Slobodan Praljak

HANDBOOK

WITH INSTRUCTION ON HOW TO THINK (*MENS REA*) AND HOW TO ACT (*ACTUS REUS*) IN ORDER TO BE DECLARED A MEMBER OF THE JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE (JCE) AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL IN THE HAGUE

HOW TO BECOME A JOINT CRIMINAL?

Facts

6

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free sample

Prof. SLOBODAN PRALJAK, M.Eng.

Theatre and Film director – Academy of Dramatic Art, University of Zagreb

Lieutenant General of Croatian Army in retirement

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CONTENT

1. ACCUSATION 7

2. MENS REA – SLOBODAN PRALJAK 8

3. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA - IN BRIEF
GETTING READY FOR AGRESSION 13

4. CONVERSATION WITH DR. FRANJO TUĐMAN, CROATIAN PRESIDENT ON 8th APRIL 1991
CLEAR "EVIDENCE" THAT DR. TUĐMAN WAS DIVIDING BiH?? 31

5. SEFER HALILOVIĆ, COMMANDER OF "PATRIOTIC LEAGUE", THE SECRET MILITARY
ORGANIZATION OF MUSLIMS IN BiH, CHIEF OF STAFF OF A BiH – MUSLIM ARMY IN BiH 37

6. HOW "TRUE IMAGE OF THE WORLD" IS CREATED 43

7. WHAT A WONDERFUL ACT – PACIFISTIC
DECISION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF 25th SEPTEMBER 1991 45

8. WEAPONS IN BiH 51

9. ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ'S ISLAMIC DECLARATION – CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF MUSLIMS IN BiH
PATRIOTIC LEAGUE – FORCE THAT WILL ENABLE THE PROJECT 67

10. IZETBEGOVIĆ AND NATIONAL EQUALITY
IZETBEGOVIĆ AND CROATIAN ARMY – RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE 83

11. WHAT DOES THE FIRST SOLDIER OF ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ WRITES ABOUT ALIJA'S POSITION
AFTER THE BOOK WAS PUBLISHED, THERE WAS AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON HALILOVIĆ IN
SARAJEVO. HIS WIFE WAS KILLED. 97

12. MUJAHEDINS 107

13. ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ'S DECEITS
HE WORKED AROUND ALL OF THE PLANS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND THERE WERE MANY.
HE SIGNED EACH ONE. HE CHEATED OUT EACH TIME. 119

14. GENERAL KLEIN, AMBASSADOR OKUN, AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH – STATEMENTS 127

15. CROATIAN AID TO MUSLIMS-BOSNIAKS IN BiH AND MUSLIM ARMY – A BiH 141

16. AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IN ARMING BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ARMY 145

17. FORMATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ARMY TROOPS ON CROATIAN TERRITORY 159

18. TRAINING OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PILOTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 187

19. WEAPONS PACKED IN FOOD PRODUCTS' PACKAGING AND LOADED INTO UNHCR TRUCKS 195

20. LOGISTICS CENTRES OF THE ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ESTABLISHED IN THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 207

21. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ARMY TRAINING CENTRES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 217

22. TREATMENT AND HOSPITALIZATION OF WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF BH ARMY AND CIVILIANS
(MOSTLY BOSNIAKS – MUSLIMS) IN HOSPITALS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 1992 – 1995 231

23. REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS FROM BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF
CROATIA 249

24. REFUGEES DURING SERBIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 1992 271

25. REFUGEES DURING AGGRESSION OF A BiH AGAINST HVO 275

26. HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTING AID FOR BOSNIAK PEOPLE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 281

27. EXTRATERRITORIAL EDUCATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA STUDENTS (MUSLIMS-BOSNIAKS) IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 289

28. AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO THE BIHAĆ ENCLAVE DURING THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 299

29. AID SENT TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA THROUGH PORTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 315

30. AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE AREA OF SPORT 321

31. AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE AREA OF CULTURE 325

32. AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR 327

33. AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IN MAINTAINING AND ENABLING TELECOMMUNICATION CONNECTIONS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA WITH THE WORLD
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA ENABLED FREE TELECOMMUNICATION NOT ONLY TO CROATS IN BIH, TO MUSLIMS-BOSNIAKS AS WELL 333

34. FOUR DOCUMENTS FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING 337

35. AGGRESSION OF A BiH AGAINST HVO AND CROATS IN KONJIC 347

36. AGGRESSION A BiH AGAINST HVO AND CROATS IN CENTRAL BOSNIA 367

37. AGGRESSION A BiH AGAINST HVO IN MOSTAR ON MAY 9, 1993 387

38. THREE DOCUMENTS WHICH TESTIFY THAT ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ IS AN UNPRECEDENTED LIAR AND A MAN WITHOUT HONOR 417

39. A BiH PLAN FOR THE OCCUPATION OF THE CENTRAL BOSNIA AND BREAKING INTO NEUM AND PLOČE 425

40. AGGRESSION OF A BiH (MUSLIM ARMY) AGAINST HVO AND CROATS IN VAREŠ – OCTOBER 1993 ... 521

41. CRIMES COMMITTED BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE A BiH (MUSLIM FORCES) AGAINST THE CROATS IN BiH 1991 – 1995 539

42. DESTROYED AND DAMAGED CATHOLIC CHURCHES AND OTHER REGLIGIOUS OBJECTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DURING THE WAR 1991 – 1995
DESTROYED AND DEVASTATED BY SOME A BiH TROOPS 583

43. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN WAR LAW IN HV AND HVO
HOW WE WORKED 615

44. THE INJURED OF A BiH, INJURED MUSLIMS-BOSNIAKS
CONDUCT OF HVO
CONDUCT OF A BiH 633

45. SEVERAL DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOW ASPIRATIONS AND ACTIONS OF A "JOINT CRIMINAL" GENERAL SLOBODAN PRALJAK
ATTACHED TO THIS BOOK, PLEASE FIND OVER 160 WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES REGARDING THE SAME SUBJECT 645

1. SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S CLOSING ARGUMENTS AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL (ICTY), 21 FEBRUARY 2011 728

2. STATEMENT - *ARCHIMEDES-PRALJAK'S LAW* 733

3. TWO STATEMENTS FOR THE END 734

46. THE SUPLEMENT FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING 735

1. REFUSAL TO ADMIT WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL (ICTY) 738

2. METHODOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL ERRORS IN CONCLUDING ABOUT THE REALITY OF WAR 755

2.1. WISHES, INTENTIONS, ACTION AND POWER 761

2.2. POSSIBLE METHODOLOGICAL ERRORS IN UNDERSTANDING (I KNOW THAT I AM REPEATING MYSELF, BUT UNDERSTANDING IS A PAINFUL ISSUE) 762

3. THE POLITICIAN WHO KNOWS AND UNDERSTANDS BARONESS MARGARET THATCHER 763

4. HUMAN BEHAVIOUR UNDER CONDITIONS OF STATE UNREST . . . AND OTHER FACTS 772

47. SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S BRIEF BIOGRAPHY 796

48. INFORMATION ABOUT THE WEBSITE www.slobodanpraljak.com 797

49. INDEX 798

50. ENCLOSURE: WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

1.
ACCUSATION

PROSECUTION CONTENDS THAT

1. DR. FRANJO TUĐMAN, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA (DECEASED AT THE TIME OF INDICTMENT)
2. GOJKO ŠUŠAK, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA (DECEASED AT THE TIME OF INDICTMENT)
3. JANKO BOBETKO, GENERAL, AT ONE POINT CHIEF OF STAFF OF CROATIAN ARMY (HV), PART OF PARTISAN MOVEMENT SINCE 1941 (DECEASED AT THE TIME OF INDICTMENT)
4. MATE BOBAN, PRESIDENT OF CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL (HVO) – CIVIL SEGMENT AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF HVO – MILITARY DEPARTMENT (DECEASED AT THE TIME OF INDICTMENT)
5. DR. JADRANKO PRLIĆ, PRIME MINISTER OF CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF "HERZEG-BOSNIA"
6. BRUNO STOJIĆ, HEAD OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF "HERZEG-BOSNIA"
7. PROF. SLOBODAN PRALJAK, GENERAL, AT ONE POINT CHIEF OF STAFF OF CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL (HVO)
8. MILIVOJ PETKOVIĆ, GENERAL, AT ONE POINT CHIEF OF STAFF OF CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL (HVO)
9. VALENTIN ĆORIĆ, CHIEF OF MILITARY POLICE (VP) OF CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
10. BERISLAV PUŠIĆ, CHIEF OF THE OFFICE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS
11. „ALL MEMBERS OF CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL (HVO), AND ALL MEMBERS OF CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (HDZ) /IN PARENTHESES: ("SOME ARE EXCLUDED") /

HAVE FORMED AN ALLIANCE IN ORDER TO:

a) DIVIDE BiH AND ANNEX ONE PART OF THE COUNTRY AS PART OF CROATIA
b) BY USING CROATIAN ARMY IN BiH – AGGRESSION AGAINST ANOTHER STATE
c) EXPELL BOSNIAN MUSLIMS – ETHNIC CLEANSING
d) ETC., ETC, WITH NO END IN SIGHT

NOTIFICATION:

WRITTEN COMMENTS ARE MINE, VIEWPOINT IS MINE.

OPINION IS MINE.

RESPONSIBILITY IS MINE.

I HAVE SUMMED UP THE NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS TO A MINIMUM, WHILE STILL PROVIDING SUFFICIENT INSIGHT TO THE TRUTH – IF SUCH A THING STILL EXISTS.

On web page www.slobodanpraljak.com you can review 65,000 documents, of which the most significant are translated to English and arranged in units - BOOKS.

2.
MENS REA – SLOBODAN PRALJAK

Who am I and what am I? Slobodan Praljak, an average „nationalist“ from Croatia, „Croatian nationalist“, and the likely candidate to become a „joint criminal“ in a future defense war?

The man marked with this label in the communist Yugoslavia thinks and speaks publicly (and ends up in prison or killed) or talks among others about the following:

1. Tito is a communist criminal (serious western historians ranked him in the top ten criminals of the 20th century), who during the war, and especially after the war (Second World War) killed hundreds of thousands, imprisoned tens of thousands and cast out hundreds of thousands (including Volksdeutscher /Ethnic Germans/ and Italians, and Poles, and ...), who executed his political opponents in mass camps (notorious prison on the island called Goli Otok) as well as in Germany, Italy, France, Austria,... DOCUMENT **D-1.**

   As I'm writing these letters (year 2016), the remains of human bodies are exhumed from mass graves in Republic of Slovenia, which were filled by Tito's partisans after the Second World War ended.

   Slovenian historians and researchers (please note that these claims are not coming from Croats) claim that there are approximately 140,000 (hundred and forty thousand) Croats buried in these mass graves.

   Trifle number, like two small atomic bombs, but small, quite small.

2. A group of states and movements that fought against Hitler (Anti-Hitler coalition) does not correspond to the group of states called antifascist coalition.

   Stalin and Tito were leaders of states with fascist ideology (subtype "communism") and countries in which they conquered the political system had all of the characteristics of Nazism, except the Holocaust of Jews.

   On others not even this could be applied.

3. Communist Yugoslavia was a dictatorship, and Tito was a dictator.

4. In communist Yugoslavia, Serbia and Serbs had a privileged position in army (JNA), police, secret service, military industry, in all federal government institutions with headquarters in Belgrade, as well as in state-owned companies that controlled the import and export of goods, especially petroleum, in diplomacy, national cultural institutions with control of international exchange, economic projects financed from the federal budget, etc., etc.

   Until 1974 communist Yugoslavia functioned as an expanded Serbia.

   When changes slowly began (Constitution of 1974), discontent in Serbia was growing, resulting in the aggression of Serbia and JNA against Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and later Kosovo.

5. Communists divided intellectuals to respectable and disrespectable.

   Respectable intellectuals actively or passively supported the system, wrote papers, master's and doctoral theses, self-government agreements, they were commemorating anniversaries of their great victories and accomplishments, especially the birthday of their great leader, a lifelong president, four-time national hero and a marshal, pioneers and youth were cheering, lambs were roasted, and symposiums (feasts, actually) were held, hundreds of thousands of copies of collected works of a wise locksmith were printed and no one raised any questions about his villas and castles (in dozens), nor

about multi-billion dollar shelters for the communist elite in the case of war (i.e. in KONJIC), no one questioned hundreds of insane and unbelievable costly army (JNA) projects (i.e. Airport in Bihać).

JNA was a state within a state, untouchable "*guarantor of our freedom and future*".

I, Slobodan Praljak, a member of "disrespected intellectuals", held that 80% of what was produced in the contemplative-social sphere was intellectual and moral trash, and I was not cheering Hallelujah at the mention of image and work of this man, and was actually disgusted by all of it.

In this country everything was a lie and a fiction story about a perfect society and the end of the history and about unity and brotherhood of the nations and nationalities, but in this very society theft was prevalent in all social segments in every imaginable way, etc. etc.

My calculations of social crystallization, negative energy accumulation and economic bankruptcy, indicated that such a regime and state shall inevitably collapse, and these were my hopes and wishes, and in line with my assessment and courage, I worked on achieving this goal.

The thesis of GYÖRGY LUKÁCS that any form of communism is better than any form of capitalism is a vulgar communist-Marxist platitude, with so many people in Yugoslavia trying to prove its truthfulness.

NOTE:

After the fall of communism in the 90's, there were numerous talks and papers about the fall of communism.

