.

Q. Is this my signature to the left? You remember that we wrote this one together, didn't we?

A. General, that's your signature.

Q. Can you tell the honorable Chamber what was your material situation, your brigade, in relation to, for example, the Tomislavgrad Brigade?

A. General, sir, Your Honours, if I may, I would like to clarify this. My unit relied on the supplies from Gornji Vakuf and Uskoplje. The logistics wasn't working properly or never fully. My soldiers received next to no salaries at all. We would sometimes be able to give our soldiers 100 German marks for three-month periods of service, but there was a war on and they wanted to have a systematic solution to deal with this situation, the reason being I was unable to keep my soldiers under control. They would be off for a weekend. They would realise, when they were elsewhere, that people were having good lives in these other areas, whereas back home there was a war on.

Q. P00259 - P02259. Paragraph 4 - it's on the screens now. Paragraph 4, that's all that I want to be looking at: "All MTS must be collected and returned to BH Army members, as well as HVO resources," there's another agreement there, "especially the resources which were taken from Colonel Miro Andric." What about Colonel Miro Andric; was he not the deputy Chief of the Main Staff, and that at the time was Brigadier Milivoj Petkovic; right?

A. General, I think so. I'm almost positive.

Q. All right. Now, tell me, to the best of your recollection, was he also a member of the recently-established Joint Command of the BH Army and the HVO for Central Bosnia?

A. He was with me at the command. I know that he had a mission like that.

Q. So what happened in Ravni Rostov?

A. General, we were on our way back from Travnik, where we had held talks with the BH Army. On our way back to the command, what by this time was the 7th Corps, at Ravni Rostov, near the ski resort, there was a camp - a Mujahedin camp. He was arrested, taken out of his vehicle, mistreated, stripped naked, and sent to Bugojno.

Q. From the 24th on, when I came there - last question, last question, last question. Just one question, just one.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: You are - you are abusing, Mr. Praljak -



JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, it's 20 to.



JUDGE TRECHSEL: - we have given you generous extra time. We do not normally do it. We made an exception in your favour, but then there must be limits to that also. I'm sorry.


THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I'm not abusing anything, Your Honour Judge Trechsel, I'm not abusing anything. It is my wish to ask another question, but don't term that abuse, because that would imply that I'm cheating, which is certainly not something that I'm trying to do. I just wanted to ask another question. I can't. Well, that's all right, I'll settle for that, too.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's have a 20-minute break.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. Tokic.









- REPETITOR /repeater/
Fortified positions of the
A BiH

Position of the "REPETITOR". The area which was under the control of A BiH, a dominant elevation from which the entire area of Uskoplje can be controlled. Possibility of artillery fire over the entire area, likewise the control of road communications towards Rama and Bugojno.






From the top of the "REPETITOR" towards the Partisan cemetery, along the entire ridge, 3rd degree shelters of the A BiH were built, some even with bricks and concrete!




Pictures 1, 2, 3, 4 – remains of the fortified positions of A BiH. Photographed in 2008.



Positions of the A BiH

Positions of the HVO before beginning of conflict



Dividing line in the town of Uskoplje

Road towards Bistrica

Photographed from the Post Office building

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
THE "ANTE STARČEVIĆ" BRIGADE

Gornji Vakuf

INTELLIGENCE ORGAN

Date: January 4th, 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Send to:

OPERATIONAL ZONE NORTHWESTERN HERZEGOVINA

- 1) Attn: IVAN MAJIĆ
- 2) COMMANDER OF THE OPERATIONAL ZONE NW HERZEGOVINA
- 3) HEAD OF SIS /Security Informative Service/ OF THE OPERATIONAL ZONE NW HERZEGOVINA,
TOMISLAVGRAD
- 4) DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR IPD /Informative Psychological Activity/ OF THE OPERATIONAL
ZONE NW HERZEGOVINA
- 5) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE IN GRUDE

Intelligence report for January 4th, 1993 as of 18.00 hours.

Today around 15 hours the flag of HOS was placed on the spot where the Muslims had taken down the Croatian flag three times already. While doing so, there was a short shooting which ended without consequences. The flags are placed in the Save Kovačevića Street, which divides the Muslim and Croat parts of the town. The very act of taking down of the flags speaks about the hatred and their decisiveness to mark Gornji Vakuf as their territory in their state, and everything which is Croat is unnecessary and as such should be removed. With the engagement of the commander of the Brigade and commander of the A BiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Headquarters the conflict was prevented, at least for now. However, from both sides of the Save Kovačevića Street there are battle-ready soldiers. They took down the HOS flag, but on that place the flag of the Croatian people was placed.

.....There is a strange peace now in the air, and the units are under the control of the commands.

Head for intelligence affairs
Lieutenant
Pero Mejdandžić

/square stamp: ECV, Name of the organ HVO HQ

Sent – received by telegram No. 33

Date Jan 5th 1993 at 00.10 hours

Processed by – Raič/

THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG BOSNIA
OZ N/W HERZEGOVINA

No.: 02/2-87

Tomislavgrad, 11 January 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET

GS HVO /Croatian Defence Council Main Staff/ MOSTAR

REGULAR COMBAT REPORT

1. INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY FORCES

In the zone of the brigade "A. Starčević", according to the received report from the GS HVO at 5,20 p.m. the brigade is in a combat readiness (combat alert). The BH Army forces have captured the 7 soldiers, members of the HVO, it is possible that the number of captured HVO members is even higher. The BH Army soldiers captured the commander of the 1. combat unit and the commander of the company. All possible actions have been taken to make the other side release the captured commander of the company, nevertheless the other side categorically refuses to release him. The present situation is calm however all the roads have been blocked. In the zone under the control of the brigade "Herceg Stjepan" the enemy at 2,00 a.m. started shelling from the artillery and small arms our positions in the village Prevlje and village Turija.

In the zones under the control of other brigades no enemy combat actions have been reported. Any further intentions of the enemy have not been reported to us.

2. OUR FORCES

The order was issued to the brigade "A. Starčević" to monitor the situation and be under combat alert and ready to defend positions in case of any provocations from the other side and even to make some attempts to defuse the existing tensions and try to organise a release of captured persons.

The brigade "Herceg Stjepan" has returned fire and shelled the enemy with 6 missiles. All the other brigades in our zone have conducted regular assignments and have not been engaged in any combat actions. The deployment of our forces has not changed.

There have not been any killed, wounded and missing soldiers, only 7 members of the HVO have been captured by the BH Army.

3. REQUESTS

As elaborated in previous reports.

On duty in operations zone

Stjepan Strbad

Seal: No. of telegram: 118

Date 11 January 1993, at 10,45 p.m.

signature illegible

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HVO Main Staff
No. 01-88/93
Mostar, 18 January 1993
Appeasement

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Attention:
Bugojno
Travnik
Vitez
N. Travnik

Please avoid conflicts of any kind, because we and the Muslims do not want our dispute to escalate again.

Pay utmost attention to your lines facing the Chetniks.

Bugojno: Please tell Mr. Dautović that the Muslims are not defending the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, but their own homes in Bugojno. Tell him also that he should try to calm the situation in Vakuf, and refrain from sending his forces against the Croats.

As a soldier, he should seek Sarajevo's permission for withdrawal of his forces.

Inform him that in the provinces allotted to the Muslim nation there are significant HVO forces, which we could also withdraw, but which we will not, because we are wiser and have more sense than Dautović.

By this act he is not blackmailing us, but is betraying his own nation.

CHIEF OF THE HVO MAIN STAFF OF
THE CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

Brigadier Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND OF THE 3rd CORPS
STR. CONF. NO: 02/33-170
ZENICA, January 18th, 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
URGENT

OpŠO /Municipal Defence Staff/ BUGOJNO
To the Command of the 307th Brigade

You did well by giving HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ an ultimatum. Take due regard and leave strong forces in Bugojno due to the Chetniks and due to HVO.

Set aside, according to possibilities as many troops and move towards G. Vakuf.

If you encounter resistance from the HVO go into open confrontation. Report immediately on the measures taken.

Also report whether the previously sent Diversionary – Reconnaissance unit went down there from the region of Bojska and Grnice or is it stationed there and if it went has it realized a joint action with IG /Reconnaissance group/ in the region of JAGNJID and DRAŽEV DOLAC.

This task is mandatory.

/Square stamp – illegible/

COMMANDER
ENVER HADŽIHASANOVIĆ
/signed/
/round stamp - 3rd CORPS/

HZ HB

HVO

IZM OZ S/Z H

Prozor, 18 January 1993 at 1000 hours

Defence

military secret

strictly confidential

OZ SB IZM VITEZ

"Herceg-Stjepan" brigade

Konjic

REPORT

For some time now, *ABiH* forces in G. Vakuf are reinforcing and forming their units, they bring new forces from Bugojno, Travnik, Konjic, Zenica etc in order to eliminate Croats in G. Vakuf municipality, and everywhere else where Muslims dominate.

In last 5-6 days they started mopping up some settlements, capturing Croats, abandoning positions toward chetniks, attacking Croatian settlements, blocking the traffic, violating decisions made by their representatives, *UNPROFOR* and our representatives, disregarding the decisions by *HZ HB*, etc. In regard to the aforementioned, and in order to protect Croatian citizens, this zone has made some preparations (reinforcement with combat groups, artillery and *OMS*), in order to start with combat activities on the direction Makljen G. Vakuf this morning.

So far, in these 6 days, we have had 12 killed and about 30 injured.

In Bugojno, Muslims are behaving the same way, slightly milder than in G. Vakuf.

There were no open confrontations, but there is a possibility they might emerge any minute. From the area near G. Vakuf *ABiH* sends manpower and *TMS* forces to *ABiH* forces in G. Vakuf.

In order to consider the entire situation in *HZ HB*, send us reports, especially from Lašva valley, Konjic and Jablanica. Let us know if one howitzer was sent from *OZ SB* through Bugojno to G. Vakuf.

Marginalia: word illegible

Commander

Željko ŠILJEG

/stamped for receipt/

HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/
HVO /Croatian Defence Council/
Prozor IZM /Forward Command Post/
Date: 19 January 1993

Reply to the ultimatum presented by Senad DAUTOVIĆ

"Eugen Kvaternik" Brigade - Bugojno

To convey /the following message/ to Senad DAUTOVIĆ

We did not look for this, and you know very well who caused these troubles from your side. We do not want to expand the conflict, but if it gets expanded, we will have to accept it.

There has never been any problem whenever you had a normal attitude on your side and whenever we had reasonable people on our side.

As far as the current conflict in Gornji Vakuf is concerned, we were trying and putting efforts to avoid it for a long time, attempting to solve the things in a peaceful way so that no one would get hurt, but it does not work that way any longer. We certainly will not let TOPČIĆ, AGIĆ and the likes to fuck us around.

Commander

Colonel Željko ŠILJEG

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE HZ /Croatian Community/ HERZEG - BOSNIA

No. 23/93

MOSTAR, 19 January 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
Strictly confidential

To: Head of Defence Department
Chief of the GS HVO /Croatian Defence Council Main Staff/

Ban on offensive operations

- ORDER

With a view to stopping conflicts between the Croatian and Muslim peoples in the area of Gornji Vakuf municipality, I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. Forbid HVO troops to carry out any offensive operations against the BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Army troops.
2. Until further notice, HVO troops shall secure Croatian settlements against possible future onslaughts by the BH Army troops.
3. Use all available forces to secure the front line against the aggressor.
4. Request the BH Army command to order their troops to stop any further offensive operations against HVO units.
5. I hereby make the Chief of the HVO Main Staff responsible for the implementation of this order.
6. Regular reports to be sent to me by 2000 hours every day.

President of the HZ HB /Croatian Community of
Herzeg - Bosnia/

Mr. Mate Boban

/signed and stamped/

/handwritten document/

COMMAND OF 4th CORPS
STR. CONF. NO 01-414/93
19 January 1993 14.00hrs

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STR. CONF.

- COMMAND OF 7th BRIGADE KONJIC
- Att: Ramić personally
- COMMAND OF BRIGADE "NERETVICA"

Situation in Gornji Vakuf is very complex. The HVO forces attack from the direction of Makljen.

I COMMAND

1. The brigade "Neretvica" jointly with the units of "Prozor" battalion (HERE, ŠĆIPE, KUTE) to capture Makljen pass.
After the capture Makljen pass must be firmly hold and the breakthrough of the HVO forces towards Gornji Vakuf prevented.
2. Engagement of units pursuant to decision and under the command of PNS ONP Ramić.
3. Inform me constantly by stages of realization of the mission.

COMMANDER
Arif Pašalić, s.r.

Stamped.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND OF THE 3rd CORPS

/square stamp – illegible/

No.: 02/33-178

Date: January 19th, 1993

OPŠO /Municipal Headquarters of Defence/ NOVI TRAVNIK

Attn: Refik Lendo

Clarification of the previous telegram

Our team recorded the telephone conversation of the members of HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ in Zenica, where, among other, it was said that they know of your intention to attack the petrol station in Novi Travnik. We therefore draw your attention that, if the above is correct, the HVO Novi Travnik is listening to you in the post office, or they have broken some code of yours if you have one. Please confirm the intelligibility of this text.

Head of the Communications Centre of the 3rd Corps

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HVO /CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL/ MAIN STAFF AND BH ARMY STAFF

No. 01-111/93

Mostar, 20 January 1993

DEFENCE

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

In order to put an end to the senseless hostilities between the Muslim and Croatia peoples in a part of the Gornji Vakuf area and to join forces in fighting the Serbo-Chetnik aggressor, the HVO GS /Main Staff/ and the BH Army Staff hereby issue the following joint

ORDER

1. Halt all combat operations between HVO and BH Army forces everywhere in Gornji Vakuf municipality unconditionally and simultaneously.

Implement of the above as follows:

- on receiving this order, cease all artillery activity (guns, MB /mortars/ and tanks) within two (2) hours;
- immediately halt any movement of the units and combat operations;
- full cease-fire and suspension of combat operations at 1500 hours on 20 January 1993;
- arrange, through UNPROFOR and the European Community, a meeting between HVO and BH Army commanders to specify the method and time of the complete separation of the clashing units and control of the end of hostilities.

2. Withdraw all forces from neighbouring municipalities from the area of Gornji Vakuf municipality by 1400 hours, 21 January 1993.

3. Designate a committee, consisting of three members from the units of the HVO and BH Army, which, with the assistance of UNPROFOR and the European Community, will oversee the implementation of this order and resolve disputed issues.

The said committee is tasked with inquiring into the causes and consequences of and responsibility for the mutual hostilities.

The committee must submit reports to the BH Army Staff and HVO GS by 2000 hours every day.

Commence work at 1400 hours on 21 January 1993.

4. Remove all roadblocks in the Gornji Vakuf area, establish joint checkpoints and unhindered passage of humanitarian aid and other transportation in accordance with properly issued documents.

5. All other HVO and BH Army Commands in the Central Bosnia area must establish contact with each other immediately and resolve any disputed issues by agreement.

Signatories

Chief of the HVO GS

/signed and stamped

Brigadier

Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

/Handwritten: Send to:

Gornji Vakuf

Bugojno

Vitez, for Tiho BLAŠKIĆ, personally

Prozor IZM /Forward Command Post/ - col. Šiljeg

For the BH Army Staff

With the authorisation of the

BH Army NŠ /Chief of Staff /

4th BH Army Corps Commander

Arif PAŠALIĆ

/signed and stamped/

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
NORTHWESTERN HERZEGOVINA ZONE OF OPERATIONS
FORWARD COMMAND POST, PROZOR

Number: Official

Date: 23 January 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Report on events in the Gornji Vakuf area since 19 January 1993

To:

- HZ-HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/ Presidency, Mostar
- HZ-HB Government, Mostar
- Defence Department of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ of the HZ-HB, Mostar
- Main Staff of the HVO of the HZ-HB, Mostar
- OZ SZ-H /Northwestern Herzegovina Zone of Operations/ Command, Mostar

On 19 January 1993, the renegade forces of the BH Army continued their combat activities, but were pushed out of the village of Uzričje and cut off in the villages of Voljice, Jagnjid and Duratbegov Dolac. Several members of the BH Army were captured.

On 20 January 1993, we received the order jointly signed by Brigadier Milivoj PETKOVIĆ and Arif PAŠALIĆ, but the BH Army forces did not honour the ceasefire at all, so we were forced to fire back at the strongholds from which HVO troops were being shot at. The renegade forces of the BH Army continued to offer the toughest resistance on Krč hill, Malo Seoce hill at the south-eastern entrance to the town, Alipašića Brijeg /hill/ and in the town itself.

On 21 January 1993, a meeting took place, involving a European Community team headed by Ambassador BUSO /as written/, UNPROFOR representatives headed by Colonel STEWART, Coordinator Victor ANDREEV, HVO and BH Army commanders in Gornji Vakuf, and Selmo CIKOTIĆ of the BH Army 3rd Corps, who was authorised to talk, because a delegation of the BH Army 4th Corps from Mostar, which was composed of Esad RAMIĆ and Emir BIJEDIĆ, had not arrived for unknown reasons, which was strange.

Ambassador BUSO demanded an immediate cessation of fire, with which I agreed and ordered an immediate cessation of fire, and it was honoured by our side. The order was conveyed to the units at 1630 hours. Furthermore, ways were sought to honour the order of the HVO Main Staff and the BH Army Staff, no. 01-111/93 of 20 January 1993, or rather to ensure its technical implementation.

I did not allow the order to be carried out to our detriment, so I agreed that the separation should be only 100 metres, because otherwise we would have lost the hills we had taken in combat.

Also, I did not allow the implementation of point 2 of the order, to withdraw the hardware (tanks, cannon, etc.) from the Gornji Vakuf area, because the order specifies only the forces, and in the military sense that means only manpower. The BH Army representative did not agree with this, so I showed him that this point was signed by his superior and that it was up to him to implement it. Furthermore, I did not allow the supervision of our forces and assets outside the municipality of Gornji Vakuf or our forces to be prevented from regrouping towards the Chetniks, so if in Gornji Vakuf I need a company of tanks trained on Kupres, then this company will be in Gornji Vakuf and no one will be able to stop its deployment in Gornji Vakuf.

Basically, I agreed to the implementation of this order, which is ready for implementation, but which can be carried out only if peace is achieved and there is no shooting at HVO troops. The agreement is ready for signing and should be signed the next day.

The text of the agreement follows:

1. In carrying out the joint order, which was issued by the senior commands of the BH Army and the HVO to their subordinate commands in Gornji Vakuf on 20 January 1993, under the supervision of the European Monitoring Commission and UNPROFOR, the HVO Command and the BH Army Command agree:
 - A. To establish an immediate cessation of fire as of 1700 hours on 21 January 1993. The ceasefire will be overseen by UNPROFOR, which will be patrolling the area.
 - B. All HVO and BH Army units should withdraw 100 metres towards their bases by 1000 hours on 22 January 1993 for the purpose of separation of the warring parties.
 - C. The BH Army and the HVO will form and participate in a joint commission. The role of the commission is to oversee joint negotiations aimed at restoring peaceful and normal relations between the HVO and the BH Army. The commission will have the assistance of the European monitors and the UN. The commission will meet under UN chairmanship every day at 1200 hours at UN headquarters in Gornji Vakuf. The make-up of the commission will be finalised on 22 January 1993 in accordance with the joint order issued in Mostar on 20 January 1993.
 - D. The disposition (location) of the military forces in the Gornji Vakuf area is to be made available at a meeting of the commission due to take place on 23 January 1993, so that the positions of the forces, artillery, tanks and mortars could be overseen with the help of UNPROFOR.
 - E. Cooperate and exchange information concerning the positions and bearings of artillery, tanks, mortars and forces in Gornji Vakuf.
 - F. All forces under the command of the BH Army and the HVO that are not normally stationed in Gornji Vakuf should withdraw from Gornji Vakuf by 1 February 1993.
 - G. Ensure free passage through roadblocks and checkpoints for the BH Army, the HVO, humanitarian aid vehicles, the UN and the ECMM /European Community Monitoring Mission/. Vehicles passing through checkpoints and roadblocks should be stopped for the minimum time needed to complete routine security checks. This becomes effective as of 1200 hours on 22 January 1993.
 - H. Guarantee UNPROFOR and the European monitors freedom of movement and safety in carrying out their respective missions.

The peace lasted for a short while. While our forces did not open fire, by 1100 hours on 22 January 1993, 3 (three) of our soldiers had been killed and 1 (one) had been badly wounded by sniper fire. The agreement to implement the joint order therefore could not be carried out because a new type of situation arose due to the BH Army violating the ceasefire, which ran counter to the order and the agreement. I could not not allow our units and troops to defend themselves.

Our forces were quickly regrouped and preparations were made to take Krc, Malo Seoce and Alipasica Brijeg on 22 January 1993.

Around 1200 hours of the same day, General MORIJON /MORILLON/ came to Gornji Vakuf and asked to meet me. He was accompanied by General BUSO. He tried to get me to ensure a ceasefire, but I explained to him that it was not us who broke the truce, that we had three dead and one badly wounded, and that the BH Army forces had changed the situation.

He asked me to say what I wanted the BH Army to do so the problem could be resolved peacefully. I explained that I had made compromises the previous day, but that today I demand that the BH Army forces withdraw from the hills around the town with their weapons, that the minefield at the entrance to the town be cleared, and that all the BH Army units withdraw from the town and go where they please.

Next day I am going to demand that they lay down their arms and after two days I will have nothing to ask for because there will be no BH Army troops left. I explained to them that they should work fast, or else there

would be no living BH Army soldiers left there, and that only when my demand was met could we discuss a ceasefire.

The BH Army representative demanded that the withdrawal should be mutual, after which I explained to him that we were not in an equal position either politically or territorially or militarily to be able to talk on an equal footing. They were told to make up their mind because time was running out. After the consultations, General MORILLON and Ambassador BUSO were no longer there because they had left, but the BH Army troops were no longer on the dominant hills either, because our units had taken those hills in combat, so the situation had again qualitatively changed, so I had no reason to discuss our previous demands, except that weapons in the town should be handed over so we could save the people and the town. I gave them a deadline of 2100 hours to let us know. During the talks, a flare was fired from Batuša, a part of the town held by the BH Army forces, and it flew into the room and ricocheted several times, but luckily no one was hit.

During the talks, I asked Fahrudin AGIĆ since when trenches and bunkers had been dug around the town, and he said they had been dug since 23 October 1992 and were directed against the HVO for attacking Prozor.

A map showing all the present positions of the BH Army in Gornji Vakuf, which was signed by Fahrudin AGIĆ, was found with a BH Army prisoner today. The map does not show any positions facing the Serb Chetniks, but only those in the town itself and in the Muslim villages.

The map was made available to you earlier.

We have received no answers from the BH Army yet, the movements of our units have been stopped, but they have continued provocative actions.

COMMANDER

Colonel Željko ŠILJEG

/signed/

No.: /illegible/

Zenica, January 24th, 1993

Press release

Today, on January 24th, 1993 at 15.00 hours the negotiations between the HVO and the Army of RBiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ have been concluded. According to the information given by our commission the following has been agreed:

1. An unconditional ceasefire on the area of G. Vakuf between the units of HVO and units of the Army of RBiH, effective today, on January 24th at 18.00 hours, and if possible earlier.
2. All entrances into the town of G. Vakur, from all directions is under the control of UNPROFOR and by tomorrow, i.e. January 25th, 1993 at 14.00 hours all units should be pulled back.
3. The obligation of both sides is to submit, on January 26th, 1993 until 12.00 hours, the lists of missing and imprisoned persons to the Red Cross.
4. In the course of realization of the above all other contentious issues will be resolved.

PRESS CENTRE OF THE 3rd CORPS

RBiH

/round stamp – 3rd CORPS)

/square stamp – illegible/

COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF THE
HQ OF THE SUPREME COMMAND – Department for crypto-protection
SARAJEVO

Date and time:

January 24th, 1993, Sunday 17.25

Original file: FAAAD1UA
Act received and elaborated
/signature/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND OF THE 3rd CORPS
Str. Conf. No. 02/33-221
Zenica, January 24th, 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

- HQ OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE OS /armed forces/ OF R BIH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
Attn: of the Chief
- Command of the 4th Corps

/Square stamp – REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA MINISTRY OF DEFENCE /illegible/ Str. Conf. 02/10-282 SARAJEVO/

URGENT !!!

HAND OVER – IMMEDIATELY!!!

Report on negotiations in G. Vakuf
On January 24th, 1993 at 15.00 hours

SUBMITS:

We received the following report from our representative on the negotiations with HVO in G. Vakuf, Selmo Cikotić:

- The agreement has been reached on the unconditional ceasefire which should take effect today at 18.00 hours, and if possible, earlier.
- Allegedly the HVO units received the order for the cessation of hostilities directly from Boban in Geneva
- It has been agreed that all entrances into the town from all directions are controlled by UNPROFOR
- Tomorrow by 14.00 hours all units brought from other locations should pull back from G. Vakuf
- Both sides should submit the complaints on war crimes committed during the hostilities
- On January 26th, 1993, until 12.00 hours submit to the Red Cross the list of missing and imprisoned persons.

II

On the basis of this report we estimate that there will be an easing of tensions, however, due to previous experiences all the measures undertaken due to the conflict with HVO in the zone of responsibility of the 3rd Corps remain in force, until further notice.

We propose that the IVS /acronym left as in original text/ of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of R BiH issue an order to the commander of the 4th Corps to keep the forces which were heading in the direction of G. Vakuf in the broader region of conflict, with the possibility of their use in case of continuation of conflict.

These forces could be accommodated in the villages under our control.

Also, we should require from the command of the 4th Corps that the members of the commission, appointed by your order urgently go to G. Vakuf.

UNPROFOR was waiting also today for their appearance in the village of Voljevac, like the previous days. Upon receipt of the original text of the agreement we will send you the same.

C O M M A N D E R

/Enver Hadžihasanović/

/In handwriting/: In the afternoon there was an incident in Busovača. Two HVO soldiers were killed. The situation is very tense.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
RBH ARMY
FOURTH CORPS COMMAND
Logbook No. 01-556/93
Mostar, 24 January 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

In view of the developments in the combat situation and in order to secure the zone of authority of your Corps and to provide support to the Third Corps 317 Mountain Brigade currently fighting the HVO in Gornji Vakuf, I hereby

ORDER

1. Annex the DIO 004 unit to your formations and subordinate it to your command.
2. When that unit joins you, use it to establish a battalion (250 men); equip the battalion with the vMB 82 mm mortar and other equipment owned by the DIO 004 and URGENTLY deploy it to the area of the villages of Here-Šćipe and Kute.
3. Upon arrival at the destination, the battalion shall take over the entire area in order to provide support to the Prozor Battalion.
4. When the area has been taken over, proceed with the engineering work paying particular attention to the entrenching of vMB 82 mm mortar and other major equipment.
5. Units should be given clear combat tasks; basic and backup defence positions; basic and additional action zones. The correct firing system should be set up as well as all the other prerequisites indispensable for successful defence.
6. While the units are getting entrenched, the battalion intelligence officer should get in touch with the Prozor Battalion Commander Salih RUVIĆ and exchange intelligence and information on the enemy and the terrain.
7. Scout groups should be despatched to find out the exact approaches leading to the MAKLJEN installation. They should cooperate with the local units and investigate features of the terrain; size of the approaches; dispositions, composition and strength of the HVO at the approaches and at MAKLJEN itself.
8. After detailed investigation, assessment and deliberation, the units should be given clear orders for combat actions to destroy enemy manpower, appropriate enemy ordnance and occupy the MAKLJEN installation in order to prevent arrival of fresh reinforcements from West Herzegovina to Gornji Vakuf. We should hold the MAKLJEN pass, entrench ourselves there and if possible undertake combat actions to ensure that our forces enter Prozor.
9. Before you actually start any action, the logistics and evacuation of the wounded should be planned in detail. You have been given priority for support from the Logistics Base of the Corps in Čelebići and the Base Commander has been informed accordingly.
10. Special attention should be paid to the communication plan and secrecy of the implementation of this order.
11. This order shall become effective immediately and shall be implemented as soon as possible; the NERETVICA Brigade Commander shall be held responsible directly to me.
12. Regular reports shall be submitted to me every day by 19.00 hours, with status as of 17.00 hours; additional reports shall be submitted as required.

To:

- a) Commander, The NERETVICA Brigade
- b) Archive

COMMANDER
Arif PAŠALIĆ

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND OF THE 3RD CORPS
Str. Conf. No. 02/33-181
Zenica, January 20th, 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Engagement of forces toward
G. Vakuf – response -

To the Command of the Headquarters
of the defence of Bugojno
and the 307th Mountain Brigade

We take into account your thinking and proposals, but we wish to turn your attention to the execution of received tasks in the zone of responsibility. Do not engage in businesses which are not in your domain. Write your reports so that they reflect the combat situation, do not give political lessons.

It is too early for confrontation in all the towns of the HZ /Croatian Community/ of Herceg-Bosnia, although this option is also on the table. Try to do all you can and help Vakuf.

C O M M A N D E R
/Enver Hadžihasanović/

Attested by the stamp
/round stamp – 3rd CORPS/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
STATE COMMISSION
G. VAKUF, February 21st, 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To the Commander of the 4th Corps
To the Commander of the 3rd Corps

/square stamp: HEADQUARTERS OF THE 4 TH CORPS No.: illegible Date: February 22 nd , 1993/

DAILY REPORT:

Today the Commission again worked in two parts.

One part went, together with the observers from the EC and UN to Pajić Polje to specify, together with the commanders of A BiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ and HVO /Croatian Defence Council/, the tasks related to the withdrawal of domestic units and filling in of the positions. They were given a deadline for the completion of works which is specified in the plan. The other part of the Commission went into the broader region of the village of Bistrica to inspect together whether all the shelters and bunkers are filled and the units withdrawn, because the agreed deadline has passed. There they could see that on both sides there are tasks which were not fully implemented, and we agreed on precise tasks and mechanisms of coordination and control for tomorrow, in order to complete the work in this region. The remainder of the works will take place according to set plan. From the five of our men released yesterday we find out that there are many more prisoners in Prozor and that their treatment is catastrophic.

For Mr Pašalić:

On today's meeting the deputy commander of the HVO "Rama" Brigade from Prozor complained that yesterday evening there was a fierce attack by A BiH from the direction of the villages of Here, Šćipe and Kute and asked that the UN, the EC and the joint Commission go to this region. I maintain that the attack should be stopped and that the men whom you sent should work on the organization of defence and strengthening of the military organization, and not undertake attacks, because the combat actions in G. Vakuf have been suspended.

Member of the Commission
Esad Ramić

4th CORPS – COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE
CARRL20C

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvođe u/d u do
oriji Istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostar i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - izvale. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuški, Gode, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvođa različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u BiH rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
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mbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspap, 13. lap
ob, 13.mtb, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
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a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

epređiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.


TO težište izvesti na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

HOW THE OLD BRIDGE WAS DESTROYED

Analysis of the destruction of The Old Bridge

FACTS

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The Old Bridge in Mostar: after destruction and after reconstruction

The bridge, a pearl of Ottoman architecture of the 16th century, one of the few works of world architecture which gave its name to the city where it stands, was destroyed on 9 November 1993, in the conflict of two armies set to fight each other, although both were actually the defenders in the war, the victims of an aggressor who wanted to subdue the entire region and dominate it, treating its native population as subhuman.

Its construction was commissioned by the sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in 1557 from the master builder Mimar Hayruddin, the student of the great Ottoman architect Sinan. Legend has it that the construction took nine years, because the builder had to die on the day when he completed the bridge, taking with him the secrets of its unique elegant arch.

In the terrible time of the fight for survival in a restricted living space, it was the only bridge connecting the two riverbanks. All the other numerous bridges on the Neretva in the wider area had already been destroyed.

On 9 November 1993, on the same day when the bridge fell down into the rapids of the Neretva, the sad news of the destruction of a masterpiece of global architectural heritage went around the world, together with the news that it was destroyed by the Croat side, more precisely, by the "army of General Praljak".

And it was accepted everywhere as an established fact.

The local and global opinion was still the same when the reconstructed bridge was opened on 22 July 2004, put together from the available remains and with the joint building effort of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Turkish construction experts and the international community.

However, ever since the accusation was pronounced by the media on the day when the arch, greatly damaged by earlier fighting, fell down into the Neretva, nobody bothered to find out the truth. It was taken for granted that the Croat side gave the deathblow.

But that is not what really happened.


This book is the first systematic effort to collect the facts, review all the available materials and present them in an authentic way to unbiased experts, so they can make their conclusions about what exactly happened on 9 November 1993. We have enclosed the report of the expert group which examined the materials and verified its conclusions through an experiment. These documents are also included in this book.

We invite the readers to conclude by themselves what actually happened to the Old Bridge in Mostar on 9 November 1993.

Slobodan Praljak




The Mostar bridge in the 1950's: the communist authorities removed the explosive planted in the most vulnerable spot by the Italians during the occupation.



The spot in the Mostar bridge where the explosive was planted.



Mostar is a city of many bridges which connect the west and east bank.



Toll Bridge (*Carinski most*), destroyed before the Old Bridge



Viaduct and bridge, destroyed before the Old Bridge



Tito Bridge, destroyed before the Old Bridge



Žitomislić, damaged before the Old Bridge was destroyed

The list of Mostar bridges and other bridges on the Neretva River and the damages inflicted to them. All the bridges were either destroyed or damaged by JNA forces or Chetnik forces. At the time of its destruction, the Old Bridge was the only bridge through which the communication between the left and the right bank of Neretva River was possible. All other bridges had been destroyed by the JNA and VRS /Army of the Republika Srpska/.

1. **Aleksića Han Bridge**, now called Begića & Begović Bridge, damaged in the war.
2. **Bridge in Drežnica**, not destroyed in the war.
- ③. **Jasen Bridge**, destroyed in the war.
- ④. **Bijela Bridge**, destroyed in the war.
- ⑤. **Bridge in Vojno**, destroyed in the war.
- ⑥. **Railway Bridge in Raštani**, destroyed in the war.
- ⑦. **Toll Bridge (*Carinski most*)**, destroyed in the war.
- ⑧. **Tito Bridge** or Emperor Franz Joseph Bridge, now called Musala Bridge, destroyed in the war.
9. **Old Bridge (*Stari most*)**, destroyed in the war, shelled by a tank from positions controlled by HVO, destroyed by the explosive from the left bank of Neretva controlled by the A BiH.
- ⑩. **Port Bridge (*Lučki most*)**, destroyed in the war.
- ⑪. **Hasan Brkić Bridge**, destroyed in the war.
- ⑫. **Airmen Bridge (*Avijatičarski most*)**, now Franjo Blažević Bridge, destroyed in the war.
- ⑬. **Railway bridge in Bačevići**, destroyed in the war.
14. **Maslenica Bridge**, built during the war at the place where the Buna joins the Neretva.
15. **Bridge in Žitomislići**, badly damaged in the war.
16. **Iron Bridge (*Željezni most*)** in Čapljina, not destroyed in the war.
- ⑰. **Čapljina Bridge**, now Franjo Tuđman Bridge, destroyed in the war.

DO WE KNOW THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD BRIDGE IN MOSTAR?

The name "Mostar" is related to the Old Bridge: *most+star (bridge+old)*.

Evlija Čelebija wrote in his *Travel Notes* in 1664: *Mostar means a town with a bridge*.

The historians Ćorović and Smodlaka believe that the city of Mostar was named after the "bridge guards", *mostari*.

Near the stone bridge, remains were found of a wooden bridge that was built some 80 years before the Old Bridge.

(Source: *The Old Bridge, from the location of events*, Miroslav Landeka, HKD Napredak Sarajevo – HKD Napredak Split, Mostar 2005)

The wooden chained bridge had defensive towers, which were probably commissioned by Herceg Stjepan Kosača. One of the towers, although dilapidated, still stands today (the Herceguša Tower). The wooden bridge was built before 1452, since the Archive of the City of Dubrovnik has a written document from the 15th century (from 3 April 1452) which mentions "two towers next to the bridge over the Neretva" (*duo castelli al ponte de Neretva*). Therefore, the wooden chained bridge and the towers existed before the Ottoman age.

The traveler and writer Evlija Čelebija mentioned it much later in his *Travel Notes*. After describing the stone bridge (the Old Bridge), he notes that the *šehar*, almost the same place, "...had, according to the tales of Latin historians, a bridge over the Neretva from one bank to the other, held by a strong iron chain..." (Evlija Čelebija, *Travel Notes*).

Mostar became a part of the Ottoman Empire in 1468. The Ottoman books from 1477 mention it as a "hamlet of 19 Christian households and a garrison of 25 people of Muslim faith from various places in the Balkans", who guarded the bridge and the towers.

Following the orders of the sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, a stone bridge was built on the same place in 1566. Its construction was conceived and supervised by Mimar Hayruddin, a student of the most famous builder of the Ottoman Empire, Koja

Mimar Sinan. The bridge was built by the Dubrovnik builders and stonemasons from Popovo, Dubrovnik and Korčula.

After 473 years of existence, the bridge was destroyed on 9 November 1993. The destruction of the bridge was reported by most global media.

In history, especially more recent history, the Old Bridge was in the danger of destruction many times:

- in April 1941, the army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia set up explosives under the bridge, but they were removed by the Croatian miners,
- in 1943, the Italian army set up explosives in the interior of the bridge during the partisan offensive (the "Fourth Offensive"), but they were removed when the danger was over,
- the Old Bridge, like all the other bridges in Mostar before the start of the Bosnian war in 1991/1992, was filled with explosives and prepared for destruction,
- in October 1992, the bridge was damaged by a second Serb shell,
- the Army of BiH (hereinafter: ABiH) removed the UN flag from the Old Bridge and placed a green flag,
- Jozo Marić, the head of the Department for Education, Science and Culture of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (hereinafter: HZ HB), sent a plea to UNESCO to urgently help and save the Old Bridge (Archive of HR HB, 0183/93, of 8 July 1993).

The destruction of the Old Bridge was recorded from several locations, even from the bank of the Neretva, as if several cameramen knew in advance that the bridge would be destroyed,

- the names of some cameramen are known: Hadži Nedžad Kasumović; former English soldier and then a volunteer of the Croatian Defense Council (hereinafter: HVO) and ABiH, freelance reporter, calling himself James Wilson and known under the nickname "Scott"; Eldin Palata,
- their statements have been preserved,
- the proof is the videocassette called *War in Mostar*, BBC Video Production, sold in United Kingdom in 2000,

- "the video recording confirms the suspicion that the Old Bridge was not destroyed by shells but by an enormous quantity of set explosives" - this

statement by prof. dr. Goluža was the first expert opinion which questioned the proclaimed truth about the destruction (prof. dr. Božo Goluža: Who Really Destroyed the Old Bridge, *Old Bridges in Mostar*, Mostar 2004).

Who would benefit from the destruction of the Old Bridge?

Already on 23 November, the District Military Prosecutor's Office in Mostar initiated the request to start the investigation against three members of HVO because of the reasonable suspicion that they participated in the destruction of the Old Bridge (District Military Prosecutor's Office in Mostar, No. KT. 2843/93 of 23 November 1993, signed by Mladen Jurišić, the District Military Prosecutor).

Pursuant to the report of SIS of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (hereinafter: HR HB), the alleged perpetrators of that act were identified as the tank crew consisting of two Croats and one Muslim (Tomo Topić, Dragan Rezić and Senaid Čavčić), against whom an investigation was started.

The proof for the investigation is the Statement of the District Military Court in Mostar sent to the Office of the President of HR HB (Archive of HR HB, District Military Court in Mostar, No. KT. 173/93 of 21 December 1993, signed by Velimir Marić, President of the Court).

The court proceedings were still ongoing in 1995, which is proven by the Court's requests for an expert analysis of the destruction of the Old Bridge from the Faculty of Civil Engineering in Mostar and the Civil

Engineering Institute in Zagreb, as well as the replies of both expert institutions. They asked the Court for additional data which would enable them to make an expert opinion. One of the questions/doubts

of prof. dr. Hrvoje Soče from the Faculty of Civil Engineering in Mostar was this: "Was the Old Bridge destroyed by artillery shells or other kinds of shells fired from the right bank of the Neretva on that fateful day (9 November 1993) even earlier, or was the destruction of the bridge caused by something else (for example, explosives that were previously set up and activated etc.)?"

The court proceedings were discontinued. The fate of the three accused men is unknown. It is also unknown who stopped the proceedings.

"It is unknown who stopped it. The reasons and method of stopping can be only guessed at. The avoidance of this issue is damaging to the Croatian people." (prof. dr. Božo Goluža: Who Really Destroyed the Old Bridge, *Old Bridges in Mostar*, Mostar 2004, prepared by dr. Ante Pavlović).

Who wants to hide the truth? If we count the opinion of prof. dr. Božo Goluža as the first one, does not the second expert opinion motivate truthful people to invite independent experts to verify the new claims?

UN/UNESCO or some other respectable international organization should found a commission which will verify the new evidence and claims, and make a verdict that should not be doubted in the future. A new, independent and convincing verification is the only goal of this collection of documents and of this expert opinion about the destruction of the Old Bridge.

1. When did the Yugoslav People's Army (hereinafter: JNA) and the Chetniks occupy eastern Herzegovina?
2. How many Croats and Muslims/Bosniaks fled the area and where did they find a place to stay?
3. Did the Chetniks and JNA occupy the entire left bank of the Neretva on 10 May 1992 and did they force the remaining Muslims/Bosniaks to flee to the right bank?
4. How many of them came and where were they lodged?
5. How many bridges on the Neretva were destroyed by JNA by then?
6. Did the "Penal Battalion" free "Orlovac" on 11 June 1992?
7. Did Slobodan Praljak (because of the speed and success of the operation which he followed in the field) order all HVO units to move towards the Neretva?
8. Did HVO fighters, by the evening of the same day, liberate the occupied part of the right bank of the Neretva – Hum, Čule, Heliodrom, Aluminij factory, Soko factory?
9. Did the speed of the decision and the top fighting readiness and motivation of HVO soldiers save Aluminij and Soko from the prepared destruction by explosives?
10. After their escape, did JNA and the Chetniks blow up the last operating bridge, the Airmen Bridge?
11. Did Slobodan Praljak decide and order on 14 June 1992 to cross the Neretva and liberate Mostar and the area up to Dubravka Plateau (freed together with Stolac some time earlier)?
12. Did Slobodan Praljak order the protection of the bridge immediately after setting up the bridgehead around the Old Bridge?
13. How many people worked on the protection of the Old Bridge and
 - Who were they?
 - Was there shooting around the bridge?
 - Was the bridgehead larger than a couple of hundred meters around the bridge?
 - How many cubic meters of planks, five centimeter thick, had to be brought?
- How many iron tubes had to be found and brought together with the tools?
- How many hours of work were needed to protect the bridge from mortar fire?
- Was the bridge already damaged?
- Did shells fall around the bridge during the work?
- Why did the commander Slobodan Praljak imperil his men to protect an *artifact*?
- Why did his men obey him then?
- Did they obey because he had a rank or because he deserved it? If the latter is the case, how did he deserve it?
14. How and why is it possible that such situations never include sensitive intellectuals and other lovers of the *beautiful* who later find it so easy to talk about what should have been done and how, and especially about the worthlessness of human life when compared to unspeakable *beauties* – when the human life in question is not theirs?
15. Who and why removed that protection which HVO built on the Old Bridge?
16. Was the bridge used for military purposes after the clash between HVO and ABiH, and
 - Did ABiH transport weapons across the Old Bridge?
 - Was the Old Bridge crossed by soldiers equipped for warfare?
17. Are there clear and multiple video recordings showing it?
18. Is it allowed by the international warfare rules to shoot at any military target and
 - Is any human *artifact* a military target if the other side is using it as a means of war?
19. Do you remember Monte Cassino and the Baghdad museum?
20. Why didn't HVO destroy the Old Bridge although it had the war right to do so?
21. If the HVO commander Slobodan Praljak had decided to destroy the Old Bridge, how would he do it, what would he use, and how long would the destruction take?
22. Isn't the dawn or nightfall the best time for the destruction, isn't it best to place the tank together with artillery on Hum, isn't it best to use shells with delayed action, which would


- destroy the bridge in one minute?! In fact, the Old Bridge is hollow.
23. This claim was verified by a journalist of *Die Zeit*, who talked to a *Bundeswehr* artilleryman. You can verify it too!
 24. If this is so, as it most certainly is, why was somebody constantly shelling from a tank for 24 hours and
 - Why were more than 80 shells fired?
 - Why didn't they use shells with delayed action, which would pierce the hollow bridge and then explode?
 - Why was it all recorded with three cameras?
 - Why was nobody from ABiH shooting at the tank, since it was very visible and very close to their positions?
 - Why didn't anybody call the Spanish battalion to stop the destruction?
 - Why was this done at the time when Slobodan Praljak was informing Ante Roso about the situation on the battlefield (8 November 1993) and formally gave him the command at 7:40 am, on 9 November 1993, and left?
 25. What was there doing the ubiquitous Englishman called "Scott" (aside from filming the destruction), who rushed to Sarajevo immediately after the destruction, leaving the supposedly blocked Mostar; wasn't he transported by a team from the ABiH 4th Corps, didn't he immediately board an England-bound plane?
 - How could an ABiH soldier (Scott) so easily board an UNPROFOR plane in Sarajevo and leave for England?
 26. Since it is certain that neither Slobodan Praljak nor any other HVO commander (which means the entire HVO) had nothing to do with the tank which was shelling the Old Bridge, who was it?
 27. Since it is clear that the tank did not destroy the Old Bridge, who did?
 28. Why was the investigation, which was supposed to determine all the facts, stopped? If the legal system was unable to complete it then, why wasn't the investigation continued after the arrival of the legal experts from the international community, and
 - Why didn't UNESCO ask for an investigation?
 - Where are the people accused as the tank crew? Are they still alive? What was their fate?
 29. It can be concluded that:
 - (a) some people were shelling the bridge to devastate it, to make the devastation last a long time and to make it attractive for cameras;
 - (b) others destroyed the Old Bridge;
 - (c) someone organized it all.
 30. Some Croats did (a), some Muslims/Bosniaks did (b), and you should investigate who did (c).
 31. You should investigate who and for what purposes wanted to incite and deepen the Croat-Bosniak conflict and who would benefit from presenting the Croats as being equally guilty as the Serbs in the matter of aggression and warfare methods!

Slobodan Praljak

Prof. dr. Božo Goluža, *Who Really Destroyed the Old Bridge?*, page 146

- The photograph of the damages caused by the second Serb shell was published in October 1992; the *Riječ* magazine showed in June 1992 the damages caused by the first shell, and in October 1992 the damages by the second shell (photographs 3 and 4)¹⁹.


- Then came the conflict between the Croats and Muslims and the destruction of the Old Bridge on 9 November 1993. Some facts can be stated about the destruction. Firstly, the explosive placed by JNA in the Old Bridge (proven by the cited *Vidoslov*) had not been removed from the bridge. Secondly, the moment of the explosion was filmed from several locations, which is proven by the recordings shown on TV, as well as the albums published later and the videocassette called *War in Mostar*, produced by BBC Video Production, on sale in 2000.



Photograph No. 3. Published in *Riječ* in June 1992. The damage from the first Serb shelling. (*Riječ* was a monthly magazine published in Mostar in 1992. Its publication was discontinued very soon. Its publisher was HVO of Herzeg-Bosnia, Mostar Municipal Headquarters).

¹⁹ In the meantime, Jozo Marić, the head of the Department for Education, Science and Culture of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia, sent a plea to UNESCO to urgently help and save the Old Bridge. See Archive of HR HB, 0183/93, of 8 July 1993.

Professor dr. Božo Goluža describes the earlier disastrous damages to the bridge



Photograph No. 4. Published in Riječ in October 1992. The damage from the second Serb shelling.

Note: *The picture below shows the damage to the bridge after the withdrawal of the Serbs from the left bank of the Neretva. The shells inflicted greater damage than before (the picture above). The pictures published by the Muslims as postcards in 1997 used photomontage to hide this damage and show the bridge as undamaged before its destruction in 1993.*

Such a big number of cameramen at the moment of the explosion, in such a dangerous spot during the conflict, cannot be a coincidence. This has given rise to the suspicion that everything had been prearranged.

- It is still a fact that the Old Bridge was shelled by HVO artillery on that occasion, but it is also a fact that a shell could not cause such a big explosion, which is proven by the previous hits of Serb artillery. It still remains a mystery how it was organized to have HVO artillery shell the bridge at the very moment when it was needed and when the recording of the event had been prepared. But the video recording confirms the suspicion that the Old Bridge was not destroyed by shells but by an enormous quantity of planted explosives.

(...) a bridge that was built in nine years, with ninety-nine steps and ninety-nine thousand eggs instead of concrete.²⁶

Earthquakes could shake the Mostar giant, great storm floods could have taken it away, like e.g. in the mid-19th century: "It happened recently – wrote Fra Petar Bakula 136 years ago – that a flood carrying driftwood from Bosnia closed the entire span of the bridge. The bridge was in peril of destruction, so an audacious man had to be lowered in a basket to saw off some branches and save the bridge from harm. That hero was Ante Ančić from Mostar."²⁷ Ante again.

The bridge could have fallen down into the river in April 1941, when the Kingdom of Yugoslavia wanted to destroy it. The explosive was removed by miners from Cim: Mijo Knezović, Tomo Mijan and Jozo Petrović. Croats again.²⁸

Everything was ready to blow in 1943, when the Italians mined the bridge. The explosive was removed by Grgo Papac, a Croatian guardsman and an outlaw, who found himself there by accident.²⁹

Explosives were again planted on the eve of the last war, both in this bridge and the other six Mostar bridges, by the Yugoslav army, and in June 1992, when D. Piljević from Malo Polje was sent to activate the bomb under the only bridge still standing, the Old Bridge. He was killed, and the explosive from 1991 remained until the explosion of 1993.³⁰

The bridge could have gone down in June 1992, when it was shelled and visibly damaged by the Serb army, and protected with planks and bags by HVO. Pero was killed in action. Croats again.

It could have been destroyed in October 1992, when the Serb army inflicted even more visible damage, and when some workers from the left bank "repaired" it (...)

²⁶ B. Žigo, *Kad je čovik tica* (When Man is Bird), in: *Nedjeljna Dalmacija*, 8 July 1979, p. 36.

²⁷ P. Bakula, *Hercegovina prije 100 godina* (Herzegovina 100 Years Ago), Mostar, 1970, p. 96.

²⁸ K. D. Miletić, *Stari most* (Old Bridge), manuscript, p. 23.

²⁹ See B. Goluža, *Tko je uistinu srušio Stari most?* (Who Really Destroyed the Old Bridge?), in: *Motrišta*, Mostar, No. 28/2003, pp. 63-64. Along with the text (pp. 58-67), which incites serious doubts (to say the least) in the systematic generalization and defamation that has been going on, the author presents drawings and photographs (pp. 67-75).

³⁰ See *Vidoslov*, the official paper of the Zahumlje-Herzegovina and Primorje Eparchy, Trebinje, 10/1997, p. 49.

The Mostar bishop Ratko Perić talks about the history of damages and destruction of the Old Bridge

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

ASSEMBLY OF MOSTAR MUNICIPALITY

Municipality Crisis Headquarters

Number: 427/92

Date: 29 April 1992

DECISION

Pursuant to the Order of the Republic Civil Defense Headquarters and the decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, passed on 04 April 1992 and 10 April 1992, and the Decision on Proclaiming Immediate Danger of War in the Area of Mostar Municipality, No. 1/92 of 09 April 1992, as well as the Decision on Withdrawing JNA Forces from the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, passed by the Presidency of the Republic of BiH on 27 April 1992, and considering the fact that Mostar Municipality is partly occupied by the forces of the so-called Yugoslav Peoples' Army (hereinafter: JNA) which, together with paramilitary forces, make armed attacks on civilian structures, plunder economic entities and family houses, and imprison the inhabitants of this municipality, and considering the fact that the so-called JNA, together with other paramilitary forces operating with it, does not recognize the legitimate and legal government bodies of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Mostar Municipality, the Mostar Municipality Crisis Headquarters passes this

DECISION

I

The so-called JNA, together with other paramilitary forces operating with it, are proclaimed enemy forces and aggressive forces in the area of the Mostar Municipality.

II

The defense and protection of the city of Mostar from the forces from Article 1 shall be entrusted to the Mostar Municipality Headquarters of the Croatian Defense Council (hereinafter: HVO), and the members of the Mostar center of the Ministry of the Interior.

III

HVO consists of the members of the Muslim and Croat peoples and the members of other peoples who recognize the legal government bodies of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and who show their loyalty to them.

The Muslims may form their own armed forces, which shall be under the joint command of HVO Mostar Municipality Headquarters.

IV

The national composition of the commanding staff of HVO shall be in line with the national composition of active soldiers.

When new defense forces are formed, the commanding staff shall be represented according to the parity principle. This provision shall apply to the forces formed after 1 May 1992.

V

The task of HVO Mostar Municipality Headquarters is to liberate the entire territory of the municipality. In order to achieve the task from the previous sentence, HVO Mostar Municipality Headquarters shall coordinate with other defensive forces from the neighboring municipalities.

HVO Mostar Municipality Headquarters shall structure and organize armed forces which will guarantee peace, freedom and security to the citizens.

This function shall be performed by military police.

VI

In order to realize the judiciary function in the domain of military right, HVO Mostar Municipality Headquarters shall found, structure and organize the operations of the military prosecutor's office and the court-martial for the territory of the municipality of Mostar.

The national composition of these institutions shall be in line with the national composition of active soldiers.

VII

In order to defend the municipality of Mostar, HVO Mostar Municipality Headquarters shall coordinate with the municipal crisis headquarters, the Ministry of the Interior and other legal bodies of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina when the circumstances demand it.

Issues in the common interest shall be resolved at the joint meetings of the Crisis Headquarters of the Assembly of Mostar Municipality and the HVO Mostar Municipality Headquarter.

All the documents for the movement of people and goods shall be issued by HVO Mostar Municipality Headquarters.

VIII

As soon as possible, the Mostar Municipality Crisis Headquarters shall form a temporary executive committee which will ensure the operation of the administrative bodies of the Assembly of Mostar Municipality.

IX

After ending the war operations and liberating the Mostar municipality and creating the conditions for the normal operation of legal government bodies, all other issues and political solutions will be regulated regarding the competent decisions passed by the legal bodies of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

MEMBERS OF THE CRISIS HEADQUARTERS:

1. Milivoj Gagro
2. Ismet Hadžiosmanović
3. Zijad Demirović
4. Borislav Puljić
5. Josip Škutor
6. Mehmed Behmen
7. Ilija Filipović
8. Fikret Bajrić
9. Jole Musa

The decision of the Crisis Headquarters of Mostar Municipality of 29 April 1992 about entrusting the defense of the city to the Croatian Defense Council

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA (HZ HB)
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL (HVO) IN MOSTAR
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF MOSTAR

Number: 234/92-R

Mostar, 24 September 1992

Pursuant to the Decision on Founding the Public Enterprise for the Reconstruction of Mostar, I hereby pass this

DECISION

I

The Commission for the Temporary Protection of Cultural and Construction Heritage shall have these members:

1. Šećo Džih, civil engineer – designing supervision,
2. Edin Prašo, civil engineer – contractor supervision,
3. Prof. dr. Dragan Milašinović, civil engineer – member.

II

For the purpose of planning the reconstruction of Mostar, the task of the Commission is to analyze the situation and protect the Old Bridge from shelling and to plan any work on the bridge to protect it from atmospheric influences.

III

In its work, the Commission may use external cooperators or experts from specific areas for the final provision of an expert opinion. Moreover, the Commission may freely choose the contractors for specific works.

IV

After making the analyses and the study, it will be verified by specific independent commission.

cc:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| - Commission members | Director |
| - Director of the public enterprise | Boro Puljić |
| - Archive | |

**The decision on appointing the commission for the temporary protection of cultural objects in HZ HB,
24 September 1992**

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

CSS – SJS MOSTAR

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PLAN
OF THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF THE STRUCTURES AND PREMISES
OF THE OLD BRIDGE

Mostar, 3 January 1993

Plan of the Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, SJS Mostar, for the physical protection of the structures and premises of the Old Bridge of 1 January 1993

Considering the importance of the structures and premises of the Old Bridge and its current function, as well as the most recent constellation of political relationships, it can be realistically expected that the only link with the left bank will be cut.

Considering the fact that the structure is badly damaged and that it has been shelled, we believe that even a small quantity of explosives would be sufficient to “finish the job”.

From the aspect of safety, the most sensitive spots of the Old Bridge are the arch, as its narrowest part, and the parts leaning on the banks of the Neretva. From the aspect of securing the place, the most sensitive spots are all the accesses to the structure and to the places on the left and right banks of the Neretva. In fact, the immediate vicinity of the bridge can be used for parking passenger or freight vehicles as potential "bombs".

The frequency is exceptionally high during the day and sometimes in the night (movements of citizens and soldiers). The structure is used to transport construction materials, weapons and ammunition, food, the wounded etc.

The current physical protection provided by the employees of the Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina, considering all of the above, is not sufficient for high-quality control and guarding of the structure and premises of the Old Bridge, especially because police jurisdiction is restricted to controlling the movements of civilians.

Therefore, we propose the following measures, actions and activities in cooperation with the military police of the Army of BiH, which will certainly result in a more comprehensive prevention control of all the premises, especially the Old Bridge, and discourage any potential diversion.

(a) SECURING THE SURROUNDINGS OF THE STRUCTURE

For this kind of security, we propose the creation of three mixed checkpoints:

- a checkpoint next to the Symphony Orchestra building (checkpoint No. 2);
- a checkpoint at the crossroads of Ulica Onešćukova and Ulica Gojka Vukovića (checkpoint No. 1);
- a checkpoint at the entrance to Ulica Jusovina from Ulica Gojka Vukovića (checkpoint No. 3).

Moreover, for day and night, we propose that mixed patrols should patrol the wider area of the Old Bridge, regularly descending to the left and right banks of the Neretva. This kind of work is suitable for daytime, while nighttime patrols should be located in the facilities of the Bar or the Museum or some other place suitable for controlling the structure.

(b) SECURING THE STRUCTURE

For this kind of security, we propose the following. The existing checkpoints on both sides of the Old Bridge (checkpoints No. 4 and 5) should be reinforced with military police. They should control the persons crossing the Old Bridge and their luggage 24 hours a day. One of the policemen or one of the checkpoints must make the controls on the bridge itself or a suitable place during day and night, to discourage any unnecessary lingering or leaving any objects on the bridge. For that purpose, it is necessary to provide a lamp under the planks at the center of the bridge, which was there and functioned until recently.

(c) DUTY OF SECURITY POLICEMEN

The policemen at the checkpoints shall do their duty regardless of the weather conditions, 24 hours a day, every day, and their basic duty is not to let vehicles, soldiers or civilians approach the Old Bridge if they do not have the appropriate approval or need. This applies especially to the curfew period, when any movement is forbidden, except for persons with the appropriate approval, while the uniformed persons must know the valid password for that period. If a checkpoint intercepts any persons who do not know the password or

do not have the appropriate approvals, they should be detained and taken to military police or, if they are civilians, to the police station II.

It is strictly forbidden to let any vehicles approach the Old Bridge or park in the immediate vicinity of the bridge. This forbiddance does not apply to the vehicles with the marks of ABiH, HVO, civilian and military police, ambulances and vehicles bringing logistical support to the units on the front lines, which will be assessed by the checkpoint policemen for each specific case. The policemen are obliged to record all the vehicles they let pass through: their make, color, license plate and the number of passengers. They must also record the time when vehicles pass through the checkpoint.

Along with the mentioned duties, the policemen at the checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of the Old Bridge must record all the persons who cross the Old Bridge and write down their residential addresses, the reasons for crossing to the left bank and the time of crossing and returning from the left bank. (this applies to civilians)

handwritten, comment of the author: WHY ONLY THE LEFT BANK?

At the same time, the military police at the checkpoints on both sides of the bridge shall control the movement of soldiers and anyone bearing a uniform, with the task to detain and disarm any person without the valid ID of the member of a military unit.

(d) SUMMARY

For a successful preventive supervision and control over the premises and structure of the Old Bridge and over the vehicles, the following is necessary:

- | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Checkpoints No. 1, 2, 3 | - one military policeman |
| | - one policeman |
| Checkpoints No. 4, 5 | - two military policemen |
| | - two policemen |

This proposal assumes work in shifts 24 hours a day, where the checkpoints 1, 2 and 3 shall work in 6-hour shifts, while the checkpoints 4 and 5 will work in turns (12 - 24 - 48). We also propose that the change of guard must be made at the checkpoints and that the policemen may not leave the checkpoints under any circumstance until the change of guard or an order of their officer in charge.

As for the patrols, their work shall remain the same: mixed patrols during the night and policemen of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the day.

The police station II will provide four policemen for each checkpoint every day, three policemen for night patrols every day and 12 policemen for day patrols. Day patrols will be made under the orders of the commander of the police station II.

Every day, the military police of Army of RBiH shall provide four policemen for checkpoints from 1 to 5 and three policemen for the night patrol.

We propose a joint meeting of the commanders of the police station II and the commander of the military police unit of Army of BiH and the men who will physically protect the premises and structure of the Old Bridge in order to reach concrete agreements to realize the proposed tasks.

ENCLOSED: Sketch of the Old Bridge with marked checkpoints

COMMANDER OF POLICE STATION II
Senad Ibrulj

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

GREAT SUCCESS OF HVO IN THE CITY ON THE NERETVA

Chetnik Strongholds Destroyed

The Chetnik "army" has been destroyed, captured or forced to flee in panic towards Nevesinje

MOSTAR - Croat and Muslim fighters under the joint command of HVO destroyed on Tuesday the last strongholds of SDS terrorists on the left bank of the city. The North Camp, Carina, Mazoljice, the notorious Konak barracks, Bjelušine, Šehovina, the so-called "south camp" – it has all been liberated. The Serb Chetnik "army" which terrorized the city from those positions during two months has been either destroyed or captured or (most frequently) forced to flee in panic towards Nevesinje. The liberators' scout units reported yesterday that there were conflicts among the terrorists themselves.

The local Serbs, who expected the left bank of Mostar to remain within an improbable "Serbian Republic of BiH", came in conflict with SDS terrorists who came from other towns. When they plundered enough stuff in Mostar, they wanted to leave in safety with their "spoils". But the "local" terrorists felt betrayed, which caused a conflict with casualties.



Serb "brothers" from other towns did not come to help their brothers in Mostar. The promised reinforcements of "Šešelj's fighters" from Nevesinje failed to appear. Abandoned and totally compromised by their crimes, the Mostar Serbs who had supported the barbaric and genocidal policy of SDS put up a desperate fight against the HVO defenders, but nothing could stop the powerful impetus of our fighters. The Serb strongholds, used by the "Serb territorial forces" to destroy Mostar and kill its inhabitants, fell one after another. Military police still does not allow civilians or even journalists to approach the area. The freshly liberated part of the city still has many mines left by the terrorists.

Sadly, the fights for the final liberation of the city claimed the lives of 18 brave HVO fighters, Croats and Muslims. They fought side by side against their common enemy, not sparing their lives. There can be no consolation for the lost lives, but Jasmin, the commander of the Municipal Headquarters, said: "It is one more obligation to persevere on our path."

If it can be of any comfort, the Serb Chetniks had many more casualties, and many have been captured. A smaller part of the enemy forces fled to the Velež forests. They are pursued by HVO forces. This is still not the time to relax and celebrate, however. The Serb Chetniks have long-range artillery in Nevesinje and around it, which can send some more "usual hellos to Mostar and its citizens".

Ermin Krehić

Framed texts:

"This is Hiroshima!"

"This is not Vukovar, this is Hiroshima", said dr. Džemal Džudža, president of the Cultural Muslim Society "Preporod", to describe the devastation of the old part of Mostar, the famous Kujundžiluk, Prijeko Čaršije, the recently restored complex of Taphane, the quarters of Donja Mahala, Luka... Those are cultural and historical structures built in the Ottoman period, partly protected by UNESCO. "The leading restoration experts are already thoroughly researching this problem, which is far more complex than the situation on the left bank", said dr. Džudža. (E. K.)

Enemy colonel Pusara killed

According to the first information, enemy colonel Tomislav Pusara suffered the fate which his criminal mind intended for the famous Old Bridge. HVO intelligence service has a sound tape where he is heard commanding the destruction of the 400-year old bridge. Sacrificing their lives under continuous enemy fire, HVO fighters covered the Old Bridge with planks and other materials necessary for its protection. It seems that colonel Pusara will not answer before a court for the crimes he did against Mostar and its citizens, because he was killed in the battle for Mostar.

Chetnik headquarters in the church

On the last day of fighting for the final liberation of Mostar, the last undamaged religious building in Mostar was put on fire. It was the Orthodox church. Reliable evidence indicates it was done by the withdrawing enemy. In fact, during the entire war, the city defenders in and around Mostar, although they had the means, did absolutely no harm to the Orthodox church. There was good reason to do so, however, since the Chetnik headquarters was in the church basement and the enemy artillery was around it. The defenders did not want to act like SDS terrorists.

Burned Even Their Own Church

All the Catholic churches and mosques in Mostar have been destroyed; the diocesan Caritas is providing help to 7,000 families in need

MOSTAR (from the reporter of Novi Vjesnik) – Not a single Catholic or Islamic religious building in Mostar has been spared the terrorist madness of Serbian artillery. They have all been fully or partly destroyed. The diocesan administration has been completely burned down. The Franciscan Church of Saint Peter and Paul has burned down to the ground. The cathedral has been bombarded or shelled almost ten times. The buildings of the Islamic Community, which belong to the most valuable cultural and historic monuments of the city, such as the Karadžozbeg Mosque (1557) or the Mehmed-paša Koska Mosque (1612-18) have also been systematically destroyed. The objective was obviously to completely obliterate any trace of Croat and Muslim communities in this region. When they were leaving, the terrorists even burned their own Orthodox church!

"The Catholic and Islamic priests asked from the city's defenders not to try to destroy the Orthodox church", says Don Ivan Vukšić, the minister in the Mostar cathedral. "We kept reminding them that such an action would make them no different than those criminals. I believe that the Orthodox church should be a symbol of the dignity of the Croatian Catholic and Muslim peoples, which know how to appreciate all that is valuable, sacred and beautiful, but also as a mark of shame for its own people."

Don Vukšić commented the destruction of churches and mosques:

"The systematic destruction of religious buildings reveals the poverty of spirit of a people which did not look for spiritual food in this region for the last fifty years. As far as I know, the Serbian Orthodox Church did not hold even one hour of religious education for its young generations in the last 50 years."

"People whose spirit is poor cannot appreciate the values of the human spirit. And people who cannot appreciate the holy things of others cannot appreciate their own holy things either. This war has proven it."

Don Vukšić believes that all the religious communities should assume "their part of responsibility for everything that happened to us. This applies especially to the Serbian Orthodox Church."

Despite their hardships after the diocese was swallowed by flames, and the cathedral was completely destroyed, the diocesan Caritas provides help to those in need every day. They receive hundreds of people of different religions and nationalities: Croats, Muslims and Serbs. Nobody leaves empty-handed. Their director, Don Andrija Iličić, often goes to Zagreb to try to transport more food and other materials to Mostar, which was a city under siege until recently.

"Food is distributed on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays", says Don Vukšić. "We record everyone who receives presents, they are given cards which enable them to come to Caritas every 15 days and take the delivered food, clothes and hygienic materials. We introduced the cards to avoid large groups of citizens such as we saw in Sarajevo. The diocesan Caritas helps everyone: Croats, Muslims, people of Orthodox faith, atheists... According to our records, most help goes to Muslims." The diocesan Caritas regularly provides food, clothes and hygienic materials to 7,000 families in Mostar.

Don Vukšić expressed his special thanks to HVO and their drivers, who bring the food to the city from the warehouses in Western Herzegovina, literally driving between shells.

Ermin Krehić

Articles in the newspaper Vjesnik of 17 June 1992 about the fight against the Serbian forces in Mostar

Singing *Ganga* in the Battlefield

"We are successful because we fight with our hearts, while they only have technology. We will capture or obtain the technology, but they lost their hearts."

A hard battle was fought to liberate the northern approaches to Mostar, i.e. the suburban area of Bijelo Polje. The lion's share of the fighting was assumed by the Third Battalion of HVO Mostar Headquarters, in which most fighters come from Cim, the area populated mostly by Croats. In front of the decided and well-prepared HVO fighters, the SDS terrorists fled in panic. They withdrew to the village of Lijeska, where they tried to consolidate and put up a desperate stand. At the crucial moments of the battle, when the battalion commander Ilija Vrljić felt that the attacking force needed more support to overcome the strong resistance, he issued a strange order to the back of his units: "Ganga!" (*Ganga is a specific kind of singing in Western Herzegovina, with a particular melodic range and tone of voice.*) Ilija's fighters sang as loud as they could, louder than shots and explosions. The battlefield rang with *ganga*:



During the fighting in Mostar



Mostar citizens returning to a devastated city

"Don't tear down the Berlin wall,

The guys from Cim will move it to Drina."


When the fighters in the first lines heard the song, they started singing too, shooting even harder in the direction of entrenched Chetniks. Who knows what the Serb terrorists thought at that moment, cowering before the incredible rain of bullets and shells, while *ganga* could be heard from what seemed like some fifty meters away. Whatever they thought, they ran like rabbits. They even left the stuff they had packed for evacuation. Bags with personal belongings, goods plundered in previous raids, enormous quantities of arms and ammunition, food... they left it all. Most importantly, the "Ganga Boys" managed to drive

away all the Chetniks from their area of operation!

And it was really something to find the strength to sing and charge in the conditions where the Third Battalion found itself. They had reached the first stronghold of SDS terrorists after walking for ten kilometers, starting from the last place reachable by vehicles. They even had to leave the ambulance ten kilometers away! All the "Ganga Boys" were aware of it, but nobody turned back. The so-called "Serb territorial forces" were surprised by the Third Battalion, which ascended an almost vertical cliff which was not guarded by the Chetniks, who had thought there was "no chance" that anyone could climb it. Well, a whole battalion climbed it. The Third Battalion, the Mostar battalion! The first one climbing was the commander, Ilija Vrljić.

"It was such a cliff that my people thought not even a mountain goat could climb it", remembers Vrljić. "I felt the disbelief in their voices. I didn't say anything, I just started climbing. And then we were supposed to walk another 30 kilometers while fighting and carrying our full gear."

The terrain did not allow for first aid help in the first, second or third battle ranks. As for logistics, they did not need it.



The pearl of Mostar still proudly stands over the Neretva

The Serb houses from which the Chetniks fled were so full of weapons and equipment that not even half of it was more than enough to supply the Third Battalion. Thirty kilometers of fighting were walked by the battalion in the planned time, with three wounded soldiers.

"We are successful because we fight with our hearts, while they only have technology. We will capture or obtain the technology, but they lost their hearts."

Journalist: Ermin Krehić

Photographs: Darko Bandić

Article in the newspaper Vjesnik of 5 July 1992 with a photograph proving that the bridge was used for military actions.

History Fell Down into the Neretva

HVO has reported that the most recent shelling only finished the destruction of the symbol of Mostar, which started at the time of the Serb aggression against the city. The Muslim radio of Mostar said: "Let it have rahmet forever, may it find eternal peace in the water of the Neretva." UNPROFOR still does not know anything about the destruction of the bridge.

MOSTAR – The destruction of the damaged Old Bridge in Mostar has attracted great attention. Many local and foreign journalist teams have arrived to Mostar. However, there are still no reliable information about the circumstances of the destruction of the most famous symbol of this city. HVO reported already on Tuesday that the bridge was destroyed during the fighting between the Croat and Muslim artillery and that the most recent shelling only finished what had been started last year during the Serb aggression against Mostar. According to that report, neither side can be directly accused of destroying this famous cultural monument from 1566, built by the Turkish builder Hayruddin. Anyway, now, after the withdrawing Serbs destroyed the other five bridges, the Neretva can be crossed only over the prefabricated bridge put up by international organizations. Moreover, from the position on the mountain of Hum, the only relatively safe place to watch the remains of the Old Bridge, one can see the pipes-and-cables makeshift bridge connecting the two banks, but it is extremely dangerous. HVO members on Hum told us that the stone arch started falling down on Monday already, but everything went down on Tuesday morning. Now there are only the towers standing on both sides of the destroyed bridge.

The Muslim perspective of the destruction of the bridge can be learned only by listening to their wartime radio in Mostar, which is quite hard, since the radio is barely audible on the right bank. Still, it can be said that they are accusing HVO of destroying the bridge. They even said goodbye to the bridge: "Let it have *rahmet* forever, may it find eternal peace in the water of the Neretva."

The public relations officer of the Spanish battalion of UNPROFOR in Međugorje, colonel Antonio Castro, told us that his soldiers were not present at the moment when the bridge was destroyed, so they do not know which side the shells came from. The only official statement by the Blue Helmets was that the bridge was destroyed by anti-tank ammunition and several mortar shells; their patrols in Mostar were ordered by the Spanish command to investigate all the circumstances, but only as long as they feel safe. When we asked him whether they contacted the Muslim side after this event, colonel Castro said they did not, so he did not want to comment their radio statements claiming that the Croats were guilty of destroying the Old Bridge.

As for the consequences of this event for the city front in Mostar, it is clear that the Muslim forces on the right bank of the Neretva will be completely cut off, which will make it hard to supply them with ammunition and food.

Written by: I. PROFACA

Article in the newspaper Slobodna Dalmacija of 11 November 1993 about the destruction of the Old Bridge

Asking for Independent Investigation of the Destruction of the Old Bridge

MOSTAR – Regarding the events related to the fate of the Old Bridge in Mostar, Vladislav Pogarčić, the head of the Office of the President of HR HB, sent a letter to the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali. Habena agency reports the content of the letter:

"The Croat population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is deeply shocked by the destruction of the Old Bridge, built in Mostar in 1566, because that unique historical masterpiece was constructed by Croatian stonemasons from Dalmatia and Dubrovnik. The crime committed against this architectural treasure is a painful issue, but the letter sent by Muhamed Šaćirbeć to the UN Security Council on 12 November is deliberately misleading, so I kindly ask Your Excellency to consider these facts:"

"The Bosnian Serb forces constantly shelled the city of Mostar from April to July 1992, using heavy artillery and mortar shells. The Old Bridge was hit by artillery shells several times, which damaged its stone parapet," says the letter of Vladislav Pogarčić to Boutros Ghali.

"On 8 July 1993, professor Jozo Marić, now the Minister of Education, Science and Culture of HR HB, sent an appeal to UNESCO, requesting urgent help to protect that monument, because the Muslim forces on the east bank of Mostar were already using the bridge for military purposes and set up explosives under it. Unfortunately, our government did not receive any reply from UNESCO. Furthermore, numerous appeals were sent to UNPROFOR and the European Community observers, indicating the critical situation concerning the bridge. On 9 November 1993, the day when the Old Bridge was destroyed, mortar duels were waged between Croat and Muslim forces in Mostar. The Muslim forces on the right bank of the Neretva in Mostar were retreating, and the time of the destruction of the bridge coincides with their retreat. Also, it must be pointed out that the Muslim forces controlled the Old Bridge and its immediate surroundings for several months before its destruction," says Pogarčić in his letter and adds:

"Only explosives planted under the bridge, or heavy artillery, could have destroyed the bridge. Let me point out again that HVO forces were using only mortars on that day. Mortar shells, even if they are direct hits, can inflict only minor damage to the Old Bridge (as shown by Serb shelling from April to July 1992). The Croats in BiH strongly protest against the accusations of the Muslim Government of BiH, the hypocrisy of their letter to the UN Security Council, and ask for an urgent and independent investigation to determine the conditions in which the Old Bridge was destroyed. I believe these information have clarified the events related to the fate of the Old Bridge," ends the letter of Vladislav Pogarčić, the head of the Office of the President of HR HB, to the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali. (Habena/Hina)

Article in the newspaper Vjesnik of 19 November 1993 about the letter of Vladislav Pogarčić, the head of the Office of the President of HR HB, to the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali, asking for an independent investigation of the destruction of the Old Bridge

MOSTAR: VLADISLAV POGARČIĆ, THE HEAD OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF HR HB, SAYS IN HIS LETTER TO BOUTROS GHALI:

The Old Bridge Was Not Destroyed by the Croats!



Mr. Vladislav Pogarčić

"On the day when the Old Bridge was destroyed, mortar duels were waged between Croat and Muslim forces in Mostar. The Muslim forces on the right bank of the Neretva in Mostar were retreating, and the time of the destruction of the bridge coincides with their retreat. Also, it must be pointed out that the Muslim forces controlled the Old Bridge and its immediate surroundings for several months before its destruction "

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Talk with Vladislav Pogarčić, the head of the Office of the President of HR HB, in the newspaper Slobodna Dalmacija of 20 November 1993, which stated publicly and with arguments that the Croatian forces did not destroy the Old Bridge.

Večernji list, 16 July 1994

dr. FRANJO TUĐMAN:

"We Will Reconstruct the Mostar Bridge Together"

It was with great pleasure that I welcomed the president Demirel and his state delegation. Our talks revealed much agreement in the views of various issues of interest not only for our two countries, but for the whole world. They are comprehensive efforts to solve the crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia, where Croatia is primarily interested in resolving the issue of occupied areas and the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We concluded with satisfaction that the policies of both Turkey and Croatia helped the signing of Washington Agreements and their implementation within the federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and confederation with Croatia. We had special talks and many agreements in the area of further bilateral cooperation. I believe that the public will approve our decision that Croatia and Turkey will reconstruct the Mostar bridge together.

Report in the newspaper Večernji list about the agreement between the leaders of Croatia and Turkey, Franjo Tuđman and Süleyman Demirel, about the joint reconstruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

No. 00115/93

Mostar, 27 July 1993

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 34, paragraph 1, item 1, of the Ordinance on Armed Forces (Official Paper of HZ H-B, No. 6/92) of HZ H-B, the president of HZ H-B hereby issues this

ORDER
ON APPOINTING

IN THE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS OF HVO

1. Major-General SLOBODAN PRALJAK
is appointed to the position of:
Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters of HVO

Date of taking over the new position: 27 July 1993

cc:

1. Supreme Headquarters of HVO
2. Personally
3. Personnel Administration
4. Archive

PRESIDENT

Mate Boban

(signed and stamped)

Order of 27 July 1993 about appointing Major-General Slobodan Praljak to the position of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters of HVO

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS OF HVO HR HB

No. 02-2/1-01-2216/93

Čitluk, 29 October 1993

SUPREME COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES OF HR HB

Mr. Mate Boban

MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF HR HB

RELEASE FROM DUTY

Mr. Bruno Stojić – as information

REQUEST

My health is very bad because of arrhythmic heart operation and discopathy.

Since such illnesses are incompatible with my function, I hereby ask you to relieve me from my duties of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters of HVO by 5 November 1993.

In the meantime, I will hand over my duties to General Milivoj Petković, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters, or to another officer you designate.

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
OF HVO HR HB

General Slobodan Praljak

(signed and stamped)

Request of Major-General Slobodan Praljak of 29 October 1993 to be released from the position of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters of HVO

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
PRESIDENT
No. UP.00242/93.

Mostar, 08 November 1993

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 34, paragraph 1, item 1, of the Ordinance on Armed Forces (Official Paper, No. 6/92), the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces and the President of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, hereby issues this

ORDER

IN THE SUPREME HEADQUARTERS OF THE CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
OF THE CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

about releasing

I

1. Major-General SLOBODAN PRALJAK, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters of HVO, is released from his duties pursuant to his personal request, No. 02-2/1-01-3216/93 of 29 October 1993, because of illness.

II

1. Pursuant to the Order on Appointment No. UP.00241/93 of 08 November 1993, Major-General SLOBODAN PRALJAK will hand over his duties to General ANTE ROSO, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters of HVO.

2. This order comes into force immediately.

MATE BOBAN

(signed and stamped)

Order of 8 November 1993 about releasing Major-General Slobodan Praljak from his duties as the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters of HVO

UNION REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS OF HVO

No. 02-2/1-01-3374/93

IZM Čitluk, 09 November 1993

Handover of duties.-

Pursuant to the Order of Mr. Boban, the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters of HVO are transferred from Major-General Slobodan Praljak as the giver to General Ante Roso as the receiver.

Operating and other documents managed in the Supreme Headquarters of HVO have been handed over.

The receiver has been informed about the situation on the front of HR H-B.

The handover has been performed on 09 November 1993.

GIVER OF DUTIES

Major-General

Slobodan Praljak

RECEIVER OF DUTIES

General

Ante Roso

Document on the handover of duties on 9 November 1993 between Major-General Slobodan Praljak and General Ante Roso in Grude at 7:35 AM

Original vs. a Hundred Copies

What the citizen of Mostar who recorded the destruction of the Old Bridge went through to win his case against TVBiH and RTV Mostar

Hadži Nedžad Kasumović must receive thirty thousand marks for his video recording of the death of the Old Bridge. This decision of the Superior Court in Mostar, according to Kasumović's attorney Mehmed Šator, has been received on the left bank like any other just decision. But he points out: "We will file a complaint." Why? "It is a very exclusive film."

Šator is precise. As the refund of damages inflicted to Kasumović until now, by exploiting the mentioned film without his knowledge or approval, he will demand that the accused (TVBiH Sarajevo and RTV Mostar) pay 100,000 marks.



This still was also copied from TV

TVBiH dictates the price

Senad Efica, deputy director of RTV Mostar, says that his house will also file a complaint: "We had no benefit from this film. God forbid! It is insulting just to talk about it. In fact, our TV house received its signal only on 10 October '95. We were just the agents for the copying of the cassette, because Kasumović did not want to hand over the original."

Efica points out that Nedžad was an army cameraman at the time when the recording was made: "He was doing his duty."

Finally, he reminds us that the verdict pronounced on 6 May was only the first-degree verdict.

Tonka Knežević, head of the legal department of TVBiH, did not want to say anything. She claims that she has not received anything from Mostar. Amila Omersoftić, director of that media house, is on a trip, so we have no comment from her either. We know, however, that she met with Kasumović some time ago to reach an out-of-court settlement that would satisfy both parties. But the court had the last word. Now nobody is satisfied.

"The lady said that she wants to remove any misunderstandings as soon as possible," says Nedžad (38), former member of the 441st Brigade of the Fourth Corps. Their conversation ended with that promise of Omersoftić.

Kasumović says, just like last year when we wrote the first article about this court case and when he went through several expert investigations, that money is not the most important thing. What then?

"I could not save the bridge, but I recorded its destruction on tape," says this citizen of Mostar, who has been making amateur films for years. He was born near the bridge. He was in Jusovina on those wartime days when the east bank was a pile of stones and rubbish. On the west bank, as he remembers, "the Ustashas were threatening over a loudspeaker that they would destroy the bridge."

On 8 November '93, Kasumović recorded the shelling of Hayruddin's structure. The recording of our interlocutor is truly a historical and impartial witness that the claims of the "other side" were not correct, both

then and later. The film has a date: 8 November '93. No author's name. The "accused parties" were holding strong to that fact.

Praises and oblivion

For that reason, they (TVBiH and RTV Mostar) claimed that the shelling of the Old Bridge was recorded by an anonymous author right before his death.

But on that rainy, cold day, Kasumović recorded the shelling of the white arch, packed the cassette to protect it from water and crossed the suspension bridge in Donja Mahala. His cassette was copied in the war studio of our army. ("I did not want to give the original to anybody, of course.") One of the first persons to see it was General Arif Pašalić, who personally told the brave citizen of Mostar that he would "make history" with his recording. But he made a court claim instead.

Also, to prove that he, soaking wet, brought the dry cassette on that evening, he counted on the fact that Sulejman Budaković Tetak, the commander of the Fourth Corps at the time, ordered Amer Bilanović, who worked in the intelligence section, to take the cassette to Sarajevo and give it personally to the commander in chief of the Army, as it would maybe preserve the bridge. For that reason, Amer appeared before the court too. He described his trip to the Bosnian capital and his thoughts: that the THING on the tape must be seen by the world. He was near Bradina when he heard that the bridge was destroyed.

At the moment when it happened, a camera was turned towards the bridge by a Scotsman, who was in the city as a member of the British army. He was also ordered by Budaković to go to Sarajevo, accompanied by the members of military security of the command of the Fourth Corps. But instead of giving the precious document to the director of RTVBiH as it was agreed, he jumped on the first UNPROFOR plane and left Bosnia.

While the Scotsman was making money on his film, Kasumović was told at the court that his recording was not a cinematographic work. What was it then? The lawyers explained: your honor, it is daily news (!?). If they could, they would have said: call it whatever you like, but the important thing is not to give it copyright, which it is entitled to, according to the Bern Convention. They said: Kasumović could not have had the idea of the destruction of the Old Bridge as the idea for a creative work (way to go, lawyers!), he just grabbed the camera and accidentally (you don't say!) recorded the event.

Kasumović still remembers the evening when they told him he would "make history" and used the hair dryer to dry his legs out of respect. (The headquarters had electricity, of course.) When everything suddenly became questionable, including the evening of its first viewing, and the film itself, the "accused party" held to their last hope. The lawyers said: Oh, yes, we forgot. Kasumović is the author, but the price he demands (why is he demanding it, they asked themselves) is too high. RTVBiH has its price list. It clearly says how much they pay per minute. The lawyers pointed out: we will pay our debt according to the price list. This is how the amount of 30,000 marks was established.

Who is using the authorship?

"It is too little," says Mehmed Šator. He reminds us that it is exceptional war material, that RTVBiH earned money from its contract with BBC for the series "Death of Yugoslavia", which used Kasumović's film.

Of course, even the least informed people know that the recording of the bridge's death was used not only in that series, but also in many other shows, both domestic and foreign, and that RTVBiH benefited from all of them pursuant to precisely concluded contracts. Kasumović, who made it possible, must fight through courts to get a small part of that benefit. This is why he talks about humiliation: "Didn't I have to prove that Budaković, who commanded the Fourth Corps, did not order me to take the camera, as the defendant's lawyers claimed? Budaković himself entered that courtroom and confirmed my words. It would have been truly surreal if one high-ranking officer (Slobodan Praljak) issued the order to destroy, while another high-ranking officer (Sulejman Budaković) issued the order to record it."

The newspaper Oslobođenje of 19 June 1997 wrote about the Odyssey of the author and his video recording of the destruction of the Old Bridge

TOPIC: Old Bridge, data on destruction.-

On 9 November 1993, at 10:16 precisely, the Old Bridge in Mostar was destroyed. It happened during heavy artillery and infantry clashes in the city, within the conflict between Croats and Muslims.

According to the operational information of the Center, the bridge had been used for military purposes by the members of the Fourth Corps of ABiH despite several warnings by the military representatives of HVO to the members of the international forces stationed in Međugorje.

This Center does not have valid data about the perpetrators, the exact origin of the shooting, and the man who ordered it. But the analytical section of the Center has been following the "media treatment" of the destruction of the Old Bridge by the information service of the Fourth Corps, the reporters of the newspaper *Oslobođenje* Omer Vatrić and Alija Behram, Izet Šahović and others. It is hard to understand and even harder to accept all the charges against the Croatian people in general and its leadership in HR HB and Croatia!

Furthermore, the analytical section of the Center has an article from the newspaper *Večernji list* of 20 November 1993 with several photographs of Mostar bridges and an article from the newspaper *Slobodna Dalmacija* of 22 December 1993, titled "The Destroyers of the Old Bridge Under Investigation", where the District Military Court in Mostar stated that an investigation was started against three HVO members who used a tank to fire several shells, some of which hit and destroyed the Old Bridge.

The report of the District Military Court in Mostar, reported by HABENA, said that the investigation was started against the following persons:

- Tomo Topić, son of Marko, born in Široki Brijeg in 1963,
- Dragan Rezić, son of Marin, born in Široki Brijeg in 1963,
- Senaid Čavčić, son of Muhamed, born in Rogatica in 1970, living in Mostar.

"This was done because of the reasonable suspicion that they are the perpetrators of the criminal act of destroying "cultural and historic monuments" from Article 151 of the Criminal Law taken from the former Yugoslavia. As the members of the tank crew of HVO forces, on the right bank of the Neretva in Mostar, on 9 November 1993, around 10:00 hours, during intense fighting between HVO and MOS, at the time when the Muslim forces were moving the members of the Muslim army and heavy war machinery over the Old Bridge from the left bank to the right bank of the Neretva, they perpetrated the act on their own initiative – without any order of the responsible commander – by using their tank to fire several shells, some of which hit the Old Bridge... and the bridge was destroyed."

Opinions and proposals:

We believe this event has not been analyzed nor documented enough or comprehensively. Therefore, a valid overview of findings cannot be made. In order to widen the findings, we propose to refer to the report of the District Military Court in Mostar, to collect data, and to request the data on the military use of the bridge by the PD and the command of ZP Mostar.

The data apply to the recording of the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar. A man called Kasumović, from the part of Mostar controlled by (*illegible, maybe "MOS"*), phoned to someone called Ante in Dalmatia around 22:00 hours on 01 December 1993, had a friendly talk and then explained to him that he recorded the destruction of the Old Bridge. Ante said that he would recognize the recording of Kasumović's camera and agreed with Kasumović that it was "Ustasha's vandalism".

On the same day, around 22:10 hours, Kasumović called his mother in a refugee center in Dalmatia and explained to her too that he recorded the destruction of the old bridge and that he stood only fifty meters away. Kasumović also told his mother that his wife Snježana gave birth to a girl six days ago, i.e. on 25 November 1993, and that she looks like Olja when he was little. Olja is probably his brother, and his mother said that he left the refugee center and went to Zagreb, where he was studying at the Medresa, which was all organized by the Arabs from IGASA.

Opinion of the worker:

Kasumović's first name should be established, his parents should be identified, as well as that Ante, to find out how Kasumović sent the images to Dalmatia and what he intends to do with them.

DISTRICT MILITARY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IN MOSTAR

No. KT: 2843/93

Mostar, 22 November 1993

OFFICIAL NOTE

Pursuant to the request of Vladislav Pogarčić, the head of the Office of the President of HR HB Mate Boban, to deliver the names of the persons from HVO who participated in the shelling and destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, together with Velimir Marić, president of the District Military Court in Mostar, I went to Lučić Ivica, head of SIS. After a discussion about this topic, he gave us the names of three persons suspected of destroying the Old Bridge, with the remark that SIS is still working to clarify that event.

According to the statements from SIS, the suspects are: Tomo Topić, son of Marko, born in Široki Brijeg (his current residence) on 22 October 1963, Dražen Rezić, son of Marin, born in Široki Brijeg (his current residence) on 28 June 1963, and Senaid Čavčić, son of Muhamed, born in Rogatica (his current residence is Mostar) on 21 September 1970.

According to the data of SIS, they were the crew of the tank that controlled the left bank of the Neretva from its right bank on 9 November 1993. Around 10 hours, at the time of intense fighting between MOS and HVO, at the time when the Muslim forces were moving the soldiers and heavy war machinery over the Old Bridge from the left bank to the right bank of the Neretva, they acted on their own initiative, without any order of the responsible commander, and fired an unknown number of shells against the Muslim forces, some of which hit the Old Bridge, which was destroyed, since it was already crumbling because of the damages inflicted by the Serb side and especially the Muslim side, which used the bridge to transport military machinery over the entire duration of the conflict.

Since there is a reasonable suspicion that they are the perpetrators of the criminal act of destroying cultural and historic monuments from Article 151 of the Criminal Law taken from the former Yugoslavia, this prosecutor's office will require the District Military Court in Mostar to start an investigation against them. This official note will be considered as the criminal charge against them.

This prosecutor's office will ask the SIS service to provide comprehensive information about the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar and possibly widen the investigation to other persons.

DISTRICT MILITARY PROSECUTOR

MLADEN JURIŠIĆ (*signed*)

Official note of the District Military Prosecutor's Office in Mostar on 22 November 1993

DISTRICT MILITARY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IN MOSTAR

No. KT: 2843/93

Mostar, 23 November 1993

TO THE DISTRICT MILITARY COURT

MOSTAR

Pursuant to Article 45, paragraph 2, item 3, and Article 158, paragraph 1, of the inherited Criminal Law, I hereby file this

REQUEST

to start the investigation

AGAINST:

1. TOMO TOPIĆ, son of Marko, born in Široki Brijeg on 22 October 1963, residing in Široki Brijeg,
2. DRAŽEN REZIĆ, son of Marin, born in Široki Brijeg on 28 June 1963, residing in Široki Brijeg
3. SENAID ČAVČIĆ, son of Muhamed, born in Rogatica on 21 September 1970, residing in Mostar.

Because of the reasonable suspicion that they:

As the members of HVO forces, as a tank crew, on 9 November 1993, around 10:00 hours, during the armed conflict between HVO and MOS in the city of Mostar, at the time when the MOS forces were moving the soldiers and heavy war machinery over the Old Bridge from the left bank to the right bank of the Neretva, they acted on their own initiative and without any order of the responsible commander and used their tank to fire several shells against the Muslim forces, some of which hit the Old Bridge, which fell down into the Neretva because of those hits and earlier damage.

* * *

Therefore, by breaking the rules of international law during an armed conflict, they destroyed a cultural and historical monument and structure.

It would mean they perpetrated the criminal act of destroying cultural and historic monuments from Article 151 of the Criminal Law taken from the former Yugoslavia, so

I PROPOSE

1. That the investigating magistrate calls and hears as the accused the following persons:
 - Tomo Topić, Dražen Rezić and Senaid Čavčić, who are all members of the "Penal Battalion" from Široki Brijeg, regarding all the circumstances of the realization of the act hereunder, and especially regarding the circumstances related to their tank commander, whether they were ordered to shell the Old Bridge, whether they intended to destroy the Old Bridge or tried to shell Muslim forces, how many shells they fired, whether somebody else was shelling the bridge etc.
2. That the investigating magistrate finds out the identity of the commander of the accused from them, and that he calls him and examines him as a witness regarding all the circumstances in which the accused parties perpetrated the act.

3. That the investigating magistrate calls the Operating Zone Southeast and obtains from them the information whether there was fighting and armed conflict between MOS and HVO in the quarter of the Old Bridge around 10 hours on 9 November 1993, and whether MOS forces were using the Old Bridge for tactical/operational purposes of transporting soldiers and war equipment.
4. That the investigating magistrate orders the expert analysis made by a civil engineering expert regarding the extent of prior damage to the Old Bridge during the Serb aggression and the effect that the transport of heavy war equipment by MOS could have had on the statics and load-bearing state of the bridge.
5. That other investigative actions should be undertaken if their necessity is perceived.

* * *

EXPLANATION

The justification of the suspicion that the accused perpetrated the criminal acts hereunder results from the data obtained in the Headquarters of SIS HR HB and stated in the official note of this prosecutor's office.

Pursuant to recordings made by the Muslim side, it is notorious that the Old Bridge was destroyed by shelling which originated on the west side of the bridge. Because of the great publicity among global public and the great cultural and historical importance of the Old Bridge, there should be a detailed investigation and it should be determined whether the Old Bridge was destroyed pursuant to a plan and concept or whether its destruction was the result of earlier damages to the bridge, which would significantly affect the legal qualification of the act.

Pursuant to the above, this request is justified and legally founded.

DISTRICT MILITARY PROSECUTOR
MLADEN JURIŠIĆ (*signed*)

otp. 23.II.1993

Z

Request of the District Military Prosecutor's Office in Mostar of 23 November 1993 to start the investigation of the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar

Prof. dr. HRVOJE SOČE
FACULTY OF CIVIL ENGINEERING
Ul. Ante Zuanica 14
MOSTAR
22-94/95

COURT MARTIAL IN MOSTAR
To the INVESTIGATING MAGISTRATE
(Mr. Ivan Hrstić)

Topic: The expert analysis in the investigation against accused Tomo Topić and others

Pursuant to your letter No. Ki 173 of 24 November 1994, I have been appointed the coordinator for the expert analysis of the causes of the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, all in relation to the current investigation against the accused Tomo Topić and others because of the criminal act from Article 151 of the Criminal Law taken from former Yugoslavia. In accordance with the order, I have appointed the expert analysis commissions.

The expert analysis should provide the answers to the following questions:

The degree of the earlier damage to the Old Bridge (before the destruction).

Was there a prior reduction in the mechanical resistance and stability of the bridge? If yes, how big? How much could that reduction have been caused by the transportation of heavy fighting equipment over the bridge?

Was the Old Bridge in Mostar destroyed by artillery or other shells fired from the right bank of the Neretva on that fateful day (9 November 1993) and earlier, or was the bridge destroyed by something else (e.g. explosives that were previously set up and activated etc.)?

However, pursuant to the review of the investigation document, a founded conclusion on the causes of the destruction of the bridge cannot be issued. Therefore, in order to be able to make a valid conclusion, we ask the Court Martial to deliver the following before the field investigation:

- video recording of the destruction of the bridge,
- any recordings (or other data) of the situation before the destruction of the bridge,
- detailed plans of the bearing structure of the bridge,
- data on shells (and other explosive devices) shot at the bridge, to be able to use the data from the previous lines, and with the help a military expert for the effect of shells, to identify the causes of the destruction of the bridge.

Mostar, 30 January 1995

Enclosed: Report of the commission members
No. 21-93/95 of 30 January 1995
Civil Engineering Institute of Croatia

Members of the commission:

1. Zulfo Robović, Minister of the Rebuilding and Development of HR H-B (*signed*)
2. Hrvoje Soče, Dean of the Faculty of Civil Engineering (*signed*)
3. Zvonimir Lucović, director of D. G. P. "Hercegovina" - high rises (*signed*)

Expert analysis of the commission from the Faculty of Civil Engineering in Mostar of 30 January 1995 for the investigating magistrate of the Court Martial in Mostar about the destruction of the Old Bridge

Civil Engineering Institute of Croatia

Ki. 173/93

21-93/95.

COURT MARTIAL IN MOSTAR

Investigating magistrate Ivan Hrstić

Topic: Expert analysis in the investigation against the accused Tomo Topić and others

Zagreb, 30 January 1995

Pursuant to your letter No. Ki. 173/93 of 24 November 1994, dr. Petar Đukan, director of the Institute, appointed us the members of the expert analysis commission in the investigation against the accused Tomo Topić and others. Our expert analysis should answer the following questions:

- The degree of the earlier damage to the Old Bridge (before the destruction).
- Was there a prior reduction in the mechanical resistance and stability of the bridge? If yes, how big? How much could that reduction have been caused by the transportation of heavy fighting equipment over the bridge?

Was the Old Bridge in Mostar destroyed by artillery or other shells fired from the right bank of the Neretva on that fateful day (9 November 1993) and earlier, or was the bridge destroyed by something else (e.g. explosives that were previously set up and activated etc.)?

Aside from the mentioned letter, we received only the investigation document about the topic. After perusing the investigation document, however, especially the minutes from the examination of the accused and the minutes from the examination of witnesses, ***it is impossible to issue a founded conclusion about the causes of the destruction of the bridge.*** Therefore, we ask the Court Martial to provide us with the following before the field investigation:

- video recording of the destruction of the bridge,
- any recordings (or other data) of the situation before the destruction of the bridge,
- detailed plans of the bearing structure of the bridge,
- data on shells (and other explosive devices) shot at the bridge, to be able to use the data from the previous lines, and with the help a military expert for the effect of shells, to identify the causes of the destruction of the bridge.

Members of the commission:

1. Dražen Aničić (*signed*)
 2. Zvonimir Marić (*signed*)
 3. Petar Sesar (*signed*)
- (*stamped*)

The expert analysis of the Civil Engineering Institute of Croatia of 30 January 1995 for the investigating magistrate of the Court Martial in Mostar regarding the destruction of the Old Bridge

Zagreb, 23 October 1997

Topic: The destruction of the Old Bridge
asking for broader findings

Deliver comprehensive findings about these persons:

1. Tomo Topić, born in Široki Brijeg on 22 October 1963,
2. Dražen Rezić, born in Široki Brijeg on 22 June 1969,
3. Senaid Čavkić, born in Rogatica on 21 October 1997.

For the above persons, deliver findings about their participation in HVO forces, especially at the time when the bridge was destroyed (unit, hierarchical line of command, their role in the "destruction" of the Old Bridge), their current status etc.

Provide all your available findings about the bridge destruction act itself, especially the findings about the warnings sent by HVO to the international organizations and observers regarding MOS's usage of the bridge for military purposes (moving soldiers and military equipment, removing the protection from the bridge, findings about its damage during the war devastation of Mostar by the Serb forces etc.).

If you have broader findings about the persons called Nijazim and Snježana Kasumović, please deliver them to us too.

Since the bridge was shelled for a long time, and the course of the shelling was recorded on a VHS camera, starting at 9:57 hours on 08 November 1993 and ending at 10:16 hours on 09 November 1993 (when the bridge was completely destroyed), it is necessary for that purpose to try to identify the connection between the cameraman (the Kasumović couple or someone else) with the Croatian side.

For now, **do not** talk to the above HVO members.

Document of 23 October 1997 about broader findings regarding the destruction of the Old Bridge

Zagreb, 14 October 1997

Dear Mr. President,

When you talked about Bosnia and Herzegovina, you said twice that I destroyed the Old Bridge in Mostar.

I did not destroy the Old Bridge in Mostar and I had nothing to do with its destruction.

I asked for a three-minute reception to tell you the exact information and reduce the possibility of you "co-signing" a possible accusation of the Hague court against me for that act.

You refused to receive me, so I am writing to you now.

Please, ask Mr. Miroslav Tuđman, Mr. Markica Rebić and Mr. Ivo Lučić to answer these questions to you:

- (a) Who did it?
- (b) Was it a military or political act?
- (c) If the act was political, what was its purpose?
- (d) Why was the bridge destroyed by day and at a time when the sun is under the best angle for video recording?
- (e) How many cameras recorded the destruction of the bridge?
- (f) Why was the Old Bridge not destroyed by central shelling (the destruction would last 30 seconds at most), but shelled on the right side, next to the shore, where it is the thickest?
- (g) How long did the destruction take and what purpose did it serve?
- (h) Why was the investigation not completed? Why was it discontinued?
- (i) What happened to the people who were the tank crew?
- (j) Why did everyone so readily accept me as the destroyer, although I immediately said both officially and publicly that I had nothing to do with it? Why is still everyone insisting on that attitude although they know what this is about?

Yours sincerely,

Slobodan Praljak


Letter of General Slobodan Praljak to the Croatian president Franjo Tuđman of 14 October 1997



A view of Mostar and the Old Bridge from Hum




Area controlled by ABiH



A view of Mostar and the Old Bridge from Hum



Area controlled by ABiH



Distance of the tank from ABiH positions

View from the Old Bridge towards the position of the tank which was shelling the Old Bridge



**ANALYSIS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD BRIDGE
BASED ON THE AVAILABLE VIDEO TAPES**

Dr. sci. Muhamed Sućeska, chemist
Prof. dr. sci. Slobodan Janković, mechanical engineer
Dr. sci. Aco Šikanić, mechanical engineer

Zagreb, January 2006

Expert analysis of the destruction of the Old Bridge, the front page of the original

PhD.C.E Muhamed Sućeska

10000 Zagreb

E-mail: suceska@hrbi.hr

CURRICULUM VITAE

1. Personal data

I was born on 10 December 1954 in the village of Krivače (Han-Pijesak, Bosnia and Herzegovina). I am married and father of two. I work in Brodarski Institute in Zagreb as the leader of the Laboratory for Thermic Analysis. I am the president of the Scientific Council.

2. Education

I went to the primary and secondary school in my birthplace. I graduated from the Technical Military Academy in Zagreb, chemistry/technology section, specialized in pyrotechnology (1997).

I graduated from the postgraduate course at the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics in Zagreb, chemistry section, with the MA paper called *Dynamic Mechanical Analysis of Solid Rocket Fuels* (1986).

I defended by my Ph.D. paper called *Reological and Detonational Characteristics of Cast Composite Explosives with Polyurethane Binding* at the Technical Military Academy in Zagreb and obtained the title of the doctor of military technical sciences, specialized in explosives, in early 1991.

I speak English and Russian.

3. Scientific and educational vocations

In 1993, I became a *scientific associate* at the Faculty of Chemistry and Technology in Zagreb. In 1999, I became a *senior scientific associate*. In 2004, I became a *scientific advisor* in Brodarski Institute.

4. Jobs

From 1977 to 1982, I worked in the Yugoslav Army in the area of ammunition storage and maintenance.

From 1982 to mid-1991, I worked in the Military Academy in Zagreb as an assistant (until 1986) and then as the lecturer of the course *Physics of Explosive Matter*.

From 1991 to 1993, I worked in the company Pires, which developed and produced ammunition. As a constructor/technologist, I worked in that company on the development of ammunition and explosives.

Since 1993, I have been working in Brodarski Institute as the leading researcher in the area of explosives.

Since 1996, I have been the head of the Laboratory for Thermic Analysis of Materials.

In early 2000, I was elected president of the Scientific Council of Brodarski Institute. I was reelected twice to that position (in 2002 and 2004), which I hold today.

Curriculum vitae of the experts who made the analysis

CURRICULUM VITAE

PhD.M.E. prof. retired Slobodan Janković

He was born in Brussels, Belgium, in 1932. He went to the primary school and comprehensive secondary school in the former Yugoslavia. He graduated from the military polytechnics in Brussels in 1958. He graduated from the postgraduate study in fluid mechanics at the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics in Belgrade in 1964. He received his Ph.D. in the area of mechanics of flight at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering in Belgrade in 1968.

He started working as an engineering officer in the precise mechanics factory "Vlado Bagat" in Zadar in 1960, and then in the Military Technology Institute in Belgrade, where he worked on the issues of exterior ballistics. At the same time, he worked as an assistant at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering in Belgrade in the course of "Exterior ballistics".

Since the foundation of the Military Technical Academy in Zagreb in 1967, he was the head of the joint teaching areas of weaponry, rocket technology and automatic piloting. In 1973, he was no longer an officer, but became an associate professor at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering in Belgrade, where he lectured the courses of "Aerodynamics of Projectiles" and "Flight Dynamics of Projectiles". In that period, he cooperated with the military industry and the Military Technological Institute for the aerodynamic design of the GROM missile.

In 1979, he started working in the Military Technological Institute again, this time as the main aerodynamic expert in the guided missile department. He continued lecturing at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering. When the aerodynamic design of the GROM missile was completed in 1984, he returned to Zagreb, where he became a professor at the Military Technical College for the courses of "Aerodynamics" and "Flight Mechanics" and managed the department for missile technology. He cooperated with the military industry (Pretis, Energoinvest, Makpetrol etc.) and with the Croatian Meteorological Institute on the issues of hail prevention as the permanent external associate of the institute. In 1990, he became a scientific advisor at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Shipbuilding. He was the secretary of the Scientific Council for Traffic of the Academy of Sciences and the expert of the Ministry of Defense (of former Yugoslavia) for the issues of aerodynamics and missile flight mechanics.

From 1991 to 1995, he worked in Brodarski Institute, where he made shooting tables and fire management software. Then he was retired. As an emeritus, he lectured airplane flight mechanics and aerodynamics at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Shipbuilding in Zagreb. He worked on the creation of the model of remote controlled missiles in the server training area and on the flight model for MiG21 in the pilot training area.

He published several scientific papers and wrote six handbooks in the area of aerodynamics and flight mechanics. He lectured at various postgraduate studies and mentored several MAs and Ph.D.s. In 1994, he was a guest professor at the Catholic University in Leuven. In 1993-99, he was an external scientific associate of the weapons department of the military polytechnics in Brussels. In 2000, he was invited to participate in the consulting called "European Forum on Ballistics of Projectiles".

For his theoretic work, he was awarded twice with the highest scientific award in former Yugoslavia, "22nd December", in the area of military technical sciences. He speaks French and reads English and Russian. He is a Roman Catholic.

CURRICULUM VITAE

PhD.M.E. **Aco Šikanić** is a mechanical engineer. He was born in Brvnik near Bosanski Šamac in 1954. He graduated from the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Shipbuilding in Zagreb in 1979, specialized in mechanical constructions.

At the end of his studies, he was on a military grant. When he completed his army service, he was given a job in the military industry "MMK Bratstvo" in Novi Travnik. He worked there for almost ten years, first as a constructor and technologist, and then as project manager and new product development manager. Here are some of those projects: tank guns, anti-armor guns, coastal guns, long-range guns, mortars of 122, 152 and 155 mm, and long-range rocket launcher. As chief project engineer, he spent a year in Iraq, helping in a newly built factory. On several occasions, he lectured and mentored students of engineering, mostly foreigners, who specialized in weapon construction.

Along with work, he attended postgraduate studies at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Shipbuilding in Zagreb, specialized in the theory of construction, where he defended his MA paper called *Dynamic Analysis of Support Devices for Artillery Weapons* in 1989. At the end of that year, he came to Brodarski Institute in Zagreb, where he did research and design work for military shipbuilding, such as the design of the maritime variant of the rocket launcher and the maritime fire management system.

Since September 1991, when Brodarski Institute started working for the independent Republic of Croatia, he actively participated in finding and realizing solutions which are necessary for the defense system of the country. He managed projects of training, reconstruction, adopting, modifying, developing and implementing rockets and rocket weapons, as well as artillery weapons and ammunition, armored vehicles, mortars of 120 mm on wheels, MOLs and others. He instructed engineers in Croatian industries. He worked on issues and procurement of weapons and ammunition. He participated in expert analyses and investigations as a member of commissions of the Ministry of Defense. He was one of the main participants in several studies for equipping and finding more reliable methods of measurement and examination of developed or bought weapon systems.

From early 1995 to early 1998, he worked as the director of the Special System Development Department in Brodarski Institute, which develops new defense projects.

Since the school year 1995/96, he has been lecturing "Construction of weapons" at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Shipbuilding in Zagreb, Construction Department. Since 1996/97, he has also been lecturing at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering in Slavonski Brod. He wrote the university handbook for that course. He also lectures at the Croatian Military Academy.

In early 1998, he filed his Ph.D. paper, called *Researching the Dynamics of Non-Symmetrical Multipart Mechanic Systems* at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Shipbuilding in Zagreb. He successfully defended it in June 2000.

He managed many complex technical projects. He published several scientific and expert papers. He participates in the creation of scientific and technological projects of the Ministry of Science and Technology. He is currently working as the manager of activities of Applied Tehnology in Brodarski Institute, which deals with complex technical systems, new technologies for environment protection and renewable energy sources. He has obtained the vocation of scientific adviser. He is married and a father of two, speaks English, German and Russian.

ANALYSIS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD BRIDGE BASED ON THE AVAILABLE VIDEO TAPES

Muhamed Sućeska, PhD. C. E.

Slobodan Janković, PhD. M. E. prof. retired


Aco Šikanić, PhD. M. E.

Zagreb, January 2006

1. GEOGRAPHICAL MAP OF THE LOCATION WHERE THE OLD BRIDGE HAS BEEN DESTROYED

The picture below displays part of the geographical map of Mostar in which the positions of the objects are marked.

Picture 1. Part of the map of Mostar




2. DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENTS

By analyzing the video documentation, which has been made available to us, on the incidents in November 1993 and connected to the military actions around the Old Bridge in the city of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina, some facts have been noticed which must be taken into consideration if the destruction of the Old Bridge wants to be explained from the objective point of view. We have taken out two sequences from the received video documentation which show the destruction of the bridge and the happenings which immediately preceded the destruction of the bridge. The first tape is a broadcast by HRT of a TV ÖRF 2 news show, while the second one is originating from a video tape belonging to TV Mostar which lasts 16 seconds. Both sequences are annexes to this report.

The fire of a military tank of the Croatian Defence Council is being held responsible for the destruction of the Old Bridge in the city of Mostar. The tank was located south at the west, that is the right bank of the Neretva River at 1.40 kilometres distance from the bridge itself (picture 1). The tapes of several TV stations which have recorded the afore-mentioned happenings show that the Old Bridge has been exposed to attacks of various projectiles, even to tank attacks, during the morning (09.57 hours) and in the afternoon (at 15.52 hours) on 08.11.1993. This conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the recorded visual effect of the explosion. Flying projectiles are also visible on some tapes. This is logical with regard to the fact that the typical speed of recording is 25 shots per second, which means that a projectile flying at a speed of 800 meters per second can be noticed/recorded every 32 meters on its flight path, while a projectile flying at a speed of 300 meters per second can be noticed/recorded every 12 meters on its flight path, etc.

However, the recordings on picture 2 from TV ÖRF 2, which immediately precede the destruction of the Old Bridge itself, indicate another possible conclusion of the destruction of the Old Bridge, which happened on 09.11.1993 around 10.00 hours.



t = 0 s



t = 40 ms



t = 80 ms



t = 120 ms



t = 160 ms



t = 200 ms

Picture 2

According to these recordings, a water pillar is visible in relation to the line which runs from the east bank, south of the bridge, to the east support girder of the bridge. The water pillar rises almost up to the half of the bridge height. At the same time, a cloud of dark smoke is noticeable at the east support girder. Immediately after the occurrence of the water pillar, the bridge collapses, which is visible on the recording of picture 3, also from the video recording of TV ÖRF 2.



Just another day, a little
after 10 pm, the end.

Picture 3



$t = 0 \text{ s}$



$t = 40 \text{ ms}$



$t = 80 \text{ ms}$




$t = 120 \text{ ms}$



$t = 160 \text{ ms}$



$t = 200 \text{ ms}$



Picture 4


In the meantime, not even one projectile can be seen to hit the bridge. This longitudinal water pillar could be a consequence of an activation of a detonating cord, which has been in the water south of the bridge from the east bank to the east bridge pier. The cloud of dark smoke at the east support girder could be a consequence of the activation of the explosive charge.

These happenings are even better visible on video recordings of TV Mostar as shown in picture 4.


2.1 EXPLANATION

The fact that a “water fountain” of 30-50 meters length is appearing in the water along the east bank on the recordings of TV ÖRF 2 and TV Mostar, and at the same time, an explosion is visible at the lower part of the bridge, indicates the following conclusion:




The characteristic “water fountain”, that is the water pillar along the stream of the Neretva River, could have been caused by a detonation of the detonating cord in the water. The expansion of gas-like products, arisen by the detonating cord under the water, has raised the water which is then visible as the characteristic “water fountain”. The detonation at the lower part of the bridge (visible by the cloud of dark smoke) at the same time could mean that the explosive charge (or any mine-explosive mean) has been activated by that detonating cord, as marked on picture 5 from the records of TV ÖRF 2, and schematically displayed in pictures 6 and 7 which have been shown on the recordings of ÖRF 2 and also TV Mostar.