It fell, collapsed and disappeared by itself.

No it didn't!!

Tens of millions of men and women lost their lives (not to mention all other hardships) for communism just to fall.

Victims are forgotten. Life goes on.

We turn to the future.

6. Year 1980

   Comrade Tito died.

   The embodiment of axiomatic truth and the MAIN AXIOMATIC no longer lives.

   Many weep, I'm with joy!

   I know that this is a beginning of the end of the communist structure.

   Epigones of the main axiomatic are no longer safe, axioms become questionable, economy has already collapsed, inflation is running wild, foreign debt cannot be repaid, love of the West veins, ... and the East cannot help.

   These are the thoughts of a future "Joint criminal".

7. THE FUNERAL OF COMRADE TITO

   Everyone who at the time was significant in the world in a political sense, came to Belgrade.

   Tito opposed Stalin, and due to "global strategic" reasons became a favourite of the west, USA in particular.

   He received finances, favourable loans, via the "Balkan Pact" (Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia) – Yugoslavia became a member of NATO (who dared to write a single word about this), he attained preferential economic relations, weapons (aircrafts, ships, guns ...), and gained significance among world leaders and politicians.

   He organized the so-called "Third World" in the "non-aligned" organization and according to the opinion of western political analysts reduced the possibility of Soviet Union influencing these countries.

   This is called "real politics".

   When he was giving weapons, received from the US to Nasser, in order to attack Israel, when he educated and gave his affection to Gaddafi and Saddam, when he hosted Idi Amin Dada, when he

was admiring and helping Castro (probably because of cigars), when he was selling weapons to all kind of dictators, when he was killing his "opponents" all over the world ...

Everyone remained silent.

My understanding of the world, history and moral is dark, but when moralistic pathetic tirades were given at Tito's grave about his historical importance, I felt nausea running through my entire body.

To a reader: these are typical symptoms of a candidate for joint criminal enterprise.

Beware of such thoughts and feelings.

8. AND FINALLY …

To this sort of man (by now you could make out my criminal thought structure) it remains beyond any kind of morally acceptable judgment that the entire world leadership gathered at the funeral as a moral acknowledgment of Tito's greatness.

Real politics is one thing, but to come to the funeral of a villain is another thing.

Then and now, I felt that graves of thousands of his victims were – PISSED upon.

That's what I think.

LIST OF UDBA* VICTIMS IN CROATIAN EMIGRATION

KILLED

1)	*Dr. Ivan Protulipac*	*1946. In Italy*
2)	*Ilija Abramović*	*1948. In Austria*
3)	*Dinka Domačinović*	*1960. In Argentina*
4)	*Mate Miličević*	*1966. In Canada*
5)	*Marijan Šimundić*	*1967. In FR Germany*
6)	*Jozo Jelić*	*1967. In FR Germany*
7)	*Mile jelić*	*1967. In FR Germany*
8)	*Petar Tominac*	*1967. In FR Germany*
9)	*Vlado Murat*	*1967. In FR Germany*
10)	*Anđelko Pemar*	*1967. In FR Germany*
11)	*Hrvoje Ursa*	*1968. In FR Germany*
12)	*Đuro Kokić*	*1968. In FR Germany*
13)	*Mile Rukavina*	*1968. In FR Germany*
14)	*Krešimir Tolj*	*1968. In FR Germany*
15)	*Vid Maričić*	*1968. In FR Germany*
16)	*Ante Znaor*	*1968. In Italy*
17)	*Josip Krtalić*	*1968. In Italy*
18)	*Nedjeljko Mrkonjić*	*1968. In France*
19)	*Pere Čović*	*1968. In Australia*
20)	*Mirko Čurić*	*1969. In FR Germany*
21)	*Nahid Kulenović*	*1969. In FR Germany*
22)	*Vjekoslav Luburić*	*1969. In Spain*
23)	*Mijo Lijić*	*1970. In Sweden*
24)	*Mirko Šimić*	*1971. In FR Germany*
25)	*Ivo Bogdan*	*1971. In Argentina*
26)	*Maksim Krstulović*	*1971. In England*
27)	*Drago Mihalić*	*1972. In FR Germany*
28)	*Josip Senić*	*1972. In FR Germany*
29)	*Dr. Branko Jelić*	*1972. In FR Germany*
30)	*Stjepan Ševo*	*1972. In Italy*
31)	*Tatjana Ševo*	*1972. In Italy*
32)	*Rosemarie Bahrić*	*1972. In Italy*
33)	*Josip Buljan-Mikulić*	*1973. In FR Germany*
34)	*Mate Jozak*	*1974. In FR Germany*
35)	*Ilija Vučić*	*1975. In FR Germany*
36)	*Ivica Milošević*	*1975. In FR Germany*
37)	*Nikola Martinović*	*1975. In Austria*
38)	*Matko Bradarić*	*1975. In Belgium*
39)	*Vinko Eljuga*	*1975. In Denmark*
40)	*Stipe Mikulić*	*1975. In Sweden*
41)	*Nikola Penava*	*1975. In FR Germany*
42)	*Ivan Tuksor*	*1976. In France*
43)	*Ivan Vučić*	*1977. In FR Germany*
44)	*Jozo Oreč*	*1977. In SAR*
45)	*Bruno Bušić*	*1978. In France*
46)	*Križan Brkić*	*1978. In USA*
47)	*Marijan Rudela*	*1979. In USA*
48)	*Zvonko Štimac*	*1979. In USA*
49)	*Goran Šećer*	*1979. In Canada*
50)	*Cvitko Cicvarić*	*1979. In Canada*
51)	*Nikola Miličević*	*1980. In FR Germany*
52)	*Mirko Desker*	*1980. In FR Germany*
53)	*Ante Kostić*	*1981. In FR Germany*
54)	*Mate Kolić*	*1981. In France*
55)	*Petar Bilandžić*	*1981. In FR Germany*
56)	*Ivan Jurišić*	*1981. In FR Germany*
57)	*Mladen Jurišić*	*1981. In FR Germany*
58)	*Stanko Nižić*	*1981. In Switzerland*
59)	*Ivo Furlić*	*1981. In FR Germany*
60)	*Đuro Zagajski*	*1983. In FR Germany*
61)	*Franjo Mikulić*	*1983. In FR Germany*
62)	*Milan Župan*	*1983. In FR Germany*
63)	*Stjepan Đureković*	*1983. In FR Germany*
64)	*Slavko Logarić*	*1984. In FR Germany*
65)	*Franjo Mašić*	*1986. In USA*
66)	*Damir Đureković*	*1987. In Canada*
67)	*Ante Đapić*	*1989. In FR Germany*

UNSUCCESSFUL MURDERS

1)	*Mate Frković*	*1948. In Austria*
2)	*Dr. Ante Pavelić*	*1957. In Argentina*
3)	*Dr. Branko Jelić*	*1957. in FR Germany*
4)	*Tomislav Lesić*	*1964. In Australia*
5)	*Obitelj Deželić*	*1965. In FR Germany*
6)	*Ante Vukić*	*1968. In FR Germany*
7)	*Mirko Grabovac*	*1969. In FR Germany*
8)	*Dr. Branko Jelić*	*1970. In FR Germany*

* *UDBA: State Security Administration (SFRY)*

9)	*Vlado Damjanović*	*1970. In FR Germany*
10)	*Dr.Branko Jelić*	*1971. In FR Germany*
11)	*Gojko Bošnjak*	*1972. In FR Germany*
12)	*Nikola Vidović*	*1972. In France*
13)	*Dane Šarac*	*1973. In FR Germany*
14)	*Gojko Bošnjak*	*1973. In FR Germany*
15)	*Miro Barešić*	*1974. In Sweden*
16)	*Dane Šarac*	*1974. In France*
17)	*Pavle Perović*	*1974. In FR Germany*
18)	*Stipe Bilandžić*	*1975. In FR Germany*
19)	*Pavle Perović*	*1976. In FR Germany*
20)	*Stipe Bilandžić*	*1977. In FR Germany*
21)	*Franjo Goreta*	*1980. In FR Germany*
22)	*Luka Kraljević*	*1982. In FR Germany*
23)	*Luka Kraljević*	*1983. In FR Germany*
24)	*Danica Glavaš*	*1986. In USA*
25)	*Miro Barešić*	*1987. In Sweden*
26)	*Ante Tokić*	*1988. In Australia*
27)	*Tomislav Naletelić*	*1988. In FR Germany*
28)	*Nikola Štedul*	*1988. In Scotland*
29)	*Slavica Barešić*	*1989. In Paraguay*

KIDNAPPING

1)	*Drago Jilek*	*1949. From Italia*
2)	*Krunoslav Draganović*	*1967. From Italia*
3)	*Vjenceslav Čižek*	*1977. From Italia*
4)	*Ivica Novaković*	*1987. From FR Germany*

UNSUCCESSFUL KIDNAPPING

1)	*Dr. Branko Jelić*	*1950. From FR Germany*
2)	*Ankica Zubić-Ilek*	*1970. From Brazil*
3)	*Franjo Mikulić*	*1979. From France*
4)	*Alija Koso*	*1971. From Brazil*
5)	*Ante Medolić*	*1973. From Brazil*

DISSAPEARED

1)	*Zlatko Milković*	*1949. In France*
2)	*Zvonimir Kučar*	*1963. In France*
3)	*Geza Pašti*	*1965. In France*
4)	*Stjepan Crnogorac*	*1972. In Austria*

3.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA - IN BRIEF

GETTING READY FOR AGRESSION

FACTS

COMMENT:

In the second half of the sixties, infected by a pathogenic socio-political virus, I timidly began looking into various CONSTITUTIONS (see Enclosure).

As the time passed, I did it more frequently and with more effort in understanding "the issue" – as it was referred to in those days.

By reading these sheets, I found out that there was a NRH /PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CROATIA/ followed by the SRH /SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF CROATIA/, from which I concluded that Republic is a state joined in an association because of interests and the realisation of these interests. I have concluded that this state has the right to "self-determination up to complete secession". Maybe I was "seeing things", imagining that these CONSTITUTIONS define a territory on land and sea which belong to Croatia (politically and ideologically determined in one way or another) and that these borders (both on land and sea) cannot be changed without the Parliament consent.

I haven't found any Parliament decision allowing JNA and other Serbian and Montenegrin military formations shooting, destruction or killings in Croatia.

I naively thought and concluded that if SOMETHING has a PARLIAMENT (ASSEMBLY), if it has CONSTITUTION and BORDERS, that this SOMETHING cannot be anything else but a STATE.

Page 18 – Number 7 OFFICIAL GAZETTE Thursday 23rd January 1947

CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

PART ONE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER I
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Article 1

People's Republic of Croatia is a people's state in a form of republic.

***

CHAPTER II
PEOPLES GOVERNMENT

Article 7

In People's Republic of Croatia all power derives from the people and belongs to the people.

***

CHAPTER III
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

***

Article 13

Boarders of the People's Republic of Croatia may not be changed without the consent of the Parliament of People's Republic of Croatia.

***

CHAPTER VII
SUPREME BODY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

A) Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia

Article 53

Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia represents the national sovereignty and is a supreme body of the government of People's Republic of Croatia.

***

Wednesday, 10th April 1963 OFFICIAL GAZETTE Number 15 – Page 115

CONSTITUTION
of the Socialist Republic of Croatia

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

I

Croatian people, in accordance with their historical aspirations, starting with their right to self-determination including the right to secession, in a joint struggle with other nations of Yugoslavia and with freely expressed will in the national liberation war and socialist revolution, aware that further strengthening of brotherhood and unity of people of Yugoslavia is in their common interest, has united with other nations of Yugoslavia in the federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities.

In the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatian working people realize and develop in their own interest and in the interest of all people of Yugoslavia:

- Socialist relations and protection of socialist system
- National freedom and independence

***

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Socialist Republic of Croatia is a state socialist democratic community of Croatian people, based on the government working people and social self-management.

Socialist Republic of Croatia is part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

***

Article 5

***

Borders of the Republic may only be changed by a decision of the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and in accordance with the expressed will of the population to which changes refer.

***

Page 110 – Number 8 OFFICIAL GAZETTE Friday, 22nd February 1974

CONSTITUTION
of the Socialist Republic of Croatia

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

I

Croatian people, together with Serbian nation and nationalities in Croatia, in accordance with its historical libertarian aspirations, in a joint struggle with other nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia in the Liberation War and Socialist Revolution has won its national freedom, government of the working class and working people and has established its state - Socialist Republic of Croatia and based on its right to self-determination, including the right to secession and association with other nations, with freely expressed will and in order to protect its national independence and freedom, freedom of all nations and nationalities living in Socialist Republic of Croatia, in order to build socialist society and comprehensive social and national development, aware that further strengthening of brotherhood and unity of all nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia is in their common interests, voluntarily unites with other nations and nationalities in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, in which, in the interest of each nation and nationality individually and jointly realizes and ensures:

***

VII

Working people and citizens of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, together with the working people and citizens, nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, determined to focus their efforts on a creative work in peace and to build their self-management socialist community, consistently pursuing the policy of peace and against aggression, war and aggressive pressures of any kind. In order to ensure its peaceful development and socialist construction, they are determined to use all available forces and means, armed struggle and other forms of nation-wide resistance in order to protect and defend their freedom, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the socialist self-management system of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

To this end, working people, citizens, nations and and nationalities of the Socialist Republic of Croatia organize and build a national defense as an inseparable part of the socialist self-management system, aware that defensive ability of society and the country's readiness to defend is higher, and the risk of aggression is lower if national defense is more developed as a form and content of the defense organization of the community. Strengthening the country's defense capabilities is an integral part of the policy of peace and equal international cooperation.