Picture 5. The Old Bridge by TV ÖRF 2



Picture 6. Scheme of the possible destruction of the bridge



Picture 7. Chronological sequence of the occurrence of the water gush and the explosion at the bottom of the bridge arch.


The detonating cord, as displayed on the recording of picture 5 and schema of picture 6, could have been activated either by a safety fuse or electrically.

With regard to the fact that the detonation speed of the detonating cord is on the basis of PETN (respectively the speed in which the detonation wave is running along the detonating cord) about 6500 meters per second, this means that the detonation wave runs approximately fifty meters (which is somehow visible on the tape) in 0.008 seconds or 8 milliseconds. Taking into account that the speed of the camera recording (25 shots per second) between two consecutive shots is 40 milliseconds, only the shot of the situation just before the detonation is visible and the shot immediately after the complete detonation of the detonating cord and explosive charge.

This afore-mentioned conclusion has also been proven experimentally. The experiment has been set up in a way to simulate the activation of the explosive charge through water as assumed in schema of picture 6.

2.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT

The experiment has aimed to proof that the noticed water pillar has been caused by the effects of the detonating cord, which has been positioned in the water along the east bank of the Neretva River, while the explosion in the eastern arch of the bridge by a detonation of the explosive charge, which has been set up at the bottom part of the east arch of the bridge as displayed on Picture 8a.



Picture 8a



Picture 8b

For this reason, a detonating cord has been set up at an artificial lake (with a core made out of PETN with an explosive mass of 20 g/m along a distance of 20 meters and at a depth of approx. 50 cm under the surface as marked on picture 8.

That detonating cord has been activated from the right end with an electric detonator. The explosive - TNT of mass 200 g - has been set up at the left end of the cord.

The detonation process has been hereby recorded by camera vertically to the direction of the cord laying. A TV camera has been used for recording with a speed of 25 shots per second.

2.3 RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT

The entire experiment has been recorded by a camera of the same speed and is attached to this text as a video record on DVD 3. The pictures below show important facts which confirm the afore-mentioned assumption.

- After 40 milliseconds (which is the shortest time interval a camera can record), a “fire ball” at the left corner of picture 9b is noticeable, which presents the detonation of 200 g TNT.
- At the following shot on picture 9c, after 80 milliseconds, the occurrence of a longitudinal water pillar is clearly noticeable. This pillar is made of water drops that have been thrown into the air by a flood wave of gas products resulting from the detonation of the cord.
- The raising of the in-line water pillar due to inertia of the water mass comes late in relation to the detonation of the cord. Therefore, the 200 g TNT detonation is firstly visible and then the raising of the water pillar, picture 9d.



Picture 9. The result of the experiment

2.4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIMENT AND SEQUENCES OF THE OLD BRIDGE DESTRUCTION

The comparative analysis of the sequences before and during the destruction of the Old Bridge and the results of the experiment proof the justification of the assumption that the Old Bridge has been destroyed by mine action as marked on picture 5, and not by hits of artillery projectiles.

Pictures 10, 11 and 12 show events happening at the same time according to a) TV ÖRF 2 and b) according to the experiment. Based on the comparison of these simultaneous events, the following conclusion poses itself:

- that the longitudinal water gush along the east side of the Neretva River is a consequence of a detonation of the detonating cord, which has been set up in the river.
- that the explosion in the bottom part of the eastern bridge arch, just before the raising of the in-line water pillar, is a consequence of the detonation of explosive charge which has caused the destruction of the bridge.

These parallel pictures indicate a high similarity of the effects, which have been gained during the experiment, and the scenes of the destruction of the Old Bridge on the recordings of TV ÖRF 2 and TV Mostar.

Old Bridge (TV ÖRF 2)



Experiment



t = 0 s Picture 10



t = 90 ms Picture 11




t = 120 ms Picture 12

In addition to that, the parallel shots of a) the sequence of TV Mostar and b) the results of the experiment of the same events on picture 13, 14 and 15 point to the similarity of effects.

This means that there is high probability that the Old Bridge has been destroyed by mine action and not by hits of artillery projectiles.


Old Bridge (TV Mostar)



Experiment



t = 0 s Picture 13



t = 80 ms Picture 14



t = 120 ms Picture 15

3. OPINION

Based on the studying of the accessible video documentation and the conducted experiment, the following can be concluded:

- a) There is a high probability that the Old Bridge has not been destroyed by attacks of gun tanks, but by a detonation of the explosive charge (or mine-explosive means) which has been placed in the bottom part of the bridge arch. The activation of the charge itself has been done through a detonating cord which has been activated from the close vicinity of the Old Bridge. This happened most probably from the left, respectively, the east bank of the Neretva River.
- b) A detailed study of the recordings of TV ÖRF 2 and TV Mostar, which have recorded the aforementioned events immediately before and during the destruction of the Old Bridge itself, point to this conclusion. A part of the examined scenes of TV ÖRF 2 is shown on pictures 2 and 3, and part of the examined scenes of TV Mostar is shown on picture 4.
- c) The proper longitudinal pillar (“water fountain”) that is visible in calm waters along the eastern bank just before the destruction of the Old Bridge itself, has most probably been caused by a detonation of the detonating cord set up in the water. The expansion of gases, which are a product of the cord detonation underneath the water, lead to the raising of a water pillar in form of a characteristic “water fountain” which dimension depends on the type and quantity of explosive charge and the depth where it is placed. This statement is realistically confirmed by the experiment shown on DVD 3, which is annex to this text.
- d) Looking at the time perspective and due to the slowness of the camera, the water fountain practically appears at the same time as the explosion at the bottom part of the bridge, which is noticeable by the dark cloud- this is a product of the detonation of the explosive charge.
- e) The experiment which has been conducted with the aim to confirm the afore-mentioned thesis and which has been organized in such a way to simulate the assumed way of destruction of the Old Bridge by a detonating cord, has shown that the destruction of the Old Bridge has been done with high probability by activating the explosive charge in the bottom part of the bridge arch, through a detonating cord, and not by gun artillery as stated before.

Enclosed to this text are the following:

- DVD 1, which shows sequences recorded by TV ÖRF 2, just before the destruction and during the destruction of the Old Bridge. The first video recording shows events in real time, while the second one shows the same events in slow motion.
- DVD 2 shows sequences recorded by TV Mostar just before the destruction and during the destruction of the Old Bridge (in continuity). The first video recording shows events in real time, while the second one shows the same events in slow motion.
- DVD 3, shows the experiment firstly in real time and then in slow motion.

Muhamed Sućeska, PhD. C. E.

Slobodan Janković, PhD. M. E. prof. retired

Aco Šikanić, PhD. M. E.



Planungsbüro für Bauwerksabbruch

Dr.-Ing. Rainer Melzer

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Att. at Law
Mr. Bozidar Kovacic
Prins Mauritsplein 28
NL- 2582 ND The Hague
THE NETHERLANDS

Ihr Zeichen

Ihre Nachricht vom
10.9.2007

Unser Zeichen
Me

Dresden, 4.10.2007

Circumstances of the destruction of the bridge "stary most" in Mostar, my endorsement and C.V.

Dear Mr. Kovacic,

enclosed you get here my professional C.V. and my technical endorsement to the "Analysis of the Destruction of the Old Bridge According to Accessible Video Tapes" written by Sucasca, Jancovic and Sikanic in January 2006.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Melzer



Dr.-Ing. Rainer Melzer
Planungsbüro für Bauwerksabbruch
öffentl. best. u. vereid. Sachverständiger für Einsturzverhalten,
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Beruflicher Werdegang und Beschreibung meiner jetzigen Tätigkeit

1. Beruflicher Werdegang

Zeitraum	berufliche Tätigkeit
1972-1976	Studium Dipl.-Bauing. Fachrichtung Konstruktiver Ingenieurbau an der TU Dresden
1976-1979	Bauprojektant im Projektierungsbetrieb der Wismut AG in Chemnitz
1979-1990	Wissenschaftlicher Assistent an der TU Dresden, Dozentur Baudynamik, experimentelle und theoretische Baudynamik, Erdbebeningenieurwesen, Forschungen zu Vorgängen bei Bauwerkssprengungen; Lehre in Statik und Dynamik;
1985	Promotion A, „Identifikation baudynamischer Parameter“
1991-1994	Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Ruhruniversität Bochum; Forschungsprojekt Sprengabbruch von Schornsteinen; Beratung zu Sprengabbrüchen von Bauwerken
1994-Gegenwart	Planungsbüro für Bauwerksabbruch; Planung von sprengtechnischen und maschinellen Bauwerksabbrüchen
1997-Gegenwart	Öffentliche Bestellung und Vereidigung als Sachverständiger für Einsturzverhalten, Erschütterungen und Schäden beim Abbruch von Bauwerken; Gerichts- und Privatgutachten zu Bauwerksabbrüchen, Erschütterungsgutachten, Erschütterungsmessungen

2. Gegenwärtiges Tätigkeitsfeld

Ich plante bisher verantwortlich den Sprengabbruch von mehreren hundert Industrieschornsteinen, vielen Kraftwerksanlagen, 34 Hochhäusern, aber auch 46 Brücken.

Durch Beobachtung und Auswertung dieser Bauwerkssprengungen erlangte ich detaillierte Kenntnisse von Sprengwirkungen, wodurch ich aussagefähig zu Sprengerschütterungen, Sprengdrücken bzw. Zerstörungswirkungen wurde. Mit diesen Kenntnissen gelang es mir übrigens, zusammen mit Praktikern mehrere neue Sprengverfahren bei Bauwerkssprengungen zur Anwendungsreife zu bringen.

Ich befasse mich außerdem mit dynamischen Bauwerksproblemen, Erschütterungsgutachten und Schwingungsmessungen. Ich war über Deutschland hinaus - allerdings eher selten - im EU-Raum, in der Schweiz und in Skandinavien tätig.

Durch meine Tätigkeit als vereidigter Sachverständiger bin ich mit den Kriterien einer unvoreingenommenen bzw. objektiven Erarbeitung von Gutachten vertraut.

Dresden, 22.9.2007

Dr. Melzer

Stellungnahme zu einer Analyse zur Zerstörung der Brücke "Stary Most" in Mostar anhand von Videoaufnahmen

INHALT:	Seite
1. Grundlagen	1
2. Situation	1
3. Beschreibung der Brücke	1
4. eigene Interpretation der Videoaufnahmen	2
5. Stellungnahme zur vorhandenen Analyse	2

Dresden, 4.10.2007

Dr.-Ing. R. Melzer



1. Grundlagen

- [1] Suceska, M., Jankovic, S., Sikanic, A.: Analysis of the Destruction of the Old Bridge According to Accessible Video Tapes; Zagreb, Januar 2006
- [2] Cramer, H.: Videoaufnahme: "Kasumovic-tape" vom 8.11.1993
- [3] Cramer, H.: Videoaufnahme: "Scott-tape" vom 9.11.1993
- [4] Cramer, H.: Videoaufnahme: "Palata-tape" vom 9.11.1993

2. Situation

Die Umstände des Einsturzes der historischen Bogenbrücke "Stary Most" über den Fluss Neretwa in der Stadt Mostar wurden in [1] analysiert. Im Folgenden nehme ich als Sachverständiger für Bauwerkeinstürze zu dieser Analyse Stellung. Meine Stellungnahme enthält trotz der Dramatik der Vorgänge und meiner persönlichen Abscheu gegen diesen "Brückenmord" ausschließlich fachliche bzw. technische Aspekte und wurde ohne jede Voreingenommenheit aufgestellt.

3. Beschreibung der Brücke

Die historisch wertvolle Bogenbrücke über den Fluss Neretwa war aus verdübelten Steinquadern errichtet. Das Verhältnis von Spannweite und Bogenhöhe (der so genannte Kühnheitsgrad) war gering. Durch diesen geringen "Kühnheitsgrad" und durch die vorhandenen verdübelten, massiven bzw. großflächigen Widerlagerbereiche besaß sie jedoch zweifellos eine sehr große Stabilität, die sie gegen den Granatbeschuss außerordentlich widerstandsfähig machte.

4. eigene Interpretation der Videoaufnahmen [2] bis [4]

Die Videoaufnahme [2] zeigt eindeutig den langanhaltenden Granat-Beschuss der Brücke aus einer Waffe, die flussabwärts stand. Der Beschuss beschädigte die Brücke zwar stark, führte jedoch nicht zu deren Einsturz. Die Granaten flogen quer zur Brückenlängsrichtung und trafen deshalb sichtbar ausschließlich die flussabwärts gelegene *Seitenwand* der Brücke.

In den folgenden Videos sichtbare Effekte ereigneten sich jedoch unter dem Bogen, also an einer *Brückenquerwand*, die genau parallel zur vorherigen Schussrichtung liegt. Diese Effekte können aus ballistischen Gründen nicht durch eine Granate aus der vorangegangenen Schussposition erzeugt worden sein.

Die Videoaufnahme [3] zeigt am folgenden Tag eine *erste Explosion* am rechten (östlichen) Brücken-Widerlager der bereits am Vortag beschädigten Brücke. Diese erste Explosion führt jedoch *nicht* zum Einsturz. Erst eine deutlich später stattfindende *zweite Explosion* bringt die Brücke zum Einsturz. Dieser Einsturz und die zweite Explosion wurden aus anderer Position auch vom Video [4] festgehalten.

In [3] ist vor der ersten Explosion ein deutlicher aber räumlich begrenzter und sehr kurzzeitiger Lichtblitz an der Flussseite des rechten Widerlagers unter dem Brückenbogen sichtbar. Kurze Zeit später wird das Wasser der Neretwa exakt linienförmig empor geschleudert und gleichzeitig explodiert ein Bereich des Widerlagers, wo vorher der Lichtblitz sichtbar war.

Insbesondere das Auftreten eines Lichtblitzes vor der eigentlichen Explosion schließt meines Erachtens eine Granateinwirkung aus.

Diese Vorgänge deuten hingegen klar auf die Explosion einer Sprengladung am Brückenwiderlager hin. Die Sprengladung wurde durch einen nichtelektrischen Zünder kurzzeitig verzögert gezündet. Dieser Zünder wurde mit einer Sprengschnur initiiert, die größtenteils unter Wasser verlegt eine Fernauslösung aus einer Position in Fließrichtung der Neretwa ermöglichte.

Eine Sprengschnur detoniert fortlaufend mit einer Geschwindigkeit in der Größenordnung von etwa 6000 m/s bzw. die Detonation pflanzt sich etwa 6 m weit pro Millisekunde fort. Das Hochschleudern der Wasserlinie geschah jedoch durch die Wasserträchtigkeit in einer Größenordnung von einigen Zehntelsekunden, also viel langsamer als das Detonieren der Sprengschnur, so dass der Lichtblitz der durchdetonierten Sprengschnur außerhalb des Wassers am Sprengschnur-Ende bzw. an seinem Ziel, der Brücke, zeitlich *vor* der Wasserwirkung sichtbar wurde.

In dieser zeitlichen Größenordnung von einigen Zehntelsekunden dürfte auch die Verzögerungszeit des Zünders in der Sprengladung gelegen haben, so dass die sichtbare Sprengwirkung an der Brücke etwa gleichzeitig mit der sichtbaren Wasserlinie begann.

4. Stellungnahme zur vorhandenen Analyse [1]

Nach dem sorgfältigen Studium der Analyse [1], Seite 1 bis 15, kann ich dort keine wesentliche technische Unkorrektheit erkennen.

In [1] wurde zwar der erste Lichtblitz am Widerlager nicht erkannt. Auch die Erkenntnis fehlt, dass bis zum Brückeneinsturz statt einer Explosion tatsächlich zwei separate Explosionen stattgefunden haben. Die Gründe lagen wahrscheinlich an der geringeren Bildfrequenz (25 Bilder pro Sekunde) und der Schnitttechnik des dort vorliegenden Videomaterials (In den mir vorliegenden Videos sind auch die sog. Halbbilder rekonstruiert, so dass effektiv 50 Bilder pro Sekunde vorliegen).

Die in der Analyse [1] abgeleiteten Schlussfolgerungen sind jedoch technisch völlig korrekt.

Den in [1] getroffenen Aussagen kann ich mich deshalb auch nach eigenen Betrachtungen der mir vorliegenden Videoaufnahmen in vollem Umfang anschließen.

Doctor of Engineering **Rainer Melzer**
Publicly appointed and sworn expert
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in the demolition of structures

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Opinion on the Analysis of the Destruction of the "Stari most" Bridge in Mostar based on Video Recordings

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1. Background	1
2. Situation	1
3. Description of the bridge	1
4. My own interpretation of the video recordings	2
5. Opinion on the present analysis	2

Dresden, 4 October 2007

/signed/

Doctor of Engineering R. Melzer

/stamp: Publicly appointed and sworn
by the Dresden Chamber of Industry
and Commerce:
Doctor of Engineering
Rainer Melzer
Expert in collapse behaviour,
concussions and damage
in the demolition of structures/

1. Background

- [1] M. Sucasca, S. Jankovic, and A. Sikanic: Analysis of the Destruction of the Old Bridge According to Accessible Video Tapes. Zagreb, January 2006.
- [2] Cramer, H.: Video Recording: "Kasumovic Tape" of 8 November 1993
- [3] Cramer, H.: Video Recording: "Scott Tape" of 9 November 1993
- [4] Cramer, H.: Video Recording: "Palata Tape" of 9 November 1993

2. Situation

The circumstances of the collapse of the historical arched bridge "Stari most" over the River Neretva in the city of Mostar were analysed in [1]. In what follows I state my opinion of this analysis as an expert on the collapse of structures. Despite the dramatic nature of the events and my personal distaste for the "murder" of this bridge, my opinion exclusively treats the professional and technical aspects and was compiled without any bias whatsoever.

3. Description of the bridge

The historically valuable arched bridge over the River Neretva was constructed with doweled ashlar. The span-to-rise ratio (the so-called "degree of daring") was low. Due to this low span-to-rise ratio and the presence of doweled, massive and large-area abutments, it nevertheless had a high degree of stability, which made it extraordinarily resistant to shelling.

4. My own interpretation of the video recordings [2] to [4].

Video recording [2] shows clearly the prolonged shelling of the bridge by a weapon that was located downstream. Though the shelling severely damaged the bridge, it did not result in its collapse. The shells flew crosswise to the length of the bridge and thus only hit the *side wall* that faced downstream, as is visible in the video.

In the subsequent videos, however, visible effects appear under the arch, i.e., on a *transverse wall* of the bridge, that lay exactly parallel to the direction of the previous shelling. Ballistics considerations rule out that these effects could have been produced by a shell fired from the previous firing position.

Video recording [3] shows on the following day a *first explosion* on the right (eastern) abutment of the bridge, which had already been damaged on the day before. This first explosion did *not*, however, cause its collapse. Only a *second explosion*, which clearly occurred subsequently, resulted in the collapse of the bridge. The collapse and the second explosion are captured on film from another position in video [4].

In [3], before the first explosion a clear but spatially confined and momentary flash of light is visible under the arch on the side of the right abutment facing the water. A short time later the water of the Neretva is thrust upward along a single line and simultaneously a portion of the abutment explodes where the flash of light was previously visible.

In particular, in my opinion the appearance of a flash of light *before* the actual explosion rules out the effects of a shell.

In contrast, these events point clearly to the explosion of a demolition charge at the bridge abutment. The demolition charge was detonated with a short delay by a non-electric detonator. This detonator was ignited with a fuse that was mostly under water and thus allowed a remote triggering of the device from a position along the flow path of the Neretva.

A fuse detonates continuously with a speed of approximately 6000 metres per second, i.e., the detonation travels around 6 metres per millisecond. The upward thrust of the water line occurred, however, due to water resistance after approximately a few tenths of a second, i.e., much more slowly than the detonation of the fuse, so that the flash of light of the detonation at the end of the fuse, i.e., its target, the bridge, became visible outside of the water before the effect of the detonation on the water.

The delay of the detonator in the demolition charge could have been in the magnitude of a few tenths of a second, so that the visible effect of the detonation on the bridge began more or less simultaneously with the visible movement of the waterline.

4. /as printed/ Opinion on the available analysis [1].

After a careful study of the available analysis [1], pages 1 to 15, I cannot see any significant technical errors.

In [1] the first flash of light was indeed undetected. There was also a failure to recognize that before the collapse of the bridge not one but actually two explosions occurred. The reasons for this probably lay in the lower frame frequency (25 frames per second) and the editing methods used in the available videos (in the videos available to me the so-called fields have also been reconstructed, so that there are effectively 50 frames per second).

However, the conclusions reached in Analysis [1] are technically completely correct.

Therefore, after my own examination of the available video recordings I can endorse the statements made in [1] in their entirety.

Helge Cramer

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Slobodan Praljak

Kraljevec 35 a

41000 Zagreb

Croatia

Scott-video recording

Pottenstein, 23rd July 2005

Dear Mr. Praljak,

I was not able to find the Briton, who was called “Scott” in Mostar and who recorded the shelling of “Stari Most” on 9th November 1993; he remained a mysterious figure and his recent “disappearance” is allegedly justified on the grounds that he went hiding in Latin America in connection with a crime. With this latest level of information, I stopped the search for the mysterious “Scott” in spring 2004. Until then, I gathered the following information:

Source and material:

The London-based production company Mentorn owes the film rights of the “Scott” material; however, I could not clarify with certainty whether this successor company of a British production company, which was working in Mostar in 1993, has the exclusive rights or whether it is only in possession of a copy of it. At first, I tried to get a copy of the raw material at Mentorn, but then I got an excerpt from a Mentorn-film for the BBC, which contained the “Scott”-images of the shelling. Based on this material, I cannot determine whether these are actually all recorded “Scott”-images of the shelling. However, I am convinced that these are not all. The material is cut and shows one peculiarity: After different shell hits, the crucial scene does not start with the hit or explosion respectively, which causes the collapse of the bridge, but nearly a second later; already the first image is stable, which I interpret like this, that at least the first two or three shaky frames, shot at the moment the camera is turned on, are cut out – it can even be more frames: because this cutting takes some of the dynamics away from this dramatic scene, which this scene would have if the initial frames were actually shaky. A cutting error, which should not happen to a professional cutter. The real content of the material can however only be determined on the basis of the original copy.

The film must have been broadcasted in England in 1994. The excerpt at hand shows a young man acting in front of a camera in Mostar and commenting the film images in the studio from his own knowledge. The man is called “Jim Wilson” several times in the voice-over commentary and once even named “ex-service man”, for whom a bounty is placed after his mission in Bosnia. It is not certain whether this “Wilson” is the aforementioned person “Scott”, who recorded the collapse of the bridge. My questions related to this issue and submitted to Mentorn were not answered.

“Scott” and the situation on the ground:

According to consistent information from Mostar, the real name of “Scott” is allegedly James Wilson, born in Edinburgh in 1972; he joined the British Army at the age of 17, participated in the Gulf War at the age of 18 and came with his unit under “friendly fire” by US-bombers; he was the only one who survived uninjured. He left the Army and became allegedly a peace activist at the Bradford Peace Institute (my investigations there on a person named James Wilson had no results). It says that he had fought from June 1992 to March 1993 as a volunteer in Mostar, first within the scope of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) against the Serbs, and then later he had changed the side with approximately ten others and joined the Mostar-Brigade on the Muslim side. He is said to have finally left Mostar in March 1993 and returned to England.

In September 1993, Wilson allegedly returned to Mostar as a cameraman of a British film crew; he supposedly stayed in Mostar with a hand-held camera of the production team, while the team returned to London.

On 8th November, Wilson has allegedly recorded with this Hi8-camera the first recordings of the bridge shelling, which then had been taken by a soldier of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Sarajevo and broadcasted on 10th November on the channel TV BiH.

On the morning of the 9th November, Wilson returned to the spot at nine o'clock in the morning, from where he recorded the collapse of the bridge; it was the same spot from where soldier Kasumović had recorded the shelling with his VHS-camera on the day before. At that time soldier Edin Palata has already positioned himself and his VHS-camera on the staircase of a bombed-out house. Edin Palata, who lived nearby, placed himself in the spot immediately after the first hits were shot from tanks on this second day, because he counted on that the severely damaged bridge would not withstand another day. Palata had a nodding acquaintance with the Scotsman and knew that the latter one was close with a British television crew, but he remembers him rather as a freelancer, who supported the TV-team with his local knowledge of the place and contacts and who also got the Hi8-camera from them when the crew left Mostar. In any case, on that particular morning, Wilson came alone, but he had - contrary to Palata and Kasumović the day before - a camera tripod, with which he calmly positioned himself in the best spot, directly in front of Palata. Palata thereupon left the place and recorded his images from another location.

It further says that Wilson had rerecorded his film images of the collapse of the bridge immediately on VHS at the channel RTV Mostar and that he had then flown with his original material to Sarajevo on the same day, i.e. the 9th November, where he had spent the night in TV BiH and had left Bosnia the next day. It also says that around the 15th November, a RTV Mostar staff member had come to Sarajevo with a VHS-copy of the Wilson-material, from where it had been broadcasted by TV BiH. It says that Wilson had tried in London to give his material to Channel 4, but they had no interest in it; later an Austrian channel had supposedly broadcasted the images.

So much for the story that is told in Mostar. The story contains various peculiarities: TV BiH must have been more than dopey not to broadcast these important images if a cameraman had arrived there on the 9th November with the very latest and highly controversial film images of the collapse of the bridge. Also the cameraman must have been very scatty if he indeed had left a VHS-copy in Mostar (from where broadcasting was not possible), and two hours later had done nothing like it at the channel in Sarajevo, except to take a nap on the original film and then, the next day, to take it out of the country without having it broadcasted. The Austrian television presented the Scott-images not much later, but soon after the collapse of the bridge (if not already on the evening of the 9th November). The British television channel would also be not quite of this world, if it had sent a commissioned production to Mostar and then showed no interest in the most sensational images, which had been brought by the last external staff member of this production and represented late-breaking news from the scene....

I suspect that not all information from Mostar is correct and that particularly the analysis of the film was not correctly understood there: as far as I see the Mentorn- film excerpts, Wilson incorporated his images of the collapse of the bridge into the same film he had been involved with in the shooting in Mostar. The complete film would shed light on it (and can certainly be obtained in London); I have not further bothered to get it, because in the end both “Scott” and his images were not relevant any longer for my project. A VHS-copy of the excerpt at hand I am sending to you as separate mail, together with the copy of the documentary film that I cut from the gathered Mostar-material. I will complete the last version of approximately 93 minutes (the first

draft version is even 15 minutes longer) with Stefan Urlaß in August; the VHS-tape shows the part as it should be. The television channels do not show any further interest in the subject, a rental cannot not be found despite all efforts so far, meaning that there will be only some presentations at documentary film festivals. Documentary film is, in the end, only a very expensive hobby.

I have negotiated with Mentorn the following address:

Nick Vance

Head of Library Sales, Sunset + Vine & Music Box,

The Television Cooperation.

30 Sackville Street, London , W1S 3DY.

Direct Line +44 (0) 2 0 74 78 7356

Fax +4 4 (0) 20 7478 7 407

nickv@sunsetvine.co.uk

www.sunsetvine.co.uk

You can search for Sunset + Vine & Music Box footage on-line by logging to the website and clicking on the Library Sales icon.

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Slobodan Praljak

Kraljevec 35 a

41000 Zagreb

Croatia

Mostar-video recording

Pottenstein, 23rd September 2005

Dear Mr. Praljak,

I have not forgotten the search for the video-recordings of the collapse of the bridge; but, unfortunately I cannot report any success regarding this matter. I ordered the English TV film with the "Scott"- video recording and the interviews with the alleged cameraman James Wilson already in the beginning of August, in between I have checked with them several times and even received a confirmation that they will send me a VHS- but the tape has not arrived yet. The situation in Sarajevo is similar; as I do not have a direct contact to the Bosnian Television, I am trying through a cameraman, who is a friend of mine, to get a better BetaSP-copy in Sarajevo. I received news today that he was shooting in the neighbouring country and could not look after this matter at all; he said that he will finally take care of it.

I hope that you received the Beta-copy of the tape, which I had got from RTV Mostar (I sent it directly from the studio in Dresden to Zagreb); the quality is not satisfying and therefore I hope that the agent in Sarajevo will be able to get me a better copy. This is only a brief interim report, I hope to get back to you soon with better news.

Sincerely,

Helge Cramer

BOŽO PEHAR

I, Božo Pehar, son of Mate, born on 8th of April 1937 in Humac, Ljubuški municipality, residing in [REDACTED], at [REDACTED] and with abode in [REDACTED], at request of Slobodan Praljak defence team, against whom the criminal proceeding before the International Criminal tribunal for crimes, committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia is conducted, I was warned to tell the truth only considering the known facts and therefore I give the following

STATEMENT

In June 1992 I lived in Mostar and Mostar was at that time under constant attack of JNA. I was a member of the engineering HVO unit in Mostar, operational zone south-eastern Herzegovina.

I remember well that on 7th of June 1992 an unknown soldier came to the premises of HVO which were located at the law faculty in Mostar and told me that Slobodan Praljak issued an order to protect the Old Bridge. That soldier said that one should provide boards for the protection of the bridge. On 8th of June 1992*, Ante Ivanković, being my superior, also told me about Slobodan Praljak's order and requested from me to enable boards to protect the bridge, as well as to protect it during the night. The order to work over night was issued for our protection because we could approach the bridge with more safety than on daylight.

Despite the chaos in town, due to constant shelling by the JNA, I provided a necessary material to execute the order and I managed to enable a truck with boards. The boards were 5 centimetres thick, the thickest ones I could find.

In the night on 8th of June 1992, around 22 o'clock, along with engineering group, consisting of 40 of us, I was working on bridge protection, panelling it with boards. During the work, shells were falling around us, but we completed the task at 01:00 hrs on 9th of June 1992.

I was warned about the consequences of giving the false statement therefore I affirm with my signature that I gave the statement truthfully, willingly and to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

In Mostar, 13th of May 2005

Božo Pehar

/signed/

/handwritten text of the statement, abbreviated version/

* Author's remark:

Probably because of the passage of time, Mr. Božo Pehar placed the description of the events seven days earlier.

Protecting of The Old Bridge has begun 15 June 1992.

Slobodan Praljak

STATEMENT

I, the undersigned, Božo Pehar, state that on 13th of May 2005, of my own free will, I gave a statement for the Defence of General Slobodan PRALJAK about events in which I participated and which are connected to the wartime events in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991-1994). I agree that my statement be used in proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and that it be made public. I am willing to testify in the proceedings before the ICTY against Slobodan PRALJAK in the case Prosecutor versus PRLIĆ et al.

I state that before giving and certifying this statement to the Defence of General PRALJAK I was warned that I had to speak the truth and that an untruthful statement is a criminal offence under the Penal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Penal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rules of the ICTY.

I state that I have understood these warnings and that everything I said in my statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

I have read the statement through carefully and it corresponds in its entirety to what I stated. I signed the written text of the statement in my own hand.

In __Mostar_____

/signed/

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - izvale. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

jerjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mbr - Trebinjska, 10.
mbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspap, 13. lap
ob, 13.mtb, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

epređiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

**DESTROYED AND
DAMAGED CATHOLIC
CHURCHES AND
OTHER RELIGIOUS
OBJECTS IN BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA
DURING THE WAR
1991-1995**

**Destroyed and devastated
by some A BiH troops**

FACTS



Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Vrhbosna	
DESTROYED AND DAMAGED RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Number of structures
Some BH Army troops	290

Roman Catholic Diocese of Banja Luka	
DESTROYED AND DAMAGED RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Number of structures
Some BH Army troops	1

Roman Catholic Diocese of Trebinje-Mrkan	
DESTROYED AND DAMAGED RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Number of structures
Some BH Army troops	3



Interview of Goran Milić with the Chairman of the BH Presidency, Mr. Sulejman Tihić

Place: Slavonski Brod

Ante Prkačin – The host

Member of the Croatian National Council of BiH - Petar Jozelić

Ambassador of BiH in Zagreb - Zlatko Dizdarević

Chief of Cabinet of the President of Presidency BiH - Sehada Kolenović

Chairman of the Presidency of BiH - Sulejman Tihić



Chairman of the Presidency of BiH



Tihić: “Terrorism in BiH, never in BiH has been committed a single terrorist act, the international forces, civil and military units in BiH, from Dayton agreement, never and nobody in that part, at least, where the BH Army was, as well as in entire Bosnia; nobody even threw a stone on the foreigner, a foreign soldier or an international representative, not to mention, hurt somebody.”

Tihić: “Is there a hotbed of terrorism in Bosnia, maybe it does exist in Germany, maybe in Croatia, however, those are all assumptions.”



Tihić: “Bosnia and Herzegovina is, Bosnian people, if you refer to Bosniaks, they are the biggest victims in the previous war. They suffered the most, most of them were killed and we have never reached for revenge. And when Srebrenica happened, there was not any revenge in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We have never used terrorism as fight method. It is opposite to our being, opposite to the policy that we implement in BiH. Therefore, I think those are rather political speculations that BiH is not a suitable ground, Bosnian Muslims, they are European autochthon people, they don't have such inclinations, they are people that which used to tolerance, respect for others and different, which was shown by the war; either way, where the Bosnians were the majority, a single church hasn't been destroyed, you know. God knows, that in other areas, in the Republika Srpska, everything was destroyed and where the HVO was, mostly all was destroyed as well.”



Tihić: “Back then, at the bare beginning, BiH and Croatia were exposed to aggression; however, some things changed later when some wanted to join Milošević in division of BiH. A conflict, unfortunately occurred in Herzegovina, some conflict emerged in Central Bosnia as well. Those are approximately territories that, according to some agreement from Karadorđevo should have been Croatian, but mostly, there were conflicts.”

There are two questions

1. Is Mr. Sulejman Tihić lying?
(LIE – conscious disregard of facts)
2. Is Mr. Sulejman Tihić not telling the truth?
(Because he does not know the facts)

With the second question we need the answer – how come that a member of the Presidency of BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/, president of the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ - the strongest Bosniak–Muslim party does not know the facts?!

And the facts are:

1. His and their leader in the “Islamic Declaration” – the political project of the “tolerant people” wrote:
“The first and most important such conclusion is the one about the incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can be no peace nor co-existence between the ‘Islamic faith’ and ‘non-Islamic’ social and political institutions.”
“Pretending to order its world by itself, Islam clearly excludes the right and possibility of any foreign ideology on its territory. There is, therefore, no lay principle, and the state should be the expression of – and support the moral concept of religion.”
“The choice of this moment is always a concrete issue and depends on a number of factors. Still, we can set up one general rule: the Islamic movement should and can approach the overtaking of power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough not only to topple down the existing non-Islamic rule, but to build a new, Islamic rule. This differentiation is important, because destruction and building does not require an equal degree of psychological and material preparation.”
2. This ideologically – political project of one of three equal nations in BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ was printed in more than 200,000 copies in 1990.
3. He and they tried to conclude “The Historical Agreement” between Muslims and Serbs about BiH remaining in Yugoslavia. The Croats were not even mentioned, nor asked, as if they did not exist.
4. He, Alija Izetbegović, roared on electoral rallies “civil state or civil war”, as reported by “Oslobođenje” from 1990, all in accordance with the theses of the “Islamic declaration”.
5. He and they considered JNA /Yugoslav People’s Army/ to be the force which will save BiH (read: Muslims) from war, even when this brute force killed and set ablaze territories throughout Croatia.

6. He, Alija Izetbegović, Tihić's party friend, when the villages of Uništa and Ravno were burnt by the JNA reservists and other Chetniks (Ravnogorci), thought of it as a Croatian problem.

And why?

Because in these villages, on the territory of BiH, the Croatian people lived. This attack, this aggression, this burning and killing in these villages of BiH, for these experts in constitutional law is not the beginning of aggression on that country – BiH. "This is not our war" said the President of the Presidency of BiH Alija Izetbegović and he counted the beginning of war in that country from the day when JNA attacked him in Sarajevo.

7. Five hundred officers of Tihić's army (A BiH / Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina) "who never resorted to revenge" (DEAR GOD!!) dutifully, in accordance with higher command and moral norms with which Sulejman Tihić prides himself in the name of the people, took part in the aggression of JNA on Croatia, as members of this army. These officers were permeated by the feelings and realization of justice only when the JNA, the army which they so dutifully served at the time of attack on Croats in Croatia and BiH, started mass shelling of their houses and kill their loved ones.

It was then, only then, that they went over to the A BiH and became allies with the always regular HVO /Croatian Defence Council/.

8. These political leaders, of the then MUSLIM PEOPLE, accepted into the regular units of their A BiH 2,700 Mujahedin.

The remaining 2,000 – 2,500 "warriors of Allah" independently advocated the ideas of Bin Laden, spread the ideas of humane warfare, and the whole army cheered "Allahu Ekber" in the name of BiH and the equality of its people. They were killed and became shehids. And all this within the constitution of BiH, equality and sovereignty of the Croat, Bosnian and Serbian peoples.

9. Mr. Tihić, in accordance with his capacities of cognition, has no idea who, how and when killed 1,147 (thousand one hundred forty seven) civilians and imprisoned soldiers of HVO in 21 (twenty one) municipalities of Central Bosnia.

And so forth.

This same Mr. Tihić, having been through Serbian casemates, found refuge in Croatia, in Rijeka, and with wholehearted help of the Croatian leadership helped the survival of A BiH even when its main enemy became the HVO.

That's how it was!

The writer of these lines could theorize in detail on the thoughts of Aristotle and Plato, Hegel and Kant and Thomas Aquinas, he could search for the solution of the "General riddle" within the scope of quantum mechanics and Heisenberg's principle of indetermination, theory of determined chaos and the Second law of thermodynamics (THE FIRST LAW TOO IS IMPORTANT) while NEWTON and MAX WEBER, Starčević and KONRAD LORENZ, as well as FREUD and his brotherhood should not be bypassed...

And all this should be simmered over a low fire and gently warmed up by tangents and arches of dialectical materialism, with the addition of great thoughts of Stipe Šušar, Predrag Matvejević and other successors of the "Short course of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)".

All this in the end leads to an ordinary, small, poor truth to be lost in the delusions of a deceptive mind.

So, what is it all about?

Mr. Sulejman Tihić is by all standards a civilized and polite person, and I don't want to offend him.

But:

What Mr. Tihić has said is a lie, a vulgar and shameless, cold and calculated.

Lie!

Mr. Sulejman Tihić lies, he lies in a vulgar, cold and calculated way. He, Mr. Tihić, member of the Presidency of BiH on that day, on that place, in front of Croatian journalists took out his weenie and pissed on the FACTS!

THIS IS THE MANNER OF TIHIĆ

It's not that the man cannot be comprehended, the main representative of one of three nations living in BiH.

But Croats and all sub-groups of this people: politicians, historians, intellectuals (honest and dishonest), journalists, academics, workers and peasants and students, artists, lovers of truth, people of religion and teaching of religion, Europeans, various associations, thirty thousand non-governmental organizations keep silent...


Everybody keeps silent!

Incomprehensibly and miserably, in a flattering and gentlemanly manner they keep silent.

They keep silent with a feeling of incomprehensible historic guilt.

They keep silent cowardly.

Slobodan Praljak



TYPE OF OBJECT	COMPLETELY DESTROYED	SEVERELY DAMAGED	DAMAGED	DAMAGED TOTAL
Parish churches	65	54	66	185
Other churches	60	53	55	168
Chapels	63	55	109	227
Parish houses and other related objects	65	84	77	226
Monasteries	8	14	8	30
Cemeteries	8	53	103	164
TOTAL	269	313	418	1000

THE AREA OF JAJCE



DESTROYED AND DAMAGED CATHOLIC CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Completely destroyed	Severely damaged	Damaged	TOTAL
Parish churches	0	0	0	1
Other churches	0	0	0	0
Chapels	0	0	0	0
Parish houses and other parish structures	0	0	0	0
Convents	0	0	0	0
Cemeteries	0	0	1	1
TOTAL:	0	0	1	1

Ključ – parish Ključ – catholic cemetery “Latini” in the town.” Damaged and devastated during October 1996 and March 1997

THE AREA OF MOSTAR AND SOUTHERN HERZEGOVINA



DESTROYED AND DAMAGED CATHOLIC CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Completely destroyed	Severely damaged	Damaged	TOTAL
Parish churches	0	0	1	1
Other churches	0	0	0	0
Chapels	0	0	0	0
Parish houses and other parish structures	0	0	0	0
Convents	0	2	0	2
Cemeteries	0	0	0	0
TOTAL:	0	2	1	3

THE AREA OF MOSTAR AND SOUTHERN HERZEGOVINA destroyed and damaged sacral structures by some BH Army troops



Mostar, Parish of Sts. Peter and Paul -
parish church of Sts. Peter and Paul and
Franciscan monastery

The church was devastated on several occasions by the JNA /Yugoslav Peoples' Army/ and the VRS /Army of the Republic of Srpska/. On 12 May 1993 an explosive device was thrown into the monastery which caused the greatest damage. Since April until the beginning of October 1993 the members of Muslim forces fired 27 grenades of various calibre on the church and the monastery.



Jablanica, parish Jablanica - parish church of Immaculate Conception of Mary.


On 21 December 1992 alongside the sacristy an explosive device was detonated which damaged the church. Since 20 March 1993 the area of the parish is under the control of Muslim forces.



Konjic, parish Konjic - parish church
of St. John the Baptiste and Franciscan
monastery.

THE AREA OF CENTRAL BOSNIA

destroyed and damaged sacral structures by some BH Army troops



DESTROYED AND DAMAGED CATHOLIC CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Completely destroyed	Severely damaged	Damaged	TOTAL
Parish churches	1	14	22	37
Other churches	7	13	17	37
Chapels	19	23	52	94
Parish houses and other parish structures	9	19	21	49
Convents	0	3	2	5
Cemeteries	8	26	34	68
TOTAL:	44	98	148	290



Bistrica, the parish of Bistrica - parish church of St. Theresa and the parish house.

During July and August 1993 the church received a direct hit by a cannon missile and the interior is completely devastated.



Bistrica, the Parish of Bistrica - the house of the nuns "Sisters of God's Love"

The house is completely plundered and burnt.



Bistrica, the parish of Bistrica - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is devastated and the cemetery severely damaged.



Bristovi, the parish of Bugojno - a filial church and the cemetery.

The church is demolished, only the walls remained and the cemetery is mostly destroyed.



Bugojno, the parish of Bugojno - the parish church of St. Anthony of Padua.

The members of the Muslim forces planted a bomb which destroyed the stained glass windows and the outer wall.



Bugojno - Čaušlije, the parish of Bugojno - cemetery chapel of St. Michael and the cemetery.

The chapel was plundered and severely damaged and all the tombstones were pulled down.



✝ Donja Ričica,
the parish of
Skopaljska
Gračanica -
cemetery chapel.

The chapel is plundered
and devastated and 15
tombstones were pulled
down.



✝ Bugojno, the parish of Bugojno - cemetery
chapel of St. John the Baptiste and the
cemetery.

Chapel and the cemetery are severely
damaged and around 180 tombstones
were pulled down.

✝ Gračanica-Humac, the parish of
Skopaljska Gračanica - the filial church of
St. Heart of Mary.

During 1993/94 the church was
demolished and on 14 July 1996 the
interiors of the church were torched. The tombstone
crucifixes were taken away.




✝ Donji Vakuf, the parish of Bugojno - a
filial church.

After A BiH took control over this area the
interiors of the church was destroyed by
an explosive device.




✝ Drvetine, the parish of Bugojno - the filial
church of St. Anthony of Padua.

During 1995 the church was torched
and everything around it was completely
destroyed.



Glavice, the parish of Glavice - parish church of St. Heart of Jesus and the parish house.

The church is completely plundered and the parish house was plundered and partly torched.



Glavice, the parish of Glavice - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is completely destroyed and tombstones are wrecked and pulled down.




Gornja Ričica, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is destroyed and the cemetery partly damaged.



Gračanica-Humac, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - the filial church of St. Heart of Mary.

The church is completely plundered and devastated and the parish house is plundered and torched.



Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, the parish of Gornji Vakuf - parish church of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary and the parish house.

In the period from 23 October 1992 until 31 December 1993 the church is severely damaged by shelling.



Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, the parish of Gornji Vakuf - the House of St. Anthony.

On 15 February 1993 the House of St. Anthony was shelled and torched.



Gračanica-Humac, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - parish church of the Most Innocent Heart of Mary.

The church is completely plundered and devastated, likewise the parish house.



Gračanica, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - the house of the nuns "Servants of the Child Jesus".

The house was plundered and torched.



Grnica-Trebare, the parish of Bistrica - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is partly devastated.



Kandija, the church is severely devastated and the parish house is completely torched together with a library containing 8000 books - parish church of St. Elias and the parish house.



Kandija, the parish of Kandija - cemetery chapel and the "Grabovi" cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery are partly damaged and severe damage is inflicted on the tomb of Kandija priests.



Krupa, the parish of Bistrica - the chapel and local cemetery.

The chapel is devastated and on 1 March 1993 the cemetery was severely damaged, which was repeated in 1996.



Lenderovina, the parish of Bugojno - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery are severely devastated.



Lužani, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery are slightly damaged.



Pajić Polje, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - the chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is completely plundered and the roof taken off. Nearly all the tombstones are destroyed.





Vrse, the parish of Gornji Vakuf - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is plundered and devastated and the tombstones pulled down.



Voljice, the parish of Gornji Vakuf - the filial church of St. Anthony.

The church is damaged by shelling.



Bilići, the parish of Deževica - the cemetery chapel.

The chapel is plundered and damaged.



Brestovo, the parish of Brestovo - the parish church of the Birth of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the parish house.

In April 1993 the church was damaged and the parish house sustained minor damages too.



Brestovo, the parish of Brestovo - the convent of Poor Clares.

In April 1993 the attic was set on fire by shelling.



Brnjaci, the parish of Kiseljak - a filial church.

Damaged by shelling.



Busovača, the parish of Busovača - the parish church of St. Anthony of Padua.

Due to shelling the church sustained damages between 25 January and 25 December 1993.



Fojnica, the parish of Fojnica - the parish church of the Holy Spirit and the Franciscan monastery.

In the period between 2 and 15 July 1993 the monastery and the church were exposed to shelling. On 13 September 1993 four members of A BiH killed the superior of the monastery Nikica Miličević and the vicar Leon Migić.



Deževica, the parish of Deževica - the parish church of St. Mary of the Snow and the parish house.

The church is devastated and all the furnishings were plundered.



Kaćuni, the parish of Busovača - the filial church of St. Nikola Tavelić.

The church is devastated.



Kazijevići, the parish of Fojnica - the filial church "Porziuncola".

The church sustained medium damage.



Kiseljak, the parish of Kiseljak - the parish church of St. Elias the Prophet.

In the period from 18 April until 31 December 1993 the church was damaged by shelling.



Milodraž, memorial chapel (on "AHD-NAMU" from 1463) and the cemetery.

The chapel was damaged and part of the tombstones taken away.



Liješevo, the parish of Gromiljak - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is completely destroyed and torched.



Kiseljak, the parish of Kiseljak - the parish church of St. Elias the Prophet.

In the period between 18 April and 31 December 1993 the church was damaged by shelling.



Šćitovo, the parish of Fojnica - the filial church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

Completely torched with all the inventory.



Prosje, the parish of Busovača - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel was torched between 25 and 31 January 1993.



Doljani, the parish of Doljani - cemetery chapels.

By the end of July 1993 two cemetery chapels are partly destroyed.



Hudutsko, the parish of Gračac - a filial church.

In mid-1993 the church is completely destroyed.



Zabrđe, the parish of Banbrdo/Lepenica - a filial church.

During the summer months the church was completely plundered and devastated.



Komin, the parish of Uzdol - chapel of St. Anthony.

Sustained severe damages.




Kosne luke, the parish of Doljani - cemetery.

By the end of July 1993 the tombstones and crucifixes were demolished by members of the A BiH.



Prozor, the parish of Prozor - parish church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the parish house.

Damaged due to shelling.



Kostajnica, the parish of Obri - a filial church.

The interior of the church was plundered and devastated.



Obri, the parish of Obri - votive chapel of St. John.

The chapel is damaged and the old tombstones devastated.



Obri, the parish of Obri - parish church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

The church is completely plundered and devastated.



Uzdol, the parish of Uzdol - parish church of St. John the Baptist and the parish house.

The church as well as the parish house were severely damaged during 1993.



Žitače, facilities of the parish of Podhum/Žitače - cemetery chapels.

In the period between 2 May and 2 October 1993 all cemetery chapels were demolished and desecrated.



Solakova Kula, the parish of Solakova Kula - the parish church of St. Elias the Prophet.

The church is completely plundered and the statues of the saints beheaded.



Žitače, the facilities of the Podhum/Žitače parish - the parish church of St. Anthony of Padua.

In the period between 2 May and 2 October 1993 the church is desecrated, plundered and partly torched. The parish house and another building were demolished.



Brnj, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.
The chapel is partly damaged.



Bjelavići, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - a filial church.

After occupation of the locality on 13 June 1993 the church was devastated and plundered.



Borovica, the parish of Borovica - the parish church of The Transfiguration, parish house and catechism hall.

The church was mined and fully destroyed with all the belongings. Parish house was completely destroyed along with the parish archive and library. Finally, this building was mined too.



Bukovlje, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel was plundered and then torched.



Bulčići, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel was devastated and the bell stolen.



Crnač, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is partly damaged.



Gornja Borovica, the parish of Borovica - cemetery chapel.

The chapel was plundered and partly devastated.



Donji Banjevac, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is partly damaged.



Duboštica, the parish of Vareš - a filial church.

During October / November 1993 the interiors of the church were desecrated.



Gornji Banjevac, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is damaged.



Haljinići, the parish of Haljinići - parish center of the Assumption of Mary.

The parish centre was plundered and devastated.



Grmače, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - a filial church.

Following the occupation of the locality on 13 June 1993, the church was torched.



Kakanj - Bjelica, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is plundered and destroyed.



Juke, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is plundered and destroyed, and the cemetery partly destroyed too.



Borovičke Njive, parish Borovica - cemetery chapel.

The chapel was plundered and devastated.



Kraljeva Sutjeska, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - the parish church of St. John the Baptist and the monastery.

By the end of 1993 desecrated on several occasions and at the beginning of 1997 damaged by a shell.



Očevije, the parish of Vijaka - a filial church.

In the second half of 1993 completely plundered and damaged.



Mir, the parish of Vareš - chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel was devastated twice and the tombstones were demolished.



Mandovina, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.
The chapel is completely plundered and devastated.



Pogar, the parish of Vareš - a filial church.
At the beginning of November 1993 it was hit by two grenades from a grenade launcher and the interior was devastated.



Pavlovići, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - a filial church.
After the occupation of the locality on 13 June 1993, the church was torched.



Pržić, the parish of Vareš - a filial church.
The church sustained heavy damages.



Pope, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.
The chapel is partially damaged.



Vareš Majdan, the parish of Vareš - a filial church.
The members of the 3rd Corps of the Muslim forces on 2 September 1993 damaged the church and devastated the interiors.



Varda, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.
The chapel is partially damaged, and the tombstones destroyed.



Seoce, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - a filial church.
After the occupation of the locality on 13 June 1993 the church was plundered and devastated.



Poljani, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - a filial church.
After the occupation of the locality on 13 June 1993 the church was plundered and devastated.



Vijaka, the parish of Vijaka - the parish church of the Immaculate Conception and the parish house.
In the second half of 1993 the church sustained minor damages and the parish house was plundered.



Olovo, the parish of Vijaka - church - sanctuary of the Mother of God ("Olovska Gospa") and the parish house.
Plundered on the part of A BiH.



Zgošća, the parish of Kakanj - chapel and the cemetery.
The chapel was damaged and the cemetery devastated.



Brajkovići, the parish of Brajkovići - the parish church of Sts. Peter and Paul and the parish house.

The church was damaged due to shelling, and the parish house was devastated.



Vukanovići, the parish of Vukanovići - the parish church of St. Anthony and the parish house.

The church was plundered and devastated.



Žitelj, the parish of Kakanj - chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel was damaged and the monuments destroyed.



Bukovica, the parish of Guča Gora - a filial church and the cemetery.

The church and the cemetery were devastated.



Čukle, the parish of Brajkovići - a filial church and the cemetery.

During April and May 1993 the church and the cemetery were damaged. The Caritas pharmacy was plundered. Until October 1997 the church was destroyed by fire.



Dolac/Bila, cemetery chapel at "Baja's" cemetery

Since the summer of 1993 the area is under the control of Muslim forces. The chapel was plundered and the tombstones demolished.



Čuture, cemetery chapel at the “Sviba” cemetery.

The chapel is devastated and the tombstones demolished.



Dolac, parish of Dolac - the parish church of the Assumption of Mary and the parish house.

On 3 June 1993 the church was damaged during shelling and the parish house plundered and devastated.



Gorica, the parish of Guča Gora - cemetery.

The cemetery is destroyed, including a number of tombstones.



Djakovići, the parish of Novi Travnik - a filial chapel.

The chapel is devastated.



Gospino Vrelo, the parish of Ovčarevo - chapel - votive sanctuary of the Birth of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

The chapel is devastated and destroyed.



Kasapovići, the parish of Novi Travnik - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is devastated.



Kraljevice, the parish of Guča Gora - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and the cemetery is destroyed.



Gostunj, the parish of Dolac - a filial church and the cemetery.

The church was damaged at the beginning of June 1993, and ca 50% of the tombstones are destroyed.



Hadžići, the parish of Novi Travnik - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is devastated.



Guča Gora, the parish of Guča Gora - the parish church of St. Francis of Assisi and the Franciscan monastery.

After taking control of the locality on 8 June 1993, the monastery was plundered, as well as the church which was also devastated.



Guča Gora, the parish of Guča Gora - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and the cemetery sustained heavy damages.



Maljine, the parish of Guča Gora - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and the cemetery are devastated.



Margetići, the parish of Novi Travnik - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is devastated.



Novi Travnik, the parish of Novi Travnik - the parish church of the Assumption of our Lord.

The church was damaged during shelling.



Ovčarevo, the parish of Ovčarevo - the parish church of St. Michael the Archangel and the parish house.

After taking control of the locality on 7 June 1993, the church was plundered and devastated as well as the parish house.



Nova Bila, the parish of Nova Bila - the parish church of the Holy Spirit, parish house and the catechism hall.

In the second half of 1993, the church, parish house and the catechism hall were damaged during shelling.



Ovčarevo, the parish of Ovčarevo - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery partially damaged



Stojkovići, the parish of Dolac - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is damaged during shelling.



Prići, the parish of Ovčarevo - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery are damaged.



Pećine, the parish of Pećine - the parish church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the parish house.

The church and the parish house heavily damaged.



Putičevo, the parish of Dolac - the filial church and the catechism hall.

At the beginning of June 1993, the church was thoroughly plundered and damaged and at the end of 1996 the bell tower was destroyed by mining.



Rostovo, the parish of Rostovo - the parish church of St. Elias the Prophet and the parish house.

The church is damaged and the parish house plundered and devastated.



Sebešić, the parish of Rostovo - a filial church.

The church is completely plundered and devastated.



Travnik, the parish of Travnik - the parish church of St. John the Baptist and the parish house.

The church is devastated and the parish house damaged.



Šenkovići, the parish of Novi Travnik - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is devastated.



Travnik, the parish of Travnik - seminary church of St. Aloysius.

The church was devastated, and the Muslim refugees were housed in the seminary building.



Travnik, the parish of Travnik - cemetery chapel and the "Bojna" cemetery.

The chapel is devastated and 39 tombstones destroyed.



Vitez, the parish of Vitez - cemetery chapel at the "Krčevine" cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery are damaged.



Vitez, the parish of Vitez - the parish church of St. George the Martyr and the parish house.

The church was damaged on 6 July 1993 during shelling. In January 1994 it received a direct hit by a grenade.



Biljačić, the parish of Zavidovići - chapel.

The chapel is plundered.



Tešanj, the parish of Jelah - the parish of Jelah.

The church sustained minor damages.



Brezovo Polje, the parish of Žepče - cemetery.

The cemetery sustained minor damages.



Čajdraš, the parish of Čajdraš - the parish church of the Heart of Jesus.

The church sustained minor damages.



Dolina, the parish of Zavidovići - a filial church and the cemetery.

The church is plundered and devastated and the cemetery damaged.



Zavidovići, the parish of Zavidovići - the parish church of St. Joseph and the parish house.

Both slightly damaged during shelling. An attempt to mine the bell tower didn't succeed.




Golubinja, the parish of Žepče - a filial church and the cemetery.

The church is completely destroyed by fire including all the inventory, and the cemetery slightly damaged.



Lovnica, the parish of Lovnica - the parish church of Sts. Peter and Paul and the parish house.

The church is completely plundered and devastated, and the parish house, as well as the other buildings plundered.



Maglaj, the parish of Maglaj - the parish church - sanctuary of St. Leopold Mandić and the parish house.

The church is heavily damaged during shelling, and the parish house was occupied by Muslim refugees.



Lovnica, the parish of Lovnica - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is plundered and devastated.



Zavidovići, the parish of Zavidovići - the parish church of St. Joseph and the parish house.



Zavidovići, the parish of Zavidovići - the town cemetery.

The cemetery is damaged.



Zavidovići, the parish of Zavidovići - the chapel of St. Vitus.

The chapel is torched.



Zenica - Podbrežje, the parish of St. Elias - the chapel of St. Roch.

On 14 May 1993, the chapel is slightly damaged and the cemetery desecrated.



Zenica - Stranjani, the parish of St. Elias - a filial church.

The church is devastated and 50 tombstones at the cemetery destroyed.



Žepče, the parish of Žepče - the parish church of St. Anthony of Padua and old and new parish houses.


The church is damaged during shelling.





Zenica - Travnik, the parish of St. Joseph - chapel.

The chapel is damaged.

Percentage of believers in BiH from 1400 till 1450



Percentage of believers in BiH in 1991



Year	Number of Catholics	Percentage of Catholics	Year	Number of Orthodoxes	Percentage of Orthodoxes	Year	Number of Muslims	Percentage of Muslims
1400-1450	750.000	87,21%	1400-1450	30.000	3,49%	1400-1450	0	0,00%
1879	209.391	18,08%	1879	496.485	42,88%	1879	448.613	38,75%
1885	265.788	19,88%	1885	571.250	42,76%	1885	492.710	36,88%
1895	334.142	21,31%	1895	673.246	42,94%	1895	548.632	34,92%
1910	434.061	22,87%	1910	825.918	43,49%	1910	612.137	32,25%
1921	440.431	23,48%	1921	820.731	43,75%	1921	586.151	31,24%
1931	557.836	24,01%	1931	1.028.723	44,29%	1931	717.562	30,89%
1948	614.123	23,90%	1948	1.135.147	44,30%	1948	788.403	30,70%
1953	654.227	23,00%	1953	1.264.045	44,40%	1953	891.798	31,30%
1961	711.665	21,70%	1961	1.406.057	42,90%	1961	842.248	25,70%
1971	772.491	20,60%	1971	1.393.148	37,20%	1971	1.482.430	39,60%
1981	758.140	18,40%	1981	1.320.738	32,00%	1981	1.630.033	39,50%
1991	760.852	17,40%	1991	1.366.104	31,20%	1991	1.902.956	43,50%

TOTAL NUMBER OF SACRAL STRUCTURES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

STRUCTURES	COMPLETELY DESTROYED			SEVERELY DAMAGED			DAMAGED			TOTAL STRICKEN		
	By the Muslim forces	By the Serbian forces	Total	By the Muslim forces	By the Serbian forces	Total	By the Muslim forces	By the Serbian forces	Total	By the Muslim forces	By the Serbian forces	Total
Parish churches	1	64	65	14	40	54	23	43	66	38	147	185
Other churches	7	53	60	13	40	53	17	38	55	37	131	168
Chapels	19	44	63	23	32	55	52	57	109	94	133	227
Parish houses and other parish structures	9	56	65	19	65	84	21	56	77	49	177	226
Convents		8	8	5	9	14	2	6	8	7	23	30
Cemeteries	8		8	26	27	53	35	68	103	69	95	164
TOTAL:	44	225	269	100	213	313	150	268	418	294	706	1000

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatrene podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

epređiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

**CRIMES COMMITTED
BY SOME MEMBERS OF
THE A BiH (MUSLIM
FORCES) AGAINST THE
CROATS IN BiH
1991–1995**

FACTS

Approximately more than a year ago I asked a reputable HTV reporter to check how many times has this “TV Network” mentioned the word “AHMIĆI” in their broadcasts and how many times the word “Trusina”?

A few days later I received a reply: “AHMIĆI” 998 (nine hundred and ninety eight) times, and “Trusina” 2 (twice).

“Trusina” 2 ‰ (two promille) compared to “Ahmići”, crimes took place in both villages in BiH. On the same day of the same month and of the same year. The battle was fought in Ahmići and it is yet unknown how many soldiers and how many civilians were killed.

THE HAGUE: “in Ahmići at least 33 (thirty three) civilians.”

In Trusina 23 (twenty three) unarmed - civilians and several soldiers who had surrendered.

Muslims were killed in Ahmići and Croats in Trusina.

And HTV from Zagreb reports about Trusina 2 ‰ compared to Ahmići.

Deranged communist sadomasochism?

I do not say “war crime” but rather “crime in war” in both cases. Isn’t this discrepancy in mentioning both crimes in the two villages on HTV [same disparity in other media], an obvious evidence of distortion in investigating the truth?

This distortion is so great that it can only be compared to the distortion of the facts seen in the fascist, nazi and communist societies and states.

Such investigation serves only for “INVESTIGATORS” to keep their positions which they have held for decades, manufacturing the truths which led to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the first place.

This human scum has its own motto:

“Let us keep the cognition at a level that enables us to keep our positions where we can manufacture the truth that keeps us where we are...!

Let’s reproduce ourselves infinitely!

About other issues on another occasion. “

Slobodan Praljak

Postscript:

The number of Croats killed by the members of A BiH in aggression against the HVO, especially in 1993, is 8 time greater than the number of Muslims killed by the Croats.

NUMBER OF CROATS IN MUNICIPALITIES ACCORDING TO 1991 CENSUS

1.	ČAPLJINA	14,969
2.	MOSTAR	43,037
3.	JABLANICA	2,291
4.	KONJIC	11,513
5.	PROZOR	12,259
6.	USKOPLJE	10,706
7.	BUGOJNO	16,031
8.	TRAVNIK	26,118
9.	N. TRAVNIK	12,162
10.	VITEZ	12,675
11.	ZENICA	23,595
12.	MAGLAJ	8,365
13.	ŽEPČE	7,813
14.	ZAVIDOVIĆI	7,451
15.	BUSOVAČA	9,093
16.	FOJNICA	6,623
17.	KISELJAK	12,550
18.	KREŠEVO	4,714
19.	VISOKO	1,873
20.	KAKANJ	16,556
21.	VAREŠ	9,016
TOTAL		269,410


The real number of inhabitants in these municipalities at the time of the crimes committed against Croats was not greater than 180,000 (one hundred and eighty thousand), because a large number of people evaded at the outbreak of the war in BiH and more than 12% of the population were economic emigrants.


If there are 1,200 civilians and prisoners of war killed per 180,000 inhabitants, it is like having:

1. 400,000 civilians and prisoners of war killed in France.
2. 400,000 civilians and prisoners of war killed in UK.
3. 2,000,000 civilians and prisoners of war killed in the USA.



QUESTION: Can you imagine the socio-psychological state of these nations and socio-pathological behavior of the groups and individuals?



Slobodan Praljak





Municipalities in BiH in which some members of the BH Army (Muslim forces) committed crimes against Croats







Opličići - ČAPLJINA
November 12th, 1993
- VLADO (Mato) VIDIĆ



Gagrice – Lokve - ČAPLJINA
October 10th, 1993
- STIPE (Blago) DRAGIČEVIĆ







In the municipality of Jablanica 63 people were killed in:
DOLJANI

Municipality of JABLANICA

Doljani
July 28th, 1993 – 63 victims, namely:

- ILIJA (Ante) ZELENKA born in 1960
- ANDRIJA (Jozo) PERKOVIĆ born in 1967
- JELA (Stipe) STOJANOVIĆ born in 1962
- IVICA (Stjepan) TOMIĆ born in 1954
- SLAVKO (Stipan) VRLJIĆ born in 1968
- ANDJELKO (Pero) MARTIĆ born in 1964
- MARINKO (Kazimir) BOŽIĆ born in 1960
- LJUBOMIR (Kazimir) BOŽIĆ born in 1966
- ŽELJKO (Slavko) BOŽIĆ born in 1960
- MATO (Ivan) DOGAN born in 1961

- ZVONKO (Bosiljko) PINJUŠIĆ born in 1967
- MATO (Tadija) BILOŠ born in 1950
- ANTO (Ivan) ŽARIĆ born in 1965
- SLAVKO (Jure) MILIČEVIĆ born in 1955
- MILENKO (Pero) GAGRO born in 1954
- DRAŽEN (Tadija) PAVKOVIĆ born in 1971
- IVAN (Mirko) ZOVKO born in 1973
- MARINKO (Ivan) ZELENKA born in 1959
- MARKO (Jure) CVITKOVIĆ born in 1954
- PERO (Ilija) SOLDIĆ born in 1967
- IVAN (Ilija) SOLDIĆ born in 1969
- JURE (Ilija) SOLDIĆ born in 1970
- STIPO (Marijan) BRADARIĆ born in 1958
- DAVOR (Pero) MARIĆ born in 1974
- IVAN (Anto) ŽARIĆ born in 1935
- ANDRIJA (Ivan) MILIČEVIĆ born in 1948
- IGOR (Nediljko) LEBO born in 1978
- IVAN (Tadija) TOPIĆ born in 1969
- ŽELJKO (Ivan) MIŠKIĆ born in 1968

- MILAN (Jure) POLE born in 1972
- ANDRIJA (Jure) GROZNICA born in 1972
- NEDJELJKO (Josip) SOLDIĆ born in 1933
- ANICA (Ivan) RIPIĆ born in 1934
- IVA (Srećko) PAVLOVIĆ born in 1930
- PAVA (Pero) STIPANOVIĆ born in 1942
- MATE MARKIĆ born in 1967
- DRAGAN ANDRIĆ born in 1976
- BORISLAV BARBARIĆ born in 1959
- MARIO HRKAČ–ČIKOTA born in 1971
- MARKO MILJKO born in 1951
- MARINKO MARUŠIĆ born in 1942
- ZDENKO KOLOBARIĆ born in 1969
- ANTONIO LASIĆ born in 1968
- MARKO LJUBIĆ born in 1959
- MILIJAN ZELJKO born in 1962
- BRANKO (Josip) TOKIĆ born in 1964
- MARTIN (Ivo) RIPIĆ born in 1933



- RUŽA (Pero) ČOLIĆ born in 1921
- ANDRIJA (Stipe) STIPANOVIĆ born in 1931
- TOMISLAV (Ivan) JOSIPOVIĆ born in 1974
- ZDRAVKO (Marija) NIŽIĆ born in 1940
- JOZO (Luka) MILIČEVIĆ born in 1929
- ANICA (Jure) ŠITUM born in 1913
- NIKOLA (Vido) DRINOVAČ born in 1971
- DRINKO (Petar) GALIĆ born in 1971
- ŽELJKO BOGDAN born in 1949
- PERICA KUTLEŠA born in 1961
- LJILJANA ZRNO born in 1962
- MARTIN BAČAK born in 1968
- IVAN RADOŠ born in 1964
- IVAN PETROVIĆ born in 1961
- LUCA BREKALO born in 1942
- JOSIP BREKALO born in 1939



Doljani - JABLANICA



July 28th, 1993

BODIES OF SIX CROATS KILLED AT "STIPIĆA LIVADA" NEAR DOLJANI BY THE 44. MOUNTAIN BRIGADE OF THE BH ARMY, AND THE VICTIMS ARE:

FROM LEFT: NEDJELJKO SOLDO, ANICA RIPIĆ, IVAN RIPIĆ, IVAN TOPIĆ, MATO BILOŠ, SLAVKO VRLJIĆ AND ANĐELKO MARIĆ.










**In the municipality of Prozor 65 people were killed in:
UZDOL AND HUDUTSKO**

Municipality of PROZOR




Uzdol

September 14th, 1993 - 41 victims, namely:

- JELA DŽALTO born in 1950
- ZORKA (Mato) GLIBO born in 1938
- MARA GRUBEŠA born in 1934
- MATO (Jozo) LJUBIĆ born in 1923
- KATA (Ilija) PERKOVIĆ born in 1922
- STANKO (Niko) RAJIĆ born in 1927
- LUCIJA RAJIĆ born in 1933
- ŠIMA RAJIĆ born in 1914
- MARA (Jakov) RAJIĆ born in 1938
- MIJO (Marko) RAJIĆ born in 1924
- IVKA RAJIĆ born in 1921
- DOMIN (Ivo) RAJIĆ born in 1936
- IVKA (Martinova) RAJIĆ born in 1934
- MARTIN (Petar) RATKIĆ born in 1935
- KATA RATKIĆ born in 1928
- LUCA ZELENKA born in 1906
- JANJA (Križan) ZELENKA born in 1931
- DRAGICA (Ante) ZELENKA born in 1934
- IVAN (Mato) ZELENKA born in 1930
- RUŽA (Kazimir) ZELENKA born in 1931

- JADRANKA (Kazimir) ZELENKA born in 1981
- RUŽA (Mijo) ZELIĆ born in 1944
- MARIJA (Jozo) ZELIĆ born in 1980
- STJEPAN (Jozo) ZELIĆ born in 1983
- ANTE (Jure) STOJANOVIĆ born in 1920
- ANKICA (Stipe) STOJANOVIĆ born in 1949
- FRANJO (Toma) STOJANOVIĆ born in 1916
- SERAFINA STOJANOVIĆ born in 1922
- KATA (Jozo) LJUBIĆ born in 1948
- VLADO BIJATOVIĆ
- FABIJAN GRABOVAC
- ANĐELKO KOZARIĆ
- JOSIP MARIĆ
- PERO LUČIĆ
- IVO RAJIĆ
- BRANKO ŠEKERIJA
- PERO KOVČLIJA
- SLAVKO (Pavo) MENDEŠ born in 1954
- FRANJO (Martin) ZADRO born in 1959
- IVAN ZELIĆ born in 1959
- ILIJA CVITANOVIĆ born in 1972



Hudutsko

September 16th, 1993 - 24 victims, namely:

- ILIJA (Krunoslav) BENDRA born in 1959
- ANĐELKO (Franjo) BILANDŽIJA born in 1941
- LJUPKO (Mato) BILANDŽIJA born in 1961
- STIPO (Pejo) BLIZNAC born in 1952
- MARKO (Jozo) BRTAN born in 1953
- ŽELJKO (Zvonko) GOLUBOVIĆ born in 1958
- ŽELJKO (Pejo) JAKAŠEVIĆ born in 1970
- ILIJA (Markov) JAKOVljeVIĆ born in 1962
- DRAGO (Mato) JEZERČIĆ born in 1971
- JOZO (Ivan) LADAN born in 1968
- KARLO (Slavko) LADAN born in 1965
- ZORAN (Ante) MARIJANOVIĆ born in 1972
- DRAGO (Ivo) MIJATOVIĆ born in 1971
- ŠIMO (Ilija) PETROVIĆ born in 1966
- DRAGAN (Ante) ŽUNIĆ born in 1959
- PEJO BOŽIĆ
- JURE BRAJKOVIĆ
- JOZO (Mijo) BOGIĆ born in 1961
- ANTE BELJO
- ANTON ODAK
- JOSIP SOLDO
- MARIN VIDIĆ
- MATO BILOŠ
- JAGODA MIJAČEVIĆ

Uzdol - PROZOR

September 14th, 1993

- DRAGICA ZELENKA born in 1934



Uzdol - PROZOR


September 14th, 1993
- STJEPAN ZELIĆ born in 1983






Uzdol - PROZOR



September 14th, 1993
- JADRANKA ZELENKA born in 1981














In the municipality of Travnik 118 people were killed in:
TRAVNIK, MILETIĆI, DOLAC, POLJE, DOLAC BILA, BRAJKOVIĆI, GRAHOVČIĆI, OVNAK, KRPELJIĆI, ORAŠAC, ČUKLE, MALJINE, ŠARIĆI, BUKOVICA, PEŠEVIĆI, RUDNIK BILA and JANKOVIĆI.

Municipality of TRAVNIK




Mehurići
Command, training camp and accommodation for Mujahedeem and volunteers from Islamic countries



Miletići
 April 24th, 1993 - 6 victims, namely:
 - STIPO PAVLOVIĆ born in 1934
 - LUCA PAVLOVIĆ
 - FRANJO PAVLOVIĆ born in 1963
 - VLADO (Srečko) PAVLOVIĆ born in 1974
 - TIHOMIR (Srečko) PAVLOVIĆ born in 1974
 - ANTO PETROVIĆ born in 1937

Travnik
(in front of "Medresa" building)
 October 20th, 1992 - 1 victim, namely:
 - IVICA STOJAK – commander of the HVO Municipal Staff

Travnik
 April 5th, 6th and 20th, 1993 - 3 victims, namely:
 - KREŠO SKOČIBUŠIĆ – from Kalibunar
 - DARIO MELJANČIĆ
 - DANICA GAŠO

At the Travnik-Vitez – Guča Gora
crossroad
 March 17th, 1993 - 2 victims, namely:
 - IVO JURIĆ born in 1972
 - ZORAN (Vesko) MATOŠEVIĆ born in 1967








In the municipality of Novi Travnik 60 people were killed in: RASTOVCI, ŠENKOVIĆI, KOPILA, KASAPOVIĆI, PRIBILOVIĆI, BUČIĆI, ZENEPIĆI, NEVIĆ POLJE and NOVI TRAVNIK.

Municipality of NOVI TRAVNIK





Zenepići
 June 6th - 16th, 1993 - 9 victims, namely:
 - IVICA VRHOVAC
 - NIKO VRHOVAC
 - MIJO VRHOVAC
 - NIKO ŠIŠKO
 - KATA VRHOVAC
 - JOZO VRHOVAC
 - MARA VRHOVAC
 - LUCA VRHOVAC
 - MARA BRKAN

Nević Polje
 October 7th, 1993 - 1 victim, namely:
 - NATAŠA (Anto) JURIĆ born in 1978

Novi Travnik
 June 17th - December 1993 - 30 victims, namely:
 - ILIJA (Marko) DRMIĆ born in 1952
 - MARKO (Ilija) DRMIĆ born in 1977
 - BORS (Ivica) AUGUSTINOVIĆ born in 1977
 - VANJA (Drago) BUNGIĆ born in 1982
 - STELA (Gordan) CVITANOVIĆ born in 1977
 - ČEKO (Stipo) ANKICA born in 1960
 - DANIJELA (Stipo) FILIPOVIĆ born in 1988
 - ANDREJA JURČEVIĆ – 5 months old baby
 - OLGA (Drago) KAFADAR born in 1973
 - LJUBICA KAPETAN born in 1926
 - SLAVKO (Franjo) TOPIĆ born in 1951
 - ILIJA (Marko) GRBAVAC born in 1964
 - FABO (Ilija) STOJAK born in 1956


- PAVO (Roko) VUKOVIĆ born in 1945
 - TVRTKO BILJEŠKOVIĆ
 - MARKO (Jozo) ZVIRAC born in 1921
 - ANKICA ČEKVIŠA
 - DOMINKO BAVARKA
 - MATO BAVARKA
 - EDITA (Zvonko) BLAŽEVIĆ born in 1977
 - DRAGO LOZANČIĆ
 - MARKO LOZANČIĆ
 - ĐORĐE MATOVINOVIĆ
 - LJUBOMIR PEŠA
 - SLAVKO RAMLJAK
 - ANTO TURIĆ
 - STIPO VUKOVIĆ
 - DRAGICA (Pero) ŽILIĆ born in 1961
 - NIKOLA ŽILIĆ



Križančevo Selo

December 22nd, 1993 - 72 victims, namely:

- ALILOVIĆ (Ivo) MARINKO born in 1965
- AUGUSTINOVIĆ (Ivo) IVICA born in 1952
- BAKOVIĆ (Dragutin) JOSIP born in 1965
- BRKIĆ (Matija) RUDO born in 1943
- ČALIĆ (Marijan) JOPIP born in 1958
- ČALIĆ (Vinko) MIRKO born in 1960
- ČEČURA (Stjepan) ZDRAVKO born in 1962
- ČEČURA (Ivica) MATO born in 1960
- DELIJA (Anto) STIPO born in 1963
- DELIJA-MATOŠEVIĆ (Pero) ŽIVKO born in 1969
- GRBAVAC (Marko) NEDELJKO born in 1966
- GRBAVAC (Tadija) ANTO born in 1959
- GRBAVAC (Anto) MARKO born in 1952
- GREBENAR (Anto) ANTO born in 1957
- GUDELIJ (Franjo) DRAGAN born in 1957
- HRGIĆ (Anto) VLADO born in 1953
- JAKŠEVIĆ (Filip) JOZO born in 1959
- JUKIĆ (Stipo) IVICA born in 1968
- JURČEVIĆ (Jozo) STIPICA born in 1969
- JURČEVIĆ (Jozo) LJUBAN born in 1966
- JURIŠIĆ (Ivo) VINKO born in 1951
- KNEŽEVIĆ (Niko) IVAN born in 1971
- KNEŽEVIĆ (Ivo) NIKO born in 1951
- KNEŽEVIĆ (Ivo) PERO born in 1949
- KOVAČEVIĆ (Radmilo) SNJEŽAN born in 1961
- KOZINA (Milko) ZDRAVKO born in 1962
- KRIŽANAC (Niko) DRAGAN born in 1945
- KRIŽANAC (Jozo) TOMO born in 1969
- KRIŽANAC (Jako) ANTO born in 1942
- KRIŽANAC (Nikola) DRAGAN born in 1960
- KRIŽANAC (Anto) IVICA born in 1959
- KRIŽANAC (Stipo) RANKO born in 1965
- KRIŽANAC (Ilija) FRANJO born in 1928
- KRIŽANOVIĆ (Vlado) BONO born in 1960
- LEŠIĆ (Niko) VLADO born in 1958



- LIVANČIĆ (Ivo) STIPO born in 1968
- LIVANČIĆ (Franjo) MIROSLAV born in 1971
- MAROS (Marko) IVICA born in 1950
- MAROS (Jozo) MARIJAN born in 1959
- MAROS (Mirko) GORAN born in 1963
- MAROS (Jako) SLAVKO born in 1948
- MAROS (Marko) JAKO born in 1943
- MAROS (Miro) DRAGAN born in 1962
- MARTINOVIĆ (Franjo) MIROSLAV born in 1957
- MATIĆ (Juraj) BRANKO born in 1973
- MILIČEVIĆ (Stipo) JERKO born in 1937
- NEDIĆ (Lazar) MILOVAN born in 1954
- NIKOLIĆ (Ivan) BRANISLAV born in 1955
- PRANJKOVIĆ (Ivo) JOSIP born in 1971
- RAJIĆ (Marko) DRAGAN born in 1957
- ŠAFRADIN (Frano) STIPO born in 1968
- ŠAFRADIN (Rafail) ŽEJKO born in 1966
- ŠAFRADIN (Marko) JOSIP born in 1972
- ŠAFRADIN (Nikica) IVICA born in 1967
- ŠAFRADIN (Mirko) ŽELJKO born in 1964
- ŠAMIJA (Ivo) IVO born in 1936
- ŠAMIJA (Drago) BLAŽEN born in 1974
- ŠANTIĆ (Ivica) NIKICA born in 1954
- ŠARIĆ (Ivica) NIKOLA born in 1969
- ŠTRBAC (Ivica) STIPO born in 1937
- ŠUTIĆ (Mato) PETAR born in 1963
- TOMIĆ (Stipo) JOZO born in 1942
- ZAMBONI (Zvonko) DRAGAN born in 1953
- ZLOJIĆ (Alen) DAMIR born in 1968
- PANJKOVIĆ (Franjo) MATILDA born in 1943
- ALILOVIĆ (Jure) KATA born in 1940
- ALILOVIĆ (Marko) FRANO born in 1962
- ĐOLTO (Fabijan) JANKO born in 1959
- BRISTOVSKI (Roki) TOME born in 1950
- GRABOVAC (Drago) DRAGICA
- RAJKOVIĆ (Frano) MIRO



VITEZ KRIŽANČEVO SELO

The bodies of killed Croats from Križančevo Selo, captured on 22 December 1993 by the members of the BH Army during their action. After the exchange done on 1 February 1994, the bodies were brought in the gym in Vitez for identification.

Buhine Kuće

January 9th, 1994 – 26 victims, namely:

- DRAGICA (Đorđe) PETROVIĆ born in 1957
- BARIŠIĆ (Marko) MARIO born in 1974
- BOŽIĆ (Mato) ANTO born in 1972
- BUHIĆ (Dragutin) MARKO born in 1957
- BULIGOVIĆ (Josip) MARIO born in 1972
- GRABOVAC (Anto) DRAGO born in 1950
- GRGIĆ (Rafael) MLADEN born in 1973
- JANKOVIĆ (Pero) NIKOLA born in 1932
- JAZVIĆ (Ivan) TONI born in 1972
- JURIĆ (Ilija) NIKO born in 1969
- JUTANDA (Đuro) DRAŽENKO born in 1960
- KAFADAR (Mijo) GORAN born in 1972
- KREŠEVLJAK (Zrino) IVAN born in 1975
- LOVRENOVIĆ (Anto) IVICA born in 1967
- PAPIĆ (Vlatko) SMILJAN born in 1969
- PERKOVIĆ (Stipo) PETAR born in 1940
- RAMLJAK (Stipo) STJEPAN born in 1941
- SAMARĐIĆ ZDRAVKO born in 1961
- ŠAFRADIN (Ilija) MIRKO born in 1960
- ŠANTIĆ (Niko) PERO born in 1951
- VIDOVIĆ (Anto) MIRKO born in 1952
- VIDOVIĆ (Mirko) DRAŽENKO born in 1975
- VIDOVIĆ (Anto) ANA born in 1952
- VIDOVIĆ (Anto) DRAGO born in 1950
- TOTIĆ (Blaž) NIKICA born in 1969
- GRABOVAC (Zdravko) ANKICA (maiden name Jurešić)
- ŠAFRADIN (Ilija) GORDANA born in 1965
- ŠARIĆ (Stipo) VELIMIR born in 1972
- ŠERO (Ivica) RIČARD born in 1974
- VIDOVIĆ (Franjo) MIRO born in 1958

Počulice

April 23rd, 1993 – 4 victims, namely:

- VIDOVIĆ JOZO born in 1945
- VIDOVIĆ IVO born in 1939
- PAPIĆ PERO born in 1960
- TROGRLIĆ TOMISLAV born in 1972

Bobaši

September 18th, 1993 – 13 victims, namely:

- BOBAŠ (Niko) LJUBAN born in 1954
- BOBAŠ (Niko) DRAGAN born in 1961
- BRKAN (Ivo) BRANKO born in 1966
- GARIĆ (Anto) FRANJO born in 1935
- IVANKOVIĆ (Jure) SLAVKO born in 1959
- KRIŽANAC (Nikola) ŽELJKO born in 1958
- KRIŽANAC (Ivica) JOSIP born in 1974
- MILOŠEVIĆ (Mladen) SLAVKO born in 1956
- MLAKIĆ (Anto) ZORISLAV born in 1950



BUHINE KUĆE
January 9th, 1994
BUHIĆ (Dragutin) MARKO born in 1957


Vitez

April 17th – September 28th, 1993 – 34 victims, namely:

- BAJO (Tomo) ZORAN born in 1973
- BILJAKA (Pero) ŽELJKO born in 1965
- GREBENAR (Pero) FRANJO born in 1957
- LIVANČIĆ (Jozo) ŽELJKO born in 1965
- MIŠKOVIĆ (Frano) MARKO born in 1967
- PERKOVIĆ (Niko) DRAGAN born in 1960
- PRANJKOVIĆ (Anto) VLADO born in 1953
- RAJKOVIĆ (Ivica) SLAVKO born in 1964
- BAREŠIĆ (Nikola) MLADEN born in 1962
- RAJIĆ (Fabijan) PERO born in 1968
- TOMIĆ (Nikola) KARLO born in 1958
- ŽULJEVIĆ (Marko) VLATKO born in 1972
- BATINIĆ (Ivan-Vlatko) MARIO born in 1983
- ANTO (Ljuban) GARIĆ born in 1993
- MARKO (Ivica) BRALO born in 1985
- ALEN (Franjo) TIPOLD born in 1977
- ZORA (Jovan) DENKIĆ born in 1932
- FRANJO (Ante) GARIĆ born in 1935
- ILIJA (Vaso) ŠARIĆ born in 1923
- DRAGICA (Niko) KAPETAN born in 1960
- BUZIĆ (Žarko) MILENKO born in 1962
- GARIĆ MILAN born in 1981
- GARIĆ SANJA born in 1975
- RAMLJAK DRAGAN born in 1978
- GREBENAR VELIMIR born in 1981
- AUGUSTINA GREBENAR born in 1984
- BORIS ANTIČEVIĆ born in 1983
- ČEČURA DRAŽENKO born in 1978
- SANJA KRIŽANOVIĆ born in 1978
- ANĐELKA KRIŠTO born in 1965
- RAMLJAK ZORAN
- ANĐELKO RAJIĆ-MIŠKOVIĆ born in 1964
- PRKAČIN DRAGICA born in 1934
- VLADO PRKAČIN born in 1955

Prnjavor

April 24th, 1993 – 3 victims, namely:
- PAPIĆ (Pero) PERO born in 1960
- VIDOVIĆ (Stipo) IVO born in 1939
- ANĐA PAPIĆ born in 1912




Brdo – Zabilje


September 5th, 1993 – 15 victims, namely:


- BOBAŠ-TOMIĆ (Vladimir) JOZO born in 1963
- GABRIEL (Johan) ALBERT born in 1960
- IKIĆ (Petar) MLADEN born in 1939
- IKIĆ (Mile) DUŠAN born in 1944
- JERKOVIĆ (Stipo) NIKO born in 1972
- KRIŠTO (Anto) VLADO born in 1956
- LOVRIĆ ŽELJKO born in 1967
- MALINOVIĆ (Špiro) MILAN born in 1953
- MARJANOVIĆ (Drago) JOZO born in 1954
- MIŠKOVIĆ (Jozo) SREČKO born in 1949
- PETRAŠ (Tomislav) BRANISLAV born in 1963
- PETRAŠ (Dragun) TOMISLAV born in 1938
- PETRAŠ (Dragun) NIKO born in 1948
- STOJAK (Ivo) ŽARKO born in 1975
- SUKARA (Risto) RANKO



Grabak


June 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- POČRNJA (Ivo) IVICA born in 1966
- ŽULJEVIĆ (Marko) VLATKO born in 1972











Kiseljak



- August 16th, 1993 – 42 victims, namely:
- FRANJO KREZIĆ – old man
 - KATA KREZIĆ – old woman
 - KATA KATIĆ born in 1922
 - NIKO ŠIRIĆ – old man
 - KATA ŠIRIĆ – old woman
 - IVICA MANDURIĆ – boy (retarded)
 - IVANA ŠIRIĆ – girl age 13
 - MIROSLAV LUČIĆ - invalid without leg
 - DAMIR KAJIĆ – boy age 10
 - KRUNO KAJIĆ – invalid
 - FRANJO TADIĆ – immobile
 - IVO VIDOVIĆ – old man
 - JAKOV TADIĆ – old man
 - IVAN PRAVDIĆ – invalid
 - JOZO BULAJIĆ – old man
 - MATO IVEŠIĆ – old man
 - STANKO ŠIRIĆ – old man
 - IVICA BANDIĆ – old man
 - FLORIJAN KREZIĆ
 - IVICA LUKEŠ
 - VINKO ZOVKO


- The remaining victims have not yet been identified.







In the municipality of Zavidovići 37 people were killed in: ZAVIDOVIĆI, BILJAČIĆI, DEBELO BRDO, DUBRAVICA, OSOVA, LOVNICA, VINIŠTE, VRBICA and JUKIĆI.

Municipality of ZAVIDOVIĆI





























KAKANJ - Kraljeva Sutjeska
Exhumation on March 4th, 1998
Doctor Marija Defins, pathologist, Doctor Mark Skinner, anthropologist from Canada and Doctor Douglas Ford, attorney from USA during the exhumation of the murdered Croats from the mass grave.



**In the municipality of Vareš 35 people were killed in:
VAREŠ, BOROVIKA and DONJA VIJAKA.**

Municipality of VAREŠ



THIS PRESENTATION COVERS 1147 VICTIMS KILLED BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE BH ARMY. THIS IS NOT THE FINAL DATA ON VICTIMS AGAINST WHOM THE WAR CRIMES WERE COMMITTED BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE BH ARMY.

IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS PRESENTATION, THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WERE USED:

- book “RATNI ZLOČINI MUSLIMANSKIH VOJNIH POSTROJBI NAD HRVATIMA BOSNE I HERZEGOVINE” (translation of the title: “WAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE MUSLIM ARMY UNITS AGAINST CROATS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA”) – published by “CPD”, Sarajevo, 1997
- book “ZLOČINI S PEČATOM – Genocid i ratni zločini bošnjačko-muslimanskih snaga nad Hrvatima BiH 1992. – 1994. godine” (translation of the title: “CRIMES WITH SEAL – Genocide and war crimes of Bosniak-Muslim forced committed against Croats of BiH during 1992 – 1994”) – author: IVICA MLIVONČIĆ – second extended and improved edition, Mostar, 2001
- book “VITEŠKA RATNA KRONIKA” (translation of the title: “VITEZ WAR CHRONICLE”) – published by HKD NAPREDAK, Vitez, 2001
- paper “STRADANJE HRVATSKOG NARODA U BIH U POSLJEDNJEM RATU” (translation of the title: “THE SUFFERING OF CROATIAN PEOPLE IN BIH DURING THE LAST WAR”) – author: Attorney M. Škobić M.E.
- book “ZA PRAVEDAN MIR – Biskupski ordinarijat Mostar u ratnoj drami 1990. – 1994.” (translation of the title: “FOR A JUST PEACE – Diocese of Mostar in the war drama 1990 – 1994”) – published by: Theological Institute Mostar – prepared by Ante Lubrić, Mostar, 1995
- book “SREDNJA BOSNA ne zaboravimo HRVATSKE ŽRTVE 1941.-50. / 1991.-95.” (translation of the title: “CENTRAL BOSNIA let us not forget the CROATIAN VICTIMS OF 1941-1950 / 1991-1995”) – Vjenceslav Topalović, M.E., Zagreb, 2001
- Slobodan Praljak’s investigation team.

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvođe u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - izvale. Po dubini s
line Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
Ključ i o. Šibenik.

jerjaku vatrene podršku izvođa različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, namo
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje ključnih avionis
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u BiH rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspap, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klupci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izvesti na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

**REFUGEES AND
DISPLACED PERSONS
(CROATS AND BOSNIAKS)
IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
DURING THE WAR
1991-1995**

FACTS

Hustlers and con artists from the company “*Horns and hooves*”^{*} for a whole decade and a half claim that Croats were not fleeing, were not exiled, were not banished from the municipalities listed in this booklet, because of the BH Army aggression or because they were killed and imprisoned in concentration camps, but because of HVO’s plan and policy to settle these Croats in Herzegovina.

“In order to improve the blood count of Herzegovina” – so they are saying.

And in this Herzegovina, where there is nothing but rock and a few karst fields which during the autumn turn into lakes, is where 95% of Croats live.

And so, according to the thesis about “the improvement of the blood count”, my dear reader, there is no one to cultivate these “reach”, “fertile” Herzegovina’s “valleys” and “fields”, and the factories “built” by the communism are lacking the workforce.

As one Serb said long ago:


“I read – ‘*The Poverty of Philosophy*’^{**} – a lot of poverty, I was crying.”

Slobodan Praljak


* Translator’s note: Ilf and Petrov: “The little golden calf”



** Translator’s note: Karl Marx: “The Poverty of Philosophy”



Preface	334
Refugees during the Serb aggression	336
Refuge from east Herzegovina over Neretva River near Čapljina at the end of April 1992	340
Refugees during the Croatian-Muslim conflict or more precisely: BH Army aggression against HVO	347
Croatian role in the care for refugees and displaced persons from BiH	356
Some of the facilities in the Republic of Croatia (mostly hotels and resorts) in which displaced persons and refugees were accommodated in the period from 1991 to 1997	364
Archive of the Croatian Government's Administration Office for Displaced Persons, Returnees and Refugees	367




Ninety war days of crime without punishment BiH 1992: Defenders and Aggressors









Refuge from east Herzegovina over Neretva River near Čapljina at the end of April 1992



A: PERSONAL DATA

1. My name is Željko Ostojić, I was born on 25th of August 1960 in Mostar
2. I attended the elementary school in Međugorje, I graduated from the high school of electrical engineering in Zagreb, as well as from college of electrical engineering, VII degree.
3. I am currently employed in HT Mostar.

B: THE INDICTMENT AGAINST JADRANKO PRLIĆ ET AL

By the Counsel who works on the preparation of Slobodan Praljak's defence in view of the indictment against Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Valentin Ćorić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković and Berislav Pušić before the Tribunal in The Hague, I was asked to provide a statement referring to acceptance and accommodation of major number of expelled persons, Bosniaks-Muslims, in the area of Bijakovići and Međugorje during 1992, in occasion of which I give the following

S T A T E M E N T

1. In the period from September 1991 till late August 1992 I performed duty of the Commander of Bijakovići company which was in the composition of the "Brotnjo" battalion which again was and acted as part of HVO HZ HB.
The company I commanded had a zone of responsibility in the south-eastern part of Čitluk municipality, that is, in the area of Bijakovići, Krućevići and Šurmanaci settlements, to be precise, immediately by the Neretva River, whereby the zone of responsibility was extended to the marginal settlement of Šurmanci which, in terms of the territory, belonged to the vicinal municipality of Čapljina. The company had 180 soldiers and throughout the time of war in its composition, it had at least 3 or more Bosniaks-Muslims.
2. In the second half of April 1992, I was invited to a meeting of the HVO Main Staff in Čitluk. The meeting was called and presided by the commander of the Main Staff, Slobodan Praljak; the meeting was also attended by my immediate commander of the "Brotnjo" battalion, Pero Pehar. Apart from me, other captains from the "Brotnjo" battalion were present at the meeting, however I am not sure whether captains of all companies were present as well. After we, the captains presented short reports by companies, commanders Slobodan Praljak and Pero Pehar introduced us to the course of preparation of a major JNA and Republika Srpska Army's offensive on the eastern side of Neretva River, to be precise, in the area of Stolac, Ravno and Čapljina municipalities and that that offensive is taking place in order to expel and ethnically cleanse Bosniaks-Muslims from the area of those municipalities, that is, from the entire space eastern from the Neretva River. Since the JNA and the army of Republika Srpska already in 1991 exiled all Croats that lived in this area, commanders Slobodan Praljak and Pero Pehar warned us that we can expect a huge wave of expelled persons, Bosniaks-Muslims already tomorrow, after which they issued an order to organize acceptance and accommodation of all expelled Bosniaks and to use all disposable accommodation capacities in Bijakovići, Međugorje and Čitluk. Our attention was especially concentrated to disposal of accommodation capacities of highest quality, food provision and other necessary care for the expelled persons, as well as the respect of will of each individual in terms of intention to stay in the area of Čitluk municipality or to be accommodated in some other locality.
3. Since I was the commander of the company in whose zone of responsibility, that is, in the settlement Šurmanci, was an improvised "ferry" on the river Neretva, which could transport people, cars and cattle over the river, I was issued with an order to organize acceptance, along with the military police from Čapljina of all expelled persons who at this point cross the Neretva River, while the commander of civil protection was issued with an order to organize shelter, provide food and other care for the expelled persons. In the following 10-15 days, to be precise, from 15th of May 1992, my company accepted several thousands of expelled Bosniaks and after the acceptance, the accommodation, nutrition and expelled persons care was taken over by civil protection who accommodated expelled

persons in mobilized tourist settlement "Kompas-Međugorje" and several private pensions in Međugorje. I know that more than 200 expelled persons were accommodated in mobilized tourist settlement "Kompas-Međugorje", some 40 of them in the pension "Europa", certain number in private houses of Ivan Ivanković, Nada Čilić and Žarko Ostojić, while about the rest of them I am not sure in which houses they were placed in. The procedure of acceptance and accommodation of expelled Bosniaks in the area of Čitluk municipality was monitored by the commanders of the staff, Slobodan Praljak, commander of the "Brotnjo" battalion, Pero Pehar, deputy commander of the battalion, Zoran Buntić and commander of the civil protection, who did not have any objections to the task that was executed by my company. I most surely know that the certain number of expelled persons, that is, one military unit, whose commanders were Bajro Pizović and Mr. Mahmutćehajić expressed wish to join Daidža's military unit because I personally and by their specific wish took this group to Vrgorac where they joined Daidža's unit. I also know that certain number of expelled persons, mostly women, elderly and children, expressed their wish to leave for Croatia or third countries, which was enabled to them, while mostly military capable men remained in the area of Međugorje and Čitluk all the way till the end of military action "Čagalj", known as "Lipajnske zore" /The Aurora's of June/ in which HVO liberated the taken areas of Stolac, Ravno and Čapljina municipalities. Out of expelled Bosniaks which I accepted then, I can remember names of Bajro Pizović, later commander of the "Bregava" brigade, Mahmutćehajić and Šabanović who was accommodated by Ivan Ivanković and who I contacted to at the occasion, while other names I cannot remember.

4. Already the day, after HVO liberated the area of Stolac and Čapljina municipalities, the expelled Bosniaks-Muslims established the headquarters of "Bregava" brigade in the liberated area, to be precise, in Počitelj in Fika's house. After the HVO, in the marked military action, liberated the taken areas of Stolac and Čapljina municipalities, the expelled Bosniaks-Muslims returned to their home, along with expelled Croats.
5. I state that this statement is given in good faith, that it is true and given according to my best recollection.

Čitluk _____

Željko Ostojić

/signed/

/stamp/

It is confirmed that Željko Ostojić /handwritten/ /illegible/

4.00 KM

7955/05

9th of November 2005

/round stamp and signature/

After we have spent days and nights (see on the photo) transporting 15,000 people (Muslims) and 3,000 cars on rafts and once we have placed them in the municipality which numbers less inhabitants than the number of newcomers, once they were transferred and accommodated to suitable, free, indoor space, once all involved in this work both Croats and Muslims (including me) were whip tired – then what?

The last group, 50-60 people, was transferred around 2 a.m., and they have spent the rest of the night on a meadow.

It was warm.

In the morning one humanitarian activist, from the civilized world, came and saw those “unattended “ people.

Dear reader, you should read her report. In her report she writes that we Croats (HVO) are somewhat better than the Nazis.

And 3,000 vehicles equal 50 ferries with 60 vehicles.



It's easy to perform this task sitting in the armchair in front of TV and complain.



About people, what can one say about 15,000 people?

1. **NOTE:** I believe there is an error in the statement given by Željko Ostojić
It didn't start on May 15th, 1992 but rather on April 15th, 1992.

2. **NOTE:** There was one more raft.


Slobodan Praljak





Refugees during the Croatian-Muslim conflict or more precisely: BH Army aggression against HVO

LATE 1992, EARLY 1993




1. FIRST CONFLICTS IN USKOPLJE (GORNJI VAKUF AND RAMA (PROZOR)) STARTED IN OCTOBER 1992 AND HAVE CONTINUED THROUGH JANUARY OF 1993 ONLY IN USKOPLJE (G. VAKUF)


2. IN TRAVNIK, CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE BH ARMY AND HVO STARTED ON OCTOBER 19th, 20th, 21st, 1992

3. CONFLICTS IN DIRECTION BUSOVAČA – KAČUNI – BILALOVAC, RESULTED IN REFUGEES FROM THESE AREAS AND FROM VILLAGES VIŠNJICE AND DUSINE

Legend: VRS BH ARMY HVO Location the BH Army attack against HVO Refugee directions of expelled Croats



MARCH, APRIL, MAY OF 1993




- BH ARMY ATTACKS HVO IN MARCH, APRIL AND MAY

- ATTACK OF BH ARMY AGAINST HVO AND THE FALL OF ZENICA ON 18TH APRIL 1993

- IN KONJIC AND JABLANICA, CONFLICTS CULMINATED IN APRIL OF 1993 WITH THE BH ARMY ATTACK ON HVO

Legend: VRS BH ARMY HVO Location the BH Army attack against HVO Refuge directions of expelled Croats




OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN BH REPUBLIC IN APRIL AND MAY 1993

- TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY VRS AND JNA
- TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY BH ARMY
- TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY HVO
- "SALVATION WAY" from SPLIT to TUZLA And towards SARAJEVO
- ALTERNATIVE ROUTS OF REFUGEES' MOVEMENT
- UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)
- LOCATION OF THE BH ARMY ATTACK ON HVO

TOTAL: 28,500 CROATS

JUNE 1993



- BH ARMY HAS ATTACKED HVO AND CONQUERED TRAVNIK ON 8th JUNE 1993

- BH ARMY HAS ATTACKED HVO AND CONQUERED KAKANJ ON 13th JUNE 1993

- ATTACK ON HVO BY BH ARMY IS INTENSIFIED IN BUSOVAČA, ŽEPČE AND VITEZ, DURING THE BH ARMY ATTACK ON KAKANJ

Legend: VRS BH ARMY HVO Location the BH Army attack against HVO Refuge directions of expelled Croats


JULY 1993



- BH ARMY ATTACK AGAINST HVO AND THE FALL OF FOJNICA ON 16th JULY 1993

- BH ARMY ATTACK AGAINST HVO IN BUGOJNO STARTED ON 17th JULY AND THE FALL OCCURRED ON 29th JULY 1993

Legend: VRS BH ARMY HVO Location the BH Army attack against HVO Refuge directions of expelled Croats



/header/

CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

APPEAL FROM KAKANJ

/handwritten for Keža

VOS received on 17th June 1993 at 1700 hours/

HVO KAKANJ on 16th June 1993

- To the Operative secretary of UN
- To the President of the RH, Dr Frabjo/as written/ Tuđman
- To the President of Parliament Stjepan Mesić /as written/
- To the President of the RH Government Nikica Valentić
- To the President of HZ HB Mate Boban
- To the Chief of HVO Staff, General major General Milivoj Petković
- To all world humanitarian and welfare organizations

NOTIFICATION

Dear Gentlemen, the Croats of the Kakanj municipality, approximately 15,000 of them, managed to survive their biggest exodus after the aggression by the so called BH Army. At this moment, they are placed in small /illegible/ town, Vareš. The life conditions, beside maximal effort of HVO Vareš and its inhabitants are rather poor. The future is absolutely precarious. Being aware of their tragic destiny so far and final virtue of all people, the political management, army and people decided to continue their Via Dolorosa on Friday, 18th June 1993, at 1000 hours, towards the territory of HB. By this occasion, we do not request for answer, we are on our way.

If you want to help us, you have got time for this; on the contrary, you shall encounter us dead on our Via Dolorosa.

PRESIDENCY OF HVO KAKANJ


HDZ KAKANJ

COMMAND OF THE "TVRTRKO KOTROMANIĆ" BRIGADE KAKANJ


REPORT RECEIVED BY IVAN ŠUNJIC, RADIO CLUB LJUBUŠKI

OCTOBER 1993

- BH ARMY ATTACK ON VAREŠ
ON 4th NOVEMBER 1993



Legend: VRS BH ARMY HVO Location the BH Army attack against HVO Refuge directions of expelled Croats



OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN BH REPUBLIC UNTIL THE END OF 1993

- TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY VRS AND JNA
- TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY BH ARMY
- TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY HVO
- "SALVATION WAY" from SPLIT to TUZLA And towards SARAJEVO
- ALTERNATIVE ROUTES OF REFUGEES' MOVEMENT
- UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)
- LOCATION OF THE BH ARMY ATTACK ON HVO

FROM THE END OF 1992 UNTIL THE END OF 1993, DURING THE AGGRESSION OF BH ARMY AGAINST HVO, A MINIMUM OF 150,000 CROATS WERE PERSECUTED FROM THE LISTED TOWNS AND MUNICIPALITIES

/stamp/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

DEFENCE

CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

MILITARY SECRET

MILITARY DISTRICT V I T E Z

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

HVO /CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL/ BRIGADE * BOBOVAC * VAREŠ

FORWARD COMMAND POST BREZIK – VAREŠ

Date: 3 November 1993

URGENT ! URGENT ! URGENT !

Time: 05:30 hours

REQUEST

- HEADQUARTERS OF THE MILITARY DISTRICT VITEZ

Communicates -

- HEADQUARTERS OF OPERATIONAL GROUP – 2 KISELJAK

Urgently send protective forces toward Vareš, in the contrary we will all bear the responsibility for the massacre over Croatian people which has already started.

15.000 Croats, mixed together with the army, are located in an area of 5 kilometres with closed exits toward the Serbian side and do not have the possibility to freely leave the town.

BRIGADE COMMANDER

Krešimir Božić

Msgr. Dr. Franjo Komarica

Bishop of Banja Luka

No. 169/93

Banja Luka 4 November 1993

Dr. Jadranko Prlić

President of the Government HR HB

MOSTAR

Subject: Appeal regarding the evacuation of refugees from Vareš

Dear Mr. President,

I have just received a telephone call from Mr. Ostojić the authorised Minister speaking on behalf of the president of the RS, he requested that I convey the following information to you as soon as possible - of course with the expectance of your urgent response:

1. They are conducting all possible measures to receive the inhabitants from Vareš. The entire population is on the move, approximately 90% Croats and 10% Serbs. They are attempting to care for all equally. They are temporarily being accommodated in Sokolac, some in buildings and some in tents. They are being assisted by UNHCR who are providing blankets and food. The people are frustrated, hungry and cold. The temperatures are below zero from the afternoon until morning, the people are inadequately dressed, most of them are elderly and children. The travel from Vareš to Sokolac is very tiresome and passes through forests and wasteland. URGENT HELP IS NEEDED!

2. He is appealing through you to the Government of HR BH:

- It is necessary to agree upon measures for proving for these people with you - he is not sure of their exact number, he thinks there are between 5 - 10,000 people! - So please respond and let them know what their ad hoc command should do!

- He suggests, or rather pleads, that you send fuel as soon as possible, approximately 3 tons or one tank truck, as well as a convoy of buses to transport the refugees through eastern Herzegovina to Herceg-Bosna.

- Therefore, I would request that you let me know s soon as possible what you have decided to do because he is waiting for an answer from us!


May God help us all - and good people!

Gladly being at the disposition for all noble activities in stopping the evil and confirming the good and humane - with respect - my kindest regards,

Franjo Komarica

(signed)

UNHCR ROAD CONVOYS PRIMARY DESTINATIONS AND MAJOR WAREHOUSES




Number of Displaced persons and refugees in Croatia 1991-1995

YEAR	MONTH	DISPLACED PERSONS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
1992	JANUARY	324.238	872	325.110
	FEBRUARY	330.787	1.276	332.063
	MARCH	336.627	16.579	373.206
	APRIL	247.278	193.415	440.693
	MAY	258.064	274.366	532.430
	JUNE	269.351	299.197	568.548
	JULY	265.786	363.270	629.056
	AUGUST	262.690	362.306	624.996
	SEPTEMBER	262.642	364.154	626.796
	OCTOBER	263.779	367.366	631.145
	NOVEMBER	264.194	370.371	634.565
	DECEMBER	260.705	402.768	663.493
1993	JANUARY	252.703	401.412	654.115
	FEBRUARY	253.246	399.566	652.812
	MARCH	252.458	386.284	638.742
	APRIL	250.328	269.003	519.330
	MAY	254.263	271.096	525.359
	JUNE	254.791	272.869	527.660
	JULY	248.206	277.054	525.260
	AUGUST	246.989	279.049	526.034
	SEPTEMBER	246.451	276.548	522.999
	OCTOBER	246.801	278.383	525.184
	NOVEMBER	248.888	281.462	530.350
	DECEMBER	249.972	281.318	531.290
1994	JANUARY	249.011	281.455	530.466
	FEBRUARY	248.352	284.155	532.507
	MARCH	248.244	281.817	530.061
	APRIL	247.185	272.383	519.567
	MAY	247.078	267.140	514.219
	JUNE	247.419	266.728	514.147
	JULY	247.068	266.056	513.124
	AUGUST	196.870	183.038	379.908
	SEPTEMBER	197.507	184.851	382.358
	OCTOBER	196.075	184.299	380.374
	NOVEMBER	196.512	187.188	383.700
	DECEMBER	195.189	187.680	382.859
1995	JANUARY	195.255	187.784	383.039
	FEBRUARY	195.626	188.230	383.856
	MARCH	195.802	188.230	384.409
	APRIL	195.825	189.531	385.356
	MAY	197.592	188.672	386.264
	JUNE	198.661	188.606	387.267
	JULY	200.782	188.217	384.938
	AUGUST	197.337	187.038	384.373
	SEPTEMBER	197.510	208.646	406.156
	OCTOBER	197.510	208.663	406.173
	NOVEMBER	198.672	214.746	413.418
	DECEMBER			

Government's Administration Office for displaced persons and refugees, Analytical department

CROATIA



The President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović and the President of the Republic of Croatia Dr Franjo Tuđman met, in accordance with the previously expressed desire of 15 June 1992, on the occasion of the summit Conference on European Security and Cooperation which was held on 8 July 1992 in Helsinki. Present at the talks were also the ministers of foreign affairs Dr Haris Silajdžić and Prof. dr Zdenko Škrabalo, as well as Head of the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia Hrvoje Šarinić and the adviser to the President of the Republic of Croatia for foreign policy Dr Željko Matić. The two presidents, after the talks, issued the following

JOINT STATEMENT

1. With regard to the fact that both countries mutually recognized each other, in the shortest possible time diplomatic relations on the level of embassy will be established. It was also decided that the representatives of the two governments shall meet in the shortest possible time to discuss current issues relevant for both countries.
2. On the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina the Serbian and Montenegro forces undertook a new offensive immediately along the border with Croatia (Bosanska Posavina). These forces are also constantly attacking the areas of the Republic of Croatia from Slavonski Brod to Županja. All of this is happening at the time when the attention of the entire world is focused on the events in Sarajevo where the initiative is under way to establish an efficient air bridge and a land corridor for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the exhausted residents of that city. Due to a justified care for the lives and survival of the residents of Sarajevo, the continuation of the brutal aggression in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina goes without punishment, including the operations of ethnic cleansing of the territories attacked by the aggressor.
3. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia have, consequently, a joint interest to defend their independence and territorial integrity against the Serbian and Montenegro aggression. Both presidents are in agreement that this joint interest should be realized by the efforts and means provided by the Charter of the United Nations and the founding documents of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.
4. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina appreciates the efforts of the international community and the Republic of Croatia in providing help, particularly the reception and care for a large number of refugees, the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5. Both presidents once again stress the adherence of their states to the principle that, after the end of the war on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, interior order of that state will be decided democratically on the basis of equality of the three constitutive peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Helsinki, 8 July 1992

Dr Franjo Tuđman
President of the Republic of Croatia

/signed/

Alija Izetbegović
President of the Presidency of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

/signed/

/coat of arms/
Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Zagreb

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
OFFICE FOR THE EXPELLED PERSONS AND REFUGEES
Professor Ph.D. Adalbert Rebić, Head
ZAGREB
Republic of Austria 14

Zagreb, 19 April 1994

AMB/ZAG/04-12204/94

Dear Mr. Rebić

Once more we would like to express our gratitude on today's phone call from the Office for the Refugees of the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb as well as on the information on increasing number of the Bosniak-Herzegovina citizens, which, by the help of UNHCR, keep arriving on the border of the Republic of Croatia, with aim to reach the third country.

We appreciate and accept, in the most special manner, the offered cooperation between the Office for the expelled persons and the refugees, and the Embassy, by which the control of organizations work should be introduced, dealing with forwarding civilians from the Bosnia and Herzegovina. It shall be our pleasure to present you the report on the substantial proposals of the Ministry for Refugees, work and social protection of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the future cooperation in this area.

Hereby, we submit you the copy of our memo number AMB/ZAG/04-12203/94, addressed to the UNHCR, as information on some activities of UNHCR on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

Sincerely yours

Ambassador
Bisera Turković
/signed and stamped/

/memo marks/: Zagreb, Pantovčak 96, p.p. 1056, phones; (+385 41) 449-528, 449-655, 429-831, 429-832, Fax: (+395 41) 441-899

/handwritten: B.Č./

/Coat of arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
Embassy
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Zagreb

UNHCR, Zagreb
Att. Mr. Jacques Mouchet, High Commissioner
Fax. No. 530 101

Zagreb, 19 April 1994

AMB/ZAG/04/-12203/94

Subject: RESETTLEMENT BOSNIAKS TO THIRD COUNTRIES

We've received a report from an associate of the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on intensified activities of the UNHCR staff on islands of Brač and Hvar. UNHCR staff is grouping refugees explaining them that the conditions are not yet right for their safe return to Mostar. They point out that Mostar is not safe neither for Croats nor for Serbs, not to mention, as they emphasize, for Muslims. They point out that Muslims cannot even enter Mostar and that they should be patient and not to be fooled by the prepared return convoys.

UNHCR staff is promising refugees that, should the Social services centers of the Republic of Croatia cancel their refugee status, that special convoys to some other countries will be organized for Muslim refugees.

We also have information on continued UNHCR activities in collective refugee camps : "Gašinci", "Savudrija", "Učka", "Varaždin", "Obonjan" and others, which refer to daily UNHCR work on relocating and resettling of Bosniak people – refugees (with regulated refugee status) from the Republic of Croatia to third countries.

We are asking you to deliver us prompt information on your representatives' work with the refugees in the field. We also want to know the reasons and aims for relocation of refugees and the grounds for UNHCR's evaluation of refugees being unsafe in the Republic of Croatia so that their relocation is being continually executed.

Given that the information we receive from refugees are correct, in our opinion, UNHCR acts contrary to its mandate, stirs political instability, unsettlement and panic within refugees, and unfoundedly stimulates and performs further resettlement.