By exercising the rights and duties to defend the country, working people and citizens, organizations of associated labour, socio-political and other organizations, local communities, self-management communities of interest and other self-management organizations and communities, socio-political communities and their bodies shall prepare and organize all forces and resources to provide a nation-wide resistance to the enemy.

National defense in the Socialist Republic of Croatia is a unique system of organization, preparation and participation of working people and citizens, organizations of associated labour, local communities, self-management communities of interest and other self-management organizations and communities, socio-political organizations, socio-political and other social organizations in the armed fight and in all other forms of resistance, in performance of other tasks of interest for the defense of the country and in protection and rescue of people and property against war actions. Within National defense, armed struggle is a decisive way of combating aggression.

Working people and citizens have the right to actively participate in building the country's defense policy and to participate in the preparations for defence, and within the system and plans of national defense, they shall be provided with necessary conditions for training for the defense and protection and for participating in the defense of the country.

***

COMMENT:

I have prepared CONSTITUTIONS OF THE FEDERATIVE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FNRY) AND SOCIALIST FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SFRY).

Some of these documents also state that certain states have: „joined", „freely", „transferred some rights", „achieve interests", „self-determination up to complete secession", etc.

SFRY Constitution, passed by the National Council of the Federal Assembly on 21st February 1974 (Documents D-3a, D-3b, D-3c), upon the approval of the Constitution by the Assembly, Parliament, assemblies of the Republics and the Autonomous Provinces of Kosovo and Metohija and Vojvodina: PART ONE - Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and Articles 1, 2, 4, define the constitutional position of the autonomous provinces.

To understand my opinion (and my delusions) please read article 398 in PART FIVE – AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF SFRY (D-3c).

When in the late eighties of the last century (20th century) Serbs started making noise and ramble throughout Serbia (and beyond), throwing yogurt at rallies and dragging some kind of bones around Serbia, I read in the newspapers that these performances are called „yogurt revolution" or „anti-bureaucratic revolution".

This clamour and uproar and spilling of sour milk resulted in the adoption of amendments to the Serbia Constitution in November of 1988.

These AMENDMENTS have substantially restricted, if not completely destroyed, the autonomy of the provinces Kosovo and Metohija and Vojvodina – autonomy guaranteed by the SFRY CONSTITUTION.

Using the procedure for amending the CONSTITUTION (Article 398) stipulated by the SFRY CONSTITUTION from 1974, in 1976 Serbian leadership proposed amendments to SFRY and Serbia CONSTITUTIONS regarding the position of the autonomous provinces. That year, 1976, other states, republics, members (whatever you wish to call them) of SFRY have rejected these amendments, so in 1988 Serbs have implemented them unconstitutionally.

By force.

Well now, with a little bit of logic that dwells in my brain, I have come to conclusion that by this act or deed, SFRY CONSTITUTION fell, it is no longer valid, it doesn't exist and has no merit, that there was a coup and consequentially Socialistic Federative Republic or Yugoslavia seized to exist.

Its over! Disintegrated!

Communists („cohesive force of SFRY"), JNA („safe keepers of SFRY"), all sorts of secret services and majority of common people (going by the flow) didn't share my opinion, but to this day, I remain resolute in defending my claims.

Not long after the fall of SFRY Constitution, the "cohesive force" of Yugoslavia also fell, collapsed, and disappeared at their infamous Congress.

I imagined that CONSTITUTION is like a foundation, reinforced concrete structure of the state, with exactly defined rules of conduct and rights granted to member states, and with strictly defined procedures for amending not only CONSTITUTION, not only an article in the CONSTITUTION, not only a word in the CONSTITUTION, but also punctuation in the text of the CONSTITUTION. And if such procedure for amendments is not adhered to, you destroy the entire construction.

By forcibly amending even one word, one punctuation in the Constitution - CONSTITUTION IS DESTROYED, IT NO LONGER EXISTS AND IS NO LONGER VALID.

Since this was my opinion, I argued that SFRY died by the end of 1988, it was dead, torn apart, killed by the Serbian coup leaders, and the remaining member states/republics are now independent.

Page 74 – Number 10 OFFICIAL GAZETTE Friday, 1st February 1946

CONSTITUTION of the FEDERATIVE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

PART ONE

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER I

FEDERATIVE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Article 1

Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's state in a form of republic, a union of peer nations, which based on their right to self-determination including the right to secession, express their will to live together in a federal state.

Article 2

Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia consists of: People's Republic of Serbia, People's Republic of Croatia, People's Republic of Slovenia, People's Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, People's Republic of Macedonia and People's Republic of Monte Negro.

People's Republic of Serbia has in its composition Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and Autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija.

***

CHAPTER III

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF NATIONS AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLICS

Article 9

The sovereignty of national republics in the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is only limited by rights given by this Constitution to Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia protects and defends the right to sovereignty of the republics.

Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia protects safety as well as social and political order of the people's republics.

Article 10

Any act directed against the sovereignty, equality and national freedom of nations of the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and their republics is considered unconstitutional.

Article 11

Each republic has its own constitution.

People's republics adopt their constitution independently.

Constitution of people's republics reflects the diversity of republics and must be in conformity with the FNRY Constitution.

Article 12

Territory demarcation of the people's republics is done by the National Assembly of FNRY. Borders of people's republics cannot be change without their consent.

***

OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF THE SOCIALISTIC FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Wednesday, 10th April 1963
BELGRADE
NUMBER 14 YEAR XIX

CONSTITUTION
OF THE SOCIALISTIC FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

INTRODUCTORY PART

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

I

Nations of Yugoslavia, starting with the right of each nation to self-determination including the right to secession, on the grounds of their joint struggle and with freely expressed will in the national liberation war and socialist revolution, in accordance with their historical aspirations, aware that further strengthening of brotherhood and unity is in their common interest, have united in the federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities creating a socialist federative unity of working people – Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, in which in the interest of each nation individually and in the common interest they realise and ensure:

Socialist relations and protection of socialist system;
National freedom and independence;

***

Working people and nations of Yugoslavia shall exercise their sovereign rights in the Federation when such rights are determined by this Constitution in the common interest, and in all other relations in the socialist republics.

***

Chapter I

INITIAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state of voluntarily united and equal nations and a socialist democratic community based on the government of the working people and social self-management.

***

3 Socialist republic

Article 108

Republic is a socialist democratic state based on the government of working people and social self-management.
In the republic, working people exercise social self-government, regulate social relations, direct the development of economy and community services, ensure the realization of citizens' rights, constitutionality and legality, and perform all social activities in common interest of political, economic, cultural and social development of the republic, except for those activities that are established by this constitution as the rights and duties of the Federation.
Rights and duties of the republics are determined by their respective constitutions in accordance with the principles of this constitution.

Article 109

Territory of the republic cannot be changed without the consent of the republic. Borders between republics may only be changed on the basis of consensual decisions adopted by the Republic Assembly.

***

OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF THE SOCIALISTIC FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Thursday, 21st February 1974
BELGRADE
NUMBER 9 YEAR XXX

CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALISTIC FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

INTRODUCTORY PART

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

I

Nations of Yugoslavia, starting with the right of each nation to self-determination including the right to secession, on the grounds of freely expressed will in their joint struggle in the national liberation war and socialist revolution, and in accordance with their historical aspirations, aware that further strengthening of brotherhood and unity is in their common interest, together with the nationalities with whom they live, have united in the federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities creating a socialist federative unity of working people – Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, in which in the interest of each nation and nationality individually and in the common interest they realise and ensure:

***

PART ONE
SOCIALIST FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Article 1

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state of voluntarily united and equal nations and their socialist republics and autonomous provinces Kosovo and Vojvodina which are part of Socialist Republic of Serbia, based on the government and self-management of the working class and all working people, and socialist self-management democratic community of working people and citizens and equal nations and nationalities.

Article 2

Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia consists of: Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Socialist Republic of Monte Negro, Socialist Republic of Croatia, Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Socialist Republic of Slovenia, Socialist Republic of Serbia and Socialist Autonomous Provinces Kosovo and Socialist Autonomous Provinces Vojvodina, which are part of Socialist Republic of Serbia.

Article 3

Socialist republic is a state founded on the sovereignty of nations and government and self-management of working class and all working people, and socialist self-management democratic community of working people and citizens and equal nations and nationalities.

Article 4

Socialist autonomous province is an autonomous socialist self-management democratic social-political community based on the government and self-management of working class and all working people, in which working people and citizens, nations and nationalities exercise their rights when it is in the common interest of working people and citizens, nations and nationalities of the Republic as a whole in accordance with the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia as determined - and in the Republic.

Article 5

Territory of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is unique and consists of the territories of socialist republics.
Territory of the republic cannot be changed without the consent of the republic, and territory of autonomous provinces without the consent of the autonomous province.

Borders of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia cannot be changed without the consent of all republics and autonomous provinces.
Borders between republics may only be changed on the basis of mutual agreement, and in case of the borders of autonomous provinces on the bases of their consent.

***

Chapter VI

NATIONAL DEFENSE

Article 237

It is inviolable and inalienable right and duty of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, working people and citizens to protect and defend the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and social system of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia established by the SFRY Constitution.

Article 238

No one has the right to acknowledge or sign capitulation, neither accept nor recognize the occupation of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia or its parts. No one has the right to prevent citizens of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to fight against the enemy who attacked the country. Such acts are unconstitutional and punishable as treason to the country. Treason is the most severe crime against people and is treated as a criminal offense.

Article 239

The rights and duties of the Federation and its bodies in the field of national defence are determined by this Constitution.
Municipalities, autonomous provinces, republics and other socio-political communities, in accordance with the system of national defense, each on its territory have a right and duty to regulate and organize national defense and to direct territorial defense, civil protection and other preparations for defense of the country, and in case of attack - to organize and manage nationwide resistance.
Organizations of associated labour and other self-management organizations and communities have a right and duty to defend the country, in accordance with laws, plans and decisions of socio-political communities, to provide funds for national defence and perform other tasks in the interest of national defense. These organizations and communities are responsible for execution of these tasks.

***

PART FIVE

AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

Article 398

Amendments to the SFRY Constitution shall be decided by the SFRY Federal Council of the Assembly with the approval of the assemblies of all republics and autonomous provinces, and if the amendments to the SFRY Constitution regulate only the position of the republics and relations between the federation and republics, decision shall be made by the SFRY Federal Council of the Assembly of with the consent of the republics assemblies.

***

Article 402

Amendments to the SFRY Constitution shall be adopted when assemblies of all republics and autonomous provinces give their consent to the text adopted by the SFRY Federal Council of the Assembly.
If one or more assemblies of the republics and/or autonomous provinces do not agree with the text of Amendments to the SFRY Constitution, adopted by the Federal Council, such proposal for amending the Constitution of Yugoslavia which was not accepted cannot be put on the agenda before the expiry of one year from the date when the Federal Council determined that there is no consent.

***

COMMENT:

The centuries-old Serbian dreams and plans (GARAŠANIN, KARADŽIĆ – STEFANOVIĆ VUK, MOLJEVIĆ) of a Greater Serbia are continued by the Serbian Academy of Sciences which in 1986 published a Memorandum on the position of Serbs in Yugoslavia.

The capital sentence of the plan and program is:

"*SERBS LOSE IN PEACE EVERYTHING THEY GAIN IN WAR*"

Ergo - war is the only solution for Serbian claims.

The ideological foundation is here, and with the reorganization in 1987 and the seizure of weapons from Croatian territorial defense (Slovenia didn't surrender their weapons) JNA completed all preparations for the creation of Great Serbia.

Serbs from Croatia must still be convinced by means of propaganda (and later from BiH) that they are endangered by the democratic processes in Croatia and that all Croats are Ustasha and a genocide nation.

This was repeated ever since 1945 so many times and in so many forms of lies that it became unbearable.

When in the late eighties of the last century, I compared the maps no. 1, 2, and 3 (see enclosure) it seemed to me (obviously I was delusional), with all other indicators in place, that only those who are completely ignorant cannot see that Serbia and Serbs, along with JNA are preparing to expend Serbian borders along the lines of:

Virovitica – Karlovac – Karlobag. Or in whatever direction possible.

Since such an expansion was possible only with the use of force, armed force, I have concluded that war is upon Croatia and Croats and other nationalities in Croatia, or in other words that aggression against the Socialist Federal Republic of Croatia is imminent.

I presented my arguments to anyone who would listen, I proposed some organizational structures as a form of resistance against the aggression that is sure to follow.

When in the summer of 1990, copying their brothers on the east, and all in line with the idea and plans for expansion of Serbia, Serbs in Croatia began to destroy the constitutional order of the state - the Republic of Croatia, placing barricades on the state roads, shouting "*This is Serbia*" in Knin and elsewhere, it was perfectly clear everyone that SFRY was possessed by the devil.

Anyway, on 17th August 1990 Croatian police force attempt to use helicopters in order to remove road barricades in Knin, was prevented by JNA air force based in Bihać – BiH.

CONSTITUTION of SFRY (which deemed such actions as unacceptable), what a joke!

This is a distinct, clear and unequivocal act of aggression, an act of state terror, of none-existent state, and thus an aggression of just one nation.

And the international community is silent except for the accusations against Slovenia (less) and Croatia (more) for separatism and breaking up of the beloved Tito's Communist Yugoslavia.

I don't know what was going through the minds of western democrats at that time, what clouded their common sense and reason.

But we had a fair share of such pristine minds at home. But long before these events, I came to realise that nobody will accept arguments and truth, if these arguments and that truth goes against interests and profit, no matter what.

Enclosure contains a map 3, that I made just for you.

MAP 1



OS SFRJ - Arm Forces of SFRY
JNA - Yugoslav People's Army
TO - Territorial Defense
VPO - Millitary Navy Area

MAP 2



Border of Great Serbia

1. MD
+3. MD
+1/3 5. MD
+2/3 MMD

Borders advocates of Great Serbia

* MD (Military Districts)
* MMD (Military Marine District)

Plan of attack-operation on Croatia

MAP 3

GREATER SERBIA ACCORDING TO THE CHETNIK IDEOLOGIST STEVAN MOLJEVIĆ'S PROJECT (30th JUNE 1941)

COMMENT:

When on 28th September 1990 „Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia“ number 1, published the text of the new CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, I walked around radiant saying to all „nonbelievers“: “*Don't you see now*?”, “*Didn't I tell you so*?”, and similar bullshit.

I was convinced that everybody, absolutely everybody, or at least all literate workers and peasants, all sorts of intellectuals, just and unjust, lawyers and constitution-lawyers, academics and those who aspire to become one, fishermen and hikers, breeders of Lipizzaner horses, artists of all guilds, beekeepers … that everyone once they read SERBIAN CONSTITUTION (see enclosure) will recognize and understand that Serbia has separated from Yugoslavia, has left and stepped out these shackles, and so on and so forth.

The document clearly states who commands the army, who is in charge for recruiting the army, who concludes international agreements, and where did “SOCIALISTIC” disappear?!

And where is the famous communist PARTY?

Great, I thought, bravo! “Communist cohesive force” and the “leading role” no longer exist, Serbia has become independent and democratic with its own borders to defend.

Things could not be better.

The situation with autonomous provinces unfortunately gets from bad to worse, and that fact alone didn't allow me to fully relax.

For now and just for this discussion, I will dismiss all other plans of the Supreme Leader, the so called *Vožd* and the others. For now, and it concerns the “constitutional issues”, it is crucial to assert that Serbia left the Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia on 28th September 1990.

That's all.

I can repeatedly search for answers to my question: How come all those from the so called West, all those secretaries, undersecretaries, MPs, delegates, ambassadors, civil servants of lower, middle and high rank, prime ministers and presidents, political analysts of all profiles, journalists and other wise men of pen and speech, how come all of them years after the 28th September 1990 and to this day, accuse Croatia for braking up SFRY and for separatism.

For God's sake, do they read anything?!

I'm not angry, and I don't complain too much, because in my view time is on my side, and They will sooner or later, in 40-50-60 years realise that they have been wrong, and at least a bit, just on the side and diplomatically wrapped, admit that their judgment and accusations were wrong.

1990.

THE CONSTITUTION*
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

I BASIC PROVISIONS

Article 1

The Republic of Serbia is a democratic state of all the citizens who live in it, founded on the freedoms and rights of man and citizen, on the rule of law and social justice.

Article 2

The sovereignty belongs to all the citizens of the Republic of Serbia.

The citizens realize sovereignty by means of referendum, people's initiative and through their freely elected representatives.

Article 3

In the Republic of Serbia everything is allowed which is not banned by the Constitution and by law.

The Constitution guarantees and acknowledges personal, political, national, economic, social, cultural and other rights of man and citizen.

Article 4

The territory of the Republic of Serbia is integral and unalienable.

About the change of the border of the Republic of Serbia the citizens decide by referendum.

* * *

Article 72

The Republic of Serbia defines and ensures:

1. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and its international position and relations with other states and international organizations;
2. The realization and protection of freedoms and rights of man and citizen; constitutionality and legality;
3. Defence and safety of the Republic of Serbia and its citizens; measures for the case of the state of emergency.

* * *

President of the Republic

Article 83

The President of the Republic:

1. Proposes to the National Assembly a candidate for Prime Minister, after having heard the opinion of the majority in the National Assembly;
2. Proposes to the National Assembly the candidates for the president and judges of the Constitutional court;
3. Proclaims laws by decree;
4. Discharges duties in the area of relations of the Republic of Serbia with other states and international organizations, in accordance with the law;
5. Commands the armed forces in peace and war and the national struggle during war; orders general or partial mobilization; organizes preparations for defence in accordance with the law;
6. When the National Assembly is not able to convene, declares, upon receiving the opinion of the Prime Minister, the existence of imminent danger of war or proclaims the state of war;

* * *

* "Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No. 1 of 28 September 1990

COMMENT:

At the session of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Croatia on 23rd May 1990, presided by the president Ivo Latin, it was concluded that the JNA stole, swiped, snatched, pinched, robbed, ..., however you wish to call it, weapons belonging to the Territorial Defense /TO/ of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and Ivo Latin, President of the Presidency, had no idea.

And what they stole was owned and under the jurisdiction of SRC and its President of the Presidency.

That is how it was stipulated in the 1974 Constitution, the Constitution of Yugoslavia, but as I have already explained, since May of 1990 this piece of paper, in my opinion, could only be used as toilet paper in some lousy pubs.

Rašeta and the company did this, because Blagoje Adžić ordered them to do so, and Croatian communist led by Račan assisted them.

Again I tried to explain in my "sermons" that SFRY Constitution no longer exists, that SFRY no longer exists, that stealing weapons from the Territorial Defense of SRC is an act of aggression, a coup d'etat, and that they are getting ready to do even worse things, and so on and so forth.

In appendix you can find all necessary documents.

Excerpted from the book written by Ivo Perić "*YEARS TO BE REMEMBERED*" (Croatian title: "Godine koje će se pamtiti"), published by Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 1995, p. 50:

***

1990

23rd May Session of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Croatian was held presided by the President Ivo Latin. Subject of the discussion was the withdrawal of Croatian Territorial Defense /TO/ armaments to JNA warehouses. It was concluded that the Presidency was not informed on this subject, although the Territorial Defense is strictly under the jurisdiction of the Republic. For this reason, and because of the objections of the Croatian public, the Presidency decided to inform the SFRY Presidency on this issue.

***

As a reaction of the military authorities to the results of Croatian elections, disarmament of Croatia was initiated, which was planned and carried out rapidly, before transfer of duties and establishment of new government took place in Croatia, in line with the election results.

According to the orders dated 14th May 1990, which were illegally (without the knowledge and consent of the Presidency of SFRY) signed by the Chief of General Staff of Yugoslavia Blagoje Adžić - "in accordance with set tasks of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, established at the meeting of the Military Council on 27th April 1990 "- until 23rd May 1990, TO /Territorial Defense/ weapons were confiscated from Croatia and placed in the warehouses of the Yugoslav National Army - estimates range from proximately 80,000 to 200,000 "barrels" (see: O. Žunec*, "War in Croatia 1991.-1995."* /Croatian title: "Rat u Hrvatskoj 1991.-1995."/, Expert studies, Polemos 1, Zagreb 1998, p. 66).

Due to the confiscation weapons, President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Croatia Mr. Ivo Latin, sent a protest note to the Presidency of SFRY, but things have not changed.

***

Excerpted from the book written by Martin Špegelj, "*MEMORIES OF A SOLDIER*" (Croatian title: "Sjećanja vojnika"), published by Znanje d.d., Zagreb, 2001., p. 287-288:

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TABLE III

WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT OF THE CROATIAN TERRITORIAL DEFENSE CONFISCATED BY JNA* IN MAY 1990

WEAPONS		**QUANTITY**
Modern long arms 7.62 mm		120,000
Trophy long and medium-long arms 7.62, 7.9 & 11 mm		80,000
Pistols 7.65, 7.62 & 9 mm		2,500
Mortars 60 & 82 mm	approx.	2,000
Mortars 120 mm	approx.	120
Hand-held antitank weapons RPG-60	approx.	800
Antitank missile systems (portable)		500
Antiaircraft cannons 20 mm (1, 2 & 3 barrels)		300
Antiaircraft missile systems Strijela 2M (hand-held)		150
Antiaircraft machine guns 12.7 mm	approx.	120
Antiaircraft cannons *boforst***	approx.	60
Antitank mines	approx.	20,000
Explosive for demolition and obstruction	approx.	80 t
IMPORTANT TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT		
Radio-devices (*motorola* and others)	approx.	800
Radio-devices of middle and long range	approx.	150
Vehicles for mobile connections		60
Trucks for logistics and transportation of troops		300
Command vehicles ŠK-1 and ŠK-2		10
Specialized ambulances		6
AMMUNITION		
For calibres from 7.65 to 12.7 mm (an average per barrel)	approx.	1,000 pcs
For calibres from 20 to 120 mm	approx.	80,000 t

* Data is not quite prices, because by the end of the eighties quantity and quality were changed on daily basis.

**These cannons were removed from JRM /Yugoslav Navy/ warships due to the lack of adequate ammunition, and were trained only for action against targets on land and sea.

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4.

CONVERSATION WITH DR. FRANJO TUĐMAN, CROATIAN PRESIDENT ON 8th APRIL 1991

CLEAR "EVIDENCE" THAT DR. TUĐMAN WAS DIVIDING BiH??



FACTS

COMMENT:

This document says what Mr. Muhamed Filipović thinks about who is to be BLAMED for such policy of the Muslims and what was Franjo Tuđman (and Slovenian leadership) offering to Alija Izetbegović back on April 8th 1990.

However, Franjo Tuđman who is well above these reserve provincial political players and who raises above by his deep comprehension of social and political powers, not only in the former Yugoslavia but also "in such a world", Franjo Tuđman knows that "*Alija Izetbegović is far more impressed and, in a certain sense, prepped by the YNA*".

Mr. Tuđman estimated and knew that Alija "*was surrounded by agents of KOS (*Counterintelligence Service*) and SDB (*Service of National Security) *and that he, Izetbegović, will not have the strength to free himself from this and to risk the conflict with this force*".

Wasn't it like that?

Further in the document it says that it was Alija and that Alija sent M. Filipović to agree on the "historical agreement" with Serbs.

Without Croats.

And then he tricked M. Filipović – Alija Izetbegović tricked him.

M. Filipović: I was Alija's diplomat

* * *

If we were not the authors of our fate, if everything that happened to us and around us happened according to the intentions of decisions taken by others, if therefore we were only an abiding element of our history, then we did not have the right to do even what we did, or to take decisions that significantly altered the position and situation of all the inhabitants of our country. By doing so, to a great extent we decided what would happen to our country and ourselves and for this we bear the greatest responsibility.

Tito was no longer around, MILOŠEVIĆ's attack on the Alliance of Communists, carried out with the help of some incautious pro-Yugoslav politicians from other republics, and the growing tendency to resurrect an old proposal for the so-called amputation of Slovenia and northern Croatia from the former Yugoslavia, initially launched by the former Yugoslav King Aleksandar KARAĐORĐEVIĆ in 1929, creating a Greater Serbia, clearly indicated that there was but one solution for all the states that found themselves in Yugoslavia, which was to flee from this hell, exercising what was at the time the constitutionally guaranteed right of the republics to disband and declare independence.

Unfortunately, it must be said that the Muslims, particularly the intellectuals, were not aware of the actual position of Bosnia and Herzegovina or themselves. They failed to react to the massive political persecution of the Muslims in the so-called *Agrokomerc* affair. They did not show even the slightest interest in the work of the Forum, in fact, some very well known Muslim intellectuals easily fell under the influence of forces and ideas that had their foundation in anti-Islamism, In order to awaken interest in this topic, I initiated a meeting of some eminent Muslim intellectuals, planned for the end of 1989 and finally held at the mosque in Zagreb in 1990. The meeting took place on 12 February 1990 while I was a guest at the *Novinarski Dom* /Journalists' Club/, at a round-table discussion of the Alliance of Croatian Journalists, where I was invited to talk about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the problem of the national identity of the Muslims. I had arranged this guest appearance myself as a cover for the meeting that was the real reason for my trip to Zagreb.

I had no desire to become its member, and was silent in response to IZETBEGOVIĆ's and ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ's offer to join the party. Once, when IZETBEGOVIĆ told me he was having a problem with some people in the party over including me in the executive committee, which he had supposedly recommended, as was confirmed by Adil ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ, I told him that he should not do it because I had no desire to be in the same party as people like Omer BEHMEN, Hasan ČENGIĆ, Salim ŠABIĆ etc. since I was a very different type of man, and to me there was no connection between religion and politics. Of course this did not mean that I considered these men unsuitable for any other reason save our difference of opinion. My opinion was completely different from theirs, because, from what I could see, they derived all their political positions from their religion, which to me were wrongly understood. I believed politics and religion were different things.

The meeting with TUĐMAN took place in his residence, the presidential palace on Grič hill, on 8 April 1991.