According to some documents we've received, an increasing number of civilians, Bosniaks and Croats, with the help of UNHCR, are leaving Banja Luka, Prijedor, Teslić and other towns of Bosanska Krajina. After transitory stay at the collective refugee camp "Gašinci", they leave for third countries through UNHCR resettlement programs. We also ask for information regarding the above.

Ambassador
Bisera Turković
/signed/

/round seal with an inscription: "AMBASADA ZAGREB, 2, Coat of arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina /

Cc:
- UN – CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
- INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATIONS
- INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE
- INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT ORGANIZATIONS

/memo marks/: Zagreb, Pantovčak 96, p.p. 1056, Telephones: (+385 41) 449-528, 449-655, 429-831, 429-832,
Fax: (+385 41) 441-899

ŠEFKO OMERBAŠIĆ
Zagreb
October 2005

The conversation was recorded, the tape is stored under the name

somerbasic

Size:
31.9 MB
Duration:
01:39:57

**Transcript of the conversation and the tape are kept in the
Central military archive
of the Ministry of Defence of Croatia**

The conversation took place in Zagreb

Who else was there, Čermak, Zagorec? Did president Tuđman know of all this?

Yes, he knew.

Šušak was there also, am I right?

Šušak was the one who decided on all of this. I don't know who else was involved in this, the three of them and president Tuđman. And these arms, this is the help by which from Croatia Bosnia was saved, what could be saved. There was an enormous Serbian force there, immense quantity of arms, it was difficult. I forgot to say this, the trains that were impounded in Croatia, a large part of these arms went to Bosnia, it went to the Patriotic League, i.e. the TO /Territorial Defence/ which was still in the preparatory phase. And this went with the knowledge of the top state officials, because the people were called to arm themselves as much as they could, to organize themselves. The financial transaction with dinars that went to Bosnia also helped us. This money didn't go only into Croatian hands, but it went to Muslims too. Of course, there was a lot of embezzlement here, there was theft, but the greatest part went in favour, i.e. for the purchase of arms and everything else. I know at the very beginning, before the war started in Bosnia, men were coming selling cows, selling anything to obtain a rifle to defend themselves, because there in Bosnia the memories of the World War II are still fresh, when the greatest number of war casualties were the Muslims. You wanted to ask something?

I just wanted to ask, the events that we are mentioning now, which period was it?

This was 1992. Especially from the beginning to the very end. This crisis headquarters was active until September 1992 when Alija Izetbegović came here in the first, state, official visit. On that occasion the agreement with Tuđman was signed, and then the crisis headquarters ceased to function and the mission came, first the diplomatic one, then the military, and then the military mission took over everything. But the Islamic community, the humanitarian "Merhamet" continued functioning with the humanitarian organizations from the Arab, Islamic world to provide care for this huge number of refugees. 300 thousand Croatia, especially in Zagreb, only in Zagreb there were 17 refugee camps.

How many people passed through these camps?

In Zagreb? In Croatia around 300 thousand, in Zagreb I think there were more than 170 thousand. We in the mosque had 25 thousand accommodated. On an area of 10 thousand square metres everything was packed. When the war began in Bosnia quite a number of volunteers went on their own initiative, and some through the HV /Croatian Army/, they went to defend Bosnia. There were more Croats than Muslims. But Muslims were also coming and going there. The mosque was the centre, the focal point where people were coming and going, because here this complete help was functioning. I met oftentimes with the late Šušak particularly over this help. 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, all the way to his death.

REPORT ON THE CARE FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES

1. INTRODUCTION

Frequent cases of forced emigration of Croatian citizens at the beginning of May 1991 from the crisis area (Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac etc.) have stimulated the organization of activities for their care, primarily as part of social welfare.

First displaced persons found their refuge elsewhere in Croatia or abroad, followed by the most massive persecution during the summer and early autumn of the same year. The largest number of displaced persons accommodated in Croatia and other countries was in mid-January 1992 – 700,000 persons, which is more than 15% of the population according to the 1991 census.

Across the Croatia, displaced persons were accommodated in hotels, sports halls, renovated army barracks, institutions of social welfare, educational boarding institutions, barracks of construction companies for accommodation of workers, resorts, wagon settlements and numerous families that showed the highest degree of humanity and solidarity by accepting the majority of displaced persons in their homes.

In addition to taking care of displaced persons, in the midst of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia also cared for refugees, regardless of their nationality and religion. Through the Government Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees, over 600,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina were accommodated, among them were 425,000 Muslims and 170,000 Croats and 5,000 others.

Pursuant to the authorization given by Croatian Government, in 1993 the Office has issued a permission for transit of 36,422 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina through Croatia, and at the same time approvals allowing a temporary stay of 24,858 persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia were issued.

7. Loans for reconstruction and return of displaced persons

Loans were not always distributed according to fair criteria, and were especially not fairly and purposefully used, and the funds were used for expending of houses, and therefore could not qualify for a return, for buying apartments, cafes or were kept for too long. In the future, loans should be granted with more caution, and the criteria should be more fair and demanding.

8. The funds given by the international community to overcome the refugee crisis in the former Yugoslavia namely Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia were not always used cost-effectively. Large portion of funds are used by the organizations (UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, WFP, ICRC etc.) for their operation (staff, hotels, transportation), and the smaller portion of funds is used on displaced persons.

We have noticed that Serbia is receiving larger amounts for refugees than Croatia. This fact should be given more attention at the international level.

9. Return of displaced persons, especially refugees is not going as planned. Since April 1992, 50,000 displaced persons returned to their homes (the largest number in Dubrovnik region, followed by Lipik, Pakrac, Osijek, Karlovac, Sisak, Zadar...), but only a small number of refugees (especially Croats) is returning

to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those refugees that could return are not returning because their homes are uninhabitable, because the majority of population are Muslims, or they do not wish to return because they are better off staying in Croatia where they have everything provided by the state. This could have serious consequences for the future of Croatia: for how long can the state support such large number of refugees? Especially if UNHCR and EU withhold the financial and humanitarian aid! Croatia itself has over 300,000 socially vulnerable citizens. The country is gradually converting to the state of socially vulnerable citizens, which will have to be supported by the inadequate number of employees and productive citizens.

At this moment we have 144,000 Croat refugees (74%) from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and only 46,500 Muslim refugees (24%). A year ago we had roughly 70% of Muslims and just 30% of Croats. This leads to conclusion that Croats are not returning to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Large number of Muslims had settled in third countries, that is true, but large number is also returning to Bosnia.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

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M.Sc. Sanja Mikloš, assistant to Head of Department
for humanitarian aid for transportation operations

HEAD OF THE OFFICE

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prof. dr. Adalbert Rebić

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GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
OFFICE FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES
ZAGREB/

Zagreb, October 14th, 1994

Some of the facilities in the Republic of Croatia (mostly hotels and resorts) in which displaced persons and refugees were accommodated in the period from 1991 to 1997

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
1	HOTEL PALME	OPATIJA
2	SCHOOL DORMITORY TOMISLAV HERO	BAKAR
3	HOTEL DUBRAVKA	BAŠKA VODA
4	HOTEL SLAVIJA	BAŠKA VODA
5	HOTEL URANIA	BAŠKA VODA
6	RESORT AGROEXPORT	BAŠKA VODA
7	RESORT CROATIA	BAŠKA VODA
8	RESORT NAPUTICA	BAŠKA VODA
9	RESORT OBOR	BAŠKA VODA
10	RESORT TUZLA	BAŠKA VODA
11	RESORT VATROSTALNA	BAŠKA VODA
12	APARTMENT COMPLEX URANIA	BAŠKA VODA
13	HOTEL HRVATSKA	BAŠKA VODA
14	HEALTH RESORT DJEČJE SELO	BAŠKA VODA
15	RESORT OBOR	BAŠKA VODA
16	RESORT VATROSTALNA	BAŠKA VODA
17	RESORT KERAMETAL	BETINA
18	RESORT ELEKTROKOVINA	BETINA
19	RESORT JELŠINGRAD	BIOGRAD NA MORU
20	SCHOOL DORMITORY	BJELOVAR
21	T. VINKOVIĆ M.Z.	BJELOVAR
22	HOTEL PARK	BOL
23	DOMINICAN MONASTERY	BOL
24	RESORT FRUCTAL	CRES
25	HOTEL EDEN	CRIKVENICA
26	HOTEL PARK	CRIKVENICA
27	CROATIAN TEACHERS' HOME	CRIKVENICA
28	RESORT VERIGE	CRIKVENICA
29	RESORT SESTRE MILOSRDNICE	CRIKVENICA
30	INSTITUTE FOR SOC. HEALTH CARE	ČAGLIN
31	HOTEL PARK	ČAKOVEC
32	RETIREMENT HOME	ČAKOVEC
33	SCHOOL DORMITORY	ČAKOVEC
34	SDP HALL	ČAZMA
35	FIRE HALL	ČAZMA
36	CASTLE ADAMOVIĆ	ČEPIN
37	RESORT DONIT	DRAMALJ
38	RESORT DRAŠNICE	DRAŠNICE
39	CARITAS	DUBRAVA-DUBEC
40	HOTEL BELEVUE	DUBROVNIK
41	HOTEL EPIDAUROS	DUBROVNIK
42	HOTEL IMPERIAL	DUBROVNIK
43	HOTEL LIBERTAS	DUBROVNIK
44	HOTEL PALLACE	DUBROVNIK
45	HOTEL PARK	DUBROVNIK
46	HOTEL PETKA	DUBROVNIK
47	HOTEL PLAKIR	DUBROVNIK
48	RETIREMENT HOME	DUBROVNIK
49	CHILDREN'S HOME MASLINA	DUBROVNIK
50	HOME FOR THE INFIRM	DUBROVNIK
51	VIS II	DUBROVNIK
52	SINGLES' HOTEL DALMACIJA	DUGI RAT
53	CATERING FACILITY ĐAKOVAČKI VEZOVI	ĐAKOVO
54	CZD BOSO ĐAKOVO	ĐAKOVO
55	PINETA FAŽANSKA ŠUMA	FAŽANA
56	VILLA SAN LORENZO	FAŽANA
57	RESORT V. LENAC	FUŽINE
58	GEST HOUSE FUŽINE	FUŽINE
59	RESORT ROS	FUŽINE
60	HOTEL ĐURO SALAJ	GRADAC

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
61	HOTEL GRADAC	GRADAC
62	HOTEL LAGUNA	GRADAC
63	RESORT VALTER PERIĆ	GRADAC
64	RESORT VALTER PERIĆ	GRADAC
65	BiH COMMUNITY RESORT	GRADAC
66	CHILDRENS' RESORT KRAGUJEVAC	GRADAC
67	HOTEL BILOGORA	GRUBIŠNO POLJE
68	HOTEL BODUL	HVAR
69	H.P. "CROATIA"	HVAR
70	RESORT B. TOPOLA	IČIĆI
71	VILLA MINTZ	IČIĆI
72	HOTEL IGRANE	IGRANE
73	SCHOOL DORMITORY	IVANIĆ-GRAD
74	WAGONS' SETTLEMENT	IVANKOVO
75	INSTITUTE LOPAČA	JELENJE
76	HOTEL JADRAN	JELSA
77	RESORT ZENČIŠĆE	JELSA
78	RESORT TREŠNJEVKA	KARLOBAG
79	SINGLES' HOTEL NOVOTEHNA	KARLOVAC
80	RETIREMENT HOME	KARLOVAC
81	MREŽNICA	KARLOVAC
82	P.N. GAZA	KARLOVAC
83	TEMELJ	KARLOVAC
84	SCHOOL DORMITORY	KARLOVAC
85	BOSNIAN RESORT	KAŠTEL GOMILICA
86	RESORT SLOVENSKO	KAŠTEL KAMBELOVAC
87	CAMP ŠULAVI	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ
88	HŽP's RESORT	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ
89	RESORT ILIRIJA	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ
90	RESORT POŽEGA	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ
91	PTT's RESORT	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ
92	CHILDREN'S RESORT	KAŠTEL NOVI
93	RESORT VRŠAČKO	KAŠTEL NOVI
94	KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	KAŠTEL STARI
95	RESORT VRŠAČKO	KAŠTEL STARI
96	RESORT ZENICA	KAŠTEL STARI
97	SCHOOL DORMITORY KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIĆ	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIĆ
98	HOTEL RESNIK	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIĆ
99	ATOCAM AS	KOLAN
100	H. CRVENI KRIŽ	KOPRIVNICA
101	HOTEL BON REPOS	KORČULA
102	HOTEL KOMODOR	KORČULA
103	HOTEL GROZD	KOTRIBA
104	ZAGREBAČKA BANK'S RESORT	KRALJEVICA
105	RESORT HRV. ŽELJEZNI.	KRALJEVICA
106	KRILO JASENICE	KRILO - JASENICE
107	RESORT SUMPETAR	KRILO - JASENICE
108	RETIREMENT HOME M. KARTEC	KRK
109	INDUSTROGRADNJA DUGA UVALA	KRNICA
110	ZELENA PUNTA TN	KUKLJICA
111	HOTEL KUTINA	KUTINA
112	HOTEL KATURE	LABINE
113	HOME FOR ELDERLY MARINO SELO	LIPIK
114	P.N. TOPLIK	LIPIK
115	DANISH RED CROSS COMPLEX	LIPOVLJANI
116	BUREAU FOR SAFETY	LOBOR
117	HOTEL RUSKAMEN	LOKVA-ROGOZNICA
118	RESORT MIMICE	LOKVA-ROGOZNICA

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
119	MERIDIONAL HOTEL LOVRAN	LOVRAN
120	HOTEL MIRAMARE	LOVRAN
121	HOTEL PARK	LOVRAN
122	VILLA SLOVENKA	LOVRAN
123	HOTEL SPLENDID	LOVRAN
124	SL. ŽEM. LOVRAN	LOVRAN
125	BIOKOVO	MAKARSKA
126	HOTEL ELBIH	MAKARSKA
127	METEOR	MAKARSKA
128	HOTEL OSEJAVA	MAKARSKA
129	HOTEL PARK	MAKARSKA
130	HOTEL RIVIJERA	MAKARSKA
131	RESORT KONJIC	MAKARSKA
132	RESORT CROTEK	MALI LOŠINJ
133	CASTLE MARUŠEVEC	MARUŠEVEC
134	HOTEL PANORAMA	MATULJI
135	HOTEL SLOBODA	MEDVEJA
136	TERMOTERAPIJA	MOKOŠICA
137	ZATON TN	NIN
138	KONUS	NOVI VINODOLSKI
139	LIVARA	NOVI VINODOLSKI
140	RETIREMENT HOME	NOVIGRAD
141	TOBAČNA LJUBLJANA	NOVIGRAD (CITTANOVA)
142	HOME NUŠTAR	NUŠTAR
143	BJELOLASICA	OGULIN
144	SCHOOL DORMITORY	OGULIN
145	HOTEL PLAŽA	OMIŠ
146	RESORT ROS	OMIŠALJ
147	HOTEL AGAVA	OPATIJA
148	HOTEL BRIJUNI	OPATIJA
149	HOTEL CONTINENTAL	OPATIJA
150	HOTEL ROYAL	OPATIJA
151	HOTEL ZAGREB	OPATIJA
152	VOLOSKO-BEČELJ	OPATIJA
153	RESORT BEČEJ	OPATIJA
154	RESORT BOR	OREBIČ
155	RESORT FOR VISUALLY IMPAIRED	OREBIČ
156	RESORT PIK TAMIŠ	OREBIČ
157	RESORT RIVIJERA	OREBIČ
158	SUBOTICA'S RESORT	OREBIČ
159	RESORT VENTILATOR	OREBIČ
160	VRANICA	OSIJEK
161	FRIENDSHIP SETTLEMENT	OSIJEK
162	HOME SVETA HELENA	OSIJEK
163	RETIREMENT HOME	OSIJEK
164	STUDENTS' DORMITORY	OSIJEK
165	SCHOOL DORMITORY	OSIJEK
166	HOTEL BELLEVUE	PAG
167	PAZINSKI KOLEGIJ	PAZIN
168	P.N. DUMAČE	PETRINJA
169	P.N. MALA GORICA	PETRINJA
170	P.N. PISAROVINA	PISAROVINA
171	HOMA MELANIJA	PIŠKOREVCI
172	HOTEL AURORA	PODGORA
173	HOTEL SALINES	PODGORA
174	HOTEL SIRENA	PODGORA
175	BANJA LUKA'S RESORT	PODSTRANA
176	RESORT KEKEC	PODSTRANA
177	RESORT KULA	PODSTRANA
178	VINKOVCI'S RESORT	PODSTRANA
179	LJUBLJANA'S RESORT	PODSTRANA
180	HOTEL PARK	POSTIRE
181	SUBOTICA'S RESORT	POSTIRE
182	RESTAURANT KOLODVOR	POŽEGA
183	SCHOOL DORMITORY	POŽEGA

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
184	RETIREMENT HOME	POŽEGA
185	MISLAV	POŽEGA
186	MARINA HOTEL LUČICA	PRIMOŠTEN
187	HOTEL ALEM	PROMAJNA
188	RESORT PROMAJNA	PROMAJNA
189	RESORT FOR ORGANIZATION NAŠA DJECA	PRVIĆ LUKA
190	SCHOOL DORMITORY	PUČIŠĆA
191	RESORT PUNTIŽELA	PULA
192	CHILDREN'S HOME RUŽA PETROVIĆ	PULA
193	I.C. KAMENJAK	PULA
194	I.C. KARLO ROJC	PULA
195	RESORT VALBADON	PULA
196	SINGLES' HOTEL 3. MAJ	RIJEKA
197	SINGLES' HOTEL HŽP	RIJEKA
198	HOTEL JADRAN	RIJEKA
199	HOTEL LUCIJA	RIJEKA
200	HOTEL NEBODER	RIJEKA
201	HOTEL PARK	RIJEKA
202	TORPEDO	RIJEKA
203	RED CROSS HOME	RIJEKA
204	D. GERVAIS HOME	RIJEKA
205	HOME PODMURVICE	RIJEKA
206	HOME SV. ANA	RIJEKA
207	RETIREMENT HOME	RIJEKA
208	GDP PRIMORJE	RIJEKA
209	STUDENTS DORMITORY I.G. KOVAČIĆ	RIJEKA
210	SCHOOL DORMITORY VUKOVARSKA	RIJEKA
211	BARRACKS SETTLEMENT BLACA	ROKOVCI
212	RETIREMENT HOME	ROVINJ
213	CHILDREN'S RESORT KARLOVAC	SELCE
214	SLANA	SELCE
215	MILITARY CAMP	SELCE
216	PINJO TEREZIJA	SIBINJ
217	WORKERS' BARRACKS KONSTRUKTOR ĐALE	SINJ
218	RAILWAY INN	SISAK
219	BARRACKS TEHNIKA	SISAK
220	RESORT A. CAR. STEPINAC	SKRAD
221	RESORT V. NAZOR	SKRAD
222	HOTEL BROD	SLAVOSNKI BROD
223	HOTEL PARK	SLAVOSNKI BROD
224	RAILWAYS' RESORT	SLAVOSNKI BROD
225	RETIREMENT HOME	SLAVOSNKI BROD
226	YOUTH AND CHILDREN'S HOME	SLAVOSNKI BROD
227	KONSTRUKTOR	SOLIN
228	BARRACKS SV. KAJO	SOLIN
229	HOTEL CENTRAL	SPLIT
230	LAV	SPLIT
231	SINGLES' HOTEL LAVČEVIĆ	SPLIT
232	HOTEL MARIJAN	SPLIT
233	HOTEL OLINT	SPLIT
234	HOTEL SLAVIJA	SPLIT
235	HOTEL SPLIT	SPLIT
236	HOTEL ZAGREB	SPLIT
237	RESORT DIOKOM	SPLIT
238	CAMP STOBREČ	SPLIT
239	SCHOOL DORMITORY	SPLIT
240	HOLIDAY APARTMENT COMPLEX LAVICA	SPLIT
241	BARRACKS LAVČEVIĆ-METROJAK	SPLIT
242	HOME GŠC	SPLIT
243	RETIREMENT HOME	SPLIT
244	SINGLES' HOME	SPLIT
245	HOME ZENTA	SPLIT
246	BARRACKS PIS	SPLIT
247	STUDENTS DORMITORY SPINUT	SPLIT

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
248	HEALTH EDU. CENTAR	SPLIT
249	HOTEL ADRIATIC	STARIGRAD
250	HOTEL HELIOS	STARIGRAD
251	BARRACKS T.T.T.S.	STOBREČ
252	HOTEL COMPLEX PALMA	SUPETAR
253	RESORT BISTRICA	SUTIVAN
254	RESORT LEWIS	SVETI FILIP I JAKOV
255	ANDRIJA HOTEL SOLARIS	ŠIBENIK
256	BOTIĆ REŠAD	ŠIBENIK
257	JURE HOTEL SOLARIS	ŠIBENIK
258	NIKO HOTEL SOLARIS	ŠIBENIK
259	ETERNA	ŠIBENIK
260	CENTER FOR UPBRINGING AND EDUC.	ŠIBENIK
261	I.C. OBONJAN	ŠIBENIK
262	RESORT INA	TIJESNO
263	RESORT NANA	TIJESNO
264	HOTEL BOROVIK	TISNO
265	P.N. ŠAŠNA GREDA	TOPOLOVAC
266	RESORT IVANEC	TRIBUNJ
267	RESORT POŽEŠKA DOLINA	TRIBUNJ
268	RESORT ZAMALIN	TRIBUNJ
269	HOTEL JADRAN	TROGIR
270	HOLIDAY APARTMENT COMPLEX KAIROS	TROGIR
271	HOTEL MEDENA	TROGIR
272	MOTEL SOLINE	TROGIR
273	CAMP BELVEDERE	TROGIR
274	BORAC	TROGIR
275	RESORT SEGET	TROGIR
276	RESORT ĐURO SALAJ	TRPANJ
277	RESORT KONIS	TUČEPI
278	RESORT NAFTAGAS	TUČEPI
279	SLAVONSKA POŽEGA	TUČEPI
280	RESORT NOVA POŠTA	TUČEPI
281	HOTEL ISTRAN	VARAŽDIN
282	P.C. VARAŽDIN 1	VARAŽDIN
283	P.C. VARAŽDIN 2	VARAŽDIN
284	P.C. VARAŽDIN 3	VARAŽDIN
285	SCHOOL DORMITORY	VARAŽDIN
286	RESORT HRVATSKE CESTE	VARAŽDINSKE TOPLICE
287	RESORT ISKRA	VARAŽDINSKE TOPLICE
288	HOTEL "JADRAN"	VELA LUKA
289	HOTEL KORKYRA	VELA LUKA
290	HOTEL POSEJDON	VELA LUKA
291	RESORT BGZ	VELI LOŠINJ
292	BISTRO GRIČ	VELIKA
293	RETIREMENT HOME	VELIKA
294	OLD SCHOOL	VELIKA
295	HIDROELEKTRA'S BARRACKS	VELIKA GORICA
296	DISPLACED PERSONS' CAMP	VELIKA GORICA
297	I.C. VINICA	VINICA
298	CROATIAN RAILWAY FACILITIES	VINKOVCI
299	TECHNICAL SCHOOL	VINKOVCI
300	BARRACKS CAMP	VIROVITICA
301	SCHOOL DORMITORY	VIROVITICA
302	HOTEL SLAVONIJA	VIROVITICA
303	RETIREMENT HOME	VIS
304	I.C. SAMOGOR	VIS
305	IMPERIJAL HOTEL VODICE	VODICE
306	HOTEL OLIMPIJA	VODICE
307	RESORT BOROVO	VODICE
308	CARE CANADA STATIONER	VODICE
309	CENTER FOR THE DISABLED	VODNJAN

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
310	ADRIATIC HOTEL VRBOSKA	VRBOSKA
311	SCHOOL DORMITORY I. L. RIBAR	ZADAR
312	GORTAN	ZADAR
313	SINGLE'S HOTEL INDUSTRIGRADNJA	ZAGREB
314	YOUTH HOTEL	ZAGREB
315	SINGLES' HOTEL VOLTINO	ZAGREB
316	SCHOOL FOR NURSES	ZAGREB
317	SCHOOL DORMITORY M. JAMBRIŠAN	ZAGREB
318	CENTER SLAVA RAŠKAJ	ZAGREB
319	CENTER VINKO BEK	ZAGREB
320	SINGLES' HOTEL GORANIN	ZAGREB
321	YOUTH HOTEL TOC	ZAGREB
322	SCHOOL DORMITORY A. B. BUŠIĆA	ZAGREB
323	SCHOOL DORMITORY A. G. MATOŠ	ZAGREB
324	SCHOOL DORMITORY I. MAŽURANIĆ	ZAGREB
325	SCHOOL DORMITORY FOR HIGH SCHOOLS	ZAGREB
326	SCHOOL DORMITORY H U K	ZAGREB
327	SINGLES' HOTEL HŽ-ČRNOMEREC	ZAGREB
328	SCHOOL DORMITORY FOR MIDWIVES	ZAGREB
329	BARRACKS BOROVO-DUBRAVA	ZAGREB
330	COO DUBRAVA	ZAGREB
331	YOUTH TOWN JP	ZAGREB
332	SCHOOL DORMITORY TIN UJEVIĆ	ZAGREB
333	SCHOOL DORMITORY D. PEJAČEVIĆ	ZAGREB
334	SINGLES' HOTEL INDOSTAND	ZAGREB
335	STUDENTS DORMITORY LAŠČINA	ZAGREB
336	CENTER FOR AUTISM	ZAGREB
337	STUDENTS DORMITORY I. MEŠTROVIĆ	ZAGREB
338	SCHOOL DORMITORY GRAD. STRUKA	ZAGREB
339	CHILDREN'S CENTER BREZOVICA	ZAGREB
340	PROGRES' BARACKS	ZAGREB
341	RADNIK NOVSKA'S BARRACKS	ZAGREB
342	SINGLES' HOTEL - RANŽIRNI K.	ZAGREB
343	VIJADUKT'S BARRACKS IN RAKITJE	ZAGREB
344	HPT'S SCHOOL DORMITORY	ZAGREB
345	SCHOOL DORMITORY SELSKA	ZAGREB
346	CDBOSO TREŠNJEVKA	ZAGREB
347	CHILDREN'S HOME A. G. MATOŠ	ZAGREB
348	S.D. "ANTE STARČEVIĆ"	ZAGREB
349	S.D. "STJEPAN RADIĆ"	ZAGREB
350	SCHOOL DORMITORY FRANJO BUČAR	ZAGREB
351	RETIREMENT HOME TRNJE	ZAGREB
352	STUDENTS DOR. CVJETNO NASELJE	ZAGREB
353	SCHOOL DORMITORY LUKA BOTIĆ	ZAGREB
354	ENIKON'S BARRACKS	ZAGREB
355	CROATIAN RAILWAYS INN	ZAGREB
356	HOTEL NOVOGRADNJA	ZAGREB-NOVI ZAGREB
357	RESORT SISAK	ZAOSTROG
358	AUTO-CAMP DALMACIJA	ZAOSTROG
359	HOME KRO ZAPREŠIĆ	ZAPREŠIĆ
360	VIJADUKT'S BARARCKS POJATNO	ZAPREŠIĆ
361	HOTEL NIMFA	ŽIVOGOŠĆE
362	RESORT VIŠEGRAD	ŽIVOGOŠĆE

Archive of the Croatian Government's Administration Office for Displaced Persons, Returnees and Refugees



Archive of the Administration Office for Displaced Persons, Returnees and Refugees contains digitalized data and documentation on at least 235,819 individuals from BiH.

Data about refugees from BiH during 1994

S. NO.	FILE TYPE	MUNICIPALITY OF REGISTRATION	FILE	FILE ISSUED	LOCATION/TOWN OF ACCOMMODATION	STREET & HOUSE NUMBER OF ACCOMMOD.
235741	IN TRANSIT	NOVI ZAGREB	4662	11.6.1994	ZAGREB	BUNDEK 7
235742	IN TRANSIT	NOVI ZAGREB	4663	11.6.1994	ZAKREB	BUNDEK 7
235743	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4664	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235744	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4665	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235745	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4666	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235746	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4667	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235747	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4668	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235748	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4669	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235749	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4670	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235750	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4712	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL SUČURAC	KAŠTELANSKA CESTA 35
235751	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4713	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL SUČURAC	KAŠTELANSKA CESTA 35
235752	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4714	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL SUČURAC	KAŠTELANSKA CESTA 35
235753	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4715	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL SUČURAC	KAŠTELANSKA CESTA 35
235754	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4716	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL GOMILICA	BRUNA BUŠIĆA 1
235755	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4717	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL KOMILICA	BRUNA BUŠIĆA 1
535756	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4727	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235757	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4558	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235758	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4728	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235759	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4729	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235760	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4730	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235761	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4731	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235762	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4732	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235763	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4733	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	CESTA 55
235764	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4734	1.1.1991	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	CESTA 55
235765	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4739	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	CESTA 55
235766	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4740	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	CESTA 55
235767	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4735	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235768	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4736	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235769	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4737	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235770	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4738	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235771	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4741	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235772	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4742	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235773	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4593	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235774	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4594	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235775	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4749	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235776	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4750	23.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235777	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	Illegible	30.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	/illegible/ 15
235778	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4520	30.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	/illegible/ 15
235779	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	Illegible	6.12.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	/illegible/ 15
235780	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	Illegible	27.1.1995	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ	MURTINICA 15
235781	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	Illegible	14.2.1995	KAŠTEL GOMILICA	CESTA 55
235782	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4940	14.2.1995	KAŠTEL KAMBELOVAC	K. CESTA 59
235783	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4941	2.12.1995	KAŠTEL KAMBELOVAC	K. CESTA 59
235784	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4942	3.3.1995	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 24
235785	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4949	3.3.1995	PODSTRANA	KAŠIĆEVA 5
235786	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4950	3.3.1995	PODSTRANA	KAŠIĆEVA 5
235787	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4951	3.3.1995	PODSTRANA	KAŠIĆEVA 5
235788	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4952	24.3.1995	PODSTRANA	KAŠIĆEVA 5
235789	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4957	24.3.1995	KAŠTEL STARI	UZVRTLE 66
235790	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4960	30.3.1995	KAŠTEL STARI	UZVRTLE 66
235791	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4953	30.3.1995	KAŠTEL SUČURAC	KAŠTELANSKA 33
235792	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4954	30.3.1995	KAŠTEL SUČURAC	KAŠTELANSKA 33
235793	IN TRANSIT	ŠIBENIK	4955	30.3.1995	PRVIĆ LUKA	PRVIĆ LUKA
235794	IN TRANSIT	ŠIBENIK	4966	30.3.1995	PRVIĆ LUKA	PRVIĆ LUKA
235795	IN TRANSIT	ŠIBENIK	4957	30.3.1995	PRVIĆ LUKA	PRVIĆ LUKA
235796	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4958	30.3.1995	KAŠTEL SUČURAC	VICE JERČIĆA 17A
235797	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4959	11.4.1995	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ	KAŠTELANSKA CESTA 33
235798	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4971	13.4.1995	PODSTRANA	CINDROVA 9
235799	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4972	13.4.1995	PODSTRANA	CINDROVA 9
235800	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4973	13.4.1995	PODSTRANA	CINDROVA 9

OWNER/TITLE OF ACCOMM.	TYPE OF ACCOMM.	CAMP	YOUNGER THAN	PERSON IS AN ORPHAN	ACCOMM. WITHOUT PARENTS	CONTACT WITH PARENTS?	CHECKOUT FROM ACCOMM.	RETURNEE STATUS SINCE	EMIGRANT STATUS SINCE
INDUSTROGRADNJA BARAKE	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	20.04.1996		
INDUSTROGRADNJA BARAKE	OTHER	0	1	0	0	0	20.04.1996		
KRIŠTO LUCA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KRIŠTO LUCA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
ŠERIĆ MATE	OTHER	1	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
ŠERIĆ MATE	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
CRNKOVIĆ JOZO	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0			
CRNKOVIĆ JOZO	OTHER	0	1	0	0	0			
CRNKOVIĆ JOZO	OTHER	0	1	0	0	0			
SPAHA IVAN	APARTMENT	1	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
SPAHA IVAN	APARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
SPAHA IVAN	APARTMENT	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
SPAHA IVAN	APARTMENT	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
PAVLOV KUZMA	RENTAL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
PAVLOV KUZMA	RENTAL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
JURIĆ ILIJA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0			
JURIĆ ILIJA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0			
JURIĆ ILIJA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0			
JURIĆ ILIJA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0			
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0			
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0			
KRIŠTO LUCA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KRIŠTO LUCA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KRIŠTO LUCA	OTHER	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
ŠERIĆ MATE	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
ŠERIĆ MATE	OTHER	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KLJUČ /illegible/	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
MARKOVIĆ VLADO	HOUSE	1	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
MARKOVIĆ VLADO	HOUSE	1	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
SAVIČEVIĆ	APARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0			
/illegible/ TEODOR	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0			
BRNJAKOVIĆ ALOJZIJE	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
BRNJAKOVIĆ ALOJZIJE	HOUSE	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
DRAGOJEVIĆ PETAR	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0			
BULIĆ IVKA	APARTMENT	1	0	0	0	0			
BULIĆ IVKA	APARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
BULIĆ IVKA	APARTMENT	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
BULIĆ IVKA	APARTMENT	0	1	0	0	0	1.5.1996	1.8.1996	
BAŠIĆ VALENKA	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0			
BAŠIĆ VALENKA	HOUSE	0	1	0	0	0			
DELIĆ SMAIL	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
DELIĆ SMAIL	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
COMMUNITY RESORT NAŠA DJECA	RESORT	1	0	0	0	0	4.5.1996		
COMMUNITY RESORT NAŠA DJECA	RESORT	0	1	0	0	0	4.5.1996		
COMMUNITY RESORT NAŠA DJECA	RESORT	0	1	0	0	0	4.5.1996		
BOŽIDAR DELIĆ	HOUSE	0	1	0	0	0			
GAREŠIĆ ZDENKO	HOUSE	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
ROGIĆ IVAN	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0			
ROGIĆ IVAN	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0			
ROGIĆ IVAN	HOUSE	0	1	0	0	0			

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One of 3931 pages from the database of registered refugees on the territory of Republic of Croatia

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
jivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspop, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PZB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

CAMPS-PRISONS- DETENTION CENTRES

**Where some A BiH troops
and other structures of
Muslim authorities kept
detained Croats**

FACTS

In 331 concentration camps and prisons where BH Army kept Croats:

- a) There were 14,444 Croats detained
- b) 632 Croats inmates of concentration camps were killed
- c) From the total number of killed, 50 Croats were ritually executed according to Sharia law.

Until today two Muslim – Bosniaks were accused.

Ladies and gentlemen (and others), please read the DOCUMENTS carefully on www.slobodanpraljak.com.

Thank you!

Slobodan Praljak

P.S. Many people helped to gather the documents, I'm not listing their names for fear that someone would be left out.

This does not diminish my gratitude, and I hope they will understand this.

/handwritten: to colonel Blaškić/
/round stamp: Croatian State Archives /

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
CENTRAL BOSNIA OPERATIVE ZONE COMMAND

Ref. no: 21-7-270/93

Vitez, July 17th, 1993

Deliver to:

- all international factors
- /note to: col. Tihomir Blaškić /crossed out/
- note to: HVO GS Mostar /crossed out/

LETTER OF PROTEST

European and international public, all important European and worldwide governments and other important factors are ACCUSING HVO AND CROATS FOR MISFORTUNES OF BH STATE, FOR SUFFERINGS OF MUSLIM PEOPLE (!), FOR ETHNIC CLEANSING OF MUSLIMS (!). On the basis of which practical behavior, on the basis of which long-term policy, on the bases of which and what kind of arguments?

In summery:

- 1) Croats consider Bosnia and Herzegovina their homeland. This is a historical fact, and they have proven this on the referendum on sovereignty of BiH by voting “yes”;
- 2) Croats were the first to resisted the aggression on BiH;
- 3) Croats were the first to sign and were the first willing to implement the Vance-Owen plan in practice;
- 4) Croats were the first to release all detainees on the principle “all for all”;
- 5) Croats were the first to sign and support the agreement on humanitarian convoys and free movement (of international organizations and units under control of HVO etc., etc.;

Therefore, where are the arguments to pronounce Croats as the aggressor who is conquering the Muslim land and even conduct ethnic cleansing of Muslims?

What is actually happening in the meanwhile? Primarily to Croats of Central Bosnia?

Out of 28,000 Croats from Travnik, barely two thousand are left, according to optimists! Where are the rest (25,000 – 26,000)? Do you know gentlemen? And why are they no longer in their Travnik? Why are 38 villages from Travnik area depleted of Croats, plundered, demolished and partially burned? Thirty eight, gentlemen! Do you know why? Who was the aggressor and the ethnic “cleanser”?

What about Croats from Zenica, gentlemen? There were about thirty thousand Croats there! How many are still there, and why were they driven away and by whom? (Estimation: approximately 15,000 people were in Zenica in medieval living conditions). Where is HVO brigade "Jure Francetić"? Who destroyed it and expelled it from Zenica region? Was this one and only brigade the aggressor on Zenica, on Muslims of Zenica and tens of thousands of soldiers of BH Army?

Who was the aggressor and ethnic "cleanser" in reality?

How many Croats are there in Kakanj today? And where is the largest part of 15,000? Where is the HVO brigade "Kotromanić" and who destroyed it? Who was the aggressor and the ethnic "cleanser" here?

How many of Croatian settlements in municipalities of Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovača are in the hands of so-called BH Army and where is the Croatian population from these settlements? Why were they expelled and why, and WHO WAS THE AGGRESSOR AND ETHNIC "CLEANSER" HERE?

Gentlemen, please look (it is quite easy) at the map of Central Bosnia and the disposition of military force of so-called BH Army and HVO! What is happening here from day to day? WHO IS OCCUPYING ON DAILY BASIS AND CONQUERING LAND, VILLAGES, CITIES? WHO IS ATTACKING AND WHO IS MERELY DEFENDING? WHO IS EXPELLING PEOPLE, AND WHO ARE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS?

Tonight Croats were expelled from Fojnica. Did you know this? Sure! But who expelled them, and cleansed the town and villages of the Croatian people and few HVO units? Well, Croats were in relative majority in Fojnica!

What about Žepče? Was the one and only HVO brigade there the aggressor against dozens of Muslim brigades? Is that even possible?

Which municipality and Croatian area is next? Maybe Vareš, with Croatian majority, already encircled by so-called BH Army from the direction of Visoko, Zenica, Kakanj, Breze? Will one and only brigade there also be accused as the aggressor against the many times more numerous Muslim troops? Or will it be Busovača, because MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ has "extra" brigades after occupying Fojnica?

What happened to historical, spiritual and religious monuments of Croatian people in these areas? Hundreds of years old monasteries and a life symbols of survival of Croats in these areas were demolished... as for example Guča Gora, desecrated... as for example Kraljeva Sutjeska. And the town of Bobovac from which the Croatian kings of this country ruled. In some of these shrines the so-called BH Army has placed its military commands! Is this a contribution to European civilization?

What has been done and how are the Croatian people treated, and especially intellectuals left in the towns cleansed by Croats? Engineers, musicians, doctors and others are sweeping the streets, and Croatian professors are promoted to genitors!

Gentlemen!

We are assuming that you are THE FIRST AND MAIN SOURCE OF INFORMATION TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, SECURITY COUNCIL and of course to your home governments regarding what is happening here.

On the bases of this information Europe and the World are building their political and practical attitude towards all actors of this bloody Bosnian drama! On the basis of these information the most powerful international organizations and, almost without exception, the most powerful European and World governments – HAVE FORMED THEIR OPINION THAT (IN BiH) HVO AND CROATIAN PEOPLE ARE THE AGGRESSORS AGAINST MUSLIMS, AND ARE OCCUPYING THEIR TERRITORY AND ARE DOING THE ETHNIC CLEANSING!!!

Is it possible, gentlemen, that such conclusions are derived from the actual situation? IT APPEARS SO! And as we can see – it is possible.

Sadly and shamefully!

So, please, gentlemen, with what arguments have you substantiated your reports to international organizations and your governments? Where are these Muslim-majority territories where HVO has attacked, on which towns and villages has HVO carried out the aggression, and from which territories has HVO exiled and ethnically cleansed Muslim population? Who is, day by day, (HVO or BH Army) compressed to the narrower and narrower area of Central Bosnia? What are you looking at and what are you seeing with your own eyes and your esteemed intellect? It is quite obvious that in naming the aggressor and ethnic "cleanser" you have a wrong name of the culprit – perpetrator.

Those who want to impartially observe, analyze and on its bases draw conclusions and inform the relevant organizations and world governments, simply MUST SEE.

- 1) Muslims who were exiled and fled the Serbian aggression have decided, with its military force (BH Army) to: MILITARILY DESTROY HVO, ETHNICALLY CLEANSE ALL CROATIAN TERRITORY IN CENTRAL BOSNIA AND SETTLE IT WITH LARGE NUMBER OF MUSLIM CIVILIANS FROM OTHER PARTS OF BOSNIA. BH Army is achieving this goal! It is obvious.
- 2) Serbian side in BiH has been preparing for war for several years with firm goals to OCCUPY LARGE TERRITORY JUST FOR THEM AND TO ETHNICALLY CLEANSE ALL NON-SERBIAN POPULATION.

Muslim side had been preparing for more than a year on how and when will they compensate the territory occupied by Serbs. And now they are implementing this plan on Croats in Central Bosnia!

From the beginning of the war, Croats have considered political solution of the problems and BH future as necessary and possible, and therefore sided with the international factors, confirming this in practice during this whole time.

AFTER EVERYTHING – HOW DID THE WORLD MAKE A CONCLUSION THAT CROATS AND HVO ARE THE AGGRESSORS AND THE SIDE WHICH IS ETHNICALLY CLEANSING MUSLIMS? The only thing that I'm asking from the international factors is TO EXPLAIN THIS TO US WITH VALID ARGUMENTS!

As you can see, this is a key moment for this question:

CAN CROATS SURVIVE THE AGGRESSION AND CAN THEY SURVIVE IN THIS AREA? BOTH PHYSICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY?

AND WHETHER THEY ARE DOOMED TO EXTINCTION?

SHOULD HVO LAY DOWN THEIR WEAPONS IN FRONT OF THE BH ARMY AND SHOULD CROAT PEOPLE ACCEPT THE STATE AND GOVERNMENT SYSTEM FROM MEDIEVAL TIMES AND OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND GIVE UP THEIR HISTORY, TRADITION, CULTURE AND FUTURE?

And then:

WHAT DO REPRESENTATIVES OF INTERNATIONAL NGOs, EUROPEAN AND WORLD GOVERNMENTS INTEND TO DO HERE? Will the benevolence or incompetence to stop Serbian aggression on Croats and Muslims of BiH be also repeated with the aggression of Muslims of BiH against Croats of BiH? With an additional and absolutely wrong assertion that the latter are culprits, aggressors and ethnic "cleansers"?

Croats will support cooperation but will not tolerate humiliation and stand by and wait for help to be offered by the spoon, and for all the pain and suffering just to hear the words "WE ARE SORRY".

It is your decision to help us or not? We are here for cooperation and to enable you to perform your duties, to perceive the realistic situation on the ground.

IS.DG/VŠ

1 x to titles

UN Liaison officer
OZ CB
Darko Gelić
/signature illegible/
/round stamp: illegible/

Deliver to:

1 x Col. A.D.A. Duncan
Commander of the British UN battalion
1 x UN General Staff for BiH, Kiseljak
1 x European Monitoring Mission, Zenica
1 x UN High Commission for refugees
1 x International Committee of Red Cross
1 x Commander of OZ CB (for information)
1 x HVO GS
1 x a/a

Objection with regard to my involvement
in the work of the R BH /Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina/ OS /Armed
Forces/ ŠVK

To R BH OS ŠVK Commander
Mr Rasim DELIĆ

With regard to the responsibilities and duties of the ŠVK Deputy Commander and your assurances that you would fully include members of the Commander's inner collegium in the management of the R BH Army, I would like to lodge my objection against my inadequate inclusion in the work of the R BH OS ŠVK.

Regardless of your resolute position that the involvement of the deputy in the ŠVK activities shall be aimed at our joint contribution to the management of the R BH Army, in my opinion this is not being realised to the advantage of the R BH Army, our joint struggle, the responsibility and unity of the R BH Army. I will outline only a few, in my opinion, important activities in which I should have been included.

1. I would like to remind you that I offered to join you or the NŠ /Chief of Staff/ from Sarajevo when going to the free territory to carry out tasks together. It seemed to me that you willingly accepted this. I did not even know that you went out of Sarajevo, maybe as deputy I ought not to have known this, but I asked myself a number of questions, the worst being whether it was yet another proof of the lack of trust in my former, current and future work in the R BH Army. I ask you whether you felt like a real R BH Army commander when representatives of only one people sat with you at the briefing in Zenica - and you advocate a multiethnic army?! I believe that you would have been more persuasive, stronger and prouder had there been one of your deputies at the talks with the representatives of authorities and religious institutions on the free territory.
- ② You were visited by General Bricquemont (several times), the US Ambassador in the R BH and others recently. Probably on these occasions too it would have been necessary for deputies to be with the commander because of the already mentioned assertion that the R BH Army is multiethnic.
- ③ Your meetings with brigade commanders in Sarajevo or with those who come to Sarajevo are opportunities for deputies to learn about the situation in those units, as well as directly contribute to seeking favourable solutions to remove flaws and participate in managing the R BH Army.

I am determined to remain in our common struggle for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, irrespective of how I am treated in the OS ŠVK. But it must be accepted that R BH OS ŠVK deputy commanders have somewhat different responsibilities, rights and obligations from those in other armies, because they are here to represent the multiethnic composition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, not a statistics detail.

DJ/SO

DEPUTY COMMANDER
RBH OS ŠVK
Jovan DIVJAK

SVK /Supreme Command Staff/ Communication Center

- Department for Crypto Protection

Sarajevo

Date and time:

June 25th, 1993, Friday 23:23

Original file: FAFGP6

Document received and processed by

/signature illegible/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
REPUBLIC'S DEFENSE

/handwritten: encircled 8/

OS /Armed Forces/ SUPREME COMMAND STAFF

MILITARY SECRET

IKM /Divisional Command Post/

TOP SECRET

URGENT

Ref.con.no: 102/03-67

Zenica, on June 25th, 1993

- PRESIDENT OF PRESIDENCY OF BH REPUBLIC – Personally:
- COMMANDER OF THE BH ARMY SCS – Personally

In connection to the letter con.ref.no. 102/03-51 that I have sent you on June 15th, 1993, I feel free to insist again on your arrival to Zenica. Here are some other reasons, which were not mentioned in the letter from June /illegible/, 1993.

On May 23rd, 1993 Head of the SCS Mr. Sefer Halilović, in front of Delić and Karić, and before arrival to Sarajevo, said that he has given the command:

- in 24 hours 3rd Corps must find and appoint several Croats in their command,
- that he has regulated that within 48 hours small illegal groups (it is known who they are) must leave Zenica in direction of Igman (executor Delić, associate Mahmuljin),
- that 3rd Corps demobilizes units,
- that 3rd Corps must introduce 24 hour working obligation, same as in SCS and other corps.

As of today, nothing has been done.

On May 26th, 1993, president of the municipal government Mr. Saferović Ramiz said in front of Šiber, Karić and Vranj:

- as a citizen I'm disappointed in the 3rd Corps, and the top people in the Corps are involved in looting and crime,
- there are senior officers who are killing people after looting,
- "I will not do anything for the army in the name of the government, until order and discipline are not installed in the city".

On June 23rd, 1993, Mr. Hodžić, president of the District and Mr. Haračić, president of the district government said:

Merdan is the main organizer of religious units: Čuvalić's, Purić's, 7.mbb /Mechanised Mountain Brigade/ and others,

Hadžihasanović was invited several times to the session of the district assembly, and he didn't want to come, not once,

Zenica and soldiers of the 3rd Corps are ruled by commanders who are heavy criminals, who do not want to, because conquest over Chetniks does not suit them, while conflicts with HVO are in their favor.

June /illegible/, 1993 during the private conversation with Hadžihanović I have raised a question:

Do you know that some parts of certain units are getting ready to secede and form the 8th Muslim brigade?

Answer: Yes, but this will not happen!

Do you know that preparations are on the way to form Muslim Corps, and in case they resist, the command of the 3rd Corps will be killed?

Answer: Yes, but these are just wishes, it will not happen!

In the meanwhile:

- On June 8th, 1993 – 35 Croats were executed in village Bikoši, and 4 witnesses are wounded and others are alive, and they were executed by Mujahideens,
- On June 10th, 1993 – over 30 Croats were executed in village Šušanj near Ovnak by the members of a “certain army”,
- On June 22nd, 1993 members of the Committee for the release of prisoners Alihodžić and Negovetić found out from Salko Beba from OG /Operative Group/ “WEST” that on the day before, close to Mehurići village under Vlašić, Mujahideens have executed approximately 50 civilians. Salko Beba’s unit is protecting 247 civilians in this village from the so called “Death Brigade” which also harasses local Muslim population, and are looting and killing. On the same day the same Mujahideens from the “Death Brigade”, who are winning over our soldiers with money, have almost shot UNPROFOR vehicles transporting the Commission with wasps and grenade launchers.

I emphasize: Plunder and crime are in full bloom. From their “positions” soldiers carry filled bags through Zenica, and I was also informed that some members refuse to go on positions if there is nothing to steal (309. bbr /Mountain Brigade/). Police officers of certain brigades continue to arrest and beat civilians in basements. Police or DSB /Service of National Security/ and security service of the 3rd Corps doesn’t cooperate at all, which was evident to Mr. Ganić during the meeting at the 3rd Corps on May 15th, 1993.

Pursuant to the above stated, I repeatedly request an urgent reaction, since change of personnel within the top officers of the 3rd Corps is necessary. I have concrete suggestions. I have requested the commander of the 3rd Corps to dismiss the assistant for morale, safety and organization - mobilization and personnel issues, but he is not responding.



Please appoint an officer with a profile like Karišić, Vranj, Najetović to the Joint command with Karić and Šiber, instead of Merdan, because he is the member of 3rd Corps and also due to the above stated about him.



I salute you,



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

DEPUTY COMMANDER



Mr. Šiber Stjepan, eng.
























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



Concentration camps, prisons, assembly centers within Gornji Vakuf region

17



Concentration camps, prisons, assembly centers within Sarajevo region



**CROATIAN ASSOCIATION OF CONCENTRATION CAMP PRISONERS DURING THE
HOMELAND WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

SUBSIDIARY IN /handwritten: ZENICA – DOBOJ COUNTY/

/County/

QUESTIONNAIRE

For gathering data on concentration camps and other detention places and forms of torture that took place there during the war in BiH 1991 – 1996

Pursuant to the Ordinance on determining the status of concentration camps' prisoners adopted at the General assembly of the Association on December 10th, 2003, the CONCENTRATION CAMPS' PRISONERS are those persons who were confined to concentration camps by police, military or paramilitary forces for reasons of ethnic cleansing and genocide for at least three days (72 hours) during the period from 1991 onwards.

CONCENTRATION CAMP is every closed or enclosed space in which people were confined en masse or individually for indefinite period of time for reasons of ethnic cleansing.

1. CONCENTRATION CAMP –PLACE OF DETENTION (municipality, town, location) /handwritten: MAGLAJ (Police station building – TO – o)/
2. CONCENTRATION CAMP IS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF (former JNA, SRY Army, RS Army, R BiH Army, police)? /handwritten: Military police of BH Army 201. Bbr./Mountain Brigade/ which operated in Maglaj region/
3. Who formed the concentration camp, and under whose orders? /handwritten: War presidency of Maglaj municipality and Commander of the 201. Bbr./
4. Was the concentration camp equipped with sanitary facilities, water, lighting, heating? ____ / ____
5. Concentration camp was opened on /handwritten: June 24th, 1993/, and closed on /handwritten: March 5th, 1994/
6. Who secured the camp (military, police, paramilitary forces)? /handwritten: Military police/
7. Number of detainees /handwritten: 37/ in total, of which male: /handwritten: all/, female: ____ / ____, children: ____ / ____, elderly: _____
8. Who performed the arrests and transportation to camps:

First and last name	Nickname
1. /handwritten: <u>Intervention squad and Anti-sabotage squad of the 201. Bbr of Maglaj</u>	_____
2. _____	_____
3. _____	_____
4. _____	_____
9. Data on camp administration:

Warden – commander /handwritten: MAHMUT MEMIŠEVIĆ, DELIĆ HASAN/

Provide as much information about wardens, guards and other staff members:

/handwritten: direct executors of torture and ill-treatment in Camp Mahmut MEMIŠEVIĆ warden, Isak MEMIŠEVIĆ prison guard, ŽELJKO VERIĆ commander of "GREEN LEGION" from Zenica, ZAJKO DELIĆ member of Maglaj police

10. Was there a special room (solitary confinement) at the location of detention in which inmates were isolated and tortured? /handwritten: there was a solitary confinement in which detainees were held imprisoned

11. Provide names and nicknames of interrogators and whether they applied force? _____

/handwritten: Željko Verić,

Isak Memišević

12. Were detainees tortured in front of others, enter data about the torturers?

13. Provide information on dead detainees of the concentration camp: _____/_____

- wounded detainees:

/handwritten: while digging trenches Zdravko Šupuković,

Pero Banović, Anto Nikolić

- missing detainees:

14. Were there any cases when detainees were forced to give blood? _____/_____

15. Were detainees taken to force labor? /handwritten: everyday

16. Were locations of detention visited by political, military and other officials from the side which was in charge of camps? /handwritten: NO

17. Were locations of detention visited by representatives of ICRC and other international institutions?

/handwritten: Yes, by

How many times? /handwritten: representatives of UNHCR - once

18. Were detainees hidden from the ICRC representatives? _____

19. Of what were the detainees deprived off? (hygiene maintenance, use of toilets, health care, visits by relatives, food) _____

20. For each camp a drawing-photo should be provided.

21. Make a maximum effort to make a list of detainees in each camp.

22. Attach and register all materials provided by detainees (sketches, drawings, records, diaries etc.).

Date 21-June 2007

Enumerator:

/Signature/ _____

(Name)

/round stamp/

/handwritten/: ZDENKO ŠUPUKOVIĆ

FAMILY NAME Janjić
 NAME, FATHER'S NAME: Dragan, Ilija
 YEAR OF BIRTH: February 16th, 1961
 PLACE OF BIRTH: Zenica
 RESIDENCE: Čajdraš 15
 TEMPORARY RESIDENCE: Busovača
 QUALIFICATIONS:
 OCCUPATION: social worker at Retirement home
 MARITAL STATUS:
 CITIZENSHIP:
 NATIONALITY: Croat

Note: material taken from Center for Human Rights Međugorje

I hereby give the following

TESTIMONY

On April 17th, 1993 a general hunt on HVO /Croatian Defense Council/ began in Zenica. I went down to the city with my mother, brother, wife and children. I placed them at my brother's wife's cousin. I was planning to go back to Čajdraš, but everything was blocked so I could not go back. Once I saw the situation, I found the best solution to go to my mother's godmother in Blatuša behind the bus station, I thought, and I was sure that no one saw me when I arrived at dawn. I was very warmly accepted, and after my explanation they have agreed to hide me.

The next day 4 members of MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ broke into the house at gunpoint, I asked them to get dressed and they took me like that for questioning. They brought me out and put me into a van. Then they took me to the Music school near the park. In music school they took me to a basement. There I saw professor from Mechanical engineering faculty, vice president of HVO Zenica, Ivan Bošnjak and Vlatko Ivanković, member of HVO. I was not questioned that day so I was able to destroy my corolla and other identification document and the rest of my staff that had Croatian national crest (personal identification documents). I hid my corolla.

The next day (night) they took out Vlatko Ivanković. They brought him back after 10, 20 minutes, he was covered in blood. We asked him immediately what they have done to him, and he said: "They just took me out and hit me on the head and all over the body with a wooden stick (shovel handle)"

That same night they took him out again for 2 - 3 hours, he came back all soaked in sweat. When we asked him why he was wet, he said he was digging a grave for himself, and they wouldn't let him rest the whole time. I thought he was just trying to scare me if they also take me so I would talk. As for Ivan Bošnjak, he was very concerned what will happen to his family and him. During the same night they took him out and he was not beaten, he was out for two days and then taken to an unknown direction and to this day we don't know where he is.

I was taken out of the basement and they took my personal data, as well as my family's data (names of children, wife...) my immediate family. I was not questioned any further that night, I was not given any food for those three days, bread that we were given we have put in one sack. Questioning had already started, next evening from 00:00 until 6:00 a.m.

They brought me to the third floor, where the office of their police station was located. Each question was a direct accusation against me, how many armaments have I brought, where have I put them? I said that I had nothing to do with armament procurement. After numerous other questions, statements to which any answer was pointless, since they raised and answered questions with accusations about things that had nothing to do with me, and then their "questioning" would stop. They referred to me only as "Ustasha".

I was returned to the basement, only to be taken again at night. This time they started to beat me immediately, from exiting the basement until the third floor (kicking me and beating me with a police baton). I was beaten by Muslim policemen:

1. Smajo Osmanović
2. Sejdo Osmanović

Two brothers. They took me to a room and made me sit on the sofa in such a way that my back was unprotected. Police officers were standing on the left and right side, and in front of me was Jasmin Isić, teacher from Busovača.

I was accused for forging my identification documents and for giving false identity. I said that it was not true, because they have my passport, and can verify my identity with my parents and neighbors. They were displeased with my answer so Jasmin Isić started to slap me, and policemen started to beat me on the back with fists and legs. Then they accused me that together with Violeta Ilić, a technician for water analysis, and at whose apartment they arrested me, I was surely preparing to poison water in order to poison the VII Muslim on Bilmište.

When I denied it, I was beaten again and I was not questioned any more. Questioning and beating lasted usually for 30 minutes. Afterwards they took me to the basement beating me on the way with a shovel handle. I was beaten all over the body, because I was trying to protect my head, and the blows threw me down on the staircase, every time, where I was further bruised. In the basement were already:

1. Franjo Štrbac
2. Anto Štrbac, HVO member and 5 HVO police officers:
 1. Dragan Jerković
 2. Damir Gelić
 3. Dragan Gelić
 4. Mario Štrbić
 5. Zoran Totić

With their arrival the usual beating portions were increased. After a while, during the same night, I was brought out again, with beatings, to a third floor. Jasmin Isić was in the room, accusing me again of water poisoning, for my alleged training in Croatia, all of which I denied because it wasn't true. He also asked me who my associates were. After I said I had no associates, he threatened that he will give me away to Mujahedeens, and that he cannot listen to my lies and I was returned to the basement without beatings.

We were scarcely given any food – some days we would receive some, and on other days we would not. However, due to all that beating we couldn't eat that little food that we did receive, so we would put the bread in a sack. Later, when the beatings were somewhat less, we would eat that stale bread, because we didn't have anything else. One of the biggest problems for everyone was defecation and urinating.

There was only one honey bucket of 3 – 5 liters in the basement, in which we all urinated and defecated. As there were up to 20 people in the basement at one time, urine and the faeces were spilling over the edge of the bucket spreading the unbearable stench throughout the room, which had no fresh air anyway.

Basement was so damp that even the walls were wet. We had to keep the windows closed, because Muslim soldiers on the return from the front used to fire through that window.

After one of the inmates Anto Vrvilo tried to draw attention of one of the guards about the window, guard Vahid Disdarević from Vrselje near Polsko promised that he will take care of it. However, in about ten minutes they came for Ante Vrvilo and handed him over to Muslims imprisoned in the next room for refusing to go on the front, so they would beat him, which duty they have performed "diligently".

When Vrvilo was dragged back to our room, they gave him 100 strikes with a wooden stick in front of our eyes, while Vrvilo was lying helplessly on the ground. One of those who were beating him took a photo of him.

Urinating was especially difficult for me considering that I have chronic urethra infection, which consists of frequent and painful urination. Due to the beating for 5 days in a row I was urinating blood. I tried to avoid

as much as I could to drink water and eat food in order to urinate as little as possible. Another problem was that we had to contact guards for food, water and defecation, which gave them additional reasons to beat us.

Because of the nature of my illness, physical hygiene is something that makes it bearable, but for 75 days I have not changed my clothes or bathed. My interrogators were aware of this because they had insight to my medical documentation. I have asked for medical checkup, but my request was never fulfilled.

We slept on wooden pallets. Due to the large influx of Croat prisoners through this room, often there wasn't enough room on these pallets, and people slept on pallets in shifts, because the floor was made of concrete and was very damp.

Interrogation was carried out exclusively at night, which completely shattered our biorhythm, and life in the basement became mentally unbearable. To suppress cries of people who were tortured, they played unbearably loud "Arab music" from the loudspeakers. A special method of torture was teaching us Arabic songs and prayers.

My interrogators were especially bothered by the fact that I didn't know many people, nor other people knew me, since I came to Zenica because of work in July of 1991, so that led them to conclusion that I was some kind of mysterious person on a mysterious mission, or this kind of fiction gave them good excuse for all the tortures.

At one moment Jasmin Isić, after he threw me on the floor and jumped with his feet on my chest, said that he was tired of my lies and that he has "an assignment" for me, result of which my life will depend on. He gave me a piece of paper that had 10 questions requiring answers which they have been asking before. I.e. Who are my first associates among Croats, which Muslims, from military and police structures, have I recruited as my allies, do I know this or that people, whether I went to training in Croatia and where my brother was.

Their questions raised numerous dilemmas for me, because I knew that my fabricated or truthful answers will cause certain consequences for me and other Croats. As I didn't know the answers to most of the questions, and I knew from previous interrogations that I will not be able to persuade my interrogators.

I had to consult with other imprisoned Croats. With their help I have answered the questions mentioning certain names, but mostly about people who were killed or were already on territory controlled by HVO. I also answered that my brother was either in Vitez or Busovača.

After I gave them this paper with answers, they didn't interrogate me anymore. This is how my first ten days went by. In the next two days I wasn't interrogated, but one day they have taken all of the Croatian prisoners to an unknown direction. There was just me and Nedeljko Šestić, who was Serbian by nationality and Zlatko Aleksovski's father in law, prison warden in Busovača.

During my imprisonment in the Musical school in the room in which I was staying (there were three other rooms in the Music school where our people were detained) was preferred that I knew about 47 Croats, staying for different length of time and who had different treatment – it was not easy for anybody, but some had it horribly difficult.

I remember one fragile young man whose name I don't know, they dragged him crushed into the room and continued to beat him in front of us in such extent that the automatic rifle with which they were beating him fell apart from the force of the blows. Especially cruel was one guard who wore glasses and had a flawed eye (he was probably injured or something like that). After they concluded that this young man was from the Croatian village Brist.

They were in particularly beating Anto Vrvilo, a distinguished civilian from Vjetrenica, Slavko Mandić, member of HVO, Ivica Badrov and his son. When people were beaten in front of us, we tried not to do anything to provoke our tormentors.

At one occasion they took me in front of the building where there was a grave hole, which was dug out by Vlatko Ivanković, and they told me this was going to be my grave if my cooperation was not to their satisfaction.

On one occasion, one of the guards asked Slavko Mandić, who was beaten frequently, whether he would be sorry if he was to cut his throat, to which Mandić, already lost from all the beating answered that he would

not. With a large military knife “Bowie”, the guard cut off his shirt collar, which was all torn apart and bloody, and then he slashed his neck with that knife.

On June 5th, 1993 all the prisoners were taken to a direction which was unknown to me, except me and Nedeljko Šestić. That same day, Šestić and I were taken to the attic of the Music school to a room approximately 2 by 2 meters in size, and there was a very dirty sponge and one blanket for the two of us, we had no bucket in which to urinate or defecate and there was no light. Sometimes they would bring us food. In the next room they have performed Muslim religious ceremonies.

In that week that we were detained in the attic, I had to clean their toilets on several occasions and this is when I met several “Arab citizens” dressed in civilian clothing. They all had beards and communicated in Arabic, and all work and the entire daily rhythm was Arabic. Room door in which religious rituals were performed had a sign written in Latin alphabet “HEZBOLLAH”. On the same paper hang on the door something in Arabic alphabet was also written. In the praying room, walls were covered with pictures of Arabic prayers. I have to mention, that at the arrival to the Music school all the prisoners were robbed, and they even took our shoes and underwear, so most of the prisoners were barefoot.

I definitely want to mention some of the moments regarding the work of International humanitarian organizations.

Around the 20th day from my arrival to Music school, guards have emptied our rooms, this was a common practice, but the reason of which I was not aware. And the reason was that European TIBO (Thibeau) observers were announced, who was French and had a translator with him who introduced herself to me as Slavica, which led me to conclusion that she was Croatian, which gave me courage to speak about the horrific school.

Later I concluded that my judgment was wrong, because I found out that the translator was Muslim by the name of Senada and brought the news about the place in which I was detained. My statement about the imposture of the Muslim translator can be verified at the European observation mission, since it happened exactly on the 20th day from my arrest.

I was arrested on April 19th, 1993. After I presented all the miseries of Croatian detainees to Mr. Tibo, he replied: “It’s nothing that your people are not doing to Muslims.” His reaction made me realize that he was not here to help me. When I came back to our room, the rest of the detainees were already there, hidden from European observers until their departure.

When they found out that I spoke to Mr. Tibo, they were visibly depressed because they were hidden and didn’t have a chance to speak, and were therefore sure that they were not registered as prisoners with any of international organizations, making their chances to survive even worse. On that same day I received the hardest beating since my arrival to the school.

I would like to note that this was the first beating in maybe ten days, unprovoked and without any interrogation which usually preceded the beating. I would also like to note that no other prisoners were beaten, and immediately prior to conversation with Mr. Tibo, guards warned me that they will kill me if I said anything about the real situation in the school. All this points that the Muslim translator Senada, has conveyed everything that we talked about to my Muslim tormentors, contrary to International Humanitarian law. Sadly, other Croatian detainees had the same experience with Muslim translators.

Now I’m returning back to the chronology of imprisonment. On June 13th, 1993, we were freed from the attic and transferred to a garage /illegible/. This garage was filled with garbage and I assumed that we were to be killed. I cannot understand the amount of hatred which they have expressed. That evening we were told that we are to be taken to criminal correctional facility. When we arrived to CC facility I was taken to a solitary confinement. Bed was on the wall, and I was able to cover myself with one blanket, during the day I was thinking of sitting and walking, and I could lie on the bed only during the night because of the terrible pain caused by the bladder infection.

At night, I would sleep if the pain would allow me. During the first 8 days I didn’t receive any bread. Twice a day they brought me porridge with few grains of rice or beans. They all behaved as though I did not exist.

Since my brother Jakob Janjić worked at the same CC facility as a guard for 15 years and with people who

have inter alia interrogated him in front of my cell, and some of them I knew, I tried to somehow get in contact with him in order to ask him for a bath, shaving or to pass information to my mother about my whereabouts. He told me that he cannot and could not do anything for me, because no one can even know about me. I asked Siradž Ahmić, an acquaintance of mine, to help me to at last wash myself in some cold water.

He took me to a trough and gave me soap and some cold water. I had half a centimeter cradle cap on top of my head, and I couldn't wash it off with cold water, and it was no different with the rest of my body. A lot of hair fell off my head at that time, which made me more miserable and depressed. Afterwards I never saw Siradž Ahmić in my vicinity, and so was with anybody else who did even a smallest favor for me, they were transferred away from me. That bathe was the first one in 75 days. Terrible depression made me sharpen the lid of a can on the bed, and I started to prepare for a suicide by cutting my wrists.

At my arrival to CC facility in Zenica and at the entrance to my solitary confinement I was warned not to use the window, otherwise I will be punished by beating. As I heard voices during my whole stay through the window and as I realized that I will not be able to withstand this situation much longer, I found a last straw of hope in that window. During the prisoners walk in a circle, I recognized Mladen Holman through that window, one of the HVO commanders, so I tried to get in contact with him.

This was very difficult, because I had a long beard and hair, except on places where it has fallen off. Also, I could only see him in a short part of prisoners circle. Our communication despite the guards' threats, about which I didn't care anymore, lasted for several days until I explained who I was and in what kind of situation I was in. It is important to mention that as a member of HVO I was placed in civilian part of the prison and only as a number, so in case international organization would visit the military part of the prison, they could not register me.

Previously mentioned neighbor Muslim Edin Bilić did visit my mother after all, and he had informed her of my condition and had acquired necessary medications and sedatives and a visit from my mother. When my mother came for a visit, due to my mental and physical condition and my decayed appearance, she didn't recognize me. As much as I was happy to see her, I was also sad, because I saw how much she had suffered because of this, and also hope was awakened within me that made me more impatient and my stay in the solitary confinement was getting harder every day.

My muscles were already atrophying, and during one attempt to let Mladen Holman know that I was alive, a guard Vehid Karamija from Kakanj dropped to my cell, pressed my against the wall and inflicted serious injuries to my head.

At the same time, due to my problems with bladder, my entire health had deteriorated, I started to feel excruciating pain in my legs, back and it reflected on my heart. My agony stopped on September 5th, 1993, when I was exchanged. Since I could not walk, my brother with the help of my fellow villagers carried me to Busovača on hands.

At the end of this statement I will list, by memory, names of Croats who underwent similar torment as I, but also names of Muslim tormentors that I recognized and remember.

List of Croats whom I met in captivity:

- | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. prof. Ivan Bošnjak | 10. two Rajić's cousins |
| 2. Vlatko Ivanković | 11. Zvonko Rajić's father Marko |
| 3. Franjo Štrbac | 12. Mario Štrbac |
| 4. Anto Štrbac | 13. Dragan Gelić |
| 5. Anto Vrvilo | 14. Damir Gelić |
| 6. Kruno Rajić | 15. Zoran Totić |
| 7. Milenko Rajić | 16. Dragan Jerković |
| 8. Milenko Rajić's father | 17. Nedeljko Šestić (Serbian) |
| 9. Milenko Rajić's brother | 18. Ivica Bradov |

19. Jasenko (Ivica) Bradov
20. Ivan Buhutinski
21. Jasenko Petrović
22. Sandro Hamer
23. Krešimir Ćosić
24. Anto Visković

25. Anto Marković
26. Pero Letić
27. Pero Letić's father
28. Jozo Juretić (junior)
29. Franjo Jandrić
30. Boško Gutić (Serbian)

Muslims responsible for deaths of many Croats in Zenica region:

1. Jasmin Isić
2. Mensur Pijanić
3. Besim Perenda (Šukrija)
4. Nesib Talić
5. Vehid Dizdarević
6. Faruk Avdić
7. Hajdar Pašanović
8. Jusuf Karalić
9. Našid Delabić
10. Smajo Osmanović
11. Sahudin Sarajlić
12. Fuad Karalić
13. Nesib Dragilović
14. Hajrudin Dulan
15. Sejo Osmanović
16. Emir Efendija Mahmutefendija Karalić in charge for these extremes.
17. Jusuf Šeta (warden of the facility in front of 7 muslims)
18. Šerif Patković

I give this testimony voluntarily and by signing its every page I testify its authenticity and verifiability.

In Busovača, October 1993

Testimony given by:
Dragan Janjić

Testimony taken by:
S. Slišković

CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS
POLICE PRECINCT TRAVNIK
POLICE STATION KISELJAK

Number: 03-9/9-4-220/handwritten:21/94
Kiseljak, February 2nd, 1994

OFFICIAL NOTE

Made at the Police station Kiseljak on February 2nd, 1994 after questioning Komšo Šimo, son of Ivo and Milica, born on December 20th, 1947 in Kakanj, living in village Čatići near Kakanj, traffic technician by occupation, Croat, married, in Kakanj performed a line of significant functions within HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/ party and Kakanj Municipal Assembly. In HVO /Croatian Defense Council/ Kakanj he performed a duty of Head of information department, after the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ arrest, he was detained for 7 months in concentration camp in Zenica.

In the interview Šimo states that on June 14th, 1993, he was arrested at a street in Čatići by three policemen of civil police Kakanj, family name of one of them was Kukić, and on the same day he was brought to Police station facilities in Kakanj, where his personal pistol was taken with a receipt, and then he was questioned by abovementioned Kukić. After questioning, he was taken that same day to Military prison located in the building of former direction of RMU Kakanj, where he found approximately 60 detained Croats. At military prison he was questioned by prison warden ŠEHAGIĆ JASMINKO, a pre-war criminal and person of problematic behavior. He was detained in the Military prison for two days, and during that time no repressive measure were taken against Šimo or other prisoners.

On June 10th, 1993 members of MOS from Zenica took Šimo and eng. Ivica Tvrtković, eng. Stjepan Mijač, eng. Pavo Pavlović and drove them in a van in direction of Zenica. In motel "Sretno" in Kakanj they took eng. Ilija Bradarić, professor Ivo Sunjić, Ivica Andrijević, Ilija Hrgota, Fabijan Pavlović, Andrija Markić and on the same day with verbal harassment during the transportation, they brought them to the Music school in Zenica.

While entering the music school they had to pass by a line of MOS members who were beating them on heads and other parts of body with sticks, and cursing their "Ustasha mothers" as they walked by.

They were placed in one large room in the basement of the school where they found Franci Župančić, reporter from Kakanj, Marijan Lučić, Serbs Novica Cvijanović, Duško Marković, Predrag Ćosić and Croat Ilija Marjanović, reporter from Kakanj. During the evening, MOS members or guards of this concentration camp made them beat their heads against the wall, this "séance" was repeated during the 7 months that he stayed in the prison.

On June 18th, 1993 members of MOS kidnapped a wounded soldier from the war hospital in Zenica. His name was Maračić Jozo from Kakanj, born in /illegible/ in village Podbjelavići in Kakanj municipality and he was heavily beaten on two occasions by members of MOS, he succumbed to these injuries on August 19th, 1993 around 9,00 a.m. in their room. They couldn't report the death of this soldier right away so they kept the body for over 12 hours, at which time prison guards put the body in a plastic bag and took it away. Consequently Šimo found out that the body was not delivered to his family, and was probably berried in same unknown location.

From their arrival to the Music school, they were beaten to unconsciousness on daily basis, and one of the inmates tried to commit a murder, as in the case of Mijač Stjepan who was beaten to unconsciousness, so on June 23rd, 1993 he tried to commit suicide by cutting his wrists. Šimo and other Croats and Serbs were beaten with fists, legs, gunstocks, shovel handles, bags field with sand, and injuries were mostly inflicted around the chest.

As far as Šimo could conclude, death of Maračić Jozo occurred due to the internal organ injuries and hemorrhage in the abdominal cavity.

During his captivity in the Music school, he was interrogated by a certain Hadžić, born in village Slapnica in Kakanj municipality – performing a duty of some kind of commander in the Prison, and during the interrogation they were especially interested in contacts Šimo had with Boban, Kordić, Blaškić, and when was the last time he contacted with the abovementioned leaders from HZ-HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/, what kind of relationship they had, then they wanted to know what kind of relationship Šimo had with the local priest Jukić Pero, and what was the nature of their relationship, if they cooperated on ideological/political level and similar questions.

On 18 August 1993 Šimo and 11 other imprisoned Croats and Serbs were taken blindfolded to the location called Bilinište into the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ headquarters where they were beaten unconscious with a bag of sand on the back of the head. On the same evening when they regained consciousness around 21.00 hours they were taken in a van into the same school where they were beaten again.

On August 26th, 1993, they were transferred from the Music school to so called assembly center within the former CC facility Zenica, where they were registered by the International Red Cross as war prisoners. During their captivity in the Music school Šimo found out that members of the Red Cross were interested in the arrested people in the school, but MOS didn't allow them access to the school.

As a representative of Red Cross, Miss Beatris had conducted interviews with them, asking them among other things whether they were physically or in other ways tortured, to which questions they couldn't give direct answers, so their situation would not be aggravated, they answered that they do not want to comment on this, but during the conversation Šimo admitted to Miss Beatris in French language that they were physically tortured, and that they endured unseen tortures carried out by the MOS.

During their imprisonment at the assembly center, their situation has improved in a sense that they were not collectively beaten and tortured, and they could receive food from their families which was often robbed, but beating of prisoners was on individual basis.

Prison food was so bad that they would have starved to death if it wasn't for the food received from their family members.

At that time, members of MOS arrested Šimo's son Goran, and sentenced him to two years in prison for joining "enemy army".

Since Šimo suffered from diabetes and need insulin for treatment of his illness, he asked the warden to allow him medical examination and during the inspection in a civilian hospital, due to his poor health condition doctor demanded that Šimo stays in the hospital, and he also noted the evidence of torture on his back and other parts of the body, but MOS members did not allow this so they transferred him back to the Music school.

At the Music school, following persons were particularly diligent in beating Croats:

- DRAGINOVIĆ NESIB, from Bugojno, member of MOS, 180 cm high, about 30 years old, brown hair, with a pronounced chin, and with no other distinguishing features.
- DRAGINOVIĆ RASIM, about 23 years old, member of MOS, 175 -180 cm high, certain..
- HAJRO born in village Šerići near Nomilo – Zenica, approximately 185 cm high, about 35 years old, MOS policeman, dark complexion;
- certain MUŠIJA from Veliki Trnovci – Kakanj municipality, worked at the mine RMU Kakanj, Halimići plant, about 30 years old, 175 – 180 cm high, wide shoulders, corpulent "expert in kicking with rifle butts";
- DŽERASOVIĆ KEMAL from Zenica, employed at RMU Zenica, plant Stara jama, qualified locksmith, 175 cm high, blond hair, about 38 years old, as human being he was insidious and hypocritical, performing a duty of prison warden;
- ISAKOVIĆ AHMED from Zenica, previously worked at the iron-plant Zenica – locksmith, 173 cm high, about 35 years old. While Šimo was detained in the prison, Isaković was appointed to duty of personal bodyguard of Prime Minister of /illegible/ Zenica, DŽAFEROVIĆ;

- JAHIĆ HUSEIN, about 36 years old, religious representative, performed a duty of Officer for religious issues at VII Muslim brigade. According to Šimo's testimony this member of MOS was fair and liberal towards arrested Croats, so within his possibilities he protect them, he was not beating them and he secretly gave them food and cigarettes.

At the assembly center within the CC facility Zenica, following persons were particularly diligent in physical harassment:

- ALIĆ HASAN from Zenica, with associate's degree in administration, before the war he was Head of Court registry office in Zenica, born in 1943, /illegible/, 190 cm high, balding, elegantly dressed, shaved, in contact with prisoners he tried to present himself as realist, but essentially he was hypocritical and with deep hatred towards Croats, as prison warden he knew about all the beatings and physical tortures of prisoners, but essentially did nothing to prevent them, although he declaratively claimed to be opposed of torture.

- ŠKOPLJAK FIKRET, born in 1957 in village Topčić Polje near Nemila, performed a duty of guard commander, 175 cm high, bolding, with mustaches. He particularly enjoyed beating Croats, and was especially sadistic during tortures.

- SMAJIĆ TAIB from Zenica, born in 1969, member of MOS, 185 cm high, beard and mustache shaved, has characteristic "gorillas" attitude, except the physical torture of prisoners he was prone to robbing them of cigarettes, food and everything else that the families would bring to prisoners.

- KADRIĆ MURIS, born in 1967 in village Lukovo Polje near Zenica, before the war worked as a driver, 180 cm high, blond, beard and mustache shaved, showed deep hatred against Croats, prone to verbal tortures;

- BEGANOVIĆ FIKRET – guard, about 35 years old, previously worked at the iron plant, according to Šimo's testimony he avoided torturing and truly condemned the actions of his colleagues and to his ability helped prisoners even after he himself was harassed.

In January of this year, members of the military police in Zenica had often performed raids in order to arrest deserters and persons avoiding conscription, so on these grounds they have performed on daily basis picked up to 70 individuals, in one day there were 190. Mostly younger individuals from 17 to 40 years old increasingly deserting the battlefields of Busovača and Vitez.

As much as the possibilities allowed in the prison and in contact with members of MOS, Šimo estimates that there are still some Muslim population and military conscripts who were condemning the policy of Alija Izetbegović, by saying that this war was senseless, and praising Fikret Abdić and his politics. If given the opportunity they would put themselves under his command.

Besides the fact that individual members of MOS were unhappy with the political options of the political leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they were increasingly showing open discontent due to the extremely poor material conditions, more widespread hunger, because of long distance walks to defense lines remote, due the fuel shortage. All these above conditions had influenced of the morale of soldiers, causing more deserting, self-injuring and in other ways avoiding to go on defense lines.

Komšo Šimo was exchanged on January 26th, 1994 through the Exchange Commission composed of Avčagić Rogib, Kitić Srećko, so that he stayed for three days in monastery in Visoko at Franciscans and with help and advice of Kitić Srećko, he managed to exchange his wife and father although this was not planned.

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Ivo Andrić

Bosnia and Herzegovina
/national crest/ **CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA**
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
MILITARY POLICE ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL MP

Class: 730-01/95-01/02
Ref. no: 02—11-05-05/95
Ljubuški, November 10th, 1994

MILITARY PROSECUTOR
VITEZ

Pursuant to Article 151 para. 6 of retained Law on Criminal Procedure is raised:

CRIMINAL CHARGES

AGAINST:

1. NUSRET DŽELILOVIĆ, from Kruščica
2. MINET AKELJIĆ
3. NESO HUREM
4. EMSUD KADIRIĆ, born on May 2nd, 1974 in village Vrpolje, m. Sanski Most, son of ŠEPIK and mother PAŠA born BEHAR, ceramist by occupation, single, member of Unit “El mudžahedum” (mujahedeens)
5. ABU HARIŠ, “El-mudžahedum” Unit commander
6. ABU MALI, “El-mudžahedum” Unit deputy commander
7. MESUD BEGOVIĆ, from Komare
8. MUHAMED BEŠIĆ, from D. Vakuf
9. BEKIR HRNJIĆ, from Karaula
10. RAMO DURMIŠ
11. MUHAMED BEŠIĆ
12. MESUD BEGOVIĆ, from D. Vakuf
13. HADŽIJA, from Kljak
14. ALIHODŽA NURUDIN, member of “El-mudžahedum”
15. ELVIR PLANIČIĆ, from Mehurići, member of “El-mudžahedum”
16. ELVEDIN BILIĆ, from Zenica, member of “El-mudžahedum”
17. ŠEMSO BALTIC, from Rudnik, member of “El-mudžahedum”
18. MIRALEM BRKIĆ, from Mehurići, member of “El-mudžahedum”
19. VARIS ABDUL, from village Kljaci, member of “El-mudžahedum”
20. ALMIR ALIĆ, from Mehurići, member of “El-mudžahedum”
21. HAFIZ, from Mehurići, member of “El-mudžahedum”

22. VEHBİJA, from Pod
23. HUSEM, from Egypt
24. EJMEN, from Syria
25. ABDU RAHMAN, from Yemen
26. ABU HASAN, from Saudi Arabia
27. ABDEL, from Egypt
28. ABU KIŠAN, from Algeria
29. ABU EJUB
30. ABU OSMAN
31. ABDUL MELIK
32. ŠAHRAZ, from Algeria
33. IBRAHIM, from Algeria
34. Other unidentified members of "El-mudžahedum", and unidentified members of 325th Mountain brigade and 327th Mountain brigade of BH Army.

FOR REASONS OF:

Reasonable suspicion of having committed a criminal offense of "War crimes against the civilian population", described and punishable under Article 142 of the Criminal Law retained former SFRY and criminal offence of "War crimes against prisoners of war", described and punishable under Article 144 of the Criminal Law retained from former SFRY.

DESCRIPTION OF THE OFFENCE:

On September 18th, 1993 around 08:00 hours started the armed-sabotage attack of the BH Army Forces, together with the unit "El-mudžahedum" whose members are charged, on village Bobaši, Kruščica m. Vitez, at which time they fired at houses of civilian population, and in a cruel way killed civilian Ljuban Bobaš, and large part of the population were detained in "Crne kuće" /Black houses/ Kruščica, where the same were tortured, intimidated, took to forced labor, beaten and in other ways physically and mentally abused.

We propose to initiate criminal prosecutions.

/handwritten: PRISON/

Appendix:

1. Testimony of Finka (Jako) Bobaš of November 9th, 1993
2. Testimony of Miroslav Miroslav (Pero) Bobaš of December 2nd, 1993
3. Statement of Emsud (Šefik) Kadirić no. 03-9/4-235-238/93 of October 20th, 1993
4. Record of identification no. Kri. 72/94 of March 9th, 1994
5. Official record of 4th bVP /Military Police Battalion/ Vitez of March 10th, 1994 with photo-documentation no. 21/94

CHIEF OF
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL MP
Krešimir Tolj

**CROATIAN ASSOCIATION OF CONCENTRATION CAMP PRISONERS DURING THE HOMELAND
WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,
SUBSIDIARY HERCEGOVAČKO NERETVANSKA – Konjic
(County)**

(Concentration camps on territory of present RS, Serbia and Monte Negro should also be provided on the form)

QUESTIONNAIRE

For gathering data on concentration camps and other detention places and forms of torture that took place there during the war in BiH 1991 – 1996

1. CONCENTRATION CAMP –PLACE OF DETENTION (location, town, municipality) Sports hall on Musala, Konjic municipality
2. CONCENTRATION CAMP IS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF (former JNA, SRY Army, RS Army, R BiH Army, police) R BiH Army
3. Who formed the concentration camp, and under whose orders? Local Muslim government in agreement with and at suggestions of military political structures from Sarajevo.
4. Was the concentration camp equipped with sanitary facilities, water, lighting, heating? NO
5. Concentration camp was established on May 10th, 1992, and closed on October 6th, 1994, and Croats were detained from April 15th, 1993 until October 19th, 1993
6. Who secured the camp (military, police, paramilitary forces)? R BiH Army
7. Number of detainees without detained Serbs, 422
8. Who performed the arrests and transportation to camps: First name, family name and nickname
 1. Hamza Ajanović, Podorašac
 2. Ismet Novalić, Teški, Podorašac
 3. Midhat Sultanović, Hamidov, b. February 21th, 1955 Podorašac
 4. Adil Sultanović, Selimov, b. January 26th, 1964, Podorašac
 5. Amir Masleša, Podorašac
 6. Midhad Pirkić, Konjic
 7. Hamdija Omerović, Konjic
 8. Mustafa Gagula, Konjic
 9. Kasim Šakinović, Orahovica
 10. Ibro Bubalo, Orahovica
 11. Vahid Mašić, Čelebići
 12. Đonko Habibija, Konjic
 13. Mehmed Cero, Konjic
 14. Alija Marić, Kralupi
 15. Mustafa Đelilović, Mujin, b. May 3rd, 1949, Kralupi
 16. Haris Đelilović, Kralupi
 17. Fadil Sivrija, Grabovci
 18. Zajko Ćibo, Fazlin, Spiljani
 19. Senad Fišić, Ahmetov, b. February 14th, 1964, Spiljani
 20. Ahmet Tucaković, Glavatičevo
 21. Salko Ćibo, Avdin, Spiljani
 22. Omer Lavić, Polje Bijela
 23. Muharem Mravović, Dervišov, b. February 2nd, 1971, Parsovići
 24. Mustafa Cero, Gornji Nevizdraci
 25. Seid Padalović, Beganov, b. September 24th, 1964, Gostovići
 26. Hamza Ćosić, Sulejmanov, b. March 6th, 1962, Jasenik

27. Nijaz Hondo, Bazov, b. May 7th, 1963, Oteležani
28. Mehmed Barjaktarević, Mustafin, b. May 15th, 1971, Lokve
29. Asim Grlica, Tahirov, b. January 3rd, 1973, Jasenik
30. Šerif Kozić, Osmanov, b. January 3rd, 1964, Jasenik
31. Vejsil Hondo, Bajrin, b. January 1st, 1966, Oteležani
32. Senad Arnaut, Hamidov, b. January 25th, 1960, Gorani
33. Asim Alibegović, Avdin, b. January 19th, 1968, Lokve
34. Adis Macanović, Čazimov, Seonica
35. Miralem Vrtić, Dervin, b. May 2nd 1965, Grabovci
36. Mirsad Memić, Šerifov, b. August 16th, 1965, Grapovci
37. Zijad Lepara, Sabitov, b. November 18th, 1963, Lisičići
38. Ramiz Borić, Mehin, b. December 26th, 1967, Lisičići
39. Zijo Mehić, Salkin, b. November 29th, 1962, Lisičići
40. Mustafa Cero, Ramin, b. February 11th, 1961, Lisičići
41. Muhamed Veljković, Jusin, b. June 26th, 1957, Treboje
42. Asim Miljević, Salkin, b. April 8th, 1959, Gornji Nevizdraci
43. Alija Bakalović, Gornji Nevizdraci
44. Salko Boloban, Jusin, b. April 8th, 1957, Treboje

9. Warden – camp commander Ismet Hebibović-Broceta and Edhem Žilić

10. Deputy cam warden _____

11. Provide as much information about wardens, guards and other staff members:

Edhem Žilić, b. August 5th, 1962, Tušila, Trnovo municipality. Married to Šaha b. Kurtović. _____

Guards beating the detainees: Ibrahim Macić Macan, Miralem Macić, Salko Kurtović, Osman Kurtović, Mustafa Bukvić, Nermin Mantić, Salkin, Halil Gakić, Hamidov, Nurko Duranović, Duranov, Sabit Čibo, Fazlin, Safet Čibo, Sejo Čibo, Ramo Žilić, Ekrem Alić, Senad Balić, Amir Mešuković, Vejsil Mešuković, Hamdija Alić, Edin Hadrović

12. Was there a special room (solitary confinement) at the location of detention in which inmates were isolated and tortured? _____ YES

13. Provide names and nicknames of interrogators and whether they applied force? YES Hasan Kašić, Ismet Mehić (now lawyer in Sarajevo)

14. Were detainees tortured in front of others, enter data about the torturers YES, They were tortured by abovementioned guards and Mithad Pirkić, Habibija called Đonko, Hamza Nuhanović, Emir Kovačić called Škembo, Osman Kurtović, Salko Kurtović,

15. Provide information on dead, wounded and missing detainees of the concentration camp: There were no killed Croatian detainees, wounded were Branislav Šimunović, Dražen Gašić, Jozo Krtić, Miroslav Bebek, severe injuries due to beating were obtained by: Dario Ljoljo, Miroslav Blažević who as a consequence urinated blood, Danko Sušac-Andrijin (due to beating has permanent mental disorder).

16. Were there any cases when detainees were forced to give blood? YES – under threat

17. Were detainees taken to force labor? YES – when taken to force labor detainees were beaten by guards and by passers, psychologically abused and called bad names.

18. Were locations of detention visited by political, military and other officials from the side which was in charge of camps? _____ YES, dr. Haris Silajdžić

19. Were locations of detention visited by representatives of ICRC and other international institutions? _____ YES

20. Were detainees hidden from the ICRC representatives? _____ YES

21. Of what were the detainees deprived off? (hygiene maintenance, use of toilets, health care, visits by relatives, food) All of the above

22. For each camp a drawing-photo should be provided.

23. Make a maximum effort to make a list of detainees in each camp.

24. Attach and register all materials provided by detainees (sketches, drawings, records, diaries etc.)

25. Mention everything of importance for the said camp The sports hall at Musala in Konjic was one of the notorious camps by the methods of abuse, the number of inmates and the duration it was operating. It received the concentration camp status on May 10th, 1992 when troops of TO /Territorial Defense/ under the command of Mithad Pirkić imprisoned eight Serbian civilians from Idbra captured the day before. It is considered as one of the few camps where Croats and Serbs were detained together.

The first group of captured Croatian soldiers and civilians were taken to the concentration camp on April 15th, 1993. Part of the detainees were first imprisoned in the primary school "March 3rd" and then at PS Konjic where they were interrogated and physically and psychologically abused. Dragan Šimunović Vejo and Željko Šimunović from Turija were exchanged on April 18th, 1993 for ten captured member of Muslim BH Army from Prevlje, although it was negotiated one for one.

Concentration camp was established by highest Muslim political and military officials led by president of Muslim party SDA and illegal president of presidency of BH Republic, Mr. Alija Izetbegović, Minister of foreign affairs dr. Haris Silajdžić, Chief of general staff of BH Army general Safer Halilović and general Rasim Delić.

Person in charge was illegal president of War presidency of Konjic, Jablanica and Prozor municipalities, dr. Safet Ćibo, who was making decisions regarding detention and release of concentration camp detainees.

Part of the detainees were locked in the market Borac next to the Supermarket, while the most distinguished members of OO HDZ Konjic were transferred to attic of SDK building: Dragutin Perić, Stjepan Rozić, Pero Barunčić, Ljubo Šimunović, Ilija Šagolj and Srećko Rebenstein and Boro Blažević.

**CROATIAN ASSOCIATION OF CONCENTRATION CAMP PRISONERS DURING THE
HOMELANDWAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,
SUBSIDIARY HERCEGOVAČKO NERETVANSKA – Jablanica
(County)**

(Concentration camps on territory of present RS, Serbia and Monte Negro should also be provided on the form)

QUESTIONNAIRE

For gathering data on concentration camps and other detention places and forms of torture that took place there during the war in BiH 1991 – 1996

Pursuant to the Ordinance on determining the status of concentration camps' prisoners adopted at the General assembly of the Association on December 10th, 2003, the CONCENTRATION CAMPS' PRISONERS are those persons who were confined to concentration camps by police, military or paramilitary forces for reasons of ethnic cleansing and genocide for at least three days (72 hours) during the period from 1991 onwards. CONCENTRATION CAMP is every closed or enclosed space in which people were confined en masse or individually for indefinite period of time for reasons of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

1. CONCENTRATION CAMP –PLACE OF DETENTION (location, town, municipality) /handwritten: Museum "Bitka za ranjenika" /"Battle for the founded"/ Jablanica
2. CONCENTRATION CAMP IS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF (former JNA, SRY Army, RS Army, R BiH Army, police)? R BiH Army and
3. Who formed the concentration camp, and under whose orders? War command of Jablanica municipality in coordination with BH Republic Presidency
4. Was the concentration camp equipped with sanitary facilities, water, lighting, heating? Sanitary facilities were inadequate in relation to the large number of detainees. One or two sinks on hundreds of detainees, no one bathed as for as long as the camp was operating
5. Concentration camp was opened on April 15th, 1993, and closed on March 22nd, 1994
6. Who secured the camp (military, police, paramilitary forces)? BH Army military police JABLANICA (commanders Dlakić nickname "Kulje", Sead Kurt and Džino Senad)
7. Number of detainees 348 in total; of which male 176, female 172, children 96, elderly: 94
Number of detainees passed through the camp who are not registered anywhere, Croats from Konjic, Croats from the suburbs and the city who were forced out of their homes.
8. Who performed the arrests and transportation to camps: First name, family name and nickname: Hasan Hindić, before the Jablanica BH Army command.
Salem Dlakić - "Kulje", Sead Kurt, and Senad Đino, MP commanders
Jasmin Džeko, Enis Popara and Nedžad Hodžić-Nečko, Rusmir Trako-Žuti special unit commanders at BH Army ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ (Unit: "Zulfikar Ališpago-Zuka") and numerous other BH Army commanders.
9. Camp warden commander Ismet Dedajić Dedo and Šaćir Mehić
10. Deputy Camp warden Šaćir Mehić -- Ismet Dedajić from the establishment of the camp until November 1993, after that Šaćir Mehić
11. Provide as much information about wardens, guards and other staff members:
Ismet Dedajić Dedo pre-war policeman in Mostar, and Šaćir Mehić teacher from Gacka. Guards were: Nail Kevrić, Ramin b. in 1947 in Dragan Selo, Jablanica municipality; Adem Halebić, Ademov, born in 1947 in

Lug, Jablanica municipality, Almir Krečinović, Omerov, b. in 1973 in Jablanica, Omer Zebić, Fadilov, b. in 1975 in Jablanica, Amil Babić, Ethemov, born in 1973 in Jablanica, certain "Arka", Đelmo, Zahirov, about 25 years old, certain "Leptir" born in Foča, about 30 years old, Fuad Begović Fuko, about 40 years old from Jablanica, Ahmet Jež from Hrasnica, about 32 years old, certain Bečir nickname "Aga" from Podbrežje, Jablanica municipality, Esad Dlakić Lačko, Ahmetov from Lug, Jablanica municipality, Džemal Nezirić form Krstaci, Jablanica municipality, certain Šubara, Ahmetov, about 30 years old, from Gornji Paprasak, Jablanica municipality, Zijo Zebić from Lug, Jablanica municipality, Omer Zebić form Lug, Jablanica municipality, Kurić from Slatina, Edo Balavac, Hajdarov, from Jablanica, Muharem Krečinić Futa, Lug, Jablanica, mechanical technician, Edin Halilhodžić, Hasanov, Jelačići Jablanica and others.

12. Was there a special room (solitary confinement) at the location of detention in which inmates were isolated and tortured? At the Museum basement there were 7 separate rooms-cells in which 88 Croatian soldiers-detainees were kept. As a special measure some were put in the solitary confinement for as long as two months. Torture rooms were hallways and rooms towards toilets.

13. Provide names and nicknames of interrogators and whether they applied force? Zenaid Đelmo, Senad Gusić, Sead Delalić, Evedin Hero and they have used force on detainees.

14. Were detainees tortured in front of others, enter data about the torturers?

YES-Usually they were tortured in hallways where others were not present but sometimes in front of others.

15. Provide information on dead, wounded and missing detainees of the concentration camp: Zdravko Nižić, died at forced labor on the first frontline, died as a result of torture by hunger: Pero Antunović Perkan from Ustirame, Prozor municipality, Anica Šitum from Doljani, Jozo Miličević from Doljani, Pero Šarić from Grabovica and Ivan Žarić Maran – died as a result of injuries, wounded were: Ivan Jozić, Bosiljko Kožul, Antonio Dujmović, Neđo Zelenika, Danica Šitum and missing Grgo Turić, he was taken by members of BH Army and he is still listed as missing.

16. Were there any cases when detainees were forced to give blood? _____ NO _____

17. Were detainees taken to force labor? YES – They were taken on daily basis to force labor to all first frontlines between HVO and BH Army, where they were regularly abused.

18. Were locations of detention visited by political, military and other officials from the side which was in charge of camps? YES, general Safer Halilović, dr. Safet Ćibo, president of war presidency for Jablanica municipality, Zulfikar Ališpago-Zuka, Nihad Bojadžić, Safet Idrizović, Emin Zebić and Mufti Šefko Omerbašić.

19. Were locations of detention visited by representatives of ICRC and other international institutions?

YES, when military authorities and camp administration would allow it. Since UNPROFOR was located in Jablanica (Spanish battalion), ICRC, European observers, and UNHCR, their representatives visited the camp on several occasions.

20. Were detainees hidden from the ICRC representatives? YES – Over 30 civilian Croats who were forced out of their homes in Jablanica and were detained in the Museum camp, they were never registered by MCK /IRC/.

21. Of what were the detainees deprived off? (hygiene maintenance, use of toilets, health care, visits by relatives, food) Since the Museum building as a whole was not appropriate accommodation for longer period, not even minimal conditions existed, and in addition local Jablanica authorities tried very hard to make life of detainees as hard as possible, one could say that conditions were extremely difficult. Detainees were lying on concrete floor, on granite and ceramic plates, with no sheets or blankets, tormented by hunger on purpose, abused and harassed daily, with no medical attention and there were also several cases of rape and sexual abuse of detained civilians.

22. For each camp a drawing-photo should be provided.

23. Make a maximum effort to make a list of detainees in each camp.

24. Attach and register all materials provided by detainees (sketches, drawings, records, diaries etc.)

25. Mention everything of importance for the said camp: From Camp Museum - Jablanica camp inmates

were taken to Donja Jablanica in the base "Zulfikar" where they were severely abused. There was one case of murder, death of detainee Zoran Milas-Buba who was strangled in D. Jablanica, and two men were intentionally wounded from blank range while others were severely abused. From D. Jablanica detainees were taken to the parish church in Drežnica where they stayed for over 20 days. They were taken on the front line where they were put as a human shield and all of them were victims of cruel and inhuman behavior of members of the BH Army in Drežnica. From Donja Jablanica they were taken to BH Army lines in Jasenjani where they had to do hard physical labor and were abused.

When Museum concentration camp – Jablanica was closed by the intervention of ICRC, one group of 30 Croats were left there, hidden from ICRC for the whole time.

Mostar, October 6th, 2007.

Questioner filled by former
concentration camp detainees:

Mirko Zelenika

Karlo Marić

Miroslav Stipanović

2.

Location of execution: Bijelo polje

Time of execution: June 30th, 1993

METHOD OF EXECUTION

On June 30th, 1993 members of the BH Army troops occupied Bijelo polje in insidious way, and on this occasion captured a larger number of HVO soldiers. The prisoners were tied and brought in front of the house and executed. In such actions, accused Adam Pajević murdered Boško Golemac, with several shots in front of other prisoners who witnessed this, therefore, a breach of principle of international law on the treatment of prisoners of war, inhuman treatment, causing great suffering, torture and murder was committed against them.

IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED

ADEM PAJEVIĆ, nickname Moca, sone of Rama, born May 17th, 1960

VICTIMS AND CIVILIANS WHO SUFFERED DAMAGES

- Golemac Boško – murdered
- Darko Knežević and other prisoners

IDENTITY OF WITNESSES OF THE CRIMINAL ACT

- Darko Knežević
- Dino Vlaho
- Pero Rajić
- Dario Rajić

TAKEN MEASURES AND ACTIONS

Criminal charges were filed on May 23rd, 1994 to District Military Prosecutor's Office Mostar

3.

Location of execution: wider area of Bijelo Polje, Raštani, Vrapčiči

Time of execution: June 30th, 1993

METHOD OF EXECUTION

On June 30th, 1993 during the occupation of the wider area north of Mostar and up to Bijelo polje, Raštani and Vrapčiči, members of MOS have arrested civil population and have detained women and children in the primary school, and men at a separate location. All citizens of Croatian nationality had to work in working squads on building bunkers, trenches and other military fortifications of the enemy army, and therefore a crime against civil population was committed by inhumane treatment, torture, violation of body and health, forcing them to labor for armed forces of the enemy army, forced labor with starvation and murder. Šćepo Bilić, Tomislav Brajković and Žarko Drinovac were forced to carry a cannon which they could not carry, and were executed by the accused Omanović Miralema with shots from an automatic rifle. Other detainees were ordered to tie the corpses by the legs and drag them to a nearby hill where they had to bury them by throwing rocks on them.

IDENTITY OF THE PERSON INDICTED

OMANOVIĆ MIRALEMA, son of Arif, born November 14th, 1967 in Potoci.

IDENTITY OF VICTIMS

- Šćepo Bilić, son of Ivan, born on May 2nd, 1932
- Tomislav Brajković, son of Luka, born on April 6th, 1936
- Žarko Drinovac, son of Stojan, born on September 18th, 1935

IDENTITY OF WITNESSES OF THE CRIMINAL ACT

- Drinovac Stanko
- Karlušić Milo
- Krezić Stanislav

TAKEN MEASURES AND ACTIONS

Criminal charges were filed on December 11th, 1993 number: 03-8/20-1-3-KU-32 to District Military Prosecutor's Office in Mostar.

COUNTY COURT IN MOSTAR

Business number K: 20/99

**TO PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIME TRIBUNAL IN HAGUE
DEN HAAG**

THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF BH FEDERATION

SARAJEVO

SUBJECT: Delivery of court's criminal case summery number K: 20/99 for review and assessment in terms of the Roman Treaty "Rules of the Road" from February 18th, 1996.

Military Prosecution Office in Mostar has raised an indictment under no Kt: 598/94 of July 18th, 1994 against Lijevo Zikrija and other persons for the criminal offense of war crimes against prisoners of war under Article 144 of the Criminal Law taken over from the former Yugoslavia (now an eponymous criminal offense under Article 154 of the Criminal Law of the BH Federation), and the same indictment is now represented by the County Prosecutor's office Mostar.

The following persons are indicted with this indictment:

1. LJEVO ZIKRIJA, son of Mumin and mother Emina, born Marić, born on October 25th, 1996 in Podgorani, leaving in Podgorani number 50, member of the BH Army,
2. ZAHIROVIĆ VERNES, son of Izet and mother Fifa, born Kukil, born on May 24th, 1957 in Doljani, Jablanica municipality, settled in Potoci 100d, Mostar municipality, member of BH Army,
3. OMANOVIĆ BEĆIR, son of Omer and mother Bega, born Daguda, born on May 24th, 1957 in Doljani, Jablanica municipality, settled in Potoci 124, Mostar municipality, member of the BH Army,
4. KAMINIĆ MEHO, son of Alija and mother Seja, born Gaštan, born on November 25th, 1935 in village Žulji, Nevesinje municipality, settled in Blagaj n.n., Mostar municipality, member of the BH Army
5. ČOPELJ HEBIB, member of the BH Army, other personal information is unknown as of yet,
6. ORUČEVIĆ HUSO, son of Arif and mother Fatima, born on March 4th, 1955 in Mostar, where he lives, street Čelebići 12, member of the BH Army,
7. PAJKIĆ PREDRAG, son of Muhamed and mother Džemila, born on October 14th, 1949 in Mostar, where he lives, street Omladinska 5, member of the BH Army.

None of the abovementioned individuals was in custody because of this criminal process, and we cannot provide you with their physical descriptions or other personal information, because they are, and have been during the war, residences on the east side of Mostar controlled of the Bosnian side, and are inaccessible to the judicial authorities of the west coast of Mostar where the investigation was led and where the indictment was issued.

An investigation was conducted in this criminal proceeding in which three witnesses were questioned, and the Prosecutor's office has issued an indictment on July 18th, 1994. Since then, the former Military Court in Mostar and High Court in Mostar-West did not do anything concerning this indictment, because the persons indicted were not available to the court, as their residence is on the east side of Mostar, which is controlled by Bosniak authorities. The former Military Court in Mostar has ordered a temporary detainment of the persons indicted with a decision number Ki: 40/94 of June 21st, 1994, and has issue an order for issuance of arrest warrant number Ki: 40/94 of June 21st, 1994. Since County Court in Mostar is now established, which covers the entire city of Mostar, and since the security situation is now normalized in the city of Mostar, conditions are met that the indicted persons may now be available to the court, and that the main hearing in this case can be scheduled.

The investigation process was conducted under the provisions of former Criminal Procedure Act of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was taken by Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the grounds of the same Act, indictment has been issued in accordance with current applicable laws and regulations. Former Military Court in Mostar has appointed a defense council Dragan Bošnjak, a lawyer from Mostar, to the indicted persons. The investigation procedure in the present case was concluded before Roman agreement was signed, and the indictment was issued before the agreement.

The accused from this indictment are charged with the criminal offense of war crimes against prisoners of war under Article 144 of the Criminal Act which was taken over from former SFRY, and the same act exists in the new Criminal Act of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation under the same name as Article 156 of the same Act.

With the subject indictment, all of the accused are charged that on September 19th, 1993 during the armed conflict between the BH Army and Croatian Defense Council in Mostar municipality, after they have captured in village Jedrinje on Salakovac, Mostar municipality, a group of soldiers from the 2nd HVO Battalion Široki Brijeg, the accused Ljevo Zikrija, Zahirović Vernes and Omanović Bećir took the prisoners in a truck to Bijelo Polje near Mostar, and when the prisoner Jozo Primorac jumped from the truck and managed to escape, the accused Ljevo Zikrija, Zahirović Vernes and Omanović Bećir have taken other prisoners out of the truck and have beaten them with guns, fists and stakes, and one of them cut off the ear of Jura Kosir with a knife, afterwards the prisoners were taken and detained in a house in Bijelo Polje, where their hands were tied and tightened with wire, and were then beaten by the accused Ljevo Zikrija, Zahirović Vernes, Omanović Bećir, Kaminić Meho and Čopelj Hebib with wooden sticks, chairs and bicycle, of which injuries prisoner Kosir Pero died, and the next day the prisoners were transferred to another house in Bijelo Polje where they were beaten again by the same accused persons and the accused Ljevo Zikrija with another unknown member of the BH Army brought prisoner Dragan Lasić out of the house and executed him in front of the house, and the rest of the prisoners were then taken to the Primary School in Bijelo Polje, where they were tied with wire and brought out, where the accused Oručević Huso together with another unknown members of the Muslim army, had beaten the prisoners and were later taken to a prison in Mostar, where they were beaten by the accused Oručević Haso and Pajkić Predrag, of which injuries prisoner Mario Lasić died.

By these actions, all of the accused have, contrary to the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 1 line 1 and Article 13 of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war, committed murder, torture, causing great suffering and violation of body, thereby committing a criminal offense under Article 144 of the Criminal Act taken over from the former SFRY, or Article 156 of the Criminal Act of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Factual description of the actions of the accused in the indictment is determined on the basis of the statements of witnesses who were examined during the investigation, witnesses being Stanislav Ljubić, Dragan Zovko and Jure Kosir.

Witness Stanislav Ljubić said that as a member of HVO he was captured in the village Salakovac, and then Muslim soldiers drove him to a house in Bijelo polje. On the way to the house one of the prisoners Jozo Primorac managed to escape, so the accused Ljevo Zikrija, Zahirović Vernes, Kaminić Meho, Čopelj Hebib, and some Mujo Karabeg took them out of the truck and they were beat with various objects, and one of the accused had cut off Jure Košir's ear with a knife. After they took the prisoners to a house in Bijelo Polje, they were tied and beaten, and due to the injuries caused by beating, prisoner Pero Kosir died the next day. When

the prisoners were transferred to another house in Bijelo Polje, the accused persons continued to beat the prisoners, and even brought children and civilians to beat them. Certain individual by the nickname "Maks" engraved with a knife his nickname on the forehead of Dragan Lasić. The accused Ljevo Zikrija came in the evening with certain persons under the nickname "Kordić", and they took out the prisoner Dragan Lasić and executed him with fire arms. When the prisoners were transferred to a prison in Mostar, they were beaten in the prison by the accused Oručević Huso and Pajkić Predrag, as well as individuals by the nicknames "Lešo" and "Nezir" and prisoner Mario Lasić died as a result of the beating.

Witness Dragan Zovko said that as a member of HVO he was captured in the village Salakovac, and then Muslim soldiers tied them with a wire and drove them towards Bijelo Polje. During the transportation, prisoners Jozo Primorac managed to escape, so the accused Ljevo Zikrija, Omanović Bećir, Zahirović Vernes, Kaminić Meho and Čopelj Hebib took them out of the truck and then they were beaten with rifles and stacks. One of the accused cut off prisoner's Jure Košir's ear with a knife. When they brought them to a house in Bijelo Polje, the accused were hitting them with different objects, and due to the injuries caused by the beating, prisoner Pero Kosir died. Civilians also came to the hose to beat them, and one civilian was hitting the abovementioned witness on the knees with a hammer. Certain individual by the nickname "Maks" engraved with a knife his nickname on the forehead of Dragan Lasić. In the evening came the accused Ljevo Zikrija along with an unknown person. He lined up the prisoners and then he took prisoner Dragan Lasić and killed him. After prisoners were transferred to a prison in Mostar, they were beaten in the prison by the accused Oručević Huso and Pajkić Predrag, as well as certain Mili Čišić, but they were mostly beaten by Pajkić Predrag, of whose beating prisoner Mario Lasić died.

Witness Jure Kosir stated that he was captured along with other members of HVO on location Jedrinje during the attack of the BH Army. Afterwards they were taken to Bijelo Polje near Mostar. On the way to Bijelo Polje, prisoner Jozo Primorac managed to escape, and then the accused took them out of the truck and were beating them with rifles and fists, and his right ear was cut off by an unknown member of the BH Army. Once they brought them to a house in Bijelo Polje, they were tied with wire, and then beaten with wooden sticks, chairs and bicycle, as the result of which Pero Kosir died. Ljevo Zikrija, Zahirović Vernes, Omenović Bećir, Kaminić Meho, Čopelj Hebib and certain Karabeg Mujo also participated in this. When prisoners were transferred to another house in Bijelo Polje, one member of the BH Army named "Maks" came to the house and carved the word Maks to Dragan Lasić's forehead. In the evening, Ljevo Zikrija came with a person known as "Kordić," they took out the prisoners Dragan Lasić and executed him. Once the prisoners were transferred to a prison in Mostar, they were beaten by the accused Oručević Huso and Pajkić Predrag, as well as persons under the nicknames "Ziko", "Lešo", "Dado", "Armin" and Mili Čišić, and they were beating them with batons and an iron boll for about an hour, and when they passed out, they were splashed with water, and then beaten again. As a result of the beating, prisoner Mario Lasić died.

On the grounds of the aforementioned evidence, competent prosecutor has issued the subject indictment, since sufficient evidence was collected during the investigation confirming that all of the accused committed the offense for which they are indicted, and given that this is a serious violation of the rules of international humanitarian law, we ask you to inform us whether you will take the prosecution of this case before the International Tribunal for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, or whether you will refer the case back to this Court in accordance with Appendix B of "Rules of the Road."

Since the subject case includes a criminal offense for which mandatory detention is regulated, bearing in mind the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 2 of the "Rules of the Road" by which the accused cannot be arrested without a review of the indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal, please state in your opinion, upon contact with the Tribunal, whether the indictment is in accordance with international legal norms, and whether detention is justified in this case.

Necessary contacts regarding this case can be made with the judge of this court Nada Dalipagić. Court address is: Ante Starčević Street 20, Mostar-West, and telephone number of the Court is 0038788/323381 and 323382.

In Mostar, February 7th, 2000

Judge
Nada Dalipagić

APPENDIX:

- case summary no. K:20/99 in Croatian and English language,
- copy of the indictment number Kt: 598/94 of July 18th, 1994, with English translation
- copy of the records of witnesses' Stanislav Ljubić, Dragan Zovko and Jure Kosir testimonies, with English translations
- copy of the decision for determining detention by the Military court in Mostar number Ki:40/94 of June 21st, 1994 with English translation,
- copy of the command for issuing an arrest warrant by the Military Court Mostar number Ki: 40/94 of June 21st, 1994 with English translation
- copy of the decision for appointment of the defense council by the Military court in Mostar number Ki: 40/94 of June 21st, 1994, with English translation
- excerpts from Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Act, showing the offense for which the accused persons are indicted, and the provisions on mandatory detention.

HIGH COURT IN MOSTAR

- Judge rapporteur -

Number: Ki-4/96.