During the meeting TUĐMAN was very pleasant and benevolent, and showed a great interest in the idea of Bosnia following the example of Croatia and Slovenia. which, he then told us, had taken an irrevocable decision to leave Yugoslavia, even telling us the precise date when the decision is to be made public. They took the decision for state reasons and because all possibilities to reach some kind of logical, rational and political agreement with MILOŠEVIĆ had been exhausted. Even if it had been difficult in the past in Yugoslavia, always dominated by the Serbs, then a Yugoslavia dominated by MILOŠEVIĆ could not survive and a decision had to be made to leave it. This was a legally justified and politically logical move, which he recommended to us wholeheartedly at the time. He emphasised that if Bosnia and Herzegovina were to leave Yugoslavia with Slovenia and Croatia, it would be much easier for everyone to take the step and strike back against any action taken by MILOŠEVIĆ. Finally, TUĐMAN believed, the world would have to support three republics leaving a state so obviously dominated by MILOŠEVIĆ, who, as far as we knew, was considered by politicians abroad to be a brute, Serbian nationalist and semi-fascist. He also told us that the Croats and Slovenes already had significant support from Germany and Austria for the step they intended to take, which was far from little to begin with. We gave him our assessment that for Bosnia and Herzegovina it would also be best to leave Yugoslavia together with Croatia and Slovenia, since once two states departed Bosnia and Herzegovina would be left alone in a Serbian sea, which will be additionally frustrated after the departure of Slovenia and Croatia, so democracy would not stand a chance in such conditions. TUĐMAN reacted to this by openly saying that he did not believe that Bosnia would leave Yugoslavia, saying he believes that IZETBEGOVIĆ was impressed and somehow prepared by the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/. Assessing that he was surrounded by agents of the KOS /Counterintelligence Service/ and DBJ /Yugoslav State Security/, he said he knew that IZETBEGOVIĆ had been at the JNA General Staff for preparations, where all the power and might of the army was shown to him and that he would not have the strength to break free from it and risk a conflict with such a force. Of course, I reacted to his statement, saying that IZETBEGOVIĆ was not the topic of discussion here and that all of this could be conjecture, but rather /we were there to discuss/ the political conditions in the country and the best decisions that could be recommended. However. TUĐMAN stuck by his position, repeating that he did not believe IZETBEGOVIĆ would take the

decision to leave Yugoslavia together with the other two republics. At the end, concluding our conversation, he offered to have us join them in leaving Yugoslavia and said he would wholeheartedly welcome such a decision from us and that he would make the effort with his Slovenian partners to accept such a position from us. He even said that he believed they would be prepared to wait a month if we could prepare for such a decision. We agreed that such a decision required some minimal but necessary preparations. Above all it was necessary to prepare the appropriate decision on our leaving Yugoslavia in the utmost secrecy, and those pertaining to the functioning of the future independent state, and it would be necessary to develop the methods for implementing such decisions. It was necessary to immediately activate military forces that would be loyal to the Bosnian government after the decision to break away was taken. We believed that the conditions and proposals offered to us were fair and that it was possible to examine the issue of us breaking away from Yugoslavia based on them and to take a set of decisions to legally and technically prepare us for it. It was really a very urgent matter and events would not wait for us to catch up. Complete political, military and legal measures were needed very urgently to allow the implementation of this delicate, risky and complex state, legal, political and military operation and to ensure its success,

Following the talks, we departed for Ljubljana on 9 April 1991. I mentioned earlier that Adil had long been acquainted with the leading Slovenian politicians of the time, some of whom were then very influential, had taken part in the former Democratic Alternative abroad, thereby making contacts and discourse much easier.

Actually, our discourse with BAVČAR, BUČAR, JANŠA and other Slovenian politicians was very direct, meaningful and smooth. Like TUĐMAN, all our collocutors believed that we would inevitably leave Yugoslavia, that it was better done as soon as possible and that the most favourable moment was when the two western Yugoslav republics were leaving Yugoslavia. They too were of the opinion that such a decision needed to be prepared, taking into account that some preparations, already completed while Slovenia and Croatia were preparing to leave Yugoslavia, would now take less time, but there was a need to hurry up with the preparations in all fields: military, political, economic, constitutional and legal. Above all this was a thorough international probe of how influential western countries would accept such a document. Considering this, it would be easier for us to take a decision knowing that it would be supported by some very important states. They believed that leaving the existing federal state or the separation of three republics would be a more plausible act and that it would offer much greater chances for tactical manoeuvring in these circumstances. First, it was not disintegration as much as halving Yugoslavia. Second, the West, whose political calculations include economic interests as an important criteria would more readily accept the separation of three than two republics, because it would thereby keep a larger market for its goods and technology and we would be better partners. In that case we represent the more developed part of Yugoslavia. Militarily it would be easier for three to defend themselves from an attack than to do so individually. Finally, now is the right time, because MILOŠEVIĆ has not properly prepared Serbia for war or homogenised the Serbs to the measure where they would be prepared to chance direct war operations.

According to Adil, IZETBEGOVIĆ said that he had neither guarantees, nor was he working on any plan for militarily or politically opposing the anticipated operations and he believed that the only way out of the situation lay in negotiations with the Serbs. When Adil ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ asked him to negotiate, IZETBEGOVIĆ supposedly told him that he could not, that he was not the best person for it, because the Serbs did not trust him, and therefore he was not a suitable negotiator. He requested that we, Adil ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ and I, negotiate with the Serbs on behalf of the Muslims. I felt something was not right and that a trap lay somewhere in IZETBEGOVIĆ's illogical proposal.

We believed that the negotiations had take place, primarily between the Serbs and Muslims. Namely, the greatest problems and severest possible consequences for Bosnia and Herzegovina would be the result of severely disturbed relations between the Bosniaks and Serbs. It had to be clear to everyone that the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be determined above all others by relations between its largest ethnic communities.

Thus began the negotiations, often referred to later, between the Serbs and Muslims on how to solve the problem of the fate of our country began under auspices of the President of the SDA Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, with the mandate he gave us. These were negotiations for finding a solution to the problem of relations between the Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the same time on the future relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Actually, the negotiations dealt with whether and under what conditions Bosnia and Herzegovina could possibly remain in Yugoslavia or whether she must leave, even if under the most unfavourable conditions

The negotiations began on 8 July 1991 and were held in the building of the state Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, actually in the office of its member Nikola KOLJEVIĆ. The preliminary, introductory negotiations were lead only by Adil ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ, Radovan KARADŽIĆ, Muhamed FILIPOVIĆ and Nikola KOLJEVIĆ.

Te negotiations began intensely every day at meetings of the two delegations. Adil and I were in one, Karadžić and Koljević in the other.

Occasionally. Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK and Biljana PLAVŠIĆ would join the negotiations on the Serbian, while on our side only Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ sometimes took part in the negotiations.

He took part in one of the very important sessions of the negotiations, when it seemed we had already come

close to an agreement. This was on 23 July 1991, after IZETBEGOVIĆ's return from a visit to the USA, when he gave a positive assessment of the negotiations, welcoming them and saying that he was aware they were being held with his knowledge and approval. The negotiations were interrupted briefly because the Serbian representatives had to consult with Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ, which the late Nikola KOLJEVIĆ said openly, because these were issues of the highest national interest for all Serbs. We did not need that much time, our communication with IZETBEGOVIĆ was easier, interrupted only by his brief visit to the United States of America. Upon his return from that visit, at Sarajevo airport, IZETBEGOVIĆ gave a statement for TV BH that he knew the so-called Serbian-Muslim talks were in progress, he approved of them and that he hoped they would succeed. During that visit, IZETBEGOVIĆ was received by BAKER's assistant at the. time, Lawrence EAGLEBURGER, and by General SCOWCROFT. the President's National Security Advisor.

Furthermore, JNA operations, which had two basic objectives, began. The first of these was to include the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in intense military operations, which the JNA was waging against the state of Croatia at that time. The second objective, in conditions of the assumed absence of a proper and energetic reaction by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to this obvious seizure of its territory, was to force a worsening of relations between the Croats and Muslims, as logical allies in this situation, so that a variety of activities aimed at destabilising these rations were carried out from our territory. The city of Dubrovnik was attacked from the territory of the municipality of Trebinje, an attack was carried out against Ravne village in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, populated by Croats committing an overt military provocation and aggression on its territory. Finally, and the final measure to test the ability of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to protect its territory, was the shameful act of the Bosnian authorities turning over the captured defenders of the Croatian town of Kostajnica, who crossed to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to avoid falling into Serbian separatists' hands in Croatia, to be turned over by our authorities to the Serbian army in the guise of the JNA, and all of them kept in the ominous Manjača camp and probably killed.

To all these over provocations, our government and Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ himself remained mute. The expected silence was the condition for the continuation of a possible Serbian military operation in our country. The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina silently allowed the Serbs to continue such operations, and their conduct as occupier received additional impetus from the stepped up campaign of the Serbian autonomous districts throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnian Krajina SAO, Old Herzegovina SAO, Ozren SAO and Semberija SAO. Preparations were under way for creating other similar entities, all with the aim of breaking up the country. This was how Bosnia and Herzegovina became a kind of leopard skin, spotted with zones where the legitimate authorities had no influence.

* * *

Muhamed Filipović: I was Alija's diplomat /orig. title: Bio sam Alijin diplomata/, Bihać, Delta, 2000

COMMENT:

Hwo are Muhamed Filipović and Adil Zulfikarpašić?

Muhamed Filipović is an academic, historian, philosopher, one of the most prominent intellectuals in BiH, and he said that it is clear that Serbs are executing their plan for a Greater Serbia, he refuses to be a member of SDA (Party of Democratic Action – Izetbegovic's Party), because in his opinion, Filipović, politics and religion should not mix together, the way leaders of SDA (Behmen, Šabić, Čengić) announced in the "Islamic Declaration".

Adil Zulfikarpašić, political emigrant, Swiss citizen after the World War II, founder and leader of the "Bosnian Institute" and a Muslim by faith.

COMMENT:

On which grounds was Izetbegović convinced (a fortune teller?) that HE (MILOŠEVIĆ) will suggest to Tuđman some kind of „partial solutions, which in part are to be achieved at the expense of Muslims in BiH?“

And what the “certain information” are, and who gave them to him?

KOS (JNA Counter Intelligence Service)? which surrounds him, SDB (State Security Service) which surrounds him or some third or fourth party, out of many who staged the conflict?

The goal is very clear, and to save paper I will not elaborate.

Again and again it is interesting how lies can become “accepted course of events” and how many „flies“ are attracted by such lies?

Manufacturers of such fictions are top experts and are well aware how a thing that we call „MAN“ functions.

A letter of the President Izetbegović to the President Tuđman on March 24, 1991



Dear President,

I am convinced (within that context I have got certain information) that **he** will offer you some partial solutions in the bilateral negotiations, that would partially be realized opposite of Muslims' and Bosnia and Herzegovina's benefit.

I ask you to turn such offers down. You know that this would lead into chaos, rather desirable by some forces. The friendship between the Muslim and Croat people can give more that any unprincipled conditions like now like in the future. I want to assure you in the friendly feelings of the Muslim people.

Sarajevo, 24 March 1991

Sincerely yours

Alija

5.
SEFER HALILOVIĆ, COMMANDER OF "PATRIOTIC LEAGUE", THE SECRET MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF MUSLIMS IN BiH, CHIEF OF STAFF OF A BiH – MUSLIM ARMY IN BiH



FACTS

COMMENT:

SEFER HALILOVIĆ: „CUNNING STRATEGY“ – SARAJEVO

Sefer Halilović, chief of the Main staff of the BH Army, former employee and associate of KOS, writes about when and where Alija Izetbegović and Ejup Ganić talk about their negotiations and plans of exchange of territory and people of Sandžak for the territory and people of East Herzegovina.

A part of Serbia for a part of BiH.

Sefer was already then appointed to the “Presidency of BiH”, as if the “Presidency of BiH” was a village fire patrol unit, and not a group of people elected in free elections.

In negotiations in Geneva, a place where discussions took place about how to REGULATE THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE of BiH, a delegation led by Izetbegović, Sefer Halilović considers as BOSNIAN, instead of BOSNIAN-HERZEGOVINIAN, while the delegations of Croats and Serbs are considered as delegations of Ustashas and Chetniks; therefore the situation is terrifying because the “*UN palace is packed with Chetniks and Ustashas*”.

Only Sefer Halilović and his company from the BASIC NATION of BiH constitute the real, original and democratic delegation of BiH.

We, from HVO (Croatian Defense Council) should have formed a joint command and efficient and joint army with this man, with his opinions and views formed in the classrooms of the KOS (Counterintelligence Service). How much effort and vain attempts went down the drain? How much damage is caused to the Croatian people?

In document D-8 is listed what was, while returning from Switzerland, in an airplane, Izetbegović saying about Arafat’s advices, how should one take his piece of land and make his own state.

Halilović disagrees with the views of his chief commander because Sefer “*does not withhold any right to anyone who respects the Bosnian state*”.

The supreme mind of Sefer Halilović will evaluate who respects what and how much respect is shown, especially which people or individuals respect the BOSNIAN STATE.

And if Halilović evaluates that some people don’t show respect for his Bosnia, he will defeat them with his PATRIOTIC LEAGUE and his BH Army, and they will have to go to Croatia (Ustashas) or to Serbia (Chetniks).

Reader, don’t you, in all this, recognize the FOUNDATION OF AGGRESSION OF BH ARMY AGAINST THE HVO?

How Bosnia was Divided up

Sefer Halilović: Cunning Strategy

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Up to that point, the division of Bosnia was a behind-the-scenes affair: the story about a sovereign and integral state was regarded in public as authoritative. Even I fell for the integral part, and this was actually the fundamental and main reason why IZETBEGOVIĆ and I parted ways. I believed his public declarations even after I had first been presented with the "division" variant. This was as far back as November 1992. On that day I was in my office, planning to visit the units in the afternoon. At some point, the President phoned me in person. I was surprised:

"Oh, it is you Mr President." He said: "My secretary is busy," and he asked me what I was up to. I told him that I was preparing some short orders. "Could you come and see me?" he asked. "Of course," I replied and immediately set off. I found IZETBEGOVIĆ and GANIĆ in IZETBEGOVIĆ's office. When I entered, I greeted them: "*Es-selamu alejkum* /greetings/, Mr President. Hi, GANIĆ." This was my usual joke with GANIĆ, which GANIC was usually cross about in private. Then I would say to him: "But you are a Yugoslav." And that is how it usually finished. But on that occasion, as soon as I greeted them I asked if I was disturbing them, since I got that impression that they were in the middle of a serious discussion. They replied: "No, no, do sit down. You are a member of the Presidency." I sat down, and they continued their discussion:

"What does Suljo say?" GANIĆ asked Alija. The President turned towards me and said:

"It is a good thing that you are listening to this discussion. I spoke on the phone to UGLJANIN and I asked him ..." he turned to GANIĆ, "would the people in Sandžak agree to swap Sandžak for Eastern Herzegovina?"

"And what did Suljo say?" asked GANIĆ, who is all aflutter whenever he speaks to Alija and I constantly have the impression that he will end up any minute in Alija's lap. And IZETBEGOVIĆ, cool and calm, as if he were talking about moving a box of matches from one pocket to another, replied:

"Suljo said that the people in Sandžak would embrace it enthusiastically."

I was so disturbed that I lit a cigarette. At the time Alija was trying not to smoke, so all of us around him tried to control ourselves and not light up until he lit up himself. I lit up and they continued the discussion. GANIĆ said:

"That would be great."

"Of course it would be great. To get the people together, sort out the country and to get on with our business," the President contentedly replied. I had the impression that they had completely forgotten about me while they were considering this idea, when GANIĆ turned towards me and said:

"What do you think of this?"

"I do not think anything. The first thought that came to mind was that I was very surprised, Mr GANIĆ," I replied seriously and continued: "because this will have several consequences that will need a head that is much cleverer than the head of a soldier like me. In any case, whenever we attempt to say anything that you would classify as politics, you get very cross. And you consider as politics anything that does not agree with your opinion, so I would rather not express my opinion on anything."

By then I was already very much aware of the fact that you could dabble in politics as much as you liked, as long as you supported their views. Otherwise, as soon as you have an opinion of your own, they immediately remind you that you are a soldier. GANIĆ ignored my comment, but continued to try to engage me in the discussion. I stuck to my guns, saying that this was politics, that this should be discussed by the Presidency, the Government, political parties ... Alija also joined in and said to me: "We know you have a good understanding of it and that you have your own opinion. But remember: only a fool never changes his mind. It is very important to us what you think and you should tell us."

"All right," I complied, "First, this would mean an division of Bosnia and Herzegovina on ethnic lines and the destruction of a thousand-year-long Bosnian state, which I think is unacceptable, to say the least. Nor do I think that we have the right to do this. Second, this would mean creating some sort of miniature Muslim state, and it is very debatable how this would be accepted by the international community. Third, this would include mass or, as MOLJEVIĆ called them, humane resettlement of people. Stalin did this in the Soviet Union and it proved to be completely wrong. Four, this would also represent a violation of the R BH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Constitution and the rejection of the platform that we, as a Presidency, adopted with great difficulties. Five, in addition, this seems a little immature. Because, in the end, Eastern Herzegovina is for now firmly in KARADŽIĆ's hold, and Sandžak is under MILOŠEVIĆ.

As soon as I said this, they both stood up. I stood up too. Alija said to GANIĆ:

"Didn't I tell you that there was no point in talking to him about this subject? He insisted on the sovereign, integral, indivisible and he is sticking to it."

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There was only one more occasion when we spoke openly and directly about this matter: in the plane, on our way back from Geneva.

This was, in any case, a different journey. We set off from Sarajevo on 1

January 1993.

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The first plenary session was the following morning at 11 o'clock. My escort came soon after 10 and we went out into the corridor. I went into the President's suite and saw him in prayer. He was still in his dressing gown. I said to LUKAVAC: "Please could you knock on my door when you set off, so I don't stand around waiting in the corridor." Mido and I went back into my room and waited. I looked at my watch: 10 to 11. I was surprised that nobody had knocked. I came out of the room and saw Swiss policemen outside the door; a policeman gestured that they had already gone. I could not believe it, so I grab hold of the door handle, but it was locked. I asked Mido: "Do you speak any English?" He said: "Little /as printed/." I will remember this 'little' for the rest of my life. We left the hotel, got into a taxi and went to the United Nations Office. Of course, we both used our hands to speak English, We were looking for the Bosnian delegation. But... KARADŽIĆ is also the Bosnian delegation, and BOBAN is also the Bosnian delegation. The Yugoslav delegation is also at the negotiations: ĆOSIĆ, MILOŠEVIĆ, BULATOVIĆ with the rest of the team, in which only the security numbered around 200 people. Therefore, the UN Office was full of Chetniks and Ustashas. We only just managed to stumble on to the right Bosnia and Herzegovina delegation.

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Returning to Sarajevo, we were once more in the small plane, but now it was only our delegation and there was enough room. The President and I sat opposite one another, our legs were touching. It was narrow. All our things were there, and among them was something like a plank wrapped in ordinary cardboard and tied with some rope. I casually asked:

"What is this you have here, Mr President?" "Ah," he said, "let me show you." He took the plan, it was about 80 centimetres long and let's say 50 or so centimetres wide, and he started unwrapping it. "Please, do not go to any trouble," I said. "Never mind," he replied and unwrapped a extremely beautiful picture of a mosque in Palestine, made from mother-of-pearl. At the bottom of the painting there was something written in Arabic. I asked: "Can you read Arabic?" "No," he said, "but I know this prayer off by heart." He was pointing at it and teaching me: "Bismillah irrahman ..." After he had studied it, he said: "Arafat gave me this picture, I was with him. We had a long talk. The fate of the Palestinian people is very similar to our fate," I did not agree: "The fate of our people is similar to that of the Jews, because when they expel the Palestinian, he takes his coat and goes off to Yemen, to Egypt, somewhere, while the Jew has nowhere to go." "We can discuss this some other time, but you will see that you are not right," the President replied and then went on: "But let me tell you what Arafat said to me. He said: 'Alija, are they offering you anything?' I replied: 'They are, they are and a good chunk,' And Arafat said: 'Take it, Alija, They made offers to me too and I did not want them, I wanted everything. In the end, I am left with nothing. Take it, Alija, while the offer still stands, because you too will be left without anything.'" When he finished telling me this, he looked straight at me and continued: "You are seriously mistaken. We should take a part of Bosnia. Let the people come back to that piece of Bosnia, let the situation be sorted out and a state made. This way, we will be left with nothing."

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A discussion ensued. I started explaining: "We do not want everything. We want to live in equality with all those who have always lived in Bosnia, without depriving of their rights anyone who respects the Bosnian state. We want to live in the entire territory of BH, since we lived on 94% of its territory. Nobody wants to deny the Serbs and Croats the right to be sovereign and equal, but if we take a piece of Bosnia, we would then be destroying the Bosnian state and the outcome would be uncertain. And finally, the Muslims cannot fit on to the piece of Bosnia that they are offering us, because in that case there will be a tendency for all the Muslims to flock to this little Bosnian state." The President said: "We need a piece that will accommodate around two million people. Some will come, some will leave and it will be just right." We both fell silent.

Sefer Halilović, Cunning Strategy /orig.title: Lukava strategija/, Maršal, Matica Sandžaka, Sarajevo, 1997

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78 OBZOR / Večernji list reminiscences
Interview with American Ambassador Okun

Interview by Jadranka Juresko-Kero in the Vecernji List, Zagreb April 15, 2006
Translated from Vecernji List by Hilda M. Foley

American Ambassador Herbert S. Okun speaks about Milosevic, Tudjman, the war, the negotiations...

Tuđman saved Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ambassador Herbert S. Okun has spent a full thirty six years in the service of the State Department and
American diplomacy. Born in New York 76 years ago to a immigrant Russian Jewish family, he did not continue his father's successful tradition in the food supply branch, the manufacture and distribution of food, but instead received his education at the prestigious American universities Stanford and Harvard and from his 25th year on devoted his life completely to diplomacy. He spent his first time in Croatia in 1957 as a tourist. He was immediately impressed by the beauty of Hvar and Dubrovnik. He returned to our country in 1990, first as the executive director of a nonprofit financial group that offered help in the establishment of a free market in the post-communist countries of the eastern block. Soon after, he exchanged his voluntary role with one of official duty as the deputy of Cyrus Vance, the special emissary of the United Nations' Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali., actively spending time in the areas of former Yugoslavia from 1991-1993. Today he lectures international relations at Yale and John Hopkins.

Interviewer: Once you commented that you already realized during the first meeting with Milosevic that one is dealing with a man of bad character, capable of anything!

- Yes, I met Milosevic in Belgrade on Dec. 12, 1990. I arrived with a group of business people and Cyrus Vance and I had a private meeting with Milosevic. Observing how he talked and acted I could not come to any other conclusion than Milosevic being a common gangster. You know, those types from Mafia movies with cigars in their mouths, who try to express themselves very theatrically but in reality are selling fog. The American ambassador at that time in Belgrade, Warren Zimmerman, spoke of Milosevic as a charming person. I was shocked. I said to him: "Don't you see that he is a gangster?" Unfortunately I was right, because it was soon apparent that the war and all the crimes were initiated by Milosevic, that he was a liar and a politician who did not honor agreements or his signature.

Interviewer: You were the vice-chairman of the International Conference for former Yugoslavia in the negotiations regarding the arrival of UNPROFOR in Croatia. Could the war have been prevented in Croatia if the West had intervened in time?

- When I was in Belgrade in 1990 I asked everyone - from Milosevic to ordinary people, taxi drivers, waiters - do they think it will come to war, they all answered, can you imagine, that this is not possible.
My experience told me that this was not correct, that war was coming because I did not trust Milosevic.
I asked him for instance on the eve of elections in Serbia if the JNA (Yugoslav National Army) has a considerable role in the country. He answered that it does not. "Mr. Okun", he said, "we are building democracy". The next day I saw his picture with the JNA generals in the Politika (newspaper).

I warned that one cannot trust him. But Milosevic knew how to manipulate the foreign media and politicians. He constantly kept repeating that "Croatians are making necklaces from fingers of Serb children". Just imagine such statements! The West tried to stop the war more than is known or deduced in public, but Milosevic did not want it. Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance offered a plan for the so-called peaceful separation of all sides in Yugoslavia, but while Croats accepted discourse plans, were signing everything and showing that they want peace, in Belgrade everything was the opposite.

Interviewer: What were your impressions of President Tudjman?

- I can say openly that I liked Tudjman because he was a serious politician who kept his word. True, he had a rigid style of behavior which many falsely interpreted, especially western journalists, but all my experiences with Tudjman are positive. After all, Tudjman, who led his country in war, with an imposed arms embargo, could not act like Gandhi. He was cooperative, wanted peace and actively participated in negotiations in the Haag, Geneva and Zagreb. They resented that he changed street names from the communist times and while he was doing that, Milosevic was killing Croatians in eastern Slavonia.

I was with Tudjman when the exodus of Croatians from Ilok began. He said to me: "Mr. Ambassador,
do something, it is terrible what my people are experiencing". Then Vance called Milosevic but he answered that he does not know what he is talking about, that he has nothing to do with Ilok. That man never spoke the truth. Tudjman was intelligent; he knew history, and speaking openly, with his leadership Croatians through Operation Storm and other military actions saved Bosnia Herzegovina. At a meeting in Sarajevo in 1991 Izetbegovic told me that he will demand of the JNA to leave BiH and I asked him: "Where is your army, who will defend you if the JNA does not comply?" I quickly realized that in Bosnia only the Croats offered organized defense and saved it from downfall, something often kept quiet by the media as well as politicians.

Interviewer: You created the Vance plan which stopped the war in Croatia. Did you have difficulties in the realization of the plan?

- After some fifteen armistices pronounced by the EC which no one honored, we turned to a different logic, and that was that the armistice is not declared by us but by the opposing sides. At that time the Serbs were already prepared for the Bosnia campaign and had therefore relatively quickly accepted the armistice. When I presented the contents of the plan to Tudjman, he immediately asked several questions, such as the status of the police which had warned about the vulnerability in the plan. Later on, these questions were shown to be correct, as the Serb side used it to evade their obligations.

6.
HOW "TRUE IMAGE OF THE WORLD" IS CREATED



FACTS

D-10a

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

Excerpt from the testimony of Mustafa Čandić in Slobodan Milošević case, ICTY, 11 November 2002

Pages 12734-12735

Q. A couple of points of detail. The first point of detail may or may not relate to either of these operations. Was there action at the Jewish graves at a cemetery in Zagreb connected to either of these named operations?

A. Your Honours, it is true that within Operation Labrador, or, rather, when this network of collaborators was active in Zagreb, at the Mirogoj cemetery in Zagreb, a terrorist attack was launched and Jewish graves were mined at the Mirogoj cemetery, the object being that the Croatian authorities should be represented and shown as being pro-fascist or, rather, to create animosity, that the Jews should have animosity towards the Croatian authorities in Zagreb. Another terrorist act was also being planned on the synagogue in Zagreb. However, that was never carried out because the members of the Labrador operation had to flee to Belgrade because they were in danger of being arrested.

Q. Finally on Labrador, who was the officer in charge of Labrador and what, if any, part of the KOG* detachments were involved or was involved?