Mostar, July 3rd, 1996

High court in Mostar, by the judge rapporteur Nada Dalipagić with participation of recording secretary Radica Cigić, in investigation procedure of the case against the accused Zlatko Alikafić called "Fana" and others, on reasonable suspicion of having committed a criminal offense under Article 144 of the Criminal Law taken over from former SFRY, has issued today on the grounds of Article 159, paragraph 2 of the Law on Criminal Proceedings the following

DECISION ORDERING THE INVESTIGATION

Against the indicted:

1. ZLATKO ALIKAFIĆ called "Fana" son of Mehmed, born on July 16th, 1963 in Mostar, member of the BH Army in Mostar, living in Alikafića street number 5, unavailable,
2. STJEPAN ANDRAŠIĆ called "Šok" son of Tomo, born on March 26th, 1958 in Zagreb, member of Com. Platoon of the BH Army in Mostar, unavailable,
3. ETHEM AJANIĆ son of Mujo, born on August 29th, 1963 in Mostar, living in Tekija 3, member of the 1st battalion of the BH Army, unavailable,
4. TAHIR BIJEDIĆ son of Sabahudin, born on August 7th, 1962 in Mostar, living in 36th street number 14, unavailable,
5. EMIR BIJEDIĆ son of Sabahudin, born on November 16th, 1952 in Mostar, member of the Mostar Brigade command of the BH Army, unavailable,
6. EMIR BEŠALIĆ called "Žučo", other data unknown, unavailable,
7. SEJO BEŠLIĆ son of Suno born on May 29th, 1965 in Mostar, living in G. Vukovića street 33, unavailable,
8. ADIM BRAJOVIĆ, other information unknown, member of the BH Army police, unavailable,
9. MIRSAD BAJROVIĆ, other information unknown, unavailable,
10. SEMIR ĆEMALOVIĆ called "Pika" son of Ahmet, born in Mostar, member of the BH Army in Mostar, unavailable,
11. DENIS ĆEMALOVIĆ son of Ahmet, born on February 16th, 1969 in Mostar, member of the BH Army in Mostar, unavailable,
12. BEĆIR ĆUSTOVIĆ, other information unknown, unavailable,
13. SEMIR DRLJEVIĆ called "Lovac" son of Halil, born on May 15th, 1963 in Mostar, living in G. Vukovića street 36, commander of the 2nd battalion of the BH Army in Mostar, unavailable,
14. SENAD DRLJEVIĆ called "Žučo" son of Halil, born on June 21st, 1959 in Mostar, member of the MP troops in Mostar, unavailable,
15. EDO DILBEROVIĆ son of Aziz, born on September 10th, 1962 in Mostar, living in H. Kolukčije street number 6, unavailable,
16. MEHO DEDIĆ son of Murat, born on January 15th, 1968 in village Kružanj, Nevesinje municipality, living in army barracks "Konak", member of the 3rd battalion of the BH Army in Mostar, unavailable,
17. HIMZO DEDIĆ son of Murat, born on September 3rd, 1970 in village Kružanj, Nevesinje municipality, living in the army barracks "Konak", member of the 3rd battalion of the BH Army in Mostar, unavailable,
18. MUNIB DŽANKOVIĆ called "Lola" son of Hamdija, born on March 18th, 1962 in Gacko, member of the BH Army MP command in Mostar, unavailable

19. ESAD EMINOVIĆ called "Fola" born on February 10th, 1961 in Mostar, living in Šehovina number 4-E, commander of the 1st battalion of the BH Army, unavailable,
20. ALIJA GUŠIĆ called "Ale" son of Halil, born on January 17th in Neum, living in R. Bitange street number 15, unavailable,
21. IBRO HUSNIĆ son of Omer, born on April 2nd, 1962 in Mostar, living in army barracks "Konak", member of the 3rd battalion of the BH Army in Mostar, unavailable,
22. SENAD HUSNIĆ, other information unknown, member of the BH Army, in Mostar, unavailable,
23. ENES HUSNIĆ, other information unknown, member of the BH Army, in Mostar, unavailable,
24. MUMIN HUSNIĆ son of Meho born on August 29th, 1970 in Mostar, living in army barracks "Konak", member of the 3rd battalion of the BH Army in Mostar, unavailable,
25. ADIS IDRIZ son of Osman born in Mostar, living in 29. HZD street 239, member of the 2nd battalion of the BH Army in Mostar, unavailable,
26. SELIM ISIĆ called "Svila", born on April 27th, 1958 in Mostar, member of the BH Army 3rd battalion, lieutenant, unavailable
27. IBRO ISIĆ son of Meho, born on January 1st, 1950 in Podveležje, living in Podveležje number 23, unavailable,
28. ALMIR JUGO other information unknown, member of BH police, unavailable,
29. certain LOLA KUDIN, other information unknown, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
30. MEDŽID KEROVIĆ son of Smajo born on April 13th, 1955 in village Tuza, Titograd municipality, living in Mostar, G. Vukovića street 37, unavailable,
31. TAHIR KEROVIĆ son of Smajo, born on March 23rd, 1960 in Mostar, living in G. Vukovića street number 37, unavailable,
32. NEZIR KOVAČEVIĆ called "Bosanac", other information unknown, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
33. MUJO KARADŽA son of Tahir born on August 6th, 1966 in village D. Bijenja, Nevesinje municipality, living in Mostar, Put 29. HUD number 13, Mostar, unavailable,
34. NERMIN KUKO son of Nazir, born on April 2nd, 1972 in Mostar, living in Prigrađani number 50, member of BH police, unavailable,
35. HARIS KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ son of Hasan, born on April 22nd, 1962 in Dubrovnik, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
36. KEMAL KEBO, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
37. ZIJO LERIĆ, son of Meho, born on October 8th, 1961 in village Bijenja, Nevesinje municipality, living in Mostar, B. Knežića street 21, unavailable,
38. SAFET MEMIĆ son of Salko, born on May 20th, 1947 in Nahora, Gacko municipality, living in Mostar, member of BH police, unavailable,
39. KASIM MUŠINOVIĆ, member of BH police, other information unknown, unavailable,
40. SUAD MUTAPČIĆ son of Alija born on August 4th, 1966 in Mostar, member of BH police, unavailable,
41. SENAD MARIĆ called Seno, son of Ibro, born on February 21st, 1969 in Mostar, living in army barracks "Konak", member of the BH Army 3rd battalion in Mostar, unavailable,
42. OSMAN MACIĆ son of Salko, born on February 3rd, 1953 in Mostar, living in army barracks "Konak", member of the BH Army 3rd battalion in Mostar, unavailable,
43. ZIJO ORUČEVIĆ son of Mustafa, born on April 2nd 1967 in Mostar, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
44. ŠEFIK OBAD called "Maca" son of Mehmed, born on July 12th, 1959 in Mostar, living in M. Gupca street 30-a, unavailable,

45. MIRSAD OMANOVIĆ called "Mačak" son of Alija, other information unknown, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
46. NUSRET PINTUL called "Bilda" son of Selim, born on November 11th, 1961 in Mostar, living in Zalik number 24, member of the BH Army, in Mostar, unavailable,
47. SEAD PINTUL son of Bešir, born on March 21st, 1944 in Fojnica living in Mostar, member of the BH Army in Mostar, captain, unavailable,
48. AHMET PECO son of Salko, born on October 11th, 1954 in Mostar, living in Mostar, member of the BH Army special platoon in Mostar, unavailable,
49. SALKO PIRUŠIĆ from Nevesinje, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
50. OSMAN PIRUŠIĆ from Nevesinje, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
51. MIRALEM SALČIN, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
52. MILI SEFIĆ, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
53. ZLATKO SKIKIĆ, born in 1948 in Mostar, medical doctor, surgeon in War hospital, unavailable,
54. SEJO SARIĆ, son of Muhamed, born on March 26th, 1961 in Mostar, living in G. Vukovića 50
55. HASAN STUPAC, son of Musta, born on November 6th, 1954 in Mostar, living in Mostar, member of the BH Army MP troops, cook in prison, unavailable,
56. GORNA STOŠIĆ called "Stoša", son of Slobodan, born on March 14th, 1969 in Mostar, living in Splitska street no.5, member of the BH Army 2nd battalion, unavailable,
57. EMIR SALČIN called "Garó" son of Bećo, born on October 9th, 1950 in Mostar, living in G. Vukovića street 118-B, unavailable,
58. SUAD ŠARIĆ son of Asim, born on May 26th, 1950 in Mostar, living in B. Brkića street 7, unavailable,
59. ABAZ ŠKORO, son of Bajro, born on September 19th, 1957 in Mostar, living in village Kutilivač number 89, unavailable,
60. HAMO ŠUNJE, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
61. IBRO ŠUNJE, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
62. ZIJO TOJAGA, son of Hasan, born on March 6th, 192 in Mostar, living in 26th street - unavailable,
63. SEMIR TOJAGA, called "Ćelo", other information unknown, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
64. ENO TOJAGA son of Adem, born on May 18th, 1969 in Mostar, living in M. Pašića street 75, unavailable,
65. ADO TOJAGA son of Adem, born on May 18th, 1969 in Mostar, living in M. Pašića street 75, unavailable
66. ESO TINJAK, son of Mujo, other information unknown, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
67. MUHAMED TASLIDŽA, son of Salko, born on December 6th, 1956 in Mostar, living in Haćamović street no. 10, unavailable
68. TARIK VILA, son of Alija, born on July 29th, 1944 in Mostar, living in BNR str. 43, unavailable,
69. ADIL VELEDAR, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
70. MIRZET VRAŽALIĆ, son of Safet, born on March 4th, 1959 in Priboj, living in Mostar, Braće Fejić street 65, prison warden, unavailable,
71. MIRSAD ZEKIĆ son of Smajo, born on October 9th, 1961 in Mostar, living in M. Gupca street 16-a, unavailable,
72. ENVER BUBALO, son of Smajo, born on February 17th, 1965 from Bijelo Polje, member of 2nd brigade and 1st HVO battalion from July 12th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
73. IZET DURAKOVIĆ, son of Lutvija, born on January 31st, 1960 from Bijelo Polje, member of 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from April 8th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable

74. SULEJMAN HERO, son of Suljo, born on January 3rd 1966 in Bijelo Polje, member of 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from April 8th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
75. AZER KUKO, son of Salko, born on November 7th, 1967 from B. Polje, member of the 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from April 8th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
76. MIRALEM KUKO, son of Salko, born on January 16th, 1962 in Bijelo Polje, member of the 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from April 8th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
77. NERMIN KUKO, son of Adem, born on April 21st, 1969 from Bijelo Polje, member of the 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from July 12th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
78. SALKO NAZDRAJIĆ, son of Osman, born on June 8th, 1953 from B. Polje, member of the 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from June 23rd, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
79. IBRO OMANOVIĆ, son of Omer, born on June 15th, 1960 from B. Polje, member of the 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from June 23rd, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
80. JUSUF FAJIĆ, son of Alija, born on January 21st, 1939 from B. Polje, member of the 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from June 22nd, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
81. HUSO POLČIĆ, son of Hasan, born on May 17th, 1963 from B. Polje, member of the 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from April 8th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
82. OSMAN TIPURA, son of Rama, born on January 4th, 1966 from B. Polje, member of the 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from June 22nd, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
83. REDŽO BAJIĆ, son of Duran, born on May 8th, 1954 from Vrapčići, member of the 2nd brigade 2nd HVO battalion from August 28th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
84. AMIR MARIĆ, son of Ibrahim born on March 7th, from Vrapčići, member of the 2nd brigade 2nd HVO battalion from June 25th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
85. SAMIR MARIĆ, son of Meho, born on March 28th, 1968 from Vrapčići, member of the 2nd brigade 2nd HVO battalion from August 8th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, unavailable
86. ZLATKO KRESO, employee at the 4th Corps command of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
87. HASAN KARADŽA, living in Mostar, put 29. HUD bb, Chief of artillery in the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
88. MUJO KARADŽA, son of Tahir, born on August 6th, 1966 in Nevesinje, living in 29. HUD 130 Mostar, member of the BH Army MP, unavailable,
89. MUMIN NAZDRAJIĆ, living in Potoci, other information unknown, unavailable,
90. EMIR NAZDRAJIĆ, son of Osman, born on January 1st, 1970 in village Ravni in Mostar municipality, living in Bijelo Polje, Kutilivač, member of MOS, unavailable,
91. DURKO NAZDRAJIĆ, from B. Polje, other information unknown, unavailable,
92. ADIS BREKALO, son of Salko, born on November 11th, 1973 in B. Polje, member of 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from June 20th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993 at which time he became member of MOS, unavailable,
93. SALKO PERVAN, son of Adem born on February 21st, 1950 from Bijelo Polje, member of 2nd brigade 1st HVO battalion from April 4th, 1992 until June 30th, 1993, now member of BH police, unavailable,
94. ZUKIĆ EDIN, son of Zuko and Zlata born on March 26th, 1967 in Donja Drežnica, living in Drežnica number 103, member of 4th MOS battalion 1st regiment, unavailable,
95. EMIR NOVALIĆ, son of Salko, born on October 8th, 1962 in village Vrdolje in Konjic municipality, living in Mostar, Vrapčići 187,
96. IBRAHIM DEMIROVIĆ, called "Hećim" and "Crna Ruka" other information unknown, unavailable,
97. ESAD TIPURA, teacher from Bijelo Polje, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,

98. SALKO TIPURA, son of Osman, born on April 24th, 1950 in Potoci, living in Mostar, 36th street number 29,
99. OSMAN TIPURA, son of Ramo born on January 4th, 1966 in village Podgorani bb, where he also lives, other information unknown, unavailable,
100. ELVEDIN OMANOVIĆ, son of Smajilo born on November 26th, 1966 in Potoci, number 120, where he also lives, other information unknown, unavailable,
101. OMANOVIĆ SENAD, son of Mehmed born on October 13th, 1968 in Kutilivač, bb, where he also lives, other information unknown,
102. ALIJA OMANOVIĆ, member of the BH Army, other information unknown,
103. EKREM OMANOVIĆ, member of the BH Army unit, other information unknown,
104. MIRSO OMANOVIĆ, called "Mačak" son of Alija born on November 1st, 1962 in village Kutilivač number 51, where he also lives,
105. DŽEVAD HALILOVIĆ, member of the BH Army, other information unknown,
106. ENES ĆURIĆ – Eno, called "Beka" son of Hamdija born on November 21st, 1965 in Bijelo Polje – Humilišani number 16, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
107. RASIM ABAZA, son of Osman born on March 1st, 1958 in Zijemlje, living in village Kutilivač bb, unavailable,
108. ZIJO ORUČEVIĆ, called "Zike", other information unknown, member of the BH Army, unavailable
109. SAFET ORUČEVIĆ, he was a member of 2nd HVO brigade as miner, other information unknown, unavailable,
110. SEMIR MARIĆ, called "Sema" from Vrapčiči, member of MOS, son of Alija born on February 26th, 1957 in Mostar, living in Vrapčiči, unavailable,
111. SUAD ZALIHIC, son of Osman from Potoci, born on December 9th, 1960 in Mostar – Vrapčiči, number 158-a, member of the BH Army unavailable,
112. OMER ZALIHIC, son of Smajo, born on January 2nd, 1937 in Mostar, living in Vrapčiči h.no. 159C, unavailable,
113. ESO OMANOVIĆ, son of Hasan, born on September 27th, 1952 in Potoci, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
114. MIRZO OMANOVIĆ, son of Hasan, from Potoci, other information unknown, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
115. POČIĆ ENES, son of Hasan, born on May 16th, 1960 in village Jasenjani, living in village Kutilivač bb, member of the BH Army, unavailable,
116. MIRZO DURAKOVIĆ, son of Lutvo, from Potoci, born on February 14th, 1963 in Mostar, living in Potoci, number 2, unavailable,
117. ZIJO ĆORIĆ, from Nevesinje, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
118. MIRAN BIJEDIĆ, son of Fadil, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable,
119. ESO TIPURA, son of Hasan born in 1950 in Potoci, member of the BH Army, other information unknown, unavailable

On the grounds of reasonable suspicion that they have:

After the Muslim army has executed an armed attack on HVO and Croatian people in the wider area of Bijelo Polje, Vrapčiči, Raštani and Army camp "Tihomir Mišić" on the territory of Mostar municipality on May 30th, 1993, and in time of war, accused have, as members of the Muslim army, violated Article 3, paragraph 1 point 1 indent-1a, Article 33, paragraph 2, and Article 32 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, taking part in an armed attack, murder, torture, inhuman

treatment, causing violation of body, intimidation and terror, unlawful detention and looting of property belonging to civilians of Croatian nationality, and contrary to the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 1 item 1 indent 1 and Article 13 of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war, participated in murder, torture and inhumane treatment of captured members of HVO, in the following way:

1. On March 30th, 1993 the 1st accused Zlatko Alikalfić, 2nd accused Stjepan Andrašić, 52nd accused Mile Sefić, 55th accused Hasan Stupac, 12th accused Bećir Ćustović, 59th accused Abaz Škoro, 66th accused Eso Tinjak, 15th accused Edo Dilberović, 34th accused Nermin Kuko, 18th accused Munib Džanković, 84th accused Amir Marić, 83rd accused Redžo Bajić, 109th accused Safet Oručević, 81st accused Huso Polčić, 96th accused Ibrahim Demirović, 100th accused Elvedin Omanović, 76th accused Mirelam Kuko, 112th accused Omer Zalihić, 111th accused Suad Zalihić, 75th accused Azer Kuko, 113th accused Eso Omanović, 104th accused Mirso Omanović, 73rd accused Izet Duraković, 116th accused Mirzo Duraković, 117th accused Zijo Ćorić, 119th accused Eso Tipura, 118th accused Miran Bijedić, 114th accused Mirza Omanović, 115th accused Enes Počić, 89th accused Mumin Nazdrajić, 78th accused Salko Nazdrajić, 80th accused Jusuf Pajić, 105th accused Dževad Halilović, 106th accused Enes Ćurić, 98th accused Salko Tipura, 110th accused Semir Marić called “Selma”, 92nd accused Adis Brekalo, 90th accused Emir Nazdrajić, 93rd Osman Tipura have performed an armed attack on Croatian people in Bijelo Polje, Vrapčići, Raštani and Zalika, and have captured and imprisoned a large number of Croatian civilians including Mirko Vučić, Mato Šaravanja, Jozo Tipurić, Zdenko Jovanović, Franjo and Jaka Kordić, Marija and Andrija Kožul, Ivanka Bošnjak, Luce Kordić, Jozo Goluža, Branko Zovko, Ilija Zovko, Ilija Leko, Zdravko Zovko, Stanka Krezić, Jozika Ivanković, Mara Sesar, Stanka Azinović, Mara Azinović, Ante and Dragica Crnjac, Stanko Bilić, Anđa Bilić, Ante and Dragica Bakić, Stanko and Ivo Puljić, Stanko and Kata Poponja, Boško Prić, Franjo and Davor Šilić, 1st accused Zlatko Alikalfić and 52nd accused Mili Sefić have forcibly taken Mirko Vučić to vehicle “Fiat 750”, and Zdenko Jovanović to vehicle “Renault 4”, 107th accused Rasim Abaza, 92nd accused Durko Nazdrajić, 74th accused Sulejman Hero and 77th accused Nermin Kuko were stealing from houses of Croatian civilians in Bijelo Polje, 89th accused Mumin Nazdrajić and three other members of MOS, whose identity is not known, have burned the house of Pero Golemac in Potok, 87th accused Hasan Karadža and 88th accused Mujo Karadža have beaten Franjo and Davor Šilić, 72nd accused Enver Bubalo was interrogating and beating civilians in a school in Bijelo Polje, and on one occasion five people from Uzarčani were brought, of which two died as a result of beating, 107th accused Enes Ćurić and 96th accused Ibrahim Demirović “Hećim”, on August 21st, 1993 took 37 captured Croatian civilians to a dam in Vrapčići and they were used as a human shield towards HVO units, among whom was also Janja Kordić.

2. After capturing a large number of HVO members and after they were assembled in Bijelo Polje 92nd accused Adis Brekalo and 95th accused Emir Novalić have wounded Mustafa Brekalo in the shoulder, 34th accused Nermin Kuko was hitting and threatening to kill Mustafa Brekalo and Mehmed Brekalo, 33rd accused Mujo Karadža and 100th accused Elvedin Omanović were beating prisoners in Ljeskovac among whom were also Mustafa and Mehmed Brekalo, who were also beaten in Skender Mlinica by the 96th accused Ibrahim Demirović with a cable, Dimitrović put a pistol in their mouth threatening to kill them, 100th accused Elvedin Omanović and other members of MOS have striped Branko Kožul to his underwear, crucified him against the wall and took 1350 DEM, 2nd accused Stjepan Andrašić – “Šok” and other members of the BH Army MP have tied Željko Hištuk with a barbwire hitting him on the head, 6th accused Emir Bešalić – “Žučo” have killed five captured HVO members at North camp, 25th accused Idriz Adis, 64th accused Eno Tojaga and 65th accused Avdo Tojaga have killed captured member of HVO MP in Salakovac, 79th accused Ibro Omanović and 101st accused Sead Omanović, 102nd accused Alija Omanović and 103rd accused Ekrem Omanović were beating Tomo Kordić and other captured members of HVO in Bijelo Polje.

3. After imprisoning captured HVO members in prison in IV. Primary school on the left bank of Mostar, 55th accused Hasan Stupac was beating detainees and took away their rings, necklaces and money, even their eyeglasses, 32nd accused Nezir Kovačević – “Bosanac” have beaten Miho Beno, Lovrić Marinko, Nikica Pehar, Franjo Barbarić, Slavko Golemac, Marinko Lovrić and Stanislav Ljubić, who died as a result of beating, Mehmed Brekalo and Darko Tomić, 70th accused Mirsad Vraželica, as a prisoner warden was ordering and implementing abuse of prisoners, 5th accused Emir Bijedić came to prison to interrogate and harass the prisoners, 37th accused Zijo Lerić, as the commander of BH Army MP ordered and approved abuse of prisoners, on July 25th, 1993 60th accused Hamo Šunja have beaten a group of captured HVO Members from Čapljina, 71st accused Mirsad Zekić was beating the mentioned prisoners and forced them to sing “Alahu ekber”, 20th accused Ale Gušić made a special effort to beat prisoners from Čitluk, Čapljina and Uzarac,

10th accused Semir Čemalović was beating all the prisoners, among whom were Ivica Jergović and Željko Hištuk, 50th accused Emir Bijedić was interrogating and beating prisoners, 19th accused Esad Eminović threatened Darko Ropić with a pistol, kicked him on the head and body, 86th accused Zlatko Kreso have interrogated and beaten Darko Topić, 53rd accused dr. Zlatko Skikić refused to help Stanko Golemac when he was transferred to a hospital, saying that he will not treat Ustasha, 108th accused Zijo Oručević came to prison and had beaten Željko Hištuk and other prisoners.

4. During the force labor of captured HVO members, 3rd accused Ethem Ajanić had beaten Mustafa Brekalo during labor on Bišće Polje, 60th accused Hamo Šunje, on July 16th 1993 during labor in Mahala had beaten Mirko Vučić and Tomo Kordić, 45th accused Mirsad Omanović – “Mačak” killed one prisoner in Cernica, in July of 1993 the 18th accused Munib Džanković – “Lola” wounded Josip Kordić in the right shoulder, 63rd accused Semir Tojaga, in Blagaj, threatened with a pistol Franjo Kordić and other prisoners that he will kill them all, 29th accused Lola Kudin have beaten 10 prisoners in a park by the theater, 4th accused Tarik Bijedić threatened to kill Mirko Beno, 36th accused Kemal Kebo ordered on September 29th, 1993 Željko Vladić to carry from “Ruža” a piece of explosive to Franciscan monastery, in November of 1993 the 10th accused Semir Čemalović forced Željko Vladić to heavy physical labor and to clean his house, 61st accused Ibro Šunje attacked Tomo Kordić in Mahala with a pickaxe and threatened to kill him, 47th accused Sead Pintul and 57th accused Emir Salčin forced Ivica Jergović and three more HVO members to extract explosives from bombs, 13th accused Semir Grljević – “Lovac” in August of 1993 at Ričina street have beaten with fists Tomo Kordić and threatened him, 56th accused Goran Stošić, commander of the Ričina sector tied Igor Kapor with a rope around the neck and ordered him to carry 25 kg of dynamite to a building next to the kindergarten.

5. After the start of the Muslim Croatian conflict in Mostar, 10th accused Semir Čemalović, 11th Denis Čemalović, 30th Medžid Kerović, 31st accused Tahir Kerović, 40th accused Suad Mutapdžić, 7th accused Sead Bešlić, 38th accused Safet Memić, 39th Kasim Mušinović, 69th Adil Veledar, 41st accused Šefik Obad, 54th accused Sejo Sarić, 43rd accused Zijo Oručević and 35th Haris Karamehmedović have intimidated and harassed Croatian civilians on the left bank of Mostar, 26th Isić Selim, 14th accused Senad Grljević, 21st accused Ibro Husnić, 41st accused Senad Marić, 49th Salko Pirušić, 50th accused Osman Pirušić, 22nd accused Senad Husnić, 23rd accused Enes Husnić, 24th Mumin Husnić, 27th accused Ibro Isić, 16th accused Meho Dedić and 17th accused Humzo Dedić have imprisoned civilians of Croatian nationality on the left bank of Mostar, and the 17th accused Himzo Dedić threatened Ronald Brnas to kill him because he is a Croat, 9th accused Mirsad Bajrović, 8th accused Asim Bajrović, 67th accused Muhamed Taslidža, 46th accused Nusret Pintul, 48th accused Amet Peco, 21st accused Ibro Husnić and 41st accused Senad Marić as sharpshooters acted towards to right bank of Mostar, and from direction of Revija, Razvitak, Banje and railway station, 18th Munib Džanković – “Lola” on May 9th 1993 imprisoned Janja Pandža in an apartment in Š. Burića street number 1, 50th accused Suad Šarić, 68th accused Tarik Vila, 51st accused Miralem Salčin, 42nd accused Osman Macić and other members of MOS have on May 10th 1993 robbed a Health center and 62nd Zijo Tojaga have lined up Croats to stand guard without weapons with Muslims, and on May 19th/20th 1993 he forced the Croats to carry ammunition from VI primary school in Cernica, 28th accused Almir Jugo and 38th accused Safet Memić have robbed houses and apartments of Croats in a neighborhood of Cinema “Partizan”.

Therefore, in violation of the rules of international law in time of war and armed conflict against civilian population, and with the actions described in items 1 and 5 the accused under numbers: 1, 2, 52, 55, 12, 59, 66, 15, 34, 18, 84, 83, 109, 81, 96, 100, 76, 112, 111, 75, 113, 104, 73, 116, 117, 119, 118, 114, 115, 89, 78, 80, 105, 106, 98, 110, 92, 90, 93, 94, 82, 85, 97 and 95 have committed armed attack on civilian population and unlawful imprisonment of civilian population, the accused under numbers: 1, 52, 107, 91, 74 and 77 have looted the civilians property, the accused under number 89 arbitrarily destroyed property not justified by the needs of the army, the accused under numbers 87, 88, 72, 106, and 96 tortured and treated prisoners inhumanely, the accused under the numbers 7, 10, 11, 30, 31, 35, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 54, 62 and 69 have applied intimidation and torture, the accused under number 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 41, 49, 50 have unlawfully imprisoned civilian population, the accused under numbers 8, 9, 21, 41, 46, 48 and 67 have killed, intimidated and tortured, the accused under numbers 58, 68, 51, 42, 28 and 38 have committed robbery violating the regulations of international law by committing acts described in items 2, 3 and 4. The accused under numbers: 92, 95, 34, 33, 100, 96, 2, 6, 25, 64, 65, 79, 101, 102, 103, 55, 32, 5, 37, 60, 71, 20, 10, 50, 19, 86, 53, 108, 3, 45, 18, 63, 29, 4, 36, 61, 47, 57, 13, 56 and 70 have committed acts of murder, torture, inhumane treatment and violation of body.

Thus the accused under numbers 1, 2, 52, 55, 12, 59, 66, 15, 34, 18, 84, 83, 109, 81, 86, 100, 76, 112, 111, 106, 98, 110, 92, 90, 93, 94, 82, 85, 97, 95, 107, 91, 74, 77, 87, 88, 72, 7, 10, 11, 30, 31, 35, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 54, 62, 69, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 57, 41, 49, 50, 8, 9, 46, 48, 67, 58, 68, 51, 42 and 28 have committed criminal acts of War crime against civil population under article 142 paragraph 1 of Criminal Act taken over from former SFRY, and the accused under number: 92, 95, 34, 33, 100, 96, 2, 6, 25, 64, 65, 79, 101, 102, 103, 55, 32, 5, 37, 60, 71, 20, 13, 56 and 70 have committed War crime against prisoners of war under Article 144 of Criminal Act taken over from former SFRY.

Reasoning

High public prosecutor's office in Mostar has filed a request for initiating the investigation procedure against the indicted Zlatko Alikafić and others, having reasonable doubt that they have committed criminal acts under Article 142, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Act taken over from former SFRY, and because the persons indicted are unavailable to the prosecution authorities of HR H-B, it was to be decided as stated in the disposition of this decision, and pursuant to Article 159, paragraph 2 of the retained Law on Criminal Procedure.

LEGAL REMEDY:

This Decision may be appealed at the Criminal Council of this court within 3 days from the receipt of this Decision.

Judge rapporteur

Nada Dalipagić

/signature illegible/

Bosnia and Herzegovina
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
Ministry of Interior
Police Directorate Travnik
POLICE STATION KAKANJ

INFORMATION

on Croatian casualties in Kakanj
municipality from the beginning of the aggression
on BH territory until the early April of 1995

MAY, 1995

INFORMATION

on Croatian casualties in Kakanj
municipality from the beginning of the aggression
on BH territory until the early April of 1995

Start of Serbo-Montenegrin aggression on the Bosnia and Herzegovina territory, in the Kakanj region, was met with the already established formations of organized armed resistance of the population via established HVO Kakanj units, resulting at first in deterrence of local Serbian armed formations from taking military actions in the region, and later in disarming them, therefore there were no armed conflicts with local Serbs in the Kakanj region, hence there were no crimes committed against local Croatian population.

At the same time, pressure by the political representatives of the Muslim people, and later their military leadership, to submit HVO units under the Muslim government and Muslim army, was growing.

As these pressures haven't yielded the desired results, in line with the strengthening of the Muslim armed forces, methods of pressure and provocations also changed.

From verbal pressure and provocations at the beginning, it escalated to barricades, disarming and arrests of some HVO members and officials, removing of the flag of Croatian people, and first murders of Croats started very soon. It all culminated in early June 1993 with the open aggression of MOS units on Croatian territories in Kakanj municipality.

Eight Croats were killed in the period from June 20th, 1992 to May 18th, 1993, before the start of the MOS's open aggression on Croatian territories in Kakanj municipality, by members of various Muslim armed formations, while on May 18th, 1993, in an attempt to provoke armed conflict on the territory of Kakanj, members of the so-called "7th Muslim Brigade of the BH Army" unreasonably arrested 16 civilians (Croats and Serbs) who were detained at the headquarters of the same unit at the motel "Sretno" in Kakanj where they were tortured for several hours, and on this occasion several detainees suffered minor and serious physical injuries.

In the early morning hours of June 8th, 1993, Muslim armed forces started the open attack on Croatian territory in Kakanj, on Croatian villages and Croats from Kakanj municipality, in which all Muslim troops from the Kakanj area participated, as well as parts of the Muslim troops from Zenica, Visoko and Breza.

Initial forms of aggression were manifested in the attack on village Lučiće with majority of Croatian population, with the intention to cut the communication between Kraljeva Sutjeska and Vareš, when two people were killed and more wounded.

At the same time, MOS began "CLEANSING" smaller Croatian villages (Lozančić, Žugoj, Brnj, Gornji Banjevac and Crnač) which were not under the direct protection of HVO units. Women and children were exiled from the villages, and most of the men detained in the improvised camps in "Old Mine Directorate", motel "Sretno", sports hall and other locations in Kakanj. Dozens of men were detained like this, and later physically abused, starved and humiliated.

Following multiple attacks of the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ on Croatian villages of Slapnica and Slapna Gora and a penetration of the defence line, NINE civilians and Croatian war prisoners were killed, and part of the population used as a human shield towards the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ units.

On June 13th, 1993, after breach of the defense line, as they entered Croatian villages, members of Muslim armed forces looted and burned homes and commercial buildings and murdered and tortured local population.

In village Drenovnik, when they came across about 40 people at refuge, majority of whom were women, children, elderly and infirm, Muslim forces forced them on a country road and there for no apparent reason they opened fire on the group killing EIGHT people and wounding several.

After the carnage in Drenovnik, Muslim troops committed another massacre in village Bradarić and Kovači villagers. For no reason whatsoever they killed SEVEN defenseless civilians mostly elderly, and THREE PRISONERS OF WAR.

In addition to these group murders, Muslim sniper actions, indiscriminate shelling of civilian targets, another TEN civilians were killed and several wounded in different ways.

After the withdrawal of HVO from Kakanj area towards Vareš, a significant number of Croatian civilian population fled the area, while the systematic repression of the remaining civilian population continued (arrests, looting and destruction of property, forced mobilization, etc.)

Along with the repression of the remaining Croatian population, Muslim civil and military authorities were calling Croatian refugees via Muslim media to return from Vareš to their homes "guaranteeing" their safety. One part of the population has unfortunately succumbed to the propaganda of Muslim authorities and had returned to their villages and their houses, and on this occasion four people were killed, and several arrested and tortured in Muslim prisons.

In addition to the above, a systematic repression was conducted against people (Croats) who remained in their homes. So, on the territory of Kakanj municipality, from the time of termination of armed conflicts to the beginning of April 1995, in the area of Kakanj municipality, occupied by Muslim forces, FOURTEEN people were killed, a larger number of people were detained and imprisoned in Muslim casamates, some of them for several months, and one person is still in Zenica prison, despite all the exchanges of prisoners.

Large number of remaining Croats was robbed of their property, their homes were searched for no reason, calls for mobilization to join the Muslim army were sent, which all contributed to the continuation of exile-persecution of Croats from the Kakanj municipality area.

In order to starve the population, Muslim authorities have blocked the delivery of humanitarian aid to Croats of Kakanj and Kraljeva Sutjeska, and the help that did come to Charitas parishes of Kakanj and Kraljeva Sutjeska were confiscated.

Likewise, during war conflicts, in addition to those previously mention, another FIVE war prisoners were killed, of which one in Kakanj, one in Zenica, two in Visoko and one in Fojnica.

During war operations in the Kakanj area, 50-70 residential and commercial buildings were destroyed, and after the armed conflicts ended on the territory under Muslim occupation, about 1,200 residential and commercial buildings were burned and about 1,500 completely devastated, owned by Croats (roofs, floors, windows, doors, installation, etc. were demounted) all in an attempt to intimidate the rest of the population and to prevent the return of the exiled population.

In addition to residential and commercial buildings, sacral buildings were also systematically destroyed, ONE SUBSIDIARY CHURCH was burned, and FOUR SUBSIDIARY CHURCHES were completely devastated. During the same period all small cemetery chapels were devastated.

All valuable mobile assets (agricultural machinery, trucks, personal vehicles, technical equipment and furniture, etc.) were stolen.

The entire "cleansed" area was immediately settled with Muslim refugees from East Bosnia, which greatly changed the demographic structure of the population in that area. From around 18,000 Croats living in the area of Kakanj before the war, now there's about 3,000 Croats, while the number of Muslims increased considerably.

ČAPLJINA, MAY 1995

PROCESSED BY

PS /Police Station/ KAKANJ

NOVI TRAVNIK MUNICIPALITY

GENERAL DATA

According to the 1991 census, 30,624 inhabitants lived in Novi Travnik municipality of which:

12,127	Croats	or	39,6%
11,649	Muslims	or	38%
4,087	Serbs	or	13,3%
2,112	Yugoslavs	or	6,9%
646	others	or	2,2%

In this overview we will reflect on particular incidents with specific information about the victims and especially about the people for whom there are grounds for suspicion that they have committed crimes.

1. VILLAGE ZENEPIĆI

Village Zenepići had around 35 households. BH Army attack lasted from June 6th, 1993 to June 16th, 1993 during which period the entire Croatian population was exiled, fleeing towards the territory controlled by the Serbian forces. Not a single Croat remained in the village. Houses were burned, property looted, and the following civilians died as a result of shelling:

Kata Vrhovac, Jozo Vrhovac, Mara Vrhovac, Luca Vrhovac, Mara Brkan.

In addition to those mentioned above, following persons were killed; Mijo Vrhovac, Ivica Vrhovac, Niko Vrhovac and Niko Šiško, all of who were killed during the attack of BH Army forces on the village.

Persons responsible for these crimes are:

- MUNIR BILIĆ, father Hasan, mother Šaćira, born on October 21st, 1952 in Vejzovići, Novi Travnik municipality.
- ŠERIF BALIHODŽIĆ, son of Sakib, mother Ševala born Kuharić, born on December 14th, 1957 in Vejzovići, Novi Travnik municipality.
- FERID BERBEROVIĆ, son of Hasan, mother Mevla born Aščić, born on April 26th, 1953 in Vejzovići, Novi Travnik municipality,
- MEVLUDIN BERBEROVIĆ, son of Zajim, mother Munira born Dervić, born on July 14th, 1955 in Vejzovići, Novi Travnik municipality,
- MEHMED AŠČIĆ, son of Meho, mother Đenka born Mlivo, born on October 4th 1949
- SEFIR KALBIĆ, son of Šaćir, mother Mesuda, born on June 9th, 1953 in Stajište, Novi Travnik municipality,

At the time BILIĆ MUNIR was the commander of artillery, at whose command the village was shelled, and as a result of shelling several people were killed-wounded.

BALIHODŽIĆ ŠERIF commanded the MOS forces from the direction of Vejzovići whose soldiers have killed Niko Vrhovac while entering the village Zenepići.

FERID BERBEROVIĆ commanded with AŠČIĆ MEHMED with a task to completely destroy and burn the mentioned village, and exile the villagers, which task they completed.

At the time, BERBEROVIĆ MELVUDIN was a chief commander for this part of Novi Travnik municipality, at which occasion and under his command Croatian population was exiled.

MEHMED AŠČIĆ had participated directly in the destruction of the village, burning and looting the property, and in the expulsion of the village population.

SEFIR KALBIĆ was the commander of the zone for the mentioned area and he had to report to a senior commander for successful completion of these actions. He received public commendation for his actions regarding the events in village Zenepići.

(Refer to statement given by Mitrović Marko and Mate Vrhovac.)

INHUMANE TREATMENT OF WAR PRISONERS

On October 3rd, 1993 members of the BH Army have captured two HVO members (Pero Vila, Petar Antelj).

During questioning, detainees were physically mistreated, conditions of detention were extremely inhumane and focused on the torture of detainees, constantly threatened with murder. After torture and exhaustion, they were taken to a prison in Zenica, where the abuse continued.

People for whom there is reasonable doubt that they committed crimes against prisoners of war are:

- BESIM SILAJDŽIJA, father Nezir, mother Stupa born Kunić, born on April 10th, 1951 in Čakići, Novi Travnik municipality, living in 4. Juli street in N. Travnik

The abovementioned physically abused the prisoners, hitting them with a cast (his arm was in a cast), on head and other body parts.

- SABAHUDIN VIŠO, father Ismet, mother Fata born Terlaković, born on April 15th, 1953 in Kakanj, living in 4. Juli street in N. Travnik

He especially stood out in the physical abuse and infliction of serious injuries.

- FIKRET OMERAČIĆ, father Smail, mother Devla born Porić, born on March 29th, 1964 in Rankovići, N. Travnik municipality.

He also participated in harassing prisoners, inflicting injuries on the faces of the prisoners with a bayonet threatening to slaughter them etc.

- ŠEFIK LENDO, father Alija, mother Tenzila born Delić, born on May 2nd, 1954 in Bistro, N. Travnik municipality.

He also tortured prisoners, Pero Vila's five ribs were broken from the force of the blows.

- ZORAN TRKELJA, father Čedomir, mother Ruža born Marić, born on January 5th, 1964 in Travnik, living in 4. Juli street in N. Travnik.

He also stood out in physical violence. He would hit prisoners on the head like a boxer until their arcade was damaged, as a result of which both detainees sustained serious injuries.

(Please refer to statements given by Antelj Petar and Vila Pero.)

VILLAGE KOPILA – WAR CRIME AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATION

On June 9th, 1993 members of the BH Army have murdered civilians in this village, and survivors were detained in the camp, afterwards they systematically looted the village.

On the same day civilian Jurišić Josip, 55 years old, was killed in his home and during the same incident his son Zdravko, 27 years old, was also killed.

The following persons participated in this crime:

- PERENDA MUSTAFA, approximately 40 years old, from Kopila village, Novi Travnik municipality

- PERENDA OSMAN, from village Sjenokosa, Novi Travnik municipality

- PERENDA KADIR, from village Sjenokosa, Novi Travnik municipality

- HASANOVIĆ SULJO, village Kopila, Novi Travnik

- HASANOVIĆ ENES, village Kopila, Novi Travnik

- HASANOVIĆ REFIK, village Kopila, Novi Travnik
- HASANOVIĆ ŠEFIK, village Kopila, Novi Travnik
- HASANOVIĆ MEHMED, village Kopila, Novi Travnik
- HASANOVIĆ MUJO, village Kopila, Novi Travnik
- HASANOVIĆ SENAD, village Kopila, Novi Travnik

(Please refer to the testimony of Ljuba Jurišić)

VILLAGE TRENICE

This village was also attacked on June 9th, 1993. The entire population was imprisoned in the local school, which was then shelled at the exact time when the prisoners, mostly women and children, were brought to the school, at which time several individuals were wounded. Men were separated and taken to forced labour or were physically tortured. Not even one Croat was left in the village, houses were robbed and almost all of them burned.

Person responsible for this crime is: NIKAD SKOPLJAR, father Mustafa, mother Zlatka born Memić, born on August 28th, 1956 in Travnik, living in Trenice bb.

The abovementioned was the commander of the parts of Trenice municipality called Opara and Rostovo. Under his command Croatian houses were first looted and then burned, and at his command prisoners were tortured and tormented, forced to labour etc. As a result of physical violence, Vilim Ćorić and Anto Adžip were seriously injured.

(Please refer to statements given by Matko Bartulović-Barnjak and Mirko Ćorić.)

The following persons stood out in particular in persecution of the civilian population detained in concentration camps where they were subjected to torture, forced labour and used as a human shield:

- GRIZIĆ SEJKAM, approximately 45 years old, from village Trenice, N.Travnik municipality
- GRIZIĆ AGAN, approximately 55 years old, from village Trenice, N. Travnik municipality
- TABAKOVIĆ ESAD, (Trenice primary school principle), approximately 30 years old, form village Trenice, Novi Travnik municipality
- SKOPLJAK MUSTAFA, approximately 60 years old, from village Trenice, N. Travnik municipality
- IMANOVIĆ NEZIR, approximately 40 years old, from village Trenice, N. Travnik municipality
- ČAKIĆ SULJO, approximately 60 years old, from village Trenice, N. Travnik municipality
- SARAJČIĆ HAJRUDIN called "HAJRO" from village Bisto, N. Travnik municipality.

(Please refer to statements given by Čonda Drago and Ćorić Vilim.)

VILLAGE ŠENKOVIĆI – GENOCIDE, FORCED DISPLACEMENT

Village was attacked on June 9th, 1993. Prisoners were usually treated in a way that they were imprisoned, houses and commercial building looted and burned and not even one Croat remained in the village. Prisoners were robbed of their valuables, money and gold. ISMET ZEC from Pečuje, took 5,000 DM from Franjo Slipac, as well as jewellery and other valuables. Gravestones were demolished.

Persons for whom there are grounds for suspicion that they participated in the activities described above are:

- ATIH HASKIĆ, son of Đemal, mother Hatidža born Kukić, born on January 5th, 1966 in Šenkovići, where he lives, qualified blacksmith.
- MEHMED KURTOVIĆ, father Halid, mother Emina born Delić, born on November 19th, 1952 in Šenkovići where he also lives, qualified crane operator

- SULEJMAN HASKIĆ, father Sulejman, mother Hajra born Tekešić, born on May 17th, 1952 in Šenkovići where he also lives
- SAFET HASKIĆ, father Avdo, mother Fatima born Habibić, born on June 16th, 1955 in Šenkovići where he lives
- SEFIR KALIBIĆ, father Šaćir, mother Mesuda, born on June 10th, 1958 in Stajište, Novi Travnik municipality, living in Kalinići, degree in law

(Please refer to statements given by Ivica Slipac and Mate Lozančić.)

CONCENTRATION CAMP IN OPARA

In Opara, members of the BH Army had formed a concentration camp for Croats, located in a wing of a primary school.

Prisoners were treated inhumanely, with constant interrogation and beating, money confiscation, intimidation with threatening, guards were using all unlawful methods of inflicting injuries, prisoners were forced to perform Islamic prayers and ceremonies, and were threatened to be killed etc.

Commander of the concentration camp in Opara was Šehinović Ismet, approximately 36 years old, from Opara. HASKIĆ SULJO, ASKIĆ ATIF, MUSLIĆ ZIJO, PERENDA NENAD, ISMET ZEC, ZIJO LUGAN and certain SEMIR, all operated in the concentration camp and participated in the abuse and torture of prisoners.

(Please refer to statements given by Knežević Nikica and Pecirep Dragan.)

UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT OF CIVILIANS IN NOVI TRAVNIK MUNICIPALITY

In April 1993, Croatian civilian population was imprisoned without any criteria. People were treated inhumanely, used as human shield on the front lines, constantly beaten and tortured in various different ways.

Prisoners were forced to dig trenches on first lines, dig out dead bodies and other physical labour. Hygienic conditions simply did not exist. People were forced out of their homes, their valuables were taken, houses robbed and burned.

Persons for whom there are grounds for suspicion that they participated in the activities described above are:

- NAZIP MUSLIĆ, approximately 55 years old, from Novi Travnik, president of the municipal government
- KUKIĆ ZIJAT, approximately 35 years old, from village Kasapović, chief of N. Travnik MP
- HAJRUDIN ŠKULJ, chief of Novi Travnik CP /Civil Police/
- KRNIĆ JASMIN, approximately 30 years old, from Krnji Potok, commander of MP brigade
- BISLIM ZURATI, born in 1961, from Sandžak (Serbia), commander of BH Army 308th brigade.

I would like to emphasize that extremist units operated in this area, such as “EL MUDŽAHEDIN”, “CRNI KOJOTI” consisting mainly of refugees from Krajina exiled from the Serbian occupied territories, “ŽIGOSANI” consisting mainly of prisoners from Zenica prison, “JAJAČKE KOBRE” and “DŽENETSKA FURIJA”.

(Please refer to statements given by Ribić Ante, Poljanica Ivica and Kata, Bartulović Franjo, Poljanica Jozo, Jelušć Zora.)

SHARPSHOOTERS' ACTIVITIES

BH Army had organised a sharpshooters group in Novi Travnik, consisting of 20 people whose primary goal was to kill civilians. The group acted mostly from skyscrapers (because of the height and visibility), killing dozens of civilians.

We would like to point out to murders of children while playing, murder of a pregnant woman, and other cases which are evident from the attached statements.

Persons for whom there are grounds for suspicion for sharpshooting activities are:

- MEHMED AŠČIĆ called HAMČE, son of Meho, mother Đenka born Milvo, born on October 4th, 1949 in Vejzovići, N. Travnik municipality, commanded a group of police sharpshooters
- ENEZ LENDO, son of Alija, born in 1952 in Bistro, living in Opara 5.
- FAUD SINANOVIĆ, father Abdulah, mother Hanifa born Tatra, born on March 3rd, 1967 in Patačići, N.Travnik municipality
- FIKRET OSMANČIĆ, son of Alija, born on July 15th, 1962, in Zenica
- HALID KRNJIĆ, son of Sulejman, mother Đevleta born Aščić, born on July 13th, 1955 in Krnjića Potok, N. Travnik, living in 4. Juli street 66/29, former president of the Novi Travnik municipality.

These people were the executors of the commands given by MEHMED AŠČIĆ, thus participating in murders. (Please refer to statements given by Stipo Filipović, Vlado Čeko, Kemal Nizić.)

IMPRISONMENT OF CIVILIANS

On June 9th, 1993, members of the BH Army have imprisoned more than 100 civilians. In detention people were beaten, severe injuries were inflicted. Prisoners were losing consciousness due to the force of the blows, many had to seek medical help in order to survive, because they were needed alive in order to be exchanged.

Elderly, women and children were killed in Šenkovići, all of which is evident from the attached statements.

Persons who stood out in these mistreatments were:

- ISMET ZEC, HODŽA, last name ĆURIĆ – commander of “MUDŽAHEDIN” unit, HASKIĆ EJUB, NIKO PERANDA, ESAD PERANDA, MEHO KOČIĆ, ATIF HASKIĆ, KUGAT FAUD, PERANDA MUSTAFA and PATAK HAMDİJA.

(Please refer to statements given by Adžaip Fabijan, Adžaip Zdravko, Adžaip Žarko, Adžaip Josip, Adžaip Marko, Ristovski Mara.)

SHELLING OF CIVILIANS WHO CAME FOR DRINKING WATER

On August 28th, 1993, members of the BH Army were shelling village Ratanjska, in which Croatian civilians came to get fresh water. As it happened, they would first shut down the water in order to control it, and once they would open it, they would start with the shelling of the aforementioned place.

Shelling was directed from direction of “Vilenice” (around Relce), part of the territory controlled by the BH Army members.

As a result of the aforementioned shelling, 3 people have died, and several were seriously wounded. Shelling of this place was almost daily, mostly in situations when the crowd would gather on the location.

(Please refer to statement given by Ramljak Ilija.)

The task of all military activities was to expel the entire Croatian population from the municipality of Novi Travnik. The most brutal murders were committed, children were murdered in the presence of their parents.

Particularly notorious were the above mentioned units. All the details are visible in the attached statements.

We would like to use this opportunity to point out some other individuals for whom there are grounds for suspicion of having committed war crimes:

- AZER (OSMANA) SILAJDŽIJA, from Bistro, Novi Travnik
- GRUDIĆ ESAD, Chief of Kraiška brigade MP
- LEDO ENES called "ŽUTI", former policeman from village Bistro, N. Travnik
- TAHIROVIĆ ARIF, from Bistro N. Travnik
- TAHIROVIĆ NIZO, from Bistro N. Travnik
- DEDIĆ HAMDİJA, from Bistro N. Travnik
- DEDIĆ NAĐA, from Bistro N. Travnik
- LENDO MUHAMED, from Bistro N. Travnik
- DEDIĆ NAŠID, from Bistro N. Travnik
- MEHINA ISMET, from Bistro N. Travnik
- LENDO TAHIR, from Bistro N. Travnik
- LENDO REDŽIB, from Bistro N. Travnik
- SOLO AHMET, from Bistro N. Travnik
- SOLO MUJO from Bistro N. Travnik
- SOLO (RAMIZA) ENIZ from Bistro N. Travnik
- ČAUŠ RAMO from Bistro N. Travnik
- LENDO SELIM from Bistro N. Travnik
- LENDO DŽEMO from Bistro N. Travnik
- LENDO SABAHUDIN from Bistro N. Travnik
- LENDO REDŽO from Bistro N. Travnik
- LENDO MAJRUDIN from Bistro N. Travnik

These individuals have participated in deportation, imprisonment, hurting and killing civilian population, and looting and burning property belonging to Croats.

These are materials that we have at the moment, however we are processing information about certain incidents, and once completed, materials will be submitted successively.

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištice, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Sreb.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
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s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

epređiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
nu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

**AGGRESSION OF
BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
AGAINST THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA**

FACTS

1. Have you ever heard any reaction from Sarajevo when village Uništa was occupied?
2. Is village Uništa on the territory of BiH?
3. What was the reaction of the Muslim leadership to the occupation of Mostar and Neretva Valley in 1991?
4. What about village Ravno? Destroyed and exterminated! What was the reaction from Sarajevo?
5. And what about the attacks on Dubrovnik and South of Croatia, killings in Slavonski Brod and the surrounding region, what was the reaction and the attitude of Alija Izetbegović?
6. Did you know about the existence of the "Patriotic League", when was it founded, what kind and whose views did it represent, how and to whom did it pledge allegiance,?
7. Didn't TO /Territorial Defence/ of BiH participate in the aggression against Croatia?
8. Were citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina recruited in units participating in the aggression against Croatia?
9. When Alija Izetbegovic "designed" his own TO of BiH, was even one Croat appointed as a commander?
10. Is it not true that more than five hundred Commanders of BH Army (with the highest ranks) were in JNA until March-April-May of 1992 and thus engaged in the aggression against Slovenia and Croatia?
11. Did you know that by signing the agreement between Alija Izetbegović and Momčilo Krajišnik (16 September 1993), the truce between Army of Republika Srpska and ABiH (Muslims), which had been agreed on 30 July 1993, had been confirmed and the conflict completely stopped?
12. Please see the general Šiber's document!
Isn't the truce signed (and mostly respected) by BH Army and RS Army on 30 July 1993, explicitly mentioned in the document?
After the cease-fire with the RS Army, BiH Army launched all of its resources of 3rd Corps, 4th Corps, 6th Corps and part of the 1st Corps against HVO.
13. Are you familiar with the BH Army offensive known as the "Neretva 93"?
 - a) Do you know what the goals of the offensive were?
 - Occupation of territory up to the western borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Neum, Ploče and beyond)
 - Široki Brijeg, Ljubuški, ... ?
 - b) how long was the front line of this offensive?
 - c) for how long did the operation of this "allied army" last?
 - d) how many units were involved in the operation – 4th corps, 6th corps and parts of 1st corps (from Sarajevo), 3rd corps (from Zenica), how many Mujahideens , ... ?
14. After the ceasefire was signed with Bosnia and Herzegovina, how many RS Army units were free to engage in the attacks on Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Army?
15. Which and how many BH Army units were engaged in the occupation of Vareš, once the ceasefire with Serbs was signed?
16. When will someone in RH /Republic of Croatia/ press charges against Bosnia and Herzegovina for actively (JNA +Serbs + TO) attacking Croatia?
 - Doesn't Republic of Srpska have legal continuity?
 - Is not Republic of Srpska part of Bosnia and Herzegovina territory?
 - Doesn't BiH have legal continuity?

17. When will someone in RH /Republic of Croatia/ press charges against BiH, because its Presidency and the President of the Presidency, A. Izetbegović passively watched as the state and territory were being occupied (Uništa) , as Dubrovnik and the surrounding area were being burned, as people in Slavonski Brod were being killed, as Metković was being attacked (all this from the territory of the State which he represents and leads) – as more than 500 Muslim officers were serving in JNA and "carrying out its mission" (without requesting them to leave the army)?

And all because this "was not his war", Muslims were not yet killed, only Croats.

Although I'm not sure that it will ever happen, I can at least hope that the "thinking" part of Croats will one day, before "thinking " and " concluding ", get to know the facts on the bases of which they think and make such conclusions .

All the facts - war, material and political, historical and sociological, psychological and economic, socio-pathological, views, opinions , judgments , fears , fatigue , despair and hope as well as all interactions within this system.

And please, let's put all of this on the timeline; let's consider the differential equations of higher rank of all interactions in the chaotic - dynamic system that we call war.

And then compare these facts with the American civil war, with the civil war in Spain, with actions of armies and soldiers at the end of the Second World War (and especially after the end of the war) and the war in Vietnam , the wars in the Middle and Far East , with Northern Ireland , (skip Africa) .

Compare war with war.

And please, for God's sakes, forget the linearity of your reasoning.

Slobodan Praljak

D-1

Alija Izetbegović later renounced this "*HISTORICAL AGREEMENT*", but the fact remains that he negotiated the fate of BiH with Serbs disregarding the Croats.

CROATIA is attacked from the territory of "his" country, but as he will declare a month later, when JNA destroyed the village Ravno (in BiH), populated by Croats - "*THIS IS NOT OUR WAR.*"

In "translation" that means → this is not our, Muslim war, WE ARE NOT ATTACKED BY JNA AND SERBS.

D-2, D-2a

President of the Presidency of BiH cares only about Muslims.

They swear to ALLAH J. SH. /Jalla Shanuhu/, they have a secret army.

All this is fine, but why is Mr. Izetbegović presenting himself as a representative of all the citizens and nations living in BiH?

How can Croats in BiH trust this policy?

D-3

D-3 logically follows the previous two documents.

Izetbegović appoints 39 commanders of the BH Territorial Defence on 27th May 1992.

Not one of the appointed commanders is a Croat.

On 10th June 1992 he appoints Daidža as a commander of some military action, Daidža's orders must be obeyed.

So what's the problem, you ask.

At that time, then, Daidža (NIJAZ BATLAK aka MATE ŠARLIJA) is a senior Croatian Army officer.

Does Izetbegović ask Dr. Franjo Tuđman, the supreme commander of HV, if he is allowed to do so?

No, he doesn't.

Nijaz Batlak-Daidža is by ethnicity and religion a Muslim, commands one unit of the Croatian Army, helps Muslims in BiH to arm themselves, and that's enough for Izetbegović.

Did Croatian President, Dr. Franjo Tuđman, in any way punish or prevent such work of General Daidža? - TO HELP THE MUSLIMS IN BiH.

No, he did not.

D-4

Sefer Halilović, JNA officer, a member of KOS (JNA counterintelligence), military communist and fascist organization, the strongest and the most powerful service in Yugoslavia, was in JNA at the time of aggression on Croatia, somewhere near Osijek.

That individual later joined the "*PATRIOTIC LEAGUE*", on 25th February 1992 when this document was written, secret Muslim military organization.

The war in BiH has not even started, and he, Sefer Halilović, in his JNA officers', counterintelligence manner, declares Croats (HDZ) /Croatian Democratic Union/ extremists.

Croats were and remain Ustashas for Sefer (other documents attest that), and he, Sefer, already has 120,000 soldiers.

All efforts from Croatia and Croats from Bosnia to find a way to fight jointly with such a man were doomed to failure in advance.

D-5

On 14th September 1993 Alija Izetbegović signed the document establishing a confederation which included parts of BiH controlled by Croats (HVO) and Muslims (BH Army) and Croatia.

Izetbegović signed a secret agreement on confederation with Franjo Tuđman during the BH Peace Conference, consisting of three Republics.

Croatian Republic and the Bosnian-Muslim Republic of BiH enter in confederation with Croatia.

And as reader of the document can see, two days later, that same Izetbegović signs the document with Serbs

which clearly shows that he divides BiH, that he abolishes it as a country, anticipates a referendum and that he seeks the state legal continuity for himself, his nation-Muslims.

That man, Alija Izetbegović, was lying from the beginning, from the Cutileiro's plan onwards, to everyone around him, including the International community.

The sad and tragic fate of his nation, the inefficiency of international politics, cannot and should not shift the blame for the tragic events, in the political sense, to others.

A lie remains a lie, lying to a friendly Croatia remains lying.

And why did Alija sign a document with Momčilo Krajišnik?

Because he was informed by his military commanders that BH Army will break HVO, that they will "liberate" BiH to Neum and Ploče (Croatia), that they will go to the western borders of BiH, in order to compensate for the territory occupied by the Serbs.

Document D-5 states that the truce with the VRS (Serbian Army in BiH) was signed on 30th July 1993, after which all Muslim BH Army forces started an offensive on Croats (HVO), known as the "NERETVA 93". My dear readers, all the documents are available to you.

To this day, nothing has changed in this policy of Muslim leaders towards Croats.

D-6

Military enforcement of the D-5 document and the confirmation of the D-5 document.

D-7 to D-21

It is very clear from the documents that JNA, Serbs from BiH (VRS) and Serbs from Croatia (Krajina Army) belong to the same armed forces, with the same military and political objectives.

Croatia is attacked from BiH; which means that BiH is attacking Croatia.

This is where logical, terminology and legal problems start.

And the problems of death.

When Croatian President Franjo Tuđman asks Alija Izetbegović (Chairman of the Presidency of BiH) to sign a MILITARY AGREEMENT between BiH and Croatia that would enable HV to defend itself against aggression on the "BATTLEFIELD" (meaning also in BiH), Izetbegović refuses. He consents to an agreement allowing HV to cross the border of BiH into "tactical depth" only.

NOTE:

Izetbegović will sign the military agreement with Croatia only in summer 1995, when Bihac area protected by UN forces is under threat to experience the same fate of the UN protected area of Srebrenica.

So, when BiH attacks Croatia, then BiH doesn't really attack Croatia, but rather Croatia is attacked by the Serbs.

When HV wants to cross the border of BiH to defend itself, then HV violates the international law and interferes in the internal affairs of the other state, and this is aggression.

And that makes "International community" especially angry.

And HV doesn't do it.

D-22

The consequences of what is indicated in documents D-7 to D-21.

And that's only for Slavonski Brod; so I wouldn't spoil your appetite for dinner with the excessive amount of "ugly" photographs.

D-23

The document demonstrates how the "Great Serbia" was created.

D-24 to D-29

Documents describe the same statement.

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina engages in a military attack on Republic of Croatia.

D-30, D-31, D-32

Please just read the documents.

D-33


Alija Izetbegović cannot stop the aggression on Croatia led by JNA and Serbs from the BH territory. But the highlight of the political and statesmanship blindness is to believe that the Serbs only want a part of Croatia, and not a part of BiH.

Even worse, the ultimate hypocrisy is indicated in the position in which Franjo Tuđman is asked to prevent spreading of the war on Bosnia and Herzegovina.


So, Alija says, let them conquer and beat people in Croatia (be it from BiH), kill Croats in BiH (Ravno, Uništa) as well, as long as they don't touch us Muslims.

One doesn't know which is worse in this attitude: **STUPIDITY OR MALICE.**

Geographical structure of JNA until 1987/88 - Army System



Geographical structure of JNA after 1988 - Army System



JNA Manpower: in peace 180,000 (15%); at war + 1,200,000 (85%)
TO: manpower in peace, approximately 1,000 (2%, only commands HQ);
manpower at war: + 1,200,000 (98%) – of which:
 Slovenia TO 110,000, Croatia TO 230,000, Bosnia and Herzegovina TO 270,000, Monte Negro TO 40,000, Macedonia TO 60,000, Serbia TO 300,000, Vojvodina TO 60,000, Kosovo TO 130,000, except that the last one existed only on paper, because it was disbanded after the demonstration of Albanians in the Spring of 1981 and the armament was taken to Serbia; armaments were either not taken from Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins (approximately 12% of the population) or they were armed later via non-institutional channels.


SFRY OS/armed forces/total number in war (with 8% stretch) 2,400,000, of which 550,000 in production and logistics, and the rest in combat units.

Land Forces (LF)
Composition: 17 Corps and 1 Guard Division (Belgrade) and 63rd Parachute Brigade (Niš) as independent General Staff units; heavy armament: 2,100 tanks, 1,000 armed transportation vehicles, 8,000 artillery armaments and 1,300 anti-tank missile weapons.

Yugoslav Navy (YN)
Composition and resources: 1 torpedo-boat Brigade (14), one missile-boat and missile gunboats (16), one patrol-boat brigade (4), one minesweeper squadron (9), one submarine brigade (11), one squadron of marine commandos and three naval infantry brigades.

Air Force and Air Defence (AF and AD)
Composition: 5th AF and AD Corps (Zagreb), 1st AF and AD Corps (Belgrade), 3rd AF and AD Corps (Skopje); resources 512 combat aircrafts, 104 transportation aircrafts, 152 helicopters and 118 other aircrafts, and 5,100 anti-aircraft guns and 2,800 anti-aircraft missile weapons.

Zones of Serbian armed rebellion



Command of Northwest theater of operations from which rebellion strategy is operated:
 3rd (Maribor) and 14th (Ljubljana) Corps have a mission to secure SFRY western borders,
 and 32nd (Rijeka) and 9th (Knin) Corps under the Navy theater of operations, have a task to
 support and supply rebels and to prevent Croatian forces to suppress the rebellion.

Corps Command HQ


Centres from which the rebellion was directed and spread

The overall spread of rebellion (approximately 25 % of Croatian territory, 144,344 Serbs live in 11 municipalities with Serbian majority, or 24.9 % of the total number of Serbs in Croatia, while in the remaining 91 municipalities there are 436,418 Serbs or 75.1 % of their total number)


Direction of JNA units' operation with a mission to "appease the situation", but in reality they created buffer zones between the rebels and Croatian police in order to stabilize the authorities in the zones of rebellion; these zones and parts of JNA which were left there had a mission to accept the main aggression forces when they start the offensive.



Protection plan of western SFRY borders


Initial general idea of the aggression against Croatia and Slovenia



Plan of attack on Croatia after retreat of JNA forces from Slovenia (VII/1991)







On August 17th 1990, intervention by Croatian police to remove barricades in the rebelled Knin, was prevented by JNA aircrafts based in Bihać (BiH)



General aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and BiH against Croatia

Aggression against the Republic of Croatia was continuously conducted from March 1991 until the occupation of Eastern Slavonia, i.e. the city of Vukovar, and these borders were not greatly changed until the summer of 1995.



Shelling of Banski Dvori in Zagreb, 7th October 1991

JNA aircraft MIG -21 took off from the Air base Čoralići – Bihać, BiH

Serbian - Muslim "Historical Agreement":
Muhamed Filipović - Radovan Karadžić (2 August 1991)

Text of the Serbian-Muslim Agreement

In the face of recent developments which have increased the threat of confrontation between our two peoples whose interests have never in history been conflicting and who have never entered into such a conflict, aware of our responsibility to the peoples we represent and all peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, we have decided, with a view to future co-operation and peace, to establish and sign the following political Agreement:

1. Aware of the difficulties inherited and those caused by post-electoral political events, we have decided, in the spirit of openness and mutual respect, to promote the historical and political interests of our two peoples. This is not an agreement against anyone but for everyone and, as such, open to all who support the principle of co-existence in freedom and full equality.
2. We believe coexistence to be founded on mutual recognition of the sovereignty of individual peoples, the securing of full territorial integrity and political subjectivity of our Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on it having the same constitutional and legal position as all other republics in our common state of Yugoslavia.
3. We believe Yugoslavia to be a historically justified state of republics and peoples enjoying full equality, and we will promote the preservation and development of this community.
4. We agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a legally and politically unified and democratically organised federal unit with legal jurisdiction over every part of its territory, provided, however, that the federal constitution and legislature constitute the foundation of the country's legal system and guarantee the equality of its citizens, peoples and republics.
5. It is in our interest to have the Croats live in full equality with us in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we hereby invite them to join this agreement. Regardless of the position of the Republic of Croatia within or without Yugoslavia, the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina have full equality.
6. Mutual relations of citizens, peoples and republics in Yugoslavia shall be organised by a common constitution, with the application of European standards.
7. We are aware that this Agreement provides merely a political and historical foundation for our permanent and peaceful co-existence. Such a political agreement, however, provides us with an opportunity to find the most constructive and the most rational solutions for the functioning of federal, i.e. joint, organs: the monetary system, the single market, joint armed forces and foreign affairs.
8. We also believe that an optimal Yugoslav community incorporates all six republics and their original constituent peoples. Withdrawal of any people or republic from this community shall imply that an agreement had been reached, guaranteeing interests of each of the members in respect of the others.


PATRIOTIC LEAGUE

Patriotic League had a historical role in organizing people in a nationwide resistance against the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressors, the former Yugoslav Army and the Chetnic's hordes. With the vision, League was the first who, in the wake of the attacks on Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and an unprecedented genocide against the Bosnian people was organized and stood in front of patriots to lead them in battle. PL's spirit can be felt today by most people and by large number of soldiers of the BH Army. This spirit should not disappear, it must be guarded and carried over to future generations. Our soldiers who gave their lives against a brutal enemy, our martyrs will not forgive us, if we do not continue the fight for free, independent and integral Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We pledge to them. We guaranty that PLs spirit will be nurtured and guarded forever.

FATHER OF PATRIOTIC LEAGUE




Mr. Izetbegović, despite the troubles at the time, managed to gather the Bosnians, by forming the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and through other forms to mobilize the resistance against the aggressor. Patriotic League was the nucleus of the first military formations.



MAN WITH HUGE MERIT

The future will show everything that was done by Hasan Čengić for the Patriotic League and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Patriotic League was formed, organized and armed by the Democratic Action Party. The League is the military division of the DAP, and emerged from a military-political organization formed on 31st March 1991, while its roots reach back to the DAP division of "Herceg-Bosna", formed in late 1990. Father of the Patriotic League is the founder and President of DAP, Chairman of Presidency of Republic BiH, Mr. Alija Izetbegović. The man who has a huge merit in the organization and its operations is Mr. Hasan Čengić. When talking about the establishment and work of the PL one must mention the late Safet Hadžić. The name "Patriotic League" was created under the auspices of the DAP, in agreement of Mr. Hasan Čengić, Dr. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, and others. The first officer who left the JNA and came to the center of the DAP was Sulejman Vranje - Sule.



IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATION

Sulejman Vranje – Sule was the first officer who left the former JNA and put his service at the disposal of his people through the DAP

After the DAP victory in 1990 elections, the Bosnian people were allowed for the first time to get familiar with its past by studying its history, to assume what to expect, and to get organized as soon as possible. Before the attack on Slovenia, it was clear that Serbia and Montenegro have territorial aspirations towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nationalistic and chauvinistic settings of “Memorandum” SANU (Serbian Academy of Science and Arts), displaying relics of Prince Lazar, recalling of the Kosovo battle, the events at Gazimestan, calling Serbian saints and heroes, excavation of common graves, public burials, public liturgy, singing of nationalist and chauvinistic songs, fiddle evenings and such, pointed to the great threat that hangs over Bosnia, and in particular against Bosnians.

PATRIOTIC LEAGUE IS A SECRET
ORGANIZATION WHOSE EXISTENCE AND
WORK WERE NOT EVEN KNOWN TO ALL
MEMBERS OF THE DAP

Former Yugoslav Army (JNA) carried out serious preparations for the realization of the plan of ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and creating conditions for a “Great Serbia”. Among other things, JNA significantly reduced the number of members in Territorial Defense, with a tendency to abolish it (the number of members has been reduced from 7 to 1.8 percent), while the weapons were placed under the control of the JNA in their warehouses. Also the command of the 7th Army Region, which was responsible for the units on the territory of BiH was abolished, while all command was concentrated in military centers located in Belgrade, under cover of form.

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Pursuant to Article 9, related to Article 41 of the legal power Regulation on Armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the meeting held on 27th of May 1992 issues the following

D E C I S I O N

on the formation of territorial defence units

The following Territorial Defence units are going to be formed:

1. 1. Bosnia and Herzegovina brigade «Kralj Tomislav». For the commander of the brigade, General Mate Šarlija is appointed.
2. 1. Brigade of the Zenica Territorial Defence (further in text TO),. For the commander of the brigade, Duvak (son of Rasim) Enes is appointed.
3. 11. P.Brigade "Zmaj od Bosne". For the commander of the brigade, Zejnilagić Enver is appointed.
4. 12. P: Brigade "Hadži Lojo". For the commander of the brigade, Džaferagić Safet is appointed.
5. 13. Novosarajevska Brigade of the TO. For the commander of the brigade, Šehović Enver is appointed.
6. 14. Brigade Novi Grad Sarajevo. For the commander of the brigade, Zyrapli Bislim is appointed.
7. Military police Battalion of Sarajevo region. For the commander of the battalion, Topić Dževad is appointed.
8. Escort platoon for the security of the BH Presidency. For the commander of the platoon, Lukovac Haris is appointed.
9. TO squad "Husić Eniz". For the commander of the squad, Bukva Sejdalija is appointed.
10. TO squad "Sretno" - Breza. For the commander of the squad, Hodžić Džemal is appointed.
11. TO squad "Misoča" - Ilijaš. For the commander of the squad, Rožajac Avdija is appointed.
12. 1. Brigade of the Bihać Krajina. For the commander of the brigade, Butković Sakib is appointed.
13. OdTO (Territorial Defence squad, further in text OdTO) Velika Kladuša. For the commander of the OdTO, Behrić Sulejman is appointed.
14. OdTO Kladuša - City. For the commander of the OdTO, Bajro Pajazetović is appointed.
15. OdTO Vrnograč. For the commander of the OdTO, Dukić Hasan is appointed.
16. OdTO Mala Kladuša. For the commander of the OdTO, Memić Hasan is appointed.
17. OdTO Bužin. For the commander of the OdTO, Kulauzović Fuad is appointed.
18. OdTO B. Otoka - Jezerski. For the commander of the OdTO, Kahrić Mustafa is appointed.
19. OdTO Bos. Krupa. For the commander of the OdTO, Palić Derviš is appointed.
20. OdTO Pećigrad. For the commander of the OdTO, Osmančević Murat is appointed.
21. OdTO Tržac. For the commander of the OdTO, Bećirević Hazim is appointed.
22. OdTO Ostrožac. For the commander of the OdTO, Pandžić Kasim is appointed.
23. OdTO Cazin - city. For the commander of the OdTO, Dizdarević Munir is appointed.
24. OdTO Čoralići. For the commander of the OdTO, Mizić Muhamed is appointed.
25. OdTO Bihać - centre. For the commander of the OdTO, Salkić Ahmet is appointed.

26. OdTO Bakšić. For the commander of the OdTO, Vuković Fuad is appointed.
27. OdTO Prekounje. For the commander of the OdTO, Toromanović Sead is appointed.
28. OdTO Brekavica. For the commander of the OdTO, Skalić Mesud is appointed.
29. OdTO Vrata. For the commander of the OdTO, Adil Bešić is appointed.
30. 3. Brigade of TO Tuzla. For the commander of the brigade, is appointed.
31. 108. Brčko TO brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Mujkanović Ferid is appointed.
32. 2. TO Tuzla Brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Ljali Džemail is appointed.
33. 1. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Džambić Muharem is appointed.
 2. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Aziri Ali is appointed.
 3. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Kurspahić Ševal is appointed.
 4. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Mujović Mirsad is appointed.
 5. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Djordje Marko is appointed. Engineer battalion - for the commander of the battalion, Prcić Faruk is appointed.
34. 1. Lukavica TO brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Salihbašić Dževad is appointed.
35. OdTO Kalesija. For the commander of the squad, the existing commander is appointed.
 5. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Djordje Marko is appointed. Engineer battalion - for the commander of the battalion, Prcić Faruk is appointed.
34. 1. Lukavica TO brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Salihbašić Dževad is appointed.
35. OdTO Kalesija. For the commander of the squad, the existing commander is appointed.
36. 1. Spreča squad Živinice. For the commander of the squad, 1st class Captain Malkić Salih is appointed.
37. OdTO Olovo. For the commander of the squad, Vrabac Nijaz is appointed.
38. OdTO. Solun. For the commander of the squad, Hasanspahić Akif is appointed.
39. OdTO - Careva Ćuprija. For the commander of the squad, Rotić Enver is appointed.

II

Minister of Defence shall organize the Seniors into the commands, Main Staffs of the above mentioned units and issue close Orders on number of men in compositions as well as the armament of the formed units.

PR number 1170

27th May 1992

Sarajevo, 27th May 1992

President of the Presidency of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Alija Izetbegović

/signed and stamped/

/handwritten/

To Dajdža and Zejnil (reply to 9th June 199 /missing number/ telex)

You have to go together. Zejnil remains commander of his unit, or as long this operation is under way, he should obey Dajdža's orders, therefore Dajdža covers the whole operation. The rest will be regulated when we meet in Sarajevo.


Sarajevo, 10th June 1992

Alija

Statistics

Commanders of TO (territorial defence) units in respect to the 27th May 1992 decision signed by the President of the R BiH Presidency Alija Izetbegović

Nationality	Number	%
Muslims	43	97,73%
Serbs	1	2,27%
Croats	0	0,00%
TOTAL	44	100%



BH Patriotic League Main Staff Directive for the defence of BH sovereignty (Sarajevo, 25 February 1992)

The military and political activities of the enemy (forces of disintegration of BH) have so far to a large extent managed to disrupt the system of government and to establish strongholds in certain areas, thus creating conditions for the complete disintegration of the BH authorities and the breaking up of BH territory.

The main strongholds of the forces of disintegration are in the Banja Luka region, eastern and western Herzegovina and the Doboj region, while their main supporters are the SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/ with the JA /Yugoslav Army/ and the extreme wing of the HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/.

In their activities up to now, they have managed to do the following: create a full political unity of the SDS and the JA; create parallel organs of government on the entire territory of BH; form commands, staffs and units; partially establish their own information system and carry out the relocation of material reserves for their own needs. The reorganisation of the JA on the whole territory of BH has created large concentrations of the JA, while the arrival of the Blue Helmets and the withdrawal of parts of the JA from the territory of the Republic of Croatia will make those concentrations still larger.

The combined forces of the enemy are as follows:

- Yugoslav Army: six corps of the KOV /Land Army/ (the Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka, Bihać, Titovo Užice, and parts of the Knin and Titograd corps), probably the strength of 2-3 KOV corps and one reinforced VAK /Air Corps/.
- Forces of the SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/ (80,000-120,000 men)
- Extremist forces of the HDZ (1-2 brigades)

The main goal of the activities of these forces is dividing BH territory and joining their mother (national) states. They will try to achieve this objective in two phases: in the first phase national confederal units in BiH will be created, and in the second they will be attached to a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia.

Before general operations begin the following can be expected: further intensification of psychological-propaganda activities aimed at exacerbating inter-ethnic relations, carrying out of sabotage-terrorist actions, provocation of social unrest, sabotage, kidnapping and assassinations of the most prominent figures of the Muslim nation. With the start of general operations powerful air and artillery-rocket support is to be expected in all regions.

2. Our forces: organized in the BH Patriotic League units from platoons to detachments and brigades, with a combined strength of approximately 120,000 men. With the start of combat operations, one can anticipate a more substantial influx of volunteers, members of the BH MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, soldiers of the JA, and forces of the Muslim people outside the territory of BiH, which would increase the strength of our forces to some 150,000. The main task for the forces of the BH PL is to protect the Muslim people and all BH citizens, to preserve the integrity and entirety of BH, in order to ensure in the future the continued living together of all the nations and nationalities in the state territory of BiH. As combat operations begin, protect the population and simultaneously close off the main routes leading into the territory of BiH, with the massive use of demolition and barrier systems; within the republic, with certain forces in swift and energetic actions, block off and occupy military buildings (depots of weapons, ammunition and MES /Mines and Explosives/ and barracks), and thereupon arm the units that have been formed as soon as possible, continue planned operations with the aim of creating the greatest possible extent of free territory and ensuring the functioning of the legitimate organs of government. Pay particular attention to pulling out the population from threatened areas and organizing provisions for them.
- 3 With initiation of activities, call the people of Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia to show solidarity with our rightful fight and immediately begin with combat activities in order to disable the enemy forces and weakening its power on the BH territory. At the same time, establish contact, co-operation and co-ordination in joint activities against the common enemy together with Croatian people in BiH. On international level, the appeal should be sent to the progressive world public to protect BH sovereignty.

4. I have decided, to engage all BH Patriotic League forces, in co-operation with our neighbours, in swift and energetic action, to close off the main routes leading to the territory of BiH, and especially in the valleys of the Drina and Sutjeska rivers. At the same time, along internal axes, set up barrier systems and occupy convenient positions for the defence of the BH people, focusing on the axis leading from the general area of Banja Luka and eastern Herzegovina. With certain forces, in swift and energetic attacks, seize JA depots and dumps of ammunition, MES and weapons, block off barracks, prevent the penetration and spread of enemy operations throughout BiH. Once satisfactory conditions have been created, move to broader offensive operations with the objective of breaking up, destroying and expelling the enemy from the territory of BiH. The main forces should be in central Bosnia, with auxiliary forces in the Cazin-Prijedor and Tuzla sectors.

MKBJ /International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia/:

**Joint Serbian-Muslim Declaration of
Alija Izetbegović and Momčilo Krajišnik
(Geneva, 16 September 1993)***

Joint Serbian-Muslim Declaration

Adopting the principles of the London Conference and taking into consideration the solutions proposed at the Geneva Peace Conference for the constitutional order of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, determined to put an instant end to hostilities and to create conditions for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and convinced that the crisis must be resolved by political and not military means, we are prepared for an immediate normalisation of relations with the Croatian people in light of the solution proposed at the Peace Conference in Geneva, we have agreed to the following:

I

1. Ensure an instant end to all hostilities and military conflicts between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army in accordance with the agreement of 30 July 1993, immediately if possible and no later than by 1200 hrs on 18 September, and ensure the establishment of direct communications (hotline) between the military commanders at all levels.
2. Ensure the bilateral and unconditional closure of all prisoner-of-war camps and the release of all prisoners in territories under the control of the Army of BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ and of the Bosnian Serbs, and immediately, starting from the release of the prisoners in Tarcin camp (207 prisoners) and Kula (207) prisoners. This ought to be done no later than by 1200 hrs on 21 September, on the proviso that both sides take full responsibility for the protection and care of the prisoners.
3. Create conditions on both sides for an unhindered and safe passage of humanitarian convoys and for the activities of humanitarian organisations, and for the safe and unhindered movement of all civilians.
4. Form working groups for the supervision and insurance of human rights in the territories under the control of the Army of BiH and the Bosnian Serb army, in accordance with the principles and solutions proposed at the Peace Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5. Form a working group for unresolved issues pertaining to territorial demarcation between the two republics in the imaginary Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the territories of Brčko, Bosnian Krajina, the Neretva valley, eastern Bosnia and Mt Ozren, and taking into consideration the natural right of access to the sea of these two republics. This is added to the already undertaken obligations to seek a permanent solution for administration of the territory of Sarajevo in the next two years. After finding a mutually acceptable solution to the territorial demarcation of the three republics making up the Union, and in the first two years of the existence of the Union, a referendum must be prepared and held. All three sides must agree to the date of its holding and the question posed to the citizens of each of the republics will be whether they agree to remain in the Union or want to leave it.

In the event of a break-up of the Union, all the rights of the Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including membership in the United Nations, shall automatically be transferred to the republic with a majority Muslim population.

* SOURCE: *Večernji List*, 17 September 1993

II

In order to create stable relations and as a joint contribution to peace in the region, the signatories decided to form the following:

1. A working group which will deal with the humanitarian status and material and financial issues related to refugees and displaced persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. A working group for drafting agreements, including agreements on the use of energy, harbours, arterial roads, communications and other economic potential.

III

With a view to a speedy, comprehensive and authentic implementation of all the measures and activities envisaged by this Joint Declaration, the signatories decided to appoint commissioners with full powers and responsibility for the implementation of the agreements envisaged by this Declaration. Alija Izetbegović has appointed Haris Silajdžić as his commissioner and Radovan Karadžić has appointed Momčilo Krajišnik as his commissioner. The signatories and the commissioners shall request and shall be ensured assistance and cooperation with international political, humanitarian and other organisations and factors, and all with the aim of a comprehensive implementation of all measures envisaged by this Declaration and in the interest of lasting peace and stability in that part of the world.

Finally, an agreement was reached for the co-chairmen of the International Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to invite the three sides in BH to a meeting to be held at the Sarajevo airport at 1100 hours on 21 September, which will review the signing of a peace package as a whole, and which will, among other things, contain this Joint Declaration and the Joint Declaration the Croats and Muslims signed on 14 September. The co-chairmen will meanwhile tour the sides in the former Yugoslavia in an endeavour to reach further agreements.

(The Declaration was signed in Geneva on 16 September 1993 by Alija Izetbegović and Momčilo Krajišnik instead of Radovan Karadžić. Thorvald Stoltenberg and David Owen signed as witnesses. The signatures of Slobodan Milošević and Momir Bulatović are not on this Document. A facsimile of the signatures was published in *Večernji List*.)

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA /R BiH/

Armed Forces Supreme Command Staff

R BiH OS /Armed Forces/ Office of the Commander
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 02/1594-214

01 March 1994

No 1/297 - 298

Sarajevo, 17 September 1993

Accepting the principles of the London Conference and determined to cease hostilities and create conditions for peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, convinced that the solution of this crisis must be achieved by political and not military means, and ready to begin the normalisation of relations with the Croatian people, the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, the President of the so called SR Yugoslavia /SRY/, Slobodan Milošević, the President of Montenegro Momir Bulatović and the President of the so called Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić signed a JOINT DECLARATION in Geneva on 16 September 1993 with a view to its realisation I hereby

ORDER:

1. R BiH Army units shall cease all combat operations against the Serbian paramilitary aggressor formations in keeping with the Agreement of 30 July 1993, immediately and no later than 18 September.
2. R BiH Army units can open fire only in case of violation of this Agreement by Serbian paramilitary formations or joint forces of Serbian paramilitary formations and HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ units, i.e. it is necessary to open fire when unit positions and R BiH Army members' lives or the territory and features under their control are at risk or if the population on the territory controlled by the R BiH Army units is at risk from the Serbian aggressor paramilitary formations or joint forces of these formations and HVO units.
3. All prisoners from collection centres and R BiH Army detention centres should be released with the mediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross /MKCK/, except for individuals subject to criminal proceedings and those who have been sentenced. The deadline for the realisation of this task is 1200 hours on 21 September of 1993.
4. Movement of humanitarian convoys and humanitarian organisations' activities shall be unimpeded on the territory under the R BiH Army control.
5. Corps commanders shall specify the obligations of subordinate commands and units in their orders, with a view to the realisation of this Order.
6. Corps commands shall forward daily reports on the realisation of this Order to the OS /Armed Forces/ ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ OCK /Operations Centre Command/.
7. Unit commanders who violate this Order shall be relieved from duty, and court action and appropriate measures shall be brought against them.

Corps commanders are responsible for the realisation of this Order.

The Order shall be implemented - immediately.

SM/FH

To:

- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Corps
- Ministry of the Interior (for information)
- Ministry of Defence (for information)
- OS ŠVK OCK

Standing in for the COMMANDER DEPUTY
Stjepan ŠIBER
/signed and Stamped/

THESE ARE THE MUSLIM OFFICERS WHO WERE IN JNA WHILE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA HAS BEEN ATTACKED.

THEY LEFT JNA WHEN THEIR PEOPLE WERE ATTACKED.

The largest influx of officers was in April and May 1992¹⁸, mostly Bosniaks, but also officers of other nationalities. The list, generated from the archive documents, shows report dates at the Territorial Defence units in Bihać municipality and district. All officers were well accepted and assigned to units, in order to assist organization of the Territorial Defence and execution of combat operations with their knowledge and experience.*

Last and first name	Report date
Agić (Salih) Hajrudin	May 15 th , 1992
Agović (Ismet) Zijad	April 22 nd , 1992
Ajanović (Mustafa) Jasmine	April 22 nd , 1992
Alagić (Ferid) Muhamed	April 22 nd , 1992
Avdić (Jusuf) Amir	June 4 th , 1992
Aziraj (Selim) Iso	June 4 th , 1992

¹⁸. Data on listed former JNA officers was taken from the war personnel database kept by the BH Army 5th Corps.

* General Ramiz Drešković "U obruču" (eng. trans. of the title "In the stranglehold"), Zenica 2004, "Dom štampe" d.d. Zenica

Bajbunović (Muharem) Malik	April 21 st , 1992
Bajramović (Sulejmin) Alaga	December 13 th , 1992
Barunović (Branko) Josip	April 23 rd , 1992
Bašić (Husein) Ibrahim	April 27 th , 1992
Bašić (Mehmed) Rasim	October 1 st , 1992
Bećirović (Salih) Izudin	May 14 th , 1992
Bećirspahić (Husein) Ismet	April 20 th , 1992
Beganović (Ismet) Samir	June 20 th , 1992
Begić (Mustafa) Mujo	December 1 st , 1992
Begić (Meho) Nijaz	July 01 st , 1992
Begić (Husein) Šefik	No data
Behrem (Alija) Rivzo	April 17 th , 1992
Behrić (Mujo) Fikret	April 20 th , 1992
Beriša (Šerif) Veselj	April 22 nd , 1992
Bešić (Adem) Adil	May 16 th , 1992
Bešić (Bećo) Bekir	May 3 rd , 1992
Bešić (Asim) Jasminko	May 19 th , 1992
Bešlagić (Husein) Šemsudin	April 22 nd , 1992
Beuk (Miroslav) Zdenko	April 22 nd , 1992
Bisić (Šime) Miroslav	May 29 th , 1992
Bonjaš (Zvonko) Dražen	June 23 rd , 1992
Brdar (Dane) Dušan	April 22 nd , 1992
Bulut (Veljko) Goran	April 24 th , 1992
Butković (Mustafa) Sakib	April 27 th , 1992
Cavor (Branko) Branko	June 6 th , 1992
Cinac (Sulejman) Ibrahim	April 10 th , 1992
Čajić (Redžo) Jasmn	April 22 nd , 1992
Čamdžić (Alija) Zahid	April 22 nd , 1992
Čandar (Mato) Zlatko	April 30 th , 1992
Čaušević (Dževad) Eldin	May 20 th , 1992
Čaušević (Ibrahim) Osman	August 1 st , 1992
Čaušević (Ahmet) Rifet	May 16 th , 1992
Čelebić (Jusuf) Jozo	August 1 st , 1992
Cikić (Muhamed) Edin	January 11 th , 1992
Čović (Medo) Emin	July 28 th , 1992
Čehajić (Ramo) Nusret	May 16 th , 1992
Čenanović (Ramiz) Rasim	May 1 st , 1992
Čoralić (Midhad) Midhad	June 23 rd , 1992
Čoralić (Šefik) Muhidin	April 15 th , 1992
Čoralić (Mujo) Nijaz	April 22 nd , 1992
Čosić (Ivan) Matija	April 16 th , 1992
Dedić (Ibrahim) Ekrem	April 16 th , 1992
Dedić (Adem) Mustafa	May 26 th , 1992
Delanović (Sejdo) Adil	April 22 nd , 1992
Dervišević (Redžo) Nazif	May 25 th , 1992
Dervišević (Nurija) Nurvet	May 16 th , 1992
Dizdarević (Huse) Dževad	April 22 nd , 1992
Dizdarić (Fadil) Sead	April 15 th , 1992
Dudaković (Omer) Atif	May 6 th , 1992
Dupanović (Isrnet) Fikret	April 15 th , 1992
Daraković (Salko) Edhem	April 22 nd , 1992
Duraković (Salko) Ramiz	July 29 th , 1992
Duraković (Hasan) Sead	April 20 th , 1992
Fazlić Isak	May 14 th , 1992
Fazlić (Abdurahman) Mirsad	April 24 th , 1992

Fejzić (Abdurahman) Edin	April 22 nd , 1992
Felić (Omer) Bejdo	September 13 th , 1992
Felić (Hasib) Dževad	April 15 th , 1992
Fiolić (Stjepan) Ivan	April 18 th , 1992
Fundak (Tomo) Damir	April 24 th , 1992
Gajić (Veljko) Aleksandar	April 19 th , 1992
Gazibegović (Mustafa) Hidajim	April 27 th , 1992
Gluhalić (Munir) Irfan	April 23 rd , 1992
Grgić (Jozo) Anto	April 27 th , 1992
Grigić (Maro) Željko	April 22 nd , 1992
Hadžić (Ejub) Elvir	December 10 th , 1992
Hadžihajdarević (Munir) Mustafa	May 26 th , 1992
Hadžović (Mirsad) Ahmed	May 25 th , 1992
Hajrizi (Bajram) Muharem	April 22 nd , 1992
Handanović (Ramo) Ramiz	April 24 th , 1992
Haračić Alaga	April 24 th , 1992
Hasanagić (Muharem) Fadil	April 15 th , 1992
Haščić (Adil) Alija	May 17 th , 1992
Himaj (Sabrija) Arif	April 22 nd , 1992
Hodžić (Rifet) Farko	April 22 nd , 1992
Hodžić (Muhamed) Nedib	May 16 th , 1992
Hodžić (Šećan) Šećan	June 1 st , 1992
Hrkčić (Alija) Senad	April 24 th , 1992
Huskić (Husein) Rarniz	April 15 th , 1992
Ibradžić (Osman) Zlatko	April 18 th , 1992
Iftić (Ahmet) Edvin	April 15 th , 1992
Ilić (Milan) Drago	April 15 th , 1992
Imširović (Hilmija) Samir	April 15 th , 1992
Imširović (Osman) Zijad	April 15 th , 1992
Išić (Ibrahim) Mumin	April 22 nd , 1992
Išić (Selim) Senad	April 22 nd , 1992
Jahić (Behadil) Nedžad	April 22 nd , 1992
Jašarević (Ferid) Senudin	May 26 th , 1992
Jonek (Vlado) Darko	May 24 th , 1992
Jusić (Rasim) Ismet	September 18 th , 1992
Kadić (Kemal) Edin	April 21 st , 1992
Kadić (Ibrahim) Jasmin	April 24 th , 1992
Kadić (Munib) Mefail	April 15 th , 1992
Kadić (Omer) Sejad	September 19 th , 1992
Kahrić (Abld) Mustafa	April 16 th , 1992
Kalafatić (Stjepan) Zvonko	May 29 th , 1992
Karabegović (Jusuf) Irfan	April 17 th , 1992
Kardaš (Ibrahim) Dželal	April 22 nd , 1992
Kasić (Huse) Edin	April 24 th , 1992
Kazazić (Mensur) Ervin	April 20 th , 1992
Keserović (Husein) Zlatko	August 1 st , 1992
KLIČIĆ (HAŠIM) SEAD	April 25 th , 1992
Kliko (Mehmed) Emir	June 19 th , 1992
Kumić (Ferid) Džemal	May 13 th , 1992
Korać (Huse) Vejsil	April 13 th , 1992
Korčić (Adern) Besirn	May 6 th , 1992
Koštić (Hasib) Mehmcd	No data available
Kovač (Refik) Rasim	June 26 th , 1992
Kralj (Juraj) Juraj	April 27 th , 1992
Kučuk (Salko) Mustafa	May 20 th , 1992

Kudić (Šaban) Husein	May 13 th , 1992
Kuduzović (Mujo) Esad	May 20 th , 1992
Kalauzović (Dedo) Fuad	April 15 th , 1992
Kurbegović (Dževad) Senad	April 26 th , 1992
Kurić (Hasib) Ismet	April 29 th , 1992
Lojić (Mehmed) Zuhdija	August 1 st , 1992
Magdić (Anto) Željko	April 24 th , 1992
Mahovkić (Omer) Nusret	April 30 th , 1992
Maleškić (Avdo) Zehrudin	April 22 nd , 1992
Marić (Zvonko) Zdenko	April 22 nd , 1992
Marković (Milorad) Ljubiša	May 22 nd , 1992
Mašović (Musa) Kermin	May 17 th , 1992
Mazlagić (Ibrahim) Ekrem	April 15 th , 1992
Merdanić (Huse) Meho	April 15 th , 1992
Mešić (Selim) Senijad	August 1 st , 1992
Midžić (Muharcem) Amir	April 27 th , 1992
Midžić (Rifet) Jusuf	No data available
Midžić (Ibrahim) Suad	April 22 nd , 1992
Miljković (Omer) Muhamed	April 26 th , 1992
Mizić (Muharem) Refik	April 22 nd , 1992
Mrenica (Stevan) Aleksandar	May 14 th , 1992
Muhamedagić (Sejdo) Sulejman	April 22 nd , 1992
Mujadžić (Nurija) Šeftek	April 15 th , 1992
Mujagić (Ibro) Fuad	April 22 nd , 1992
Mujagić (Husnija) Sekib	April 7 th , 1992
Mulić (Šefik) Amir	April 24 th , 1992
Mulić (Bećir) Emir	May 19 th , 1992
Mulić (Adem) Mensur	April 22 nd , 1992
Mureškić (Alaga) Esad	April 27 th , 1992
Murgić (Joso) Milan	April 24 th , 1992
Murić (Mujaga) Đulaga	April 9 th , 1992
Murk (Emil) Davor-Ivan	April 22 nd , 1992
Mustafić (Rasim) Hamdija	April 21 st , 1992
Nadarević (Selim) Ibrahim	April 20 th , 1992
Ninić (Ibrahim) Izet	April 4 th , 1992
Nijemčević (Omer) Suad	April 27 th , 1992
Nikolić (Đorđe) Aleksa	April 22 nd , 1992
Omanović (Abdulah) Šeifulah	April 4 th , 1992
Omeragić (Omer) Arif	May 17 th , 1992
Omeragić (Omer) Ismet	April 13 th , 1992
Omerčević (Hasib) Salih	July 21 st , 1992
Oračević (Mustafa) Mujo	May 6 th , 1992
Osmanagić (Alija) Hajrudin	April 14 th , 1992
Osmančević (Abid) Abdija	April 17 th , 1992
Osmanović (Suljo) Šerif	May 5 th , 1992
Pajić (Habib) Izet	June 20 th , 1992
Pašić (Izet) Adil	April 22 nd , 1992
Pašović (Šemso) Edin	April 22 nd , 1992
Pavić (Ivo) Vinko	June 19 th , 1992
Pavlina (Stjepo) Josip	April 24 th , 1992
Pečenković (Esad) Damir	April 15 th , 1992
Pečenković (Esad) Emir	April 22 nd , 1992
Piralić (Šerif) Besim	May 15 th , 1992

Plavulj (Suad) Amir	May 16 th , 1992
Poprženović (Mujaga) Husein	April 27 th , 1992
Porčić (Jusul) Zlatan	April 22 nd , 1992
Pozderac (Ante) Zlatko	April 22 nd , 1992
Preljević (Sajlo) Enver	April 15 th , 1992
Prša (Grga) Ivan	May 12 th , 1992
Puškar (Ferid) Edin	June 25 th , 1992
Ramić (Nurija) Husein	April 16 th , 1992
Ramić (Smail) Murat	April 16 th , 1992
Ramić (Mahmut) Samir	April 22 nd , 1992
Ramović (Adem) Ismet	April 15 th , 1992
Rastoder (Meta) Zejto	April 20 th , 1992
Redžepagić (Husein) Edhem	April 16 th , 1992
Rekić (Sulejman) Enes	April 15 th , 1992
Rekić (Osme) Esnaf	April 15 th , 1992
Rizvanović (Šerif) Izet	April 23 rd , 1992
Ruždijić (Adil) Almir	April 24 th , 1992
Ružnić (Murat) Adil	May 29 th , 1992
Sadiković (Smail) Fuad	April 30 th , 1992
Sadiković (Šerif) Midhad	April 8 th , 1992
Salihagić (Osman) Sulejman	April 22 nd , 1992
Silihović (Ibrahim) Edin	April 23 rd , 1992
Sedić (Kadir) Mirsad	April 20 th , 1992
Sefić Suad	April 23 rd , 1992
Semanović (Huse) Mirsad	May 28 th , 1992
Sirovina (Murat) Bećir	April 25 th , 1992
Smlatić (Sulejman) Sidik	April 28 th , 1992
Smlatić (Sulejman) Zlatan	April 22 nd , 1992
Sofić (Husein) Ismet	May 27 th , 1992
Sokać (Franjo) Željko	June 25 th , 1992
Somborac (Antun) Antun	April 23 rd , 1992
Spahić (Šerif) Asim	March 27 th , 1992
Stanojević (Miloje) Goran	April 27 th , 1992
Suljević (Harun) Samir	May 4 th , 1992
Suljić (Hasan) Hilmija	April 16 th , 1992
Suljić (Šefko) Nedžad	May 1 st , 1992
Suljkanović (Husein) Osman	April 24 th , 1992
Šabačkić (Safet) Fikret	April 1 st , 1992
Šabinović (Aziz) Razim	April 22 nd , 1992
Šabotić (Osman) Šefket	April 22 nd , 1992
Šečić (Himzo) Mirzan	July 1 st , 1992
Šimić (Pero) Marko	April 15 th , 1992
Tabaković (Sula) Ševko	June 4 th , 1992
Tahirović (Mehmed) Ibrahim	May 15 th , 1992
Tahrić (Ibrahim) Rifet	April 22 nd , 1992
Vinčar (Henrik) Vladimir	November 24 th , 1992
Zanačić (Arif) Senad	April 16 th , 1992
Zjakić (Rizo) Irfan	May 16 th , 1992
Zulić (Hamdija) Mustafa	April 22 nd , 1992
Živković (Milan) Marinko	April 24 th , 1992
Živković (Ivan) Pave	April 16 th , 1992
Žmavc (Borislav) Marjan	April 16 th , 1992
Žuvela (Franko) Tunči	April 22 nd , 1992

* General Ramiz Drešković "U obruču" (eng. trans. of the title "In the stranglehold"), Zenica 2004, "Dom štampe" d.d. Zenica

46179 SO CAP YU
 46234SO MOS YU
 SOCIALISTIC REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
 SARAJEVO

NUMBER: 04-32/92
 SARAJEVO, 13 January 1992

- URGENT -

PRESIDENT OF THE MUNICIPAL ASSEMBLY
 PRESIDENT OF THE MUNICIPAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
 MUNICIPAL NATIONAL DEFENCE SECRETARIAT
 ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR MOSTAR REGION
 ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR SARAJEVO REGION

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE PASSAGE OF MILITARY CONVOYS.-

ON 11 JANUARY 1992 COMMAND OF THE 2nd OPERATIONAL GROUP HAVE SUBMITTED A TELEX TO THE GOVERNMENT OF SR BiH INT. NUMBER 116-1 OF THE FOLLOWING CONTENT:

/illegible/ PURSUANT TO THE DECISION OF THE SFRY PRESIDENCY REGARDING THE RETENTION OF CONSCRIPTS ON THE FIELD UNTIL APRIL, AND THAT REPLACEMENT OF PARTS OF UNITS AWAIT US ON THIS BASIS IN THE PERIOD FROM 11 JANUARY 1992 TO 22 JANUARY 1992, WE INFORM YOU THAT THE UNITS, DURING THEIR ARRIVAL OR PURPOSE OF ASSUMING THEIR POSITIONS ON THE FRONT OR TRANSFER TO THEIR ORIGINAL GARRISONS SHALL BE DIRECTED FROM THE WEST OF SERBIA, MONTENEGRO AND EAST HERZEGOVINA TO DUBROVNIK, STON AND MOSTAR.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES ACCEPTED IN SARAJEVO, AND THAT MOVEMENT OF UNITS AWAIT US, IN ORDER TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND UNPLEASANT SITUATIONS, PLEASE NOTIFY YOUR MUNICIPALITIES AND POLICE PRECINCTS THROUGH WHICH TERRITORY JNA UNIT MOVEMENTS WILL BE CARRIED OUT.

COMMANDER LIEUTENANT-GENERAL PAVLE STRUGAR
--

WE SUBMIT THE ABOVE FOR YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

MINISTER
 JERKO DOKO, B.Sc.Econ

46179 SO CAP YU
 46234SO MOS YU
 NNNN

MILITARY POST

No. 6372

/handwritten: No. 677-1/

/handwritten: 8 December 1991

BANJA LUKA

Formation of TD/ territorial defence/ sq.

"WEST", O r d e r

/stamp/

CROATIAN

MEMORIAL DOCUMENTATION

CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR

ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

Based on the indicated need and due to certain shortcomings in the work of TD sq. "West"

I HEREBY ORDER:

1. Formation of TD sq. "West" consisting of manpower from v. Lađevac to v. Paklenica.

2. I appoint the following command composition:

- TD dep. Commander res./reserve/ Lieut. GUBIĆ SLOBODAN

- Deputy commander res. Serg. BAJIĆ MILENKO

- Security officer res. Capt. ŠAJATOVIĆ JURICA

a/ TD TROOP RAJIĆ

- Troop commander res. 2nd Lieut. MILAŠINOVIĆ MOMČILO

- Deputy commander res. 2nd Lieut. MILAŠINOVIĆ MILE

- 1st Platoon commander res. 2nd Lieut. KOVAČEVIĆ ILIJA

- 2nd Platoon commander res. Serg. ZASTAVNIKOVIĆ JOVAN

- 3rd Platoon commander res. Serg. 1st Class. KEZAN MILAN

b/ TD TROOP OBROVAC

- Troop commander res. 2nd Lieut. DOŠEN VOJO

- Deputy

- 1st Platoon commander res. 2nd Lieut. MARIĆ VITO

- 2nd Platoon commander res. 2nd Lieut. ĐURAŠINOVIĆ BOŠKO

c/ TD TROOP LAĐEVAC

- Troop commander sold. PRIBIČEVIĆ NEDELJKO

- 1st Platoon commander sold. MILJANOVIĆ VELJKO

- 2nd Platoon commander sold. ČALIĆ RANKO

- 3rd Platoon commander sold. CLATOVIĆ MIRKO

d/ INDEPENDENT PLATOON PAKLENICA

- Commander sold. DEDIĆ NEDELJKO

e/ INDEPENDENT PLATOON RAJIČIĆI

- Platoon commander res. 2nd Lieut. NJENJIĆ ŽELJKO

3. Squad is to be formed and records established no later than 9th December 1991 and put at the disposal to 16. motorised infantry brigade. Take all males 20-45 years of age capable of military service.

4. Squad command shall appoint temporary government authority which will organize collection of crops, gathering of abandoned animals, as well cultivation of land.

5. Village patrol is to be formed of personnel not assigned to TD sq., which will patrol the village day and night. In each village, patrol commander and his deputy must be appointed. Squad commander will personally report to me regarding the functioning of village patrol.

MG/SŽ

COMMANDER

COLONEL

Milan Čeleketić

/stamp: MILITARY POST no. 6372/

SERBIAN AUTONOMOUS DISTRICTKRAJINA (SAOK)

GENERAL STAFF OF TO SAOK

Ref.no. /handwritten: 301/1/

Knin, 20th September 1991

/stamp/

CROATIAN

MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION

CENTER OF HOMELAND WAR

ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

- SUPREME COMMANDER OF SAOK FORCES
- COMMANDER OF SAOK FORCES
- ODB (State Security Authority)

REPORT**September 19th /20th 1991**

150 conscripts were mobilized yesterday in Knin, mobilization operational zone Golubić. Manpower was also activated in Bobodol and Ljubče, of which one platoon can be formed.

After the initiative of Krajina supporters from Grahovo, Drvar and Petrovac who want to be actively involved in the defence of the SAO Krajina and to help our people, the area was visited by the President Milan Babić and secretary Milan Martić who accepted their cooperation and arranged influx of manpower.

There were no major conflicts in the Obrovac area. Our forces have crossed to the other side of Maslenica bridge and is now fully under our control.

In Benkovac area, in addition to sporadic gunfire in several locations when Erceg Slobodan from G. Zemunik was wounded, there was a powerful explosion at the intersection of Biograd road resulting in shooting from automatic guns, killing Alen Miljević from Benkovac.

In region Travica in Skradin hinterland, our positions were attacked. Under heavy fire our units retreated to the backup position.

During the cleansing of grounds in direction of Sinj in the Bitelići region, there was a fierce conflict, at which occasion Montenegrin Nikola from Kovačić was killed and Đuić Jovica wounded.

In the evening hours, while returning to Knin in Vinalići region, three member of TD /TERRITORIAL DEFENCE/ were ambushed and Vučković Slobodan from Kovačić was wounded.

Situation is the worst in the area of Gospić where Police and National Guard dug in and are using existing atomic shelters, and without strong artillery fire as well as the help of aviation, significant advancement will not be possible.