A. The officer in charge for Operation Labrador was the head of the security department, Slobodan Rakočević, in Zemun, while the operative staff of the second detachment of the counter-intelligence group in Zagreb, first and foremost Colonel Ivan Sabolović and Major Čedo Knežević, were the people who had links with the collaborators in Zagreb and the persons in the field in the state security that actually launched these operations and sent in reports about everything that was happening in Zagreb and in the top leadership of the Republic of Croatia.

D-10b

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

Excerpt from the statement of Radenko Radojčić on 15 March 1994:

" … I said it would be good that during my absence the bag with the explosive is not in the premises of the "Templum" company.

Platiša asked is it something that goes "bang" which I confirmed. In spite of that Platiša took the bag and carried it into his car.

In connection with the bag which Platiša took, by the end of August, in the Čatež spa, when Platiša, Malobabić and I had a conversation, I asked Platiša to hand over the bag to Malobabić who offered on his own to place the bag somewhere safe.

Later in Belgrade, he told me he had put away the bag on a safe place, in the second storage on Jarun (Zagreb) which he showed me when we were hiding his sack.

Around 2 p.m. on that day, Malobabić and I took off in my car from Zagreb to Holland, into Emen, and stayed with Henk. I had a contact in Emen related to the business of my firm, and as for Malobabić, we arranged for him to buy an Opel Kadet on the name of the representative office of "Grafi-linea b.v."

Connected to the stay in Emen, I wish to stress two other moments.

I don't recall the exact date, but on the morning news of Sky News, on the television, around 10 a.m. we heard that there were two explosions in Zagreb, on the Jewish cemetery and in the Jewish Community."

*KOG – Counterintelligence Group

7.

WHAT A WONDERFUL ACT – PACIFISTIC

DECISION OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF 25th SEPTEMBER 1991



FACTS

COMMENT:

Brilliant decision of the UN Security Council, superb decision, mixture of wisdom, knowledge, insight, leadership and historic responsibility, startling level of HUMANITY.

BRAVO, BRAVISSIMO.

Well – Russians and Serbs show their affection publicly, French like Serbs (Mitterrand expresses this publicly), well, ok, English don't like anyone, let alone Croats, Yugoslavia is liked by everyone, but Americans, Americans, Americans.

John Ford and John Wayne must be turning in their graves from all this battle righteousness.

Montenegrin poet and bishop Njegoš said:

„*The battle is not won by bright weapons, but by the beating heart in the chest of a hero*"

Greek poet Cavafy wrote:

„ *Honour to those who in the life they lead define and guard a Thermopylae* ".

We paid a great price and WON.

JNA ARMED FORCES
STRUCTURE AND NUMBER OF SFRY ARMED FORCES
(**ARMED FORCES = JNA + TERRITORIAL DEFENSE**) AT WAR AND PEACE:*

JNA MANPOWER:	in peace:		180.000 (15%)
	at war:		+ 1.200.000 (85%)
TD MANPOWER:	in peace:	approx.	1.000 (2% command only)
	at war:	approx.	1.200.000 (98%) - of which:

Slovenia TD 110,000, Croatia TD 230,000, Bosnia and Herzegovina TD 270,000; Montenegro TD 40,000; Macedonia TD 60,000; Serbia TD 300,000; Vojvodina TD 60,000, Kosovo TD 130,000, keep in mind that the latter existed only on paper, because after the demonstrations of Albanians in the spring of 1981 TD was disarmed and weapons were taken to Serbia; Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins (around 12% of the population) were left with the weapons or were later armed via parallel non-institutional channels.
Total SFRY armed forces in war (stretched by 8%): **2,400,000**, of which approximately 550,000 in manufacturing and logistics, and the rest in combat units.

Land forces (LF)

COMPOSITION:	17 corps
	1st guard division (Belgrade) and 63rd Parachute Brigade (Niš) as independent units of the General Staff.
HEAVY ARMAMENT:	2,100 tanks
	1,000 armoured personnel carriers
	8,000 ordnance
	1,300 antitank missile weapons.

Yugoslav Navy (YN)

COMPOSITION AND RESOURCES:	1 torpedo boats brigade (14)
	1 missile boats and missile gunboats brigade (16)
	1 patrol boats brigade (4)
	1 minesweepers division (9)
	1 submarine brigade (11)
	1 naval commando unit
	3 naval infantry brigades.

Air Force and Air Defence (AF AND AD)

COMPOSITION:	5th Corps of AF and AD (Zagreb)
	1st Corps of AF and AD (Belgrade)
	3rd Corps of AF and AD (Skopje)
RESOURCES:	512 combat aircrafts
	104 transport aircrafts
	152 helicopters and
	118 other aircrafts, and
	5,100 antiaircraft guns and
	2,800 antiaircraft missile weapons.

* Source: Martin Špegelj, "Memories of a soldier" (Croatian title: „*Sjećanja vojnika*") published by Znanje d.d., Zagreb, 2001, II Appendix outside the text: 2 Maps: 4 Territorial organisation of JNA after 1988 - military system;

In a letter dated 14 November 1991[182] the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General as follows:

"I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 12 November 1991[181] concerning an addition to the Member States contributing military personnel to the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia has been brought to the attention of the Council members. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter."

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF HUNGARY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

LETTER DATED 24 SEPTEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Decision

At its 3009th meeting, on 25 September 1991. the Council decided to invite the representative of Yugoslavia to participate without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled:

"Letter dated 19 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council *(S/23052)."*[22]

"Letter dated 19 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council *(S/23053)."*[22]

"Letter dated 20 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23057)."[22]

"Letter dated 24 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23069)."[22]

Resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991

The Security Council.

Conscious of the fact that Yugoslavia has welcomed, through a letter from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council[183] the decision to convene a meeting of the Security Council.

Having heard the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia.[184]

Deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia, which is causing a heavy loss of human life and material damage, and by the consequences for the countries of the region, in particular in the border areas of neighbouring countries.

Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Commending the efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, through, *inter alia,* the implementation of a cease-fire including the sending of

observers, the convening of a conference on Yugoslavia, including the mechanisms set forth within it and the suspension of the delivery of all weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.

Recalling the relevant principles enshrined in the Charter, and in this context taking note of the declaration of 3 September 1991 of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that no territorial gams or changes within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable.

Taking note of the agreement for a cease-fire concluded on 17 September 1991 in Igalo, and also that signed on 22 September 1991.

Alarmed by the violations of the cease-fire and the continuation of the fighting.

Taking note of the letter dated 19 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.[185]

Taking note also of the letters dated 19 and 20 September 1991 from, respectively, the Permanent Representative of Canada[186] and the Permanent Representative of Hungary[187] to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.

Taking note further of the letters addressed to the Secretary-General dated 5 and 22 July, 6 and 21 August and 20 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands188 the letter dated 12 July 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia,[189] the letter dated 7 August 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,[190] and the letter dated 19 September 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Australia[191]: as well as the letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 7 August 1991 from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Austria,192 and the letters dated 29 August and 4 and 20 September 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland193 to the United Nations.

1. *Expresses its full support* for the collective efforts for peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia undertaken under the auspices of the member States of the European Community with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe consistent with the principles of that Conference;

2. Supports fully all arrangements and measures resulting from such collective efforts as those described above, in particular with regard to assistance and support to the ceasefire observers, and to consolidate an effective end to hostilities in Yugoslavia and to assure the smooth functioning of the process instituted within the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia;

3. Invites to this end the Secretary-General to offer his assistance without delay, in consultation with the Government of Yugoslavia and all those promoting the efforts referred to above, and to report as soon as possible to the Security Council;

4. *Strongly urges* all parties to abide strictly by the ceasefire agreements of 17 and 22 September 1991;

5. *Appeals urgently to and encourages* all parties to settle their disputes peacefully and through negotiation al the Conference on Yugoslavia, including through the mechanisms set forth within it;

6. Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete **embargo** on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Council decides otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia;

7. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict in Yugoslavia, which would permit all Yugoslavs to decide upon and to construct their future in peace;

8. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

Adopted unanimously at the 3009th meeting.

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

8.
WEAPONS IN BiH



FACTS

COMMENT:

How could have I thought, then, at the end of 1991 on the battlefields in Croatia that the aggressor, Serbian JNA, should have been disarmed in the blocked army camps, soldiers and officers freed to return to their homes, with only their personal weapons, and the rest of the weapons – national, purchased also with my money, RETAINED – because, for God's sake, we needed something to respond with to an enormous number of shells dropped on us as gifts on daily basis.

I'm ignorant, stupid, naive, whatever you want, the choice is yours.

How could such a man understand the pressure of people, prudent, smart, experienced, intelligent people, internationally relevant people, pressure on Croatia to let these weapons pass and enter BiH, because, well, there it will bring peace and stability, and Serbs don't have any territorial claims there, all nationalities love each other, as well as all individuals, men and women.

Alija Izetbegović had the same opinion, God forgive him.

Now I understand that all of this was also my plan, to initiate the full blown bloody war in BiH in all its glory, and then we "joint criminals" will snatch one piece of this land for ourselves.

I must be so, I do not know. I'm stupid and ignorant.

"The Geneva Agreement" on the withdrawal of JNA from Croatia (Geneva, 23rd November 1991)*

a) Croatia will immediately end the blockade of all the barracks and facilities of JNA in Croatia;

b) JNA will immediately start the withdrawal from Croatia of the manpower, weapons and military equipment from the above barracks and facilities, and complete the process of withdrawal in accordance with the existing mutually agreed schedule;

c) both sides will immediately order to all the units under their command, control or political influence to observe the unconditional ceasefire, starting from tomorrow, 24th November, and will see to it that the paramilitary units which are not under their command, control or political influence, also observe the ceasefire starting from this date;

d) both sides will facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to persons who suffered in recent clashes.

Lord Carrington will see to it to secure that the international Observer Mission does all in its power and competencies that the ceasefire lasts.

Geneva, Switzerland, 23rd November 1991

Signed:

Dr. Franjo Tuđman, President of the Republic of Croatia

Slobodan Milošević, President of the Republic of Serbia

general Veljko Kadijević, Federal Minister of Defence

Cyrus Vance, special envoy of the UN Secretary General

* SOURCE: ***Glasnik***, Croatian political journal, No. 93, 17 February 1993, p. 24.

D-14a


1992
Operational development of
Armed forces of SFRY
LJUBLJANA
ZAGREB
BEOGRAD
SARAJEVO
SKOPJE
DUBROVNIK
SPLIT
ŠIBENIK
ZADAR
KARLOBAG
BANJA LUKA
PRIJEDOR
SLUNJ
KARLOVAC
BJELOVAR
VIROVITICA
SOMBOR
OSIJEK
VINKOVCI
VUKOVAR
NOVI SAD
ZRENJANIN
SREMSKA MITROVICA
SL. BROD
GRADAČAC
TUZLA
ZVORNIK
VALJEVO
KRAGUJEVAC
ŠABAC
GORAŽDE
FOČA
MOSTAR
TITOVO UŽICE
NIŠ
PRIŠTINA
ANCONA
PESCARA
XXX 31
XXX 14
XXX 13
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XXX 2
XXX 13

D-14b


20 March 1992
Deployment of JNA
forces in BiH
LJUBLJANA
ZAGREB
BEOGRAD
SARAJEVO
SKOPJE
DUBROVNIK
SPLIT
ZADAR
KARLOBAG
BANJA LUKA
PRIJEDOR
SLUNJ
KARLOVAC
BJELOVAR
VIROVITICA
SOMBOR
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KRAGUJEVAC
ŠABAC
GORAŽDE
FOČA
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TITOVO UŽICE
NIŠ
PRIŠTINA
ANCONA
PESCARA
RIJEKA
10
Soldiers - 25 086
Volunteers - 2 300
5
Soldiers - 19 316
Volunteers - 16 750
9
Soldiers - 14 531
Volunteers - 2 200
2. VO
4. VO
17
Soldiers - 8 512
Volunteers - 8 240
4
Soldiers - 5 826
Volunteers - 33 220
10
Soldiers - 25 086
Volunteers - 2 300
5
Soldiers - 19 316
Volunteers - 16 750
9
Soldiers - 14 531
Volunteers - 2 200
17
Soldiers - 8 512
Volunteers - 8 240
4
Soldiers - 5 826
Volunteers - 33 220

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

1.

GREATER SERBIA ACCORDING TO THE CHETNIK IDEOLOGIST STEVAN MOLJEVIĆ'S PROJECT (30th JUNE 1941)

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

1985

2.



Armies have the signs of their respective republics

3.