REPORT SUBMITTED BY

Milivojević Slavenko

/stamp: GENERAL STAFF OF TO SAOK/

NOTE: JASENOVAC IS LOCATED IN CROATIA

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CROATIAN
MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

LIST

of military conscripts of Republic of Srpska RR /as written/ at VP /military police/ 9162/TG-1 Jasenovac, by municipalities:

I – Banja Luka municipality

1.	Aćimović (Milan) Dušan	Serg.	6751	1957.	21902
2.	Agostini (Selim) Klaudije	Cons.	5833	1973.	11812
3.	Ahmetović (Rasim) Ahmet	Cons.	5304	1952.	11812
4.	Alijagić (Hamdija) Senad	Cons.	5865	1954.	11201
5.	Amidžić (Jovo) Gojko	Cons.	5866	1945.	11101
6.	Amidžić (Boško) Radenko	Cons.	5867	1964.	12701
7.	Ančić (Miroslav) Danko	Cons.	5868	1965.	11202
8.	Antonić (Bjelan) Mario	Cons.	5869	1971.	12403
9.	Arčaba (Mihajlo) Ilija	Cons.	5870	1941.	11101
10.	Babić (Strahinja) Goran	Cons.	4393	1963.	12201
11.	Bahtijaragić (Mustafa) Mustafa	Cons.	5872	1952.	11207
12.	Bajić (Anđelko) Zoran	Cons.	6752	1955.	11206
13.	Balaban (Ljubo) Živko	Cons.	5873	1960.	11812
14.	Balić (Sulejman) Zlatko	C. 1st cl.	5874	1949.	31102
15.	Barjaktarić (Miroslav) Bernard	Cons.	5875	1972.	11601
16.	Bibić (Ilija) Ernest	Cons.	5876	1958.	12701
17.	Bilbija (Svetozar) Dušan	Cons.	5877	1949.	11101
18.	Bižić (Lejla) Zoran	Cons.	6753	1956.	11101
19.	Bjelajac (Marko) Ranko	Cons.	5878	1947.	11101
20.	Blagojević (Stojan) Dušan	Cons.	5879	1967.	12401
21.	Blagojević (Stojan) Slavko	Cons.	5880	1958.	11901
22.	Borić (Bogoljub) Saša	Cons.	5881	1964.	11627
23.	Božić (Dragutin) Aleksa	Cons.	5882	1973.	11601
24.	Branković (Vlado) Goran	Cons.	5883	1973.	11107
25.	Branković (Branko) Zoran	Cons.	5884	1949.	11901
26.	Brborović (Đorđo) Petko	Cons.	5885	1955.	11203
27.	Brkić (Slobodan) Duško	Cons.	5886	1964.	11101
28.	Brković (Branko) Saša	Cons.	5887	1963.	11812
29.	Brujić (Boško) Jugoslav	Cons.	5888	1961.	11101
30.	Bulatović (Ljuban) Željko	Cons.	5889	1959.	21107
31.	Bunić (Stojko) Đurad	Cons.	5891	1956.	11701
32.	Bunić (Milan) Rodoljub	C. 1st cl.	6754	1950.	31101
33.	Bursać (Dušan) Mladen	Cons.	5892	1956.	11201
34.	Čolić (Milenko) Slaviša	Cons.	5894	1974.	11214
35.	Čatović (Bajro) Zijad	Cons.	5895	1957.	11801
36.	Čurić (Pašo) Jasminko	Cons.	5896	1960.	11107
37.	Dedić (Uroš) Aleksandar	Cons.	5897	1973.	11107
38.	Dervišević (Muhamed) Muhamed	Cons.	5898	1971.	11406
39.	Domazet (Jozo) Jovica	2 nd Leut.	5899	1968.	31102

40.	Dokić (Velimir) Dragan	Cons.	5902	1966.	11107
41.	Dragičević (Mirko) Manojlo	Cons.	4384	1955.	11101
42.	Dragičević (Branko) Milenko	Cons.	5901	1953.	12701
43.	Drljača (Mirko) Duško	Cons.	5903	1968.	11107
44.	Ducanović (Mirko) Slobodan	Cons.	5904	1951.	11101
45.	Ducanović (Slobodan) Draško	Cons.	6755	1974.	11107
46.	Dujilo (Joco) Ivo	Cons.	5905	1946.	11503
47.	Dujilović (Marko) Milan	Cons.	6756	1960.	11314
48.	Duronjić (Sretko) Vitomir	Cons.	5907	1962.	11101
49.	Đuričić (Salko) Slobodan	Cons.	6757	1974.	11807
50.	Erceg (Vlado) Vojislav	Lieut.	5908	1952.	31202
51.	Ferjančić (Zvonko) Dejan	Cons.	6202	1969.	13.805
52.	Gačić (Tomislav) Tomas-Alex	Cons.	5909	1974.	11107
53.	Gajić (Dragomir) Marinko	Cons.	5910	1969.	12117
54.	Gatarić (Gavro) Goran	Cons.	5911	1960.	12403
55.	Gacrić (Dušan) Aleksandar	Cons.	5912	1974.	11403
56.	Gligorić (Žarko) Vidoslav	C. 1st cl.	5913	1947.	21207
57.	Golubić (Ljuban) Aleksandar	Serg.	4399	1967.	21701
58.	Golubić (Ljuban) Zlatan	Cons.	4398	1965.	11406
59.	Granolić (Čedo) Milutin	Cons.	5916	1967.	12701
60.	Grvić (Velimir) Vidoslav	Cons.	5917	1960.	11812
61.	Grgić (Ahmed) Meho	Cons.	5918	1947.	11201
62.	Guzijan (Simun) Nenad	Cons.	5919	1952.	12701
63.	Hamešević (Smajo) Ibrahim	Cons.	5920	1947.	12107
64.	Handžić (Hazim) Islam	Cons.	5921	1954.	11901
65.	Heralić (Nezir) Mehmed	Cons.	5922	1964.	12402
66.	Hrkalović (Jovo) Dragan	Cons.	5926	1953.	11404
67.	Husić (Ibrahim) Bakir	Cons.	5923	1947.	12102
68.	Huskić (Fahrudin) Zlatko	Cons.	4378	1965.	11106
69.	Ignjatović (Veljo) Milan	Cons.	5927	1945.	11101
70.	Ilić (Zdravko) Boro	Cons.	5928	1970.	11101
71.	Ilić (Milodrag) Branislav	Cons.	5929	1951.	11101
72.	Indžić (Pane) Borislav	Cons.	5930	1959.	11101
73.	Jakovljević (Jovan) Slobodan	Cons.	5931	1946.	11101
74.	Janković (Dragoljub) Bane	Cons.	6205	1961.	11201
75.	Jašarević (Muharem) Damir	Cons.	5932	1967.	12701
76.	Jevđenić (Stojan) Draško	Cons.	5933	1971.	11104
77.	Jojić (Đuro) Branko	Cons.	5935	1941.	13422
78.	Jokić (Dušan) Radivoje	Cons.	5934	1943.	21102
79.	Josipović (Franjo) Stefan	Serg.maj.	5938	1952.	11301
80.	Jovanić (Đurad) Radenko	Cons.	5936	1967.	11101
81.	Jovanović (Đuro) Đorđe	Cons.	5937	1950.	11209
82.	Jurić (Milorad) Tomislav	Cons.	5939	1968.	11101
83.	Kasalović (Milan) Veseljko	Cons.	5941	1973.	11101
84.	Katana (Mirko) Jelenko	Serg.	4401	1968.	21101
85.	Kecojević (Mihajlo) Milivoj	Cons.	5942	1947.	11101
86.	Kelečević (Zdravko) Slobodan	Cons.	5943	1945.	12202
87.	Knežević (Ljubomir) Milinko	Capt.	5944	1965.	31102
88.	keram (rasim) Enes	Cons.	5945	1954.	11201
89.	Kiklić (nenad) Zoran	Cons.	5946	1964.	11101
90.	Kolobarić (Stanko) Dušan	Cons.	5947	1955.	12701
91.	Komljenović (Vinko) Vinko	Cons.	5998	1958.	11201
92.	Komosar (Đuro) Dragan	Cons.	5949	1958.	11107
93.	Komosar (Đuro) Željko	Lieut.	5950	1966.	31202
94.	Kondić (Tode) Borislav	Cons.	5951	1959.	12701
95.	Koprena (Dragutin) Ilija	Cons.	5952	1962.	11101
96.	Kosić (Ostoja) Nikola	Cons.	5956	1969.	11101
97.	Kovačević (Pero) Slavica	Cons.	6758	1955.	11316
98.	Kovačević (Dojčin) Goran	Cons.	5957	1962.	11408
99.	Kovačević (Ostoja) Boro	Cons.	5959	1971.	11101
100.	Kovačević (Drago) Zdravko	Cap. 1 st Class	5958	1947.	31102

101.	Kozić (Vojin) Dragoljub	Cons.	5960	1954.	11102
102.	Krističević (Branko) Branko	Cons.	5958	1944.	12119
103.	Krnić (Adem) Milan	Cons.	6759	1954.	12701
104.	Krnjajić (Čedomir) Željko	Cons.	5954	1957.	11222
105.	Kulenović (Huesin) Almir	Serg.	5961	1956.	21107
106.	Kuprešanin (Vojislav) Dragan	Cons.	5964	1955.	11101
107.	Kuridža (Petar) Slavko	Cons.	5962	1955.	11401
108.	Kurjak (Midhat) Muris	Cons.	5963	1973.	11603
109.	Kurjak (Avdo) Midhat	Cons.	6760	1951.	12701
110.	Laguđa (Vasilj) Ivica	Cons.	5965	1960.	11201
111.	Latinović (Vaso) Milorad	Lieut.	5966	1955.	31101
112.	Lazinica (Đuro) Milorad	Cons.	5967	1947.	12501
113.	Letica (Miladin) Dragan	Cons.	5868	1947.	11207
114.	Lolić (Boro) Zoran	Cons.	5970	1961.	13401
115.	Ljubičić (Branimir) Dubravko	Cons.	5971	1950.	11901
116.	Macanović (Marinko) Aleksandar	Cons.	5972	1972.	11812
117.	Mačinković (Rade) Anto	Cons.	5973	1958.	11822
118.	Majstorović (Milenko) Darko	Cons.	5974	1972.	12701
119.	Majstorović (Tomislav) Milivoj	Cons.	5975	1956.	12701
120.	Maksimović (Branko) Borislav	Cons.	5976	1965.	11701
121.	Malbašić (Bjelan) Krstan	Cons.	5977	1969.	11344
122.	Malbašić (Borko) Nenad	Cons.	5978	1973.	11101
123.	Marić (Gojko) Danijel	Serg.	4395	1952.	21401
124.	Marić (Radivoj) Igor	Cons.	5980	1973.	11107
125.	Marić (Radivoj) Siniša	Cons.	6761	1973.	11107
126.	Marjanac (Savo) Siniša	Cons.	4391	1971.	12403
127.	Marjanović (Vaso) Mitar	Cons.	6762	1973.	11101
128.	marković (Dušan) Nebojša	Cons.	5984	1970.	11107
129.	Matanović (Morislav) Zvonimir	Cons.	5985	1952.	11802
130.	Matić (Mirko) Vlado	Cons.	5986	1955.	12107
131.	Matoš (Vladimir) Saša	Cons.	5987	1969.	11802
132.	Mičić (Ostoja) Božo	Cons.	5989	1949.	12701
133.	Mihajlović (Lazo) Nenad	Cons.	5988	1960.	11103
134.	Mihalović (Todor) Milorad	Cons.	6763	1951.	11806
135.	Mijatović (Bogdan) Željko	Cons.	5990	1970.	11217
136.	Mikerević (Petar) Mirko	Cons.	5991	1958.	11404
137.	Milaković (Vaskrsija) radovan	Cons.	5992	1965.	11101
138.	Milanković (Grozda) Dušan	Cons.	5993	1963.	13413
139.	Milanović (Novo) Goran	Cons.	5994	1963.	12102
140.	Miličević (Petar) Dragan	Cons.	5995	1948.	12701
141.	Milošević (Veljko) Ranko	Cons.	5996	1964.	12401
142.	Mirnić (Simeun) Nebojša	Cons.	5997	1967.	11218
143.	Misirlić (Bego) Muradif	Serg. 1st Class	5998	1946.	21307
144.	Muhurdarević (Ibrahim) Adem	Cons.	5999	1960.	11207
145.	Mušić (Dušan) Milan	Serg.	6100	1968.	21301
146.	Nanić (Mustafa) Ekrem	Cons.	6102	1946.	11807
147.	Nežić (Boro) Siniša	Cons.	6103	1969.	11101
148.	Nježić (Bogdan) Vujadin	Serg.	6104	1958.	21107
149.	Omić (Asim) Emer	Cons.	6105	1961.	11601
150.	Opolcer (Jozo) Ivan	Cons.	6106	1954.	11401
151.	pašalić (Emir) Dragan	Cons.	6107	1970.	11101
152.	Pavlović (Petar) Borivoje	Lt. Col.	4366	1947.	31102
153.	Pavlović (Anto) Drago	Cons.	6110	1945.	11701
154.	Petrović (Čedomir) Ljubimir	Cons.	6111	1954.	11301
155.	Pejaković (Dragutin) Zoran	Cons.	6112	1959.	11402
156.	Plivac (Čamil) hasan	Serg. 1st Class	6113	1944.	22401
157.	Popović (Gojko) Milorad	Cons.	6114	1947.	12701
158.	Popović (Ratko) Saša	Cons.	6115	1974.	11406
159.	Porić (Ibro) Aleksandra	Serg.	6117	1962.	21101
160.	Prajz (marko) Željko	Cons.	6118	1965.	11101
161.	Preselj (Ilija) Ivica	Cons.	4381	1965.	11101

162.	Predić (Savo) Goran	Cons.	6120	1952.	12121
163.	Radanović (Gojko) Milorad	Cons.	6121	1972.	11107
164.	Radulović (Boro) Draško	Cons.	6122	1959.	11101
165.	Rađen (Vlado) Malden	Serg.	6123	1969.	21901
166.	Rajić (Hajrudin) Reuf	Major	6124	1954.	31102
167.	Rajković (Todor) Goran	Cons.	6125	1958.	11901
168.	Ratković (Đuro) Malden	Cons.	6126	1969.	12107
169.	Ratković (Dušan) Zoran	Serg.	4383	1954.	21101
170.	Rezniček (Drago) Boris	Cons.	6764	1953.	11401
171.	Ridžal (Ašir) Sead	Cons.	6128	1949.	11807
172.	Slavić (slavoljub) saša	Cons.	6130	1969.	11203
173.	Savić (đorđe) Bogdan	Cons.	6129	1947.	11301
174.	Seferagić (Hasan) Enes	Cons.	6132	1949.	12120
175.	Seferagić (Enes) Edin	Cons.	6131	1972.	11201
176.	Sejdić (Salih) Fikret	Cons.	6133	1973.	11301
177.	Selimović (Junuz) Sead	Cons.	6134	1964.	11701
178.	Semiz (Imran) Nedžib	Cons.	4397	1965.	11107
179.	Silvaši (Đorđe) Zlatko	Serg.	4382	1956.	21101
180.	Sladojević (Stanija) Radoslav	Cons.	6148	1955.	11101
181.	Soboljevski (Tomo) Josip	Cons.	6136	1964.	12403
182.	Srdić (Vojislav) Aleksandar	Lieut.	6137	1966.	31102
183.	Srdić (Vojislav) Blaže	Cons.	6138	1970.	11412
184.	Stajčić (Živko) Vojislav	Cons.	6149	1949.	11401
185.	Stanić (Pantelija) Radenko	Cons.	6765	1963.	11714
186.	Staniveuković (Milorad) Goran	Cons.	6151	1969.	11812
187.	Stevković (Miloš) Tomislav	Cons.	6152	1940.	11101
188.	Stošić (Ljubiša) Branislav	Cons.	6153	1951.	11301
189.	Strika (Dragoljub) Neđo	Cons.	6139	1944.	11301
190.	Stočanin (Burhadin) Miroslav	Sn.Lt. 1 st Cl.	illegible	1948.	22130
191.	Stupar (Stevo) Radivoje	Cons.	6140	1955.	11808
192.	Subašić (Dragan) Alen	Cons.	6141	1969.	11409
193.	Subašić (Numan) Dragan	Cons.	6142	1947.	12108
194.	Subašić (Smajo) Jasmin	Serg.	4385	1968.	21107
195.	Subašić (Numan) Plamenko	Cons.	6114	1949.	11604
196.	Subašić (Božo) Strahilo	Cons.	6155	1956.	11701
197.	Subotić (Kosta) Mirko	Cons.	6145	1950.	11101
198.	Subotić (Milan) Radan	Cons.	6156	1958.	11101
199.	Sulejmani (Fehim) Smajo	Cons.	6146	1972.	11101
200.	Sarić (Milan) Goran	Cons.	6157	1966.	11101
201.	Ševarika (Nikola) Čedo	Cons.	6158	1969.	11413
202.	Šipka (Milutin) Nenad	Cons.	6756	1970.	11402
203.	Šipka (Vaskrsija) Vlado	Cons.	6159	1944.	11801
204.	Šipka (Ratko) Zoran	Cons.	6160	1952.	11101
205.	Šišarica (Jovo) Čedomir	Lieut.	6161	1924.	31101
206.	Šišarica (Čedomir) Mileta	Cons.	6162	1945.	11101
207.	Šobot (Rada) Aleksandar	Cons.	4390	1971.	11223
208.	Šodić (Anto) Nikola	Cons.	6164	1965.	11101
209.	Štikić (Mirko) Dragan	Cons.	6165	1950.	11301
210.	Štikovac (Nikola) Zdravko	Cons.	6166	1952.	12704
211.	Štrkić (Blažo) Milorad	Cons.	6167	1952.	13417
212.	Šukalo (Mirko) Milan	Cons.	6168	1943.	11101
213.	Šukalo (Mirko) Dragan	Cons.	4372	1971.	11807
214.	Šutilović (Stole) Dragan	Cons.	6170	1969.	12403
215.	Tadić (Ostoja) Ljubomir	Cons.	6172	1953.	11107
216.	Tadić (Kosta) Dragoslav	Cons.	6171	1953.	11401
217.	Tejić (Bjelan) Novica	Cons.	6173	1955.	11309
218.	Telebak (Aleksa) Mladen	Cons.	6174	1969.	11101
219.	Tešić (Milorad) Vinko	Cons.	6175	1956.	11201
220.	Toković (Džemo) Murat	Cons.	6176	1954.	11901
221.	Tomić (Branko) Dušan	Cons.	6177	1951.	12103
222.	Topić (Milovan) Nenad	Cons.	6178	1957.	11901

223.	Trbojević (Ratko) Željko	Cons.	6179	1956.	11101
224.	Tubić (Gojko) Radenko	Cons.	6180	1963.	11102
225.	Tučić (Gojko) Slavko	Cons.	6181	1948.	12701
226.	Tukić (Đurad) Milan	Cons.	6182	1960.	11904
227.	Tulumović (Dušanko) Đorđe	Cons.	6767	1966.	11205
228.	Vasilčić (Mile) Goran	Cons.	6768	1969.	12201
229.	Velić (Irfan) Zlatko	Cons.	6184	1959.	11304
230.	Vekić (Gojko) Vladimir	Cons.	6185	1968.	11201
231.	Vrbica (Mirko) Denis	Cons.	6187	1972.	12701
232.	Vučić (Miroslav) Darko	Cons.	6156	1971.	12701
233.	Vukelić (Miloš) Milan	Serg.	6188	1943.	21702
234.	Vuksan (Đoko) Dobrila	Serg.1 st Cl.	2592	1950.	21101
235.	Vuruna (Stojan) Ostoja	Cons.	6190	1950.	12701
236.	Vuruna (Stojan) Slavko	Cons.	6191	1951.	12701
237.	Zajec (Milan) Željko	Cap.	6192	1955.	31202
238.	Zec (Tomislav) Ognjen	Cons.	6193	1974.	11101
239.	Zoraja (Vojin) Siniša	Cons.	6194	1960.	11812
240.	Zorić (Savo) Žarko	Cons.	6195	1946.	11801
241.	Zorić (Slavko) Željko	Cons.	6196	1964.	12701
242.	Zrnić (Risto) Rajko	Cons.	4396	1965.	11101
243.	Zrnić (Drago) Slobodan	Cons.	6198	1952.	11901
244.	Zvonar (Simo) Milijan	Cons.	6199	1965.	11101
245.	Žilić (Ragib) Oman	Cons.	6200	1967.	11101
246.	Žunić (Tatjana) Haris	Cons.	6201	1963.	12121
247.	Aleksić (Milutin) Vlatko	Cons.	6769	1957.	11107
248.	Grmuša (Stanislav) Ranko	Cons.	6770	1969.	11107
249.	Vujinović (Bogdan) Mirko	Cap.	6771	1945.	31101

II – Gradiška municipality

1.	Barać (Žarko) Milan	Serg.	6258	1944.	21101
2.	Bursać (Milovan) Duško	Cons.	6259	1968.	11107
3.	Divjaković (Milan) Dobrivoje	Cons.	6260	1973.	11101
4.	Dobrinjac (Jovo) Predrag	Cons.	6261	1969.	11101
5.	Erceg (Lazo) Nenad	Cons.	6262	1968.	11107
6.	Gligić (Milovan) Dragoljub	Cons.	395	1957.	11401
7.	Ivaštanin (Ljubo) Dragan	Cons.	2245	1966.	11203
8.	Kojić (Milan) Slobodan	Cons.	6263	1964.	11301
9.	Lipovac (Trivun) Saša	Sn. Serg.	6772	1970.	21107
10.	Oljača (Savo) Milan	Cons.	2286	1951.	11101
11.	Sarajlić (Ljubomir) Ilija	Cons.	6268	1958.	11104
12.	Staživuk (Mihajlo) Srećko	Cons.	6264	1965	11101
13.	Šteković (Božo) Željko	Cons.	6265	1964	11101
14.	Todić (Žarko) Mirko	Cons.	6266	1970	11107

III – Srbac municipality

1.	Crndak (Drago) Vojislav	Cons.	6773	1958.	13024
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IV – Laktaši municipality

1.	Brković (Nikola) Dragan	Serg.	6271	1953.	21101
2.	Brkić (Slavko) Dubravko	Cons.	6272	1961.	11101
3.	Brkić (Slavko) Miroslav	Cons.	6273	1962.	12202
4.	Čustić (Dobrivoje) Zoran	Cons.	6274	1964.	11101
5.	Gajić (Mile) Davor	Cons.	6275	1974.	11601
6.	Gašić (Dušan) Goran	Cons.	6276	1967.	12704

7.	Grebenar (Budimir) Miroslav	Cons.	6277	1966.	11101
8.	Ivanić (Živko) Milan	Cons.	6278	1965.	11101
9.	Kezerović (Simo) Gostimir	Cons.	6279	1968.	11101
10.	Popović (Slavko) Darko	Cons.	6280	1968.	11101
11.	Savić (Slavko) Željko	Cons.	6281	1968.	11101
12.	Savić (Milivoj) Zoran	Cons.	6282	1971.	11101
13.	Stanković (Miladin) Siniša	Cons.	6774	1973.	11101
14.	Vujmilović (Tomo) Zoran	Cons.	6283	1974.	11406
15.	Zečević (Vlado) Nebojša	Cons.	6775	1969.	11101

V – Čelinac municipality

1.	Branković (Vida) Danimir	Cons.	6776	1966.	11101
2.	Jevđenić (Branko) Dragan	Cons.	6287	1964.	13401
3.	Jevđenić (Neđo) Mile	Cons.	6288	1958.	11812
4.	Jungić (Dragomir) Boško	Cons.	6289	1964.	11101
5.	Jungić (Gligo) Dragan	Cons.	6290	1966.	11101
6.	Jungić (Jovo) Mićo	Cons.	6291	1970.	11101
7.	Jungić (Ostoja) Rajko	Cons.	6292	1968.	11101
8.	Milanović (Dušan) Dragiša	Cons.	6294	1969.	11717
9.	Mitrović (Bogdan) Slavko	Cons.	6295	1966.	12403
10.	Todorović (Nedeljko) Vlado	Cons.	6801	1970.	11223
11.	Trivić (Dušan) Dragana	Cons.	6777	1970.	12403
12.	Trivić (Slavko) Goran	Cons.	6778	1967.	12403
13.	Trivić (Miloš) Slobodan	Capt.	6779	1960.	31102
14.	Trivić (Miloš) Vitomir	Cons.	6780	1965.	21802
15.	Predragović (Petar) Duško	Cons.	4405	1969.	11101

VI – Kotor Varoš municipality

1.	Petrović (Mile) Vinko	Cons.	6306	1958.	11407
2.	Tovilović (Miloš) Vinoslav	Cons.	6304	1961.	11304
3.	Tovilović (Miloš) Vojislav	Cons.	6305	1964.	11107

VII – Prnjavor municipality

1.	Dujaković (Jovo) Željko	Cons.	306	1967.	11812
2.	Palikuća (Vladimir) Jelenko	Cons.	6307	1962.	11101
3.	Živković (Milorad) Siniša	Cons.	6308	1974.	12210

VIII – Jajce municipality

1.	Gavrić (Ilija) Marinko	Cons.	6309	1967.	11101
2.	Sevo (Mićo) Zoran	Cons.	4376	1965.	11107

IX – Kozarska Dubica municipality

1.	Babić (Marko) Miodrag	Cons.	6206	1957.	11103
2.	Babić (Nedeljko) Mlađo	Cons.	6781	1972.	11101
3.	Dodik (Nikola) Milan	Cons.	386	1962.	11101
4.	Dodik (Milisav) Miloš	Cons.	6782	1953.	12701
5.	Dragelj(Dragutin) Milan	Cons.	413	1960.	11101
6.	Đaković (Radomir) Veljko	Cons.	6209	1962.	11104
7.	Gajić (Branko) Borko	Cons.	375	1960.	11221
8.	Grahovac (Milan) Branko	Cons.	482	1954.	11104

9.	Hrnjak (Rajko) Tomislav	Cons.	392	1960.	11901
10.	Kanazir (Drago) Predrag	Cons.	486	1967.	11223
11.	Kojanović (Milinko) Marinko	Cons.	316	1965.	11101
12.	Korica (Mile) Dragan	Cons.	6215	1952.	11201
13.	Kos (mile) Miodrag	Cons.	340	1954.	11901
14.	Kovačević (Dušan) Dušan	Cons.	6217	1957.	11101
15.	Latinović (Đorđe) Vukas	Cons.	3803	1960.	12701
16.	Lončar (Novo) Miodrag	Cons.	6219	1963.	11701
17.	Mandić (Vlado) Milenko	Cons.	6220	1964.	11101
18.	Marković (Branko) Žarko	Cons.	329	1971.	11107
19.	Mirković (Mihajlo) Dragomir	Cons.	336	1950.	1102
20.	Mirić (Mihalo) Mirenko	Cons.	380	1954.	11901
21.	Mišković (Milan) Ilija	Cons.	6224	1974.	11107
22.	Papučić (Nikola) Milan	Cons.	6225		11101
23.	Plilipović (Žarko) Branko	Cons.	376	1956.	11101
24.	Radulović (Mirko) Miroslav	Cons.	6227	1966.	12701
25.	Rašić (Rade) Branko	Cons.	311	1968.	11103
26.	Rašić (Rade) Gojko	Cons.	327	1964.	11101
27.	Raković (Đuro) Milan	Cons.	389	1960.	11604
28.	Rokić (Boško) Zdravko	Cons.	6231	1958.	11101
29.	Samardžija (Milanko) Rajko	Cons.	328	1950.	12701
30.	Savić (Rade) Brane	Cons.	6233	1960.	13422
31.	Savić (Boro) Marinko	Cons.	6234	1965.	11101
32.	Selak (Dragoljub) Dušan	Cons.	6235	1954.	11101
33.	Sinkić (Rajko) Milovan	Cons.	365	1961.	11101
34.	Stojaković (Boro) Stojan	Serg.	6237	1953.	21201
35.	Šipka (Milojko) Milorad	Cons.	3238	1952.	11101
36.	Štaković (Božo) Željko	Cons.	6265	1964.	11101
37.	Toroman (Milorad) Miroslav	Cons.	391	1969.	11101
38.	Trkulja (Milorad) Milan	Cons.	330	1963.	11101
39.	Vujasin (Boško) Branislav	Cons.	6241	1972.	11101
40.	Vukojević (Grujo) Grujica	Cons.	349	1956.	11101
41.	Zelić(Milenko) Rade	Cons.	6243	1953.	11101
42.	Zelić (Ljubomir) Zdravko	Cons.	6244	1960.	11812
43.	Zgodić (Drago) Mijo	Cons.	6245	1957.	11101
44.	Zorić (Mirko) Milan	Cons.	6246	1954.	12401

X – Novi Grad municipality

1.	Milašin (Gojko) Ivan	Cons.	324	1960.	11202
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XI – Prijedor municipality

1.	Paspalj (Mirko) Milan	Cons.	6783	1964.	11101
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XII – Ključ municipality

1.	Travar (Pero) Duško	Cons.	6784	1969.	11107
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COMMANDER

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MILITARY POST

Illegible

Jasenovac/

Lieutenant colonel

Borivoje Pavlović

/signed/

Received: 2 February 1996		
Classification mark	Org. Unit	
/handwritten: Archive; persons/	109007	
Registration number	Attachment	Time
100-09-00072		09

LIST

of conscripts from Republic of Srpska /illegible/ Okučani:
(RJ – 7100), by municipalities:

6643 22. TRIŠIĆ Pero Siniša con. 1963 11701

I – Banja Luka municipality

2640 1. ČETKOVIĆ Đorđe NEDO, st. Vod 1953 21802 Beogradska 11
5586 2. NOVAKOVIĆ Marjan ZORA, lieut. 1957 32502 M. Obilića 44
6644 3. VULIN Vitomir NILENKO, con. 1952 11102 -
6645 4. RUDIĆ Mile DUŠKO, con. 1948 11101 M. Knežopoljke:
6646 5. OSTOJIĆ Nenad RATKO lieut. 1957 31102 Z. Carića 210
6647 6. TAMBURIĆ Đorđe JELENKO, con. 1964 11812
6648 7. CVIJIĆ Milorada BORISLAV, con. 1957 11107 M. Glišića 4
6649 8. UZELAC Milan MILAN con. 1958 12502 -
6650 9. VUČIĆ Nenad NINOSLAV, con. 1973 11101 -
28 10. KOSANOVIĆ Stevan PAJO con. 1954 11802 -
(refugees from Bilogora, on RR MP 9167 Jasenovac)
4486 11. RADULJ Dragoljub DUŠKO, l.corp. 1970 11702 Verići
5730 12. ĐUĐIĆ Mirka DRAGAN, l.corp. 1972 11406 Verići
4463 13. STANKOVIĆ Zdravko DARKO, l.corp. 1971 11101 -
14. /crossedout/
6651 15. VUČIĆ Novak ILIJA, con. 1961 11101 -
6652 16. ŽUŽA MILAN con. (dentist)
6653 17. TRIVIĆ Spasoje MIRKO con. 1959 12701 -
3868 18. LAKIĆ Ilija ALEKSA serg. 1955 22702 Tunjica bb
6172 19. TADIĆ Ostoje LJUBOMIR con. 1953 11107 F. Filipovića
6654 20. KASIPOVIĆ Drago ANTON con. 1956 11314 V. Momčila 10
5908 21. ECEG Vlado VOJISLAV C1C 1952 31202 Đ. Đakovića

II – Gradiška municipality

4579 1. JANJETOVIĆ Milutin MILE lieut. 1960 32402 G. Podgradci
5794 2. ŠESTIĆ Rajko LJILJA, con. 1960 11101 G. Podgradci
4436 3. BJELOVUK Vojislav GOJKO S.lieut 1965 32402 Jablanica
4498 4. PANIĆ Vido ŽELJKO serg. 1970 21413 G. Podgradci
5704 5. PEJIĆ Dušan VLADO, con. 1953 11101 Gašnica
5705 6. MISIMOVIĆ Milivoj MILUTIN serg. 1968 21217 Jablanica
6655 7. KUKIĆ Drago RADOVAN con. 1968 11301 G. Podgradci
4484 8. SAVIĆ Miladin BOŠKO, con. 1967 11610 Gašnica
5712 9. BARUDŽIJA Jovo NIKOLA con. 1963 11701 Gašnica
5700 10. LUKIĆ Pantelija ĐORĐE, serg. 1969 22702 Jablanica
4483 11. BABIĆ Ddragutin NIKOL serg. 1969 21102 Jablanica
4456 12. BATIĆ Dragomir BORISLAV, con. 1960 11101 Gašnica
4457 13. BJELAJAC Rade DRAGO con. 1959 12704 Gašnica
4449 14. STAJČIĆ Milenko DRAGOJA, con. 1959 11107 Jablanica

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ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

4460	15. GRGIĆ Božo MILAN,	con.	1972	11101	Jablanica
4485	16. RANILOVIĆ Đuro STEVO	con.	1969	11807	Gašnica
5708	17. PASPALJ Radivoje radoslav,	con	1963	11801	G. Podgradci
4466	18. /illegible/ SAVANA JUGOSLAV,	con.	1972	12704	Kruškik
5701	19. MISIMOVIĆ Milivoj MILAN	con.	1967	12403	Jablanica
4493	20. VODOGAZ Ostoje RADOVAN,	con.	1951		G. Podgradci
6656	21. LUKIĆ Milan ZORAN,	con.	1969	11107	Dubrave
6657	22. KLJAKIĆ Milorad BORO,	con.	1965	11101	G. Podgradci
6658	23. BABIĆ Gojko MIODRAG,	serg.	1962	21102	G. Podgradci
6659	24. MARKOVIĆ Marko ŽELJKO,	capt.serg.	1960	22702	S. Revolucije 12A
6660	25. LJOLJIĆ Đuro MILE,	con.	1961	11107	Cimiroti 60
6661	26. KLINCOV Dimitar RADOMIR	con.	1967	11101	Liskovac (Čikule)
5706	27. POPOVIĆ Miledin BOGDAN	con.	1960	11742	G. Podgradci
4459	28. LUKIĆ Pantelija RADOLJUB,	con.	1966	11223	Jablanica
4462	29. DIMITRIJEVIĆ Kostadin RADO	S.liut.	1952	31102	G. Podgradci
4467	30. DAKIĆ Ljugo PERO,	con.	1955	11101	G. Podgradci
4465	31. GOLIŠ Petar ZORAN,	con.	1964	11701	Gašnica (Orahova)
5714	32. BJELOVUK Vojislav NEDO,	con.	1963	11223	Jablanica
4446	33. BILANDŽIĆ Ivica MIROSLAV,	con.	1970	11101	B. Cesta
5711	34. ŠLJIVAR Branko RADISLAV,	con.	1953	12401	Gradiška
6662	35. DONČIĆ Dušan DALIBOR,	con.			
5713	36. STUPAR Petar NEBOJŠA,	con.	1966	11101	Jablanica
6663	37. VIDOVIĆ Mile ZORAN,	con.	1955	11401	
6664	38. KNEŽEVIĆ Rade BRANKO,	con.	1961		M. Dročića
6665	39. DAKIĆ Dragoljub DUŠKO	con.	1972	11415	D. Jurkovića 20A
2186	40. JOTIĆ Vlado STEVO,	con.	1972	11407	S. Miljevci
2098	41. MARIĆ Teodor ILIJA,	serg.	1964	21107	Crveni Krst bb
3445	42. BABIĆ Nikola MILAN	serg.	1949	22707	R. Keviča 8
6666	43. PASPALJ Rade DRAGOSLAV,	con.	1971	11107	G. Podgradci
1682	44. PETROVIĆ Đuro RADENKO,	l.corp	1957	11107	G. Podgradci 32
6667	45. ŠERBULA GOJKO (journalist)				

III – Mrkonjić Grad municipality

6668	1. PETKOVIĆ Boro BRANKO,	con.	1970	11107	Podbrdo
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IV – Prijedor municipality

6669	1. BANJAC Rade DRAGOLJUB,	major	1940	3112	-
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 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

V – Kneževo municipality

6670	1. BRĐANIN Mirko Mladen	con.	1970	12403	Javorani
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VI – Laktaši municipality

6671	1. PEJCINOVIĆ Salvko ZLATKO,	lieut.	1954	31102	Slatina bb
6672	2. RADINKOVIĆ Dragomir ZORAN,	con.	1966	11314	Slatina
6675	3. CETOJEVIĆ Radovan DOBRIVOJE,	lieut.	1970	31402	Laktaši
6674	4. LAPAC Milana DRAGAN,	con.	1971	12701	Laktaši
6675	5. JEREMIĆ Ljube LJUBOMIR,	con.	1971		Tetoševci
6676	6. JORGIĆ Mirko BRANISLAV,	con.	1972		Laktaši
6617	7. BABIĆ Radovan JUGOSLAV	con.	1969		Sltina
6282	8. SAVIĆ Milovan ZORAN,	con.	1957		Laktaši

List prepared by

Captain

Marko Vujić

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APPROVED:
COMMANDER
Lieutenant
Ratomir Simić
/signed/

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MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET

PLAN
FOR ELIMINATING WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED BY THE 5th CORPS COMMAND TEAM

- JANUARY 1992 -

Element	Seq. No.	Task description	Time	Responsibility	Cooperation
1	2	3	4	5	6
L&C	1	Provide part of area for handling combat operations.	Jan 25, 1992	PNŠONP	ACLo
	2	Analysis of all performed activities, identify shortcomings and experiences and increase efficiency in execution of all tasks	Permanent task	CoS, unit command. and capt.	Brigade comm..
	3	Avoid mixing of units in zones (regions) b/d, especially mixing of 5th ib with other units. Required number of soldiers subordinate from 5th id to arbr. and delineate borders of operation zones within units	Jan 25, 1992	CoS	2nd arm.br. comm. and 5th ib. comm.
	4	Stop unnecessary firing from all kinds of weapons and thus respect ceasefire agreement	Permanent task	CoS	commanders and jr. commanders
	5	Improve organization of enemy reconnaissance in valley and covered land. Inform reconnaissance bodies of all detected changes with the enemy, especially regarding the arrival of new forces, regrouping, fortification, obstructions or change of the ceasefire line	Permanent task	PNŠONP	RT. comm, sn. and jun. unit comm.
	6	Establish reserve brigade for intervention on affected routes.	Jan 25, 1992	CoS	4th arm.br. comm.
	7	Establish operation records in units	Jan 25, 1992	5th ib. comm.	PNSONP
	8	Create a fire scheme and table with elements for night operations for all units	Jan 30, 1992	Comm. and jr. comm.	PNŠONP
	9	Fully regulate defense regions of units and KM in engineering terms	Jan 30, 1992	NI	Unit comm. and jr. comm.
	10	Take measures in all units to ensure full combat readiness in front, sides and joints and by setting outposts, announcement signs and patrol referral	Jan 30, 1992	Unit comm. and jr. comm.	PNŠONP
Mobilization readiness	11	Take all measures necessary to accept newly mobilized manpower deployment in the units, equipping and arming	Permanent task	PNŠONP	Unit comm. and jr. comm.
	12	Appoint to 5th ib with respective commanding personnel, send written request to 5th C command to appoint missing personnel. Supplement other units with missing personnel and equipment.	Feb 15, 1992	PNŠONP	5th ib jr. comm.
	13	By order of the brigade commanders regulate assignment of the command staff to the 5th ib and submit proposals for promotion of those who are capable to command units.	Feb 30, 1992	PNŠOMPP	5th ib jr. comm.

Esprit	14	Talk to soldiers on positions on daily bases and warn them through conversation about the dangers of putting their guard down and possible surprises of Ustasha	Permanent task	ACME	Comm. bodies, sn. and jr. Comm.
	15	Complete and updated records in the field of ME	Jan 30, 1992	ACME	
	16	Reconcile the relationship with former Okučani TD Staff, so it would not influence moral of 5 th ibr soldiers	Feb 1, 1992	Commander	Comm. bodies
State of training	17	Plan and implement training between combat operations, especially: - full reconnaissance of defense zone, analyze and continuously monitor enemy position; - secure junctions, sides and interspaces; - put obstacles on facilities and routes; - general maintenance of Com. vehicle, arming and equipment; - adjust precision of NS and machine guns on com. vehicle; - open exits to MP; - aiming at night and indirect aiming	Feb 1, 1992	Units sn. and jr. comm.	PNŠONP, chiefs of sectors
Training	18	Training tank crew and permanent crew of APC M-60 and BVP-80 based on the curriculum given curriculum in the training center.	Permanent task	Centre commander	PNŠONP
CSS	19	5th ib background relieve of all duties not related to the battalion, supply it with the necessary equipment, weapons and vehicles	Feb 15, 1992	ACLo	Chiefs of dep., 5th, ib comm.
	20	Examine the causes of the frequent malfunctions of large number of clutches on T-55, OT M-60 and malfunctions on PAM 12.7 mm "Broving"	Jan 30, 1992	NTS1	Units sn. and jr. comm.
	21	Regular and quality basic maintenance of combat vehicle weapons and other equipment.	Permanent task	Units sn. and jr. comm.	NTS1
	22	Urgent updates of all technical databases and determine the status of resources (in MT, km and other), first combat, than MV. Upon completion of task, NTS1 will submit a written report to 5th C commander.	Jan 30, 1992	Units sn. and jr. comm.	NTS1
Safety and self-protection	23	Prevent removal of weapons outside the combat zone as well as theft.	Permanent task	Units sn. and jr. comm.	NB
	24	Take security and self-protection measures when handling personal weapons, in order to eliminate self-inflicted injuries and killings.	Permanent task	Units sn. and jr. comm.	Brigade command bodies
	25	Take all legal measures against personnel which left their units.	Permanent task	NB	
	NĐ/MN		/stamp illegible/	Chief of Staff lieutenant colonel Novica Simić / signed /	

ACLO – Assistant commander for logistics

CoS – Chief of Staff

RT – reconnaissance troop

L&C – leadership and command

ACME – ASSISTANT COMMANDER FOR MORAL EDUCATION

ME – MORAL EDUCATION

APC - ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER

MT – MOTORIZED TROOP

CSS – COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

MV – MOTOR VEHICLE

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 CROATIAN
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 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21
 Command 329th arm.br.
 Ref. Number 2-44
 23 January 1992

MILITARY SECRET
 CONFIDENTIAL

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Based on the orders of 5th Corps command str. con. No. 33-3 of 22nd January 1992, in order to regulate specific areas of responsibilities and organization of combat security focused on defence,

I HEREBY ORDER:

1. 5th ibr command will subordinate TD/territorial defence/ platoon Poljane, manpower of 40 soldiers, to 2nd arm.br. command. 2nd arm.br. command will register members of the platoon on their list of soldiers and direct it as formation unit until further notice.
2. Responsibility zone of 2nd arm.br.: Right: railway up to v. Dubovac, left: hill Vundukovo (tt204) – Duga Medja (tt158) – road junction in v. Smrtić – Blatuše (junction) – Smrdan).
3. Responsibility zone of 5th ibr: Right: left border of 2nd arm.br., left: Rovišta – school in v. Širinci – Gradina (tt 360) – Kresevac (tt 311) – hill Vražije.
4. 5th ibr command will form unit shifts for purpose of defence in duration of 7 days according to the following:
 - Defence region 2. TT (TANK TROOP) in v. Medari 2. IT (INFANTRY TROOP) (Medari) and 3. IT (Okučani – 1)
 - Defence region 3. TT in v. Trnava with 50% of manpower securing on position 4. IT (Okučani – 2)
 Rear backup security of these units will be under 5th ibr.
5. 5th ibr. command will regulate takeover of positions in region Gornji Ratkovac by the 5th IT composed of TDT (TERRITORIAL DEFENCE TROOP) Prnjavor and Sime Bogdanović volunteer platoon. Unit commander is Lieutenant Veljko Milanković.
- Other 5th ibr units according to decision of 5th ibr. commander.
6. 2nd arm.br. will determine a unit of strength up to TT which will serve as reserve for intervention of 2nd arm.br. and 5th ibr. jeopardized directions.
7. Command of the 3rd Infantry Brigade will regulate accommodation of units that do not have built shelters in the wider region of v. Ratkovac and Smrtići. Resting of personnel in the villages in which they live will be done as needed with the appropriate compulsory permit to stay outside the unit.
8. Command of the 2nd Armoured Brigade and 5th Infantry Brigade will, pursuant to this order, carry out reconnaissance, prepare combat documentation and occupation of positions pursuant to this order no later than 12.00 hours on 25th January 1992.

NS/MN

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COMMANDER, LIEUTENANT

Ratomir Simić

/signed/

5th CORPS COMMAND
 Ref.no. /handwritten: 278-21
 17th March 1992

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 CROATIAN
 MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

Establishment of command in village
 Grubišno Polje, Order.-

TO THE COMMAND OF THE
 COMMAND OF GRUBIŠNO POLJE

Based on the instructions regarding the performance of civil affairs in crisis areas and the Order of the Federal Secretary for National Defence, str.conf. number 3383-1 of 3rd December 1991 relating to organizational and formational changes in the JNA and authorization of the Federal Assistant Secretary for the civil sector (formation of bodies for Civil Affairs)

I HEREBY ORDER:

1. Form and establish command of Grubišno Polje in the village Šeovica.
 2. Commander of Grubišno Polje command will be res. lieutenant BASTAŠIĆ MILAN.
 For other duties in the Command assign;
 - ZAGORAC ŽIVKO, economy officer,
 - BEZBRADICA DUŠAN, officer for social activities,
 - SAVATOVIĆ RADE, Officer for housing and utilities;
 - KADIĆ MILOVAN, security officer.
 3. Corps Assistant Commander of Personnel Directorate in accordance with this order and the proscribed formation shall assign personnel to aforementioned military posts, and regulate their status in the service.
 4. Commands will base their work on provisions of Instructions on the exercise of civil affairs in crisis areas and the orders and instructions of senior officers.
- In performing their duties, they shall cooperate with the 5th Corps Division for Civil Affairs.
5. For logistics, town command will rely on the 5th ibr. (technical and quartermaster)

/stamp: 5th CORPS COMMAND/

COMMANDER
 Lieutenant General
 Vladimir Vuković
 /signed/

5th CORPS COMMAND
 Ref.no. /handwritten: 264-4/
 21st March 1992

/stamp/
 CROATIAN
 MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

MILITARY SECRET
 CONFIDENTIAL

Organization, planning and
 execution of training with
 TD /territorial defence/ units Western Slavonia
 order. -

COMMAND
 /handwritten: Commander of Zone Headquarters
 of Territorial Defence Western Slavonia/

For the purpose of assisting the TD Zone Headquarters Western Slavonia in the organization, planning and execution of combat training and education of TD and their battle drills,

I HEREBY COMMAND

1. – For the organization, planning and execution of combat training and education, in cooperation with the Commandant of TD Zone Headquarters Western Slavonia, Colonel Jovan Čubrić, the following units are responsible:

- 5th Communication Battalion for [TD] communication units
- 5th Military Police Battalion for [TD] military police unit
- 5th LAR (LIGHT ARTILLERY REGIMENT) AD/ air defence/ for [TD] AD units
- 5th MAAR (MIXED ANTITANK ARTILLERY REGIMENT) for [TD] antitank units
- 5th MAR (MIXED ARTILLERY REGIMENT) for [TD] artillery support units

For the quality of the organization, planning and implementation of combat training and education, responsible are Commander of TD Zone Headquarters and 5th C. Chiefs of Sectors.

2. – Training is to last 10 working days from 01st April 1992 to 10th April 1992 in the region of v. Gređani for all units except the communication unit. Communication unit is to have its training on the 5th Communication Battalion position.

The planned shooting practice from infantry, artillery and air defence weapons is to be executed on the training ground "Manjača".

Thematic plans for training in cooperation with Commander of TD Zone HQ, Colonel Jovan Čubrić, will be elaborated by the security bodies and the chiefs of sectors of the 5th Corps command and delivered to units until 24th March 1992, and the work and training schedules by commands responsible for organizing, planning and execution of training until 27th March 1992.

Immediate preparation for the organization and planning of training, with Chiefs of Sectors and senior officers from 5th Corps command security bodies, as well as with chiefs of staffs of 5th LAR AD, 5th map, 5th MAAR, the deputy communication battalion commander and military police battalion of the 5th Corps will be executed by Colonel Jovan Čubrić on 22nd March 1992 in period 09.00 - 10.00 hours in the Chief of Sectors' room at the military post of 5th Corps Stara Gradiška.

Training is to be carried out on the formation's equipment belonging to TD units which are located within the 5th Corps. Training unit shall be responsible for providing these resources.

3. – Extraction of troops and senior officers from combat contact with TD units which will be trained and gathering in completely safe regions will be executed until 10.00 hrs on 31st March 1992. Unit commands in whose formation are now soldiers and officers of TD units, shall be responsible for extraction and collection.

Transport of personnel from collection regions to training units will be done by unit's vehicles in whose formations are now TD personnel; Transporting of personnel shall be executed on 31st March 1992 in the period from 12.00 to 14.00 hours.

Detailed list of personnel which will form TD units for training shall be promptly provided by Senior Staff officers and TD units.

4. – Senior officers of TD Zone HQ will be responsible for the accommodation arrangement of units in v. Gređani and 5th communication battalion will be responsible for the communication units. Food arrangement of manpower in v. Gređani shall be organized by the 359th arm.br., and for communication units by the 5th communication battalion.

Where the accommodation in buildings is not possible, personnel will be accommodated in tents. Soldiers of TD unit shall carry two blankets and mats.

5. – Take all measures to avoid injuring of people and damaging of the equipment during the training.

JĆ/JM

/stamp illegible/

COMMANDER

General Major

Momir Talić

/Signed/

5TH CORPS COMMAND
 Ref.no. /handwritten: 293-1/
 22nd March 1992

/stamp/
 CROATIAN
 MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

Use of 5th Corps MP
 command's stamp
 approval submitted.-

COMMAND
 /handwritten: Commander
 of TD Zone HQ Western Slavonia/

Based on the indicated need, I authorize the use of MP 4022 Banja Luka stamp for: 2nd ibr, 5th ibr and Western Slavonia TD units.

The right to use the stamp are exclusive to brigade commanders, and in their absence their deputies.

Any abuse will be legally sanctioned.

KN/JM

COMMANDER

/stamp: COMMAND illegible/

General Major

Momir Talić

/Signed/

/stamp: REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
 TD ZONE HQ
 WESTERN SLAVONIA
 Handwritten: illegible/

5th CORPS COMMAND
 Ref.no. /handwritten: 321-1/
 3rd April 1992

MILITARY SECRET
 CONFIDENTIAL

/stamp/
 CROATIAN
 MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

Letter to soldiers
 of Banja Luka Corps.-

COMMAND
 /handwritten: 329. arm.br.

Political and security situation in BiH is rapidly deteriorating. The objective of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ leadership to transfer the warfare of BiH is gradually realized, thanks to the leadership of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the actions of certain parties.

Battles are fought in Bosanski Brod, Bijeljina, on Kupres, and every moment war flames could be ignited in Western Herzegovina, Travnik, Derventa and other regions of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Setting up barricades in Banja Luka on 3rd April 1992 by the so-called Serbian armed forces threatens the peace in Bosanska Krajina, although reasons for this do not exist, because all of the requirements set by the organizers of these barricades can (and must) be resolved amicably.

In connection with the latest events in Banja Luka, we draw attention of the 5th Corps members to the following:

- With the eight-month battle, combatants of the 5th Corps have rescued Serbian people of Western Slavonija from... /illegible/...liberated them and ... /illegible/... Serbian territory in this part of Croatia, prevent penetration Paraga's soldiers on the territory of Bosanska Krajina and created conditions for the arrival of UN peacekeeping forces, which should mean the end of war in this region.

- By timely and realistic consideration of the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to protect our families and the entire nation of Bosanska Krajina, Corps command with the approval of the Supreme Command, conducted the mobilization of new units and transfer of some units from Slavonia battlefield and has taken positions from Skender Vakuf via Vlačić - Maslovar - Motajica - Mrkonjić Grad, Jajce, Sanski Most to Kupres.

With such deployment of forces, our Corps has closed all entrances to the Bosanska Krajina and disabled raid of paramilitary units and the Croatian armed forces on the territory of Krajina.

From the above it can be concluded that the Corps is surrounded and that during the period ahead we will have a difficult task of maintaining peace in this part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

To protect Bosanska Krajina from destruction and our families, in the coming period, we have to:

1. - remain on our positions until the arrival of blue helmets (around 20th April), which will create conditions for the safe transfer of Corps from Western Slavonia and involvement in the preservation of peace in the Bosanska Krajina. This is especially important when we know that with the arrival of UN peacekeepers, in addition to Banja Luka, also Knin and Bihać Corps will enter Krajina.

Leaving the position in Slavonia before the arrival of UN peacekeepers would lead to immediate and safety endangerment of Bosanska Krajina by the Ustasha forces, who wish to revenge, and not to mention that this would mean a betrayal of our dead and wounded comrades and ourselves.

2. - We must remain unified and not allow to be drawn into political games. Thanks to present unity and sacrifice of all Corps members, we won great victories, and gained reputation and confidence of the people not only in Bosanska Krajina, but also throughout BiH and Yugoslavia. This is confirmed by the continuous

rise in the number of soldiers in the corps, which is filled by members of all nations and nationalities of Bosanska Krajina.

With our unity and consistency of veteran soldiers, we will also give support to those who reasonably request to provide the fighters with the same rights as those of NOR and financial security of families and to lead the fight against war profiteers and all those who want to use misery and blood of people for their own interests.

3. - Ensure that the Banja Luka Corps stays a protector of safety for all people and nationalities in Bosanska Krajina and to allow people of Krajina to peacefully build their democratic government and along with other willing nations and republics to build a new common state in which our children will not fight .

I am sure that we will succeed.

/round stamp: illegible text /

COMMANDER
General Major
Momir Talić
/signed/

/handwritten: illegible/

GRUBIŠNO POLJE
COMMAND
Number 017/92
Okučani, 25th April 1992/handwritten: 17/

/handwritten: submitted on 25th April 1992/
/handwritten: illegible/

/stamp/
CROATIAN
MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
District Police Western Slavonia
OKUČANI

Please send this telegram to Beli Manastir police to attention of police officer Kodić Milovan with the following content:

“Milovan, everyone that have sent a request for Grubišno Polje police should go to Banja luka
Your arrival is expected within THREE days.”

We expect you to send this immediately and we thank you in advance.

COMMANDER KM /command post/
Lieut. Dr. Milan Bastašić
/signed/

MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
 329. arm.br. Command
 Ref.str.con.no. /handwritten: 16-12-1/
 24th May 1992

/stamp/
 CROATIAN
 MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

Order to PVO /air defence /AD//

To command /handwritten 5th ibr./

1. In future combat operations, enemy air strikes are expected on units and facilities in 329. Arm.br. zone of operation.

Massive attack for supremacy of airspace is expected against Air Force and Air Defence.

Base airfields are in neighbouring countries (Hungary, Austria, Italy), and with the recognition of RH and Slovenia, aviation bases are expended to airfields of these states.

In support of the Air Force, focus of activities is expected against first, second and third armoured battalion as well as against HAS (howitzer artillery squadron) - 122 and the bridge over the Sava River.

There is also a possibility of strikes on army complex "Kozara" in order to prevent the mobilisation and to spread panic among the civilian population in the wider region.

Air strikes are expected from airplanes of type "Tornado", "Fantom" and "Mig".

There is also possibility of agricultural aviation type "AN-2" especially from the direction of N. Gradiška and northwest.

Flights will most likely be made at low altitudes, while the attacks on objects will be from the medium and low altitudes trying to avoid AD response.

Attacks are expected in small groups of four to six airplanes, or in order to achieve surprise possibly by medium-sized group of eight to 12 airplanes.

2. Tasks and engagement of AD artillery missile units.

329. LSPAMS (LIGHT SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY-MISSILE SQUADRON) AD without the first and third battery performs AD of the bridge on the river Sava and Struga from the current firing positions.

Adjoin the first mixed LSPAMS AD to HAS-122 with the same AD mission for the entire duration of combat operations.

Adjoin the third mixed LSPAMS AD to third arm.br. with the same AD mission for the entire duration of combat operations.

LAMP (LIGHT ARTILLERY MISSILE PLATOON) AD shall execute AD Command Post and Auxiliary Command Post 329. Arm.br. in Okučani region.

Divisions S-2 M will occupy firing positions in the discretion of the battalion-division commander and will execute AD of its units.

3. Neighbours

AD Artillery Missile units of Krajina Corps shall have a mission of AD of units and facilities in collaboration with Aviation Brigade, 155 MR (MISSILE REGIMENT) AD and 55th Air Warning Center .

1st LAR AD organizes and performs AD of units to support 1st Krajina Corps from positions in the wider region of Okučani, Bijeke Stijene, Laminci and Derventa.

16th LAR AD is located in the wider region of v. Rajići and performs AD of 16th Brigade units.

4. Organisation of Amy Intelligence Unit

Organisation of AIU will focus on its own resources for monitoring and reporting.

Deploy ROST (RADAR OBSERVATION STATION) in current region.

Deploy VOST (VISUAL OBSERVATION STATION) in current regions with the task of timely detection and reporting of enemy aviation flights.

All units must activate immediately RF-5 or RF-2 ...

Frequencies were provided in the previous order. Reporting on aviation flights should be made via Command radio network. All command posts must have airspace observation posts

5. Air safety measures

All units must camouflage and fortify firing positions. Special attention must be given to the quality of shelters for soldiers.

Upon detection of danger alarm all units.

Radars should be used for observation according to the strict planning regime.

Lights on buildings and other objects must be switched off during the night.

6. Command and Communications

Put all AD units in the highest degree of combat readiness.

Commands to units to open fire must be done with /illegible/ AD and /illegible/ batteries.

In the event of an attack from the ground and the defence of firing positions deploy units to engage in the attack on land and water.

Communication must be organized according to the current radio communication plan.

To prevent attacks on our own aviation, adhere to the current guidelines and instructions.

Activity report on objectives of the airspace and changes of firing positions immediately submit via command radio network.

AD combat readiness must be put to the degree of combat readiness as stated in the Order at 20:00 hours on 24th May 1992.

GM/ZD

/stamp: illegible/

DEPUTY COMMANDER

Lieutenant

Novica Simić

/signed/

NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CLEARLY SHOWS THAT JNA, AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF WESTERN SLAVONIA (OKUČANI - CROATIA), GAVE ITS ARMAMENT, MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT TO REBELLED SERBS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

1st KRAJINA CORPS COMMAND
 Con.Ref.No. /handwritten: 258-4/
 27th May 1992

/stamp/
 CROATIAN
 MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

Deactivation of Okučani
 Command, order.-

TO COMMAND /handwritten: TD Zone HQ W. Slavonia/

Based on the Instructions on the performance of civil affairs in crisis areas, and given that the civil authorities of the municipality Okučani is fully formed and performs all the government duties, and the need for the continued existence of the Okučani Command no longer exists, on the aforementioned grounds

I HEREBY ORDER:

- ①.- To deactivate the Okučani command as of 31st May 1992
- ②.- Command personnel is to be made available to the Okučani municipality Council and Western Slavonia Zone Headquarters.
 Colonel Branislav Grujić will report to the personnel authority of the 1st Krajina Corps Command.
- ③.- Protection platoon of the Command is to be given to TD Zone HQ Western Slavonia.
- 4.- Return the armament to units and institution from which it was received.
- 5.- Update and close operation records, and submit it to 1st Krajina Corps command archive for storage.
 Protection platoon formation and Command's working map must be submitted to 1st Krajina Corps CA command.
- 6.- Building in which Command was located is to be transferred to TD Zone HQ Western Slavonia.
- 7.- Command commander will deliver a written report about the deactivation of Okučani command until 14,00 hours on 2nd June 1992.

DŽ/VL

/stamp: illegible/

COMMANDER
 General Major
 Momir Talić
 /signed/

1st KRAJINA CORPS COMMAND
 Con.Ref.No. /handwritten: 551-1/
 30th June 1992

MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/stamp/
 CROATIAN
 MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

Deactivation and termination
 of town commands on the territory
 of Western Slavonia,

Order.-

/handwritten: Podr. Slatina command/

On the basis of indicated need, in accordance with previously defined tasks and responsibilities of the town Commands on the territory of Western Slavonia,

I HERBY ORDER:

- ①.- As of 1st July 1992 commands for Daruvar, Podravska Slatina, Pakrac and Grubišno Polje, along with protection units will stop operating.
- ②. Town Commands and protection units are to be deactivated and all personnel from their composition made available to TD Zone HQ Western Slavonia and municipal TD Headquarters in this area.
- 3.- All assets including weapons, ammunition and M&E (MINES AND EXPLOSIVES) return to units from which it was received, with appropriate documentation.
- 4.- Vehicles and machinery, buildings and other facility return to natural and legal owners, with the handover records.
- 5.- 1st Krajina Corps command will, once the conditions are met, execute all financial obligations to town commands no later than 30th June 1992.
- 6.- Upon the completion of these tasks, town commands will submit a report to this command until 3rd July 1992.

MB/VL

AT COMMANDS APPROVAL

Colonel

/stamp: illegible/

Milutin Vukelić

/signed/


Delivered to:

- a/a

- town commands:

Daruvar, Pakrac, Grubišno


Polje and P. Slatina



Slavonski Brod (Republic of Croatia) was systematically shelled from BiH by the RSA / Republic of Srpska Army/

In the period from November 1991 – September 1992
182 persons were killed in Slavonski Brod and the
surrounding area as a result of shelling, of which 27
children of age two to seventeen!

<http://www.slobodanprajjak.com>



Slavonski Brod (Republic of Croatia) was systematically shelled from BiH by the RSA /Republic of Srpska Army/

During the period from November 1991-September 1992 in Slavonki Brod and vicinity 27 children in age from 2 till 17 were killed from bomb shelling and heavy artillery

Considering that the right of a people to self-determination, i.e. the right of a people to freely determine its political status is historical, natural, sacred and inalienable;

Confirming that the principle of continuous sovereignty of a people and a nation over the territories on which it lives is a guarantee of national, social, cultural and economic development;

Finding that this right and this principle are legalized in numerous documents of the Organization of the United Nations, OSCE and Conference on Yugoslavia (Declaration on Human Rights, Resolution 1803 (XVIII) of the General Assembly of 14 December 1962 and other, final act of the OSCE and other, the Brioni Declaration of EC on Yugoslavia from 1991, Principles of the London Conference on Yugoslavia (V) and other);

Stating that the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republic of Srpska are state entities which, after the secessionist breakup of SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/, were created by the embodiment of the right to self-determination and the principle of permanent sovereignty of a people and a nation, and that they have the right of coming to an understanding on cooperation;

Stressing their adherence to the norms of international community, and in accordance with European strivings on strengthening international cooperation in all aspects, which both parties see as useful and contributing to the well-being of its people;

The Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Assembly of the Republic of Srpska, on a joint session held on 31 October 1992 in Prijedor, adopt the following

D E C L A R A T I O N

on cooperation

and aspiration towards the unification of the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina

- 1) The two assemblies declare that the legal system in the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republic of Srpska will be identical.
- 2) The two assemblies declare that the citizens of the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina have Serbian citizenship and that the state symbols are the same and in accordance with the historical continuity of the Serbian people.
The coat-of-arms is the traditional Nemanjić coat-of-arms with the crown, and the flag is Serbian: red, white and blue. The anthem is "Bože pravde" (God of justice).
- 3) The two assemblies declare that the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina enter into a defence alliance, whose task is to protect the freedom and integrity of the two republics until the emergence of a final political solution.
- 4) The two assemblies declare that the competent authorities in the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina must ensure that all educational programmes and levels must be identical.
- 5) The two assemblies declare that the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republic of Srpska enter into a monetary and customs union.
- 6) The two assemblies declare the readiness of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Republic of Srpska to establish associations in all aspects of culture, information, transport and communications, social and medical care, economic activities, trade, energy, ecology and other.
- 7) The two assemblies declare that the Republic of Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina will establish common relations in the area of taxation policy and the policy of the payment system.
- 8) The Assembly of the Republic of Srpska and the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina adopt the decision to postpone the elections for political offices in both republics until the end of the war. Upon the end of the war, further forms of cooperation between these two republics, including the possibility of unification shall be decided by referendum.

- 9) The Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Assembly of the Republic of Srpska allocate responsibility with competent organs of the two republics to form appropriate common bodies without delay for the purpose of realizing the declared aims. All forms of cooperation and association is being initiated and incorporated by the Coordination Committee which consists of: Presidents of the Republics, Presidents of the Assemblies of the Republics and Presidents of the Governments of the two Republics.
- 10) For the purpose of developing and coordinating the above forms of cooperation, the Assembly of the Republic of Srpska and the Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Krajina shall hold joint meetings.
- 11) All of the above forms of cooperation will be offered to other Serbian states as well.
- 12) An initiative will be launched for the convening of all-Serbian assemblies (Republic of Serbian Krajina, Republic of Srpska, Republic of Serbia and Republic of Montenegro) where political, economic, cultural and other issues will be analysed, as well as all other issues of interest for all Serbian people.
- ⑬ The Assembly of the Republic of Srpska and of the Republic of Serbian Krajina announce the commitment of the Serbian people in these republics for state unification. This unification is being postponed until the expiry of the United Nations plan on the protection of the Krajina.
- 14) This Declaration will be published in the Official publications of both Republics.

PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY
REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA

Mile Paspalj

PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY
REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA

Momčilo Krajišnik

TELEPRINT-CODE CENTER – ŠIBENIK

RECEIVED: on /handwritten: 23rd January 1993/ at /handwritten: 16:55/

DELIVER TO: number /handwritten: 402/ to _____

ENCRYPTED: on _____ at --- _____

DELIVERED: on /handwritten: 23rd Jan / at 17:00 /signature illegible/

Republic of Srpska Krajina
General Staff of Serbian Army
Str.con.no. 21-24/25
On 23rd January 1993

/stamp/
CROATIAN
MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

Very urgent

Possible attack objective
For r-65.- request.-

To command of 21st C, 38th C and 18th Corps
/ to commanders personally/

1. We will be supported by the Republic of Srpska Army fire r-65 upon request. In preparation of plans today. Urgently provide us with some important objectives that you wish to be attacked, and which will inflict heavy losses to Ustasha ž/s /living force/ or greater destruction of infrastructure facilities.

Please send objectives data today ASAP.

Commander
General Major
Mile Novaković

/stamp in Cyrillic: REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA

TD ZONE HQ
WESTERN SLAVONIA
Handwritten: 209-82
31st January 1993
OKUČANI/

2nd KRAJINA CORPS COMMAND
 Con. Number /handwritten: 5/4-506
 7th September 1993

/handwritten: illegible/
 MILITARY SECRET
 CONFIDENTIAL

/stamp/
 CROATIAN
 MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

Return of conscripts from
 2nd KC /KRAJINA CORPS/ Zone of responsibility requests.-

GS – REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
 KRAJINA ARMY
 (Attn: commander personally)

To our knowledge increasing number of conscripts from the 2nd Krajina Corps zone of responsibility are located in your units. This is about conscripts from the municipality Grahovo, Drvar, Glamoč and Serbian municipalities of Bihać, in most cases these conscripts were in our units while there was a war there, and now that the war has started here they transferred to the Republic of Srpska Krajina Army, and we kindly request that you do everything to send them back to their home municipalities because this reflects negatively on other conscripts from the said municipalities.

We have detailed data on conscripts located in Donji Lapac Military post 9074, and who are originally from the military district of Drvar, namely:

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. BURSAC Miroljub MILOČ | born in 1963 |
| 2. ĐILAS Dušan VOJIN | born in 1964 |
| 3. RAĐENović Srećko DRAGAN | born in 1967 |
| 4. RAĐENović Mile ZORAN | born in 1970 |
| 5. RAĐENović Rade NEDELJKO | born in 1954 |
| 6. RAĐENović Dragan MILAN | born in 1965 |
| 7. RAĐENović Đuro DUŠKO | born in 1956 |
| 8. KECMAN Jovo ZORAN | born in 1963 |
| 9. RAĐENović Mile NIKOLA | born in 1949 |
| 10. PILIPOVIĆ Stanko MARINKO | born in 1962 |
| 11. KNEŽEVIĆ Petar /illegible/ | born in |
| 12. KNEŽEVIĆ Đuro MILORAD | born in 1956 |
| 13. FILIPOVIĆ Mihajlo DUŠAN | born in 1965 |
| 14. GRBIĆ Nikola DRAGAN | born in 1966 |
| 15. GRBIĆ Mihajlo NIKOLA | born in 1960 |
| 16. FILIPOVIĆ Dušan DRAGOSLAV | born in 1969 |
| 17. JURIĆ Petar DRAGAN | born in 1969 |
| 18. MATIJEVIĆ Dragan DRAGO | born in 1952 |
| 19. STOJISAVLJEVIĆ Milan DRAGAN | born in 1961 |
| 20. GRBIĆ Milorad ĐURO | born in 1970 |
| 21. KNEŽEVIĆ Miladin MILAN | born in 1958 |
| 22. PERIŠIĆ Mile DUŠKO | born in 1963 |
| 23. RAĐENović Milan VELIBOR | born in 1965 |
| 24. RAĐENović Nikola BRANKO | born in 1957 |
| 25. KLJAJIĆ Slobodan MIROSLAV | born in 1968 |
| 26. KLJAJIĆ Slobodan RATISLAV | born in 1968 |
| 27. KLJAJIĆ Slavko DRAGAN | born in 1951 |
| 28. RAĐENović Pero ZDRAVKO | born in 1961 |
| 29. RAĐENović Pero DUŠAN | born in 1956 |

30. /illegible/ Dane BORO	born in 1950
31. RAĐENOVIĆ Nikola PERICA	born in 1961
32. ŠEVO Dušan NENAD	born in 1959
33. ŠEVO Dušan ZORAN	born in 1964
34. RAĐENOVIĆ Dušan DUŠKO	born in
35. RAĐENOVIĆ Mirka ŽELJKO	born in 1957
36. RODIĆ Koste ZORAN	born in 1966
37. RODIĆ Kosta MILAN	born in 1967
38. DROBAC Dušan MIROSLAV	born in 1969
39. KNEŽEVIĆ Bogdan VLADO	born in 1968
40. KNEŽEVIĆ Slavko ŽELJKO	born in 1969
41. ĐILAS Pero DRAGAN	born in 1964
42. KNEŽEVIĆ Dušan MIŠO	born in 1960
43. KNEŽEVIĆ Slavko DRAGAN	born in 1971
44. STOJANOVIĆ Slavko ŽELJKO	born in 1969
45. GRBIĆ Petar MIĆO	born in 1961
46. PILIPOVIĆ UROŠ	
47. GRUBOR Ilija MILAN	born in 1963
48. MARIĆ Svetko DUŠKO	born in 1967
49. DROBAC Dušan RADE	born in 1961
50. PAJIĆ Jovo DARKO	born in 1970
51. ĐILAS ĐURO	
52. KNEŽEVIĆ Bogdan JOVO	born in 1959
53. KNEŽEVIĆ Dragan MILAN	born in 1959
54. KNEŽEVIĆ Đuro RADE	born in 1968
55. KNEŽEVIĆ Pero ZORAN	born in 1971
56. KNEŽEVIĆ Gojko MIROSLAV	born in
57. BAUK Branko MILAN	born in 1966
58. MARIĆ Bogdan MILAN	born in 1964
59. PILIPOVIĆ Uroš VOJO	born in 1958

Ending with ordinal number 59 (fiftynine).

We would also like to emphasize that there are numerous conscripts in units in Knin, Benkovac and Obrovac but we have no precise data in which units. We have learned that there are conscripts assigned to you who are neither part of the RSK Army units nor Republic of Srpska Army units.

Conscripts from the 2nd Krajina Corps zone of responsibility have taken weapons and equipment from 2nd KC, and when combat operations started in this area, they escaped to the Republic of Srpska Krajina, so please send all conscripts from the Drvar district area to the 2nd Krajina Corps command in order to be assigned to units.

Please note that we have issued an arrest warrant and criminal proceedings for all conscripts who left the Republic of Srpska Army without an approval.

/stamp: illegible/

COMMANDER
General Major
Gjuro Borić
/signed/

/stamp/
 CROATIAN
 MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

MILITARY SECRET
 CONFIDENTIAL

/in Cyrillic:
 REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
 GENERAL STAFF OF SERBIAN ARMY
 /handwritten: CONF., No. 48-168
 19th September 1993/

Conscripts from the
 territory of 2nd KC
 data verification, request.-

TO 15th CORPS COMMAND

We have received a document from the 2nd Krajina Corps requesting the return of conscripts from the territory of the municipalities of Grahovo, Drvar, Glamoč and Serbian municipalities of Bihać. The attached list contains 59 military conscripts who are located in the Donji Lapac MP 9074.

Please check the above list of conscripts and if the data is correct and the same are on the first line of combat, GS /general staff/ Command will direct a request to the KC command that they remain in our units.

If listed conscripts are not engaged in combat operations, please direct them to 2nd KC at their request.

DĐ.-

/stamp: illegible/

BY COMMANDER'S AUTHORIZATION

Lieutenant Colonel

Dragan Đumić

/signed/

/in Cyrillic:

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
GENERAL STAFF OF SERBIAN ARMY
/handwritten: illegible, No. 5/1-113
13th August 1994/

/stamp/
CROATIAN
MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

YUGOSLAV ARMY GS /Main Staff/
(Personnel department – 40. KC)

Request for transfer of pilots
From 30. KC to 40 KC,
Delivers.-

In order to fill the vacancies in certain formations and for purpose of required combat readiness of SVK
/Supreme Command Staff/ units, please immediately transferred to SVK GS / general staff/- 56 he Police RSK
for further assignments following professional officers (pilots):

1. Second Lieutenant INJAC Mićo SAŠA, born on 31st October 1971 in Glamoč, Republic of Srpska, PIN:
3110971143666, graduated from the 43rd class MAA (MILITARY AVIATION ACADEMY) YA – vid AF and
AD (Aviation) which lasted from 1st September 1990 to 30th July 1994.

2. Second Lieutenant DOŠEN Nikola NIKOLA, born on 17st January 1972 in Glina, RSK, PIN:
1701972160042, graduated from the 43rd class MAA YA – vid AF nad AD (Aviation) which lasted from
1st September 1990 to 30th July 1994.

Given that these two pilots will report to Bjeljina on 16th August 1994, for further assignments to RSA, based
on the interviews, and that they have expressed a wish to be members of the 56th he RSK police, please accept
this and transfer the said pilots immediately to SVK GS - 56 he RSK police no later than 16th August 1994.

COMMANDER

General Major

Milan Čelekić

/signed/

/Stamp: illegible/

/stamp and handwritten text: illegible/

/document in Cyrillic script/

/stamp/
CROATIAN
MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA KRAJINA
GENERAL STAFF OF SERBIAN ARMY
/handwritten: conf. No. 5/1-151/
19th October 1994

MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

Change of post
C.1st Class DUKIĆ TOMISLAV

/handwritten: Dukić PKPo-103
Send a proposal to 40KC/

RSA GS

At a meeting held on 10th April 1994 between the Commanders of GS / General Staff/ of RSA/Republic of Srpska Army/ and SAK /Serbian Army of Krajina/ Colonel General Ratko Mladić and Lieutenant General Momir Talic gave their consent that C.1 class. Tomislav Dukic changes his post from RSA (now commander SkPg Lička Kaldurma) to SAK.

Captain Dukić was born in v. Tomingaj near Gračani. He has repeatedly expressed his desire and requested transfer at the SAK. Based on the consent of the Commander, please direct C. 1st Class Dukić to SAK as soon as possible and no later than 1st November 1994.

SD/VR

COMMANDER

General Major

Milan Čeleketić

/signed and stamped/

/stamp illegible/

/stamp/
 CROATIAN
 MEMORIAL-DOCUMENTATION
 CENTRE OF HOMELAND WAR
 ZAGREB, Marulićev trg 21

MILITARY POST 8840
 Str.con.no. 12-/handwritten:675/
 24th June 1992
 BANJA LUKA

MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Referral of Western Slavonia
 soldiers to TD, order.-

TO COMMAND /handwritten: 5456/71 /

Pursuant to the order of MP 4022 Banja Luka str.con. number Op 526-3 from 23rd June 1992

I HEREBY ORDER

- 1.- Western Slavonia soldiers must remain on the present territory and are referred to Okučani TD Staff, regardless of their wishes.
- 2.- All the soldiers that left the Western Slavonia zone, must return immediately and report to Okučani TD Staff.
- 3.- Unit commanders must be present during the referral of the soldiers and complete the task of referral to the Okučani TD authorities with the appropriate records and delivery of lists.

NM/NM

/stamp: MILITARY POST No. 8840
 BANJA LUKA/

COMMANDER
 Colonel
 Ratimir Simić
 /signed/

The Parliament of the Republic of Croatia at a joint session of all chambers held on the day 8 October 1991 adopts

THE CONCLUSIONS

1. An armed aggression on the Republic of Croatia has taken place by the Republic of Serbia and the so-called JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/. The Republic of Croatia is forced to defend itself from the aggression with all available means.
2. The so-called JNA is hereby declared an aggressor and occupation army and must leave the territory of the Republic of Croatia which it has temporarily occupied without delay.
3. The Parliament of the Republic of Croatia requests from the former JNA to enable all Croatian citizens who are currently in the military service to leave the army without delay and freely return to their homes.
4. We call upon the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro not to allow the use of their state territories for the waging of war against the Republic of Croatia.
5. We call upon all states, especially the members of the European Community and the United Nations to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of Croatia.
6. In accordance with the rules of international law, the Republic of Croatia shall respect all the rights and obligations of the former SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ towards other states and organizations in the part which relates to the Republic of Croatia.
7. The Republic of Croatia shall continue to participate in the work of the Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague, which is held under the auspices of the European Community.
8. These conclusions enter into force at the moment of their adoption.

Class: 021-03/91-05/07

Zagreb, 8 October 1991

PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

President of the Parliament

Dr. Žarko Domljan, signed

Source: *Official gazette* no. 53, 8 October 1991

Assembly of BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/
Memorandum of the BH Assembly
(Sarajevo, 11 October 1991)

Having considered various initiatives for solving the Yugoslav constitutional and legal crisis and having listened to the opinions and remarks of the representatives of all political parties,...the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the highest body of authority in the Republic, at a session on 11th October 1991 announces the following:

MEMORANDUM
(LETTER OF INTENTIONS)

1. Considering that the Republic of Serbia has adopted a new constitution, and that republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia have adopted decisions and measures based on plebiscites and referenda, thereby fundamentally and irrevocably changing the Constitution of Yugoslavia and creating a new legal and factual state of affairs, the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina refers to the current Amendment LX to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This amendment, pursuant to which Bosnia and Herzegovina is (we quote) "a democratic sovereign state of equal citizens, peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Muslims, Serbs and Croats and members of the other peoples and nationalities who live in it", permanently defines the constitutional status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as relations in it and its relations with others.
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to strive for the survival of the Yugoslav community on new foundations, acceptable for all. In the meantime, it will also strive for the normal functioning of the existing common institutions, but its representatives will not attend sessions of the SFRJ Assembly and the SFRJ Presidency if they are not attended by representatives from all republics and regions. Any decisions made by these bodies in an incomplete composition do not bind Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3. Considering the ethnic makeup of its inhabitants, Bosnia and Herzegovina will not accept any constitutional resolution of a future Yugoslav community which does not contain Serbia and Croatia at the same time. In the future integration - whatever its nature - Bosnia and Herzegovina must be connected to Serbia and Croatia in the same manner.
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina strives for the complete demilitarisation of its territory. Taking this as its long-term aim, Bosnia and Herzegovina supports the efforts for the consolidation of the cease-fire in the current conflict and the establishment of a permanent peace. If these efforts fail for any reason whatsoever, Bosnia and Herzegovina will do its utmost to remain neutral in the conflict which presumes that its citizens will not engage themselves on either side in the conflict and that its territory will not be used for war purposes.
5. The views expressed in this memorandum represent the will of the majority of deputies of this Assembly and as such they also represent the political will of the majority of the citizens of BiH and the compulsory basis for the conduct of state and political authorities of the Republic.
- ⑥. Proceeding from the rights of the Assembly majority to decide on the fate of the Republic as a whole, the Assembly also recognises the right of the Assembly minority to demand and represent every legitimate interest - ethnic, cultural, economic and social - on the condition that it is implemented without force and in a legal and democratic manner.
7. This memorandum will be made public by the Assembly at home and abroad.

Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina

/national crest/
 REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
 The Croatian delegation for negotiations
 with the local Serbs' authorities

/handwritten: IMPORTANT/

Class: 004-01/93-03/10
 Ref.no: 594-93-1
 Zagreb, 25th August 1993

- TO CO-CHAIRMEN OF INTERNATIONAL
 CONFERENCE ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Mister LORD DAVID OWEN
 Mister THORVALD STOLTENBERG

- HEAD OF UNPROFOR MISSION
 Mister JEAN COT

SUBJECT: protest against enemy forces insertion from
 Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in UNPA
 zones in the Croatian Republic.

Dear Sirs,

During July and August of 1993, especially since the tension started to build up due to the announcement of opening Maslenica pontoon bridge and airport "Zemunik", successive arrival of enemy reinforcements is noticed in manpower and less in the equipment from the territory of Serbia and the "Republic of Srpska" (BiH), to the Republic of Croatia in the areas of UNPA and "pink" zones. The forces have been deployed in the area of northern Dalmatia and Lika, and partly Banija and Kordun. The abovementioned refers to the following forces:

- Battalion (approximately 600 soldiers fully equipped and reinforced by artillery) from the 2nd Krajina Corps of the "Republic of Srpska Army - RSA," arrived in mid-July to the Benkovac area, and in the past few days (18/19 August) another battalion arrived to the same area, which is almost an equivalent to a Brigade;

- groups of volunteers from Serbia were continuously arriving in this period (groups of 50, to 200-300 men), especially to the area of northern Dalmatia, and were immediately put on the battlefield, and to a lesser extent in the region of Lika and Kordun. Despite the fact that soldiers were replaced in the meantime, according to available data this represents continuous reinforcement of approximately 1300 to 1500 soldiers, which is also equivalent of a Light Infantry Brigade.

- approximately 150-200 officers and non-commissioned officers from the "Yugoslav Army - YA" were assigned in the composition of the 15th Lika Corps, and to a lesser extent to the 7th Knin Corps .

- one battalion from the composition of 16th Light Infantry Brigade of the 1st Krajina Corps - Banja Luka in the area of Banija (village Bojna) directed to Cazin Krajina.

- From the composition of the 1st Krajina Corps, one brigade is constantly on the right bank of the Sava River facing Okučani and troops from the brigade are periodically inserted in the area of Western Slavonia.

- In the area of northern Dalmatia, after it was equipped with resources from RSA and YA, one light artillery air defense regiment – AD was formed and assigned to positions in order to strengthen the system as part of preparations for a possible international military intervention.

On the basis of these and other available data we assess that on the UNPA area of the Republic of Croatia there is a continuous presence of an equivalent of 3 to 4 brigades, i.e. 6,000 to 7,000 men with an artillery regiment as support and one armored battalion (40 tanks) from the ranks of the “VRS” /Army of the Republic of Srpska/ and VJ /Yugoslav Army/ slipped in from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- This planned redeployment and arrangement of forces, in the opinion of this Delegation, clearly aims to strengthen the military option in resolving conflicts in the Republic of Croatia. Strengthening the militarization of the UNPA areas "North" and "South" from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina indicates a potential major military operation planned in Serbian political and military centers. This is confirmed by the information on movement of large number of civilians from the area of Benkovac, Obrovac, Gračac and Knin to areas around Vukovar, Šid, Baranja, in order to, as past experiences also suggest, create favorable conditions for war operations.

- Republic of Croatia and this Delegation, invest huge efforts to achieve peace in the Republic of Croatia through peaceful means. Tremendous efforts are put at achieving a ceasefire agreement as soon possible (continuation of negotiations in Geneva and Vienna). Therefore this information about the strengthening of enemy troops in the UNPA zones of the Republic of Croatia is deeply concerning us, and we believe, separates us from the peaceful solution to the crisis. We don't want to believe that representatives of the local Serb authorities, while negotiating peace and cease-fire, did not sign the agreement because they were already counting on the military option of resolving the conflict, and that all these military activities are only a prelude to future large-scale military actions.

We strongly believe that activities directed to strengthening of military option in the search for peace must be prevented in its inception.

Dear gentlemen,

Protesting against the arrival and operations of Serbian military forces in the UNPA zones "North" and "South", please, in the interest of achieving peace through political means, use all your influence to stop this negative process. We demand also that the inserted troops into UNPA zones in Croatia retreat back to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

With best regards,

HEAD OF DELEGATION

Slavko Degoricija

/signed/

/fax message/

FROM: PRESIDENCY OF BiH

SARAJEVO

PHONE NO.: 38 71 517 958

P01

/handwritten date/

21 September 1991

/coat of arms/

PRESIDENCY

OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

THE PRESIDENT

Sarajevo, 21 September 1991

TO THE PRESIDENT

OF REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Franjo Tuđman

Z A G R E B

Mr. President,

I hereby inform you, as one of the signatories of the Statement from Igalo, on the demands adopted yesterday on the meeting of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to the situation created in the Republic by the entry of unannounced military columns on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina from several directions in Serbia and Montenegro.

1. That the General Staff of the armed forces of SFRJ /Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia/ immediately issue an order for the armed columns to leave the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina along the same routes by which they came.

2. That the military authorities in charge order a mobilization of the territorial units on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. To urgently cease war activities in Yugoslavia, in accordance with the Agreement with the European Community and the Statement of Igalo.

4. That the Presidency of SFRJ immediately holds a meeting on which the current political and security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be discussed and appropriate decisions adopted.

The Presidency of the SRBiH /Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ demands of you to undertake concrete steps to prevent the political and military conflicts in other republics and parts of Yugoslavia from spilling over into the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

PRESIDENT
OF THE PRESIDENCY OF SRBiH

Alija Izetbegović

/signed/

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostar i pravci: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
lavršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
ite u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishljanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PuB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom na
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
rovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr c
a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

STUPNI DO

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I cannot write extensively about Stupni Do for many different reasons.

Also, the number of documents in the printed publication is limited due to one serious reason - lack of money.

Therefore you can and should visit www.slobodanpraljak.com - where you can find everything you need in order to ask logical questions that will lead you to the truth.

Here are some of the questions?

1. What was happening in Kakanj during the summer of 1993?
2. Why and where were Croats from Kakanj going?
3. What was the situation in Vareš prior to October 23rd, 1993?
4. What was the III Corp of BH Army preparing and who was attacking whom in Central Bosnia (especially in Vareš) in 1993?
5. When did HVO attack Stupni Do?
6. Haven't the combat activities ended in the early afternoon of October 23rd, 1993, and weren't the HVO soldiers withdrawn from Stupni Do?
7. Who was roaming around the village afterwards, who was entering and exiting and whose army was that?
8. To what has Slobodan Praljak's command to Milivoj Petković sent from HQ of HVO from Čitluk on October 23rd 1993 at 23:10, referred to and to whom did it relate?
9. What has this command had to do with the events in Stupni Do on the previous day?
10. What happened in Stupni Do on October 23rd, 1993?
11. What have the FOREIGNERS encountered in Stupni Do?
 - a. Nordic battalion
 - b. Numerous TV crews
 - c. UN Police – what have they witnessed, recorded and how and to whom have they submitted a report?
12. How was the burned animal added to the number of burned people?
13. Who burned the dead people, when and why?
14. And where were they burned – review photos – walls, roofs, houses where they were found?

15. Where and to whom was the autopsy report presented?

16. If the number of found dead bodies was 15, and 10 members of BH Army were killed in combat – how did the number increase to 38, when did the number increase, what was the increase rate until the spring of 1994, who led the investigation, etc.?

17. Did three dead women in the basement had weapons, were they firing from these weapons through the basement window, were they “slaughtered”, as one of the witnesses stated, were they “killed by fire from automatic weapon” (and they were in trap), as one of the witnesses claimed, or were they killed by the thrown grenade?

Please review the photos under number 4 – and you will see bullet shells.

Request and look for autopsy report and tell me where do you see the trap?

My dear readers, if you put just a little bit of effort in thinking this through, the number of questions will soon rise to more than a hundred (100).

Then look for the answers to two questions:

- a. Were crimes in Stupni Do on October 23rd, 1993 committed by members of HVO?
- b. Whether the cause of the crime lies within the individual, his individual hatred and what was the reason for this hatred? (this serves not to justify, but to better understand the situation). Or was the crime committed through chain of command: by written approval, verbal approval, by keeping silent, or other kind of approval.
- c. If the crime in Stupni Do was committed by HVO SOLDIERS, WHAT WAS THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS CRIME, WHO KILLED WHOM AND WHERE AND WHAT ARE THE EVIDENCES CONFIRMING THIS?

IT LOOKS LIKE (ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCES) THREE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED IN STUPNI DO, AND AS FAR AS I KNOW THE CULPRITS WERE PUNISHED. ALSO IT LOOKS LIKE (ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCES) THE NUMBER OF DEAD INCREASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF BH ARMY PROPAGANDA.

Giving answers to these questions will lead to the punishment of real culprits, the victims can rest with due honors, and the hatred spiral will be stopped.

Slobodan Praljak

D-1

Can anyone dispute this sequence of events?

Dispute it by facts, not by writing propaganda material.

October 18th, 1993 Muslim army (BH Army) started the attack on Vareš.

During the invasion attack on Croats, Muslim army had already occupied Travnik, Kakanj, Konjic, Bugojno, Fojnica, And offensive attack "Towards Neum" and "Western border of Bosnia and Herzegovina" was in progress.

From all these "liberated" towns, Muslim army has banished the Croats.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Muslim government in Sarajevo, without any reservations and verification immediately speaks of at least 80 civilians killed in Stupni Do.

Lies like killed "*women, children and the elderly*" was a common wartime propaganda directed from Sarajevo at the time.

Nobody cares how many will such propaganda "produce" willing to go beyond the threshold of what is allowed and commit war crimes.

And I say: they are worse than criminals.

D-A, D-B, D-C, D-D

Propaganda, lies, production of future crimes - "OSLOBODENJE" - Bosnia and Herzegovina independent weekly newspaper.

October 25th, 1993:

- HVO /Croatian Defense Council/ kills local civilian population;

- Dozens of innocent civilians killed and arrested;

- The exact number is not known. In fear of a large number because the massacre was carried out on young children, elderly and sick.

October 26th, 1993:

The exact number of killed is yet unknown, but what is known is that the whole village is destroyed, all residents killed including children.

October 26th, 1993:

UNPROFOR brings at least a little truth to this "story" saying that there is no data about the killed civilians.

October 31st, 1993:

The story was released to the world and Western governments reacted, reminding Croatia that they have committed to request Bosnian Croats to respect human rights.

Croatia is already guilty.

In what way and how can anyone in Croatia prevent one man to kill three people in Stupni Do.

How come a gentleman like Mr. Alois Mock doesn't understand all this?

D-2

Miroslav Pejčinović, President of Vareš municipality Council (first man of the municipality), writes to Ante Nobile (who defended Tihomir Blaškić in Haag), about the situation in Vareš municipality.

In military terms Vareš municipality was under command of Tihomir Blaškić, who was unable to come to Vareš (surrounded and attacked by Muslim army) - from Vitez (surrounded and attacked by Muslim army).

And it is so simple to talk about the chain of command.

D-3, D-4, D-5, D-6, D-7, D-8, D-9, D-10

Please read about the situation in Vareš, before Stupni Do was attacked by HVO, in the following documents.

Special attention should be given to conclusions "A" and "B" in document D-6.

D-11

October 22nd, 1993 "Bobovac" Brigade Commander from Vareš wrote to his first superior commander that the defense command system in Vareš has collapsed and that he, Emil Harah, brigade commander, in an unstable mental state.

D-12

October 23rd, 1993 at 11:45, Emil Harah informed Slobodan Praljak, Commander of the Main Staff that "*cleansing has been done in some village in vicinity of the town*", and that Ivica Rajić was commanding the actions in Vareš.

D-13

HVO Commander in Vareš seeks help from 2nd Corp of the BH Army, to influence the 3rd Corp of the Muslim army.

Vareš is besieged, and Croatian refugees from Kakanj are located in Vareš, and all humanitarian aid for Tuzla is directed through Vareš. HVO is attacking nobody.

D-14

The new Commander in Vareš tried to stop the abuse of civilians – October 28th, 1993.

D-15, D-16

Superior Commander Ivica Rajić approved the attack on Stupni Do – October 23rd, 1993 at 06:40.

D-17, D-18

October 23rd, 1993 General Slobodan Praljak, Commander of the HVO Main Staff, sends a message from Grude at 23:00 to Milivoj Petković, his deputy general located in Kiseljak.

Based on the information that I had, I requested him to sort this situation “*without mercy*” - and to find people who can handle this situation.

“*No mercy*” for Croats performing military functions and to find among Croats those who can bring order and defend Vareš.

FIRST NOTE:

General Petković could not come to Vareš because Vareš was besieged.

General Petković was able to enter and exit Kiseljak only in UNPROFOR transporter, with 7 days prior notice and only if UNPROFOR was to approve such “transportation”.

General Petković’s return to HVO Main Staff was approved (Grude – 200km) and general Petković has returned in UNPROFOR transporter on October 26th, 1993.

SECOND NOTE:

All this correspondence, commands and instructions like “*take care of the situation ...*” is sheer fantasy - anger, helplessness, despair - any fool knows that this can amount to nothing, it is a futile attempt, correspondence is futile.

Tragedies in Vareš and Stupni Do took place and now we’re waiting for Fortinbras.

It’s like writing a command:

“Take care of the situation in Bagdad, fix the situation in Syria, Cairo, Yemen, take care of Yemen pirates, fix the situation in New Orleans – after the hurricane “*Katrina*”.

But, one must at least try.

D-19

Report of Commander Tihomir Blaškić on the situation in the ZP /Military District/ VITEZ on 23rd October 1993. T.Blaškić is the superior Commander of Ivica Rajić, but he is not sending a report about the attack on Stupni Do to GS HVO Commander Slobodan Praljak.

D-20

October 24th, 1993 Slobodan Praljak was leading the defense in Uskoplje (Gornji Vakuf) against the attacks from Muslim army in the main direction of attack of the “*Neretva 93*” operation.

We have limited tactical successes.

In any case, operation “*Neretva 93*” had failed.

D-21, D-22

Documents D-21 and D-22 are proving that the instructions from Slobodan Praljak to Milivoj Petković were correctly and accurately interpreted.

Ivica Rajić has put Ivica Gavran and Zvonko Dužinović in isolation.

D-23

Ivica Rajić tries to bring order in Vareš in order to defend the city and stop the Muslim army from attacking.

D-24 to D-41

HVO Main Staff, Praljak, Petković, Tole, Office of the President of HR-HB /Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia/ Mate Boban – everyone is trying to receive information about what has truly happened in Stupni Do.

But!!

According to the Law, full investigation must be conducted by investigating judge.

Army (HVO) cannot lead the investigation, it can only provide necessary information.

But!!

Muslim forces have occupied Vareš and 9,000 (nine thousand) new refugees must be transferred to Herzegovina.

But,

Muslim army offensive “Neretva 93” on HVO is still in progress.

But,

There is no possibility to get an insight to the location, and UN investigation team is not cooperating with HVO.

QUESTION:

How and what kind of investigation would you be able to conduct in such military and social circumstances?

D-42, D-43

I request help from UN forces.

D-44

How to take medical care of refugees from Vareš.

D-45

Commander of the HVO Main Staff, general Slobodan Praljak writes to Ramsay: “*we will do everything possible to find the culprits for the actions in Stupni Do*”, but also for the prosecution of Croats.

But!?,

There was no official and public talk about the prosecution of Croats.

Muslims were the victims in Sarajevo, and this was the “*world’s*” truth, and the victim cannot be guilty.

MAPS I, II and III:

Muslim army attack plans on HVO in Vareš and other areas of BiH.

A BH Army attack on Vareš started on 18th October 1993.

D-46 to D-53

Muslim Army (A BiH) commands in connection with the attack on Vareš.

D-54

What exactly happened in Stupni Do?

1. A war crime was committed.

- HVO soldier has killed a child.

- HVO soldier has killed an old man.

- HVO soldier has killed a man.

- HVO soldier has raped a woman.

- some of the houses were burned intentionally, and some burned during the battle because HVO soldiers were using “incendiary” ammunition.

2. October 23rd, 1993 HVO attacked Stupni Do.

- According to the 1991 consensus, 216 Muslims live in Stupni Do.

- 43 members of BH Army defend Stupni Do from seven bunkers around the village (Kemal Likić witness statement **D-61**). Civil protection members should be added to this number.

- In the evening of that day, October 23rd, 1993 Mufida Likić (**D-63**) returns to the village to find armed members of BH Army in camouflage uniforms.

- HVO retreats from the village in the afternoon of October 23rd, 1993.

3. Witness Nelson Draper, MP from Canada, leading the investigation in **D-59** claims that few more than 193 people left Stupni Do alive.

QUESTION:

What kind of quality investigation about the killings can military police officer lead?

Witness Nelson Draper claims (**D-59 – “A”**):

”I had Master Corporal Scott McKee do the crime scene processing so he would have gone through it very closely, whereas I did a general walkthrough of the village to see what was what. I myself did not go through each crime scene processing it.”

4. On November 12th, 1993 general A. I. Ramsay signed the preliminary report about the events in Stupni Do.

- The village was secured by the BRITBAT – company “A” – until the arrival of MP /Military Police/.

- Part of NORDBAT, military police platoon and 4 TV crew entered the village – about 150 people – see the photos.

- Everything was recorded (video) and photographed (900 photos).

- The surrounding area was searched.

- The place where dead bodies were found was marked on the map and marking was recorded on video.

- 10 dead bodies were calcified, 5 dead bodies can be identified.

5. QUESTIONS:

- How is it that the number increase to 38 over time?
- How and who determined the number and how was the investigation led?
- Who burned the bodies and who rearranged them around the village - it is obvious that they were not burned at the place where they were found - see the photos?
- Why would be the reason for HVO members to do this and when would they have been able to do it?

D-55

December 20th, 1993, almost two months after Stupni Do was attacked by HVO, a Commission consisting of three Muslims from Stupni Do signed the report stating that 17 people lost their lives in Stupni Do.

After the UNPROFOR report (15 killed), the number increased by two names.

NOTE:

A child born on April 22nd, 1992 was listed.

QUESTION:

How did the number increase to 5 killed children later on?

Witness Nelson Draper (D-59) claims:

"The information was provided by the villagers themselves."

And THIS IS THE ANSWER to Slobodan Praljak's question:

"Therefore, the 22 dead bodies that you did not detect at the time you were there, did you infer that they were there exclusively on the basis of the information provided to you by the BH Army after they had captured both Vareš and Stupni Do?"

QUESTION to Nelson Draper:

"Can you give an answer to this Trial Chamber as to how the number of victims increased progressively over the months in the course of your investigation? How many victims did you have on the 27th (27.10.1993., author's remark). How many there were on record in November, in December, January, and February? How did the number of victims increase over the months? If you can't do that, tell me so."

Nelson Draper's RESPONSE:

"The original number of victims were pretty well from the outset that list of 38. Confirmation of them didn't come until witnesses were interviewed and confirmed

that they had recovered the bodies or portions of the bodies or what was left of the bodies. That's the best answer I can give you, sir."

COMMENT:

Number of found dead bodies was 15 (D-54) and it remains unclear what kind of a list is "OUTSET LIST OF 38", AND THEN IT TOOK MONTHS TO SUPPLEMENT THE "OUTSET LIST OF 38" WITH NEW NAMES.

NELSON DRAPER CLAIMS (D-59):

"All the bodies were pretty well recovered in November (1993., author's remark) as soon as the villagers got home. I didn't confirm it until I was able to interview these individuals, and being able to track them down and interview them took me up to March 1994. The bodies themselves were recovered fairly quickly."

TO BLOW UP YOUR MIND OR THE BRAKEDOWN OF RATIONAL MIND.

Nelson Draper claims that dead bodies (38 dead bodies) – according to "OUTSET LIST" were found in November 1993, document D-55 – three local villagers from Stupni Do claimed on December 20th 1993 that there were 17 dead; and this is the end of December?

Nelson Draper claims to have received the information about the number of dead bodies from the interviewing villagers until the April of 1994, and at the same time he knew in November 1993 already that the number of dead bodies was "pretty close to OUTSET LIST OF 38".

Slobodan Praljak's comment:

This is not how it works in the civilized world, this is not how you determine the truth, but this is rather a way how DNA of future evils is created.

D-56

On September 22nd, 1994, 11 months after the events in Stupni Do took place, Husnija Mahmutović signed the new document about the casualties in Stupni Do occurring on October 23rd 1993.

- The "OUTSET LIST OF 38" is completed (supplemented).

- The same man signed the list of 17 dead on December 20th, 1993 (D-55)

- In D-56 5 children were killed, and 10 BH Army soldiers and 6 members of Civil Protection were killed.

NOTE:

CIVIL PROTECTION IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF BH ARMY.

D-56 A

In the book by Mirsad Tokača (earnest and serious research work): "*Bosanska knjiga mrtvih*" / "THE BOSNIAN BOOK OF THE DEAD" / three names from **D-56**, listed as dead members of Civil Protection, are listed in this book as dead members of BH Army.

THE FINISH NOTE

This book about Stupni Do (Facts) was printed in Croatian language in 2500 copies and was distributed free of charge.

There were no reactions. Not a letter, not a sound, not a picture, just silence, and the "truth" about Stupni Do still serves only for the "continuation of war by other means".


VAREŠ

Display XC




BASIC MUNICIPALITY INFORMATION:

Population in 1991:	22,203
Municipality area, km ² :	356
Population density, st/km ² :	62.4
Settlements in municipality:	85
Population in the center of the municipality:	5888
Changes in population:	
index 1991/1948	146.5
index 1991/1981	97.3



Ethnic composition by settlements

	Total in municipality	Absolute majority Population	Relative majority Population
Croats	9016	7429	1462
Serbs	3644	1794	
Muslims	6714	5122	
"Yugoslavs"	2071		50
Others and unknown	758		



5. PERMANENT POPULATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

	Permanent population of Bosnia and Herzegovina									
	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981					
					Ethnic composition					
					Total	Croats	Muslims	Serbs	„Yugoslavs“	Others and unknown
Slavin	205	240	245	225	167	-	-	167	-	-
Sršljenci	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Strica	148	156	147	138	149	131	-	10	-	8
Striježevo	141	159	178	444	477	1	472	-	-	4
Stupni Do	144	153	216	259	261	1	216	40	3	1

By the 1991 census, 216 Muslims have lived in Stupni Do.

Serbs from the village (40) have already left the village.

There is no evidence and no logical reason to believe that someone settled in Stupni Do during the war.

MILITARY SITUATION IN BiH ON 23 OCTOBER 1993



BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Department for Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues

No: 0075/93

Mostar, 27 October 1993

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS: STUPNI DO - VAREŠ

15 October 1993

A humanitarian aid convoy for the Vareš area was stopped and plundered by 300 Muslim women in Kakanj.

16 October 1993

Another convoy was stopped 10 km east of Kakanj and again plundered by 200 Muslim women and children.

17 October 1993

A regrouping of Muslim units was observed from the Visoko - Breza - Dabravina axis toward the Kopjari - Plješi - Mir elevations. There were artillery attacks along the Breza - Vareš road.

18 October 1993

The Muslim army is starting an all-out attack on Vareš from the direction of Breza and Visoko. They are attacking the Croatian village of Kopjari from the Plješi and Mir areas. The attacks are resulting in the expulsion of more than 1,200 people to Vareš in the process. After the taking of the village of Kopjari, where the Muslim forces did not allow the evacuation of severely wounded members of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/, elite units of the Muslim army began to concentrate in the village of Stupni Do. The village of Stupni Do is in the Bogoš elevation area. The elevation was completely fortified for offensive operations against Vareš. The Bogoš elevation is perched in a position commanding the entrance to the town itself. On the same day, 18 October 1993, immediately before the Muslim attack, 5,700 refugees from Vareš set out for Herzegovina in an organised convoy. Therefore, the Muslim attack occurred precisely at the time when thousands of refugees were leaving Vareš. The Muslim forces tried to achieve a military advantage by this attack, including the taking of the town itself.

19 October 1993

In UNPROFOR's daily report on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the President of the Security Council dated 18 October 1993, it is stated that in the area of Central Bosnia, in the Vareš and Breza area: "... the UN military observers report on fighting in the Croatian area of Kopjari. An UNPROFOR platoon was prevented from entering the area by both the Muslim and the Croatian forces".

20 October 1993

HVO units are organising the defence of Vareš from incessant attacks in order to prevent the Muslim army from penetrating the town itself.

20 October 1993

In UNPROFOR's daily report on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the President of the Security Council dated 19 October 1993, it is stated that in Central Bosnia, in the Vareš and Breza areas: "... the situation remains very tense. Reports have been received that the HVO is at full combat readiness and

awaiting a direct attack by the Muslim forces, although the reasons for this are unclear. Refugees were warned to leave the area, and they did..."

UNPROFOR's reports dated 18 October and 19 October 1993 are contradictory. In the report dated 18 October they talk about fighting in the Croatian village of Kopjari, and in the report dated 19 October they wonder about the reasons behind the HVO's full combat readiness.

21 October 1993

The Muslim forces managed to take the villages of Kopjari and Mir and thus practically to take the HVO's first lines of defence, thereby threatening the Dabravine - Vareš - Majdan road and all the dominant elevations in the area. The first 700 Croatian refugees from Kopjari and Mir are being evacuated to Vareš. The HVO is stabilising the second line of defence.

In the report for 20 October 1993 dated 21 October 1993, UNPROFOR state: "... the situation is stable. The local HVO units report that they are expecting a Muslim attack within the next 48 hours". No need to comment on this!

To the west of Vareš, on the Vitez - Kakanj road, the Croats stopped an UNHCR convoy in protest against the Muslim stealing of food for the Croatian enclaves on 15 and 16 October 1993 in the Kakanj area.

22 October 1993

The Muslim forces are fortifying themselves in Kopjari. In Stupni Do, they took dozens of the local Serbs hostage and are using them as a human shield, as so many times before, while preparing a wide-range attack. They are fortifying all housing buildings and are preparing the artillery for attacking Vareš, which is 3 km away.

The village of Stupni Do is in Vareš municipality (3 km south of Vareš, 1 km from the Breza - Vareš road). According to the 1981 census, there were 261 inhabitants in the village of Stupni Do, 216 of them Muslims, 40 Serbs, one Croat, and four members of other ethnic groups.

23 October 1993

In their report for 22 and 23 October 1993, UNPROFOR state that "... the situation is tense due to attacks by the Muslim army which controls Kopjari, a Croatian village to the west of Vareš. On 23 October 1993, fierce fighting was reported between the Muslim army and the HVO, following a Muslim attack on the Vareš enclave by heavy machine-gun fire, mortars and artillery. The road Skoda from Gradačac to Sarajevo, was closed down by the HVO 5 km to the north and to the south of Vareš. According to reports, Croatian civilians are being evacuated from Borovica in expectation of new attacks..."

23 and 24 October 1993

All Muslim civilians from the village of Stupni Do were evacuated during the night toward the Muslim village of Budoželje, which has been confirmed by about a hundred Croatian refugees from the village of Mir.

23 and 24 October 1993

The Muslim forces from the fortified village of Stupni Do are trying to break through the HVO defence line, using captured Serbian women as human shields.

By evacuating their civilians and using Serbian women as human shields, the Muslims are trying to conquer the elevations above Vareš in a perfidious way. However, they failed to take into account the readiness of the Vareš HVO units to withstand the attacks that had already gone on for five days.

SUMMARY: VAREŠ IS ONE OF THE SEVEN CROATIAN ENCLAVES. IT HAS BEEN COMPLETELY ENCIRCLED BY THE MUSLIM AND SERBIAN FORCES FOR 17 MONTHS. UNTIL RECENTLY, 12,000 REFUGEES WERE STAYING IN THIS AREA. ATTENTION WAS DRAWN REPEATEDLY TO THE TRAGIC SITUATION OF THE MORE THAN 5,000 CHILDREN AND 3,000 WOUNDED AND SICK, WHOSE ONLY RELIEF WAS INSUFFICIENT AMOUNTS OF HUMANITARIAN AID. DESPITE THE HARSH CONDITIONS MAKING THE SURVIVAL OF THE NATIVE POPULATION AND REFUGEES NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, AND FACED WITH INTERNAL DISCORD BETWEEN THE KAKANJ AND

VAREŠ HVO STRUCTURES, THE VAREŠ HVO MANAGED AT ALL TIMES TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER THE DEFENCE LINE AND TO REPLY TO PROVOCATIONS BY THE MUSLIM AND SERBIAN FORCES. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT THE HVO WERE BUSY HELPING TO EVACUATE 6,000 REFUGEES FROM VAREŠ, THE MUSLIM FORCES LAUNCHED AN ATTACK ON THE TOWN, APPLYING THE SAME STRATEGY THAT WAS USED MONTHS AGO IN THE CROATIAN AREAS OF KONJIC, JABLANICA, MOSTAR, TRAVNIK, NOVI TRAVNIK, BUGOJNO, ŽEPČE, FOJNICA... THEY ONLY ATTACKED THOSE CROATIAN AREAS THAT WERE FULLY ENCIRCLED BY CUTTING OFF COMMUNICATIONS, SEIZING LARGE AMOUNTS OF HUMANITARIAN AID, AND USING CIVILIANS AS HUMAN SHIELDS DURING THEIR ATTACKS. WHEREVER THEY SUCCEEDED. THEY WOULD CLOSE OFF THE CONQUERED AREAS AND REFUSE TO GRANT ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS. WHEREVER THEY FAILED, AS IN ŽEPČE, NOVI TRAVNIK, VITEZ, BUSOVAČA, MOSTAR, AND NOW VAREŠ, THEY TRIED TO CONCEAL THEIR CRIMES BY ACCUSING THE OTHER SIDES. LET US NAME SEVERAL EXAMPLES: BUŠČAK, ORLIŠTE. TRUSINA, KONJIC, BIKOŠE, MOSTAR, DOLJANI, KISELJAK, ŽEPČE, TARČIN, UZDOL, AND DOMANOVIĆI SINCE APRIL 1993, WE HAVE BEEN WARNING ABOUT THE INTOLERABLY INDIFFERENT BEHAVIOUR OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS PRESENT IN THE AREA, WHICH HAVE NOT ONLY FAILED TO MAKE A SUFFICIENT EFFORT, BUT HAVE EVEN QUITE OFTEN DIRECTLY INFLUENCED THIS SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (SUPPLYING FOOD TO THE MUSLIM SIDE BEFORE ALL MAJOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS; SMUGGLING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION; BLOCKING COMMUNICATIONS TO ENABLE COMBAT OPERATIONS; DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT - THE CASE OF MILAN 2; FAILURE TO SUPPLY SUFFICIENT HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE CROATIAN POPULATION; BIASED, UNVERIFIED AND PARTIAL REPORTS). THE CASE OF VAREŠ CONFIRMS IN ALL ITS DETAILS EVERYTHING STATED IN THIS SUMMARY).

24 October 1993

UNPROFOR reports: "... On Sunday 24 October 1993, according to reports, the situation in Vareš is quiet but dense due to a supposed massacre. The HVO granted UNPROFOR an official permission to carry out an investigation. UN Military Monitors report that the HVO has denied their presence in the village... "

25 October 1993

UNPROFOR reports: "... the situation remains very tense. A visit was made to the school building where 233 Muslim soldiers are detained... ". UNPROFOR reports confirm that the Vareš HVO military command's behaviour was very correct for the following reasons:

1. Events in Stupni Do are a direct consequence of the fierce attack launched by the Muslims on 18 October 1993.
2. UNPROFOR has violated the rule of impartiality during combat operations by making false accusations concerning the alleged massacre. UNPROFOR's reports during the last five days of the Muslim attack, although very contradictory, confirm a major offensive operation against Vareš by the Muslim units.
3. The Vareš HVO did not violate any norms of the international law of war. Furthermore, after the end of combat operations, the HVO granted UNPROFOR entry into Stupni Do, thus disclaiming rumours concerning the HVO's entry into that village.
4. According to provisional results of the investigation ordered by the President on 24 October 1993, we have indications that, while withdrawing, the Muslim army massacred part of the present population (the assumption is that these people were used as human shields), according to the model used during the offensive operations against Bugojno, Žepče, Travnik, Konjic and Mostar.
5. Let us repeat that, pursuant to a Decision of the HR HB /Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia/ Government dated 27 October 1993, a special commission was set up for investigating the war crimes committed and violations of human rights.
6. Should any of the allegations prove true, the perpetrators will be punished severely.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Muslim Government in Sarajevo, Dr. Haris SILAJDŽIĆ, in his letter dated 26 October 1993 to the President of the Security Council, states: "... the most recent attack on the village of Stupni Do in Central Bosnia carried out by the Croatian extremist forces last weekend. Sources in the area talk about a massacre in which over 80 Muslim civilians, including a number of women, children and old people, lost their lives. It is feared that the actual number might be even bigger..."

The enclosed statement only confirms the Muslim attacking strategy that has already been seen through. In case of failure, they start accusing the other side, while not even trying to specify the location (given generically as Central Bosnia) or the events that had preceded it. They randomly exaggerate the number of casualties without any real and reliable evidence.

UNPROFOR's report of 27 October 1993 for 26 October 1993: "The situation remains very tense. After entering the village of Stupni Do yesterday, UNPROFOR reports on a massacre that had taken place, resulting in the death of about 15 people".

THE CROATIAN SIDE REITERATES ITS REQUEST FOR AN IMPARTIAL AND INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANT FACTS AND WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING THE TRUTH.

WE REQUEST THAT THE PERPETRATORS OF THIS HORRIBLE CRIME BE IDENTIFIED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEY DESERVE SEVERE PUNISHMENT.

/handwritten: Vladislav Pogarčić/

50 YEARS
SARAJEVO
YEAR LI
Number 16297
Monday,
October 25th, 1993
Price 15,000 BHD

OSLOBOĐENJE

NEW CRIME COMMITTED BY HVO

Massacre in Stupni Do

This village in Vareš municipality inhabited with approximately 250 Muslims, since Saturday practically does not exist.

SARAJEVO, OCTOBER 24TH (BH – PRESS) – Stupni Do with 250 inhabitants as of yesterday no longer exists. Extreme parts of HVO Vareš and Kakanj in large numbers and with the artillery and infantry fire raided the village burning and killing the local civilian population, as stated in the press service release of the War Presidency of the Municipal Assembly and the BH Army Vareš.

50 houses were burned and dozens of innocent Muslim civilians killed and arrested. The opinion was that such terrible exodus of Muslims from Vareš cannot happen, because no bloodshed was ever recorded in the past, nor any animosity among the peoples of the region, said the statement.

The press release ends with the statement that the exact number of dead in Stupni Do is not yet known. There are fears of large numbers since the massacre was carried out on young children, elderly and sick, and the corpses were burned. HVO Vareš took one part of the prisoners from Stupni Do in an unknown direction.

50 YEARS
SARAJEVO
YEAR LI
Number 16298
Tuesday,
October 26th, 1993
Price 15,000 BHD

OSLOBOĐENJE

SILAJDŽIĆ'S LETTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Genocide continues

SARAJEVO, OCTOBER 25th (BH PRESS) – We inform you about the latest in a series of massacres carried out by the Croatian extremists in the village of Stupni Dol near Vareš in central Bosnia. For now, the exact number of killed people is yet unknown, but what is known is that the whole village was destroyed and all the people killed, including children. Genocide continues, says the letter from dr. Haris Silajdžić, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent today to the Chairman of the Security Council.

Dr. Haris Silajdžić states in his letter addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council that given that destruction, starvation and genocide of the population continues despite all the efforts made by the Government of BiH in finding peaceful resolution and improving the humanitarian situation, we request that the Security Council urgently takes all measures within its jurisdiction on the grounds of the adopted relevant resolutions.

OSLOBOĐENJE • TUESDAY OCTOBER 26th 1993

FROM UNPROFOR

Confirmation of the massacre in Stupni Do

UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman claims that BH Army attack on Croatian village of Kopjari preceded the cleansing of Stupni Do village.

Due to the massacre reported by the army press the day before yesterday, referring to the attack of HVO units on the Muslim village of Stupni Do in the Vareš area, UNPROFOR for Sarajevo Sector at yesterday's press conference presented their information about the incident. In fact, according to the UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman, BH Army started a heavy attack last Thursday on Vareš, specifically on Kopjari, the village with a majority of Croatian population.

- This village was supposed to be connected in this way with the next larger area controlled by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina – said Aikman, adding that the village is completely cleansed. UNPROFOR has no data on the killed civilians.

- Then HVO attacked the village of Stupni Do on Saturday and has allegedly committed a massacre of civilians, burning all the houses - said Aikman.

He pointed out that there were no observers or UN members at that location on Saturday, but the next day members of the Nordic battalion tried to enter the village. Unfortunately, it was impossible to get close enough to the location of the massacre to attest everything, but they could still see that the village was burned. HVO opened fire from one of the barricades on Nordic soldiers before entering Stupni Do - explained Bill Aikman.

**PROTEST OF SARAJEVO DISTRICT IO /EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE/
FOR FASCISM TO RECOIL**

SARAJEVO, OCTOBER 25TH (BH PRESS) - The Executive Committee of the Sarajevo County filed a protest to the UN Security Council, UNPROFOR commander for former Yugoslavia and the UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of the crimes committed on October 23rd of this year by the extremist HVO units in the village of Stupni Do in Vareš municipality.

Among other things, the protest states that the HVO extremists have flattened the entire peaceful Bosnian village to the grounds and in the cruelest way killed a large number of women, children and elderly. From a total of 250 Muslim people, only 16 managed to escape the knife of Ustasha. All 80 homes are ruined, and all 56 houses are either burned or completely destroyed to the ground. This horrific death scene must evoke at least a little pity and be a cause for action, because witnessing and not responding to the crime is same as participating in the crime, the protest concludes.

With timely political and military activities, you should try to restore the confidence you given by the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on your arrival to these areas in order to contribute the recoil and disappearance of fascism forever, stands at the end of the protest of the Sarajevo district Executive Committee addressed to the UN Security Council and UNPROFOR commanders for the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

OSLOBOĐENJE • SUNDAY, 31ST OCTOBER 1993

Condemnation of the crimes in Stupni Do

The world community condemned the massacre today, committed against the Bosniak population by the members of HVO in the village of Stupni Do. Therefore, yesterday in their announcements the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish and French governments have condemned this massacre. Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock urged the Croatian government to investigate who is responsible for this massacre and to prevent possible recurrence of such incidents. Mock recalled that Croatia has committed to demand from Bosnian Croats to respect human rights and also said that nothing can justify this barbaric act.

Bosnia and Herzegovina
 FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 Municipal council Vareš municipality
 Number: OVV-M.P.-74/97
 Vareš, 21 May 1997

OFFICIAL SECRET
 STRICTLY
 CONFIDENTIAL

To Dr. Anto NOBILO, by hand

SUBJECT: Information about the situation of Croats of the Vareš municipality in the period of 17 October 1993 until now.

INTRODUCTION

In the following lines we wish to give further information on the situation and events which have occurred to the remaining civilian population in the area of Vareš municipality after the expulsion of Croats on 2 November 1993.

As a reminder, some important facts should be emphasized. The date Vareš was attacked, in the military sense, should be put at 17 October 1993, when members of the Third Corps carried out an attack on Liješnica in the region called Kruškovac in our zone of responsibility. Four days later, on 21 October 1993 Kopjari village, which lies in the area of responsibility of the Bobovac Brigade, was attacked from Dragovići village, by units of the Third corps as well as Muslim forces from the Vareš villages of Dragovići, Mijakovići, Striježevo and Ostrlja. After this armed provocations were carried out, as well as increasingly heavy shelling of the Gornja Borovica and Donja Borovica villages. Under these circumstances, the entire civilian population of these two villages withdrew towards Vareš town on 30 and 31 October 1993. In these days the attacks on the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ zone of responsibility from several directions escalated, and the civilian population pulled back more and more with the defence line towards the urban part on 30 and 31 October and 1 and 2 November 1993.

On 30 October 1993, members of the Second Corps attacked and in the course of the day took Duboštica village, after which combat activities were transferred towards Zvijezda mountain.

On 2 November 1993, Muslim forces launch a general attack from three directions. These attacks showed the extreme aggressiveness of the Muslim army and in the midst of the great panic which had gripped the civilian population, the decision was taken to start the evacuation of civilians. The evacuation was started in the night from 2-3 November 1993 and continued on 3 November 1993, when the largest amount of the majority Croat civilian population of our municipality was evacuated. The evacuation was carried out over territory which was then held by the Army of Republika Srpska (Brgule, Nišić) in the direction of Kiseljak and Kreševo. In the area of Vareš municipality, which in the following days was overrun by the BH Army, 914 Croats remained.

ETHNIC CLEANSING

According to information collected by members of the uniformed police of the PS /police station/ Vareš-Daštansko and the Municipal council of Vareš municipality, after 3 November 1992 a series of events and phenomena occurred in the area of Vareš municipality, which unequivocally indicate and substantiate the well-founded suspicion that grave crimes (murders) had been committed and there are also elements substantiating the well-founded suspicion that criminal offenses of a war crime had been committed too.

Apart from information which will be presented at various places such as: the Vareš Municipal council, the Vareš and Vijaka County office, the Borovica County prefect, the Kiseljak Military court, the Kiseljak police station /PS/, Kiseljak TV, the SIS /Security and Information Service/ of the 96th Bobovac Home Guard Regiment and the SIS of the *Ban Jelačić* brigade, the HR H-B /Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia/ Commission for the investigation of war crimes, there are several pieces of evidence such as (written accounts, photographs, video tapes, audio-recorded materials, official notes, copied documents taken from A BiH /BH Army/ members and other documents) which confirm the basic thesis that A BiH members entering the area of Vareš municipality avenged themselves in a most brutal and cruel manner on the innocent, unarmed and unprotected civilian population, which, although in smaller numbers, remained in their homes awaiting the "liberators". The Muslim

soldiers vented their fury and brutality, killing pensioners, old and infirm people, burning houses, desecrating and destroying churches, chapels and graveyards, raping and looting innocent people.

In the case of some settlements and villages such as Gornja and Donja Borovica, Kopjari, Mir, and even Semizova Ponikva the purpose was, clearly, to flatten the village so that it would never again be possible for Croats to return there. Such systematic looting, burning and devastating of practically everything in residential buildings, which not seldom ended in the removal of the roofs from the houses, could only have one purpose of totally destroying these buildings and rendering them uninhabitable. Before the Washington Agreements, and partly also afterwards, the conduct of A BiH members was such that we no longer can, nor do we want to, or dare to, return. In Vareš town the local members of the Muslim-Bosniak people rushed in to take over flats of expelled Croats, and after them groups of inhabitants of Zubeta, Ravne, Crna Rijeka, Olovo and Sokolac, as well as other places, also resettled there. The movable property of our population, painstakingly acquired over the years, changed ownership overnight and was hauled away to Olovo, Živinice, Tuzla, Breza, Kakanj, Visoko, or taken away by domicile Bosniaks, who had been our former neighbours.

Some Croatian villages such as Očevija and Vijaka (partly) and the entire urban area of Vareš were deliberately and systematically repopulated by Muslims with the aim of completely changing the demographic composition of the population. This was a case of perfidious ethnic cleansing in the most practical sense of the word. However, this became even more perfidious at the end of the spring and the beginning of the summer of 1994, when the Muslim civilian authorities in Vareš under the guise of implementing the basic constitutional principle that everybody has the right to return to their home, allowed some hundreds, maybe even 1,000 Croats to indeed return from Kiseljak to Vareš. This was followed by a ban on future returns of Croats and the introduction of terrible repression, and a small number of Croats, (around 300) according to criteria known only to them /Muslim authorities/ was indeed allowed to remain, without any rights, while a genuine hunt was opened on the undesirables who were sent back in a quite rigorous way, under force, to where they had come from, that is, Kiseljak.

From then up till now the civilian and military authorities of the A BiH in Vareš are doing everything they can to make life miserable for the civilian population and members of the 96th Vareš Bobovac Home Guard Regiment. Any communication whatsoever between the civilian population of Daštansko and Kiseljak is forbidden, although the agreement signed allows for this. Any type of meeting between the representatives of the civilian authorities in Vareš and Daštansko is prevented and ignored. Unfortunately, the countless letters and oral appeals to the President of the Federation, representatives of the authorities of the Republic of Croatia, and representatives of the Muslim authorities, have not helped either. The question is how long this can go on. Why is no help offered anymore to this people, because the information which will follow, although it is very brutal and devastating, has not deterred our fighters and civilians, who, despite everything, in considerably large numbers, wish to return and live in their homes where their ancestors lived.

Killed, raped, missing

On the area of Vareš municipality (after 3 November 1993) in an extremely treacherous and brutal way, members of the A BiH killed several male civilians. According to our knowledge in nearly all cases they were elderly persons who for the most part were not liable for military service. All these persons were, at the time of their murder, according to our knowledge, unarmed and did not offer any passive, let alone active, resistance.

In Donja Borovica village, nevertheless, after the withdrawal of the army and civilians, some persons remained who were killed in the period from 3-8 November 1993. These are:

1. Ilija IVKIĆ, son of Andrija, born in 1941. He was killed in front of his family home. The corpse was found by UN members. He had multiple gunshot wounds on his body and two wounds in the chest and stomach areas, which were caused, probably, by stabbing with a knife. Ilija IVKIĆ was subsequently buried in the Catholic graveyard in Kiseljak.
2. Stjepan MARKOVIĆ, son of Ilija born in 1938. Killed in front of his family home. The corpse was found by UN members. According to the information we possess, his body was mutilated. The back of his head was smashed in by a blunt instrument. Underneath the neck a wound is visible, probably inflicted by a knife, and there were several gunshot wounds to the body caused by a firearm. The body of the murdered Stjepan MARKOVIĆ was subsequently buried in the Catholic graveyard in Kiseljak.

3. Marko PARIĆ, son of Mato born in 1934. According to UN information, the remains of his body were not found under his burnt family house in Donja Borovica village.
4. Ivo VUKANČIĆ, son of Ilija born in 1915. His corpse has still not been found. It is suspected that he remained in his house which was almost entirely burnt down by A BiH members.
5. Mato IVKIĆ, son of Andrija born in 1935. According to our information he was killed by members of the 7th Muslim brigade in his house which was afterwards burnt down.

Apart from these civilian victims, who were brutally killed in their homes, in the neighbouring village Gomja Borovica near the school building, UN members discovered during their visit and inspection of this terrain the corpse of HVO soldier Kruno DJAKOVIĆ, son of Željko born 1963. He was killed by firearms during the HVO's withdrawal from Borovica. However, the body was subsequently mutilated. The head was smashed in by a blunt instrument. And there were several wounds on the chest which were probably caused by a knife. The body of the deceased was subsequently buried in the Catholic graveyard in Kiseljak.

In Rajčevac suburb in Vareš Majdan, Ferdo LOVRENOVIĆ, an unarmed civilian, was killed in front of his family home, without any reason or motive.

In the same suburb near his family home, the unarmed civilian Jozo PETROVIĆ, was killed, also by firearm. Both persons were killed on the same day, probably 5 or 6 November 1993.

In Kralupi suburb in Vareš Majdan, Jerko TERZIĆ was killed above the Catholic church in front of a hut, in the first days after the Muslim army took Vareš.

Pensioner Svetislav JAZIĆ was killed in his flat in Vareš Majdan in Kraljice Katarine Street. According to insufficiently verified information he told the looters of his property who were taking things away one after the other in his presence "Does the A BiH really do such things", after which one of the looters killed him with an automatic gun. It is interesting to note that this man has a son living in Visoko who is a member of an A BiH unit.

Alojzija ČOVIĆ, called Alko, was killed in his brother's flat on Kralupi St. in Vareš Majdan. He had remained after people and the army had moved out and at that place had awaited the "liberators".

Ivo PEJČINOVIĆ, called Altoka, was killed in Vareš town (the old town) in the first days after the entry of the Muslim army. According to our information the killing happened near the house of Kruno ANTIĆ.

In Brezik village A BiH members killed two civilians, namely:

Pero MILETIĆ, pensioner. He lived in the barracks in Brezik suburb where he was killed, and afterwards the barracks were set alight and burnt down completely.

In the same village Ivo JELIĆ was killed, a civilian who at the time of his murder, according to our information, was in Marko MIRČIĆ's house.

There are reasonable grounds to suspect that A BiH members in our area also carried out two crimes of rape. One was reported in Vareš town against Željka PETROVIĆ which took place in Ljepovići suburb. The second rape of Marinka FRANJKIĆ, an elderly woman living in Tribija hamlet, took place in Vijaka village.

In addition to this information it has to be noted that three persons from our area are recorded as missing. In the first case this concerns Božo SKELEDŽIĆ, son of Mato from Očevija, who, according to our information, went missing from this village in the spring of 1994. From then until now none of his close relatives, or none of the inhabitants of his village has any information as to what happened.

The second case concerns two persons from Ratanj village, Kakanj municipality, who were in Kopjari village when it was attacked and taken. They are Ivo TEŠEVČIĆ and Tonka TEŠEVČIĆ. From 21 October 1993, until now, none of the relatives of these persons or even their acquaintances have any reliable news of what happened to them.

Churches, chapels and graveyards

The kind of intentions with which the Muslim "liberators" entered this area is demonstrated by the example of their behaviour towards the churches, church dwellings, chapels and graveyards of the Croatian population. In some cases they went about the destruction of these Catholic symbols in such a brutal way that one cannot

help but wonder, whether they, with such an attitude, in fact, wished to forever erase all things which in the least bit recalled anything Croatian, Christian, their symbols, habits and tradition. In what other way can the brutality be explained with which A BiH members destroyed and burnt everything they could in Gornja and Donja Borovica villages. They killed people, destroyed houses and outbuildings, and finished or maybe began with the Catholic church of the Lord's Transformation, which was totally destroyed. The parish house was also totally destroyed. The interior of the church is completely reduced to ashes and full of rubble. The graveyard chapels in these villages were broken into and looted, and the crosses on top of them were smashed. The big cross was destroyed on the plateau in front of the church in Gornja Borovica, after having been pulled down from the top of the church tower and smashed. Through this act the Muslim soldiers apparently wanted to destroy and desecrate everything bearing symbols of other religions and traditions.

In Borovička Njiva hamlet the chapel in the local graveyard was demolished, and some monuments on the Catholic graveyard have been damaged.

In the neighbouring village of Kopjari the local Catholic graveyard was desecrated by shooting from firearms among the monuments. All cast iron crosses which were on the tombstones were turned over, some were thrown about the graveyard. Three monuments were completely pulled down. The chapel was completely demolished and damaged. There is practically no grave without signs of shooting.

In the Catholic graveyard in Duboštica village A BiH members forcefully opened the front door to the chapel.

In Mir village, Muslim soldiers on two occasions in 1996 totally defiled the graveyard and the chapel. The first time was in July 1996, and the second time in the night from 2 to 3 November 1996, when they completely destroyed the chapel and 60 monuments (all wooden and iron crosses were broken, and the monuments smashed up).

In Bijelo Borje village A BiH members in the night from 2 to 3 November 1996, A BiH members totally defiled the graveyard and the chapel. 14 monuments, all iron and wooden crosses were broken and the monuments smashed up.

There are reasonable grounds to suspect that the perpetrators are Halid, Bajro, Mufid and Himzo LIKIĆ from Stupni Do village.

In Vijaka parish signs of the barbaric and vandalistic outpouring of hatred against the Croatian population and their sacred objects are visible in several places. The parish church was forcibly entered in Gornja Vijaka and church property was stolen from it. The parish house which is located next to the church was broken into, looted, and partially damaged. Things belonging to the church were thrown in all directions (church paintings, crosses etc.). The Muslims closed bovine cattle and sheep in the parish house.

In Donja Vijaka village the door of the chapel in the graveyard itself was prized off and everything was stolen from it, while in the graveyard itself one cross was broken.

In Krčevine village (Vijaka) the bell tower shows signs of shots, and on the *Raskrstje* /cross-roads/ location the face of Jesus on the big cast iron cross has been destroyed.

The parish priest of Vijaka parish, father Željko FILIPOVIĆ, was physically attacked and beaten up in front of the church immediately after the invasion by the A BiH by members of these units. After this incident the parish priest was again on two occasions searched and ill-treated by individual members of the Muslim army.

In Očevija village the local church doors were forcefully broken down. The church's property was partially stolen, and the big cross was taken out and thrown on the rubbish dump, some 100 metres down the road.

In the local graveyard in Pogar the Muslim army damaged some monuments by firearms, and the church was shelled and a lot of windows were broken.

The door of the Catholic church in Vareš Majdan was forcefully broken down without any of the church property having been stolen.

The church in Brezik graveyard was damaged as a result of combat activities. Namely, A BiH members used this religious building as a firing position towards HVO members.

In (Gornja and Donja) Borovica village there were 262 families. 340 houses were set on fire, as well as 750 farm buildings.

Kopjari village had 150 inhabitants. The village was taken over by the Muslim army twice. In the first onslaught two houses were set on fire, and in the second onslaught practically all the remaining houses, which had not been set on fire were first looted and then devastated.

Borovička Njiva had 11 families, all the houses were looted and devastated.

Duboštica village had 29 families, four houses were set on fire, the others were looted and completely devastated.

Kopalište village had 17 families, no houses were set on fire, but all were looted and devastated.

Pogar village was inhabited by 120 families. Twenty-eight houses were set on fire, as well as 16 other farm buildings. Houses which were not deserted were looted and devastated.

Ivančevo village was inhabited by 49 families. Houses in which no one remained were looted and completely devastated. Not one house was set on fire, but five farm buildings were set on fire.

Krčevina village had 75 families. Eighteen houses and ten farm buildings were set on fire. All the other houses were looted and devastated.

Radoševići village was inhabited by 62 families, all the houses were looted and devastated. No buildings were set on fire.

Tribija village had 15 families, only one house was set on fire, and the others were looted and devastated.

In Donja Vijaka village with 50 families, two houses were and two farm buildings were set on fire, and the other houses were looted and completely devastated.

Očevija (Donja and Gornja) - had 120 families. One house was set on fire, and the houses that were empty were looted and devastated.

Bijelo Borje had 15 families. Two weekend houses and two farm buildings were set on fire. The other houses were looted and devastated.

Mir village had 44 families. Fifteen houses, one weekend house, two local community buildings and 21 farm buildings were set on fire. The remaining houses were looted and devastated.

Diknići village had 44 families. Four houses and two farm buildings were set on fire.

Mlakve village had seven families, one house was set on fire, the other ones were looted and devastated.

Brezik village had 60 families. Eight houses and two farm buildings were set on fire. The remaining houses were looted and devastated.

Pržići village is in the HVO zone of activity. Several houses were damaged, and two farm buildings were set on fire as a consequence of combat activities.

In Kolonija-Pržići village there were 34 families. Nine houses were set on fire, as well as five socially-owned buildings, which contained nine flats. One weekend house and six farm buildings were set on fire. The remaining houses, to which the population has largely returned, were looted and devastated.

In Tisovci village there were 50 families. During the conflict five houses were set on fire, and after the ceasefire another two houses were set on fire. The remaining houses were completely looted and devastated.

Javornik village had 62 families. Two houses were set on fire and the other were ones looted and devastated.

Ljepovići village had 84 families. One house was set on fire, the other ones were looted and devastated.

Osoje village had 25 families, two houses were set on fire, the other ones were looted and devastated.

Zvijezda and Ponikva village had 35 families. During the attack the *Ponikva* hotel, the Hunting Lodge, the *Šumarstva* labourers' boarding house in Ponikva, and a socially-owned building containing four flats burnt down.

In Vareš town - Vareš Majdan, during the attack of the A BiH on Vareš, 750 Croats and some 70 Serbs remained. The Muslim population moved into all empty private houses and flats, completely looted all Croatian property, devastated houses and flats after they had left, and so forth.

During the army's attack on Vareš, the *K* apartment complex (*K-4, K-5, K-6, K-7*), containing 84 apartments, a food warehouse and silos burnt down, and five single-family houses were set on fire, and after the ceasefire was signed, another three single-family houses were set on fire.

In Vareš Majdan an apartment block of four apartments burnt down. After the ceasefire was signed Croatian property was destroyed and looted on a massive scale.

The looting and devastation of all Croatian property was carried out by the Muslim population and A BiH soldiers.

Witnesses to the events

In the procedure to establish the specific criminal activities and conduct of a certain number of A BiH members before the responsible judicial bodies, it will be most difficult, obviously, to find witnesses and eye witnesses as well as other evidence on the basis of which persons, the perpetrators of the above mentioned acts, can be charged.

Three living witnesses exist to the events which occurred in Gornja and Donja Borovica, who at the time remained in the village. These are Ilija and Manda KALFIĆ, a married couple, inhabitants of this village currently living in Vareš town. Their statements should be taken together, of course, with that of Blaško (son of Andrija) IVKIĆ, who has meanwhile left Vareš and, according to our knowledge, now lives in Zagreb. Alongside these, of course, it is necessary to consult the official reports of members of the UN peacekeeping forces, who regularly inspected the above-mentioned villages and surely reported back to their superior on the situation they encountered. One UN officer by the name of MC KEE is mentioned often.

After Semizova Ponikva village was taken over, some local inhabitants also remained, who would have something to say about the events of those days. These are: Kaja MARIĆ, Pero DŽOJA, Krešo DODIK and Jozo FRANJKOVIĆ.

In Vijaka parish area, an obvious witness to many of the events is the parish priest Father Željko FILIPOVIĆ, who in this period moved around the most in the area, contacting the remaining Croats.

In Pogar village it would certainly be interesting to listen to the recollections of Stjepan ŠURKIĆ, the president of that local community and president of the local branch of the HSS /Croatian Peasants' Party/ for Vareš. Ivo BARNJAK and his son Gabrijel, living in Barice hamlet, and Rudo ŠIMIČEVIĆ and Marko MUTIĆ from the same village, stayed with him the whole time.

A witness to the many happenings in Očevija village is, doubtlessly, Ljuban VIJAČKIĆ, who worked at the Vareš town waterworks pump all the time, and who also trained several members of the Muslim population to do this work. Apart from him, we think the testimony of a villager, Mijo SEMUNOVIĆ, would also be interesting.

After 3 November 1993, according to our knowledge, one civilian remained in Kopaljšta village, who is still living there now. This is Verka DUSPER who without doubt could give an interesting statement.

Given their proximity to the line of separation between the A BiH and the HVO forces, according to our knowledge, Božo MALBAŠIĆ remained in Tisovci and Brezik settlements for a short while, before he was expelled from that village.

In Diknići village, which was also near the line of separation between A BiH and HVO forces, few villagers remained. According to our information after 5 November 1993 in this village its inhabitants Petar BOŽIĆ, a veterinary surgeon by profession and his sister Ivanka as well as Marijan FRANJIĆ stayed there for a while. All three persons mentioned above now live in Vareš after they were expelled by A BiH members.

A small group of Croats remained in Buboštica village after 3 November 1993, among whom we would single out Vinko and Tihomir PENDIĆ, as well as Mijo PAVLIĆ, a trader in that village.

In Borovička Njiva hamlet (Borovica parish), according to our knowledge, only one inhabitant remained, and this was Ilija NIKOLIĆ.

For the Vijaka, Očevija, Zvijezda, Ponikva and Vareš areas, Zdravko DUJMOVIĆ, who stayed in Olovo during this period and some time afterwards, could give a lot of rather interesting information on the military formations which attacked, entered and remained in these areas after 3 November 1993. He carried out the

duties of commander of the uniformed civilian police in Olovo SJB /Public Security Service/, and he was also the President of the Olovo HDZ /Croatian Democratic Union/. He currently works as a work methodology inspector with the uniformed police of the MUP/ Ministry of the Interior of HR HB /Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosnia/ in Mostar.

In Vareš town, according to our information, Franjo DUŽNOVIĆ, living in Ljepovići settlement, wrote down mostly everything he saw. In Kota settlement witnesses of all events are Rafo and Marija GRGIĆ. In the town itself Mihovil FRANJKOVIĆ, nicknamed Planda, Dragan BRKOVIĆ, son of Ilija, and Ljubo RAJIĆ, have quite a lot of information. We emphasize that the entire period, Katarina TOMIĆ, who was president of the lower court in Vareš, and still holds that position remained in Vareš town, along with her husband Tomislav TOMIĆ, one of the SDP /Social Democratic Party/ leaders in Vareš. Also interesting would be the testimony of Ljerka MATOŠEVIĆ, a teacher at the Secondary School Centre. On several occasions she publicly criticized the conduct of the Vareš civilian authorities concerning the registration of Croatian children at the school, and because of these convictions was often criticized by the director of this institution, Alija GOGIĆ.

Regarding the problematic situation in Vareš town and Vareš Majdan, a special place should be given to the information and knowledge of the Vareš parish priest Father Mato TOPIĆ and other priests who remained in Vareš during this time.

For the urban part of Vareš Majdan, a lot of information on Rajčevac settlement as well as accounts on the circumstances under which Ferdo MIOČEVIĆ and Jozo PETROVIĆ were killed can be obtained from their surviving wives who are still living in this settlement. In any case as to what happened in Vareš Majdan it would be necessary to listen to Ivo ČOVIĆ whose brother Alojzija ČOVIĆ was killed after the A BiH's entry. Among the witnesses we also specifically mention Dragan PRANJIĆ and his wife Zlata. We wish to emphasize that in this part of town in late 1993 Ivan LUČIĆ was appointed commander of the civilian police in Vareš Majdan at the SJB Vareš and held this position until the end of 1994. He currently works as a crime inspector for common crimes in the SJB Vareš.

Perpetrators of the acts

Who are the perpetrators of the above-mentioned acts? If we knew this, we would certainly take the collected evidence to the competent judicial bodies of Herzeg Bosnia and the Federation, and probably we would not leave out the International Court in The Hague who would adjudicate. However, at this stage in the collection of information we can with absolute certainty speak about the responsibility of members of individual units which have inflicted great evil on the remaining inhabitants of Vareš municipality and carried out unheard of looting.

We know with absolute certainty that parts of the 7th Muslim Brigade and the Kakanj brigade of the 3rd Corps entered Gornja and Donja Borovica.

Pogar, Zarudje and Strica village were entered by members of the 119th Muslim Brigade from Banovići, the Vijaka parish villages of Tribija, Radoševići, Krčevine and Ivančevo were entered by units of the reconnaissance and sabotage company of the 1st Olovo Glorious Brigade.

Očevija village was "liberated" by parts of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Olovo Brigade from the direction of Zubet and Ravno.

Vareš town was entered by members of the 2nd Corps, that is units of the 119th Banovići Brigade, the 1st Olovo Brigade, the Kladanj Brigade of the A BiH as well as special units of that Corps (the Živinice wasps, the Lukavica bears and the Olovo jokers) under the command of the deputy commander of the 2nd Corps Ramiz SUVALIĆ and his deputy Abdulah BAŠIĆ.

The urban part which we call Vareš Majdan was "liberated" by the Tactical group composed of members of the 329th Kakanj Brigade, the 126th Visoko Brigade, the Breza Brigade, the Vareš independent detachment as well as special units of the 3rd Corps of the A BiH (the *Frka* company, the Black Swans, and the reconnaissance and sabotage company of the 7th Muslim Brigade), all under the command of Hasim SPAHIĆ and his deputy Hrustem MALIŠEVIĆ.

There are reasonable grounds to suspect that the majority of lootings and other criminal offences which took place in Mir, Bijelo Borje, Brezik, Tisovci and Diknići villages were carried out by members of the 322nd Mountain Brigade composed of members of the Muslim-Bosniak ethnicity from the area of Vareš municipality. This unit has been constantly present in the above-mentioned villages from 5 November 1993 until now.

There are reasonable grounds to suspect that the villages of the Vijaka parish were looted mainly by members of military units of the A BiH as well as civilians from Krivaja valley (Careva Čuprija, Solun, Čuništa and other villages in Olovo municipality and Muslims from the neighbouring villages of Mižnovići and Ligatići). Members of the Vareš-Daštansko PS /police station/ have a written document, drawn up by members of the Muslim civilian police, which shows information with the first and last names of persons of Muslim nationality and a list of stolen things which were looted from villages of the Vijaka parish.

There are reasonable grounds to suspect that Očevija village was largely looted by A BiH military formations which entered the village and by civilians from the neighbouring Muslim Ligatići, Mižnovići, Solun and Musići villages.

Bajro RASUMOVIĆ, the chief of security of the 3rd Operations Group of the 2nd Corps, who was for located in Očevija village for a while, will without doubt have a lot of security information.

There are reasonable grounds to suspect that the killings, looting, arson and desecration of religious buildings and graveyards in Gornja and Donja Borovica and Kopjari villages was for the most part carried out by members of the A BiH 7th Muslim Brigade (from Zenica, Kakanj - especially Brnjić and Nažbilj villages), as well as Muslims from Mijakovići and Dragovići villages.

For the needs of the competent court which will examine the concrete cases of criminal offences on the area of Vareš municipality, information can also be sought from the SJB Vareš. We are aware that members of this station took a small number of things and objects from civilians and some of these were returned to their owners. In case this is necessary, it may be requested to examine official information at the disposal of the Vareš lower court which, if it carried out its constitutional function, it must have undertaken specific measures against the perpetrators of serious acts in this area together with members of the SJB.

And of the end of this Report, instead of any conclusions we will single out some of the most important statistical indicators, which speak for themselves. They would probably not mean anything to people like Hrustem MALIŠEVIĆ, even if they were larger, however they are crucial for the organs and bodies which prosecute and punish the perpetrators of such acts.

From 3 November 1993, in the area of Vareš municipality which was controlled by the A BiH, according to our information, 13 civilians were killed, three civilians were recorded as missing, and two women were raped. In the same period, A BiH members set fire to one church, partially damaged another one and looted four Catholic churches. One parish house burnt down completely and one was looted. Six chapels in the same number of graveyards in the area of the municipality were broken into, damaged and looted. Five Catholic graveyards were desecrated through shooting, the destruction of crosses, and the pulling down of monuments. Over 460 residential buildings were set on fire, destroyed and rendered uninhabitable, with no complete information for socially-owned flats. Over one thousand auxiliary buildings, such as stables, sheds, garages, smokehouses etc. were set on fire and destroyed.

All members of the uniformed police of Vareš-Daštansko PS participated in the collection of security-related information from the entire area of Vareš municipality, monitoring these problems in the villages on a territorial basis. This report represents a summary of work carried out until now. It should be pointed out that besides the details given in the individual information a number of other details have been gathered on each village. We emphasize that on this occasion we did not cover the areas which were inhabited by a majority Serb population (Planinica, Slavin, Pajtov Han) which, according to the information which has reached us, also suffered great misery.

Delivered to
1 x addressee
1 x files

/round seal, inscribed/ BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA, CROATIAN
REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA -
VAREŠ MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF
VAREŠ MUNICIPALITY

CHAIRMAN OF VAREŠ OV
/MUNICIPAL COUNCIL/
/signed/ (Miroslav PEJČINOVIĆ)

D-3

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
Croatian Defence Council
Central Bosnia Operations Zone
HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ *Bobovac* Brigade Vareš
ZM /Command Post/ Ponikve - Vareš

Defence
Military Secret
Strictly Confidential

Number: 01-/handwritten: 522-1//93
Date: 11 August 1993 Time: 16,20 hours

Order for preventing
crime and smuggling in the sectors
and on the lines of defence

To the commands of the 1st and 2nd Battalions -
to the commanders personally -

Based on official reports concerning ever more frequent incidents of smuggling and criminal activity by civilians in the sectors and on the lines of defence, and in order to more effectively prevent such activities and conduct, I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. Pursuant to orders by the relevant administrations of the civilian and military police in Travnik and Vitez, the responsibility of HVO civilian and military police units has been established with regard to checking traffic, vehicles, goods of all kinds, and the freedom of movement of civilians on roads and at the established checkpoints.
The task of the civilian and military police teams which have been established is to consistently implement legal regulations, decrees and orders from the competent police organs of the HZ H-B /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/ and the OZ SB /Central Bosnia Operations Zone/ and orders from the top political and military leadership of the Vareš HVO.
2. In the sectors and on the lines of defence, special attention is to be devoted to civilians and others who in any way seek to evade checks on goods being transported through civilian and military police checkpoints, or attempt in some other way to transport goods illegally or outside valid regulations for the purpose of unlawful material gain.
3. With regard to routes, roads and channels for which it has been established that they are being used for the illegal transport of goods, battalion commanders are authorised, by means of their orders transmitted via company commanders in the sectors or the zones of responsibility, to perform, at their own discretion, periodic checks on all persons moving on routes and roads outside the checkpoints maintained by the civilian and military police.
These checks should be concentrated on routes leading to the villages of Daštansko, Višnjići, Tisovci and Pržići, followed by Striježevo, Stupni Do, Mijakovići and Dragovići.
4. Checks on the transport of goods of all kinds in the zones of responsibility of the companies can be made with full supervision and inspection by the company commanders. Any person found illegally transporting goods in a company zone of responsibility must be taken by the patrol leader to the company command, where the goods will be confiscated by a commission and in the presence of the military police. A proper receipt for the confiscated goods will be issued and sent, together with a copy of the record, to the logistics of the brigade or the battalion, depending on the quantity of goods confiscated, and the battalion commanders and the chief logistics officer of the brigade must be informed thereof. Confiscated goods may be distributed in the battalions only with the approval of the battalion commanders and the prior consent of the brigade's commander or chief logistics officer.

5. Any abuse or disobedient conduct by soldiers in the form of stopping civilians and confiscating goods is strictly forbidden. For this reason, the personnel carrying out patrols and checks are to be specially chosen.
6. Any unruly behaviour by soldiers and disobedient conduct, e.g. the confiscation of goods for personal gain, is to be strictly penalised by applying the most severe disciplinary measures, and even initiating criminal proceedings.
7. The commanders of companies and battalions shall be personally responsible to me for any violation of this order or the inconsistent application of instructions proceeding from it.

EH/FP

Typewritten in five (5) copies and

BRIGADE COMMANDER

DELIVERED TO:

Emil HARAHA
/signed and stamped/

commander of the 1st Battalion x 1,
commander of the 2nd Battalion x 1,
commander of the VP /Military Police/
of the HVO x 1,
Chief of the SIS /Security and
Information Service/ x 1,
files x 1

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

MILITARY POLICE HEAD OFFICE MOSTAR
COMMAND OF THE VI BATTALION MP
GENERAL-TRAFFIC MP OFFICE
Livno, September 4, 1993

W O R K R E P O R T
on the II and III Company checkpoints of the
VI Military Police Battalion

During my visit to checkpoints last week, I noticed that in most cases the appearance of the military police officers is unsatisfactory, they are not properly dressed, most of them without badges, forearm sleeves, caps, white belts. They do not look like military police but rather like paramilitary forces and provoke negative reactions from stopped passengers. Uniforms are not the same, and during the conversation with their commanders I learned that they do not have nor have they received other uniforms from the MP Head office. The appearance of checkpoints is not at an enviable level, however, along with the military police there is also civilian, brigade and SIS police and it is therefore expected that the checkpoint has various signs and commercial signs, and some of the checkpoints look like markets. Not all of the checkpoints have banners, which contributes to the overall horrific appearance of checkpoints.

As for the behavior towards passengers, more or less everybody understands that they must behave in accordance with the regulations, therefore complaints in that remark are rare or nonexistent.

It often happens that military policemen are late for their shift, or go for a drink during work or even in some cases came to their shift in private vehicles.

At the Kamensko border crossing it often the case that military officers come to work in black uniforms.

Working conditions at checkpoints are not satisfactory, for which commanders are responsible and their efficiency in the work of the Military Police, records of traffic of goods and passengers are almost nonexistent.

NOTE:

The primary responsibility for such appearance of checkpoints, military officers and work performed lies on commanders. Commanders should look for and find new ways to perform tasks in order to approve the general appearance of working of checkpoints and military officers, but they should also have certain working conditions, which I have already indicated, which can be obtained through requests to the General secretary of Logistics of the VI military Police Battalion, or otherwise certain sanctions will be undertaken because checkpoints are the mirror of the military police in general.

I submit this report for information purpose and for further reference.

REPORT FILED BY:

ASSIST. COMM. FOR GENERAL TRAFFIC OF MP

/signed/

IVICA KREŠO

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
 COMMAND OF THE BRIGADE
 "BAN JOSIP JELAČIĆ"
 WAR HOSPITAL
 KISELJAK

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
 /handwritten su-120, circled/

Number: 07/3-2654-1/93
 Date: 27 September 1993

GS Mostar
 Headquarters of OZ SB IZM Vitez
 Doctor Drago Džambas

Report

I would like to use the opportunity to inform you on the current situation of the war hospital Kiseljak. As far as you are introduced, after the successful evacuation of the war hospital Fojnica, due to danger to fall into the arms of MOS, we established the war hospital Kiseljak, earlier, the surgery point in the building of the former health care centre. In the short 15 days period, we moved the health care centre to another building. We adapted and adjusted the existing premises for the hospital work. We established 3 operation rooms; septic, aseptic and auxiliary room, with all necessary equipment for the normal work. Apart from this, we established all auxiliary services such as transfusion, haematology and biochemical laboratory, three surgery bend rooms, gypsum premise, sterilization room and own kitchen. We formed the surgery intern department with 40 hospital beds in total. On 17th of July 1993 we started with our work, having performed 50 operations, under the general anaesthesia. I was personally authorized by the order of Ivica Rajić and the commander of OG-2, Chief of brigade "Ban Josip Jelačić", Doctor Petar Laco to establish this hospital and to organize its work.

After the successful start and the hospital work, we encountered problems due to high expert personnel drain, therefore, the work itself and the survival of the hospital were suddenly questioned. In a rather short period, the following persons left the hospital:

1. Doctor Zdenko Nikolajević, surgeon, former commander of the RB HVO Fojnica
2. Doctor Marko Samardžić, transfusion, worked in RB Fojnica
3. Doctor Vladimir Štambak, chest surgeon, now appointed commander of RB Kiseljak by the GS Mostar
4. Doctor Mario Ravlić, specialist, urology

Right now, in the war hospital, I am the only surgeon and only as the commander of the war hospital, I warn you, if something radical cannot be done regarding the personnel of experts, I shall be forced to reduce the hospital to a regular surgery point with a stationary premise.

To be delivered to:

-Attn

-commander of the brigade "Ban Josip Jelačić"

Deputy Commander of the war hospital
 Doctor Darko Finci

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
 CENTRAL BOSNIA MILITARY DISTRICT
 HVO BRIGADE „BOBOVAC“ VAREŠ
 ZM PONIKVE – VAREŠ

URGENT! URGENT! URGENT!

Number: 01-613-12/93
 Date, October 14, 1993
 Time, 20:45

DEFENSE
 MILITARY SECRET
 CLASSIFIED

Information about the arrival of convoy
 for refugees and further status of the members
 of the 1. and 2. Battalion "Kotromanić",-

COMMAND HEADQUARTERS OG-2. KISELJAK
 Att. Commander IVICA RAJIĆ

1. A convoy of vehicles (30 trucks) arrived to Vareš today to evacuate refugees from Kakanj to Herzegovina.	A
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2. In preparation for the departure of the convoy from Vareš, the plan is to evacuate women, children, elderly, incompetent and temporarily incapable military conscripts from Kakanj (with instructions for medical institutions).

3. Because of the inability of the 2. Battalion "Kotromanović" to pass to Kiseljak, there is a belief that they will also be part of the convoy to Herzegovina.

Such beliefs have encouraged members of the 1. Battalion "Kotromanić" (Commander Marko Janjić) to start making preparations to join the convoy by descending from the deployment region in the city.

4. Keeping in mind your command and considering the possibility of unpredictable situations in relation to convoy's departure to Herzegovina that can cause chaos and jeopardize the defense system in the "Bobovac" brigade's responsibility area, I propose the following as the only way out of this situation:

- That you, based on our principle agreement at the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Srpska army in Pale contact Mr. Colonel KOMNEN ŽARKOVIĆ on tel. 071/783-498 or via fax 071/783-497 and that you request permission to relocate 2. Battalion (approximately 650 soldiers) "Kotromanić" to Kiseljak on 15th or 16th October 1993.

- This will ensure that our police officers can control members of the 1. Battalion "Kotromanić" and keep them in Vareš for the purpose of engaging in the defense of the area in our responsibility and to perform selective embarking of refugees and to transfer them to Herzegovina on October 16th.

- It is my judgment that if we do not perform the separation of able men from refugees in the next two days, we will not be able to avoid open armed conflict between our people, the other way to avoid the bloodshed is to evacuate all citizens from Kakanj regardless of the command that was previously issued.	B
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- Regarding the new situation and missions you commanded I also suggest that you estimate the situation, accept my suggestions and quickly refer military units to Vareš for members of the 2. Battalion otherwise, despite my best efforts, I will not be able to comply with your command.

/stamp: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
Croatian Defence Council
Central Bosnia Operations Zone
HVO / Croatian Defence Council/ *Bobovac* Brigade Vareš
ZM /Command Post/ Ponikve - Vareš

Defence
Military Secret
Strictly Confidential

Number: 01-/handwritten: 616-1/ /93

Date, 21 September 1993

Order for preventing unusual incidents

To the commander of the 1st *Kotromanić*
Battalion

To the commanders of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
Battalions and independent units of the
Bobovac Brigade

Based on reports from the field, personal inspection of the situation on the lines and areas of deployment of the units, and observations by officers from brigade command, reconnaissance units and members of the VP /Military Police/, and with the aim of preventing unforeseeable consequences and frequent unusual incidents in the units of the brigade, I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. Consistently and responsibly comply with earlier orders regarding vigilance and attention by soldiers on the line of defence due to heightened reconnaissance activities and sabotage operations carried out by the enemy near our lines.

The focus of vigilance and attention must be along the line Liješnica - Vis (trig. point 1065) - Kopijari - Pliješ - Založnik - Jezero - Igrišta - Kruščić.

2. Do not permit any sort of movement by civilians in the proximity of or across the line of defence, regardless of the reasons and needs of these persons. Civilians should be advised to make use of legal routes commonly used for transportation and movement within the defined zone of responsibility. Unfamiliar persons found outside ordinary routes are to be turned back and moved away, and suspicious persons are to be taken into custody and questioned according to regulations and, depending on the information obtained, proceedings are to be initiated.
3. The transport of goods or any other kind of commerce or the acquisition of unlawful material profit in the areas of deployment of the units or on the lines of defence is most strictly forbidden. All members of the HVO or civilians found participating in such activities will be arrested, and appropriate misdemeanour or criminal proceedings against them will be initiated at the Travnik District Military Court - Vareš Department.
4. The responsibility of commanders at all levels should be heightened as far as possible, with the aim of preventing misconduct by soldiers in performing their duties on the line of defence and in the area of deployment, or in preparing for combat operations, and the unauthorised use of certain material property (cutting firewood, crops, hay, grain and the like).

The cutting of firewood may be done only with the written permission of an expert from the Šumarstvo enterprise, the approval of transport of the firewood from the battalion commander, and the consent of the commander or chief of staff of the brigade, with the possibility of incidental transport when leaving for or returning from a given military assignment.

5. The use of vehicles with PZO /anti-aircraft defence/ weapons for any kind of transport is strictly forbidden, in order to maintain the achieved level of combat readiness.

Any offence committed or violation of this order will be severely penalised.

6. Due to frequent incidents of self-inflicted wounds among soldiers, which are already reaching an alarming level, I make all commanders responsible for the proper handling of weapons in the field and in closed premises, and in the direct use of arms for combat purposes. No soldier is permitted to carry loaded weapons except when on combat assignments, and the safety catch must be on.
7. All members of the HVO *Bobovac* and *Kotromanić* Brigades and members of the VP of the Vareš HVO are forbidden to perform any arbitrary or self-initiated search of buildings and interception and search of civilians, unless such individuals are, in their assessment, capable of endangering the security of members or institutions of the HVO in any way.
8. Undisciplined behaviour in town by our soldiers, taking cigarettes and other goods from the shopping centre and on the street, refusing to pay for goods consumed in catering facilities, all under threat of arms, thus harming the reputation and image of the Vareš HVO in a direct and vulgar manner, is most strictly forbidden.
9. Commanders at all levels of command are responsible to me for carrying out this order and familiarising all commanders with it, and, based thereon, for assigning them with concrete tasks and requesting reports on measures taken.
10. Those responsible for preventing all the aforementioned and other negative unusual incidents are the battalion commanders and commanders of independent units attached to the brigade, who will, according to the line of command, ensure consistent implementation of this order.

EH/FP

Typewritten in thirteen (13) copies and

DELIVERED TO:

1 x commander of the 1st Battalion of
the *Kotromanić* Brigade,

1 x each commander of the 1st, 2nd and
3rd Battalions and independent
units of the *Bobovac* Brigade,

1 x commander of the VP of the Vareš HVO

1 x files

BRIGADE COMMANDER

Emil HARAHA

/signed and stamped/

/stamp of Croatian State Archive/ handwritten text, illegible

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
MILITARY DISTRICT VITEZ

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT
GS HVO MOSTAR IZM ČITLUK
Commander of 3 OG Žepče

Number; 01-10-383/93

Date; 18th of October 1993

Time; 15:10 hours

Special report

THE ENEMY

The MOS forces carried out an attack to the positions in the area of Liješice, Kopjari and Pliješ in the zone of responsibility of Bobovac brigade, Vareš.

At the moment, there are fights going on in order to return the lost part of the defence line in the area of Liješica. The attack to Kopjari, with usage of cannon fire has been rejected. The line of defence on Kopjari hasn't been changed.

Within these conflicts, we had 4 wounded, 2 disappeared and one captured combatants in our troops.

Losses by the enemy are not precisely known.

OUR FORCES

In full combat readiness, we shall do everything to return the lost lines on Liješica.

Activities to direct the civil Croatian population to Herzegovina are current, as well as the organization of military subscripts from Kakanj.

SM/SSV

Typed in 3 examples

To be delivered to:

1 x the Addressee

lx

1 x Files

Commander
Colonel
Tihomir Blaškić

/stamp: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council
 Vitez Military District
 HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ *Bobovac* Brigade Vareš
 Ponikve ZM /Command Post/ - Vareš
 Number: 02-675-5/93
Date: 20 October 1993
 Time: 1620 hours

Defence
 Military Secret
 Strictly Confidential

HZ /Croatian Community/ "Soli" Tuzla
 115th *Zrinski* Brigade
 to the commander Mr Zvonko JURIĆ personally
 - to the commander of the 2nd Corps of the BH Army, Mr Hazim ŠADIĆ

Dear Commander,

We are sending you a chronology of the events of 17 October 1993:

- At 1930 hours on 17 October, suddenly and without provocation, a group attacked Liješnica and drove a wedge through its middle. They carried out further offensive operations during the night and seized it.
 Concurrently, operations began along the Kopijari - Jezero line, during which Kopijari village and the entire defence line were shelled. Following this, members of the BH Army took two trenches on Pliješ mountain. Fighting ceased during the late hours of the night.
- Fighting continued in the early morning hours of 18 October, during which the two trenches were retaken and the Kopijari - Jezero line stabilised. Around 1000 hours mortar fire began from Striježevo and Budoželje, following previous mortar fire from Halinovići and Zagradje.
 Five shells were fired from Striježevo and Budoželje at Planinica village and Slavin village.
- 19 and 20 October passed calmly, but with provocations and maximum grouping of forces against our positions. Units of the *Bobovac* Brigade responded to all firing, with the exception of sniper fire from Dragovići village on the Kopijari - Jezero line of defence, on Kopijari village, and on an ambulance when the wounded were being evacuated.

We had three men killed, two missing and eight wounded (final total) in these operations.

I assure you that the report from the 3rd Corps, according to which we began shelling first, is not correct.

You, Commander, are very well aware of what the Vareš HVO did in the period from the start of the war until 17 October 1993 to maintain peace in this area. We succeeded in maintaining peace even when your 2nd Corps forces were above our villages. We did this together, with full cooperation from you and us. Although we have seen that this can be done without bullets and dead, we, according to the 3rd Corps report, have started the war first. We leave this to your consideration. We accept Mr BAŠIĆ's call for a meeting and discussion, which we propose to take place tomorrow, i.e. 21 October, at 1200 hours in Šimin Potok.

Respectfully yours,

MF/FP

TO:
 addressee x 1,
 files x 1

BRIGADE COMMANDER,
 Emil HARAHA
 /signed and stamped/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/
 V I T E Z MILITARY DISTRICT
 BOBOVAC HVO BRIGADE, VAREŠ
 PONIKVE ZM /Command Post/ - VAREŠ

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Number: 06-689-7/93
 Date: 21 October 1993
 Time: 1945 hours

Combat Report

V I T E Z ZP /Military District/ COMMAND
 OG-2 /Operations Group 2/ COMMAND, KISELJAK

1. ENEMY FORCES

In continued attacks from the Dragovići village sector, they raided and captured Kopijari village, while forces from the direction of Kakanj occupied part of the defence line in the Pliješ sector and cut off part of our forces above Kopijari towards Kakanj.

We managed to evacuate three seriously wounded soldiers from Kopijari village. When the ambulances returned the second time, the Muslim forces captured the drivers and seized two ambulances. They are preventing the recovery of three other seriously wounded.

Four of our people were killed in these clashes and we cannot recover them either. According to collected information and our assessment, the Muslim forces are preparing continued attacks in the morning as follows: part of the special detachment under the command of the 6th Corps, the strength of 30 men and comprising members from the territories of Breza and Vareš municipalities, will attempt a raid on the general Perun sector with the objective of destroying artillery support weapons and troops in that sector.

Part of the *Laste* /Swallows/ detachment the strength of 20 men has been sent in another direction with the same task.

The Muslim forces engaged so far in attacks on our brigade's defence lines are reinforcing themselves, with the probable task of launching an attack on the Gornja Borovica and Donja Borovica sector, and since part of the defence line on Liješnica and Kopijari has been lost, they will bring in MTS /material and technical supplies/, mostly MB /mortars/, from those directions to the general Mijakovičko Polje sector, from which they can fire directly at the town.

According to our information, between 150 and 200 members of the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ have so far converged in the Stupni Do village sector with the probable intention, in the event of the start of an attack, of attacking the part of Vareš town called Majdan.

2. OUR FORCES

- a) Losses so far in today's combat in the general Kopijari village area: four killed, six seriously wounded; we do not know the exact number of slightly wounded since part of our forces have been cut off.
- b) All available troops are engaged on the lines of defence. Part of the troops from the Vijak sector (the Brigade's 2nd Battalion) the strength of two rifle platoons has been transferred to the Borovica sector to reinforce the Založnik - Jezero - Igrišta line of defence and close passages towards Donja Borovica and Pogar village.

3. LOGISTICS AND MEDICAL SUPPORT

We lost two ambulances from the Health Centre, which were seized and their drivers captured. Three seriously wounded have been taken care of, while the others, whose recovery is being prevented, have not been attended to and their condition is unknown to us.

The 90,000 bullets that you know about have been delivered to us.

We urgently need replenishment of 120, 82 and 60 mm mortar shells, BsT /recoilless gun/ shells, RB /hand-held launcher/ and RPG /anti-armour rocket launcher/ shells, anti-personnel mines and hand grenades.

4. OTHER

The assistance of long-range artillery is essential (to provide fire support) at targets agreed on in advance (the TG /Tactical Group/ Vg /fire support group/ of the "XY" side has so far not received an order to provide this to us. In this connection, Chief of Staff Miroslav FRANJKIĆ is coming to see Mr. RAJIĆ in Kiseljak during the night to inform him about the overall situation in our zone of responsibility and beyond. Passage has been secured with the "XY" side.

KB/FP

CHIEF FOR ONP /Operations and Training/
Krešimir BOŽIĆ

SENT TO:

1 x Addressee

1 x Files

/initials/

Enclosure:

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council
 Vitez Military District
 Bobovac Brigade of the Vareš HVO
 Ponikve ZM /command post/ - Vareš
 No: 01-613-51/93
Date: 22 October 1993

/illegible stamp/
 Defence
 Military Secret
 Internal

TO: Commander of the Kiseljak OG-2
 Art. Mr. Ivica RAJIĆ

Dear Commander,

I have been thinking long and hard about approaching you directly regarding my status, position and the role I play within the command and control system of the HVO within the perspective of overall events in political and military life in the Vareš municipality HVO.

Due to constant pressure by the HVO Presidency, most of my decisions in the organisation of defence, and commanding and controlling the Brigade have been contrary to my views and those of my associates. That is why I have found myself in a difficult mental state as a result of the consequences that arose from that. Among all the mistakes that I made, my removal of the Chief-of-Staff, Borivoj MALBAŠA which was done under extreme pressure, has to be my gravest mistake, and also fatalas regards my future personal status. In my current psychological state, I am not able to accept the responsibility and burden of such a serious task as defence in the area of responsibility.

Bearing in mind that a large part of the vital defence elements are under the control of presidency members, and that I have almost no insight into that, this would be a tall order even if my psychological state were stable.

Bearing all this in mind, I ask for your assistance whatever the shape and form you decide, so as to prevent a possible disastrous outcome of the current negative developments on the frontline.

Commander, I ask for your understanding, because due to my severe mental state my current command and control capabilities make me unfit to deal with the situation at hand, and as for the constant accusations against me and the command staff that come from certain members of the HVO Presidency, whose political decisions had a lot to do with that, I consider them to be inhuman and unfair!

BRIGADE COMMANDER
 Emil HARAHA

/stamp: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/
VITEZ MILITARY DISTRICT
BOBOVAC HVO BRIGADE - VAREŠ
PONIKVE COMMAND POST - VAREŠ

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

Number: 01-703-1/93

Date: 23 October 1993

Time: 1145 hours

Report on the situation in the zone of responsibility

HVO GS/Main Staff/, MOSTAR
To the Commander, General Slobodan PRALJAK in person

1. MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ of the 3rd Corps of the A BiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ are launching fierce artillery and infantry attacks on the defence lines of the Bobovac Brigade from the directions of Zenica, Kakanj and Breza towards Vareš.

They have been shelling the town and its inner area intensely since the morning hours. Their intentions are to take over the zone of responsibility of the brigade completely and place the HVO under their control, to which aim they have requested the forces of the Tuzla 2nd Corps for coordinated action. They are expecting assistance and support and are counting on the forces of the 2nd Corps, which are also supposed to launch fierce artillery and infantry attacks on the northern lines of our defence in order to draw out our forces and take over the Vareš area completely.

2. Our forces are resisting the attacks successfully for the time being.

We have mopped up one Muslim village near the town.

The forces on the defence line are drawn out over a wide area and there is a likelihood of our lines breaking because there are few troops.

Commander Mr. Ivica RAJIĆ from Kiseljak is leading the actions in Vareš and he insisted that we send you this information.

EM/DM

BRIGADE COMMANDER
Emil HARAHA

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 MILITARY DISTRICT V I T E Z
 HVO /CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL/
 "BOBOVAC" BRIGADE VAREŠ
 COMMAND POST PONIKVE – VAREŠ

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No: 01-675-6/93
 Date: 24 October 1993
 Time: 01,00 hours

HVO /CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL/ "SOLI" TUZLA
 115. BRIGADE "ZRINJSKI" TUZLA
 Attn: Commander Mr. Zvonko Jurić
 (for Mr. H. Šadić, Commander of the 2nd Corps
 of A BiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Tuzla)

On the date 23 October 1993 units of A BiH from the Budoželje and Stupni Do sectors began offensive activities toward the Croatian village of Mir with the aim of taking the village and the dominant object Veliki kamen trig. point 1246 in order to achieve a merger of their forces in Stupni Do with the forces in Budoželje, and from the dominant object control over the districts Planinica, Poljanice – Samari – Mala Rijeka. After that, in our assessment, from the districts of Mijakovičko poljice and Stupni Do offensive actions would be launched towards the town of Vareš itself with the purpose of cutting off the HVO forces. From everything what the A BiH has done so far against the HVO forces in the districts of Kopijari, Liješnica, Mir and Pajtov Han, the intent to destroy the HVO in Vareš is obvious.

I assure you Commander that not a single shell has fallen on the Stupni Do district from our positions. I also assure you that we responded with artillery over the districts from which the artillery of A BiH was shelling the town of Vareš. From today's shelling of Vareš by the 3rd Corps of A BiH we have suffered casualties - killed and wounded soldiers as well as 6 wounded civilians from the town of Vareš. At this very moment while I am answering your inquiry we are under attack by the forces of the 3rd Corps of A BiH over the districts of Pajtov Han, Poljanica and Planinice. All military activity around the villages of Stupni Do and Budoželje ceased on 23 October 1993 at 12,00 hours.

I am asking you to use your authority to effectuate immediate ceasing of attacks by the 3rd Corps on the zone of responsibility of the "Bobovac" Brigade, and retreat to starting positions. Only such a course of events can promise a good perspective in Croatian-Muslim relations on these areas.

Respectfully yours!

To:
 1 x addressee
 1 x files

BRIGADE COMMANDER
 Emil Harah
 /signed and stamped/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
VITEZ MILITARY DISTRICT
HVO "BOBOVAC" BRIGADE VAREŠ
ZM PONIKVE - VAREŠ

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

Number: 01-720-1/93

Date: 28 October 1993

TO THE COMMANDER OF HVO
MILITARY POLICE
VAREŠ

I FORBID

Use of repressive measures, especially physical abuse and maltreatment of persons temporarily put in the isolation in the zone of responsibility of HVO "Bobovac" brigade.

Members of their families are free citizens of Vareš and should be treated that way.

During the investigations, visits to persons temporarily put in the isolation are not allowed, unless I give special permission.

KB/FP

Delivered to:

Addressee

A/a

BRIGADE COMMANDER
Krešimir BOŽIĆ
/stamped and signed/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
OG /Operations Group/ - 02 COMMAND, ZP SB /Central Bosnia Military District/
KISELJAK

D-15

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No: 10-4248-02/93
Date: 23 October 1993
Time: 0640 hrs

To: Bobovac Brigade in Vareš,
Mr. Krešo BOŽIĆ personally

I approve your proposal to carry out the operation in the area of Bogoš hill and the village of Stupni Do.

Reinforcements from Kiseljak should be absorbed immediately in the zone of responsibility of the unit on the location of Bogoš and Stupni Do. They are capable lads who can be trusted to carry out offensive operations. If the going gets tough, keep them at a sufficient distance along with your own people.

After the infantry attack, try to neutralise the agreed military targets by mortar fire.

Anything in the area of Bogoš hill and Stupni Do that can pose a threat to the units or the population in the Vareš Majdan area must be neutralised.

It is imperative to thwart the arrival of MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ reinforcements in this locality.

Proceed with caution. I have information that elite Muslim units are in that area, and that UNPROFOR gave them some weapons.

I will talk to XY for permission to come to your area in the course of the day.

Proceed with caution. Be clever.

OG-2 COMMANDER
Ivica RAJIĆ

/stamp: CROATIAN STATE ARCHIVES, ZAGREB/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 VITEZ MILITARY DISTRICT
 OPERATIVE GROUP 2 COMMAND, KISELJAK

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential Number:

Vareš, 23 October 1993

Information about combat activities in Vareš

- To the vice president of the HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/
Mr. Dario KORDIĆ
- To the chief of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Main Staff, Mostar
Major General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ
- To the commander of the Central Bosnia Military District, Vitez
Colonel Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ
- To the commander of the *Ban Josip Jelačić* Brigade
Mario BRADARA

After repeatedly attacking the area of responsibility of the *Bobovac* Brigade, MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ forces broke through at Liješnica and have now taken the elevations of elevations of Dragovičko Brdo /and/ Vis - Površje.

The next step of the MOS forces was planned from the direction of the Muslim village of Budoželje towards Stupni Do, where there were strong MOS forces, which would have enabled them to establish a Stupni Do - Perun - Mijakovičko Poljice line, thus putting their forces into a highly favourable position to cut off the forces of the 1st Battalion of the *Bobovac* Brigade, I made an assessment and in the morning hours I carried out an attack on Stupni Do and Bogoš. The Bogoš feature was taken by our forces, and about twenty armed members of MOS and some civilians remained in the village of Stupni Do, which was completely surrounded. A large number of members of MOS and some civilians were killed, while our losses were two killed and seven wounded, all of them in stable condition.

The town of Vareš has been mopped up and all Muslims of military age placed under surveillance.

Because they attempted to obstruct the planned activities, I have placed into isolation Messrs. Anto PEJČINOVIĆ, Zvonko DUŽNOVIĆ and Ivica GAVRAN. The brigade commander is seriously depressed and unable to perform his duties. I enclose a letter I received two days ago from Commander Emil HARAHA.

As of today, Vareš is Croatian and we shall fight to keep it that way - you must help me.

COMMANDER
 Ivica RAJIĆ

/stamp:/ CROATIAN STATE ARCHIVES
ZAGREB

/handwritten: 471/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
VITEZ MILITARY DISTRICT
COMMAND OF OPERATIVE GROUP 2, KISELJAK

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential Number: _____
Vareš, 23 October 1993

- To the Vice-President of HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosnia/ Mr. /underlined by hand/ Dario KORDIĆ /handwritten: Vitez/
- To the Chief of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Main Staff, Mostar Major General /underlined by hand/ Milivoj PETKOVIĆ /handwritten: illegible/
- To the commander of the Central Bosnia Military District, Vitez Colonel /underlined by hand/ Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ
- To the commander of the *Ban Josip Jelačić* Brigade Mario BRADARA /handwritten: illegible/

/incoming stamp/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
SECURITY AND INFORMATION SERVICE
MOSTAR

Received: 28 October 1993			
Organisational unit	Number	/illegible/	/illegible/
	5021		

After repeated attacks by MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ forces on the area of responsibility of the Bobovac Brigade, they broke through Liješnica and took the elevations of Dragovičko Brdo and Vis - Površje.

The next step of the MOS forces was planned from the direction of the Muslim village of Budoželje towards Stupni Do, where there were strong MOS forces, which would have enabled them to establish a Stupni Do - Perun -Mijakovičko Poljice line, thus putting their forces into a highly favourable position to cut off the forces of the 1st Battalion of the Bobovac Brigade. I made an assessment and in the morning hours I carried out an attack on Stupni Do and Bogoš. The Bogoš feature was taken by our forces, and about twenty armed members of MOS and some civilians remained in the village of Stupni Do, which was completely surrounded. A large number of members of MOS and some civilians were killed, while our losses were two killed and seven wounded, all of them in stable condition.

The town of Vareš has been mopped up and all Muslims of military age placed under surveillance.

Because they attempted to obstruct the planned activities, I have placed into isolation Messrs. /underlined by hand/ Anto PEJČINOVIĆ, Zvonko DUŽNOVIĆ and Ivica GAVRAN. The brigade commander is seriously depressed and unable to perform his duties. I enclose a letter I received two days ago from Commander Emil HARAHA.

As of today, Vareš is Croatian and we shall fight to keep it that way - you must help me.

COMMANDER

/underlined by hand:/ Ivica RAJIĆ

/handwritten:/

TO PETKOVIĆ

- DEAL WITH THE SITUATION IN VAREŠ WITHOUT MERCY TOWARDS ANYONE
- FIND MEN WHO ARE EQUAL TO THE TIMES AND THE TASK

/illegible stamp/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA /HR H-B/

MAIN STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE HR H-B

Number: 02-2/1-02-3147/93

IZM /Forward Command Post/ Čitluk, 23 October 1993

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Solution of problem in Vareš

TO:

- KISELJAK

Deputy Commander of the HVO /Croatian
Defence Council/ Main Staff

Major General M. PETKOVIĆ, personally
Commander of the *Ban Josip Jelačić* Brigade

M. BRADARA, personally

Commander of Operations Group-2

Ivica RAJIĆ, personally

-VITEZ

Vice-President of the HR H-B

Dario KORDIĆ, personally

Commander of the Central Bosnia Military District

Colonel Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ, personally

- Sort out the situation in Vareš showing no mercy towards anyone.

- Find people who are up to both the times and tasks.

COMMANDER OF THE HVO MAIN STAFF
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK

/a signature/

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
Croatian Defence Council
Vitez Military District

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Number: 01-10-487/93
Date: 23rd October 1993
Time: 19:00 hrs

URGENT!!!

- Commander of the Croatian Republic of
Herzeg-Bosnia Armed Forces Main Staff -
Čitluk

EXTRAORDINARY REPORT on the
situation in the Vitez Military District;
request and suggestions for further actions

1. Operative Group - Travnik

After the suffered losses and obvious failure, the enemy is rapidly regrouping its forces and resupplying with materiel and technical equipment (ammunition of all calibre and projectiles for artillery), and it particularly increased its propaganda activities and the activities of its sniper groups.

The Muslim Armed Forces are in a state of turmoil, especially in Zenica and Travnik, which results with frequent conflicts and fights. The aggressor is using all means in its attempts to take over the Vitez explosives factory, which is the reason why it also engaged the units that have "the assignment to by it off regardless of the price". The assignment of the Muslim forces is to obstruct all humanitarian convoys for the area of Lašva, and to prevent the evacuation of the wounded, as well as to initiate internal conflicts in the Croatian Defence Council.

In irregular intervals but mostly at night, the Muslim Armed Forces artillery fires on the towns of Vitez, Busovača, Novi Travnik and Nova Bila.

Today all intervention units of the Muslim Armed Forces are being assembled in the village of Trenica and in Novi Travnik with probable intention to sent them to the positions at Uskoplje or to continue offensive operations on the areas of Lašva, or both. It is noticeable that lately the Muslim Armed Forces suffer defeats against the Croatian Defence Council, therefore they will try to regroup on a larger scale and then try to achieve goals that would be secondary, in which case there is a possibility of a stronger offensive operation on a selected facility.

According to my estimate, that would be the explosives factory. Cooperation between the Muslim Armed Forces and the Army of the *Republika Srpska* is extremely good; even the meetings between the representatives of the political authorities of Travnik, Zenica, Donji Vakuf and Banja Luka had been held for the purpose of "normalisation of the relations".

The situation includes the possibility of expulsion of 20, 000 Croats from Zenica, who will be sent to us by the Muslim forces at the most critical moment.

OUR FORCES:

Persistent decisive defence continues with maximal saving of the materiel and technical equipment. We have stopped all our offensive operations and counter-attacks because of the uncertainty of supplying. We are intensively working to join all our forces and elements of defence.

So far we destroyed - put out of action four enemy tanks T-55 although our means for anti- armour combat are limited. Due to the intensity of the combat operations, so far our units suffered great losses; just the Croatian Defence Council Brigade "Viteška" had 286 killed and 728 wounded soldiers and civilians, among which there was a great number of commanders of battalions, companies and platoons (commanders of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th battalions were wounded, but they are still at the positions).

SUGGESTIONS:

1. The military age men of the Kakanj Brigade "Kotromanić" should be engaged into the organisational and formational structure of the Lašva Battalion which should be reorganised into the Lašva Brigade.
2. The problem of fuel for 95,000 to 100,000 Croats of the area of Lašva should be solved because we are forced to evacuate the wounded by carts. On 22nd October 1993, the Nova Bila hospital /verb missing/ 600 litres although 1,000 litres a week are required and we did not receive it from the UNHCR until 23rd October 1993 when 600 litres have been delivered /as stated/.
3. If it is possible, we ask that in the future you organise convoys of food that would be 50% for the Croats of the area of Lašva and 50% for the Muslims, because so far the convoys were mainly passing by us and they were not for this area. Colonel DANKAN /as written/ Commander of the UN British Battalion asked me at a meeting, "Why don't the Croatian Defence Council authorities organise a convoy for the Croats of the area of Lašva, which would be monitored and escorted by my troops".
4. Cigarettes: I ask that you deliver cigarettes or tobacco in sacks because it is more practical; so far we received around 410 kg of tobacco and 980 kg of cigarettes.
5. I know that there are a lot of problems with the organisation but helicopter overflights should be more regular especially with regard to the supplying of material and technical equipment - ammunition and projectiles as means for anti-armour combat. From 1st October 1993 until today, there were 4 (four) overflights including, 6th October, 13th October, 14th October, and 16th October 1993.

REQUESTS:

1. I request a highest level examination of the possibility that the Muslim Armed Forces in the *Bratstvo* factory in Novi Travnik are producing:

54 pieces Howitzer shells	152-mm
400 pieces of mortar shells	120-mm
500 pieces of mortar shells	82-mm
600 pieces of mortar shells	60-mm "Brando"

as our current positions vis-a-vis this facility are very favourable because we control the entrance and the exit, but with larger support and favourable development of the situation we should try to take over the entire facility. Of course, the precondition for this is material and technical equipment including intensification of offensive operations in the direction Uskoplje-Novı Travnik. I know that you are aware of the importance of this facility.

2. Today there was a swearing-in ceremony for the company of recruits, for which we have no weapons to spare, so I request that you comply with our earlier requests.
3. Due to the highland-terrain and lack of necessary infantry weaponry, I request that you provide and deliver between 25 and 30 M-84 machineguns.
4. I request a solution for the authorisations of the Security and Information Service and its place vis-a-vis the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Armed Forces.
5. I ask for reinforcements for the medical crew of the Nova Bila War Hospital.
6. It is necessary to provide 20-mm and 40-mm ammunition for the Anti-Aircraft Defence.

2. Operative Group - Kiseljak

The enemy carries out offensive combat operations mostly through Sabotage-Terrorist Groups with the intention to take control over certain tactical facilities as a precondition for larger offensive operations.

The enemy's main goal is to tie its forces in the direction of the communication between Lepenica and Brnjaci, Visoko and Fojnica- junction - Gomionica - Visoko, which would put Kiseljak into a tactical encirclement.

In Vareš, the Muslim Armed Forces are using the previously taken positions; indecisiveness of the brigade's command and the Croatian Defence Council representatives is manifested through allowing free movement to the members of the 2nd Corps of the Muslim Armed Forces and even to the high officers that observe the situation in Vareš, while units were brought to the 2nd Corps in the valley of the Krivaja River.

OUR FORCES:

Are actively engaged in persistent defence and organising of the Brigade "Kotromanić" according to the earlier plan.

All defence lines are stable and the emphasis is put on the making of the operative plan on active combat operations for the purpose of tying areas and troops of the Travnik Operative Group -1 and the Kiseljak Operative Group -2.

SUGGESTIONS:

1. The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Armed Forces Main Staff Forward Command Post should definitely remain in Kiseljak because besides the quality efficiency, it also has an enormous effect on the morale.
2. To persist on breaking through the corridor and tying Busovača and Kiseljak because that would solve our problem of the blockade of the Travnik Operative Group - 1 but it would also break the spine of the Muslim Armed Forces which would then be in a total blockade which would definitely ease off the pressure on Mostar and Uskoplje and break off the communications between the 3rd Corps and the 4th Corps of the Muslim Armed Forces as well as the communications with Konjic, the main supplier of ammunition.

Preconditions with regard to the manpower are fulfilled and it only remains to arrange with the XY side to provide the support; the enemy in that area is without experience in combat.

3. To speed up the delivery of the gunpowder for the special purpose production in the Grude Central Logistics Base.

REQUEST:

1. To provide the transportation from Kiseljak to Grude and from Grude to Nova Bila for the requested medical crew.
2. To consider the possibility of organising a food convoy for the Travnik Operative Group to Kiseljak, and then to insist that the UN provides transportation from Kiseljak to Vitez, which could be mediated by the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Main Staff Forward Command Post in Kiseljak.
3. I ask that appropriate help in materiel and technical equipment is provided to the Croats of Vareš.
4. I ask that in case of an attack by the 2nd Corps of the Muslim Armed Forces on the Croats of Vareš, the Tuzla 115th Brigade Zrinski is ordered to prevent the Muslim Armed Forces from a joint engagement.
5. I ask that the Command of the Brigade "Bobovac" be provided support while changing the personnel.

3. OPERATIVE GROUP - ŽEPČE

Through combined operation by the Sabotage-Terrorist Groups and the artillery, the enemy troops of the Muslim Armed Forces are trying to recover the lost positions and to take control of the right riverbank of the Bosna River, but so far they did not succeed in it.

The Muslim Armed Forces will decrease the intensity of offensive operations on the units of "the 111th Xp" /expansion unknown/ due to the threatening offensive by the forces of the Army of *Republika Srpska* that will try to tie Ozrengrad .. .aghaj) /as written/ with Sokolac through Zavidovići along the valley of the Krivaja River, through Vareš and Olovo.

OUR FORCES:

Are actively engaged in persistent defence and they took control over most of the dominant topographic objects in the area from the South-east to the West and to the North to Novi Šeher. Command and control in

the brigade is efficient, and the next actions include further tying of the Croatian areas around Zavidovići and securing the area of responsibility from Žepče to the West and to the South-east.

SUGGESTIONS:

1. I suggest that you do not allow any personnel changes in the Command of "the 111th Xp" /expansion unknown/ because so far Mr Ivo LOZANČIĆ distinguished himself and surely wields great authority.
2. I suggest that you send certain number of soldiers of the Kakanj Brigade "Kotromanić" to the area of the Žepče "111th Xp" /expansion unknown/ as reinforcements for further continuance of activities.
3. We should bear in mind the development of events after the Army of Republika Srpska takes over Maglaj because then Tešanj would be in total isolation and bigger part of the Muslim Armed Forces would increase the pressure on our units, especially in the direction of Zavidovići - right riverbank of the Bosna River to Zenica.

REQUESTS:

1. To continue reinforcing this brigade that is totally breaking the troops of the 3rd Corps of the Muslim Armed Forces in cooperation with the Operative Group -1.
2. To intensify the cooperation between "the 110th Brigade Usora" and "the 111th Xp" Žepče.

4. Operative Group - Sarajevo

1. The enemy:

The Muslim Armed Forces did not commence disarmament of the Brigade "Kralj Tvrtko" because this brigade holds a significant part of the front line against the Army of *Republika Srpska* while a larger number of the Muslim Armed Forces soldiers undisturbedly go out of Sarajevo over the Mt Igman to the battlefields of the Mostar Military District, Tomislavgrad Military District, and Vitez Military District. I believe that that is one of the main reasons why this brigade has not been attacked. The Muslim Armed Forces managed to infiltrate certain number of its agents into the ranks of this brigade, and they surely carry out orders by the Military Intelligence Service of the Muslim Armed Forces, which we are taking into account.

OUR FORCES:

The Vitez Military District is linked up with the Brigade "Kralj Tvrtko" through packet communications, and we have all communications through Kiseljak; the assignment of the brigade's command is to not allow the disarmament. Of course the problem is that there is a number of the Muslim Armed Forces agents infiltrated into the brigade, but for the time being it has no effect on the combat strength of the brigade although we are taking it into account and working to identify those individuals.

SUGGESTIONS:

To continue with the earlier engagement of this unit to expand the work by our Military Intelligence Service and because of the significance of the delivered information.

CONCLUSION:

The Muslim Armed Forces are definitely continuing their aggression on the territory of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and it is certain that our main assignment remains to carry out organised operations against the attacks by the aggressor. For the sake of 100,000 Croats in the area of Lašva, it is necessary to work fast on the replenishment of the material and technical equipment and to provide at least one food convoy, especially because the Muslims will surely try to send us the remaining Croats of Zenica now when we are short of everything, but we are prepared for that as well.

REQUEST:

1. We URGENTLY need a dialysis machine with all its equipment, which we requested in the request no. 27-01-247/93 dated 23rd October 1993.

The report on the assignments that I received from the Supreme Commander was sent under number: 01-10-290/93 on 13th October 1993; we are working fast on the assignment no. 3.

2. According to our intelligence information, the Muslims want to set up a field hospital in the Eastern Mostar because they believe that by doing so they would draw even bigger media attention and the attention of the world humanitarian and diplomatic organisations, and that would, as they say, "defend Mostar from Ustashes". I suggest that you give special attention with regard to this information.

4. I ask you Commander of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Armed Forces Main Staff to publicly commend parts of the Herzegovina brigades that fight in the areas of the Vitez Military District, particularly the "Bruno Bušić" and the "Ludvig Pavlović" regiments and the Anti-Terrorist Group "Tuta", because it would have a strong effect on the Muslims.

⑤ We should bear in mind this cooperation between the Serbs of Donji Vakuf and Banja Luka and the Muslims of Travnik and Zenica (trade, turnover, electricity, and other).

6. Commander of the Operative Group - 2 Mr Ivica RAJIĆ temporarily placed President of the Vareš Croatian Defence Council Mr Anto PEJANOVIĆ in isolation for obstructing offensive actions against the Muslim Armed Forces, so I ask for your support.

I relieved certain members of the Brigade "Bobovac" Command from their duty, particularly those that had been expecting the UN forces to defend them.

TB/KB /expansion unknown/

COMMANDER
Colonel Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ

Typed in three copies.

Delivered to:

1 x Adresse

1 x Operations and Training Organ

1 x ad acta

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
COMMAND OF THE "BAN JOSIP JELAČIĆ"
KISELJAK

Time: 04:00 hours
Date: 24 October 1993

Information on sending a request to the XY side

To: "BOBOVAC" BRIGADE
PONIKVE - VAREŠ
n/r /personally to/ Ivica RAJIĆ

In connection with your report number 06-2-OZ-SB of this night, I hereby inform you that I have sent a content-related request for /as stated, meaning: to/ gentlemen at the XY side, by a courier. I expect that they will react immediately, and I informed the officer on duty about the contents of this request, so that he can IMMEDIATELY start the preparation for the realisation of our requests.

Bog! /greeting/

P.S. We received an information from Major-General Slobodan PRALJAK, stating that continuous active operations are executed in the last three days in the Gornji Vakuf area, and that we occupied Brenovac, Oglavak and part of Bistrice, and that we move along, as well as an order for Vareš: "The situation in Vareš has to be resolved showing no mercy to any one. Find men able to cope with the moment and the assignments."

ZB/LJL

Submit to:
- addressee
- ONO /Operations and Training Organ/

Operative /officer/ on duty
Zorinko BOŠNJAK

/headed paper/

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
 TRAVNIK POLICE ADMINISTRATION - IZM /Forward Command Post/ KISELJAK

Number: 03-9-073/93

Date: 25 October 1993

To:
 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
 MOSTAR,
 n/r /personally to/ Branko KVESIĆ,
 Department Head
 - /in handwriting/ Colonel Dario KORDIĆ

Subject: Putting of Ivica GAVRAN, Commander of the Vareš PS /Police Station/,
 in isolation

By authorisation from Major-General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ, Commander of the HVO Main Staff, that the situation in Vareš has to be resolved showing no mercy to any one, Ivica RAJIĆ, Commander of the II OG OZ SB /2nd Operative Group, Operative Zone Central Bosnia/ put Ivica GAVRAN, Commander of the Vareš Police Station, in isolation on 24 October 1993. Ivica RAJIĆ informed, in writing, the Travnik Police Administration, IZM Kiseljak, about this event, and requested start-up of proceedings for relieving Ivica GAVRAN of duty.

Mladen TOLO, Deputy Head of the Travnik Police Administration, informed Dražen /illegible name/, officer on duty in the Mostar Department of the Interior, about the above mentioned event; and then /Mladen TOLO/ reported to the II OG OZ SB Command, /illegible one word/ Vareš and PS Vareš in writing that Jozo ĆORLUKA, assistant to the Commander of the police in uniforms /as stated/ in the Vareš PS shall be assigned the duty of the acting Commander of the Vareš PS.

Ivica GAVRAN is in isolation in Kiseljak, and military security services will undertake an investigation. You will be informed about the outcome of this investigation upon its completion.

With respect.-

Attached: Document number 03-9-072/93
 Letter from the Zap. /Commander/ of the II OG OZ SB

Deputy Commander of the Travnik PU
 Mladen TOLO
 /signed and stamped/

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
OG-2 /Operations Group/ OZ SB /Central Bosnia Operations Zone/ COMMAND
VAREŠ

Vareš, 24 October 1993

Information on action undertaken to strengthen security

To: KISELJAK
Chief of Travnik PU /Political Administration/
- Mladen TOLO

As authorised by the Commander of the GS HVO /Main Staff of the Croatian Defence Council/ Major General Slobodan PRALJAK in order to bring order to the situation in Vareš without mercy for anyone, for reasons you are aware of I have placed both Ivica GAVRAN and Zvonko DUŽNOVIĆ in isolation.

I will be transferring them to Kiseljak during the day so that they can be processed. Institute proceedings to have Ivica GAVRAN relieved of duty for these reasons.

COMMANDER
Ivica RAJIĆ

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 COMMAND OF THE OPERATIONS GROUP 2 - KISELJAK

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 01-704-21/93
 Vareš, 25 October 1993
 Time: 2230

- FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE "BOBOVAC" BRIGADE COMMANDER -
 - FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE VAREŠ HVO -
 - FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE POLICE STATION COMMANDER -
 - FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE VAREŠ MILITARY POLICE COMMANDER -

On the basis of the order of the HVO General Staff Commander of the HR H-B /Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia/, reg. number: 02-2/1-02-314/93 dated 23 October 1993, I am issuing an:

ORDER

- ①. All the structures of civilian authorities are to operate under war circumstances and are to serve all aspects of defence. Their operations are to be adjusted to the requests of the HVO "Bobovac" brigade commander.
- ②. All material goods and manpower in the zone of responsibility of the HVO "Bobovac" Brigade are to be used for the purpose of defence.
3. No one can leave Vareš without the written permission of the HVO "Bobovac" Brigade Commander, nor can anyone enter Vareš.
4. Any contact with UNPROFOR, EZ /European Community/ observers or media is to be made with the approval of the brigade commander or person authorised by him.
5. Any contact with the military or political representatives of the BiH Army or the Army of the Republika Srpska is to be made with the approval of the brigade commander or person authorised by him.
6. All powers as regards detained and imprisoned are in the jurisdiction of the brigade commander, or a person authorised by him.

KB/OA

/seal/: REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY
 HERZEG-BOSNIA
 VAREŠ
 "BOBOVAC" BRIGADE
 DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

COMMANDER OF THE OG-2/OPERATIONS GROUP/
 /signature/
 Ivica RAJIĆ

cc:
 1 Addressee
 1 File

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG – BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 HVO /CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL/ HEADQUARTERS
 IZM /FORWARD COMMAND POST/ K I S E L J A K

D-24

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/coat of arms/ No. GS-1-25/93

Issued: 25 October 1993

URGENT

Situation in Vareš and
 further steps

Brigade "Bobovac" – Vareš
 - Attn. Ivica Rajić
 - Brigade commander

1. Provide me until 09.00 hours with the real information about Stupni Do - the number of killed soldiers of the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ - the number of killed civilians
2. What is the nature of the problems with UNPROFOR.
3. As of tomorrow, irrespective of the consequences allow UN into Stupni Do (get it into your mind – the more we drag our feet on this the worse for us).
4. Avoid any conflict with the UN.
5. I also expect information on the readiness to implement point 3.

To:

Addressee x 1

Files x 1

HVO HEADQUARTERS
 Major general
 Milivoj Petković
 /signed/

/stamped: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

D-25

Number: 184

25 October 1993

Given the disinformation published in the Muslim media concerning an alleged massacre of civilians in Stupni Do village, Vareš municipality, the command of Operations Group 2, Central Bosnia operations zone, has released a statement which reads:

"During the night of 23-24 October 1993 all civilians of Muslim ethnicity from Stupni Do village withdrew towards the Muslim village of Budoželje. The accuracy of this information can be checked by members of the UN because access to Stupni Do village by military observers is permitted".

/handwritten: HVO Main Staff/

/stamp:/ Croatian State Archive, Zagreb

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/
 COMMAND OF THE OG-2 /OPERATIVE GROUP/ OZ SB /CENTRAL BOSNIA
 OPERATIVE ZONE/
 KISELJAK

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Vareš, 25 October 1993

Report on the events in Stupni Do, to:

Chief of the GS /Main Staff/ HVO
 Commander of the ZP /Military District/ SB Vitez

I express my doubts regarding the authenticity of the recordings presented as allegedly being of Stupni Do. The first entrance into the village was allowed today to a team of military observers led by Colonel MARTIN, in my presence. No bodies were found because the area had been cleaned up. I do not know how the said recordings could have been made. It was only today that I had the opportunity to visit the village and it can be objectively said that it is completely destroyed because of the fierce nature of battles fought there. The village of Stupni Do is at the foot of /illegible/ elevation point which dominates the entrance to Vareš, and which was fully fortified for combat operations in town. I will order for the facility with engineer fortifications to be filmed and delivered to the HTV /Croatian Television/ including the remnants of the village in order to compare them to the alleged recordings that they have. Battles were fought from house to house, from room to room. MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ troops in the village were reinforced and according to their plan the village had to remain theirs as it was their basis for entering Vareš. The operation was stopped when the surviving MOS troops and some civilians, whose numbers we do not know, remained in a few houses with very difficult access.

Security for the village during the night in question was provided by local soldiers who left enough space on purpose so that the civilians and some MOS troops would get out although they did not receive the order for this. I presume that they have done it out of fear and that they were themselves shocked by the fierceness of the clash. In any case, during the mopping up of the village the following morning they did not find anyone. A group of civilians of Muslim nationality were received by UNPROFOR on the rail track in Pajtov Han. There were about 150 of them on 25 October 1993. I do not know any other details because the participants and eyewitnesses do not wish to talk about it for understandable reasons. There is a possibility that a certain number of those killed burned in houses that caught fire during the clashes but this is highly debatable. UNPROFOR members have not been allowed access until today because of the danger of MOS troops using their entrance into the village to return to the village as they have already taken the village of Kopjari thanks to them /UNPROFOR/.

Commander
 Ivica RAJIĆ

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ECV Name of Organ	2M
Received telegram no.	1921
Date	26 October 1993 at 0755 hours
Radio connection	
Processed by:	/signature/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
OG-2 OZ CB COMMAND
VAREŠ

DEFENSE
MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET

Vareš, October 25th, 1993

HVO GS /main staff/ MOSTAR

Information on situation in the village
Stupni Do, submits,

Village Stupni Do is controlled by HVO units and there are no civilians in the village, Muslim civilians have fled during the night of 23rd/24th October 1993 to Muslim village Budoželje.

Members of the UN can verify the accuracy of this information since military observers are allowed to access Stupni Do.

COMMANDER
Ivica Rajić

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
BRIGADE COMMAND
BAN JOSIP JELAČIĆ
- K I S E L J A K -

DEFENSE
MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET

Number: GS-3123-1/93
Date, October 25th, 1993

Information

GS /main staff/ HVO ČITLUK
Att. Gen. Praljak

1. I request information regarding the evacuation of MOS's wounded members from Mostar. We need to evacuate 60 wounded (for now) from N. Bila, I am afraid that there will be major problems with this evacuation, especially when you consider that none was made from Mostar. Due to heavy casualties from N. Bila please make the best valid decision.

2. VITEZ: occupancy of MTS is critical, is there any chance for helicopters.

VAREŠ: The situation stabilizes, I do not know if the locals are able to receive defense without assistance from Kiseljak. Men power from Kiseljak will have to withdraw in 2-3 days. Planned actions on the territory of Kiseljak municipality will have to be dropped for now (men power in Vareš, and MTS from "XY" despite solid promises not arriving).

It is necessary to keep the convoy from Vareš in the area of Herzegovina, they are not interested in ammunition but in food for resale to Muslims in Tuzla. Perform informational interviews with those responsible for the convoy.

UN: Has a request for transfer of 45 tons of explosives from the Sarajevo airport and about 25,000 detonators, supposedly to build a road in the area of Kakanj. I'm afraid that this is for Muslims, Serbs have not given them transport permission. In Kiseljak will be in touch with Serbs, so if they give them transport permission it will be blocked on our side.

In Vareš, UN was driven away by fire from our forces, I'm trying to modify the situation.

ŽEPČE: You know that the Lozančić resigned due to a conflict with the Regiment "B. Bušić" I have sent him a letter of support and requested that he reassumes his position. Please do the same.

Major General
Milivoj Petković

/stamped: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

NUMBER: 189

26 October 1993

Given repeated news reports in the Muslim media, as well as reports from some foreign agencies about an alleged massacre in Stupni Do village, the Command of Operations Group /handwritten: 2/ of the Central Bosnia Military District has presented the following facts:

- On 18 October 1993 the Muslim army made an unprovoked attack on Kopjari village and the Pliješ and Liješnica sectors in Vareš municipality, using large infantry forces and powerful artillery support.
- Following the capture of Kopjari village, from where the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ did not permit the evacuation of seriously wounded members of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/, a large number of Muslim soldiers concentrated in Stupni Do village intending to go on to attack the town of Vareš. (Stupni Do is at the foot of the Bogoš elevation, which dominates the entrance to the town of Vareš and had been thoroughly fortified for operations against the town).
- HVO units were compelled to organise a defence of the town and prevent the Muslim army from entering, and for this reason a fierce battle developed in Stupni Do village. The HVO operation was halted after some of the Muslim soldiers entered houses in which there were civilians. The report by the Command of the Operations Group of the Central Bosnia Military District continues:

“The village was secured by local commanders, who intentionally left a space for civilians and a few members of the MOS to withdraw.”

“No civilians were found the following morning, but UNPROFOR took charge of a group of 150 of them in the Pajtov Han area.”
- A team of UN Military Observers led by Colonel MARTIN was permitted to enter Stupni Do village.

HVO MAIN STAFF

/stamped: Croatian State Archives Zagreb/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL /HVO/
 HVO MAIN STAFF
 KISELJAK IZM /Forward Command Post/

No: GS-3149-1/93

Date: 26 October 1993

Implementation of investigative
 procedure

- personally to the commander of OG-2 /2nd
 Operative Group/ ZP SB /Central Bosnia
 Military District/, Mr. Ivica RAJIĆ
- personally to the commander of the *Bobovac*
 Brigade, Vareš, Mr. Emil HARAHA

On 3 October 1993 an armed conflict took place in Vareš municipality between HVO units and members of BH Army units (MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/). In combat operations HVO units took control of the village of Stupni Do.

A powerful media campaign is being waged on BH radio and television against Vareš and Kakanj HVO units.

They are being accused of abusing the civilian population, torching family homes and businesses and thus attempts are being made to tarnish the reputation of HVO units.

In order to establish the real situation in existence both during and after combat operations in the area of Stupni Do village, and pursuant to Article 59 of the Rules of Military Discipline (*Official Gazette of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia*, no. 6/92), I hereby

O R D E R

1. Conduct a complete investigation into the aforesaid event, and in particular:
 - a) which units and which commanders participated in combat tasks,
 - b) in what way was the area of Stupni Do village taken,
 - c) how was the civilian population of Stupni Do village treated, if there were any civilians found in the area,
 - d) what state were residential and business buildings found in, and what was done with them after the area was taken,
 - e) did any HVO members behave in contravention to regulations, tarnishing the reputation of HVO units, and if there was such behaviour, the perpetrators should be identified.
- ② In the course of the investigation, without fail involve the competent organs and work constantly with them until light has been shed on all the circumstances that arose after the village of Stupni Do was taken.
3. After the completion of the investigation, send me a written report and the full documentation on the investigation, as well as the findings of the competent organs, by 15 November 1993 at the latest.
- ④ The above commanders shall be directly responsible to me for the implementation of this order.

HVO DEPUTY COMMANDER
 Major General
 Milivoj PETKOVIĆ
 /signed and stamped/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 OZ SB /Central Bosnia Operations Zone/
 OG-2 /Operations Group 2/ COMMAND
 VAREŠ

/stamped: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Vareš, 26 October 1993

Information, and response to enquiry
 about the situation in Vareš

To: HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ MAIN STAFF
 Major General
 Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

1. I submitted my information concerning the true situation in Stupni Do to the Chief of the HVO GS /Main Staff/ without mentioning the number of casualties, because it is not objectively possible to determine it precisely. The majority of victims were burnt in the houses because the fighting progressed from house to house, area to area. According to the statement of the commanders who led the operation, and you are acquainted with them, something like 25 to 30 Balijas /derogatory term for Muslims/ died, and the number of civilians is a little less, between 20 and 25.
2. The problems with UNPROFOR started when members of the Nordic Battalion /as printed/ wanted to enter the village at the time the operation had not yet been completed and, among other things, protect the armed Muslims who did not want to surrender. We attach an intercepted radio message, between members of the MOS /Muslim armed forces/ and their commander, so that you may judge for yourself. That was the way that, with UNPROFOR's assistance, they burnt Kopjari village too. UNPROFOR forces closed the routes through the town with transporters on several occasions, preventing brigade vehicles from communicating normally, and they had transporters stationed in several places, which at night flashed signals towards the Muslim villages from which an attack might be expected, and they sent up flares, so that we had to give them a sharp warning not to do so.
3. Since yesterday, 25 October 1993, there has been free access to Stupni Do village with no problems, and I myself made the first tour of inspection with Colonel MARTIN of the UN Military Observers Mission.

While writing you this text I received information that UNPROFOR has given shelter to some civilians who are slowly coming down to the road out of the woods around Stupni Do. I have made a start on determining the precise number of civilians who will be evacuated in order to refute the negative report of an alleged massacre.

COMMANDER
 Ivica RAJIĆ

ATTACHMENT: MOS radio communications message intercepted 23 October 1993.

/original all capitals/

Frequency	Time	Parties
42,150 MHz	1620 hours	<i>Delfin-Kobra2 /Dolphin-Cobra2/</i>

- Organise yourselves. Do not let them capture you, during the night we shall make a corridor by which to withdraw.

- I know that you are surrounded, but explain to the men, try to get them into the bunkers., we have done everything possible to get UNPROFOR to evacuate the inhabitants, try to use their presence to enter the village, but we shall do it via our channel, you have to hold out. I know that it is critical, you must not surrender. Part of the job is already done, we'll speak again in half an hour.

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 COMMAND OF OPERATIVE GROUP 2
 CENTRAL BOSNIA OPERATIVE ZONE
 VAREŠ

/stamp: CROATIAN STATE ARCHIVES, ZAGREB/

MILITARY SECRET
 CONFIDENTIAL
 /handwritten: illegible/

Vareš, 26 October 1993

Urgent information about the conduct of
 members of UNPROFOR

HVO /CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL/ MAIN
 STAFF, MOSTAR
 To Major General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

The members of the Nordic battalion are carrying out forced evacuation of the Muslim population from Vareš, not allowing even routine checks of the composition and number of persons being taken out, which can be very dangerous, because clearing of the town can create the prerequisites for unimpeded fire on the town.

Please send us instructions urgently because an open conflict could easily break out.

For the sake of the truth about these events and to prevent the possibility of infiltration of MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ sabotage-terrorist groups, agree with them on routine checks and inform us of this.

COMMANDER
 Ivica RAJIĆ

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Package at att. of Gen. Petković

General Petković is with you, and has received instruction, take all necessary measures – let General Petković make arrangements with UN on how to proceed.

Commander of HVO GS /Main Staff/
 General Major
 Slobodan Praljak

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
MAIN STAFF

Ref. No. 02-2/1-01-3176

FORWARD COMMAND POST ČITLUK, 25 October 1993

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

VAREŠ

We have received a confirmation by the HTV /Croatian TV/ saying they have footage of the massacre in Stupni
Do which they had received through exchange with foreign agencies.

In order to take a correct stance, I am demanding the truth about this event so that the HVO Main Staff could
take the proper position.

NGS /HEAD OF THE MAIN STAFF/

/Seal/

/illegible stamp/

Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Croatian Republic of Herzeg - Bosnia /HRHB/
 Command of the OG - 2 /operations group/
 SB /Independent Battalion/
 - KISELJAK -

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No: 10-3242-1/93
 Date: 31 October 1993

Report on developments
 in Vareš

To: President of the HRHB GRUDE
 Mr. Mate BOBAN

Mr. President!

With regard to developments in Vareš, it is my duty to inform you of the following: Without any immediate cause, the MOS /Muslim Defence Forces/ forces launched an attack on the defence line of Vareš, they took possession of the dominant features Liješnica and Pliješ, inflicting losses on HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ troops. The Croatian village of Kopijari was ethnically cleansed, and after that, their full presence was achieved in the Muslim villages of Mijakovići and Dragovići, deep in the territory towards the town of Vareš. The political and military leadership of Vareš adopted a benevolent attitude towards this MOS activity without undertaking concrete measures in order to prevent the Muslims from entering Vareš. While all this was happening, hundreds of able-bodied Muslims stayed in and moved freely about the town of Vareš. A large number of them were members of the self-same units which participated in the attack on the Croatian parts of Vareš. This put Vareš in a state of silent occupation. The entry of the Muslim forces into Vareš was planned via the Croatian village of Mir which was the only obstacle on the way to the Muslim village of Stupni Do and the Bogoš trig point, which dominates the town and which the Muslims had fortified and prepared for the attack on Vareš. You will receive video footage of the fortifications in Stupni Do village and at the Bogoš trig point as soon as the crew of the Kiseljak war television station, who were sent there, return from the field. In order to prevent the unhindered entry of MOS forces into Vareš, the village of Stupni Do had to be cleared and a large number of able-bodied Muslims in the town had to be put under surveillance, regardless of the consequences. The existing military and political leadership of Vareš was not prepared to do that - although the majority of soldiers and the command staff considered this to be the only proper way to overcome their inferior position vis-a-vis the Muslims. The operation was carried out by the special purpose units *Maturice* and *Apostoli*, and their commanders Dominko ILIJAŠEVIĆ and Marinko JURIŠIĆ, respectively. The operation itself was headed by Marinko LJOLJO, in command of all the special purpose units, with my personal assistance, as is usually the case in more difficult operations. The MOS forces in Stupni Do village had been reinforced, which is corroborated by the fact that two of our best soldiers were killed and ten were wounded in the operation. The fierceness of the conflict has left the situation in Stupni Do as you already know it, as a direct consequence of the death and wounding of our soldiers. In all practical terms, no influence could be brought to bear on this situation during the operation. As for the activities of some people in Vareš immediately prior to it, information on this can be found in the letter of the Brigade Commander, Emil HARAHA, which I received immediately before my departure for Vareš.

Enclosed herein, please find the original text of the letter:

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
Croatian Defence Council
Vitez Operations Zone
Bobovac Brigade of the Vareš HVO
Ponikve - Vareš ZM /command post/
No: 01-613-51/93
Date: 22 October 1993

TO: Commander of the Kiseljak OG-2
Att. Mr. Ivica RAJIĆ

Dear Commander!

I have been thinking long and hard about approaching you directly regarding my status, position and the role of I play within the command and control system of the HVO, within the perspective of overall events in political and military life in the Vareš municipality HVO.

Due to constant pressure by the HVO Presidency, most of my decisions in the organisation of defence, and commanding and controlling the Brigade have been contrary to my views and those of my associates. That is why I have found myself in a difficult mental state as a result of the consequences that arose from that. Among all the mistakes that I made, my removal of the Chief-of-Staff, Borivoj MALBAŠIĆ, which was done under extreme pressure, has to be my gravest mistake, and also fatal as regards my future personal status. In my current psychological state, I am not able to accept the responsibility and burden of such a serious task as defence in the area of responsibility.

Bearing in mind that a large part of the vital defence elements are under the control of presidency members, and that I have almost no insight into that, this would be a tall order even if my psychological state were stable.

Bearing all this in mind, I ask for your assistance whatever the shape and form you decide, so as to prevent a possible disastrous outcome of the current negative developments on the frontline.

Commander, I ask for your understanding, because due to my severe mental state my current command and control capabilities make me unfit to deal with the situation at hand, and as for the constant accusations against me and the command staff that come from certain members of the HV Presidency, whose political decisions had a lot to do with that, I consider them to be inhuman and unfair!

BRIGADE COMMANDER

Emil HARAHA

Also, here enclosed please find the original text of the report that was sent to me by the Deputy Chief of the Travnik PU, Mr. Mladen TOLO, after his visit to Vareš on 19 October 1993:

Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
 Croatian Defence Council
 Department of Internal Affairs
 Travnik Police Administration
 Kiseljak IZM /Forward Command Post/
 No: 03-9-63/93
 Date: 19 October 1993

To: COMMAND OF THE 2nd OG OZ SB /Central Bosnia
 Operations Zone/
 Att. Ivica RAJIĆ

INFORMATION

Through intelligence work on the ground as well as through intelligence contacts, we have come by certain interesting information relative to the area of Vareš municipality, which consists of the following:

At the entry checkpoint in Daštansko village, a Herceg-Bosna flag has been put up and the point is manned by HVO members. On the municipality building are the flags of Herceg-Bosna and the "lilies".

The President of the Vareš HVO, Mr. Ante PEJČINOVIĆ, the SIS /Security and Information Service/ commander, Zvonko DUŽNOVIĆ, the Brigade Commander, Emil HARAHA, the PS Commander, Ivica GAVRAN and the Commander of the 1st Battalion, have usurped all the power, to the dissatisfaction of the soldiers and population there. Rumour has it that the President of the Vareš HVO ceded six tons of sugar to the Tuzla region in return for which he got a new Mercedes 200 D. Two key positions in the HVO government are occupied by Muslims, one in the healthcare and social welfare department, and the other in education. Cooperation between the MOS and the HVO in town is at an "enviable" level. This cooperation is particularly strong in the smuggling of goods which are in short supply on the market (cigarettes, coffee, drinks, etc.) Representatives of the HVO government in Vareš hold weekly meetings with representatives of the 2nd Corps of the BH Army. The 2nd Corps Commander and Security officer stay in the *Ponikve* hotel, for five days at a time, and move freely about the municipality.

During negotiations between the HVO and the 2nd Corps, representatives of the 2nd Corps mostly ask for fuel and food from the HVO. According to some information, convoys which arrive in Vareš from Herzegovina, stop at the sports ground in Ponikve, where lorries from Tuzla wait for them ready to reload the goods. According to estimates two thirds of the goods are transported to Tuzla, and one third stays to meet the needs of Vareš. Currently four trucks of fuel are waiting to be reloaded and to go to Tuzla; allegedly this fuel is destined for the 115th Zrinski Brigade in Tuzla.

In the town of Vareš itself, shops are badly supplied, most are closed, despite the convoys which arrive from Herzegovina. The difficult situation for the entire population, and especially refugees. Coupons have been introduced for the population (of Croat and Muslim ethnicity) which entitle them to a discount when they purchase goods, so that they pay 750 HRD /Croatian Dinars/ for a loaf of bread. At the same time, refugees, who are not entitled to coupons, pay one German Mark for a loaf of bread. It has been noticed that Muslims from Banovići come to Vareš and buy ten or more loaves of bread at a time, as well as other food items, and take them to Banovići.

Such things are conducive to the large-scale smuggling of goods which takes place between HV and MOS soldiers.

The private company *JAHIĆ* supplies all kinds of goods to the population of Vareš and provides services to the refugee population when it comes to receipt of money and delivery of mail. They charge a 10% commission for money transactions and 10 Marks for every letter delivered.

The RH Government is being kept abreast of the situation in Vareš by means of regular reports, which mostly describe the situation as being normal and under HVO control, which, for the most part, does not reflect the real situation because these reports are censored by the Vareš leadership before they are despatched.

Deputy Chief of the Travnik PU
 Mladen TOLO

Mr. President,

After this information, we could not proceed without doing something. As a soldier, I was most embittered by the information that some people took it upon themselves to release about 2000 able-bodied men from Kakanj, who were in the territory of Vareš, and that this was done without any authorisation. Despite the fact that the instruction by Major General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ, an order by Colonel Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ and my order were in place, and that according to those, this was not to be allowed, the political leadership of Vareš made a decision and transported all of these people to Herzegovina. The proof of that is in the report that was delivered to me on 19 October 1993 by the Commander of the Bobovac Brigade, Mr. Emil HARAHA. The original text of the report is follows:

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
Croatian Defence Council
Central Bosnia Assembly Area
Bobovac HVO Brigade Vareš
Ponikve - Vareš ZM

No: 01-686-4/93

Date: 19 October 1993

Time: 1630 hours

Report following your inquiry
about the situation in the area of responsibility

Command of the Kiseljak OG-2
To: Commander Ivica RAJIĆ, personally

1. In the combat that took place yesterday, we lost the defence line in the Liješnica sector, despite our efforts to return it, as you have already been informed. This is what I decided upon my arrival on the scene and having inspected the overall situation, in order to stop further unnecessary losses. The defence line was immediately consolidated at the reserve positions in the following sectors: Slavin, Planinica and Greda elevation 1172.
In the course of the day yesterday, on the Kopijari - Pliješ - Založnik defence line, strong mortar and infantry attacks were successfully repelled, and the defence line is being consolidated and reinforced.
The situation on all the lines facing the 2nd Corps forces is unchanged, without clashes, movements or provocations.
2. Your order not to have male military conscripts put on a convoy has not been observed. They were all sent to Herzegovina.
I was merely informed of that on my return from the combat sector, the decision on the release of able-bodied men having been made by the political leadership of the Vareš HVO in my absence.
3. Please, push for the 7.9 ammunition to be returned to us at Brgule as urgently as possible. The situation with regard to this ammunition, as well as with hand grenades, rifle grenades, 20/3 ammunition for PAT /anti-aircraft gun/, and mines for 120mm and 6 mm mortars is critical.
4. We shall keep you abreast of all other details.

BRIGADE COMMANDER
Emil HARAHA

Mr. President, this development hit me as hard as if it were the surrender of Vareš. It is impossible to protect the entire area of Vareš municipality with only the troops of the Bobovac Brigade. The gentlemen from Vareš waved goodbye to the two thousand military conscripts who could have replaced troops of the Bobovac Brigade who are exhausted after having spent so many days on the frontline, and no sooner than the following day they asked for troops to reinforce the defence of Vareš. Currently, there are 250 members of the *Ban Josip Jelačić* Brigade in Vareš trying to salvage what can be salvaged. At the very beginning of the conflict with the MOS forces, the Commander of the Bobovac Brigade filed a request to be removed from his post, the content of which I hereby send to you in its original form:

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
VITEZ MILITARY DISTRICT
BOBOVAC HVO BRIGADE VAREŠ
PONIKVE - VAREŠ ZM

No: 01-706-1/93

Date: 24 October 1993

Request for the relief from duty of the
Brigade Commander

To: Commander of the OG-2 KISELJAK
To: Mr. Ivica RAJIĆ, personally

As a result of my mental state described in my personal letter sent to you on 22 October 1993 and the consequences of the developments over the past two days, I am now totally shattered. I kindly ask you to relieve me from my position of Brigade Commander since the huge psychological and physical strain that I am suffering could lead to disastrous consequences for the defence system in the area of responsibility of the Bobovac Brigade.

I suggest that the command of the Bobovac Brigade should be taken over by Krešimir BOŽIĆ, the chief of ONP /operations and training/ in the Brigade Staff.

My status, assignment and future engagement as per your assessment and decision.

EH/FP

Typed in two copies and

Sent to:

1 x Addressee

1 x Archives

BRIGADE COMMANDER
Emil HARAHA

All activities and operations which have been carried out in Vareš are in keeping with instructions issued by Colonel Tihomir BLAŠKIĆ, Deputy Commander of the GS HVO /Main Staff of the Croatian Defence Council/, Major General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ and Commander of the GS HVO, Major General Slobodan PRALJAK.

Mr. President, after a serious conversation in Kiseljak, messrs. Ante PEJČINOVIĆ, Zvonko DUŽNOVIĆ and Ivica GAVRAN were returned to Vareš with concrete instructions on the activities to be carried out there in order to prevent Vareš from becoming a new Kakanj or Fojnica. I am still not sure that we will manage to preserve Vareš, but I am sure that we are doing our utmost to defend it, and some have already given their lives for that.

COMMANDER
Ivica RAJIĆ

/stamp: Croatian State Archives, Zagreb/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA /HZ HB/
COMMAND OF THE CENTRAL BOSNIA MILITARY DISTRICT
OPERATIVE GROUP-2

- Kiseljak -

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No: 10-3362-1/93

Date: 8 November 1993

Report on events in Stupni Do

General Staff of the Mostar Croatian Defence Council /HVO/
Čitluk Forward Command Post
Major General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

With respect to your telegram of 8 November 1993, no. 02-2/1-01-3379/93, we wish to inform you that the most of the investigation procedure has been completed, in view of the fact that pursuant to your order of 26 October 1993, 15 November 1993 is the deadline for drawing up and submitting a report with the complete documentation. Abiding by the fundamental investigative principles that the investigation procedure be carried out in a thorough and methodical manner, my efforts thus far in investigating and determining the relevant facts regarding events in Stupni Do of 23 and 24 October 1993 were aimed in several directions, described below. All organs which could contribute to shedding light on the Stupni Do case were activated. They are to submit reports and the requested information about their work in this field if they are available. Military judicial organs (the Travnik District Military Prosecutor's Office - the Deputy District Military Prosecutor in Kiseljak and the Travnik District Military Court - Kiseljak Criminal Chamber) are to become involved in the work and if there are elements to raise the issue of criminal liability, they should take the appropriate legal action in that field. On the basis of the intelligence work of the Information and Security Service of the *Ban Josip Jelačić* Brigade of Kiseljak, all material traces, that is to say, evidence of importance to determine the truth about Stupni Do are to be gathered and preserved. The local information media are to provide adequate coverage of the case and contribute to obstructing the campaign which is being waged in the mass media by the Government and BH Army (Muslim Armed Forces) in a malicious and tendentious manner. As a result of all these activities, a report is to be submitted by the envisaged deadline. In applying the methodology of the investigation procedure to draw up a report, we have the following sources of information at our disposal: the personal information obtained by the author of this report, the report of the Information and Security Service and Information and Propaganda of the *Ban Josip Jelačić* Brigade, the statements of the direct participants, that is to say the commanders of the units which participated in combat operations around Stupni Do, the statements of eyewitnesses (the residents of Vareš Municipality and the village of Mir), the reports of military judicial organs active in the area of the municipalities of Kiseljak, Kreševo and Fojnica, videos - original cassettes at the disposal of Kiseljak War Television, filmed by Mladen MOLINAR, and the documentation at the disposal of the Command of the *Ban Josip Jelačić* Brigade (combat reports, communications and other). The above sources of information are entirely authentic.

On the basis of the above sources of information, the following may be noted: Lately (before Stupni Do), Muslim Armed Forces increasingly concentrated on the neighbouring hills above Vareš. The concentration of forces is the most pronounced in the sectors of Budoželja and Striježevo which according to their geographic position represent the greatest threat to the town of Vareš. These two villages are directly connected with the periphery of Vareš through the village of Stupni Do. On the basis of reconnaissance, it was well-known that the village of Stupni Do dominates the town of Vareš (which can be seen in the video cassette), while

strong fortifications were observed around the village and in the village itself. The fortifications consisted of constructed dugouts with three layers of logs on them and large layers of soil. Artificial shelters consisting of sandbags and logs and other shelter facilities were located on the family houses of the inhabitants of the village. Our scouts observed, within the framework of their possibilities, daily changes in the village. The fortifications were set up around two months ago when the government of the Vareš HVO issued an ultimatum that the village of Stupni Do hand over its weapons to the Vareš *Bobovac* Brigade. /The residents/ refused and brought to the village a unit of around 200 members of the special forces of the BH Army. Since that period and up to the conflict in this village, the presence of BH Army units from other areas was observed in the village. All this, as well as the fact that BH Army units ethnically cleansed and torched the Croatian village of Kopjare pointed to the suspicion that Vareš could soon be attacked from the direction of the village of Stupni Do. When they occupied the village of Kopjari, the Muslim forces maintained normal communication with the villages of Dragovići and Mijakovići and occupied the dominant features of Liješnica and Pliješ. This heightened suspicions about their intentions even further. The only obstacle on this road whereby all the villages in these parts held by the Muslims were linked up was the Croatian village of Mir located between the village of Stupni Do and Budoželje. The houses of Mir village are fairly dispersed with a small number of inhabitants and the probability existed that the Muslim forces would commit genocide against these civilians. As regards the policy conducted by the Vareš HVO Presidency, it could be concluded that all affairs and activities were conducted by the civilian authorities, while the Vareš *Bobovac* Brigade played a very limited or almost no part in all of this. The leaders of Vareš tried to create a commercial town and conducted all their affairs, and primarily trade /with/ the Muslims of the Tuzla sector and they pursued their own personal interest. In the mass of transactions with the Muslims, the equipping of the Vareš *Bobovac* Brigade and care for displaced persons from Kakanj, Zenica and other villages was neglected. At one point there were around 4,000 able-bodied men in Vareš and they endeavoured, through their actions, to get rid of them from the municipality as soon as possible, rather than to involve them in the defence of these parts. Likewise, one must not forget the fact that anyone could enter Vareš. There were many cases of individual members of the BH Army living in Vareš with their families and they went every day or every week to military training or operations which the Army planned. All Muslims from Vareš lived a normal life and went about the village. In addition, it happened on several occasions that the Military Police captured members of special units of the BH Army who were then quickly released so as not to disturb relations with the Muslims.

On the basis of the above and the information which the Commander of the Vareš *Bobovac* Brigade, Emil HARAHA, sent to the Commander of operative group 2, Ivica RAJIĆ, specific actions had to be taken in order to prevent the entire area of Vareš Municipality and its inhabitants from being captured by the BH Army and turned against the Croats. The defence of surrounding areas was organised with the troops and equipment available, but since the enemy concentrated far greater forces, our lines were moved to our detriment. Since the probability existed that the town of Vareš could be attacked from the direction of the village of Stupni Do, on 23 October 1993 the *Maturice* and *Apostoli* special units were sent to Vareš, as was a part of a manoeuvre unit including a total of around 250 troops. On the same day, a detailed attack plan by HVO units was drawn up in the Command of the Vareš *Bobovac* Brigade.

The plan envisaged seizing the dominant features around the village of Stupni Do, held by the Muslims. The coordinator for the execution of this operation was the commander of the special units, Marinko LJOLJO. Domink ILIJAŠEVIĆ, Commander of the *Maturice* special unit, with a reinforced platoon of 45 men, was given the task of attempting to take, over the V. Kamen elevation, Bogoš hill which is 267 metres above sea level, dominates both the village of Stupni Do and the town of Vareš and has strategic importance for our positions because the Muslims were well fortified in this area.

Slavko ANTIĆ was given the task to seize with a platoon of 17 soldiers the line on the V. Kamen - village of Mir sector and to cut off the withdrawal route and prevent the arrival of reinforcements from the direction of the village of Budoželje. The *Apostoli* special units which were on that day headed by Marinko KEPIĆ and a part of the *Maturice* special units headed by Miroslav ANIĆ were given the task of taking the lines in the Bijelo Borje sector in the direction of the village of Stupni Do. The execution of the operation and the taking of starting positions commenced that same day at 0900 hours. According to plan, the taking of the starting positions was carried out without any problems. The units headed by KEPIĆ, ANIĆ and ANTIĆ did not engage in any attack operations while ILIJAŠEVIĆ encountered the fierce resistance of the Muslim Armed Forces after moving the starting positions. Forming a skirmish line, they set out to take Bogoš hill. On this

occasion they used personal weapons, and primarily automatic rifles, several PM-84 heavy machine-guns, rifle launched grenades and hand grenades. While this operation was under way, support was extended by 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns, anti-aircraft machine guns and heavy machine guns.

The enemy primarily used in his defence small arms along with the strong support of 80 and 60 mm mortars from the village of Stupni Do. The fighting to take Bogoš lasted three hours, when the unit headed by ILIJAŠEVIĆ captured this strategic elevation in its entirety. When the elevation was taken all units which had participated set off in the direction of Stupni Do. They encountered strong fire from all kinds of weapons from the direction of the village of Stupni Do and from fortifications built around the village. The fighting lasted until 16,30 hours when our forces approached the entry to the village. On this occasion we had two dead and seven wounded. When the attack operations by our forces ceased, the defence lines were taken in anticipation of the following day. During the combat operations, several family houses were set on fire in the village with incendiary ammunition used by our troops in order to drive out members of the Muslim Armed Forces from the houses who desperately fired at our units, primarily using fragmentation ammunition, rifle launched grenades, hand grenades and mortars. On these defence lines the following night passed primarily with strong acts of provocation. On 24 October 1993, it was agreed to continue with the interrupted operation with a view to completely capturing the village of Stupni Do. At around 0900 hours, operations were again commenced to take the town. Our forces and members were deployed in the same manner as on the preceding day and they set off, encircling the village from three sides, while one part was open towards the village of Budoželje. Strong resistance was extended from all houses that had not been damaged. In addition to the soldiers, women could be seen firing from a number of family homes. The advance to take the village went slowly. Upon entering the village, one house after another was taken with a great deal of trouble. A number of civilians were captured and confined in the cellars of family homes. Around 25 women and children who during the operation opened fire and then headed towards the forest in the direction of Budoželje and were not fired on because they were civilians were held in the cellar of a house. During the operation, on several occasions soldiers or the women themselves activated explosive devices so they would not fall into the hands of HVO units alive. Likewise, there were cases when women and children who abandoned family houses and set off towards an open space in the direction of Budoželje set the houses on fire so that our units would not take them.

The operation to completely capture the village of Stupni Do lasted until approximately 1200 hours when it was terminated. When the operation was over, a large number of automatic weapons, 80 and 60 mm mortars and a 62 mm mortar which only UN forces have were discovered in the village, which proves that the UN supplied them with weapons and ammunition.

By analysing the evidence presented, the following conclusions can undoubtedly be reached:

- The Stupni Do operation was necessary and justified from a military and strategic standpoint;
- In putting the Stupni Do plan into operation, only permissible combat equipment was used (small arms, rifle launched grenades, hand grenades, anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft machine guns);
- The system of command and control, based on the principle of subordination, was for the most part abided by. Individual unit members (Zoran FILIPOVIĆ - the *Maturice* special unit and Franjo BOKULIĆ - the *Apostoli* special unit, exceeded the instructions and orders of their commanders, firing at civilians located in houses. However, it is necessary to say that in the course of the night, when the operation was halted, a free area was left so that civilians could withdraw with several members of the Muslim Armed Forces, concerning which an order had not been issued;
- A number of civilians whom our forces came across in the village, while combat was underway, were temporarily taken to cellars. After the operation was over, their withdrawal in the direction of the positions held by the forces of the BH Army was made possible;
- Since the village of Stupni Do represented a veritable fortress, combat operations were waged with maximum ferocity. It is necessary to bear in mind that our positions and our unit members were fired on from houses and that as a result our soldiers also used incendiary ammunition, so that most of the houses in the village burned down;
- A number of houses were set on fire by the BH Army and the civilians themselves when they abandoned them. This especially pertains to newer homes which were better furnished;

- It is evident that a number of civilians were killed, which was for the most part the direct consequence of combat but also the fact that some civilians (especially women) actively participated in defending the village, while some of the civilians were killed as a result of ill-considered conduct by certain members of our units (Zoran FILIPOVIĆ and Franjo BOKULIĆ);
- Up to 7 November 1993, not a single criminal report was received by the Kiseljak District Military Prosecutor's Office in connection with the events in Stupni Do. No investigation was initiated in criminal proceedings against a member of the units which took part in the operation;
- In order to elaborate a complete synthesis, it would be necessary to use the information obtained by the Command of the *Bobovac* Brigade. This information has not been obtained yet because a platoon from the village of Mir participated in the operation (a Home Guard platoon-strength unit) which closed off the route before the village of Mir, in the direction of which part of the civilian population and BH Army forces were withdrawing towards the (Muslim) village of Budoželje;
- The initiation of criminal proceedings against specific individuals can be expected when the competent organs analyse the cases and gather all material evidence, whereupon criminal reports may be filed with the Military Prosecutor who has asked that operative work in this field be expedited;
- The investigation procedure has not been terminated. It is still underway and is impeded by combat operations in the given area, so that new information can be expected.

ZD/MB

To:

- Addressee
- Information and Security Service
- Files

COMMANDER OF OPERATIVE GROUP-2
Colonel
Ivica RAJIĆ /signed/

UNION OF REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA

D-36

HVO MAIN STAFF

Number: 02-2/1-01-3370/93

IZM (Detached Command Post) Čitluk, 8 November 1993

DEFENCE

MILITARY SECRET

TOP SECRET

OG-2 (Operative Group) Kiseljak
Mr. Rajić

Request for urgent Report of OG-2
Kiseljak concerning Stupni Do

Send me urgently a brief report for Stupni Do pursuant to my Order.

Submit the names of two persons for initiating investigative procedure (one is Krešimir Božić).

HVO MAIN STAFF

Major-General

Milivoj Petković

Signed by Slobodan Praljak (for)

/stamped:

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosnia

Defence Department

Main Staff

Mostar

2/

/stamp:/ Croatian State Archive Zagreb

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 COMMAND OF THE 2nd OPERATIONS GROUP
 OF THE CENTRAL BOSNIA MILITARY DISTRICT
 - KISELJAK -

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Number: 10-3466-1/93
 Date: 15 November 1993

Report on the events in Stupni Do

Main Staff of the Mostar HVO /Croatian Defence Council/
 Čitluk Forward Command Post
 Major General Milivoj PETKOVIĆ

REFERENCE: Your order no. GS-3149-1/93 of 26 October 1993

I was instructed by the above order to conduct a thorough investigation into the events that occurred in Stupni Do, Vareš Municipality, on 23 and 24 October 1993. The deadline for the execution of your order was 15 November 1993. Following your order, I hereby inform you as follows:

In response to your communication no. 02-2/1-01-3379/93 of 8 November 1993, we sent you a report on the results of the investigation into events in the village of Stupni Do. In the report, we presented the methodology applied, the source of the information collected during the investigation and the facts that had been established. In the report, we also said that we were continuing the investigation and would send you any new information we might obtain. We maintain that there is no need to repeat what we stated in the report. Instead, we want to let you know that we directly contacted the Deputy District Military Prosecutor in Vareš, Ivan KRISTIĆ. On the basis of his report we, among other things, obtained new bits of information. The Deputy District Military Prosecutor's report shows that, after the media had reported that a war crime against civilians had been committed in the village of Stupni Do, he took appropriate measures within his competence. He wrote to the Commander of the Bobovac Brigade in Vareš as well as to the Commanders of the Vareš Military Police and the Civilian Police, inquiring whether units of the said Brigade or any other military units in the Brigade's area of responsibility had perpetrated any crimes from 23 October 1993 to the day when the request was submitted. By 15 November 1993, he had received no reports or criminal reports against possible perpetrators of crimes from the aforementioned organs, but he did find out that all these organs had begun collecting data. This can be objectively justified by the fact that this municipality was occupied on 3 November 1993 following a fierce offensive by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his report, the Deputy District Military Prosecutor also said that he had not received any official information, but unofficially, he learned that several days before the conflict in Stupni Do, most of the Muslim civilians had been evacuated. The evacuation was partially carried out via the Croat-populated village of Mir. It was mostly special units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were positioned in the village. They were well-fortified in houses and dugouts with their gun barrels directed towards Vareš. It is interesting to mention that during the fighting, the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina that were in the village asked their immediate Command for permission to withdraw or surrender to HVO units, which their Command categorically rejected. Therefore, there are indications that these units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and even some civilians who had remained in the village were in a way sacrificed to justify the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina's aggression on Vareš town. At the same time, the HVO was portrayed in a negative

light in the international community. The Deputy District Military Prosecutor also said that this was all he could objectively do in this case because the said village was again occupied by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 2 November 1993.

Obviously, the investigation in this case has not been completed primarily due to objective reasons. Further investigation into this case is made impossible by war operations in Vareš Municipality and particularly by the fact that the Bobovac Brigade has withdrawn from Vareš town and is now positioned in a narrow stretch of land. Some documents and files of the Bobovac Brigade, especially documents that the military and civilian police had in their possession, have been destroyed, which makes the investigation more difficult and slows it down. However, the most important thing is that all the relevant circumstances have been established, as was requested in your order. According to this report, it has been established which units participated in the execution of military tasks, how the area of Stupni Do was captured, how the civilian population was treated and in what condition the houses and buildings were. It was also established that there had been instances of irregular conduct by members of the HVO unit and the perpetrators had been identified. In this context, it is necessary to continue to shed light on all the circumstances surrounding the events in Stupni Do, while organs authorised and responsible for the detection and prosecution of perpetrators of crimes should take appropriate action, of which you will be timely informed.

The original documents which served as the basis for the compilation of the said reports are in the Command of the *Ban Josip Jelačić* Brigade in Kiseljak.

TO:

1 x Addressee

1 x Security and Information Service

1 x Files

COMMANDER OF THE 2nd OPERATIONS GROUP

Colonel

Ivica RAJIĆ

/signed/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL OF VAREŠ MUNICIPALITY
 Number: 301/93
Vareš, 09. 11. 1993.

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To:
 - Commander of the 2nd OG /Operative Group/, Kiseljak
 Attn. Mr Ivica RAJIĆ, Colonel

Following your order no: 06-3367-01/93 of 09. 11. 1993. I hereby make the following

DECISION

1. The following are appointed to the commission that will take part in transferring cash money of Vareš Municipality HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ through the territory of Republika Srpska:
 - Mr Ivan KRISTIĆ, son of Tadija, Deputy Travnik District Military Prosecutor, identification card no. 157/93 issued by Vareš Police Station; and
 - Mr Alojz FRANJIĆ, son of Marijan, Inspector in Vareš Police Station, identification card no. 314/89 issued by Vareš SUP /Secretariat of the Interior/.
2. Members of the Commission with the assistance of the Addressee have to deposit cash money of Vareš Municipality HVO on separate bank account in the territory of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ for the needs of the expelled populace of Vareš.
3. Members of the Commission from Item 1 of this Decision are authorized to open an account in an authorized bank in the RH and deposit cash money in the name of Vareš Municipality HVO.

President of
 Vareš Municipality HVO
 Anto PEJČINOVIĆ

cc

1. Addressee
2. Mr Mato BOBAN, President of the HR HB /Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia/
3. Finance Office of the HR HB
4. Commander of the HVO Brigade "Bobovac", Vareš
5. Members of the Commission
6. File

UNION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATION REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA
BRIGADE "BAN JOSIP JELAČIĆ" COMMAND

KISELJAK

/handwritten: act as proposed, issue written order on my behalf/
/signed, illegible/

/coat of arms/

On 8th of November 1993

Subject; cash funds of HVO Vareš, report to be delivered

Re; your act number 10-3327-1/93, dated 7th of November 1993

Referring to your above numbered act and cited date, I notify you that I found the President of HVO Vareš, Anto Pejčinović in place called Daštansko, Vareš municipality on 7th of November 1993, around 1600 hours and that I had a conversation with him regarding the circumstances of transferring the cash funds of HVO Vareš over the Republika Srpska to Kiseljak.

During this informative interview, Mr. Pejčinović accepted the cooperation, related to these activities. Immediately after the interview, he formed a commission to count the monetary funds, being deposited in two locations. According to Pejčinović's statement, one part of the funds has been pulled out from the premises of SDK Vareš, whereas the other one from the HVO Vareš cashier. The commission started with its work around 1800 hours and terminated it around 2000 hours. After the cash funds have been counted, it has been fortified that HVO Vareš disposed with 851 000 DM and 534 970 ATS. After it has been counted, the money has been re-deposited on the safe spot, whereby these premises got safeguarded.

Mr. Anto Pejčinović, as well as other members of the commission, stated that they were absolutely interested in transferring money to the safe location, precisely to Kiseljak, and afterwards to the Republic of Croatia, where the community of Vareš inhabitants already exists, being interested in reaching an agreement regarding the money deposit in the bank and further control of the above cited money. At this occasion, they emphasized that someone of authorized persons from HVO Vareš, authorized by them, would participate in money transfer, to be more precise, all money funds should be under their control. I responded to their demands affirmatively.

After all events in the area of Vareš municipality, including the city defeat, as well as the defeat of the significant part of the municipal area, the population of Vareš lost major part of their assets, whereby some individuals lost everything they were in possession of.

Therefore, they are rather sceptic towards the idea of keeping the current positions and return to /illegible/, which raises suspicion towards further control of cash funds, being to them, as they state, everything they have.

I propose therefore, that the money transfer, as well as its deposit, shall be executed by the commission of HVO Vareš, bearing at the same time all responsibility and possible illegalities that might occur.

ZN/MG

To be delivered to:

- Attn
- SIS

/handwritten 3367/

DEFENCE

MILITARY SECRET

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To Commander of OG-2

Attn. Colonel Ivica Rajić

Assistant commander for SIS brigades

Ivica Marjanović

/signed/

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA
 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
 SECURITY-INFORMATION SERVICE
 MANAGEMENT

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Operational number; 02-08-1-2338/95
 In Mostar, on 20th April 1995

OFFICIAL NOTE

Subject: misappropriation of the cash funds, in possession of HVO Vareš, findings

On 7th November 1993, Commander of OG, Colonel Ivica Rajić authorized the Assistant for SIS brigade, "Ban Josip Jelačić" to conduct an interview with the President of HVO Vareš, Ante Pejčinović, related to obtaining information on condition of money funds in the cashier of HVO Vareš. On the same day, Ivica Marjanović left to the place Daštansko, Vareš municipality and found the President of Vareš municipality, Ante Pejčinović around 1600 hours; at this occasion he had an interview with the above cited, regarding the circumstances of transferring the cash funds of HVO Vareš to Kiseljak. The commission established that the amount of 851 000 DM and 534 970 ATS was present in the cashier, where afterwards, the money has been deposited to the safe location, being safeguarded.

The money transfer has been executed afterwards, in 3-4 days, most probably on 13 or 14 November 1993.

We suggest that it would be necessary to conduct an interview with all persons, being involved in monetary funds of the HVO Vareš extraction, in order to establish what happened with the cited money.

Please find enclosed:

- Authorization number 10-3327-1/93, dated 17th November 1993,
- Report of Ivica Marjanović, Commander of OG-2 Kiseljak to Ivica Rajić, dated 8th November 1993.
- Decision on appointment of Commission, President of HVO Vareš, Mr. Ante Pejčinović, attn to Commander of OG-Kiseljak, Colonel Ivica Rajić, number 301/93, dated 9th November 1993.

Order by Colonel Ivica Rajić to the President of HVO Vareš, Ante Pejčinović, number 06-3367-01/93, dated 3rd November 1993.

Notification by Colonel Ivica Rajić to the President of HVO Vareš, Ante Pejčinović number 06-3377-1/93, dated 10th November 1993.

UNION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
 BRIGADE "BAN JOSIP JELAČIĆ" COMMAND
 KISELJAK

DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Number: 06-3367-01/93
 On 9th November 1993

To the President of HVO Vareš
 Attn. Mr. Anto Pejčinović

Pursuant to emerged needs, as well as your requests on dislocation of cash funds of HVO Vareš I issue the

ORDER

1. You are obliged to form a commission, composed of two members that would participate in dislocation of cash funds of HVO Vareš.
2. You are obliged to deliver the general data for the commission members in order to enable the above cited to pass through the territory of the Republika Srpska.
3. The commission members shall bear responsibility in case of illegalities that might occur during above cited funds treatment.
4. The deadline for the execution of the above cited is 10th of November 1993. Mr. Anto Pejčinović is personally responsible to me, referring to execution of this Order.

To be delivered to:

1. President of the HVO Vareš
2. SIS of the brigade
3. Files

Commander of OG-2
 Colonel Ivica Rajić

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
 MAIN STAFF OF HVO
 Operational number: 02-2/1-01-3282/93
 Mostar, 3 November 1993

UNPROFOR
 SPABAT-Međugorje

Subject: Request

The severe offensive of the Muslim forces to Croatian areas in Vareš and its vicinity has been going on for days. In several occasions we tried to solve the problems by agreement, however, we failed.

Since MOS concentrated extremely powerful forces in this area, our units are not able to defend 20000 civilians approximately. Currently, there is a fight in surrounding in the area of 5 km².

We request the pulling out of innocent civilian population through UNPROFOR.

We have data that the massacre of civilians already started in villages Tribija, Vijac, Borovice, Pogar and Ivančica.

For the above cited crimes in villages, there is already panic and disorganization among inhabitants and units, therefore we ask that the UN forces intervene as soon as possible, in order to prevent further massacre and enable pulling out of surrounded inhabitants from the area of combat actions.

MAIN STAFF OF HVO
 Major General
 Slobodan Praljak
 /signed and stamped/

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
MAIN STAFF OF HVO
Operational number: 02-2/1-01-3309/93
Mostar, 4 November 1993

D-43

UNPROFOR
SPABAT-Međugorje
To the UN Commander
Kiseljak

Subject: request

Pursuant to request of GS HVO, no 02-2/1-01-3284/93, dated 3 November 1993, concerning the protection and pulling out the civilians in the area of Vareš, we kindly request to submit the report, as being done so far.

We emphasize that the severe offensive of Muslim forces has been carried out for days to the Croatian enclave of Vareš, therefore it is necessary to do everything in order to protect the innocent civilians.

MAIN STAFF OF HVO
Major General
Slobodan Praljak
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG BOSNIA
 CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
 DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT FOR HEALTHCARE

Number: 02-5/1-672/93

Mostar, November 4th 1993

Government of the Croatian Republic HB

PLAN FOR MEDICAL SECURITY FOR REFUGEES FROM VAREŠ

Afore mentioned convoy to medically secure with two ambulance vehicles, two doctors and two medical technicians (one of nurses is delivery nurse). One vehicle is driving on the end of the convoy and the other one is in front. Each vehicle must be capable for rendering full scale medical aid (oxygen equipment, medications, bandage materials, infusions, and stabilization material).

1. Preventive medical measures
 - Ban intake of water during the evacuation.
 - Drinking water to be sanitary processed (water-supply of the city of Mostar) and to be transported in canisters which were sanitary processed before.
 - Each vehicle must have one canister of drinking water.
 - Strictly ban intake of food during evacuation.
 - Give a task to commissary service to supply necessary quantity of fresh food.
 - Food to be distributed to vehicles or during the stops.
 - Through commissary service to secure enough warm covers.
 - Determine places for stops according to evacuation plan and during stops perform distribution of food, warm beverages, water and possible rendering of medical aid.
 - Because of weather conditions, exhaustion of people and the length of the trip, provide one camp kitchen.
2. Care for sick and wounded
 - During the evacuation, when the convoy stops, in cases of emergency immediately offer full scale of general medical aid, for which are afore mentioned medical teams equipped.
 - In case of the need for specialist aid, sick and wounded are to be evacuated to medical centers along the route of the evacuation.
3. Necessary medical material resources and vehicles procure from HVO war hospital Mostar.
4. Each vehicle must have one Motorola*.

Assistant to HR H-B Minister of defense
 for healthcare sector
 Brigadier Dr. Ivan Bagarić
 /Signature/

/Round seal/

*Motorola - most common communication device used during the war in BiH made by Motorola. Not a cell phone.

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA

HVO GENERAL HQ
Office No. 02-2/1-01-3350/93
Mostar, 6 November 1993

UNPROFOR
COMMANDER OF THE HEADQUARTERS
A. I. RAMSAY

Dear General Ramsay,

Many thanks to UNPROFOR and in particular to you for your having taken an active part in the case of Vareš.

We hope that you are convinced of the persecution of the Croats by the Moslems which began long ago in Konjic and was continued in Kakanj, Zenica, Bugojno, Fojnica, etc.

We shall do our best to find out the committers of what happened in Stupni Do. After such incidents there is always a certain number of people who will return the same sort of ill treatment, which can be attributed neither to soldiers, nor police, nor the people.

I hope that you will show more objectivity in observing all very difficult events.


Concerning the Moslem helicopters, I ask you once more, as I have already asked General Briquemont, to understand that it is the least of a military problem, that you could not expect from me to resolve it, but we have done laterally everything by being flexible towards the Moslem side in order to arrange the prisoners' exchange and thus enable the evacuation of the Moslem wounded by helicopters to Zenica. We hope it will be done, as planned, tomorrow, Sunday, 7 November 1993.

Respectfully,


HVO GENERAL HQ
General
Slobodan Praljak

SITUATION IN VAREŠ ON 10 NOVEMBER 1993


MAP-I



SLIGHTLY IMPROVED UNPROFOR MAP OF SUMMER 1993



A BiH (MUSLIM ARMY) ATTACK ON VAREŠ (HVO) BEGINS ON 18 OCTOBER 1993



- VRS
- A BiH
- HVO

/stamp: illegible/

MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET

On the basis of the latest developments in relation to the behavior HVO units and in accordance with the command K-de 7.M. BR. /Command of the 7TH Mountain Brigade/ I g i v e

A T T A C K O R D E R

1. At the Battalion direction of attack, enemy defends in strength one battalion (300) man power in the following arrangement:

- one troop in region of v. Čukle
- one troop in Novo selo region
- one troop in reserve in Grahovčići

So far the following fire points have been observed:

- 3 pits at Crni Vrh
- MB and Bat actions from direction of Ušice attacks
- 4 pits from Ušice to Šušanj
- minefield in front of the above mentioned 4 pits

2. Our battalion from expected region of village Vrselje attacks in direction:

S. Vrselje – Crni Vrh – Ušice – Čukle – Brajkovići – Rebrovac – Šušanj – Novo Selo – Plavčići, grouping main part of forces and equipment (II squad and guerrilla) in direction v. Vrselje – Crni vrh – Ušice – Čukle – Brajkovići, and smaller part of forces and equipment (I squad) in direction Vrselje – Rebrovac – Šušanj – Novo Selo, in order to take village Čukle and Novo Selo as a closer mission target, and to take villages Brajkovići and Plavčići as a further mission target.

Observation post of Battalion's commander is located in the village Vrselje.

- I. squad attack on midnight direction Vrselje – Rebrovac – Šušanj – Novo selo – Plavčići with a mission goal to participate with the guerrilla group in actions from the side take enemy positions on Crni Vrh, Ušice and v. Čukle as a closer mission target, and to take v. Brajkovići as a further mission target.

Guerrilla group attacks in the main part of forces with II squad in the main direction with the mission goal to open passage in the line of the enemy defense /illegible/ stronger fortifications in the line of attack: Crni Vrh – Ušice – v. Čukle - /illegible/

- Battalion Kakanj moves in direction of the majority of attack force (guerrilla groups and II squads) in readiness for the introduction to combat action.

- Battalion fire group consisting of 3 MB 82mm and 60mm 4 MB occupies the main launching site at elevation 668 north of the village Rebrovac with the mission to:

- open fire on specified targets and in accordance with requirements and needs
- Squad POLO occupies launching site on Crni Vrh and at commander's signal opens fire on armored vehicles and heavy firing points in the direction of the attack

3. Logistic support: Equipping the units with 100 bullets per soldier, and guerrilla group with 1.5 combat kit and provide units with 3 SDO.

- Sanitation support: provide each soldier with I bandages, each troop with litters, ambulance.
- COMMUNICATION: Establish a communication line between the units according to the preliminary orders dated June 3rd, 1993, issue work plans, communication system readiness at 02:00 on June 7th, 1993
- Transportation section: Order necessary number of buses and vehicles for the mission.
- Security support: Give maximum attention to preparation of B/D /combat operations/, transportation of soldiers and attacks. When using a radio device use the document for crypto protection.

ATTACK READINESS AT 3:00 HOURS ON JUNE 07th, 1993

Delivered to:

- 1 x commander of 3. Battalion Kakanj
- 1 x commander of I squad
- 1 x commander of II squad
- 1 x commander of Guerrilla group
- 1 x commander of POLO
- 1 x commander of Accompanying troop
- 1 x deputy commander of logistics
- 1 x Communication section
- 1 x Medical service officer
- 1 x Transportation section officer of the II Battalion
- 1 x A/A

2. Battalion commander
/stamp and signature illegible/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE OS RBH
 /Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
 Strictly confidential No. 02/1016-1
Sarajevo, 21 August 1993

/handwritten and circled: 31/
 DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE COMMAND OF THE 3rd CORPS

Re: Your strictly confidential letter No. 02/33-1913 dated 16 August 1993

After reviewing all the relevant facts presented in the analysis and assessment of the possibility of switching to an offensive in the general area of Vareš that we received, here is our opinion:

1. We agree with your proposals for mounting limited offensive operations against the Liješnica feature and the Jezero (tt. /trig. point/ 1459) - Borovica village axis.
2. Targets to be easily engaged are artillery VP /firing positions/ and 120mm and 80mm MB /mortars/ in the general area of the village of Borovica. This should be the aim when infiltrating through the village of Mahorići.
3. It is possible to engage our forces from the sectors of Dragovići and Mijanovići villages in capturing the Pliješ feature (tt. 1153), whereby we would unblock the road between Kraljeva Sutjeska and Mehović village.

In the above-mentioned report, you did not provide information about the situation in the Rostovo and Sebešić sectors. We need this information **urgently**.

ACTING ON BEHALF OF COMMANDER
 DEPUTY COMMANDER
 Stjepan ŠIBER
 /signed and stamped/

HG/JA

Dispatched on 21 August 1993 at 1710 hours

a signature/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BiH
 6th CORPS COMMAND OG /Operations Group/ EAST

No: 01/4-2016
Visoko, 23 October 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Breza SJB /Public Security Station/
 Art: OG - Breza IKM /Forward Command Post/

In view of the deteriorating situation in the area of responsibility of the Vareš OpŠO /Municipal Defence Staff/, escalating b/d /combat operations/, especially in the Stupni Do village area, which has been under fierce combined artillery and infantry attacks by the Ustashas since early morning and is entirely surrounded, and in order to help and break the blockade of the village of Stupni Do, I hereby

ORDER:

- ① The Breza MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ Intervention Unit shall be kept at the ready to engage in combat along the axis under attack, pursuant to Breza IKM Commander's decision.
2. When introducing the unit /into combat/, take all /necessary/ security and self-protection measures.
3. The Breza MUP Commander or the Chief and Commander of the Breza OG East IKM shall be responsible to me for the implementation of this order.

ONLY UNITED CAN WE PERVAİL!

SD/ /?ŠS/

COMMANDER
 Abdulah AHMIĆ
 /signed/

(c) VLM /expansion unknown/
 TIME: 1538 hrs
 DATE OUT: 23 October 1993
 PROCESSED BY: /handwritten:/ ŠEHOVIĆ
 FILE: BZDDNAUA
 C: ĐPGPĐBZDDNAUA.TXT

APR 25 '93 23:25 38 72 712903

P.2

ENCLOSURE:

Zenica,

October 24th, 1413 (* time according to Islamic calendar)

To whom it may concern:

We hereby inform you that all hostages - "HVO" officers are alive and in order to release them we request IMMEDIATELY RELEASE of all prisoners - foreign nationals from HVO prison in Busovača.

It should be noted that on more than one occasion we have - through your agencies and other responsible organizations - wanted to release them, but we didn't receive any answer. Therefore, we are left with no other choice but to kidnap your leaders - officers in order to exchange them. We waited too long giving opportunity to these organizations to liberate our Brothers without any bloodshed.

Be warned that in case that our Brothers are not released, we will kill all the hostages, and as for our Brothers from foreign countries, for your information - they know their way to God because they know that they will die as Martyrs on the path to Allah and that's all.

We also warn you that such an operation will never be the "last", on the contrary, it will only be the beginning of serious Jihad operations and actions of Martyrs that we will be able to accomplish with the help of Allah, to whom we return and to whom everything is subordinated.

Last but not least, you and all the other organizations will be responsible for the death of hostages and prisoners.

(* signature in Arabic)

P.S. This document was received from the deputy commander of the 3rd BH Army Corps, Mr. Đemo Merdan, representatives of the Joint Operation Center of the Army of BH and HVO and handed to Mr. Zvonko Vuković, also a member of the same center.

THE ACCURACY OF THE COPY IS CERTIFIED BY:

OZ SB INFORMATION OFFICE

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/stamp:/
7th MUSLIM BRIGADE
Strictly confidential no. 1120-11/93
7 November 1993

In order to prepare for the upcoming combat preparations in the best possible manner, and organise the leave of soldiers and officers after the combat operations in the area of Vareš municipality, I hereby

ORDER

1. Officers such as company commanders /komandiri/ and battalion commanders /komandanti/ shall be on leave until 0800 hours on Tuesday 9 November 1993, and other soldiers until 1800 hours on Wednesday 10 November 1993.
- ② Only the troops that have participated in the operations on the Vareš municipality front shall go on leave.
3. The troops from the area of Vareš municipality shall remain and go home after the receipt of reports of units from the waiting area.
- ④ After arriving at the base, the soldiers shall go home; use the following days to distribute the soldiers' war booty.
5. Before going on leave, the soldiers shall duly return all the weapons and MTS /equipment and material/ to the brigade and battalion warehouses.
6. Before the soldiers go on leave, make sure to analyse the past combat operations with them.
7. I appoint the commanders /komandante/ and commanders /komandire/ of independent units to be responsible for a full implementation of this order.

COMMANDER
Amir KUBURA
/signed and stamped/

To:

Commander of the 7th Mbbr /Motorised Mountain Brigade/ x 1
NŠ /Chief of Staff/ x 1
Battalion commanders x 3
Files x 1

/Handwritten numbers: see original/
 REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF
 THE OS /Armed Forces/ OF THE RBiH /Republic of BiH/
 SARAJEVO

/illegible handwriting/
 DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly Confidential Number: 02/1202-1
 Sarajevo, 1 November 1993

URGENT !!!

3rd CORPS COMMAND

The Command of the 2nd Corps turned to the ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ of the OS /Armed Forces/ with a request that the forces of the 3rd Corps be engaged in carrying out our order strictly confidential number 02/1192-1 of 26 October 1993. Carrying out the above order, the forces of the 2nd Corps took the Kozja Glavica feature (8 km north of Vareš) and are continuing combat activities with the aim of converging with the forces of the 3rd Corps. In order to carry out coordinated combat activities and converge the units of the 2nd and 3rd Corps on the line assigned as soon as possible, I hereby

ORDER

- ① Units of the 3rd Corps selected for the offensive against the Ustaša forces in Vareš, shall be IMMEDIATELY engaged on the assigned axes and converge with the forces of the 2nd Corps in the area of the Kozja Glavica feature as soon as possible.
 - ② The two Corps commanders (2nd and 3rd Corps) have agreed on how to do this in the spirit of our order strictly confidential number 02/1192-1 of 26 October 1993.
3. To carry out this task successfully, coordinate action with the Commander of the 2nd Corps at the site and time of action of your own units.

ZS/DH

COMMANDER
 OF THE SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE OS R BiH
 Rasim DELIĆ

/Handwritten:/
 Sent
 3 November 1993
 at 2154 hours

/a signature/

/handwritten:/ Braco
 O/illegible/P /expansion unknown/
 Files

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Army of the Republic of BiH
 6th CORPS, COMMAND OF THE *ISTOK* /East/ OG /Operations Group/

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Number: 02/1-2355
Visoko, 4 November 1993

TO THE COMMAND OF THE 6th CORPS
 TO THE COMMAND OF THE 3rd CORPS

Interim b/i /combat report/

At 1045 hours on 4 November 1993, the Chief of Staff of the *Istok* OG reported via means of communication that a battalion of the 7th Mbbr /Muslim Mountain Brigade/ had entered Vareš by the main road. They are stealing and looting everything they see. Total chaos reigns because nobody is commanding this unit and they do not obey anybody's orders. After learning of this situation, members of other units joined the general looting. It is necessary to provide all the available police forces. He asked that the Commander of the 3rd Corps come personally and take the appropriate measures.

The Command of the *Istok* OG has sent the PK /Assistant Commander/ for Security to the spot. He previously arranged with the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ to send the *Lasta* /Swallow/ unit to try to establish order together with the MP /Military Police/ forces.

MM/EV

COMMANDER
 Abdulah AHMIĆ

/illegible/ file: D:DPGPĐPAAA4BPA, date of receipt: 4 November 1993, time of receipt: 14/text breaks off/
 Signature of operator
 /a signature/

Signature of secretary

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
 ARMY OF THE BH REPUBLIC
 6th CORPS, COMMAND OF THE *ISTOK* /EAST/ OG
 /OPERATIONS GROUP/ -
 - *VAREŠ* TG /TACTICAL GROUP/

REPUBLICAN DEFENCE
 MILITARY SECRET
 STRICTLY
 CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential no. 01/3-17

Vareš, 10 November 1993

Analysis
of the execution of tasks involved in
Operation *Vareš* including the chronology of events

The combat operations involving the *Vareš* HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ units followed the assassination of four BH Army soldiers in the canyon of the Bukovica River in the vicinity of the medieval town of Bobovac, which heralded the imminent isolation and encirclement of the villages of Dragovići and Mijakovići.

The situation in the z/o /zone of responsibility/ of the *Istok* OG at the IKM /forward command post/ of the 1st *Istok* OG in Breza having been assessed accurately, a meeting was held designating a group of officers from the *ISTOK* OG, the *Vareš* OpŠO /Municipal Defence Staff/ and the 304th bbr /Mountain Brigade/ to reconnoitre the area of Dragovići and Mijakovići villages and submit a proposal for lifting the blockade of the said villages.

The planning of this operation was preceded by a discussion within the team of senior officers headed, by authorisation from the chief of the *Istok* OG, by the chief of artillery of the *Istok* OG, on one hand, and the commander of the *LAŠVA* OG with associates, on the other. A feasibility study was prepared within 4-5 days and a TG /Tactical Group/ headed by the *LAŠVA* OG PNS /Assistant Chief of Staff/ was established.

Since the newly formed TG was not functioning very well and since not all the documents required for the operation had been drawn up, we proceeded to prepare the documents and plan the operation ourselves, independently of the *LAŠVA* OG, and completed the elaboration of all the necessary documents in one day.

The planned operation was aimed at lifting the blockade of Dragovići and Mijakovići villages by virtue of capturing Kopjari /as printed/ village and the Pliješ and Liješnica features. The task of the *ISTOK* OG units was to take control of the Liješnica feature from the sector of the blocked villages, while the units of the *LAŠVA* OG were to capture Kopjari village and the Pliješ feature.

On 15 and 16 October 1993, the situation in *Vareš* becomes more complicated with the evacuation of the inhabitants of Kakanj and the able-bodied fighters who were not allowed to leave. The defence line of the Liješnica feature was taken up by soldiers from *Vareš*, as it had been abandoned by the soldiers from Kakanj who left for *Vareš* to see off their families in the convoy that had been planned for the moving out of Kakanj's refugees and the population of *Vareš* through Chetnik territory into so-called Herzeg-Bosnia.

Making an accurate assessment of the situation, the commander of the detachment from the Kakanj OpŠO which was holding the Poljani-Oštri Vrh line attacked the Liješnica feature in the evening hours of 16 October and took control of it that night. In this way b/d /combat operations/ started before the scheduled time. The takeover of Liješnica was carried out suddenly and with great military skill, without a single casualty on our side.

In the morning hours of 17 October 1993, after receiving notification of the capture of the Liješnica feature, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Artillery, the PK /Assistant Commander/ for Security of the *ISTOK* OG and the Commander of the Breza TG set out to visit the site in order to take stock of the situation and undertake measures for the execution of the planned task, i.e. the complete unblocking of the villages of Dragovići and Mijakovići.

The order was wired to the Commander of the *Vareš* OpŠO to come immediately to the sector of Liješnica.

At the same time, it was ordered that the *Bosna* DIČ /sabotage company/ of the 304th bbr. be sent immediately

to this sector to prevent any counter-attack by the Ustashas and make preparations for full implementation of the planned task.

After assessing the situation on the spot, it was ordered that the 4/304th bbr. /Fourth Battalion of the 304th Mountain Brigade/ take up positions immediately on a part of the Kruškovac line and link up with the units of the Kakanj OpŠO and the Mijakovići Company from the 3rd Vareš PDO /Anti-Sabotage Detachment/, and that was indeed done in the course of the day and the night of 17/18 October 1993.

Upon returning from Liješnica late in the afternoon of 17 October 1993, a meeting was held in Šošnje village with the newly arrived officers from the Command of the 304th bbr. and the Vareš OpŠO. After a number of proposals, it was decided to transfer the 1-4/304th bbr. /Battalions 1-4 of the 304th bbr./ to Mijakovići village together with the TG KM /Command Post/, while a part of the Command was to go to Striježevo in order to facilitate the command, linking up and reception of units coming into this sector.

In the course of the night, the TG Command, together with a platoon from the 4/304th bbr. carried out a 6-hour march on the Šošnje-Dragovići axis, while the commander of the 4/304th bbr. remained in Šošnje village in order to receive the *Bosna* DIČ of the 304th bbr. and organise accommodation and meals for them. On 18 October 1993, the defence line in the sector of Dragovičko Brdo /Dragovići Hill/ was reinforced with a platoon from the 4/304th bbr. and, around 1100 hrs, the TG officers carried out a commanders' reconnaissance of the sector of Kopjari village. An attack on Kopjari village from the sector of Dragovići village would enable the units of the LAŠVA OG to take control of the Pliješ feature which, according to plan, was their task in hand.

The 304th bbr. DIČ reached Dragovići in the afternoon, and reconnaissance was carried out once again together with the commanders. The TG *Breza* Commander arrived in the evening and was updated on the activities carried out on 18 October 1993 and the proposed use of the 304th bbr. DIČ on the Dragovići village-Kopjari village axis to unblock Dragovići and Mijakovići villages, which had not been envisaged by the attack order.

In the evening hours, one platoon of the *Bosna* Company from the Kakanj OpŠO arrived, their task being to act in coordination with their units from the direction of Dragovići village. That same evening, contact was made with the Kakanj OpŠO, which requested that we attack Kopjari village at 0400 hrs on 19 October 1993.

As there had not been enough time on 18 October 1993 to make all the preparations for the attack, a telegram was sent postponing the action by 24 hours. The next day, on 19 October 1993, the commander of the platoon from Kakanj was briefed on the plan and his own task in the attack. Preparations were made on the organisation of communications. After that, a 107 mm launcher was brought from the 304th bbr., as well as crews for the 120 mm and the 82 mm MB /mortars/. According to the plan, for which we had not prepared the /required/ documentation, the task was as follows:

By envelopment from the right, insert units into the HVO-controlled territory and attack the enemy in Kopjari village from the rear, channelling him with one platoon towards the ambush set in the canyon of the Bukovica River. We were to attack the enemy positions on the Pliješ feature also from the rear, by cutting through the line in the sector of the checkpoint, and carry out a lateral attack towards tt /trig point/ 1153-Pliješ. We were to keep the cut-off part encircled and get them to surrender.

In both cases we had planned lateral support which was supposed to channel the enemy and prevent him from getting assistance from the direction of Borovica village. We had planned to attack in the afternoon (1400 hrs) and notified this to Kakanj, which replied with an order that there was to be no postponement, i.e. that we must attack in the morning (0400 hrs) without fail.

Starting at 0400 hrs on 20 October 1993, the following units were committed:

- the *Bosna* DIČ of the 304th bbr. behind the enemy's back, above Kopjari village;
- 1-4/304th /bbr/ on the assault position from the front and in the ambush in the canyon at Bukovica village;
- a platoon of the *Bosna* Company of the Kakanj OpŠO behind the back /as printed/, below the Pliješ feature.

Once the agreed signal was given from the *LAŠVA* OG, the operations were to start with the insertion of units.

However, after an hour passed with no signal, contact was made with the *LAŠVA* OG and the TG Command was notified that the commander of the TG appointed by the *LAŠVA* OG was at home in Kakanj and that the action was being postponed for 24 hours.

With enormous difficulty, we pulled out our units from the enemy's depth, but we were discovered by civilians and had no choice but to detain Pera ŠIPČIĆ and take him with us. After the withdrawal, which was completed around 1130 hrs, we deployed the units and decided to leave the plan unchanged, except for reinforcing the reserve with soldiers from the 1-4/304th bbr, which we deployed in the vicinity of the units for the diversionary of frontal attack. We also planned to support the flank by introducing the Vareš OpŠO PDV / anti-sabotage platoon/, which had arrived at Dragovići village that day, and to send the entire Kakanj platoon to the Pliješ feature - tt 1153.

At around 0500 hrs on 21 October 1993, the units were put into assault positions once again.

When the b/d touched off, the Vareš OpŠO PdV /anti-sabotage platoon/ ran into an ambush wherein the commander was wounded, and the entire platoon withdrew along their line laong which they were brought in.

The other units disregarded these operations and continued their activities on the execution of their task. At the entrance to Kopjari village, they came under frontal and lateral fire and remained pinned down there for all of two hours on very difficult and hostile terrain.

The attack mounted by 1-4/304th from the front and the left flank destroyed hostile fortifications and enabled the *Bosna* DIČ of the 304th bbr. to advance to the first houses in Kopjari village.

Simultaneous, shelling from the 60 mm MB and the 107 mm LRL /light rocket launcher/ and a regrouping of the *Bosna* DIČ of the 304th bbr. resulted in the capture of Kopjari village from the east side at around 1200 hrs.

The Kakanj OpŠO was asked to head towards the Pliješ feature and their response was that the units had been given a break.

As the attack by the units of the Kakanj OpŠO failed to proceed, it was decided to continue the attack and capture the Pliješ feature.

After the checkpoint was taken over, one platoon of the *Bosna* DIČ of the 304th bbr. advanced towards the Pliješ feature and took control of it within two hours.

Once Pliješ was captured, at 1500 hrs we asked that the Kakanj units come and take up position on the line. At first we were informed that the unit on the other side had withdrawn, but then, around 1800 hrs, one group came and we turned the Pliješ feature over to them.

It is important to note that the UNPROFOR observed the whole course of the battle and the attitude of the RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ soldiers to civilians. The soldiers carried children in their arms and helped civilians to withdraw from the zone of b/d, together with the UNPROFOR members. No one was killed on our side, and three soldiers were lightly wounded. The enemy had 14 wounded and killed, and six were taken prisoner. The units returned to Dragovići and Mijakovići villages in the evening.

The entire action was organised and carried out by the *Breza* TG, while the costs of MTS /material and equipment/, fuel for transportation to and fro, and fuel for the medical corps were borne by the 304th bbr.

In this action, the following ammunition was spent: 120 mm shells - 3 pcs., 82 mm shells - 7 pcs., 60 mm shells - 7 pcs., rockets for the 107 mm launcher - 3 pcs. The following units took part in the takeover of Kopijari:

1. The DIČ of the 304th bbr.;
2. A platoon of the *Bosna* DIČ of Kakanj;
3. The Vareš PDV;
4. The 4/304th bbr. /Fourth Battalion of the 304th Mountain Brigade/;
5. The Mijakovići-Dragovići companies from the 3rd PDO /Anti-Sabotage Detachment/ of Vareš.

On 22 October 1993 we tried to gather the war booty and distribute it according to the criteria agreed before the action. During the day, after leaving for Kopijari village, we dealt with the demands of the civilian population together with representatives of the UNPROFOR. In the afternoon, the Commander of the Vareš OpŠO arrived in order to link the line together and soon after his arrival, a telegram came from Stupni Do warning that the encirclement of the village was being tightened, and requesting assistance.

On 22 October 1993 at 1500 hrs, according to plan, the *ISTOK* OG scheduled a meeting of the OpŠO Command and the War Presidency of Varoš Municipality for a briefing on the evaluation of b/g /combat readiness/ after an inspection had been carried out by a team from the *ISTOK* OG.

The meeting was attended, on behalf of the *ISTOK* OG, by the NŠ /Chief of Staff/ and the officer leading of the inspection team, whereas the Commander of the Vareš OpŠO was in Mijakovići village at that time.

On 23 October 1993, as soon as it became known at the *ISTOK* OG IKM-1 /Forward Command Post 1/ in Breza around 0800 hrs that Stupni Do had been attacked, the *ISTOK* OG Chief of Staff set out with members of the OG from the IKM to the Vareš OpŠO at the Dabravine KM /Command Post/. At the KM, the team received a detailed update on the situation and then continued into the field in order to gather detailed information on the situation on the spot.

The OG Chief together with the PK /Assistant Commander/ for Security drove out towards Budoželje. The car ran out of fuel halfway to its destination and they walked the rest of the way, arriving at Budoželje around 1030 hrs.

The Commander of the 1st PDO of the Vareš OpŠO reported on the situation in the sector of Stupni Do, which had been attacked by infantry from all directions, with full artillery preparation using /guns of/ all calibres, from several sectors.

From the sector of Budoželje village, one could see with the naked eye that the houses on the edge of Stupni Do village were on fire. Around 1100 hrs, communications with the unit (a reinforced platoon, 39 men) defending Stupni Do were interrupted, so information about the situation in that sector was no complete.

Communications were restored around 1300 hrs, but, judging by the voice of the signalman operating the radio from the Stupni Do unit, the communication was suspect. It was suspected that the signalman was working under duress because he was unable to identify himself on request. After reviewing the situation, with account taken of that possibility as well, no subsequent reports could be completely trusted.

After making his evaluation, the Commander of the 1st PDO concluded that it was not feasible to dispatch the Intervention Unit by the only route available - the "tobacco route" - due to very difficult terrain and the likelihood that the canyon through which they would have to pass was blocked. The assessment shared by all the officers from the command was that the unit would not be able to get through to Stupni Do that way.

In the process of searching for a solution on the spot, the decision was made to attack the checkpoint at Pajtov-Han and to advance the attack in the direction of Pajtov-Han - Mir village - Stupni Do village in order to lift the blockade on this village. The *ISTOK* OG Chief of Staff headed with the Commander of the 1st PDO to Pajtov-Han, while the PK for Security from the OpŠO remained at Budoželje.

In the afternoon hours, the checkpoint at Pajtov Han was taken over, and so was the first line of trenches above *Redja's* Café and the tunnel. This operation was carried out by the Intervention Unit of the 1st PDO. The capture of the toughest bunker was commanded by the *ISTOK* OG Chief of Staff personally.

They returned to the OpŠO command in Dabranive simultaneously with the arrival of the members of the TG command who had commanded the execution of b/d in the Kopijari sector, and the other officers from IKM-1 had been summoned as well. However, after taking stock of the latest developments, the OG Chief of Staff decided to form the Vareš TG to deal with the new problems that had arisen. The same TG that had commanded the Kopijari action was designated, with the addition of some commanding officers.

Units were immediately given specific tasks and the order to prepare for action. The officers from the command of the *ISTOK* OG and the TG were sent out into the field, the *ISTOK* OG chief of artillery and the OpŠO Chief of Staff were sent to Budoželje, while the commander and the PNŠ /Assistant Chief of Staff/ of the 304th bbr. were sent to the sector of Striježevo in order to assess the situation and submit their suggestions.

Before dusk, in the rain, the Chief of Artillery together with the chief of the Vareš OpŠO carried out reconnaissance of the sector in Mala Rijeka, as well as the Višnjevik and Bogaš features. At that time a flash was seen from the sector of Stupni Dol village. Upon arrival at Budoželje village, the situation was assessed and specific tasks were issued, the most important of them being the following:

- prepare units with the help of an intelligence agent from the 1st PDO to assist the unit in Stupni Do village, with their assignment to be given during the night, together with signs of recognition;
- fortify of l/o /defence lines/ in the z/o /zone of responsibility/ (complete facilities for action and dig a trench on the Kula-Katun line);
- take up positions on the l/o above Mala Rijeka and reinforce l/o in the z/o;
- continue gathering information and send it in good time to the Vareš TG Command.

When they arrived in the Trebijaš sector, the second group of superior officers saw a brightly glowing flame in Stupni Do village, despite the heavy rain. In Striježevo village, the group learned the details of the massacre and its first victims from a woman named Fatima LIKIĆ who had fled from Stupni Do village. Upon returning to the Vareš TG KM in Dabravine village, the group suggested that there would be no sense in committing units on the axis in question because they would be exposed to Ustasha fire from the sector of Planinka and Klačonice from one direction, and Chetnik fire from the Žižci sector plus Ustasha fire from the Mir area from another direction.

After assessing the situation, two routes of attack were proposed: the main axis: Mijakovići village - Tavanci - Ponor Planinica, and an auxiliary axis: Pajtov Han - Mir village - Stupni Do village. This proposal was not adopted and it was decided instead to continue operations on the route already taken - the *Zrak* factory - Poljanice village, which was a prerequisite to continue the advance towards Vareš.

It was agreed that, in the course of the following day, the command, including the commander of the Vareš TG, the commander of the 304th bbr. and the Assistant Chief of Staff for ONP /Operations and Training/ of the 304th bbr., and the NA /Chief of Artillery/ of the *ISTOK* OG would go on a reconnaissance mission together with the commanders of the DIČ of the 126th bbr. and the Striježevo and Budoželje companies, with a view to planning operations on the said axis.

On 24 October 1993, the said command carried out the reconnaissance and were satisfied that the *Zrak* factory and Poljanice village were abandoned, which was confirmed when scouts were sent there. Mala Rijeka was also abandoned and, after the units had entered the said sectors and returned, the commander of the Vareš TG issued an order to take up positions on the line that was reached, namely: the PDO /at/ Budoželje, the southern side, the VP /Military Police/ of Mala Rijeka, the DIČ of the 126th bbr. - from Pajtov Han to the Bukovina creek, with control of the *Zrak* factory, and Striježevo companies - from the Bukovina creek across Samara and Poljanice village on tt 1118, taking control of the crossroads in Pajtov Han towards Striježevo. Unit commanders and the Vareš OpŠO received the order and departed to establish the lines that had been reached.

On 25 October 1993, Ustashes fired from the Višnjovik and Poljanice sectors on the Pajtov Han sector and the Dabravine-Vareš road. On that day, activities were conducted with representatives of international organisations about going to Stupni Do and rescuing survivors from the Bogoš sector (towards the road).

On 26-27 October 1993, taking into account the entire situation in the Vareš OpŠO z/o and the latest regroupings of Ustasha forces, the decision was made to develop a plan for operations in the direction of Perun and Karasanovina, and it was requested via the Corps that the Second Corps join in the offensive b/d as well.

A proposal was submitted for the commitment of the units that were currently available from the *ISTOK* OG z/o, as well as the available MTS. Those were mostly intervention units from the 126th bbr., 304th bbr., 310th bbr., 302nd mtbr. /motorised brigade/, as well as units from the Vareš OpŠO. The decision was mapped and an order for attack was prepared. Since the territory in question was very extended, it was decided that the TG command should go to the Mijakovići sector, a part of the command headed by the *ISTOK* OG NA /Chief of Artillery/ would stay at Striježevo and another part, headed by the chief of the *ISTOK* OG *VIKG* /expansion unknown/, would remain in Budoželje. The OG NŠ /Chief of Staff/ would stay at the OpŠO KM

for the purpose of coordination and linking-up of all the three IKMs and for contacts with the UNPROFOR representatives, military observers, EC observers, the ICRC, the RP /?War Presidency/ and others, all in relation to Stupni Do and the events in the town of Vareš caused by HVO soldiers when they arrested all the male population and took them away to detention facilities.

On 28 October 1993, the command, consisting of the commander of the Vareš TG, the commander of the 304th bbr., the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training of the 304th bbr., the Chief of Artillery of the 304th bbr., the Assistant Chief of Staff for ObP /intelligence affairs/ of the 304th bbr., the Chief of Communications of the *ISTOK* OG, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training of the Vareš OpŠO, left for the sector of Mijakovičke Poljice village with the task of preparing for attack in coordinated action with a company of the *Sjenke* /Shadows/ Detachment of the 302nd mtbr. and the 3rd Vareš PDO from the south, and for taking control of Perun and Karasanovina, Slavina and Planinka.

When they arrived at Mijakovičke Poljice, reconnaissance was carried out, and the 304th bbr. DIČ arrived at Mijakovići village on the same day.

The NA /Chief of Artillery/ of the *ISTOK* OG set out with the Vareš OpŠO NŠ /Chief of Staff/ to the Trebijaš KM /forward command post/ to carry out reconnaissance and prepare the units for the execution of the task.

Upon completion of reconnaissance and assessment of the situation, a briefing was held where the following specific tasks were given:

- the company of the *Sjenke* Detachment of the 302nd mtbr. was given the task of carrying out the attack on the designated route and preparing officers and soldiers for the execution of the forthcoming operations;
- the 3rd PDO was given the task of holding the defence line firmly and preventing any Ustasha counter-attack, preparing the unit to take up positions on the line reached and linking forces during the attack;
- the 120/82mm MB /mortar/ V /platoon/ was given the task of supporting the attack on both axes;
- the civilian defence was given the task of organising levelling of the road for pulling out the wounded, the selection of men to carry the wounded, food supplies and the clearing up of the battlefield;
- the organs of the local commune were given the task of organising accommodation for the soldiers of the company from the *Sjenke* Detachment of the 302nd mtbr. and other units that might arrive in the course of the b/d.

On 29-30 October 1993, a commanders' reconnaissance was carried out with all the units, resulting in a proposal which was approved in its entirety. Orders to units were drawn up and a plan of action was made on an improvised map.

The attack was planned in such a way so as to attack Veokovac, Perun and Karasanovina from the rear, and Planinica village by envelopment left and right. Minor forces for a diversionary attack were envisaged from the front.

Units were brought up at 0150 hrs on 31 October on the Veokovac route, and at 0430 hrs on the Planinica route.

At 0530 hrs, contact was made on the Veokovac route with the units which were below the mountain lodge and three out of the 10 groups planned were behind the enemy's back, in their positions.

Just as the attack was expected to commence with uninterrupted further development, we were informed around 1000 hrs that the units had returned to base. When we arrived there, we learned that a guard detail had been detected below the mountain lodge and it had been decided to destroy it, rather than go around it and continue according to plan. When the guard detail was destroyed, panic ensued and the units withdrew unscathed. However, the unit commanders bungled matters, failing to proceed with variant two, which envisaged that, once the units were detected, a diversionary attack should start from the front, one soldier per trench, with a simultaneous attack from the left flank in the rear, because, given good guides and favourable weather conditions, the enemy would not be able to know our disposition and organise a defence. As the unit commanders failed to report after liquidation of the guard detail below the mountain lodge, we could not commence the attack from the command post.

On the route of attack of the *Sjenke* company of the 302nd mtbr., reveille for the unit was sounded at 0300 hrs. At 0330 hrs the Chetniks shelled the sector of Lučevac, killing two soldiers from the 3rd PDO and wounding a

third. Nevertheless, all the soldiers were ready for the execution of the assignment. In the course of the night, the Trebiješ IKM was arranged and camouflaged for conducting b/d and the communications centre of the 3rd PDO was moved.

Taking advantage of the fog, the company from the 302nd mtbr. *Sjenke* Detachment had penetrated deep inside the enemy disposition and was waiting for the commencement of b/d from the Perun direction. As these operations failed to materialise, the unit was pulled out around 1500 hrs and returned to the sector of redeployment. The attack was postponed until the next morning. We called in the unit commanders and notified them to prepare the units for a move at 1400 hrs and for frontal attack by zones: the 310th bbr. DIČ - Veokovac, the 304th bbr. DIČ - the sector of the trenches above the mountain lodge, and the 126th bbr. DIČ - the Sridica feature. The said targets were the task in hand, while the next task was Karasanovina. Once the units had come out into the field once again, the unit commanders and we realised that we could not mount an attack without a plan because our intentions had been revealed, so we returned the units to base and agreed that the unit commanders should go out into the field with their commanders the next day, 1 November 1993, and make preparations for the plan which implied the following:

The 310th bbr. DIČ attacks the feature of Veokovac, with a combination of lateral and frontal attack;

The 304th bbr. DIČ attacks the elevation above the mountain lodge, also with a combination of lateral and frontal attack;

The 126th bbr. DIČ attacks the Srdice feature and, by circular attack, envelops left;

The 1-4/304th bbr. attack the flank of Tavanci and Slavina village and carry out a frontal attack on Srdice, which the DIČ 304th bbr. is to attack laterally after completing its own task.

The task shared by all the units was to take Veokovac, the elevation above the mountain lodge and the features of Srdice and Julorič, and the next task was to capture the Tavanci and Karasanovina features. The features were to be captured from the left flank and once that was done, the reserve was to be pulled in to take up positions on the line reached and reinforce the attack as the completion of the task approached. This pace of commitment /of units/ as envisaged by the plan proved to be right, because, after completing their task, our units took control of Slavina village and, using the route from Karasanovina behind the enemy's back, enabled the company from the *Sjenke* Detachment of the 302nd mtbr. to enter Planinica village.

Around 11 o'clock, the command of the 7th Mbr. /Muslim Brigade/ arrived at the Trebijaš IKM together with battalion commanders to carry out reconnaissance and prepare the execution of the task which had been postponed.

An interim report suggested to the commander of the *ISTOK* OG to consider the possibility of engaging the 7th Mbr. and that it should be placed under the command of the TG. The OG commander decided to carry out the task without taking the 7th Mbr. into consideration and that was the way it was done. At 2000 hrs there was a briefing led by the Chief of Artillery of the *ISTOK* OG, attended by the officers of the 3rd PDO, the MB platoon and the company from the *Sjenke* of the 302nd mtbr., and also by representatives of the civilian authorities of the MZ /local commune/, where specific tasks were given for attack at 0600 hrs on 2 November 1993 on the Planinica axis.

The 7th Mbr. platoon, which was at that time in Striježevo village, did not accept this engagement due to the absence of orders from their superior command, explaining that they would join in if the Ustashas attack the l/o /defence line/. The units set out to execute the task at 0300 hrs on 2 November 1993 on the Veokovac axis. The sequence of developments was the following:

- the units departed to carry out their task at 0300 hrs;
- at 0500 hrs they took up position at the assault position;
- at 0630 hrs operations commenced;
- at 0700 we seized control of Veokovac and committed the 304th bbr. DIČ as reserve;
- at 0800 we seized control of the slope above the mountain lodge and committed the 304th bbr as reserve and at 1100 hrs we captured Slavin village;
- at 1100 we captured the Srdice feature and inserted the 126th bbr. DIČ as reserve;

- at 1200 hrs defence was organised from the direction of Vareš by bringing in the first platoon of the Dragovići Company and the first platoon of the 4/304th bbr., the DIČs were reinforced and a plan for continued b/d was made;
- the KM was transferred to Srdice;
- the attack continued and, by 1500 hrs, Karasanovina and Tavanci were taken;
- the units attacked Planinica village behind the /enemy' s/ back, captured a PAM /anti-aircraft machine-gun/ and 60 mm shells, 7.62 and 7.9 mm ammunition, as well as rockets for the RB /hand-held rocket launcher/. Planinica village was taken over around 1600 hrs. Shooting continued until the evening;
- the units returned to base at 2100 hrs.

After going out into the sector of the retransmission station at Karasanovina, the commander of the Vareš TG had to go to the *ISTOK* OG for a coordination meeting. Upon returning to base, we spent some time above Vareš-Majdan, which was empty, as confirmed by one section which had descended all the way to the road.

In the morning hours, the Chetniks shelled the sector of Lučevac again, with several howitzer shells.

Simultaneously with the commencement of operations in the area of Veokovac, the company from the *Sjenke* Detachment of the 302nd mtbr. was brought in on the planned axis, Striježevo village-Planinica, with the artillery at the ready. An ambulance van was sighted in the area of b/d and was stopped by a 82 mm shell (the driver escaped). Communication with subordinates was not functioning very well, so the NŠ /Assistant Chief of Staff/ of the OpŠO was sent to the Lučevac area as an intermediary in communications with the *Sjenke* company, and also to check the work of the 3rd PDO.

In the course of b/d, a PAT /anti-aircraft gun/ on a truck appeared twice. The first time, it was neutralised by a 82 mm shell, and the second time, being overtaken by an 82 mm MB /mortar/, it was hit in the back of the truck and did not reappear again. By moving fire along the depth of the 120/82 mm MB platoon, our forces were able to advance more rapidly from both directions. It is important to note at this point that the 120/82 mm MB platoon carried out its task completely and impeccably, for which they deserve full credit, especially the target plotter of the 304th bbr.

Around 1000 hrs, a platoon (24 men) from the 7th Mbr. joined in the b/d and was linked up with the company from the *Sjenke* Detachment of the 302nd mtbr. The command of the units from the Trebijaš IKM was executed very professionally and earned special praise from the commanding officers of the 7th Mbr. / Muslim Mountain Brigade/ who had monitored the progress of the attack. During the b/d, the soldiers from the 126th bbr. DIČ and the 304th bbr. DIČ merged with the company from the *Sjenke* Detachment in Planinica village without encountering any major problems and continued operations towards the lateral ridge in the Podjavor village sector. Forces from the 3rd PDO were brought in to take up the line, while the forces that had been involved in the attack were collecting the war booty. At that time, the units of the 2nd K. /2nd Corps/ were on the Pogar-Očenija-Zvijezda line.

That night, the 7th Mbr. arrived and it was decided at the briefing to engage it under the order on the Pajtov Han - Mir village - Pržići axis, with the second battalion in the echelon and the first one in the reserve, one platoon of the latter following the advance of the main forces through the main valley.

On 3 November, the fall of Perun and Karasanovina-Planinica was the military fall of Vareš, too. In the early morning hours, the civilian population was evacuated from Vareš. According to the people who remained in Vareš, HVO soldiers swept through the town, driving everyone out, and even killed those who resisted. Today was used for reconnaissance, and the decision on the engagement of the 7th Mbr. was changed, so that it was sent to the Bijelo Borje-Bogaš-Daštansko axis instead. Also, work began on the clearing up the captured terrain, engineering arrangement and taking up positions on the line reached the day before.

Their mission completed, the intervention units did not depart to their sector of deployment, as ordered, which resulted in a certain amount of confusion. They were therefore returned to their original units, while the company from the *Sjenke* Detachment of the 302nd mtbr. was returned to its sector of deployment in Striježevo village.

On 4 November, the plan was to engage only the 7th Mbr. on the Višnjevnik-Mir-Stupni Do-Tisovci-Pržić-

Daštansko axis, in two echelons. The task was not carried out completely, because the troops did not get beyond Bijelo Borje and Tisovci, but headed for the town instead.

The second echelon took the road into the town, where unpleasant scenes occurred -looting, wholesale smashing of shop-windows, making off with goods, and smashing cars. In addition to the soldiers of the 7th Mbr., the soldiers of the company from the *Sjenke* Detachment of the 302nd mtbr. also entered the town, although they were not even engaged, and so did the soldiers of the Vareš OpŠO unit, and even civilians from the neighbouring villages. Around 1500 hrs the situation was somewhat reined in and all the troops were to leave the town, with only the military and the civilian police staying behind. The events of that day are covered in detail in the security report attached to this analysis. The TG commander entered Vareš through Papale around 1100 hrs, immediately took over the premises of the *Snaga* DP /socially-owned enterprise/ and scheduled a briefing for that evening to be attended by the entire TG command and the members of the OG. In the course of the afternoon and the night, representatives of the authorities also entered Vareš.

5th November. Around 1100 hrs, the commander of the *Kladanj* OG-3 came to the premises of the *Snaga* enterprise - then serving as the KM /command post/ of the Vareš TG - and informed the Commander of what had been done from the north, i.e. what had been done by the units of the 2nd Corps. When the orders came that the units of the Vareš OpŠO were resubordinated to the *Kladanj* OG-3, i.e. the 2nd Corps, the Command and the units of the *ISTOK* OG completed their engagement in the b/d around Vareš.

It should be noted once again - and this is a fact - that, with equal success, the 304th bbr. DIČ, the 126th bbr. DIČ, the 310th bbr. DIČ and the 4/304th bbr. jointly crushed the defence of Vareš by capturing the features of Veokovac, Perun, Karasanovina and Slavina village in coordinated action with the company from the *Sjenke* Detachment of the 302nd mtbr. on the Lučevac - Planinica village axis and the Vareš OpŠO unit, with excellent command and planning and participation of all the commanding officers from the Vareš TG and the *ISTOK* OG of Visoko, and achieved major results with minor losses and minimal MTS.

The following units belonging to the *ISTOK* OG participated in the liberation of Vareš from the south:

1. DIČ of the 126th bbr.
2. DIČ of the 304th bbr.
3. DIČ of the 310th bbr.
4. 4/304th bbr.
5. Company of the *Sjenke* Detachment from the 302nd mtbr.
6. Units of the Vareš OpŠO
7. Platoon of the 7th Mbbr.

The 7th Mbbr. did not have any b/d, but its presence was a source of stability and confidence for all the soldiers and units which fought for the liberation of Vareš, and it also combed the terrain in the Višnjevnik-Mir-Stupni Do-Bijelo Borje sector. The aforesaid task was not executed the first day because the troops diverted into the town. The actions planned for the next day toward Daštansko village were not carried out because one battalion of the 7th Mbbr. was turned back halfway when, after the link-up had been secured, information came from the command of the *Kladanj* OG-3 that units had already been brought in on that axis and that we were not to bring in our own, and that the point of convergence was to be at Bijelo Borje.

Positive experience:

- Timely assessment of the situation and adoption of correct and complete decisions and implementation of the decisions on the ground with clear tasks.
- Full preparation and resolve to carry out the task on the part of every soldier.
- Re-grouping of units and resources geared to enhance the fire capacity of units involved in the execution of the task, as well as command and control.
- Establishment of a provisional command - a TG made up of the best commanding officers from several units.

- Correct choice of units for the execution of the task and full application of the principles of military skills in the execution of b/d.
- Presence of the most responsible officers in the units during the preparation and execution of b/d.

Negative experiences:

- Inability to control the units after the liberation of settlements: despite all the measures taken, there is uncontrolled plundering and destruction of material goods.
- Inability to make a complete analysis of the completed activities with the military collective due to an undeveloped military attitude.
- Inability to make a complete record of the war booty due to confiscation by soldiers and civilians alike.
- Uncontrolled spending of ammunition after completion of activities due laxity and /a wish for/ celebration on the part of some soldiers.

What can be said in conclusion?

From all of the above, one can conclude the following:

The entire *Vareš* operation from the southern side was carried out brilliantly. Based on assessments of the enemy, the terrain and the weather, correct and timely decisions were made on the use of elite units, which alone were capable of executing all the given tasks, confronting far more numerous and better equipped Ustasha units on these features (120 well-fortified bunkers manned by 5-6 Ustashes each were captured on one line alone).

Our losses in the operation are 4 men killed and 11 wounded.

With a minimal spending of the MTS available to us at the outset of the b/d, the wall of the *Vareš* defence was taken, making its fall inevitable.

With excellent coordination and full implementation of RIK /command and control/ at all levels, from section commander to OG command, the tasks were carried out with utmost professionalism.

The credit for such work goes to the following:

the superior officers of the *ISTOK* OG command, the *Vareš* TG and the superior officers of subordinated units.

Also deserving of praise and reward is the entire command of the TG and all the units which took part in the liberation of *Vareš* from the southern side. A proposal for individual commendations, level by level, is attached hereto.

Also attached to this analysis is the complete documentation of the *Vareš* TG which is being deposited in the archives of the *ISTOK* OG.

Drafted by: Hašim SPAHIĆ, Šefket HRUSTANOVIĆ and Meho MEŠTROVIĆ.

To:

1. ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/
2. 6th Corps
3. 3rd Corps
4. 2nd Corps
5. Files

COMMANDER
OF THE *VAREŠ* TG
Hrustem MALIŠEVIĆ
/no visible signature/
ISTOK OG CHIEF OF STAFF
Hašim SPAHIĆ
/signed/



UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE



HEADQUARTERS

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA COMMAND

Kiseljak

November 12, 1993

Please find enclosed the interim report on the Stupni Do investigations, as requested.

A.I. Ramsay
Brigadier
Chief of Staff BH Command

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MILITARY POLICE
INITIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT

MP HQ CASE REF NO:
MP PL CASE REF NO: BHCOMD MPPL 510-2-93

Subject: MURDER - WAR CRIMES

1. Date/Time Occurred: 23 Oct 93, commencing approximately 0800 hrs.
2. Place: Village of Stupni Do, Bosnia Hercegovina
3. DTG Reported to MP: 2215 hrs, 26 Oct 93.
4. To Whom Reported: BHComd MPPL, Kiseljak, Bosnia Hercegovina.
5. Complainant: NORDBAT, UNPROFOR, Vares, Bosnia Hercegovina.
6. INJ/PROP/VEH/DAM involved: Corpses of fifteen humans accounted for, majority of village structures including their contents destroyed by fire and explosive forces.
7. Witnesses: Being treated as Police Confidential source information at this time. To be fully identified in subsequent Military Police reports depending on final report distribution.
8. Suspect(s): Members of HVO armed forces who attacked the village of Stupni Do, 23 Oct 93.
9. Brief Circumstances:
 - a. at approximately 2215 hrs, 26 Oct 93 I was advised that this MPPL had been mandated to investigate an alleged massacre which had taken place at the village of Stupni Do;

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- b. at about 1140 hrs, 27 Oct 93, I arrived at Stupni Do where I spoke to senior personnel of "A" Company, 1 PWO, BRITBAT, Vitez, presently securing the village of Stupni Do;
- c. a familiarization walkthrough of the village was conducted by my Investigative team followed by commencement of crime scene processing. Full details will be included in a future report upon analysis of all information collected, including photographs. A brief synopsis is as follows:
- (1) fifteen confirmed bodies were found, five of which are identifiable and the remaining ten burnt beyond recognition,
 - (2) an additional pile of bone and ash was discovered and believed to be by an on scene UNPROFOR medical officer to be that of an animal however he could not be sure. The remains were photographed and treated as a body,
 - (3) all bodies and their locations were photographed. The surrounding areas were also searched for physical evidence,
 - (4) all evidence seized such as bullet casings, ammo boxes, photographs etc., (to assist in identification action) were documented and secured,
 - (5) sketches of the scene not drawn to scale were also compiled, and
 - (6) on scene examination of the bodies by a UNPROFOR medical officer revealed the possible cause of death in most instances to be by gunshot;
- d. during the period 28/29 Oct 93, residents of Stupni Do were interviewed at NORDBAT faculties near Vares. Another resident was interviewed in the town of Dabravine 29 Oct 93. A brief combined synopsis of these interviews is provided to outline the Stupni Do attack:
- (1) Stupni Do is a small Muslim village situated on a hillside containing about 50 to 70 houses and approximately 250 people. It is mainly a agricultural community with some cattle. Some men work in the nearby community of Vares,

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(2) at the beginning of the conflict 10 Serb families who also lived in the community moved away. Their village is surrounded by Croatian towns,

(3) the village had a defence force of forty BH soldiers, all locals,

(4) when the BH soldiers were changing shift at about 0800 hrs, 23 Oct 93 an explosion happened followed by continuous gun fire which seem to come from all over. The attack appeared to come from below the village and work upwards,

(5) all witnesses took shelter, one family in a basement, another in a bathroom and one in a hole built into the ground a short distance from their home (this witness's baby started crying so she left the hole and fled on foot towards Vares),

(6) heavy small arms fire and shelling continued until about 1100 hrs, 23 Oct 93 which appears to be the time HVO soldiers broke through BH defensive lines,

(7) one witness's family left their house about 0900 hrs to enter the house next door which was one of three shelters in the village. While moving numerous fires were noticed burning in the village,

(8) shortly thereafter BH soldiers were screaming the HVO broke through their lines and to run for the woods. Some villagers ran and others stayed in the shelter,

(9) one witness who was hiding stated HVO soldiers entered their house and discovered them about 1130 hrs,

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- (10) another witness stated they were discovered in the shelter about 1100 hrs,
- (11) witnesses described the HVO as all having camouflaged uniforms with white ribbons around their left arms, some had camouflaged faces, some had HVO insignia patches others with nothing. Some worn flak jackets. None of the witnesses recognized any of the HVO soldiers as being from the local area, nor did they hear names being used (other then nicknames),
- (12) the remaining witnesses stated their groups were taken outside and lined up where HVO soldiers took all their personal valuables from them, for example their money and jewelry. One witness stated they separated her Grandfather because he had no money to give. A HVO soldier then machined gun him in the presence of her group including her child (age three),
- (13) one witness stated in confidence to this investigator she had been taken into a house by an HVO soldier who placed the muzzle of a gun in her mouth telling her to be nice. She was told to take off her clothes. The soldier then dried fired the weapon in her mouth and raped her,
- (14) after being raped the witness was brought outside where she saw her father dead on the ground, another man dead on the ground and a third in the process of having his neck cut. This man was yelling don't do this, kill me. The witness looked away and heard him being shot,
- (15) one witness's group was instructed by a HVO soldier to start walking down the main road towards Vares where they would be put into concentration camps and be used in prisoner of war exchanges. The group followed his instructions passing three groups of HVO soldiers approaching the town who verbally threatened them and their children with death. Upon reaching Vares no HVO soldiers were there,

4/5

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- (16) the witness group had at one time around twenty HVO soldiers around them. One stated they should shoot them all, another stated to put them in a house and burn them to death. They were taken into a summer house where HVO soldiers locked them in. Through the window of the front door of this house she saw HVO soldiers drag the bodies of her grandfather and other corpses into the house she had been raped and the house set on fire, and
- (17) the soldiers disappeared at which time an axe which had been hidden from the soldiers view immediately behind the front door and was used to break the door. The group ran for the woods. They stayed in the woods and met up with another group in the morning. After another night in the woods they found UNPROFOR vehicles and were taken to NORDBAT.

Location and information resulting from the attack on Stupni Do

D-54-2

VAREŠ-MAJDAN ROAD



 A BiH BUNKERS



VAREŠ-MAJDAN ROAD

BOGOŠ




VAREŠ-MAJDAN ROAD

⊗ A BiH BUNKERS

TRENCHES AROUND THE VILLAGE OF STUPNI DO

212



Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 VAREŠ MUNICIPALITY
 Stupni Do MZ/ Local Community
 Number: /handwritten/ 22 /?December/1993
 Date: 20 December 1993

FINDINGS OF COMMISSION

In keeping with the decision of the War Presidency, demonstrated need and decision number 02/1-413/93 of 15 December 1993, the Executive Council formed a commission to confirm the death of people killed in the village of Stupni Do.

The commission consisting of:

1. Husnija MAHMUTOVIĆ. President (MZ representative);
2. Abid LIKIĆ, member (/CZ/ civil protection commander);
3. Zaim LIKIĆ, member;

identified and buried the following people who were killed on 23 October 1993 by the Vareš Croatian Defence Council /HVO/.

	First and last name	Date of birth		Place of burial
1.	Raif (son of Asim) LIKIĆ	12 November 1960	CZ	Stupni Do
2.	Adis (son of Kemal) LIKIĆ	24 September 1976	soldier	Dabravino
3.	Šerifa (daughter of Meho) LIKIĆ	27 April 1938		Stupni Do
4.	Ibrahim (son of Ibro) LIKIĆ	26 February 1930		Stupni Do
5.	Đehva (daughter of Alija) LIKIĆ	26 February 1930		Stupni Do
6.	Munira (daughter of Alija) LIKIĆ	19 August 1947		Stupni Do
7.	Alija (son of Osman) LIKIĆ	16 July 1931		Stupni Do
8.	Rasima (daughter of Bešić) LIKIĆ	27 April 1921		Stupni Do
9.	Šerifa LIKIĆ	1929		Stupni Do
10.	Ramiz (son of Salkan) LIKIĆ	17 November 1936		Pomenići
11.	Refika (daughter of Alija) LIKIĆ	25 November 1940		Pomenići
12.	Zahida (daughter of Taib) LIKIĆ	31 December 1966		Pomenići
13.	Enis (son of Ejub) LIKIĆ	3 August 1990		Pomenići
14.	Vernesl (son of Ramiz) LIKIĆ	4 July 1966	soldier	Pomenići
15.	Minheta (daughter of Huso) LIKIĆ	6 November 1969		Pomenići
16.	Sabina (daughter of Vernest) LIKIĆ	22 April 1991		Pomenići
17.	Nazif (son of Ibro) LIKIĆ	23 August 1926	CZ	Pomenići

All the dead bodies found in Stupni Do were burnt and chaired except the dead body of Rasema LIKIĆ (daughter of Bešir). For identification, the commission relied on statements of family members and eyewitnesses who were present at the scene of the crime.

COMMISSION:

1. Husnija MAHMUTOVIĆ
/signed/
2. Abid LIKIĆ
/signed/
3. Zaim LIKIĆ
/signed/ /stamped/

cc:

Executive Council of Vareš Municipality x 1
 Vareš Health Centre x 1
 Vareš Registrar's Office x 1
 Commission x 1
 Stupni Do MZ x 1
 Files x 1

THE LIST OF KILLED RESIDENTS IN STUPNI DO

13

REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
 OPŠTINA VAREŠ
 ŽUPANSKA ZAJEDNICA STUPNI DO
 Broj: 08-753/94
 Vareš, 22.09 1994.god.
 PREDMET: Spisak poginulih u MZ Stupni Do dana, 23.10.1993 god.

Red. br.	Prezime ime oca i ime	datum rođenja	Mjesto sahrane
1.	Likić (Esad) Vahidin	08.07.1985	Stupni Do
2.	Likić " Mebrura	24.01.1980.	"
3.	Likić (Ibrahim) Merima	10.10.1959.	"
4.	Likić (Ibro) Rašida	19.06.1937.	Dabravine
5.	Likić (Ibro) Mehmeda	22.09.1932.	CZ Dabravine
6.	Likić (Idriz) Lejla	22.07.1942.	Stupni Do
7.	Likić (Bajro) Salih	01.01.1919.	"
8.	Likić (Osman) Salke	30.10.1941.	borac Dabravine
9.	Žutić (Mijasa) Indira	25.06.1990.	Stupni Do
10.	Likić (Salke) Muharem	12.12.1973.	borac Dabravine
11.	Likić (Abdulaha) Rifet	27.03.1967.	borac "
12.	Rahić (Ago) Samira	23.05.1966.	borac "
13.	Likić (Ibro) Abdulah	31.08.1936.	CZ Hedžići
14.	Likić (Salke) Hatidža	15.12.1942.	"
15.	Likić (Sulejman) Medina	19.04.1977.	borac Dabravine
16.	Mahmutović (Zejnil) Edin	21.08.1960.	borac "
17.	Mahmutović (Derviš) Zejnil	02.06.1932.	borac "
18.	Likić (Rifet) Navzeta	18.05.1965.	Budožalje
19.	Likić (Osman) Ramiz	08.11.1939.	CZ Dabravine
20.	Likić (Salih) Hafa	09.11.1932.	"
21.	Likić (Asim) Raifa	12.11.1960.	CZ Stupni Do
22.	Likić (Mehe) Serifa	27.04.1938.	"
23.	Likić (Ibro) Ibrahim	25.07.1931.	"
24.	Likić (Alije) Memira	09.08.1947.	"
25.	Likić (Alije) Šehava	26.02.1930.	"
26.	Likić (Osman) Alija	30.09.1931.	"
27.	Likić (Kemal) Adis	24.09.1976.	borac Dabravine
28.	Likić (Bečir) Rasema	27.04.1921.	Stupni Do
29.	Lulić Šerifa	1929.	"
30.	Likić (Vejsil) Šefke	27.02.1942.	borac Dabravine
31.	Likić (Salkan) Ramiz	17.11.1936.	CZ Pomenići
32.	Likić (Alija) Refika	25.11.1940.	"
33.	Likić (Taib) Zahida	31.12.1966.	"
34.	Likić (Ejub) Enis	03.03.1990.	"
35.	Likić (Ramiz) Vernest	04.07.1966.	borac "
36.	Likić (Huse) Minketa	06.11.1969.	"
37.	Likić (Vernesta) Sabina	22.04.1991.	"
38.	Likić (Ibro) Nazif	23.08.1926.	CZ Stupni Do

Poginulo je boraca, 6 pripadnika CZ, petero (5) djece i ostale civili raznih godišta.

Djeca od 01 - 13 godina starosti i - 5 (PET)

U trenutku napada u selu je bilo 220 stanovnika i 8 raseljenih lica.

U Dabravinama sahranjeno 11 osoba.

Jedna osoba nije pronađena (LIKIĆ Hafa)

OPŠTINA VAREŠ
 ŽUPANSKA ZAJEDNICA STUPNI DO
 Mjesto Mehmutović/
 Mahmutović

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Vareš Municipality
 Stupni Do Local Community
 Number: 08-753/94
 Vareš, 22nd September 1994

Subject: list of person killed in Stupni Do Local Community on 23rd October 1993


Number	Last name, Father's name, Name	Date of Birth		Place of Burial
1.	Likić (Esad) Vahidin	08.07.1985.		Stupni Do
2.	Likić (Esad) Mebrura	24.01.1980.		Stupni Do
3.	Likić (Ibrahim) Merima	10.10.1959.		Stupni Do
4.	Likić (Ibro) Rašida	19.06.1937.	illegible	Dabravine
5.	Likić (Ibro) Mehmed	23.09.1953.	„CZ“ /civilian protection/	Dabravine *soldier, A BiH
6.	Likić (Idriz) Lejla	22.07.1942.		Stupni Do
7.	Likić (Bajro) Salih	01.01.1919.		Stupni Do
8.	Likić (Osman) Salko	30.10.1941.	Soldier	Dabravine
9.	Žutić (Nijaz) Indira	25.06.1990.		Stupni Do
10.	Likić (Salko) Muharem	12.12.1973.	Soldier	Dabravine
11.	Likić (Abdulah) Rifet	27.03.1967.	Soldier	Dabravine
12.	Rahić (Ago) Samir	23.05.1966.	Soldier	Dabravine
13.	Likić (Ibro) Abdulah	31.08.1936.	„CZ“ /civilian protection/	Hodžići
14.	Likić (Salko) Hatidža	15.12.1993.		Hodžići
15.	Likić (Sulejman) Medina	19.04.1977.	Soldier	Dabravine
16.	Mahmutović (Zejnil) Edin	21.08.1960.	Soldier	Dabravine
17.	Mahmutović (Derviš) Zejnil	02.06.1932.	Soldier	Dabravine
18.	Likić (Rifet) Nevzeta	18.05.1965.		Budoželje
19.	Likić (Osman) Ramiz	08.11.1939.	„CZ“ /civilian protection/	Dabravine *soldier, A BiH
20.	Likić (Salih) Hafa	09.11.1932.		
21.	Likić (Asim) Raifa	12.11.1960.	„CZ“ /civilian protection/	Stupni Do *soldier, A BiH
22.	Likić (Meho) Šerifa	27.04.1938.		Stupni Do
23.	Likić (Ibro) Ibrahim	25.07.1931.		Stupni Do
24.	Likić (Alija) Munira	09.08.1947.		Stupni Do
25.	Likić (Alija) Džehva	26.02.1930.		Stupni Do
26.	Likić (Osman) Alija	30.09.1931.		Stupni Do
27.	Likić (Kemal) Adis	24.09.1976.	Soldier	Dabravine
28.	Likić (Bećir) Rasema	27.04.1921.		Stupni Do
29.	Lulić Šerifa	1929.		Stupni Do
30.	Likić (Vejsil) Šefko	27.02.1942.	Soldier	Dabravine
31.	Likić (Salkem) Ramiz	17.11.1936.	„CZ“ /civilian protection/	Pomenići
32.	Likić (Alija) Refika	25.11.1940.		Pomenići
33.	Likić (Taib) Zahida	31.12.1966.		Pomenići
34.	Likić (Ejub) Enis	03.08.1990.		Pomenići
35.	Likić (Ramiz) Vernest	04.07.1966.	Soldier	Pomenići
36.	Likić (Huso) Minheta	06.11.1969.		Pomenići
37.	Likić (Vernesta) Sabina	22.04.1991.		Pomenići
38.	Likić (Ibre) Nazif	23.08.1926.	„CZ“ /civilian protection/	Stupni Do

* Three persons which are listed in this document as killed MEMBERS OF CIVIL PROTECTION, in the book of Mirsad Tokača: "Bosanska knjiga mrtvih" (eng. trans.: "The Bosnian Book of the Dead") are listed as killed SOLDIERS of BH Army.

The following were killed: 10 soldiers, 6 CZ /civilian protection/ members, five (5) children and other civilians of all ages.
Children 01-13 years of age: 5 (five).
At the time of the attack there were 220 residents and 8 displaced persons in the village.
11 persons were buried in Dubravine.
One person was not found (Likić Hafa).

/stamp: illegible, Vareš Municipality, illegible/

Stupni Do Local Community Commissioner
Husnija Mahmutović
/signed/



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[prijevod Senada Kreso, Linda Popić, Selma Islamović].

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Testimony of Prosecution witness MUFID LIKIĆ on 20 March 2007, Case Prlic et al., ICTY

D-57

Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:

Q. Good afternoon, Witness. Mr. Witness, good afternoon.

A. Good afternoon.

Q. On page 3 of the Croatian version of your statement in one, two, three, four, five -- fifth paragraph from the bottom, you said that on the 18th of October, 1993, you were in your uncle's house; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that Himzo Likić was there, too, commander of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stupni Do unit.

A. Yes.

Q. Jakub Likić, member of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stupni Do unit?

A. Yes, that's my brother.

Q. All right. Esref Likić, commander of the battalion in Breza, near Bosnia-Herzegovina. Resad Likić, former member of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but he stepped on a mine and became an invalid, and Ahmed Likić member of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stupni Do unit?

A. Yes.

Q. And you say all were dressed in civilian clothes except for Esref who was wearing camouflage uniform?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell me, were there quite a few people in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina who often wore civilian clothing?

A. Yes, in the beginning until the army was established; of course, they did not have uniforms.

Q. When you say in the beginning here a reference is made to the 18th of October, and you say out of six or seven men everybody wore civilian clothes except for Esref. So do we agree that the members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina then, in Vareš and around Vareš, very often wore civilian clothes as though they were members of the BH army; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. And you say for the very same day, a few lines down, that a man in BH army uniform walked in as you were sitting there, and he took Himzo out and spoke with him for a while.

A. Yes.

Q. When Himzo came back he told us that they had to go to Stupni Do because the situation was getting worse and there were -- there was already fighting going on between the HVO and the BH army around Vareš, especially in an area called Liješnica. Is it correct?

A. Yes.

Q. That fighting around Vareš started -- or, rather, around Liješnica started around the 18th?

A. Well, I don't know whether that was the date, but if that's what I wrote then that's correct.

Q. All right. Was Liješnica in that direction from where the 2nd Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was coming, the one that was stationed in Zenica -- or, rather, the 3rd Corps - sorry - stationed in Zenica?

A. How can I know? I was not the corps commander, sir, you know.

Q. Mr. witness, I'm not insisting on anything.

A. Well, I don't know. I really don't.

Q. All right. You say further on that this man who informed you about the fighting having started, you say he told us that the man who visited him and spoke to him was the chief of staff of the Army BH brigade of Vareš.

Do you know that the Bosniaks, the Muslims from Vareš, had their own brigade which was a regular brigade of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. Regular brigade, they had it when the army took Vareš. That's when it was the regular brigade.

Q. What about earlier on? You say here that the chief of staff of the brigade of Vareš of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina spoke to him?

A. Well, all right. Perhaps that's what they called it, brigade, but it wasn't a brigade.

Q. Do you know what -

A. No, no. He was outside with him. I personally did not see the man, and they talked when they took him outside.

Q. All right. So you don't know what the number of that brigade was and whether it had a name, the brigade of the BH army composed of Bosniaks Muslims from Vareš, that is.

A. The 122nd Brigade, I think. I think that's what it was called.

Q. Was it the 322nd or the 122nd?

A. The 322nd.

Q. Thank you. Now, do you know whether that brigade, the 322nd Brigade, attacked Vareš together with the other units of the BH army from the 2nd and 3rd Corps?

A. I wasn't there then. I was in hospital. I was in Breza.

Q. In talking to the people you knew later on, did you receive any information to the effect that that brigade, the 322nd, composed of Bosniaks from Vareš, took part in the attack on Vareš?

A. Well, certainly -

THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness kindly be asked to approach the microphone. Thank you.

Q. You said that you were received by a Croatian doctor and despite risk to him sent you to hospital where there were 15 other wounded Croats; is that correct?

A: Yes, that is correct, and I would like to say thank you to the doctor.

Q. And on page 6, on page 6 you also confirm - you say underneath that: "I spent the rest of day in that department and the following night, and the next morning we were able to see and hear that there was fighting going on from the direction of Mount Perun, and it seemed that the BH army was attacking the HVO from its positions." Now, do you confirm that statement of yours?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you know that the HVO as it was from the arrival of the people from Kakanj, from June, or the arrival of the people from Kakanj, until the 18th of October succeeded in preserving an oasis of quiet, of calm in Vareš, as witnesses said, until the attack started, regardless of the problems that occurred with so many refugees, right up to the 18th - 17th, 18th of October when the BH army started to attack Kopljari and take control of it, and that they had three dead, two wounded and so on? Do you know that at that time there was law and order, relatively speaking, with enough food and everything else in Vareš up until that time?

A. As to enough food, sir, if you turn over to the second page and read about this oasis of peace on the 30th of August and what it says, I said I was with Adisa Likić, Edina Kadrić, and Almedina Luković [as interpreted] in a cafe called Mak in Vareš-Majdan. I intended to buy a truck and, for that purpose, I had four and a half thousand Deutschmarks. I would just like to refer to that oasis of peace, as you said it. I was arrested in that oasis of peace and they took away my four and a half thousand Deutschmarks and my health. And I spent all the rest of the time in the hospital in Breza, in that oasis of peace and calm.

Q. Witness, I will be asking you the questions and would you kindly answer them. I'm not trying at all to deny what happened to you individually, personally. Now what I asked you about the oasis of peace is something that witnesses testified to here in this court who belong to your own nationality or ethnic group. I didn't imagine this, think this up. I wasn't in Vareš but I'm talking about the general state of affairs, not what

happened to you, and it is with regret that I learn what happened to you, but who took part in the knowledge that you had four and a half thousand Deutschmarks. This is something that the Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina must establish, which unfortunately isn't doing that, and I'm asking you about the overall situation regardless of the very ugly and terrible personal fates that you individually suffered. I don't want to contest that at all. So I'm asking you once again: After the arrival of the 15.000 people from Kakanj who were expelled in June 1993, up until the 18th of October of that same year in Vareš, generally speaking, without taking into account the terrible situation you yourself were in, what - would you say that the situation was tolerable with a view to food, that it was a relatively calm, that kind of calm can exist in a state of war?

A. Well, it was peaceful, but there wasn't enough food because whatever we went to buy in Vareš we had to wait and they were – policemen were waiting for us at Stupni Do. We men wasn't - weren't able to go down to Vareš and the women had to make do and go to Breza and take the food. Now as far as shooting is concerned, there wasn't any of that.

Q. Thank you. I don't need to ask you anything else. Thank you for answering my questions and for coming here.

**Testimony of Prosecution protected witness with facial distortion (open session) on 20 March 2007,
Case Prlic et al., ICTY**

Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:

Q. Good afternoon, Madam Witness. I am accused before this court, and quite simply I am speaking in my own name, and it is own proper for me to face the bad things that happened to you too. I'm not going to ask you about that. Heaven forbid. I'm going to ask you about some of the things that the Prosecutor wanted to prove through you. The first matter are telephones in Vareš. The Prosecutor asked you whether after the HVO takeover in Vareš whether you could phone Zenica, Tuzla, and Sarajevo and your answer was no; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether Sarajevo could phone Tuzla?

A. I don't know.

Q. Could you make telephone calls from Zenica to Tuzla?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know anything about coaxial cables for the transmission of such signals and repeaters and things like that? Do you know anything about that?

A. No.

Q. You don't know under whose control these coaxial cables were between towns, and repeaters, and communication centers of that nature? Do you know anything about that?

A. I don't know anything.

Q. Do you know what the last day was when one could make telephone calls from - from Sarajevo to anywhere?

A. I don't know.

Q. My second question has to do with the Prosecutor's question stating when the people from Kakanj arrived. Tell me, did they come to Vareš as a tourist excursion, or were they expelled from Kakanj, to the best of your knowledge?

A. To the best of my knowledge - well, I don't know. It's not that they were expelled. It was more a case of them having fled. I don't know exactly.

Q. All right. You don't know. You stated that in Vareš everything was cheap and there was an abundance of everything and that there was an oasis of peace under HVO authority. I'm putting two questions to you. Regardless of the arrival of 15.000 inhabitants of Kakanj who had fled from something to Vareš, and that was in June 1993, nevertheless, the situation was good, wasn't it, all the way up to this 23rd of October? Can we agree on that?

A. Well, we can.

Q. Very well. Thank you. Also, you said that in Vareš it was much better than in other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tell me, did you go from Vareš to Tuzla, Zenica, Busovača, Vitez? Did you actually know what it was like in other areas so that you could make this kind of comparison, saying that it was, say, better in Vareš than it was in Kiseljak?

A. According to what - well, while we had some kind of TV programme we could see that in some places there was nothing to eat, whereas in Vareš there were all sorts of things, and nothing was expensive at that. Many people in Bosnia-Herzegovina had nothing to eat and had no money to buy anything with, and we had everything.

Q. Thank you for your answer. Please, these convoys that brought food into Vareš, where were they coming from?

A. I don't know exactly.

Q. Very well. Just one more thing. In paragraph 5 of your statement - could I please have a look - you said that a week before the 23rd, in Vareš there was a kind of ominous peace. So there was this tension, but it was quiet.

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to read paragraph five where you say: "Seven days before the attack on Stupni Do the town of Vareš was completely empty. There was something going on. Nobody was in the cafes or in the streets, even no soldiers. They used to be there but now they had gone. The front linings from Kakanj to Vareš were broken. At that time there was some shooting by our BiH army, and the front lines to Kopljari were also broken." Yes. Is this correct what you had stated?

A. Yes.

Q. So according to your statement, is it not the case that seven days before the 23rd, the BiH started attacking this oasis of peace with an abundance of food and everything else, inexpensive? They were attacking the HVO. Is that the way it was?

A. I don't know.

Q. Just two more things. First of all, your mother, your lady mother had a shop?

A. No. She worked in a shop for someone else.

Q. All right. In Vareš throughout this time, did you see any other money but Deutschmarks?

A. Yes, the Croatian kuna.

Q. Oh, the Croatian kuna was still there. So it could be exchanged for German marks; right?

A. Yes.

Q. There wasn't any other money that came, say, from Sarajevo, from the authorities that were in Sarajevo? There was no money that was printed by the national bank in Sarajevo?

A. No, nothing.

Q. Thank you. There weren't any Yugoslav dinars either; right?

A. No. I didn't come across any.

Q. You didn't come across any. As for the expulsion of the HVO, first question: Did you personally see any soldiers of the HVO threatening Croats to leave town, you personally?

A. I didn't because I was not there.

Q. And what about your father? Did he say to you that he had seen a single soldier of the HVO forcing Croats to leave Vareš by pointing rifles at them?

A. No. He just heard about this.

Q. All right. So everything you know about that is what you learned after the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina came and after the Croats left; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Testimony of Prosecution witness NELSON DRAPER on 28 March 2007, Case Prlic et al., ICTY

Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:

Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Draper. I would appreciate short answers, and if you want to give a longer explanation, could you please indicate that to me. I took part in that war, and when we look at photographs like this we must understand that that's part of those things that war brings, and we have to face them. You said that from your information from various sources the village was defended by 36 members of the BH army. Is that correct?

A. Yes, approximately 36. That's correct, sir.

Q. Thank you. From your scouting of the village, did you observe any trenches around the village?

A. We didn't go outside the village just due to safety concerns, for the team's safety itself. So, no, I didn't go through any trenches, sir. But through -

Q. Sorry, sorry. Could you - could you please answer again, because my - my headset was turned off for a second. I'm sorry.

A. Okay. I'll repeat my answer. No, we didn't go and visit any of the trench areas because of -- for safety concerns. It was a little bit too far out of the village, and we wouldn't be able to have the security provided with us, but I - so to answer your question, I personally didn't, no. We were there, sir, if that's what you mean. Defenders said there were trenches as we were manning them.

Q. Thank you very much. Do you know based on the interviews that you made that during the HVO attack on that defended village whether shooting came from houses as well as trenches? Are you aware that houses also held some combat positions?

A. Quite possibly, because I know there was BiH defenders protecting the shelters where inhabitants were protected.

Q. Thank you. Similarly, you noted quite clearly that 193 persons from that village survived what we call the massacre at Stupni Do. Is that right, 193 persons left that village alive?

A. Quite possible - yeah, right around that number. There might have been a few more that weren't on the list that I first received.

Q. In your report on page 17 of the Croatian version, there's something I want to read and then you will comment. It says: "Most HVO members were horrified when they had heard what had happened at Stupni Do. Nobody had told them about it before. The soldiers brought some food and treated them kindly." This is a reference to the large group of refugees received at that HVO check-point. You say: "Two UNPROFOR vehicles arrived, but the HVO prevented them from being evacuated because they were afraid. They were fearing - they were fearing a BH army attack." Is it true what you said in this report that these soldiers were horrified? One. And secondly, is it true that HVO soldiers received refugees at their check-point and later enabled them to cross over to BH-held territory?

A. Yeah, I recall that. That was from some of the witnesses and that group of refugees that arrived at that check-point that was manned by local HVO, and they were, I recall from the interview, they were -- didn't really realise what had gone on, weren't aware of it and what happened, and they were shocked at the events, and I believed dressed some of the wounded and give them some bread and some -- along those lines, what they had.

Q. Thank you very much. On page 13 of your report you say that based on some information you received later you learnt of something that was found at Stupni Do, and it was a sign which had the letters HOS there and an emblem of a checkerboard, red and white squares, and beneath the sign it said, "For homeland ready." Have I quoted your words well?

A. Yes, more than likely. I remember that was probably on the 12th of November 1993, when we had a return trip to Stupni Do and we were trying to identify all the body locations and the names of those people, and it was found on the ground at that time. Is this the one - I'm sure you read it. Is this the one where Master

Corporal McKee says that it was quite noticeable and he would have noticed it last time around?

Q. Thank you very much. Do you know that the HOS was not under the command of the Croatian Defence Council? Are you aware of this?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that these units were either an independent military force or are under the command of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. From the information I gathered from interviews they were under the command of Colonel Ivica Rajić from Kiseljak.

Q. I didn't receive interpretation. I'm not denying that they may have been under the command of Ivica Rajić, but they were not under the command of the HVO, but never mind. I should like to put another question to you, and could we have that video on standby, the one that we already watched. I would like it to be stopped at some sections. When on the 27th of October you entered the village for the first time, you inspected the village carefully and thoroughly; is that right?

A. Not myself. I had Master Corporal Scott McKee do the crime scene processing so he would have gone through it very closely, whereas I did a general walkthrough of the village to see what was what. I myself did not go through each crime scene processing it.

Q. Thank you very much. I'm interested in the following, Mr. Draper: Any one of the four TV crews, there were also security officers there, Mr. McKee, and you, all of you there were able to find 16 corpses; is that right?

A. Yeah. One of which that didn't appear to look like - well, we didn't know if it was an animal or human. But we treated it as a human. And ...

Q. Fine. So there could have been less than 16, but you definitely found 16 corpses. Can you explain the Honourable Judges in what way you were able to find 22 more bodies at a later stage, thus arriving at the total number of 37? This remains an enigma, a mystery. If you entered the village, you inspected it thoroughly and photographed it and established that there were 16 bodies. In what way were you subsequently able to arrive at 37 persons who were killed at Stupni Do through whichever procedures you used? And I don't know which sort of procedures these could have been. How is this possible?

A. After the 16 bodies were done and we left the area in early November, BiH authorities, I guess, mounted an offensive or whatever and took over the Stupni Do area. And once it was back under their control, the villagers were able to go back to their village, and of course the relatives and the victims knew where people were killed, and - plus do a more thorough search for bodies, and that's where the rest were discovered, because while we were there we did not shift through any of the burnt-down houses. Most of the bodies were found underneath debris from buildings that had collapsed in on them. And as - with the more interviews I did, the more corroboration I could get from people that had found these bodies. For example -

Q. My apologies, sir. Excuse me. Could we now have that video clip shown, and we will see that there are quite a few burnt houses there, but there are no ruins there. We will stop at some sections, and you will tell me which ruins you were supposed to shift through or sift through to find these additional corpses.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could we have the video played?

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, the video, please.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The first one. The long clip.

MR. FLYNN: Which part of the first one are we talking about, the part with the bodies, the crime scenes, or are we talking about the part with the damage to the buildings?

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Both of them. I will ask them to be stopped at some points to put questions.

Q. Sir, please let me know when you see the ruin that you were supposed to go through where you were unable to see dead bodies beforehand. We can see that the houses were burned.

[Videotape played]

THE WITNESS: Stop there.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Is this a ruin?

A. This is scene 1 where around - so you're asked after the 22 bodies that -

Q. Sir, please. I'm the one leading this. You're telling me that this is a ruin. We can't go into all the details, repeating that this is scene 1. You are here to assist us. You are supposed to say, "This is a ruin. We didn't have time to go through the ruin, and there may have been a dead body left beneath there." So please can you confirm for me the following: Is this a ruin?

A. I'm not quite following you. The - I cannot tell you what houses or what ruins the rest of the bodies were in. Only the people that found the bodies can do that for you. I wasn't there when it happen. So how can I say what building they were in? I would just be guessing or assuming. I can point out on the map that I made out, but those buildings and how they relate to the ruins on this film, I never lived there before, so I won't be able to say exactly which ruin the bodies were recovered in. Only the people that lived there and found the bodies would be able to do that, I would think, sir.

Q. Excuse me, Mr. Draper. The military police of the UN international forces went into a village, the village we're dealing with here. You were investigating there until the month of March 1994. You sign a report. You're talking about, at first, 16 persons plus some additional corpses.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Praljak, I must ask you to keep to the facts. There is no way that this witness has been investigating from the moment he started on 27 October 1993 until the month of March 1994. He was not there from A to B. Maybe it's a difficulty of the translation, but it gives a wrong impression. He did not stay several months there, he told us.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Very well. Honorable Judge, I -

JUDGE TRECHSEL: I apologize. But he was not in Stupni Do all the time. That is what I wanted to say.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I didn't say that. Can the basis be accepted? We have the fact that four TV crews and a group of international professional police investigators visited a village that was burned but was not in ruins, and one did not need to have excavators there. One could see dead bodies, both those burned and unburned, and then they established that there were 16 bodies. The rest is propaganda. This was used in the BH press, who increased the number up to 100, and here they increased it to 37. I'm not trying to downplay the events. I only wish to arrive at the truth of what actually happened and at the accurate figures. How could one get from the figure of 16 to 37? Where were 22 bodies then? We're not talking about possibly two bodies that they might have overlooked. These were 22 bodies that were additionally listed as Stupni Do victims.

That's why, Mr. Draper, I'm asking you to indicate for me here where is that ruin which held so much rubble that you had to dig under there to find 22 persons? But I may move on. I will move on to other matters. Could we play the video.

[Videotape played]

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could you stop there, please.

Evidently we could see a woman on the right-hand side wearing a military shirt and a military jacket. Is that true, Mr. Draper? Is that what we were able to see there?

A. I can't tell from here -- from here, but, yeah, there was one that had a military top on.

Q. The third woman whose photograph we did not see, who was between the two women in the background, was she not also wearing a military jacket? You may know that or not. One of the two women we can see is wearing a military jacket. The other one isn't. What about the third woman who was killed there? Did she have a military uniform on or not? If you don't know, tell us, and we can move on.

A. I'm not seeing anything on my screen other than black. Have you got a different... There was a flash of -

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Can I suggest that rather than taking this video where one doesn't see anything, I didn't even distinguish a woman, you did back, Mr. Praljak, for your question to the pictures, and the picture 00357599 would be the good one, I suggest.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] 599. Yes, please. Could we please have photograph 00357599.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Praljak.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could we have the photograph? 6116.

MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] The photograph Mr. Praljak is showing you to is 113.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] No. 7599. That's the photograph. Could you enlarge it, please? Do you see, sir, that the woman who was killed and who is on the right-hand side is wearing a T-shirt and a jacket that are part of a military uniform?

A. The vest definitely looks military. T-shirt, it looks kind of greenish, military greenish.

Q. Mr. Draper, you're saying "it seems." Let us be specific. Is this the top part of a military uniform, the T-shirt and the jacket? You're a professional officer?

A. It looks like one, sir, but -- but maybe, yeah, it looks like one.

Q. Very well. The woman whose head we see leaning forward and who was killed there, was she wearing a military uniform or not, to your knowledge?

A. I can't tell from this photo, sir.

Q. Very well.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: As long as we have the picture, there is fabric with a kind of a flower pattern on the lower part of the woman to the right in the picture. Can you tell us what this is?

THE WITNESS: The lower part of her clothing?

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes, where her left hand is resting on.

THE WITNESS: Part of her lower part of - I don't know. It looks like a dress to me.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Or a skirt?

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Yes. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] In my view, it would be a ribbon perhaps covering that part of the body, or a handkerchief or something. But let's move on.

Do you know that according to the statements here a pistol and a hand grenade were found in the cellar? Were you aware of the fact that according to some statements they had a hand grenade with them?

A. Not in the statements I have, no, I'm not. Or the interviews I did.

Q. I have one strictly military question. When gunfire is opened from houses and positions are being taken, if somebody in the house is wearing a military uniform would it not be only a natural reaction and part of the professional conduct of armies that upon entering a house and seeing a military uniform the soldier concerned would open fire automatically? Therefore, a soldier entering a house and a cellar in the course of fighting, upon seeing a person - or upon seeing a military uniform would instinctively open fire?

A. Are you talking about these people, this person that's there and the other two ladies? Like I --

Q. Sir, my question is quite simple. As a member of the Canadian army, a professional, when you attended trainings concerning capturing features including houses, because I suppose it is quite ordinary for - sometimes for military positions to be held in houses, is it not natural for the people present in these houses would come out bearing a white cloth and surrendering themselves, or else soldiers capturing these positions enter the house, they smash the doors and open fire without asking whether anyone is in the house, because presumably, had anyone been in the house, they would have surrendered. Was this not part of your professional training?

A. No. I'm a military policeman, and my training is, you know, before you - you -

Q. Very well. Thank you. You don't know anything about this. Very well. Let's move on.

Could you play the video, please.

JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Witness, this picture is disturbing indeed, and I had put the question myself to you during the examination-in-chief, and I believe we must pay attention to what the Accused Praljak is currently telling us. My question is as follows: Based on your experience in Stupni Do, in that region where the armed conflict was taking place, were people, was the population aware that by wearing a military uniform they could be mistaken for combatants? Were they aware of that, first? And in order to avoid being targeted, would people prefer not to wear military uniforms? I hope you've understood my questions. If not, I'm ready to repeat it.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. If I was in that situation or if that was my wife, she definitely wouldn't be wearing camouflage, because, you know, walking around in a war zone wearing camouflage would make anybody a target, I would assume. But I've never been at war and this is only assumption on my part, but I definitely wouldn't want to be a civilian - or if I wasn't part of a military organization in a war zone, I wouldn't want to be wearing camouflage of any type or have any military attire around me. Does that answer your question, sir? Like for me as a military policeman, we're trained to not shoot and ask questions later. We have to make sure there is a threat to life before we draw the weapon. Whereas a soldier-soldier relation, it might be different, but I was trained as a military policeman, not an infantry soldier.

JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Thank you.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Our time is almost up. One more question. These sacks that we see on the left-hand side, did you see any windows in the cellar that could have been used as an opening out of which one could fire? Did you notice if the cellar had any windows?

A. Through witness statements there was a girl hiding underneath the legs of these three women, and when the HVO soldiers left after killing them, she slipped out between them and went out a window in this room. That would have been Mufida Likić. She was already shot in the leg.

Q. Please, permit me to tell you that you have to listen to my question. I don't know how it is being interpreted to you. In - to your knowledge, did this cellar have a window, and could these sacks have possibly been used as part of the protection normally used in fortified positions? That was my question.

A. I can't tell you that for sure, sir. But they're -

Q. Thank you. Thank you very much. I would like the video to be played because we could see some shells there, and perhaps we could continue that tomorrow. Let me now put this question to you: These 22 dead bodies that were found later to have allegedly been killed at Stupni Do, was this something that you arrived at based solely on the information you received solely from the BH army? Therefore, the 22 dead bodies that you did not detect at the time you were there, did you infer that they were there exclusively on the basis of the information provided to you by the BH army after they had captured both Vareš and Stupni Do?

[Videotape played]

THE WITNESS: The information was provided by the villagers themselves.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. When? Since what date did you start receiving information about possible additional victims from Stupni Do?

A. Probably be early November to - right up to March. Early November 1993 to March 1994.

Testimony of Prosecution witness NELSON DRAPER on 29 March 2007, Case Prlic et al., ICTY

Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:

Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Draper. As we did not finish reviewing the video material yesterday, I would like the AV booth to prepare the video footage while I ask some questions. You learnt, sir, that approximately 36 members of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina defended the village of Stupni Do. Did you ask for and obtain the names of the members of BH army in that village? I'm asking you this because maybe we could later by comparison establish which of the victims were civilians and which were members of the BH army. So did you find out the names of the BH army members in the village?

A. Only through witness interviews, and I wouldn't have - I don't think I got the names of everyone. As the witnesses were interviewed, they were asked if they were a member of the defender force. So name - we got names, though I don't think we got them all. We didn't have - we weren't able to interview all of them.

Q. Do you remember how many names you were given?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Thank you. Did you find out from talking to the witnesses that members of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Stupni Do were dressed some in uniform, some in civilian clothes? Are you aware of that?

A. I know that a lot of them were -- lived in the village, so they would dress in their normal clothes. If they had regular uniforms of the BHI -- BiH, I'm not too sure on that.

Q. Thank you. On the 27th of October, you noted - in fact, you and your team found 16 victims. When in March, 1994, you concluded your investigation saying there were 37 victims in Stupni Do, can you tell me how the number of victims increased progressively over the months? If there were 16 in October, how many more were there in November, December, January, and February? Can you give me an idea of the timetable of increase of victims in Stupni Do until the end of your investigation?

A. Yeah. At the beginning of the end of the investigation, we had 16 bodies from the initial investigation, and then we obtained the list of people that were still living and people that were deceased or not accounted for. These people that were deceased or not accounted for were that list of 38 I think you're referring to. As time progressed and we did interviews, witnesses would come forward and say they - for example, one was missing seven members of his family and couldn't account for them; then as time progressed and they returned to the village and rummaged or went through the wreckage of their houses, they located the rest of their family members. And as this progressed through November, they were eventually able to account for the rest of the remaining family members and bodies that are on that list of 38 that's included in my report. Some of the bodies were recovered and, I believe, brought to the mortuary later on.

Q. Mr. Draper, please don't give me explanations I did not ask for. My question is precise and clear. Can you give an answer to this Trial Chamber as to how the number of victims increased progressively over the months in the course of your investigation? How many victims did you have on the 27th? How many there were on record in November, in December, January, and February? How did the number of victims increase over the months?

A. The original number of victims were pretty well from the outset that list of 38. Confirmation of them didn't come until witnesses were interviewed and confirmed that they had recovered the bodies or portions of the bodies or what was left of the bodies. That's the best answer I can give you, sir.

Q. All right. I'm not getting anywhere much. The original number was 16, but can you answer this: If all the remaining villagers had withdrawn to the free territory of the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and all of them knew one another, most of them had the same surname, how was it possible for people not to know where their five or six family members were, and how was it possible for them to only find out several months later? Didn't you ever have suspicions about the fact that the population of one rather small village finds out that they were missing a dozen members, a dozen men, a couple of months later and they were all located within a relatively small area? Did you have any suspicions then?

A. I'm sorry. I probably didn't explain myself. All the bodies were pretty well recovered in November as soon as the villagers got home. I didn't confirm it until I was able to interview these individuals and being able to track them down and interview them took me up to March 1990. The bodies themselves were recovered fairly quickly.

Q. Who recovered those bodies? Your team found them, or did people tell you they recovered them?

A. People told me that they recovered them, sir.

Q. Very well. Thank you. According to witness statements and to what you concluded with - after witness interviews, they said that there were approximately 150 people in the village in two or three houses, and they managed to fend off the attack with hand grenades. So, 150 people using hand grenades. In that village, from what we heard, there were death squadrons of - from Apostoli and Maturice armed with RPGs and other heavier weapons, and all of them managed to pull out, reach the HVO check-point, and retreat towards Breza. Never mind where. Please tell me, how was it possible, and how do you explain that 150 people did not surrender, wielded hand grenades? They were surrounded by HVO units with rocket launchers, RPGs, hand-held rocket launchers, and that group was not captured, was not killed, a group of 150 men.

MR. FLYNN: With respect, Your Honors, I don't think it's fair to ask the witness to answer that question. It calls for too much speculation.

MS. ALABURIĆ: [Interpretation] Your Honors, if you allow me, I'd like to say why the question of General Praljak is appropriate. In the documentation the Prosecution provided with this witness, we have a witness statement from Halid Likic who was a member of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he was a radio operator in Stupni Do. He said that he was based in a schoolhouse, and he tried to contact the command of the BH army in Budoželj to get assistance and protection from the UNPROFOR. The command of the BH army did promise him that assistance, and that's probably the reason why BH army members decided to stay in the village and try to defend it. In that sense, I believe this question is absolutely legitimate and justified.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have heard the question, the objection as well. General Praljak put a purely military question to you. He's asking for a military explanation. In military terms, are you able to answer or not? If you're not, just say so and then we can move on.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] I think the question should be somewhat amended as put by Mr. Praljak. Here mention is made of 150 individuals; and in General Praljak's question, these people suddenly become 150 men. So I don't know how suddenly all these individuals are being identified as being males.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honor Judge Trechsel, I don't know if I said that. One hundred fifty people, I said, not men.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: It says "men."

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Indeed on line 23, "there was a group of 150 people." You probably said in your language men or so.

THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's mistake. I apologize.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] It's corrected now, so let's move on.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. I said precisely 150 people, some of which were members of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and according to witness testimony we heard here, they were defending themselves with a couple of hand grenades. Opposed to them is what I'm talking about and what we read in the report notorious Maturice units wielding RPGs, hand-held Zolja rocket launchers who blew off roofs, et cetera. That's what I'm asking the witness. If a massacre was attempted against a village and people were defending themselves with only hand grenades, how come there was no capture of those people? They were not massacred, instead they managed to retreat towards the woods. If you don't know the answer to this question, it's fine.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Without going into speculations, do you have an answer to this question or do you not have an answer?

THE WITNESS: From the interviews I did, it appeared that the BiH defenders, once their trench areas were overrun, they returned to the shelter areas and then one shelter told the people to run their shelter - their lines had been overrun so run for the woods. And some did; some didn't. And the remaining BiH defenders that stayed in the village stayed around the shelter areas. I had assumed just to protect their families. As for a military point of view, I can't give any - any insight there because I was - all my career I've been a military policeman, not so much a soldier on that aspect.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. All that is true. But in the concluding remarks of the report that you wrote and that was submitted to the United Nations, there was clearly indicated what the intent of the HVO was. It's inconceivable how somebody managed to capture all the trenches and then let through all those defenders if their intention was to capture or massacre the population. Now, you were working step-by-step, and at that time I was commander of the Main Staff of the HVO. And I want to ask you: Did you feel the need, you or your superiors, to share the results of your investigation with my Main Staff or any other judicial or political authority of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia?

A. That kind of information would have been looked after by BH command legal, not myself.

Q. All right. Did you suggest that it would be a good idea to submit that to the Main Staff so that the Main Staff can assist you in your investigation? Did you make that suggestion? I don't know whose decision it was, but did you suggest that it would be a good idea to involve the Main Staff of the HVO in your investigation?

A. The only information I can give you there is I did submit a memorandum to BH command legal, requesting that they get ahold of HVO because I wanted to interview anyone involved in the attack on - on Stupni Do. And a copy of that, I believe, is in my report, and results of that, I think there was two memorandums that came back that I think are also in the report from Koak [phoen], where he talked with, I think, Mr. Banić and an HVO liaison officer.

Q. After learning what you learned in Stupni Do on the 27th, Vareš had not fallen yet at that time, did you attempt to go to Vareš and talk to the civilian police or somebody else? Of the HVO, I mean.

A. At the time I believe that we were working out of Kiseljak, and we tried to get some witness interviews first to see what had happened, and then we were restricted from doing any kind of movement - we weren't allowed to go back to Vareš for a while because the BiH were moving in. So for our safety, the BH command wouldn't let us leave.

Q. Thank you. Could we now play again the video clip? I have some more questions.

[Videotape played]

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Stop here, please.

Here, next to this white little bag or sack, we see something that looks a lot like - and I'm not sure about this. That's why I wanted to ask you. It looks a lot like a casing from an artillery barrel, and could this thing next to the bag be an artillery shell or a grenade - a mortar grenade? Did you try to explain in your investigation what the object on the left and the object on the right are?

A. No.

Q. So you did not go on to check whether there was a mortar shell, a piece of a mortar, or something else?

A. No.

Q. Did you know if the BH army in Stupni Do had a mortar or any other artillery piece? Did you come by any such information?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. I don't need the video footage any more. Could we please retrieve the - the stills from the footage from the autopsies we saw. I will not be going into this because Judge Antonetti already asked you about the discrepancy between the charred bodies and the surroundings where the bodies were seen, which did not seem to fit into the whole picture.

The autopsy report is which number? Can the Prosecution help me, please? I didn't write down the number.

MR. FLYNN: The number is P06314.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The photograph. The Prosecutor showed them for just a second. Not the photographs, the footage that we saw for a very brief time.

MR. FLYNN: I understand. These were extracts from P06318.

[Videotape played]

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Prosecutor. I'm interested in the third or fourth photograph. Look at this photograph. I'm - I find it actually hard to even put questions about this, but look at this area on the right-hand side, which looks like the head of an animal. Could we please play this particular sequence from the start.

[Videotape played several times]

Q. Did you see this burned body? The doctors who were part of your team, did they take a look at this, and did they identify this as the charred part of human body or...

A. There was one - one body that the medical officers wasn't too sure if it was a human or an animal; whereas, the - some of the medical persons thought it might be a body so we treated it as same.

Q. Very well. That was all. Tell me the following: When conducting this investigation, were you guided by the fact that even a crime should be investigated within certain standards, and that one needs to be guided by the factual findings as they will, in fact, lead to the truth and only such an investigation based on such principles can provide adequate vindication to the victims? Were you guided by such principles in your investigation?

A. All the standards of investigations I -- I tried to abide by to get to the truth of the matter whatever that would be.

Q. Thank you.

Testimony of Prosecution witness HAKAN BIRGER on 27 March 2007, Case Prlic et al., ICTY

Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:

Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Witness. I would like to place a map by Mr. Birger. And while that is being done, let me ask you this: From all you know, were there elements of civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Did that conflict include certain elements of civil war? From everything you know from history or -

JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, Mr. Praljak. I think that's not the correct question because it asks for a legal qualification, which the witness is not qualified to give.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Never mind then.

Q. You said you had not seen a single Mujahedin. Did your superiors inform you of the existence of Mujahedin in the 3rd Corps and their number? Did you have such information?

A. We have some information that it was what you call Muslim elements in - in the 3rd Corps, and also information about it was very hardly [sic] corps, and we have also example for that in the village of Borovica.

Q. I am sincerely surprised by your references to some information, certain knowledge, et cetera. You were soldiers. I'm sure that you had pretty good briefings. Anyway, you have a map behind you which depicts the development of movements of the 3rd and later 2nd Corps against Vareš. The map was developed based on your diary and some information you have already shared with us. Could you please look at the map and tell us whether it is accurate. And if you don't think it's accurate, could you tell us in which way. The colour green shows the advance of the Muslims, the fall of various villages as described in your diary until their entry into Vareš, and on the right-hand side the pull-out of the HVO, the refugees towards Daštansko, and the areas controlled by the army of Republika Srpska. Is this military map accurate?

JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. I'm asking the technicians whether it's possible to let us share the view of the map, because at this distance without the optical instrument necessary we cannot see it. Maybe a camera could - yes. That's already better. Maybe it can be a bit sharper.

THE WITNESS: I can explain little. What I can see - what I can - it's not working. What I can see here on the map, it should be the 3rd Corps who was attacking up in Duboštica and in Vijaka. In my opinion, it was wrong; it was forces from the 2nd Corps, and it was forces from the 3rd Corps up in the line like this, north of Borovica and south, in this direction. Here it was forces from the 2nd Corps who was attacking the pocket of Vareš. That seems correct here down, think it was attacking in this direction. It was also correct that were, so to say, the rest of Bobovac Brigade escaped to the village of Daštansko in this area here and they would stay here after it had been a little bit calmed down in the area. So it's more or less here up. I don't think it's really correct, in my opinion, about it, what we understand. It was the 3rd Corps, the 3rd Operational Group from a third - from a second corps who attack and take Duboštica and Pogar.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]: Thank you very much. I just want to make one thing clear. Do you know that Krivaja river depicted in the upper part of the map separated the 3rd from the 2nd Corps? Do you know that Krivaja river was the separation line between the 2nd and the 3rd Corps? Therefore, this map depicts the position of the 2nd Corps completely correctly as attacking Vijaka village? If you know these two things, that Krivaja was the separation line between the 2nd and the 3rd Corps, and indeed it is indicated that the 2nd Corps was attacking Vici or Vijaka village, then it is quite accurately depicted on the map that these various components attacked these villages.

A. I say it again. It was the 2nd Corps who was attacking in this area in Pogar, Vijaka, and also the representatives of the 2nd Corps. The command of the 3rd OG, they have their responsibility for various area. Later they change. They changed command. They changed forces inside Vareš area. It was sometimes I understand it was from the 3rd Corps, but in the end of my time in - at the month of April, the Vareš area and so on was the part of the 1st Corps, 1st Corps. But I don't really know what - I can understand where -

Q. Lieutenant Colonel, please. Please. I'm asking you kindly. We're talking about the fall of Vareš. We're not talking about April 1994. I'm asking you nicely. Tell me, if you think this map is inaccurate, how is it inaccurate? Take a pencil and say, "I think the map is inaccurately depicting this. I don't think the 3rd Corps was there. I think the 2nd corps was there instead." Leave the - April 1994 alone. Please take a pencil and tell me, "Mr. Praljak, it's incorrect in this and that spot for this and that reason."

MR. MUNDIS: The Prosecution objects, Your Honor. We have given both the Praljak Defence team and General Praljak some leeway here. But really we've gone well beyond context in terms of what might be admissible. This is generally, this is irrelevant to the charges listed in the indictment. The Vareš municipality charges certainly are much more narrow than any of this evidence that General Praljak is seeking to educe and this is, with all due respect, not a productive use of the Trial Chamber's time.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, you have a map before you. The Defence is showing you this map. From where I'm sitting, but I was able to see the map on the screen, it would seem that the Vareš area was circled by the BiH army except at the bottom where we see that the VRS is holding the position at the bottom. Now, the Defence, or General Praljak, is telling you that it's the 3rd Corps that was attacking or that was making this operation on Vareš. You see the 2nd Corps, the 3rd Corps. Except for the mention of the 2nd Corps to the right where you can see 2nd Corps.

Now, this being said, do you agree with the lines the way they were drafted here, and independently of the lines the fact that there is a mention of a 3rd Corps and a 2nd Corps, is that placed where they really were placed at the time? And this is with regard to the period covering the end of October, early November, since the dates that General Praljak is mentioning go from the 18th to the 22nd of October. It's Pogar, and they also go to the 3rd of November.

So now, there you are. You were there. Only you can tell us what the situation was like. You were a neutral party, and you can tell us if this map is correct, if it's not correct. And if I understood you correctly, I thought General Praljak wanted you to tell us why you don't agree with this map and what is erroneous with this map and what does not correspond to what you saw on the field when you were deployed.

THE WITNESS: That's correct. That's both the 3rd Corps and the 2nd Corps who get inside Vareš. 2nd Corps more or less from east and the north, and the 3rd Corps from west and south. The only thing I don't agree with the map was up in Duboštica, Pogar area. I said that was the 2nd Corps was attacked. The situation in Vareš area with these both corps is correct in this days we are talking about. They came into Vareš from different - from north and south, so to say. That's correct.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Can you please mark next to Duboštica, can you please mark that spot and write the 2nd Corps. And can you then please sign map and place today's date on it.

A. I must say I couldn't do that exactly. That's impossibility of two reasons. It's a long time ago, and we don't have that exact information. I could only talk about village. What I know, the village of Duboštica was taken by the 2nd corps, the 3rd Operational Group, because we meet the commander there at the evening when it was taken. We also could see they have prisoners from HVO there [Realtime transcript read in error "from there"], prisoner of war. We also know that the village of Pogar was taken by the 2nd Corps because I meet the Chief of Staff of the corps up in Pogar which day it was taken. But exactly where the border between these two corps was in the terrain, I couldn't mark out. I could only talking about village.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, you told us that Duboštica and Pogar were taken by the 2nd Corps. Is that right?

THE WITNESS: That's right, yes.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could you please circle Duboštica. Put a circle around Duboštica and write 2nd Corps next to it.

MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honor, I apologize for interrupting the examination, but I see that there's one sentence uttered by the witness that was not reflected in the record. The witness said that when he met at Duboštica with the representatives of the 2nd Corps that he saw HVO prisoners of war there and this sentence was left out of the record.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] So the witness repeat it.

THE WITNESS: I can repeat it, and it was not my person. It was my deputy commander who was there and he reporting to me. It was about 20, 25 prisoner of war HVO soldiers in Duboštica.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask Their Honors to permit the witness to sign the - and place the date.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you please put on the map Duboštica and Pogar and please write down 2nd Corps because this is what you told us.

THE WITNESS: [Marks]

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Could you write "The 2nd Corps," please.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can you remember, could you please mark 2nd Corps around the two circles, because the witness told us it was 2nd Corps.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, you drew two circles. Now, these two circles, do they correspond to the 2nd Corps? If so, then please just mark under the circles, 2nd Corps.

THE WITNESS: The circle is the two village.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well. Could you please give us a number.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, this map will become Exhibit IC 510.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It is 10.40. We'll take a 20-minute break.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Praljak, how much time do you need to complete your questions?

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honor, several minutes. I only have a couple of questions left.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A few minutes. That could mean one hour, because one hour is 60 minutes. You are talking about several minutes. What does it mean?

.....

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. In your statement given on the 6th and the 7th of February, 2001, on page 3 in the Croatian version you speak of the 21st of October, 1993, and on page 4 you say the following concerning this date: "I left Kopjari around 1700 hours. As I was leaving, the commander of the BH army on the ground called out to me and said, 'See you in Vareš.' On our way I saw some soldiers of the BH army herding sheep from Kopjari to Dragovići." Is it true that this is something that you said concerning the 21st of October, 1993, that one of the BH army commanders said, "See you in Vareš"?

A. Yes. He said so, yes, that's correct.

Q. Thank you. I am not allowed to ask you about the legal qualifications or the legal definitions of civil war, but I can ask you the following as an officer: Do you know how civilians and soldiers were treated in the American civil war?

MR. MUNDIS: Objection, relevance.

MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honor, the question was misinterpreted. The question was interpreted as how civilians and soldiers were treated in the American civil war. The question was: What was the ratio between civilian and military casualties.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] My question is quite technical. Therefore, in the American civil war, what was the ratio between civilian casualties and military casualties?

JUDGE TRECHSEL: I must agree with the Prosecutor. This is not a question for a witness who is here to tell what his experience was, what he has seen and heard in the connection with Vareš. It's a question for an expert on American history.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honor, any senior officer -

JUDGE TRECHSEL: We're not going to discuss this. The Court rules.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, can you please move on to another question for the following reason: What took place during the civil war in the United States of America is something of a very complex nature, and the witness will probably not be in a position to shed any light on this for the Chamber, and we are very, very far from what - from your case, from what is at the heart of your case. So intellectually speaking, yes, indeed that can be a very interesting question, but legally speaking it's irrelevant. That's why my fellow Judge has asked you to move on to a different topic.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Very well. There was this question that after World War I in any subsequent war there were more civilian than military deaths and the ratio was always negative.

Q. But tell me the following: The communications systems you used between platoons and companies, did it require you to have a position on higher ground, or were your communication - communications always operational also with the units that were stationed in valleys? My question, therefore, is: Did your communications system function at all times in and around Vareš?

A. In this time we have an operation -- I had one platoon in Kopjari area, and we have clear contact with radio contact from my company staff in Vareš to this place. It was no problem. It was therefore -- also was informed of - about the attack of Kopjari this morning, the 21st of October.

Q. Lieutenant Colonel, I didn't mention Kopjari at all, and I did not mention the communications between Kopjari and Vareš. My question to you was: At any point in time when your units were stationed in valleys were they able to communicate properly, given the layout of the terrain, or did you perhaps have difficulties in communicating with an APC or a platoon if it was in a depression. Did you have any such communications difficulties and, if so, which?

A. Yes I agree with what you are saying. There was some problem with radio communications. So therefore we put up one platoon in Mijakovići. It's up in the area here, in the highest place north of - of here. I think it's not on the map, but here, up in the mountains, we had one platoon. So we use this platoon also to say to Vareš - we use it for communications. Yes, yes, correct.

Q. Right. So you had to have a platoon stationed on higher ground to use it as an intermediary for the purposes of communications; is that right?

A. That's right.

Q. Thank you very much.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have no further questions. Thank you, Lieutenant Colonel, for your exhaustive answers.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION
OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY
OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Name: LIKIĆ Last Kemal First

Nickname/Alias: Last First Middle

L.K.
C.F.R.

Address: [Redacted]

Telephone: [Redacted] Date of Birth: January 4, 1953.

Gender: MALE

Ethnic Origin: MUSLIM

Religion: ISLAM

Occupation: Current: NIL

Former: Miner

Language(s) Spoken: BOSNIAN

Language(s) Written: BOSNIAN

Date(s) of Interview(s): 16 MARCH, 1996

Interviewer: Ehsan Ullah BAJWA

Interpreter: Jasmina LIBRAHIMOVIĆ

Language(s) Used in Interview: BOSNIAN AND ENGLISH

Names of all persons present during interview(s):

Signed/Initialed *Likić Kemal L.K.*
Jasmina S. Ibrahimović J.S.
[Signature]

WITNESS STATEMENT

1 My name is LIKIĆ, Kemal and I was born on January 4, 1953 in the village of Stupni Do in the municipality of Vareš. I was married in 1975 to Kada LIKIĆ. I have two children now; LIKIĆ, Dženana born in April 1983 and LIKIĆ, Adisa born in October 1995. My third child, a son LIKIĆ, Adis was killed during the Stupni Do attack and at the time of the attack he was seventeen years of age. I have been a miner and my place of work was near the town of Vareš.

2 I started performing guard duty of the village on July 1, 1992. Other people had already organised guard duty and I joined them at that time. Among those who were at that time performing the duty I remember the names of the following:

-LIKIĆ, Samir
-LIKIĆ, Bajro
-LIKIĆ, Sulejman

LIKIĆ, Esref was the incharge of the village guards.

3 At the start we did not have any weapons. We only had two hunting rifles, two Russian automatic rifles.

4 There were the following places around the village where there were trenches to defend the village and where we would perform the guard duty:

① On the way from Vareš Majdan to Stupni Do the place called 'POTOK'. The point was set up only after the problems with the Croats started. There was a shed made of timber where we would take shelter. Beside the shed, there was a trench deep enough for two people to stand inside and take cover. The purpose of the point was to watch over the traffic from Vareš Majdan and to prevent the possibility of attack from that side,

② The other entrenched point and hence duty point was 'BRADVICA' to defend against the possibility of attack from the Serb position at ŽISCI and the point also later served the second purpose of watching over the Croat village of Bijelo Borje.

③ the third point of trench was at RASKRŠĆE; the point was at the intersection of the Mir-Bijelo Borje road and the road that branched off to ŽISCI

④ The trench at BOROVA GLAVA to protect against the possibility of attack from ŽISCI and later Mir

⑤ The trench point of 'DO' to protect against the possibility of attack from the Croat village of Mir and the point was set up only after the problems with Croats had started


⑥ The point called BOGOŠ which was also started after the problems with Croats cropped up and was designed to protect against the possibility of attack from Mir

⑦ The point called STIJENCICA that was designed to protect against the possibility of attack from the Croat village of Prnjavor and Planinica

Thus the three trench points of BRADVICA, RASKRŠĆE and BOROVA GLAVA were initially the points that were initially being manned to defend against Serbs and the other four abovementioned points were established and manned only after the problems with Croats began.

5 Even before the emergence of problems with the Croats, the Croats did not join us to defend against the Serbs; they may have, however, organised defenses in their own villages.

6 I have drawn a sketch of the respective locations of the different trench-points that I have speaking of for purposes of illustration, signed it and given the sketch to the interviewer.

 L. K.
J. J.

- 7 Beside each of the trench we had built up a small log cabin. We would stay in the cabin where we would light fires to keep ourselves warm. Every now and then we could go out just to observe the area around. We would normally rotate from one point to another. There were about forty-three guards in the village and since finally it had come to be seven points of duty, so at each point there were normally three people and in one guard-shift about twenty-one people. 'POTAK' was the most unpopular duty-point because of the perilousness of its position; it was between two hills and situated in a way that it could be attacked and those manning it would find it very hard to defend it.
- 8 On the night between the 22nd and 23rd of October, 1993 my point of duty was BOROVA GLAVA. My companions were Avdija LIKIC and Rifet LIKIC. The shift started at 1900 hours on 22nd of October and it continued until 0700 hours in the morning of 23rd October 1993. We could see the village of Mir but of course our visibility was obstructed due to the dark of the night. All three of us stayed in the trench the whole night. None of the three of us at BOROVA GLAVA noticed any unusual movement, of vehicles or men. None of us noticed any unusual sound. At 0700 hours, the next shift came of which I remember the names of LIKIC, Mustafa and LIKIC, Meho. I do not remember the name of the third. All three of us who had performed the night shift left BOROVA GLAVA together after the arrival of the next shift.
- 9 On the way to home I met my daughter Dzenana who was taking our two cows for grazing and was accompanied by Nerma who had her own cow. From BOROVA GLAVA I came direct to my house. I should have reached the house at quarter past seven. My wife Kada, my son Adis were present at home. My wife wanted me to accompany her to the neighbouring house of Nevzeta for taking our morning coffee and so I went with her leaving Adis alone at home. The coffee was still being beaten when the attack on the village of Stupni Do.
- 10 I rushed back to my house, put on my uniform that I had personally bought from Breza and taking my Automatic Russian gun I got out of the house. The firing was so intense that I had to crawl to the house of my neighbour Salko LIKIC. Together me and Salko went to the trench position of BOGOS which was the most important point. We went crawling where the ground was open and running kowtwd when we were in the clumps of trees.
- 11 The two of us ran across the road that goes to Prica Do near the house of Ismet LIKIC. We met Enver LULIC, Nermin LIKIC and Suvad LIKIC on our way. We were able to reach a point called RAVNICA in the woods on our way to BOGOS. I know that on that morning the following five were performing the day-shift on BOGOS:
- Muamer LIKIC
 - Sevkija LIKIC
 - Mujcin LIKIC
 - Ejup LIKIC and
 - Ismet LIKIC
- 12 At Ravnica we met Mujcin, Ejup and Ismet who told us that Muamer and Sevkija LIKICs had been killed defending the BOGOS position and BOGOS had already fell to the attackers. Salko, whose son Muamer had been at the peak BOGOS, clambered

Handwritten signature: Salko LIKIC

up running in that direction and his dead body was later found near the trenches at the top of BOGOŠ near the dead body of his son, Muamer.

13 There were ten of us now left behind after the departure of Salko LIKIĆ;

The following are the names:

- Myself
- Enver LULIĆ
- Nihad LULIĆ
- Džemo LIKIĆ
- Fadil LIKIĆ
- Rasim DŽAFO
- Mujčin LIKIĆ
- Ejup LIKIĆ
- Ismet LIKIĆ and
- Vejsil LIKIĆ

14 We could hear the attacking soldiers chanting, 'URA, SPREMNI ZA DOM!' and the cries were becoming louder.

We disposed ourselves to fight.

15 There was an engagement at that point that drew out to about two-and-half an hours. The attacking soldiers had higher positions and they were firing at us. And we were responding to that fire. The distance between the attackers and us should have been fifty meters but because of the trees we could not see them. I did not see any attacking soldier. I heard one of the attacking soldier saying: ' TOMO, ZAOBIĐI LIJEVIM KRILOM' that is, 'Tomo, go around from the left wing'.

After about three hours the shooting had stopped.

16 Sometime then Kada and Zineta came to us from the village. They brought a message for us to surrender. Kada, my wife, told me that she was the only survivor among those who were sheltered in our house and that the attacking Croat soldiers had killed everybody. She also told me that the commander of the Croat soldiers had told to some 'TOMO' not to shoot at Kada and Zineta because they were coming to tell us to surrender. We decided not to surrender. We told Kada and Zineta not to go down into the village. Now there were thirteen of us including the two women. Myself, Vejsil, Nihad, Enver, Nermin and Suvaid along with the two women stayed at Ranvnica and the others went down to the village to defend their families. Vejsil said that he wanted to leave. He said that he did not know what was going to happen to him because he had to pass through the Croat lines in Mir and Pajtov Han to go to Budoželj. He said that he would inform the ABiH in Budoželj and to ask for succour. Saying this Vejsil left. After the departure of Vejsil, we did not know what to do because the village had fallen to the HVO and we could not do anything to take it back. So sometime after Vejsil had left, Nihad, Enver, Nermin and Suvaid also decided to leave and try to go in the direction of Budoželj. After their departure, me, Rasim DŽAFO, Fadil LIKIĆ and the two women were left behind. We decided to go to Striježevo.

17 It was decided that we would go round the BOGOŠ and then walking in the woods parallel to the road from Vareš Majdan to Pajtov Han, we would try to go to Striježevo. Since there was an antiaircraft gun in Bijelo Borje, I told others to conceal them with some bushes and branches and then come crawling to reach across the clearing in the woods. I was the first to creep my way and I was fired at by the gun.

L. K.
J.H.

18. Since Zineta and Kada could not crawl, so they held some boughs around themselves and shuffled their way extremely slowly across the clearing and were not shot at. Rasim and Fadil were also able to make it. Walking we reached a cave in the the part of the woods called Mala Vraca. We reached the cave at about quarter to eight and left it at about half-past nine. We started to move to go around BOGOŠ.
19. We were able to reach Pajtov Han sometime in the night of the Sunday, at about two-thirty in the morning. But there was an HVO checkpoint there and we could not cross it. We were scared of being caught by the soldiers at the checkpoint trying to cross it. So we started walking back and stopped at a point in the woods when the sun rose and it became difficult to move unnoticed. On Sunday the whole day, we were on the other side of the BOGOŠ from where we could see the road from Vareš Majdan to Pajtov Han as well as road branching off from the main Vareš-Breza road toward Planinica.
20. I saw a locally made camouflage-painted HVO APC moving on the road and going to Pajtov Han. The APC made several rounds that day, between Vareš Majdan and Pajtov Han. I could see that it was an HVO because I could see that written on it though the APC was camouflaged with bushes-and-grass-net.
21. From my position in the woods I could also see the road to Planinica and I saw trucks carrying anti-aircraft machine-guns borne on TAM and anti-aircraft gun on a FAP, being carried to Planinica and I saw many groups of the HVO soldiers on the road to Planinica who were patrolling on the road.
The guns wer firing in the direction of Striježevo.
22. The whole day on Sunday and the following night, we were at the same point in the woods. We did not have anything to eat and to drink. So in the evening of the same day, i.e. Sunday, Fadil LKIĆ left us and I later came to know that he had escaped to Budoželj.
23. At about eight of clock in the morning of Monday, we decided to go back to the village hoping to be able to sneak into the village and to find something to eat there. We reached STIJENČICA near Priča Do. Near our trench in STIJENČICA I saw the dead body of Zejnil MAHMUTOVIĆ. He was lying with his belly and face on the ground and there was a big wound produced by the dum-dum bullet in his back.
24. It was about half-past eleven in the morning and a clear day. Leaving the women and Rasim DŽAFO behind, I approached a place we used to call KRČEVINA above Priča Do and from that point I could take a panoramic view of the village.
25. I saw the whole village in ruins. The whole village was burnt out and there were strands of smoke still rising from some houses; cattle nosing about at the charred wreckage of homes. I could hear the sounds of somebody singing in BRADVICA where we had a trench:

‘Sarajevo, ispod Trebevića
To je mjesto Ante Pavelić’


which means:

‘Sarajevo, below the hill of Trebević
That is the place of Ante Pavelić’

Handwritten signature/initials

*L. K.
J. H.*

26. I saw two soldiers at BOROVA GLAVA and they were roistering, drinking and shooting in the air. I could not recognize the soldiers.
27. I also heard sounds of dum-dum bullets being fired from where the POTOK trench was. I went back to where I had left others. Every now and then I would go back to the same point to see what was happening. I wanted to go back to the village to my home to find my son or his dead body but my wife stopped me and told me to go only at night when nobody could see me.
28. During one of these views, at about half-past one in the afternoon on the same day, Monday, I saw a jeep coming from the direction of the village of Mir. The jeep came to the village and stopped near GUVNO and out of it came Radomir OROZOVIĆ who was a Serb resident of our village married to a Croat woman by the name of Marija from Mir. Radomir was clad in a blue dungaree and there were two other men with him who were all clad in black uniforms and black caps similar to FES. They stopped near the house of Radomir and looked at the house and then they went back to Mir.
29. At about six in the evening, looking at the village, I saw one of our Croat neighbours of the village of Mir whose family name is all that I remember: MIOČEVIĆ. He was a military policeman in the Vareš HVO. He had blonde hair like Germans. I saw him coming from Mir and he stopped in the GUVNO of the village, passing by the truck called TAM. He stood there for a while and again started walking and went away.
30. By about seven in the evening of Monday, the sun had set and it was dark and I decided to go to the village. I asked Rasim whether he wanted to accompany me to which he agreed.
31. We went down the Priča Do road upto the Muslim Cemetery and crossing down to the left, walking past Zineta LIKIĆ's house, we reached my house. Rasim stood there to wait for me.
32. I had a lighter with me but I did not want to light it.
I lit upon what appeared a corpse. Its back was facing the sky. I could see that it was burnt to blackness. Slices of flesh cut off and hanging on a side. I was dumb. I thought it could be the corpse of my son, Adis. I decided that I would take it and place it in the nearby Muslim cemetery.
33. I proceeded into the basement of my house which was all burnt. Inside, I lit my lighter. I saw the dead bodies of Nevzeta, Hatidža and Medina in the pit we used to store potatoes. There was a big, red candle lying beside the pit. There were some wooden planks and some sacks inside the basement and I pushed them aside, thinking that my son might be hiding behind them but it was a vain effort.
I fumbled around for where my wife had told me I would find some bread. I found the place and found the bread.
34. I came out of the house and flashed the lighter on the cremated body to take a closer look. Rasim was also with me. From the half-burnt stockings of the corpse that stuck to the feet I concluded that it might be the dead body of Merima LIKIĆ which subsequently proved to be true.
35. We walked back. I was in a state of self-oblivion and I do not remember of what happened that night.
36. Next morning on Tuesday we walked back to the part of the woods near the Vareš Majdan-Pajtov Han road.



L. K.
J. H.

37 At about six in the morning on Tuesday, the UNPROFOR rescue team came announcing on the megaphones for those survivors of the Stupni Do who were still in the forest to come out to be taken to Dabravine. That is how we were rescued and taken to Dabravine.

*Likić Kemal
Jasmina H. Ibrahimović*

in

WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This Statement has been read over to me in the BOSNIAN language and is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this Statement voluntarily and am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the Tribunal.

Signed: _____

Dated: _____

*Likić Kemal
Jasmina H. Ibrahimović
16.03.1996*

INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

I, Jasmina H. IBRAHIMOVIĆ, Interpreter, certify that:

1. I am duly qualified and approved by The Registry of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 to interpret from the BOSNIAN language into the English language and from the English language into the _BOSNIAN language.
2. I have been informed by Kemal LIKIĆ that he speaks and understands the BOSNIAN language.
3. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the BOSNIAN language in the presence of Kemal LIKIĆ who appeared to have heard and understood my translation of this Statement.
4. Kemal LIKIĆ has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in her Statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of his knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed his signature where indicated.

Dated: _____

Signed: _____

16.03.1996

Jasmina H. Ibrahimović

WITNESS STATEMENT:

1. I am here to give voluntarily a statement to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
I am still willing to testify in person and of my own free will in Court in The Hague if I would be called to do so.
I hereby confirm my statement given to an Investigator of the Prosecutor's Office on the 16th of March 1996.
2. At the request of the Prosecutor's Office if there is some additional information that I could provide regarding the issues mentioned in my previous statement, I can additionally state the following :
3. When I arrived at my house, accompanied by Rasim DZAFO, to look for my son, I found on the concrete path that surrounds my house, a burnt corpse, which afterwards has been identified in the morgue in VISOKO as Merima LIKIC' body.
4. I then entered on my own the basement of my house, while Rasim DZAFO was waiting outside. The part of the basement which was used as living room was burnt out. I lightened my lighter in the other part of the basement which wasn't burnt out and found the three dead bodies of LIKIC Nevzeta, LIKIC Hatidza and LIKIC Medina ; they were lying on the top of a pit which was filled with potatoes.
5. I saw that they were all massacred ; Hatidza's throat was cut ; she was simply slaughtered ; her left breast was cut. When I tried to lift up Nevzeta's head by her hair, I noticed that her left cheek was smashed off. Medina looked as she was just sleeping ; I haven't noticed any wounds on her because I didn't want to touch her.
6. Beside the pit was a thick red candle standing (about 20 to 30 cms. of height) with the HDZ sign on it and the word 'ZNA SE' which means 'It is known'. It must have been left there by the perpetrators.
7. I then left the basement and went out of the house by the same way I came in. I didn't visit the other parts of the house ; the whole house was burnt except the above mentioned part of the basement.
8. Three days later UNPROFOR found five other dead bodies in the part of my house that I didn't visit ; they were all charred. I heard that these five people were killed outside my house and then taken into it, after which the house was set on fire. I have seen these five charred bodies in the morgue in VISOKO when I went over there to verify if my son was amongst them. These five corpses were identified as those of LIKIC Suhra, ZUKIC Lejla, LIKIC Merima, LIKIC Vahidin and LIKIC Membrura. My son's body wasn't among them.
- The charred remains of my son's dead body were found afterwards just behind my house ; His body was burnt too, but has been identified by some pieces of clothes he was wearing. I also want to state that the HVO attacked Stupni Do deliberately from the direction of BIJELO BORJE and VARES MAJDAN, because that side of Stupni Do was unprotected by BiH army, that was operational in the opposite area which was about nine kilometers from Stupni Do ; BiH was in control of the villages BUDOZELJE and STRIJEZEVO, who are situated in this area. If the HVO would have attacked Stupni Do from this side, they could have been trapped by BiH Army.
- This is all I had to add to my previous statement, in which all the other information and facts that I am aware of and that I can testify to are reflected.

①

7/9.

Testimony of Prosecution witness KEMAL LIKIĆ on 17 January 2008, Case Prlic et al., ICTY

Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:

Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Likić.

A. Good afternoon.

Q. You will appreciate that this Court needs to investigate certain details. I appreciate your family tragedy, and I don't wish in any way or form to hurt your feelings by my questions. However, in order to clarify the whole situation, some questions need to be asked and they will be of military and technical and mathematical nature. First of all, I would like the usher to put this photo in front of Mr. Likić in order to round off this story about Vareš Majdan and the trenches that were facing it. This is a photo that you already saw yesterday. I marked it by number 4. Can you please put it on the ELMO, and we will define certain things based on this photo. Yesterday in this photo, in its part that depicts your village and is facing Vareš Majdan, you showed us bunkers on -- into parts in the left and in the right. Do my markings match your marks as you put them in the photo yesterday?

A. How shall I call this? The sentry point has to be moved a bit further down toward the so-called Botuk [phoen], and as for the X marking this is Stijenčica, and this is correct. This is the entrance from Prnjavor.

Q. Could you please take the pen and mark the exact positions and correct where I was wrong. Please mark the exact places where the trenches were, where the bunkers were.

A. [Marks]

Q. Put a circle around that and number 1 next to that circle.

A. [Marks]

Q. And also mark the second bunker, the second trench, the place where they were.

A. It's in the same place.

Q. Can you please put a number 2 next to that.

A. [Marks]

Q. And at the right bottom side of the picture where you see Vareš Majdan, can you please put a number 3 next to that.

A. [Marks].

Q. Very well. Thank you very much. This is Vareš Majdan, isn't it? Is that correct?

A. Yes. Can you please put the full photo on the ELMO. Thank you. Okay. This is very similar. In the previous footage we saw two bunkers. One was made of wood, and the other one also contained sandbags or earth bags. It was well fortified, wasn't it?

/AUTHOR'S REMARK: in original transcript this part was marked as witness answer, but it is obvious that it is a question asked by accused Praljak/

The thing that you marked by number 2, is that Borova Glava?

A. No, this is Stijenčica.

Q. Stijenčica?

A. Towards Pajtov Han, i.e., towards Prnjavor.

Q. Very well, then. Yes. And where then would be Borova Glava according to you? Where is the Borova Glava a trench that you spoke about a little while ago, you mentioned it?

A. You can't see it in this photo but you can - it would be towards me but in a different photo.

Q. Can you place an arrow pointing in the direction of Borova Glava, please? We will try and talk more slowly and try not to overlap, because the interpreters cannot follow. My question is this: Can you please put an arrow on the photo in the direction of Borova Glava?

A. [Marks]

Q. Mr. Likić, I have here in front of me the trenches around the village of Stupni Do, so show P 09399. 9399.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, you've just shown trenches number 1, trench number 2, and number 3, which is the Vareš village. In the middle of the photograph we can see your own village covered in snow.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Right. So the village is in the middle of the photograph. Here is my question: When the HVO troops attacked to take those two trenches, from which direction did they come? Did they arrive from Vareš, number 3, or did they come crossing the village? Do you have any information on this?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, and I can tell you. This trench, number 1, Potok, as it was called, the HVO soldiers arrived there by the road straight from Vareš Majdan to the village of Stupni Do. Across, I mean. There's a road connecting the straight and one round about.

Now, when the soldiers took Bogoš hill, they went down the left-hand side and took the one where the arrow is, and then there's a hamlet lower down where they killed the people I said they'd killed yesterday, those ten people.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: As we'll need this later on, would you please mark that place that you've just told us about, Prica Do, where as you say these ten people were killed. You can probably see that very well there, so where is that Do and where are those houses?

A. [Marks]

Q. Thank you. Put a number 4 there then, please.

A. [Marks]

Q. And as I read in your statement, you went there at a certain point in time, and from there you went to your own house. So could you mark in your house now.

A. [Marks]

Q. And put a number 5 there, please.

A. [Marks]

Q. Thank you. May we put the date on the photograph and have the witness's signature and then an IC number, please.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you please write your initials on the photograph, Witness.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Or your name.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [Marks]

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's have a number for that photograph, please.

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the photograph will become Exhibit IC 784.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: Mr. Likić, can we agree on a military question now. According to what we've seen on this photograph and the other photographs, the bunkers that you marked on the other photographs previously, whether the trenches around the village were made in a circle. That is to say they encircled the village along the possible axes of attack. Would that be correct?

A. All the trenches around the village were in a circle surrounded with Potok, Stijenčica, Bogoš, Do, Borova Glava, Raskršće, and Bradica.

Q. Thank you. So we can agree that it was a circular defense for the village?

A. Yes.

Q. Now I'd like to go through exactly what you -- the way you moved because that wasn't done properly. The night before the attack onwards. So I'm going to ask you simple questions, and I hope to receive simple answers from you. The document, the P document that I had up is P 09399 and -- Witness, that's the documents that you made the markings on; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And you've signed it, and you agree that that's how the trenches were situated?

A. Yes. And that's what the photograph shows.

Q. Thank you. Now we'll take it slowly. In the night between the 22nd and the 23rd of October, 1993, you stood guard at the locality that you indicated to us.

A. Borova Glava.

Q. Borova Glava. Yes. Right. Now, on the 23rd, at 7.15, you were sitting in your house waiting for a cup of coffee when the attack started; is that right?

A. The attack began -- I didn't have a watch, but it began at around 8.00 or maybe five minutes past 8.00 in the morning.

Q. All right. Now, at that time you took up your weapon and went towards Bogoš hill, a place called Ravašnica, and you indicated that to us on an earlier photograph. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. We don't have to repeat that then. You then say in your statement, the statement you gave, that there were 11 soldiers there; is that right?

A. Yes. Ten or 11 is what I said.

Q. Right. And then you went on to say that the fighting lasted an hour and a half?

A. I think I said approximately. I didn't have a watch. Let me repeat again. I don't know exactly how long it went on for. I was speaking approximately because I didn't have a watch on my arm.

Q. Well, two and a half hours or three hours, it's not important. Roughly, you say. Now, then after two and a half, three hours, your wife Kada came; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. After that, in your statement you say that after that time, and that is to be found on page 4 of the text that I have -- so with two women that makes the number of people up to 13. And then you say that some people left you at that time, and the people who were left was you, Vejsil, Nihad, Enver, and Suvaid, and two women, that they stayed in Ravnica; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. After that five of the 11 left, and you say they left to defend the village?

A. I said that two or three soldiers ran to the village.

Q. Mr. Likić, I'm just counting. You say there were 11 plus two women. That makes it 13. Then you say you Vejsil, Nihad, Enver, and Suvaid stayed, and that makes it six men and two women. So five people. And then you go on to say: "And the rest went down to the village to defend their families." That's what it says in the statement?

A. Yes, that's true, but it needn't mean three because I wasn't -- I thought I could be killed any moment, so I wasn't fully aware of what was going on.

Q. That's why we're speaking - talking slowly here and taking it step-by-step. But anyway, in this statement you say that these five people went to the village to defend their families. Does that mean that they took their rifles with them, the rifles they had?

A. Let me explain. Your Honours, quite frankly and sincerely, we as soldiers in Stupni Do only had 28 barrels. However, there were 11 of us up there. So those 11 perhaps only had six weapons. Just six. You understand that? Maybe it was even five. And so if anyone were to be killed or wounded, then we went to take over the weapons and to continue shooting if there was any ammunition left. So that, friend, is what happened, how things were. And I state quite honestly that that's what it was, but we did not all of us, all 11 of us, have weapons.

Q. Mr. Likić, I don't want to contradict you. I wasn't there at all. I'm just trying on the basis of the statement to reconstruct what happened together with all the other people here in the courtroom. So I'm just asking you a logical question. If five people, according to your statement, you say went to defend their families, would you not ask the same question? If they were going to defend their families then probably they have weapons with them. That's a simple question?

A. Of those five there might have just been one or two weapons. And I repeat that. And they went down to the village. They rushed down to the village. It doesn't mean that they all had weapons. And we did not -- they did not all have weapons. I told you exactly and frankly how many weapons we actually did have.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, we need a specific answer to this - to that question. When your wife came to see you and to tell you that they were asking you to surrender, it means that the HVO was already in the village. So there were HVO fighters, armed men, in the village. Somebody comes and asks you to surrender. You're telling General Praljak then five men out of the 11 who were with you went to the village. Were they carrying weapons or not? That's the question. Because if they leave with a weapon, it means that there will be some shooting, because of course the other men in the village will see armed soldiers coming towards them and they might shoot at them. So are you telling us that they went to the village to defend -- they could defend even without having their weapons with them at that time? So can you remember? Did they have weapons when they left or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that they might have one or two rifles, but not all of them had rifles. They mostly went to see their families to see what had happened to them, those that hailed from the village itself.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: Mr. Likić, all right. Please do not think that I'm trying to put words into your mouth. I am just asking questions based on which -- on what you stated. These people that ran into the village to defend it, according to you and had one or two or I don't know how many rifles, did they wear military uniforms, at least partly? Did some of them wear trousers or blouses or boots? Did they have parts of uniforms on them?

A. Yes. They looked very colorful. Some had normal clothes, some had trousers. They did not all have the whole uniform as the army would.

Q. In your statement you say that those of you who stayed went to Budoželj to inform the BH Army to send help; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Further on you stated that later on four men had left you, Enver, Nermin, Suvaid, and Harad [phoen], and they went to Budoželj; is that correct?

A. Yes. Three men left us, not four. Two stayed with me together with two women.

Q. Very well. You said four, and I'm just asking. Now you're saying three.

A. The numbers don't have to match. It was really a lot of the psychosis in the air. That's why I'm not sure about the numbers.

Q. I know, sir, how it looks. That's why we're going through things slowly taking things one at a time. Džafer Rasim and Fadil Likić stayed with you; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you and Kemal Likić [as interpreted] stayed on together with two women; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. After that you ran across a clearing. You were shot at, and as for the two women they were not shot at. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. On same day, at 19.45 on the 23rd of October, 1993, at 19.45 hours you arrived at Pećina?

A. Yes. This was the so-called Stijene above Pajtov Han.

Q. At 21.30 hours or thereabouts you skirted Bogoš; is that correct? And you arrived at Pajtov Han on the 24th of October, 1993, approximately around 2.00 after midnight; is that correct?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. Fadil Likić also left you at the time and went to Budoželj?

A. He left us on the following night, not on that night. You can read it in my statement that it was on the following night.

Q. Džafer Rasim stayed together with you and with the two women; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And now let's talk about that night and about Monday the 25th October 1993 when you started walking towards the village to see what had happened. You were hungry. You were thirsty.

A. I apologise. Can you repeat the date?

Q. It was Monday.

A. Yes. Monday, the 25th of October.

Q. Was it at around 8.00 in the morning?

A. Yes, that's when we left Stijene and started walking towards our village.

Q. Very well. And you arrived in your own village around 11.00 and 30 [as interpreted]?

A. No. It was not in the village but above the village.

Q. You arrived in Prica Do that we marked?

A. Even further from Prica Do. Here, thereabouts.

Q. In Krčevine; is that correct?

A. Yes, that's what is known as Krčevine.

Q. Krčevine, Prica Do?

A. Yes.

Q. And this is where you stayed to see what had happened in the village. You observed the situation; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you observed people coming into the village and this is something that is not of any interest to me. What I would like to hear from you is this: Did you see that on 25th of October, the day when you observed the village, an UNPROFOR vehicle entered the village carrying Mr. Martin and Ivica Rajić; did you notice that from the place where you were?

A. No I didn't.

Q. Very well, then you did not notice anything on the 25th. And now towards the end of the day, we're talking about Monday, when it was already getting dark the had sun set as you said, you arrived at your house; is that correct?

A. Yes, it was already dark when I arrived at my house.

Q. Very well then. And now it says Rasim stayed outside and waited for me; is that correct?

A. Yes. He stayed above my house.

Q. And you entered the house?

A. Yes.

Q. And you say that you found something that looked like a body that was lying on - on its stomach; is that correct?

A. I found three women's bodies.

Q. Hold on. Hold on. You will find that later. First you found something that looked like a body, and I'm quoting your own statement. "I came upon something that looked like a body that was lying on its stomach. I saw that it was a charred and some pieces of meat were hanging from its flanks." Please. I went numb immediately and I thought that could be the body of my own son Adis." And you go on and say I decided to carry the body and bury it in the nearby Muslim cemetery. Now I would like to hear from you this: Did you find this body in the house?

A. I found this body as I was approaching the house and the pavement above the house.

Q. Very well then. And this was the body of Merima Likić?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that the body was outside of the house on the pavement.

A. Yes. On the - next to the pavement if you know where the pavement is.

Q. Yes I do. Thank you. And she was completely burned but you recognized the stockings and you could tell that it might have been Merima Likić; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you entered the house -

A. I entered the cellar.

Q. The cellar. And you saw the bodies of Nevzeta and Hatidža and Medina in the pit that you used to store potatoes?

A. Yes.

Q. You say here that you wanted to bury the body of Merima Likić in the nearby cemetery. Did you do that?

A. Yes. At first I thought when I saw the body - actually, when I saw the women's stockings, before that I thought that this was the body of my son that was killed not far from there.

Q. But when you saw that this was a woman, you did not bury the body.

A. No, I didn't.

Q. The late Mrs. Medina is the same Medina who was a member of the BH Army. She was a soldier of the BH Army, wasn't she?

A. Could you please repeat your question? I didn't understand it.

Q. In the pit there were three bodies.

A. Yes.

Q. The Medina whom you saw, was she wearing a camouflage uniform, and was she a member the BH Army?

A. Medina Likić only had a military vest on her body, nothing else. She had been a member of the BH Army because she was the main cook who prepared lunches for the BH Army.

Q. Thank you very much. And let's finish with this. On the 25th, in the evening when you saw when you saw what you saw, you say that you went away from the place, that you left the place, and that in the morning on

the 26th, and now we're talking about Tuesday, 26th of October, 1993, at 6.00 in the morning, UNPROFOR received you because they had been inviting people to approach them, and they took you to the free territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. In the first statement that you provided, to the OTP on the 16th of March - I apologize. The statement was provided in 1996. In the second statement that you provided in 1998, I believe in 1998, actually, 1998, you now - actually on the 28th of October, 1998, you now add - added something to what you'd seen in your cellar, and you say that the three persons that you saw in your cellar had been massacred. Hatidža had her throat slit and her left breast had been cut off. "When I grabbed Nevzeta's head to lift her head I could see that her left side of the face had been massacred, and chiseled. Medina looked like as if she had been sleeping. I did not notice any wounds of her - on her body simply because I didn't want to touch her." My first question sir is this: How come did you not say all that in your first statement? How come you did not describe things as precisely as that? Why do your first statement and the second statement differ in these very gruesome but very important details?

A. Can you please repeat the first statement? What year was that?

Q. In 1996 you only said that you saw three bodies. In your first statement in 1996 you say: "I descended into the cellar of my house that had been burnt completely."

A. Yes.

Q. "I lit a lighter and I saw Nevzeta, Hatidža and Medina's bodies in the pit we used to store potatoes. There was a big red candle lying beside the pit. There were wooden planks and some sacks inside the dead cellar. I pushed them aside thinking or hoping into my son might be hiding behind them, but it was a vein effort and you started looking for bread and so on and so forth. That's the first statement.

The second statement is the statement that says this: "Hatidža's throat had been slit. She had been slaughtered. Her left bosom had been cut off. Nevzeta's left face had been smashed," and you also added that the red candle bore the markings of the HDZ and that it bored the word HDZ.

A. Yes.

Q. Sir, I understand these are terrible details, gruesome details one retains for their whole life, but I would like to know this: How come did you not provide all these details in the first statement? Why your description lacked all these details. How come that only your second statement contained all those details?

A. Let me put it this way and be very frank: In the first statement I said that there were three bodies; that's correct. That they had been massacred, but I did not provide any details as to how they had been massacred.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That they were killed. And in the second statement I provided details. I said that they had been massacred and that Hatidža's throat had been slit and her breast had been cut off.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: Yes.

A. In the first statement I did not want to say all that because of the neighbors that lived next door. That was the only reason, the only reason. There was no other reason. I did not want to hurt their feelings. I did not want to upset them again. Those were my neighbors, my friends. Nevzeta was even my relative, my cousin's wife.

Q. Very well then. Thank you. Now I would like to know this: In the second statement you say: "Three days later UNPROFOR found five more bodies in the part of the house that I had not visited, and they had all been charred -- they had all been charred, those bodies." Tell me, please, according to everything that we know here in this court UNPROFOR entered Stupni Do on the 26th of October, 1995. 1993 the soldiers entered together with the journalists, the investigators, and the civilian police of the United Nations entered Stupni Do, and they counted heads in the village, and they made a video footage. In that video footage one could see the three dead bodies that you mentioned, and we saw this video footage several times. I can run it again for you. And despite all my effort I did not see any signs of massacre on those bodies as you describe it. We're not going to see the footage again. Obviously we could. The footage depicts three bodies laying over each other. I don't know whether anybody had thrown a grenade or not, but what you're describing according

with what I saw, I couldn't see any of that. Since there is a video footage of the whole thing, is it possible that at that moment you could not count the number of rifles that were taken to the village? Is it also possible that you could not see the bodies well? Medina was on top in - wearing a uniform. How could you see the other bodies lying beneath her if you had left them in the same way you found them and in the same way that UNPROFOR found them when they entered the village? Is it possible that in your condition, carrying just a small cigarette lighter in your hands, could you maybe see the picture differently? Maybe you could see things that had not happened, actually. Is that possible? Is that a possibility?

A. May I answer now?

Q. Yes, of course.

A. Merima was lying to the right, to the right, like this. She seemed to be sleeping. I didn't want to disturb her. I lifted Nevzeta up by her hair and her body, her cheek was resting against the potatoes, and Hatidža, I just moved and put her back and there was blood here. That's what I did. With a lighter, you know, it's dark, you have a lighter. So that's what I was able to see, and that's what I said.

Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Likić. Now, in your statement you - to the Prosecutor, and you were up there, you said that you don't know whether from your basement there was any shooting.

A. Well, how could I know when I wasn't there?

Q. So you can't testify about that. Perhaps one of those people - Medina, perhaps, might have had a rifle and might have shot at someone through the window in your basement. You can't know that, can you?

A. No, I don't know that, but I said earlier on that we didn't have that many weapons for everybody to be - to have a weapon to carry, because there were 42 fighters and just 28 barrels.

Q. Well, the maths doesn't help us there, but you cannot know either way -

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have the feeling that you've overstepped your time, so you need to conclude. There's a question which you should have been asked that hasn't been asked and which I shall put to you. Your house, was it a house that was fortified in the cellar or not? In other words, had you fortified in some manner the cellar of your house or hadn't you done anything about it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't do anything. It's a basement that was made to keep your winter provisions in just with an entrance. And there's nothing else. There was the basement for the winter preserves, and the upper part where we lived with just with a partition wall.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] To your knowledge a young woman who was carry - or wearing a camouflage uniform, who was cooking for the A BiH unit, could this person perhaps have held a gun in her hand?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That person didn't have any weapon. Please believe me when I say that. I was there. I know how many weapons we had, and that particular person didn't have a rifle, a gun.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Two other women who were with her, could they have had a rifle or not?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Are you asking me?

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Would you repeat the question?

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You told us that the woman who cooked was carrying no weapons. What about these two other women who were there? Could they have had a rifle?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And why could they have a rifle?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I wasn't there, so I don't know. I can't say. I can just assume that they didn't have any, because I know how many weapons we had.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Praljak, you will have to finish now.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'll be done very quickly.

Q. In your statement, in two places you mention dum bullets and say that you saw a member of the BH Army who was killed with a - and that he had a large hole in his back, and you said that that was cause the by the dum-dum bullets. And then in another place you say that you heard somebody shooting in a trench using dum-dum bullets. Could you explain to Their Honours what these dum-dum bullets are and what the difference is when you shoot with an ordinary bullet and when dum-dum bullets are used?

A. Your Honours, I made the statement as it stands. However, in my statement I said that I assume that Zejnil Mahmutović, whom I found lying on his stomach face down, had a large bloody hole on the back, so I assume that he might have been killed by a dum-dum bullet because of this large hole in his back. Now, this other - I heard these dum-dum bullets firing. Sort of - there's a shot once and then another shot later on. I'm not a military expert to be able to explain this to you.

Q. All right. Thank you. That's not how dum-dum bullets work. They enter the body and then explode and that's why they're dum-dum or expanding bullets. They weren't available.

A. Well, I apologise then.

Q. When you waited to return to Stupni Do, you saw an HVO APC -

MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Perhaps, Your Honour, because of the overlapping a sentence was omitted when the witness said yes, and I apologise then when Praljak gave his opinion about the dum-dum bullets.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not a military expert, so I'm not well-versed in different types of ammunition. I thought that that was something else.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: Yes. Thank you. Let's just summarize what you say you saw the HVO had. They had an APC; right?

A. Yes. While I was until the Stijene locality for two nights, I spent two nights there, you understand, the first night I wasn't able to pull out between the HVO trenches and go towards free territory with the women, so we went back. We returned and spent two days in the forest looking at what was going on around us. To the left you have Bogoš hill and to the right you have Perun hill or, rather, the village of Planinica. Now, in between there's the Vareš Majdan road going on to Breza and so forth, and the check-point was set up at the - on the road to the Han where the village - where the road to Strijezovo Selo goes. The APC which was made from a mining truck that I knew about because I earned my pension working in a mine in Vareš, in Treskavac [phoen], it was a mining truck that was covered in camouflage, and it went from Vareš Majdan to Pajtov Han to that check-point and back several times. We saw it go there and back several times. Now, the other trucks -

Q. Just a moment, please. That's something you saw. Now let me ask you this: You also saw that an on a smaller truck -

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You need to finish now, because the Bench is getting somewhat impatient.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may we just note that the HVO, according to the witness's statement, an anti-aircraft 20-millimetre machine gun.

Q. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you also see on a large truck a large-calibre Bofors anti-aircraft cannon?

A. Well, I'm not an expert. There was something like a machine-gun. There were different types of weapons anyway.

Q. That's what I wanted to tell Your Honours. We saw that there were 170 men at one point and 140 at another point and that with weapons like that you could blow-up the whole village because these weapons destroy all the walls and everything. So it's important to know what the HVO had so that we know how the operation evolved and whether there was any sense to it or not. Thank you, Mr. Likić. Thank you, Your Honours, for allowing me the time to ask the questions.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION
OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY
OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991

WITNESS STATEMENT

WITNESS INFORMATION:

Name: LIKIC Mufida _____
 Last First

Nickname/Alias: _____ MUFKA _____
 Last First Middle

Address: _____

Telephone: _____ Date of Birth: JULY 1, 1979. _____

Gender: FEMALE

Ethnic Origin: MUSLIM _____ Religion: ISLAM

Occupation: Current: NIL _____ Former: _____

Language(s) Spoken: BOSNIAN

Language(s) Written: BOSNIAN _____

Date(s) of Interview(s): _14/15 MARCH, 1996_____

Interviewer: _Ehsan Ullah BAJWA_____

Interpreter: _____ Senada HADŽAGIĆ _____

Language(s) Used in Interview: _____ BOSNIAN AND ENGLISH _____

Names of all persons present during interview(s): _____

Signed/Initialed: Likic Mufida L.M.
S. Hadzagic P.H.
L.M.

WITNESS STATEMENT:

My name is Mufida LIKIĆ and I am also called 'MUFKA' which is the name given to me by my friends. I was born on first of July, 1979 in the village of Stupni Do. We were three sisters: Samka LIKIĆ who is ten years older than I, Medina who was born in 1972 and myself. My eldest sister Samka is married and has a son Nermin HERCEGOVAC; she went to live in Striježevo after her marriage. Medina was murdered during the October, 23-1993 attack on Stupni Do. So now we are two sisters only.

My father Sulejman LIKIĆ works in a certain factory in Vareš town and my mother Mevla LIKIĆ has lived in home all my years. I completed my elementary school, which is eight years of education, sometime in mid-1993. I started working with PakBat in August, 1994 and after their departure I have not found any work.

The elementary school that I went to was situated in Vareš Majdan and I would go to the school five days a week. My workaday life as a student of the elementary school would start at about half past seven in the morning when I would leave my home in Stupni Do, walking my way to Vareš Majdan with my friends. It would take us about an hour reaching the school. Our classes would start at nine in the morning and we would finish our day at school by half-past-one in the afternoon. I would be back home in the village by half past two in the afternoon and would normally stay home the rest of the day. About two times a week I would accompany my mother to the town of Vareš to buy food, odds and ends.

I do not know how it came to be and I can not date it, but I know that I started seeing policemen in different kinds of uniforms; there used to be police in grey uniforms before but the new ones first wore camouflage trousers with a camouflage t-shirt and then they started wearing a camouflage jacket on the camouflage t-shirt. They also wore patches with Croat chessboard and HVO written on them. Most of these new policemen would be wearing Crosses around their necks.

Many times I was stopped by these policemen who would be roaming around in the town; they would ask me who I was, who my father was, what he did and my identification card. Then they would take away sugar, coffee or cigarettes that I would have bought. This not only happened to me and to my mother but also to many others from Stupni Do or from the Muslim village of Striježevo.

And I remember that it was a morning about ten or fifteen days before the October 23, 1993-attack on Stupni Do that I and my friend Mebrura LIKIĆ were coming back to the village from Vareš Majdan, talking while walking. We had gone to Vareš Majdan to buy some bread. Suddenly two HVO men, I do not remember whether they were soldiers or policemen, stopped us and asked us why we were seen there. We explained that we wanted to buy bread. They told us not to come to Vareš Majdan and to stay in the village. I told them that if they did not permit us to come to Vareš Majdan, we would not permit the Croat people of Mir village to go to the town, and left. I saw them cursing us and saying that we were threatening them.

LIKIĆ Mufida L.M.


It was in the evening of October 22, 1993, at about half-past-seven or eight, when Ramiz LIKIĆ who was our neighbour, came to our home.

Me, my mother, my sister Medina, my sister Samka's two-years- old son Nermin Hercegovac and my father's fifty-two years old sister Hatidža were at home.

Ramiz looked worried and told us to be prepared with some food, clothes and shoes in case something happens and we have to escape out of the village. He also told us to sleep in our basement that night. He remained with us for about fifteen minutes and then went.

My father was not at home when Ramiz came. He was probably on guard-duty and he came back at about half past six next morning. I do not remember when the guard-duty had started in the village nor do I know when my father first started going on his guard duty.

There were lots of young men in the village who would do guard duty. About fifty, I think. And I say about fifty because I would hear my father speaking to my mother and to my cousins, Jakub and Ešref LIKIĆ, about these things.

So after the departure of Ramiz we started talking about what he had said. We were afraid. We had some bread and a few food-cans at home. We took some clothes and put them in a bag and soon after Ramiz had left we went into the basement of our house.

At about ten of clock at night, it blacked out. This had been taking place for some time now and we had a few white candles in the house. We would light them whenever electricity would go. My mother thought that since the electricity was gone there should be trouble ahead. We were talking amongst ourselves and talking, we went to sleep.

Next morning on 23rd of October 1993 I was up at about seven. My mother, my aunt and Nermin were taking their breakfast. Father was back and was asleep in the basement having already had his breakfast. I took my breakfast with my sister Medina. We were still in the basement of our house and we prepared and took our breakfast in the basement. After the breakfast, Medina started cleaning the house. I started piling the logs, outside the house. Mother and Nermin took the only cow that we had to the fields near the village of Mir to graze it.

I heard a few bullets fired; I thought it was the usual firing that the soldiers in the village did at times. But then the sound of a grenade going off. And then shooting. Real shooting started. It was big shooting. I could hear the sounds of shooting coming from the direction of Vareš Majdan. And then from all directions.

I ran to the basement where my father, my sister and my aunt were. Father was still asleep and we woke him up. Soon after, the glasspanes in the window to the basement were hit by bullets and shattered to smithereens. All of us inside the basement lay on the floor. No one was sitting or standing. We dared not see outside the window. Bullets were coming inside the basement and hitting against the cement wall of the basement. Some of the pellets would fall on the floor and others penetrated the wall and we could see the holes on the wall. I saw the pellets on the floor of the basement that we were lying on. We were not talking.

Father crawled out of the basement wanting to see what was going on. He came back after a while and said that he had been hiding behind a corner of the house from where he could see around. He told us that he had seen an HVO soldier running around the house of

Michael L.M.
L.H.

'PIPE'. 'PIPE' whose real name I do not remember was a Croat and his house was located in the village of Bijelo Borje at such a prominent point that it could be seen from our house. Meanwhile Nevzeta LIKIĆ who was our neighbour in the village, about twenty-six-years of age and married to Jakub LIKIĆ, came to our basement along with her ten-year-old daughter Nerma. Lejla LIKIĆ, about forty- years- of-age and who was married to Tahir LIKIĆ also arrived with her about one year old grand-daughter Indira. All four of them came together. No sooner had they arrived than my father went crawling out of the basement and the house, saying that he was going to defend the village and that we should try to escape if possible. It was about half-an-hour after the start of the shooting that the father left.

There were sounds. Sounds created when bullets are fired one by one and those created when they are fired all together. There were both kinds of sounds. There was no silence between sounds. Sounds were coming constantly. I can distinguish the sound created when a rifle is fired and when some bigger weapon is fired. I heard that kind of a sound of a bigger weapon every ten or fifteen minutes.

And there was smell. Smell of bullets. I can not describe the smell but it was very strong. We were at that time seven in the basement; myself, my sister Medina, my aunt Hatidža, Nevzeta with her daughter Nerma and Lejla with her one-year-old grand-daughter Indira. All of us except Indira were lying flat on our bellies against the brown and polished surface of the parquet floor of our basement. Lejla was lying sideways so as to make it possible to hold Indira to her bosom. Nerma and Indira were crying. We were staring at one another.

I do not remember who said what, if at all; but I remember that we did talk about what was going to happen, how would we escape and is the shooting going to stop or continue. Lejla told us that she was in the field near a part of Stupni Do that was called 'STOP', with her grand-daughter when suddenly the shooting had started. She had run and on her way to our basement which happened to be nearest to where she was, she had called Nevzeta and Nerma out of their house.

About one hour after the departure of my father, Melča BEGANOVIĆ who is about forty years of age, came to the basement that we were lying in.

She was wearing a 'Dimija' and a t-shirt. I do not remember the colour. I noticed that her clothes were grimy.

She was pale and she was trembling. She was terrified and I was frightened to see her.

She told us that she saw HVO. She said that seeing the HVO, she fled from her house and came running to ours. Melča told us that the HVO were clad in black uniforms, were wearing black caps and had white ribbons tied on their upper arms. She said that all the soldiers had guns and that they were coming to her house.

About half-an-hour after Melča BEGANOVIĆ, Merima LIKIĆ, wife of Esad LIKIĆ came to our basement with her two children Vahidin and Mebrura. Merima was about thirty-seven years old and her son Vahidin and daughter Mebrura were four and thirteen years of age respectively.

Merima LM
SH

Merima as well as her both children were in very bad condition. Merima was also wearing Dimija with a t-shirt and a pullover; both the children were wearing track-suits. Mebrura's tracksuit was navy blue in colour and Vahidin's was light blue. But the clothes were all bedraggled and soiled and I could see that they had come crawling and kneeling. Merima and her children were crying.

Merima told us that the walls of her house were riddled with bullets, that the mural on the wall was broken and in pieces. She did not speak of having seen any soldiers.

With the arrival of Merima we became eleven:

- 1) Medina LIKIĆ
- 2) Mufida LIKIĆ
- 3) Hatidža LIKIĆ
- 4) Nevzeta LIKIĆ
- 5) Nerma LIKIĆ
- 6) Lejla ŽUTIĆ
- 7) Indira ŽUTIĆ
- 8) Melča BEGANOVIĆ
- 9) Merima LIKIĆ
- 10) Mebrura LIKIĆ and
- 11) Vahidin LIKIĆ

We were all afraid. We knew that if the soldiers were near Melča's and Merima's houses, They would soon arrive where we were. We talked about it and decided to go in Kemal's basement.

Kemal LIKIĆ's house was across the road from my house. We knew that there was heavy shooting going on and it was dangerous, but we had to go. We went one by one. I do not remember who followed whom but I remember that I was one of the last ones.

I crawled to the road and then scurried across it to Kemal's house. I did not see anybody, soldier or civilian. I could feel the bullets whizzing past me. It is difficult for me to remember the time when we left for Kemal's house.


At Kemal's house, we met Kada, Kemal's wife and her son Adis LIKIĆ.
And so we were thirteen in the basement of Kada LIKIĆ's house.

Kada's house consisted of two floors: a basement of one room and an attic of about three rooms, a kitchen and a bathroom. The basement had small windows on all sides: in the direction of my house, in the direction of Ramiz LIKIĆ's house and in the direction of Priča Do; and we could see through the glasspanes of the windows. The basement was furnished with some chairs and there were lots of flour-filled sacks in the basement.

There were concrete stairs that went to the attic of Kada's house and the stairs were outside the basement, along the wall and one could go to the attic only by going out of the basement and stepping up the stairs.

All thirteen of us were in the basement. Melča and some other were sitting in the chairs, some were perched on the sacks and others were just pacing around.

I could look outside through the glasspanes of the windows and I noticed smoke rising from my house and house's stables which were in flames. I did not see anybody setting them on fire. I also saw the stable of a Serb house on fire. I told everybody else of what I saw.

There was no pause in firing. However in Kada's house we did not lie on the floor and I could not sense any bullets striking against the walls of the house.

Half-an-hour after I had seen my house and its stable on fire and in smoke, we heard Hamdija LIKIĆ's voice who was begging, 'help me!' None of us dared respond to his call. None of us went outside to look for him. At that time we did not hear any other voice.

My sister Medina saw HVO soldiers in the vicinity of our house, in front of our basement. She called me. I went up to the window and looked outside. I saw a few soldiers. Three or four of them.

They were all in black uniforms with a white band tied around their upper arms. They had black baseball caps on their heads with a white 'U' on it. I could see their faces but can not describe anyone of them because they had some kind of a paint on their faces.

They all had automatic rifles and the rifles were held against their shoulders with the barrels pointing in the direction of Kada's house where we were hidden.

The soldiers were coming out of the basement of our house. I did not hear their voices and I can not remember whether they were talking. They seemed to be about to come in the direction of Kada's house. We told everybody that the soldiers were coming in our direction. Both me and my sister Medina left the window. Everybody hastened to the door of the basement. We wanted to flee the place.

Out of the basement, I saw the houses in the neighbourhood in flames. The houses of Ramiz and Salko LIKIĆ were burning. The shooting continued. Kada said, 'Follow me.' She was going towards the house of Ramiz LIKIĆ. Adis and Melča went after Kada.

There was a metallic barrel used for water-storage lying near the wall of Kada's house. I dashed for it and hid, crouching behind it. I was not completely hidden and could be seen.

I saw Merima lying on the stairs to the attic of Kada's house. She was lying along the length of the concrete stairs in such a way that her body was propped against the edges of a few landings, her face toward the stairs. She was not lying flat along the surface of just one landing because that could not have been possible due to the length of each landing. Her two children, Mebrura and Vahidin were huddled beneath her in the spaces between the landings and her over-vaulting body. She was thus trying to protect them.

Lejla with her grand-daughter Indira was about three meters from me. Lejla lay flat on the concrete ground with her face toward it and Indira beside her, in her arms.

Hiding behind the barrel I did not see Kada, Adis, Melča, Nevzeta, Medina and Hatidža.

Something struck the barrel behind which I was hiding. I thought it was a bullet.

I left the barrel and crawled toward where Lejla was. I was just squatting beside her.

Then I noticed that my Dimija had been torn on my left side and the skin underneath was pierced. There was a trickle of blood, too. I realized that I had been hit by a bullet which entered from behind my buttock and pierced through the flesh, exiting from the front. I heard the voices of my sister Medina and my aunt Hatidža who were calling me back into the Kada's basement.

I went crawling slowly back to the basement. I left Lejla and Merima along with their children, outside.

Inside the basement, there was my sister, my aunt and Nevzeta. They asked me what had happened and I told them about my leg which was becoming numb. They bandaged the wound.

There was a pit in the concrete floor of the basement of Kada's house which was used for storing potatoes. The pit was deep enough to cover me up to my knees, if I stood inside it. However it was wide enough for the four of us left in the basement to cram into it. So the

Handwritten signature: "Melča" and initials "L.M. S.H."

four of us sat in the pit. But we were hardly concealed because anybody entering the basement would have seen our heads. However I lay on the floor of the pit and my sister was almost sitting on me, covering me. My eyes were shut.

While in the pit, we heard masculine voices. All that I can remember is that somebody was using the names 'Dragan' and 'Kum'.

Two bombs exploded inside the basement where we were hiding. We were unscathed. There were sounds of people crashing the doors and windows upstairs. The sounds were nearing and heightening.

'Is there anybody in the basement?' __ A male voice coming from the side of the door.

We did not respond. We kept quiet. Somebody entering the door of the basement.

The same man who was calling for us in the basement and seemed to be entering inside, called out for someone by the name of 'KAKANJAC' and asked him to come in the basement. Kakanjac asked, 'what?' and was replied, 'I have found three Balija's women.' I was hidden beneath my sister and they could not probably see me.

They were cursing and swearing. I think there were just two soldiers inside the basement. Then I heard a burst of gunfire. It was just the sound of a burst fire and I did not hear any voice. Neither Nevzeta's, nor Medina's, nor Hatidža's. I just felt the body of my sister suddenly becoming heavier on me.

Then the voices who were inside, cursing and swearing, stopped. It was again quiet inside the basement. I realized that the voices were gone. I opened my eyes.

I called Nevzeta, Hatidža and Medina in low whisper. There was no response. I called my sister's name again and touched her hand. She did not respond. I crept out of the pit. There was a candle burning on the floor, near the pit. I picked it and blew it out. I do not know who had lit that candle.

Nevzeta, Hatidža and Medina still sat crouching in the pit, their heads bent over, their chins touching their chests. I tried to shake the body of my sister but she was dead. All three of them were dead. I did not try to find the bullet wounds.

The floor of the basement was greasy probably because diesel-cans inside the basement had spilt. Things were lying around in disorder. The glasspanes in the windows were all broken. I was not hearing any voices, though the sounds of gunfire still continued. I tried to look outside through the windows but it appeared that there was nobody around. It should have been about half-past two in the afternoon.

I wanted to flee the place, so I jumped out of the window of the basement of Kada's house in the direction of Priča Do. Out of the basement, I started to crawl toward the clump of trees behind the house of Kada LIKIĆ. Reaching the edge of the clump, I stood up to jump over the timber-fence that Kemal LIKIĆ had made around the clump. Inside the clump, I was still crawling. I had to cross another patch of clear ground to reach the trees that lined the path to Prica Do. So I ducked my body and ran toward the clump. Reaching the clump I saw about fifteen soldiers, clad in black uniforms sitting and standing around the house of Zineta LIKIĆ. They were looking in my direction and could see me. But they did not ask me to stop. They were talking amongst themselves but I could not hear their voices because of the distance. I kept running in the trees and reached the way winding up to Priča Do. I was walking briskly along the way. I heard a voice. Somebody was telling some soldiers to run after somebody, catch and kill her. Bullets started hitting the ground around me. I broke into a sprint, leaving the road and running past the house of Amir and Mehmed LIKIĆs in Priča Do, I reached the woods behind. I was panting and tired and could run no more. So I stopped and sat on the leafy floor of the forest. I remained sitting for about five minutes. From where I was sitting I could only see a part of Priča Do.

Handwritten signature and initials, possibly 'Kemal' and 'L.M.' or 'S.H.'.

I saw the house of Husnija MAHMUTOVIĆ in flames and smoke rising from it. I think at that time the sounds of shooting had also stopped and it was quite calm.

Then I rose and began walking fast through the woods. I wanted to find out my father. I kept trudging through the forest. Suddenly I heard a whistle and I stopped. I looked around and tried to see who the whistler was. I could not see anybody, so I resumed moving. I reached the place inside the woods called RAVNICA. I knew a clearing inside the woods at Ravnica that was used by the villagers of Stupni Do to cultivate vegetables and it was fenced around. When I reached that place I saw about five or six soldiers wearing camouflage uniforms who were jumping over the fence; they had probably seen me first. They shouted aloud and told me to surrender to them. I broke into a fast run. I was wounded in my leg and I was limping and trying to run as fast as I could. They were shooting at me and the bullets were hitting around me.

Running I reached the place in the woods called PLAN, the part of the forest almost on the edge of the village near where the house of Enver LULIĆ is situated. I hid myself in the part of 'PLAN' where the trees were densest so I could not be seen. So hidden I noticed a man in camouflage clothes crawling. He was close enough to have seen me. I recognized him to be our soldier Vejsil LIKIĆ. He asked me how I had reached there and I told him. He wanted to go to Ravnica but I told him about the HVO soldiers there and persuaded him not to go there. He saw my wound and bandaged it. Then we withdrew from PLAN and crawled deeper into the woods to a part called 'DO'. At DO Nihad and Enver LULIĆ came wandering to us. They were also in camouflage uniforms and they told us that they were coming from Enver LULIĆ's house. They told us that there were some civilians sheltered in the basement of Enver LULIĆ's house. We were then joined at 'DO' by Suvajid and Nermin LIKIĆs. All the five soldiers wanted to go for fighting and they told me that Zineta and Kada would join me at 'DO' and they left. I was left alone.

It occurred to me to climb up the tall beech tree that I was lurking beside and to take a look at the village. So I climbed up the tree.

Atop the tree, perched on a branch, I could see Stupni Do __ Priča Do, Mlinčić, Stop and the main village itself; and I could also see the plain field near the Croat village of Mir called 'LIPA'.

I saw the houses in my village on fire. Almost all the houses. The three houses in Mlinčić were burning. The houses in Priča Do were burning. The house of Melča Beganović in 'STOP', burning. I could see some people running around in GUVNO. I think they were soldiers but I am not sure because I could not see their uniforms from that distance. I could hear some light firing every now and then, not constantly. I saw two people walking toward Stupni Do from Lipa, I think they were HVO soldiers because they were coming from the direction of the Croat village of Mir at a leisurely pace. But I am not sure because I could not see any uniforms from that distance.

Then I was struck with the tearing sounds of an explosion and I saw mortar and pieces of a rooftop of a house in GUVNO in air. I can not remember which house it was. However, because of a later visit to the village after these incidents I think it could be the house of Tahir and Ifet LIKIĆs.

I should have remained atop the tree for about one hour. It had meanwhile started raining. I climbed down and started walking toward the house of Enver LIKIĆ. I reached Enver LIKIĆ's house. It was not burning and appeared intact from outside. I went inside into the basement. Things were topsy-turvy but there was not a soul in the basement. I left the house and crossed the road to go to Fadil LIKIĆ's house. This house was also not burning and had until then been left intact. I went into the basement and found nobody there. I walked through

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the clump of trees and walked past Hamid LIKIĆ's house. The house was not burning though its walls were all splattered with bullet holes. I did not go inside the house. Moving on, I walked past the house of Kadrija LIKIĆ that was on fire. I approached Ešef LIKIĆ's house. I saw my father in front of Ešef's house. I also saw Sevko LIKIĆ, Izudin ČAKAL, Sudo LIKIĆ and Ramek REDIĆ. All of them were in camouflage uniforms with guns in their hands. They were surprised to see me and asked me how I had made it to them. There was no more shooting in the village and it was silent. Probably the HVO soldiers had left because I saw none.

My father asked me about Medina my sister, Nevzeta, Hatidža and others that he had left behind in the house with me. I told him that Medina, Nevzeta and Hatidža had been murdered; I did not know at that time what had happened to Merima, Mebrura, Vahidin, Lejla, Indira and Adis. It was only during the following night when my father went back into the village to see the dead bodies of Medina, Hatidža and Nevzeta that he also came to see the dead bodies of Merima, Mebrura, Vahidin, Lejla, Indira and Adis. He told us on his return that night from the village that the dead bodies of Merima and her two children were lying on the stairs of Kada's house. He also told us that night that the dead bodies of Lejla and her granddaughter Indira were lying just beside the wall of Kada's house on the concrete. The dead body of Adis was also lying nearby the other dead bodies, outside the house of Kada LIKIĆ. They were all where I had last seen them.

Then I went into the basement of Ešef LIKIĆ. It was full of people, all of them except two, women and children. The two were wounded old men: Avdija LIKIĆ and Kadrija LULIĆ.

I was looking for my mother and the son of my sister SAMKA whose name is Nermin HERCEGOVAC but nobody in the basement knew of their whereabouts.

My bandages were changed and my story heard.

In the evening my mother appeared with Nermin HERCEGOVAC. She told she had been able to reach and hide at the basement of Youth Centre. There were other thirteen people also hiding with her at the Youth Centre who also came with her to join us at Ešef LIKIĆ's house.

The mother started crying to see me. Nermin was also crying. The mother asked me about Medina and others and I told her that Medina, Nevzeta and Hatidža had been murdered. She sank into a swoon to hear this. When she came to, she again broke down and started weeping and sobbing.

Among the men with us I can recall the names of Šefko LIKIĆ, Ramek REDIĆ, Sudo LIKIĆ, Izudin ČAKAL, Hamid LIKIĆ, Sulejman LIKIĆ and Ismet LIKIĆ.

It had been calm all this time since I had come to Ešef LIKIĆ.

At about two o'clock of the night (2 o'clock am) it was decided to leave the basement. So all of us left the basement of Ešef LIKIĆ.

Outside, it had stopped raining. The dark of the night was lightened by the flames that were eating the timber of our homes. The silence of the night would every now and then be broken by the crackle of the burning wood or sound of ammunition going off on catching fire. The cow of Hamid LIKIĆ was sniffing around, untended.

We started walking a tiptoe towards Priča Do. A point in the nearby forest called STIJENE, which was in the direction of Pajtov Han, was our destination and the way to the point went through Priča Do. We would pause every now and then to make sure that there was no body around. Nadira, only a few months old, would start crying in the arms of her mother Dina. We passed through Priča Do. All the houses were burning. The house of Husnija Mahmutović was burning, so was Suada's, and Ferida's.

Avdan LIKIĆ's house was already burnt out and a heap of cinders; Avdan's dead body in white t-shirt and blue trousers lay stretched-out and flat on the ground near his house.


And then we passed into the forest. We reached Stijene by dawn, or a little before it perhaps.

Stijene was a rocky place in the woods near the village. It was strewn with stones and huge boulders. I do not know why it was decided to go there. I do not know that it afforded any special protection against the shooting. I think the reason for us to go there should have been the fact that it was on the way to and close to Pajtov Han and Dabravine, the places where we ultimately wanted to escape to.

We had reached Stijene at dawn on twenty-fourth of October. It was Sunday. We left Stijene in the afternoon of Monday, twenty-fifth of October.

Nobody had any water or food, so we went hungry and thirsty the whole time. We were all under the open sky and there was no shelter. It was cold. The wind swept unbroken. On the night of the twenty-fifth of October, it began raining. Some of us had blankets but wet blankets afforded no warmth. My mother held me close to her to warm me and she was also holding Nermin in her lap to keep him warm. Others were also twining together to be warm. However, weather-beaten, weary and famished, we decided to leave Stijene and to reach the main road leading to Dabravine.

Subsequently we were able to reach Dabravine with the help of NordBat.


 Initials: Likić Mujida LM
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WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This Statement has been read over to me in the BOSNIAN language and is true to the best of my knowledge and recollection. I have given this Statement voluntarily and am aware that it may be used in legal proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, and that I may be called to give evidence in public before the Tribunal.

Signed: Likić Mujida 

Dated: 15.3.1996

INTERPRETER CERTIFICATION

I, Senada HADŽAGIC, Interpreter, certify that:

1. I am duly qualified and approved by The Registry of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 to interpret from the BOSNIAN language into the English language and from the English language into the _BOSNIAN language.
2. I have been informed by Mufida LIKIĆ that she speaks and understands the BOSNIAN language.
3. I have orally translated the above statement from the English language to the BOSNIAN language in the presence of Mufida LIKIĆ who appeared to have hear and understood my translation of this Statement.
4. Mufida LIKIĆ has acknowledged that the facts and matters set out in her Statement, as translated by me, are true to the best of her knowledge and recollection and has accordingly signed her signature where indicated.

Dated:

March 15, 1996

Signed:

S. Hadžagić

Testimony of Prosecution witness HUSNIJA MAHMUTOVIĆ on 12 December 2007, Case Prlic et al., ICTY

Cross-examination by Accused Praljak:

Q. Good afternoon, Witness.

A. Good afternoon.

Q. As you've already heard, I'm going to try and clarify certain matters and certain technical and military matters, as well as some other facts, and I'm going to try and put them in certain perspectives.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the usher to put before us a map on the thing over there. On this map, you will see some markings.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can you put the part with the circles. You will see eight circles there, marking the village of Kopjari. Can you see that? Witness, can you please look at the map: The village of Kopjari; the village of Dragojevići; Mijakovići; Liješnica, that's a hill top; 5 Bogoš hill; Stupni Do; Mir and Daštansko villages. I'm going to ask you this: During the attack on Stupni Do, did you know that the units of the BH Army of the 3rd Corps had attacked the villages of Kopjari, Dragojevići, and Mijakovići several days before that?

A. Yes.

Q. Along the axis indicated by the green arrow pointing towards Vareš, were you familiar with that?

A. Yes, I was. I've heard of that.

Q. Thank you very much. You can see that to Stupni Do and Mir and Bogoši have been marked. You said that a while ago that Stupni Do is some seven kilometres away from Bogoš hill. This map that you have is in the scale of 1:100.000, and that means that seven kilometres to be seven centimetres on the map. Would you agree with me that it is not at all possible if you look at the map, and you will see that --

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. I'm somewhat lost. The Bogoš hill is seven kilometers away from the village, is it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, if you walk there on foot.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] On foot. Seven kilometers on foot. Seven kilometers.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You have to go to Mir, then there are serpentines, you have to negotiate a trail up the meadows; and Mr. Praljak is talking about the distance as the crow flies. As the crow flies, it may be one or two kilometres; but in order for you to climb, you can't go straight. You could if you were a mountain climber, an alpinist. That's the whole point.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Very well. You will agree with me that the houses in Stupni Do are rather scattered and that the distance between the houses on the left side to the right-hand side is about one kilometre and a half, would that be correct, if we consult the map?

A. I apologize, Mr. Praljak. I did not understand your question at all.

Q. We'll take it slowly. Is it correct that the village of Stupni Do is rather elongated, so that one from side of the village to the other side of the village, the distance is about a kilometre and a half at least?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you very much. Here I've also marked the lines of the Republika Srpska army in red. Will you agree with me that this is more or less how the things were at the time?

A. I can't really see this map very well. I apologize.

Q. Look at the red colour?

A. Yes. I can see the red colour, but nothing is legible on the map, so I'm not able to follow.

Q. Look at Daštansko towards Zvijezda?

A. Yes, I'm clear on that.

Q. Thank you very much.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now, to better understand where the Bogoš hill is and where the village is, we have a photograph which has been given to us by the Prosecution. Could we put it on the ELMO, please, and the witness could then tell us where the Bogoš hill stands which would make everything much clearer. We have a photograph here. Can we see the Bogoš hill here?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, on the right-hand side, you can see this rather large hill. Here, on the right-hand side of the map, there is a meadow. You can see that towards the centre, and there is a little forest. And from there, on the right-hand side, Bogoš hill starts, but it is not depicted in the picture. That's where it starts. It's a very steep slope, and it goes towards the right side, but it's not depicted in this photo.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. We can just see the beginning of it. Right. Please proceed, Mr. Praljak.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. I have also marked by an arrow that goes from Vareš to Daštansko. This has nothing to do with you. But just for the information of the Trial Chamber, according to your knowledge at that time and later on, was this road that the HVO soldiers and Croats used to withdraw from Vareš when the BH Army had attacked Vareš, and they went to Daštansko?

A. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can I have the IC number for this map, Your Honours?

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, could we have an IC number of the map with circles on it.

THE REGISTRAR: The map shall be given Exhibit number IC 754. Thank you, Your Honour.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can this piece of paper also be placed on the same place so that we may take a look, merely.

Q. A witness drew this map, and I'm not going to say his name. He is supposed to appear before this Trial Chamber. We have received this map from the Prosecutor's Office, and this map depicts seven trenches, seven trenches around the village from number 1 to number 7. According to your knowledge, is this a true marking of the trenches that were placed around the village of Stupni Do?

A. Just bear with me for a moment.

Q. Take your time.

A. Mr. Praljak, please, could you explain the meaning of this circle and number 3 next to it?

Q. That's that trench. This witness claims that there was a trench here, a BiH army trench, or a trench of the forces that were in Stupni Do. He also made a sketch of the roads around the village, and he also drew the seven trenches around the village. Do you agree with this sketch? It's not a map; it's actually a sketch, a drawing. Can you agree with it?

A. Yes, with everything, except for number 3. I don't know what that is.

Q. Very well. It's enough.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask the IC number for this sketch, please, and then I'll move on.

Q. Can you correct the distances that you provided to the Trial Chamber? You will see -- you will see it on the film. Can you agree that these distances were not two or three kilometres, that these trenches were much closer to the village?

A. Mr. Praljak, I never measured any of these distances. I didn't have a tape measure or anything else. But judging by the logic of the thing, if the distance between Vareš and Majdan and Stupni Do, if that's two kilometres and 800 metres, it's only logical that all these trenches were between two and seven kilometres away.

Q. Okay. If you want to stick to that, be my guest.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can I please have an IC number?

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. What will be the number?

THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit number IC 755. Thank you, Your Honour.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. In your statement, and I'm reading from the statement that was provided to us by the Prosecutor's Office, you said that you heard the first shots around 8.00 in the morning and that you thought that it was some lads fooling around because that had sometimes happened.

A. Yes. There had been provocations before that.

Q. Thank you very much. And then you heard from the surrounding hills not only infantry weapons but also some heavy weaponry, artillery weaponry, and particularly the answer aircraft cannons; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. The aircraft cannons ranging between 20, 40 millimetres?

A. Yes. I was their target as well.

Q. And then you say that they targeted the houses at the beginning of the village, in the lower part of the village?

A. Yes.

Q. And that that was the inflammatory bullets that set houses on fire?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you go on to say that the lines were falling, you were in a trench, then you saw 19 soldiers advancing from the direction of the forest, and then you returned to your house to the shelter there; is that correct?

A. But I never entered the shelter. I came to the door of my house, and I told them to that they had to leave, that they had to leave the shelter, all of them to go to the forest, to take the road to the rocky part of the forest in order to save themselves because the line on Bogoš, the first line of defence on Bogoš, had fallen.

Q. And you say that half of the people from the shelter who were women and children reached the forest safely. You are saying here that children and women, regardless of the bullets falling around them, had reached the forest safely; is that correct?

A. What I said is correct. I was watching the first group of people that left the shelter. The four of them jumped over the fence. If you understand what I'm saying, they jumped over the fence that was below the house, and they went towards the forest, and they were followed by the others. However, the shooting was so strong that they were afraid to proceed, and they returned to the shelter. They didn't dare proceed. But I didn't know that they had returned to the shelter because I with my father had headed towards the line.

Q. I understand you, sir, but the fact that they returned because of the shooting is not part of your statement, and I'm glad that you've clarified. You didn't know that they had returned?

A. No, I didn't know.

Q. And afterwards, you too went closer to the woods where there was an underground shelter; is that correct?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. And you stayed there until late afternoon or early evening, as we already heard, which was when you went back, and you stated that half of the village was on fire and the other half of the village was not on fire; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You encountered a neighbour in the fields. His name is ML. I'm not going to give you his full name. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. We have dealt with this. But I'm now interested in the following: You stated that you know that 38 people died or were killed in Stupni Do; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Mahmutović, you have to understand that I have to ask this for the simple reason that we are trying to come to the truth about Stupni Do. I'm going to show you a film that was taken by UNPROFOR, by UNPROFOR police that conducted an investigation, after it entered the village of Stupni Do. So my question to you will be the following before we go on to show you the clip: In the meantime, between the arrival of UNPROFOR and the departure of the people from Stupni Do, did anyone bury the people, the dead people, in Stupni Do? Did anyone bury any of the dead bodies?

A. Could you please repeat your question?

Q. The people from Stupni Do, and you yourself, left in the night between the 23rd and the 24th of October 1993. After that, UNPROFOR came in, I think it was on the 25th -- or rather, the 26th. It entered the village of Stupni Do, and some footage was filmed showing everything that could be seen there; and at that moment, 15 or 16 bodies were found.

A. Yes.

Q. My first question to you is the following: In the meantime, did anyone bury any of those people who died or were killed, or was the scene intact until the arrival of UNPROFOR to your knowledge?

A. Well, to my knowledge, and what I know is true, the HVO in Vareš did not allow UNPROFOR to enter the village for three days after the attack, for three days.

Q. Yes, we know that. This is not controversial.

A. None of the villagers could not and did not dare to get in there.

Q. Why I'm going to ask you to watch closely, and I apologize in advance because I'm sure that this -- that you will be affected by watching this film. It will take you back to everything that you lived through, but I have to show it to you. Why? You told us that sometime on the 4th or the 5th of November, you had gone back to Stupni Do, that you went to the burned out remains of the buildings, and that you took three or four days to dig out all the bodies from the charred debris. So now we will see what the houses looked like, and --

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me, Mr. Praljak, on line 12 of page 86, there is an answer which has a double negative: "None of the villages could not and did not dare to get in there. That means that all the villagers could and dared to get in there." Is that what you wanted to say, witness?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, no, Your Honor. Nobody dared to go back there until Vareš was liberated.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you for the clarification. Excuse me, Mr. Praljak.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honor. This was a double negation. Anyway, let us look at P06321.

[Videotape played]

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. So is it correct that now we can see the basement, the shelters, the windows, we can see the sandbags around those windows in the background?

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I don't know what's going on.

Q. Sir, we have seen the terrible images in another film, and the charred bodies of the people who came to be autopsied. I don't know how the autopsy was carried out. We will see them standing around locations where there was no burning, and there had been no burning. His Honor Judge Antonetti noticed that, too, when we first saw this film. What I am bothered about is how the bodies in this other film came to be charred beyond recognition when those houses that we are about to see cannot burn to such a degree. You can see the roofs, the structures, and people inside could have some burns and could perhaps suffocate; but how could some bodies be burnt beyond recognition? Did you --

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could you please stop there.

Q. Did you look for an answer to that question? Here, we can see three women who had been killed.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I don't know whether this is very visible or not, or how clear we can get it.

Q. The woman, the first woman here, is in a military uniform. My question to you is whether there was a woman among the BH Army troops in Stupni Do?

A. Yes.

Q. Unfortunately, this image could be of better quality.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could we please continue.

[Videotape played]

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. You can see she is wearing a camouflage uniform, and below her there are two other women. In the background, we can see those images, we can see the sandbags. We can't see the windows does, though. Another question that I'm going to ask you is whether you know for a fact that from those basements that were protected, that there was no fire on the HVO troops?

A. Yes, I know that.

Q. So nobody opened fire from the houses?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. My next question is: If you were in one position from 8.00 a.m. onwards and then you left this place and you were with your father at one point, so I'm asking you how do you know that? I'm asking you to distinguish between what you really knew was going on in the village that was a kilometre and a half long, and what you learnt subsequently. At that time, on the 23rd, in the morning and during the day, were you in a position to know and to see that fire was not opened from the houses, from the basements, on the HVO, or was that something that you could not know?

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could you please stop there.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. You have to stop the picture here, please. We can -- could we see once again the previous sequence.

[Videotape played]

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please stop here. This seems to be a body, calcinated body, and I can notice that all around the body there are no traces of burning. If there had been some combustion, that whole area would have been blackened. Do you know, Witness, why and how is it that aside from that calcinated body, nothing else seemed to be burned around it? I am putting there question to you because there is a hypothesis according to which the calcinated body may have been brought there after wards, after the fact, and that the body may have been burnt elsewhere. What do you say to this hypothesis?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't recall this building, specifically; and since the image is a bit blurred, if I could see the building from the outside, then I could tell precisely whose building that was, whose house that was, and who was on -- who is depicted here. But as it is now, I cannot tell that. It is not clear.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Witness, you also told us that you were able to identify all the bodies that were found. Could you explain how you could identify a body charred like this one, assuming it is, but that's what we are told.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The easiest way to identify the victims was through the relatives, the survivors, mothers, fathers, grandmothers, grandfathers, because they knew the precise location where the victim was left, either dead or wounded, and this was our main source. This is what helped us most to identify the victims. To be quite specific, at Ejub Likić's house, I was able to retrieve seven burnt bodies: Two small children, his wife, his sister-in-law, his brother, and his mother. He helped me in that. They were all in the basement; and once we dug them out, we were able to ascertain that they had been in the basement. So in most cases, we were assisted by the next of kin to identify the victims. This was done also at the town cemetery in Visoko when efforts were made to identify the victims. We didn't have the DNA analysis, but we had relatives identify them because parts of bodies would be remain whole. They were parts of bodies that were not burned. I remember a little girl whose foot remained intact. The rest of her body was charred.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Very well.

Q. This is yet another body in another house, not the same one. We can see that walls are white and only the ceiling had caved in. It is obviously, I don't know, a child or I can't -- I don't know who did the analysis. But when the Judges asked their questions, it is really difficult for me to accept that these people were burnt right here on these locations.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] But can we move -- can we move on.

Q. You can see we have a mortar shell.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could we please stop here.

Q. Is this a mortar shell, a part of a mortar shell, not a 60 millimetre mortar shell but a larger calibre?

You can see a barrel or a tube next to it. Are you sure that mortars were not fired from the village?

A. Yes, I'm sure.

Q. How can you be sure?

A. Well, I know what we had, Mr. Praljak.

Q. But this was filmed by UNPROFOR, not by Praljak unfortunately. So I'm asking how could UNPROFOR in the village of Stupni Do on the 26th film everything that they saw? They saw 16 bodies, one was doubtful. They saw the houses that had been set on fire, houses that had collapsed, and they also saw this mortar shell. Whence is this mortar shell here?

A. Let me explain to the Judges, Mr. Praljak. UNPROFOR forces entered the village after the HVO gave its approval, and this footage was made by UNPROFOR. So there are living witnesses who filmed that. Let me put it this way: They picked up the bodies that were visible. They were either whole or charred. They put them into their APCs, and they took them in to the town cemetery in Visoko. So the first 16 persons, these are the persons. So in order to get at the truth, we have to ask them, one of them, the difference. The rest of the people were underneath the rubble. They only took away the bodies that were visible on the surface, and we went after the ones that were under the rubble. So there was this difference in the reports. 16, 38; 16, 38. People kept saying, "Well, 16 people were found, 16 people were found by UNPROFOR."

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Praljak, I would like you to explain for the Chamber this picture. I see on the right something blurred; then a piece of a -- of a tube; then something that could be a mortar grenade, half hidden under what may be paper bags or something; and to the left of that, again something which has more or less the form of a mortar grenade. Do you agree? Do I see it correctly, interpret the picture correctly?

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, definitely. This thing to the right, mortar shells are kept in some kind of a casing, just as you would a piece of paper. This thing to the right should be the casing where this mortar shell was supposed to be. That's my explanation based on what I know, and I do know a couple of things. This is how you actually package mortar shells.

Q. But at any rate, sir, an UNPROFOR witness, a police officer who was in charge of the whole investigation, told us that the investigation had been carried out under their auspices. You told us that in the first month - and this does not tally with what he had said - that the search for the dead bodies lasted until March 1994. I asked him how many new victims were found each month to increase the total for the victims in Stupni Do, and he was unable to explain, to tell me that. Now I'm asking you, with which UNPROFOR members, where, at which houses, were you able to find the remaining bodies, the difference between the 16 and the 38 bodies? So which UNPROFOR member, in which houses did you dig, and when did you do that? So which house had been destroyed to such an extent that the body was buried under the rubble, yet the buildings - the only ceilings had caved in on those buildings? Now let us look at those houses that had been set on fire by incendiary bullets to what extent that they were actually burnt.

[Videotape played]

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Including your own house. I will show you your own house. You can see, well, there is no roof there, but we can't see the kind of rubble, at least not on these houses, that would necessitate that kind of excavation to get at the victims. You will answer when, where, with whom, from UNPROFOR, you actually did the digging?

A. Well, I don't remember the name of that UNPROFOR member. Those were their police officers. They had -- they were armed. They had cameras. And in Milos Rozević's house, we found a body - the body, Alija Likić's body. His father name was Osman. Ostoja Danilo's house is destroyed to this day. There is another house where we found Alija, and there was another house that was also destroyed. This is where we found the two disabled persons who had been burnt down. So there are quite a few buildings that haven't yet been renovated.

Q. Yes. That is not controversial, but we have those charred bodies and nothing else. Look at the houses here. They are burned down. They are destroyed, but there was fighting. A crime was committed. This is not in dispute here, but the extent of this crime is something that I am really fixated on. When were you able to dig out the remaining people to make up the difference between the 16 and the 38 victims? The investigation ended in March, yet the number of victims kept growing. Was the investigation really completed in March, or did new victims of Stupni Do emerge later?

A. Well, I don't remember the exact date when I completed the investigation. I explained to the Trial Chamber that only one victim out of the 38 has not yet been found, and I learned later from a witness what happened to that person. But as for all the others, I don't remember whether it lasted a month or a month and a half; but at any rate, I was able to find and bury all the victims. I explained about all those cases. If I am not speaking the truth, there are other victims -- witnesses. There is footage taken by the Nordic Battalion, and they filmed and they were present when I found Likić, Alija. That's just one example.

Q. We had a man here who showed us some really ugly photographs here of the 16 --

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You just mentioned something, sir. When you found the bodies, you say that the Nordic Battalion was already there. Did they take any pictures? Did they shoot a video as well?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Apart from the 16 bodies - one was doubtful here, too - we did not see any photographs taken in the course of the excavation, exhumation, or the bodies themselves, because the bodies would be completely decomposed after a month and a half, and given that there had been raining - there had been rain. We never saw any photographs of those bodies being exhumed or taken anywhere. We have the information only regarding the 16. So I'm just asking whether anyone would bring here photographs that would show what really happened in Stupni Do, but let us not dwell on is that.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] You can take all of this away.

Q. Let me just ask you some more questions. Sir, a witness says that there were 43 guards in the village, and he says that since there were seven guard posts, there were three men on each of them, 21 men per shift. We had people say there were 20 people, and this guy says 43. And you were not a commander, but is it possible that in Stupni Do there were 43 armed people, as a protected witness testified?

A. No, Mr. Praljak. The shifts were -- these were not real soldiers. The shifts were like the shifts that you would have in a factory. People did not take their weapons home. A soldier would go to do his shift; and after 12 hours, he would hand over the rifle to another soldier to replace him, and he would go home.

Q. Okay. So this witness says there were 43 of them, and he goes on to say that the worst guard post was Potok, the stream, because it was located between two hills and it was the place that was very good for an attack. So anyone guarding that post would be in dire straits if they had to defend against an attack there. Is that so?

A. This was a post halfway between the village of Stupni Do and Vareš Majdan. Now, as to whether it was really that dangerous or not, I'm not a military analyst. I can't tell you.

Q. Is it true, according to you, that on that day, there were five people -- at least five people at Bogoš from your village?

A. I don't know the exact figure. I know that two people were killed in the trench. They remained there. I know that Ejub Likić was there, and I know that he ran out of the trench leaving his rifle behind. He ran to the village. He's mentioned here. I know that the father of one of the lads who got killed up there went in that direction. He was unarmed, and he was shot and killed by the HVO halfway up.

Q. So Momir and his father, Salkin Sekjia [phoen], were all killed?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. And then he says that they prepared for the fight and the fighting that ensued lasted two and a half hours. Are you familiar with the fact that on one of these positions - and apparently this is the position which is close to Bogoš - that the fighting lasted for two hours and a half and that the distance between the attackers and the defence was 50 metres?

A. Well, I don't know that, Mr. Praljak.

Q. Do you know that apart from this group that was in the centre of the village, as this one witness put it, not in the shelters of two or three houses, do you know that a group of about 40 people had pulled out earlier, going through the woods to the HVO check-point, where they were given water, UNPROFOR was called, and they were transferred to the free territory, territory controlled by the BH Army? Are you aware of that fact?

A. No, Mr. Praljak, but I think that this is not true.

Q. Fine, fine. I'm just talking about testimony that we heard.

A. No, no. I don't know about that, and I can't tell you things that I don't know.

Q. Yes. Thank you very much. You just tell us what you know, and we will be able to proceed.

MR. FLYNN: Before we do, Your Honors, if I may. I will need about four minutes for redirect, if that's possible.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] No problems. I will conclude briefly.

Q. Let me just tell you this: Are you aware of the fact that a statement - that a witness said that: "Near our trench at Stensiska [phoen], I saw the dead body of Zejnil Mahmutović. He had a very large wound on his back caused by a dum dum bullet." Do you know that Zejnil Mahmutović was killed next to the trench?

A. This was my father, and I know for a fact where he was killed. I know that for sure.

Q. I'm sorry, sir. I didn't know that. I didn't have that information.

A. Let me just explain. There was no trench there. This was a place above those houses. The last time that I left my father there, he didn't want to leave the two people, the people who couldn't move, who had been

- who later got burnt in the rubble. He didn't want to leave them behind he was such a good man. I found him, or rather, UNPROFOR found him and UNPROFOR took him away. I was able to see him just before the funeral. He had four through-and-through gunshot wounds on his chest, so he was not killed by a dum-dum bullet. It was a sower of death, a machine-gun, and the bullet wounds were from the top going to the side. This I can tell because I was able to see him in the coffin.

Q. I'm sorry. I just put to you the testimony of a witness who testified as a protected witness. So this is not what I'm claiming. I'm just trying to put together this jigsaw puzzle.

A. And I'm here just to tell the truth, Mr. Praljak.

Q. Whatever happened - and the Trial Chamber will be able to ascertain that on the basis of various elements in the end, I'm sure - I want to know the following: You claim that at least 500 HVO soldiers, and two of the units as we came to learn, were special units, Maturice and Apostoli, and that they attacked the village that was defended by a certain number of people who had rifles, machine-guns, and whatever. 170 people were gathered in a place. You said that some of those who attacked the village were under the influence of drugs. So how is it possible that if the overall plan was to kill the inhabitants of Stupni Do, how is it possible that an armed force of this magnitude, that included two good units in military terms, that they decided not to attack 170 people defended by a handful of people after just two hand grenades were thrown? Is this possible? If somebody is really bent on killing these people, as you're saying, who would decide not to proceed after only two hand grenades were thrown? Is this, according to you, logical in military terms? We all went through this war, so did you see that or did you just hear stories about that?

A. The information about the accurate number of participants in Stupni Do village I read in the autobiography by Mr. Miroslav Pejčinović -- actually, it was Ante Pejčinović, the then chief of the Vareš HVO, who published a book. The Defence line was very long, and a lot of people were needed to man that line. According to Mr. Pejčinović, between 400 and 500 men participated, and I'm talking about real soldiers, those who had already participated in fighting. There were about 120 according to his statement, and they were Maturice and Apostoli. The other HVO troops were from our own mess, from the neighbouring villages close to the Stupni Do commune. There was the Pukovnja Brigade from Mir, there was one from Bijelo Polje, from the village of Perizići [phoen], all of which were close to the local commune of Stupni Do.

Q. Very well, then. Just tell me whether you saw anybody throwing hand grenades and whether you saw those soldiers under the influence of drugs giving up on their attempt. Did you see it?

A. I heard that from the people who were in that atomic shelter that I spoke about a little while ago.

Q. Was that just one atomic shelter or were there more houses? There is no single house in Stupni Do that accommodates 200 people.

A. The attack reached the two or three houses that remained there in the bottom part of the village. As for the exact number there were in the first or second or third house, I really can't tell.

Q. But Mr. Mahmutović, if the lines are long and if people withdrew together with the army to the three houses, there are no longer the lines of defence of the BH Army. The HVO was around those three houses. How can there be lines? How could the village had fallen? How come people were in the houses? There is no logic to that.

A. You said it, Mr. Praljak, that our soldiers went to the HVO road, that the UNPROFOR took them away.

Q. I was saying - I was just relating the witness's words. If there were three houses left with a few soldiers that were defending them, that means that the rest had been already captured by the HVO and that the HVO with 150 or 200 troops was around those three houses. And even after the two hand grenades were thrown -

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, I have a question which perhaps will clarify matters for the Bench. We had a witness, I will not give his name, who clearly indicated what the purpose of this military operation was. According to him, it was to take control of the Bogoš hill. According to this witness, this was a hill of a strategic - of strategic importance, and enabled the people taking it to control the village.

So there was an attack and fighting on this hill, and there were wounded people on the HVO side. Two people were injured. After the attack, the hill was taken and the HVO troops who were not - there were not

500 soldiers but much less. This is what this witness said to us. Does that fit in with what you saw, Because were you there at the time.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether the witness said in that statement that one trench, where there were five BH Army soldiers and which was above the village to the left, towards the village of Mir, was never captured. It was never taken. They sent the woman to the trench, the one that the lady lawyer spoke about. They sent the woman with the message for these soldiers to surrender. There were some 20 to 30 soldiers around it, and they were trying the whole day to take it but they never succeeded. That trench was between Mir and Stupni Do. That was the second elevation in terms of strategic significance, and some of those -

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And this trench wasn't taken?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Never. It was never taken, and it was three kilometres away from the village itself.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And the HVO had sent this woman so that these people would surrender?

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. I adhere to my question. If the lines except for the trench that was never taken, if all the other lines in Stupni Do were taken, and majority of the population, 107 plus/minus were in the three houses, the HVO is all around, then according to your information, the HVO has anti-aircraft cannon that can pierce every wall of those three houses. According to military logic, would take be of these houses have been any problem at all for the HVO force that was there at the time, in your view?

A. The moment when the HVO soldiers entered the village, or at least one part of the village, the mortar fire stopped, the mortar fire stopped. The artillery fire because, of course, they would not shoot at their own men. Everything else that happened was by death sowers and the automatic rifles.

Q. Very well. So mortars are easily movable, so are the anti-aircraft cannons, but I won't dwell on that.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can we please look at

Q. There is a photo of your house.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] P083877 is the number.

Q. Can you please confirm that this is your house? The roof had burned down. It is not habitable, but it is not devastated. And if you want to dig, there is nothing to dig because what had fallen off from the roof, what had burned down, does not pose a problem and cannot bury anybody who would be underneath.

A. Yes. The house existed, it's still there, it has not been reconstructed. You can see it any day, any time of day. There is also the atomic shelter. Everything is there.

Q. My question to you, sir, was this: Is it true that there is nothing to dig out from here? If there was anybody dead in the basement, anybody who came up to the house could have seen that person?

A. Sir, the house was absolutely brand new at the time.

Q. I'm not in dispute of that. I'm asking you: The way we see the photo, when the house burned down, when the roof caved in -

A. This is not my house.

Q. This is not your house?

A. No.

Q. Then this is the problem on the side of the Prosecutor, because the Prosecutor claims that this is your house.

A. No. A while ago that was my house, in the photo.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can you please show it again, P08377.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is my house.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. We don't have that photo. I cannot tell whether this is correct or not. There is no telling. Is this your house?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Please, I know it was new. I know that it was torched. All that is correct. But my question is this: If somebody had been killed or died in the shelter outside the shelter around the house, should there have been any digging for these bodies? If there had been a body, you could see it. You didn't have to excavate for it, especially if they were in the shelter.


A. Mr. Praljak, 50 per cent of the houses were old. They were made of wood and bricks.

Q. Sir, I'm asking about your house. You said that something had happened here and that you had to dig for days.

A. No, no. Not here. Here the people were killed in front of the house. That's why I never attempted to reconstruct it and renovate it.

Q. The house - the Judges can see this on the film. I can't embark on any further analysis. This would be - thank you very much, sir. I'm sorry I had to show you things that evoke unpleasant memories. I would like to thank the Judges and you.

1.a. UNPROFOR marks the places in Stupni Do where dead bodies were found.



1.b. According to the UNPROFOR Military Police report sent to UN Security Council, 15 bodies have been found.



2. Village of STUPNI DO



2.a. Members of UNPROFOR in STUPNI DO



2.b. Members of UNPROFOR in STUPNI DO



2.c. Members of UNPROFOR in STUPNI DO



2.d. Members of UNPROFOR in STUPNI DO



2.e. Members of UNPROFOR in STUPNI DO



3. THE BODY IS CARBONIZED AND THE WALL BESIDE THE BODY IS WHITE?





3.a. THE BODY IS COMPLETELY BURNT AND THE WOOD BELOW THE CORPSE ISN'T? HOW THE ARM OF A MAN WHO WAS SHOT CAN REMAIN STANDING IN THE AIR? MUNITION BESIDE THE BODY, THUS BURNT, DIDN'T EXPLODE? WHERE WERE THESE BODIES BURNED, AND WHO PLACED THEM INTO THE HOUSES BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF UNPROFOR?

4. THREE DEAD WOMEN WERE FOUND IN THE BASEMENT.



4.a. ONE OF THREE DEAD WOMEN IS TAKEN TO BE A MEMBER OF A BiH (CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORM)



4.b. ARE THE VISIBLE CARTRIDGE CASES PROOF THAT GUNS WERE FIRED FROM THIS BASEMENT?

h formacije sa teritorije BiH izvode u/d u do
oriji Istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

te dejstva se od Mostara i pravce: s. Crnogla
a - s. Ravno i s. Slano - Izvala. Po dubini s
ina Lištica, Čitluk, Ljubuski, Grude, Posušje
eljevac i o. Šiben.

erjaku vatreni podršku izvodi različitim art
vanim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
livanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popost
lavršene korektore, odnosno obezbeđenja preciz
t.

voje je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionima
te u daljnjim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
resinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebinjska - s.
s. Slano - s. Izvala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u Bići rejon Stoca sa pomoć muslimanskoj B
ne Hercegovačkog korpusa i ishijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove sa dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
se.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru Ist
linjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bilećka, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.
tbr - Nevesinjska, 13.msp, 13.mspap, 13. lap
ob, 13.etc, PZ Kude NK i PuB, OTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
slučio sam: nastaviti sa obaveznom odbranom sa
kovec, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
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a liniji: s. Velja Meda - s. Trebinjska - s. O
s. Grebol - s. Kalđerdevići - Vlačnik.

eprediti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
onu Hercegovinu.

TO težište izati na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

I was born on January 2nd, 1945 in Čapljina.

Primary and high school education (Realna gimnazija) – 4 years – Rama, 6 years Široki Brijeg – 2 years Mostar.

University of Zagreb:

I have graduated the eight-semester studies from the following fields:

- a) Faculty of Electrical Engineering – profession, MS in Electrical Engineering (weak current – telecommunications).
- b) Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences – Professor of Philosophy and Sociology.
- c) Theatre and Film Academy – profession, Director.

Professional experience:

- As a student I worked in Stockholm company „Akla“ and I was washing dishes in restaurants, and during my student years I have worked for five summers as a waiter in Germany, Titisee.
- Head of laboratory for electronics – Technical high school “Nikola Tesla”–Zagreb.
- I taught “Fundamentals of electrical engineering”, “Theory of electrical engineering”, “Theory of automatic regulation” to Associate students.
- In 1973 – I became “Freelance artist“, living on honorarium.
- I worked as a director in theaters in Croatia and BiH, I have directed two TV movies, a serial for children, one feature film and documentaries.
- I participated in establishing HDZ (political party – Croatian Democratic Union).
- I was a General Secretary of HDS (political party – Croatian Democratic Party).
- In spring of 1991, I withdrew from political activities.
- As a volunteer soldier I went to Sunja (near Sisak) and on September 5th, 1991 I was appointed Defense Commander of Sunja.
- November 26th, 1991 – I received the rank of Colonel of Croatian Army (HV).
- March 10th, 1992 – I was promoted to Brigadier of Croatian Army (HV).

- March 14th, 1992 – I left Sunja to become an Assistant Minister of Defense of Croatia for IPD – Informative–psychological activities.
- April 3rd, 1992 – I received the rank of Major General.
- From April 11th, 1992 to May 07th, 1992 I went to BiH (Herzegovina) as a volunteer and performed a duty of the Commander of Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina – Čapljina – Mostar – Jablanica –Konjic.
- On October 27th, 1992 I've been appointed at VONS – (Vijeće obrane i nacionalne sigurnosti RH) Croatian Council of Defense and National Security.
- June 1st, 1993 – I requested to be released from Croatian Army due to my transfer to BiH.
- June 15th, 1993 – I was released from my duties in Croatian Army.
- July 24th, 1993 – I was appointed Commander of HVO – (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane) Croatian defense council.
- November 9th, 1993 – I withdrew from my duties as a Commander of HVO.
- I returned to Croatian Army.
- Later I performed various functions in Croatian Army, including the Head of the Military Cabinet of the President of Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tuđman.
- As a volunteer I participated in military action „Oluja“/Storm/ on route Hrvatska Kostajnica – Dvor na Uni.
- At my personal request, I retired on December 1st, 1995.
- After my retirement, I worked as a director (manager), and later as Chairman of Supervisory Board in the factory „Chromos boje i lakovi “– cooperating with “Sigma” from Amsterdam (marine paints).
- In early April of 2004, I was in custody in The Hague, accused for many atrocities.
- On May 29th, 2013, by the first instance verdict, I was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Slobodan Praljak

CONTENT OF THE WEB PAGE www.slobodanpraljak.com:

- Slobodan Praljak's opening statement at the beginning of the main hearing of the criminal proceeding before the ICTY on April 27th, 2006.
- War documents – overview of war documents by monographic units (100 monographic units published so far, with 55 000 authentic documents which can be searched via search engine by title, author, place of origin and date of origin).
- 3 video galleries: war videos, video of General Slobodan Praljak's testimony, videos of cross-examination of General Slobodan Praljak's witnesses.

Total duration time of video materials exceeds 1,400 hours with over 8,000 pages of description and content of war videos with associated transcripts of video galleries related to the trial before the ICTY.

- Statements about Slobodan Praljak and wartime events – 188 statements, with English translations, published so far.
- Testimonies and expert findings of professor Slobodan Janković regarding the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, prof. Vlado Šakić regarding the socio-psychological aspects of war and prof. Josip Jurčević regarding the historical aspects of war.
- Trial documents – court decision, judges' opinions, trial transcripts, final filings (submissions), documents presented to defense witnesses of dr. Jadranko Prlić.
- Slobodan Praljak's letter against Carla del Ponte, selection from books and press publications, transcripts, 58 audio recordings.
- Publications on war – monographic overview of major war events in BiH and their consequences.

WEB PAGE STATISTICS

Until November 2014 web page was visited by more than 7 350 000 page visits from over 170 countries, reviewing more than 11Tb of web content in over 60 000 different files (documents, video materials, photos, texts...).

A BiH / BH Army	Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Allah dž.š.	Allah j.sh. /Jalla Shanuhu/
AP ZB	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
AVNOJ	Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia
B/D	Combat Activity
bbr	Mountain Brigade
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
br	Brigade
CLoB	Central Logistics Base
CZ	Civil Protection
DM	Deutsch Marks
DŠK	Degtyaryov-Shpagin Calibre
DVD	Volunteer Fire Department
EC	European Community
ECMM	European Community Monitor Mission
EEC	European Economy Community
Gbr	Guards Brigade
GS	Main Staff
GS HVO	Croatian Defense Council Main Staff
HOS	Croatian Defense Forces
HR-HB	Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
HRM	Croatian Navy
HRSS	Croatian Peasant Workers' Party
HRT	Croatian Radio and Television
HRZ	Croatian Air Force
HTV	Croatian Television
HV	Croatian Army
HVO	Croatian Defense Council
HZ-HB	Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IFOR	Implementation Force
IO	Executive Committee
IPD	Informative Political Activity / Informative Propaganda Activity / Informative Psychological Activity
IZM	Separate Command Post
KOS	Counterintelligence
KOV	Land Army
KPJ	Communist Party of Yugoslavia
LoB	Logistics Base

LRL	Lightweight Rocket Launcher
M/V	Motor Vehicles
MB	Mortar
mbr	Mechanised Brigade
MKBJ	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
MKCK / MCRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MO	Ministry of Defense
MORH	Ministry of Defense of The Republic of Croatia
MOS	Muslim Armed Forces
MP	Military Police
MRUD	Directed Fragmentation Mine
MTBR	Motorised Brigade
MTS / TMS	Material and Technical Equipment / Technical and Material Equipment
MVP	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MZ / IC	International Community
NDH	Independent State of Croatia
NŠVK	Supreme Command Chief of Staff
OG	Operative Group
Okb	Armored Battalion
OkŠO	District of Defence Staff
OpŠO	Municipal Defense Staff
OSMP / OSPP	Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan
OZ	Operative Zone
PAT	Anti-Aircraft Gun
Pdo	Anti-Terrorist Squad
PZO	Air Defense
RBiH	Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
RH	Republic of Croatia
RPG	Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
RSK	Republic of Serbian Krajina
RZ	Working Group
SANU	Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences
SAO	Serbian Autonomous Region
SAO Krajina	Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
SDA	Party of Democratic Action/Democratic Action Party
SDAH	Party of Democratic Action-Croatia
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party
SFRJ / SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SIS	Security Informative Service
SKC	Split Clinical Center

SKH	Alliance of Communists of Croatia
SKJ	Alliance of Communists of Yugoslavia
SKOJ	Yugoslav Communist Youth Association
SO	Assembly of Municipality /AOM/
SPABAT	Spanish Battalion
TO	Territorial Defense
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Forces
Vb	Vitez Brigade
VBR	Multiple Rocket Launcher
VEP	Military Economic Mission
VOMP / VOPP	Vance-Owen Peace Plan
VONS	Council of Defense and National Security
WEU	Western European Union
ZNG	Assembly of National Guard
Ž/S	Living Force/Manpower