1985

revealed intentions

operationalization **1987**

AD - ARMY DISTRICT
VPO - NAVAL DISTRICT

4. INITIAL GENERAL IDEA OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST CROATIA AND SLOVENIA



5. PLAN OF ATTACK ON CROATIA AFTER RETREAT OF JNA FORCES FROM SLOVENIA (VII/1991)



6. MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION IN CROATIA DECEMBER 1991 – JANUARY 1992



1) All borders of the JNA in Croatia were captured by Croatian forces, or they were evacuated.
2) The zone of the Serbian armed insurgency is reduced by the liberation of the northern part of West Slavonia, but at the moment when the planned continuation of a successful offensive from the Pakrac – Požega line towards Sava is supposed to begin, the political top takes the decision to stop all military activities.
3) Two attempts to unblock Vukovar fail and the town is in the hands of the aggressor.
4) Counter-strikes in the flanks of the enemy positions in the Bukovica area did not give significant results, but the borders of the zones of insurgency are under the control of HV.
5) On the Ston – Hutovo line the penetration of enemy forces into the Neretva Valley has been definitely halted.
6) Defeat of the JNA on the battlefields in Croatia (heavy losses in the fight for Vukovar, and a complete breakdown in the advancement toward Osijek and Đakovo. This is a consequence of activity of HV, but also of unsuccessful mobilization in Serbia, where military draftees refused to go to battles outside of their republic.
7) The overall relation of forces is completely changed in favour of Croatia: HV numbers around 250.000 soldiers in 63 brigades and dozens of independent battalions, it is well armed, and a satisfactory command system has been established; it is fully capable for a general offensive with the aim of removing armed insurgency and complete liberation of Croatia.
8) In alliance with the defence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that state
9) Instead of a general offensive, on 2nd January 1992 in Sarajevo a permanent ceasefire is signed; The war is transferred into BIH, and the state of neither war nor peace in Croatia will last for four more years.
10) Aware of the definitive defeat, the top of the JNA saves what it can and forms three Serbian armies: Srpska vojska Krajine (for preserving territorial gains in Croatia), Vojska Republike Srpske (for taking over a major part of BIH, 65 – 70%) and Vojska Jugoslavije (as the armed forces of Serbia and Montenegro). SVK was annihilated in the spring and summer of 1995, while other armies exist until the present day.

7. ZONES OF SERBIAN ARMED REBELLION IN CROATIA



Occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia

- cities in a war zone
- no economic or tourist activities

I - Dubrovnik area – most of the hotels were burned and destroyed during the aggression

II – Occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia

III – The area in which refugees and displaced persons were housed in all of the hotels - from BiH and Croatia (upon their departure all the hotels were devastated). During that whole period and for years afterwards, tourism - the main economic sector was dead.

IV – During the war from 1991- 1995 almost entire economy was dead in these cities. They were exposed to bombing and the majority of large industrial facilities were destroyed.

V – Economic activities in other cities were diminished for many reasons, which need further explanations.

Simulation of statistical data if JNA and Serbia had attacked France or USA instead of Croatia

– Selected statistical data and simulation based on the data comparison –

Croatia – Selected statistical data and simulation based on analyzed percentage ratio for USA and France

CONSEQUENCES OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CROATIA

	ACTUAL DATA		SIMULATION FOR USA AND FRANCE BASED ON PERCENTAGES	
	Croatia	Percentage of total population	**USA**	**France**
Total population	4,495,902	100.0%	316,668,567	65,951,611
Displaced persons from Croatia	260,705	5.8%	18,362,740	3,824,353
Refugees from BiH and SRY (1992)	402,768	9.0%	28,368,938	5,908,313
Total no. of refugees and displaced persons (1992)	663,493	14.8%	46,733,087	9,732,960
Total number of killed and missing persons during the JNA and Serbia aggression	14,499	0.3%	1,021,236	212,690
Total no. of soldiers killed and missing during the JNA and Serbia aggression	7,896	0.2%	556,154	115,829
Total number of civilians killed and missing during the JNA and Serbia aggression	6,603	0.1%	465,082	96,861
Total number of soldiers wounded during the JNA and Serbia aggression	31,141	0.7%	2,193,414	456,816
Croatian war veterans who have committed suicide after the war* (1991-2012)	2,482	0.1%	174,820	36,409

Croats in BiH – Simulation based on the analysis of percentage ratio for USA and France

CONSEQUENCES OF AGGRESSION AGAINST BiH (JNA) AND ATTACKS OF SERBIAN AND MUSLIM ARMY FORCES ON CROATS

ACTUAL DATA FOR BiH

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Total population: 4,377,033



Total of Croats (17,4%): 759,906

Percentage of total number of Croats in BiH

SIMULATION FOR USA AND FRANCE BASED ON PERCENTAGES

USA

Total population: 316,668,567



54,977,503

France

Total population: 65,951,611



11,449,999

Croat civilians killed in BiH (1991-1996)	2,484	0.3%	179,712	37,428
Croat soldiers killed in BiH (1991-1996)	5,919	0.8%	428,226	89,185
Total number of Croats killed, died or missing in BiH (1991-1995)	9,909	1.3%	716,894	149,305
Total number of Croats wounded in BiH (991-1996)	20,649	2.7%	1,493,909	311,132

Registered refugees and displaced persons in Croatia after the JNA and the Serbian aggression against Croatia and BiH

Date of registration	Displaced persons from Croatia	Refugees from BiH and SRY in Croatia	TOTAL NUMBER IN CROATIA
1st Dec 91	550,000	-	550,000
1st Dec 92	260,705	402,768	663,493
1st Jun 93	254,791	272,869	527,660
1st Aug 94	196,870	212,056	408,926
1st May 95	210,592	188,672	399,264
31st May 96	167,609	184,545	352,154
1st Mar 97	117,721	106,750*	224,471
4th Apr 98	94,796	37,400**	126,181

* The total number of refugees from BiH and FRY was 147,000 of which 106,750 were registered in the care system, and 40,250 people were not included in the care system

** Total number of refugees from BiH and FRY was 139,000 of which 37,400 were registered in the care system, and 101,400 were not included in the care system

Registered refugees and displaced persons – simulation for USA in proportion to Croatia - after the hypotetical agression against the USA

Date of registration	Displaced persons in USA	Refugees from BiH and SRY in USA	TOTAL NO. IN USA
1st Dec 1991	38,739,214	-	38,739,214
1st Dec 1992	18,362,740	28,368,938	46,733,087
1st Jun 1993	17,946,188	19,219,510	37,165,698
1st Aug 1994	13,866,526	14,936,151	28,802,676
1st May 1995	14,833,034	13,289,100	28,122,134
31st May1996	11,805,529	12,998,415	24,803,944
1st Mar 1997	8,291,671	7,518,929	15,810,600
4th Apr 1998	6,676,950	2,634,267	8,887,551

Source: Population of USA was teken from www.cia.org on July 15th, 2013

Registered refugees and displaced persons - simulation for France in proportion to Croatia - after the hypotetical agression against France

Date of registration	Displaced persons from France	Refugees from BiH and SRY in France	TOTAL NO. IN FRANCE
1st Dec 1991	8,068,100	-	8,068,100
1st Dec 1992	3,824,353	5,908,313	9,732,960
1st Jun 1993	3,737,599	4,002,790	7,740,388
1st Aug 1994	2,887,940	3,110,707	5,998,647
1st May 1995	3,089,231	2,767,681	5,856,912
31st May1996	2,458,702	2,707,141	5,165,843
1st Mar 1997	1,726,881	1,565,945	3,292,826
4th Apr 1998	1,390,588	548,631	1,850,983

Source: Population of France was taken from www.cia.org on July 15th, 2013





CROATIA
56,542 km²
4,495,900 inhabitants

USA
9,826,675 km²
316,668,567 inhabitants

CROATIA

Attacks from BiH, Serbia and Montenegro on Croatia in 1991

Occupied territory of Croatia in 1991

26% of the territory (14,700 km²)



FRANCE

Simulation of the attacks from neighboring countries on France, in proportion to Croatia

Simulation of the occupied territory of France, in proportion to Croatia

26% of the territory (143,441 km²)

CROATIA

56,542 km²
4,495,900 inhabitants

FRANCE

551,695 km²
65,951,611 inhabitants

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

9.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ'S ISLAMIC DECLARATION – CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF MUSLIMS IN BiH PATRIOTIC LEAGUE – FORCE THAT WILL ENABLE THE PROJECT



FACTS

COMMENT:

The perception of "ISLAMIC DECLARATION" in Croatian "intellectual" circles is an impressive example of moral and intellectual cowardice and distorted communist awareness.

This social and religious programmatic idea matured in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since the World War II, especially on relation Sarajevo-Zagreb; many people were imprisoned for that idea for a long time; it was finally completed in the 80's of the 20th century when Alija Izetbegović and other of the same opinion, mature, intellectual, serious, imprisoned people, put that idea in its form and publish it in 200 000 free copies as a certain COMMUNIST MANIFESTO.

And just before the FIRST free, democratic elections in BiH.

Those people, future leadership of SDA, a party which significantly forms political and national aspirations of the MUSLIMS, publicly and clearly, urbi et orbi, say that:

"*There is no peace and co-existence between Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions*".

"*That the first and the most important conclusion is a conclusion about impossibility to join Islamic and non-Islamic systems*".

"*The Islamic movement should and can access the takeover of the power as soon as it is morally and massively powerful enough that it can ruin the present non-Islamic power and build a new Islamic one*."

PUNKTUM.

Well, intellectual gentlemen of all types, these views are pure fascism, sublime Nazism, communism, genuine fundamentalism, a religious one, in this case a Taliban-like fundamentalism.

SANU /Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art/ memorandum is nothing in comparison to this part.

"Islamic Declaration" by Alija Izetbegović and his associates who pursued the Muslim policy in BiH is the same as "MEIN KAMPF", a fundamentally radical, intolerant, dangerous, militant idea and program.

Citations should be followed by my paragraphs of apologies and an explanation that all this is "not directed towards ISLAM AND BOSNIAKS", all of it on behalf of something that should be an inexistent guilt and on the trace of false loves and reconciliation.

It will never happen.

"ISLAMIC DECLARATION" IS WHAT IT IS.

ISLAM is a great religion whereas Bosniaks are a people just like all other people.

We felt the development of ideas from "Islamic Declaration" in the aggression of the BH Army against the HVO in the war in BiH; how it will continue depends, amongst other things, on the quantity of silence, quantity of delusion in heads of those who write and speak about ideas on the territory of BiH.

Development of each pernicious idea, fascistic, communistic, Islamic-fundamentalist is directly proportionate to the silence and cowardice that follow its development.

See Bergman's "SNAKE EGG".

Printed in 200 000 samples

Alija IZETBEGOVIC
President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina

THE ISLAMIC DECLARATION

A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples

Sarajevo, 1990

THE ISLAMIC DECLARATION

A PROGRAMME FOR THE ISLAMIZATION OF MUSLIMS AND THE MUSLIM PEOPLES

OUR GOAL: The Islamization of Muslims

OUR MOTTO: Believe and struggle

BISMILLAHIRAHMANIRRAHIM!

The Declaration which we today present to the public is not prescribed reading, intended to demonstrate to foreigners or doubters the superiority of Islam over any particular system or school of thought.

It is intended for Muslims who know where they belong and whose hearts clearly tell them which side they stand on. For such as these, this Declaration is a call to understand the inevitable consequences of that to which their love and allegiance bind them.

The entire Muslim world is in a state of ferment and change. Whatever whatever form it eventually takes when the initial effects of these changes is felt, one thing is certain: it will no longer be the world of the first half of this century. The age of passivity and stagnation has gone forever.

Everyone is trying to make take advantage of this time of movement and change, particularly foreign powers, both East and West. Instead of their armies, they now use ideas and capital, and by a new mode of influence are once more endeavouring to accomplish the same aim: to ensure their presence and keep the Muslim nations in a state of spiritual helplessness and material and political dependence.

China, Russia and the Western countries quarrel as to who among them will extend patronage and to which part of the Muslim

world. Theirs is a pointless dispute. The Islamic world does not [redacted] them, but the Muslim peoplee

A world of 700 million people with enormous natural resources, occupying a first class geographical position, heir to colossal cultural and political traditions and the proponent of living Islamic thought, cannot long remain in a state of vassalage. There is no power which can check the new Muslim generation from putting an end to this abnormal state of affairs.

In this conviction, we announce to our friends and enemies alike that Muslims are determined to take the fate of the Islamic world into their own hands and arrange that world according to their own vision of it.

From this point of view, the ideas contained in the Declaration are not absolutely new. This is rather a synthesis of ideas heard with increasing frequency in various places and which are accorded about the same importance in all parts of the Muslim world. Its novelty lies in that it seeks to promote ideas and plans into organized action.

The struggle towards new goals did not begin today. On the contrary, it has already experienced *shihada** and its history contains pages of the suffering of its victims. Still, this is mainly the personal sacrifice of exceptional individuals or courageous minor groups in collision with the mighty forces of the *Jahiliya**. The magnitude of the problem and its difficulties, however, required the organized action of millions.

**shihada*: martyrdom. *Jahiliya*: the godless. Period of darkness prior to Islam. (*Translator's note*).

Our message is dedicated to the memory of our comrades who have fallen in the name of Islam.

Sarajevo, 1970
Jumadi-l-awwal, 1390

***

The Islamic order is a society freed of this conflict, a framework of relations in which the Muslim finds himself in complete harmony with his surroundings.

To the question: what is a Muslim society? we would say it is a community composed of Muslims, and we think that this says it

all, or almost all.

The meaning of this definition is that there is no system of institutions, relationships and laws disparate from the people who are its object of which it could be said: this is an Islamic system. No system is Islamic or non-Islamic of itself. It is only so because of the people who compose it.

A European believes that society is ordered by the rule of laws. Since Plato's "Republic", and the various utopian idea which followed up to the most recent - Marxism - the European spirit has been searching for one scheme, one pattern, which, by simply altering the relationships between people or groups, would give birth to the ideal society.

In the Qu'ran, on the other hand, there are relatively few real laws, and much more religion, and requirement for practical action in keeping with this religion.

A multiplicity of laws and a complex legislature is usually a sure sign that something is rotten in a society and that it should stop passing laws and start educating people. When the rottenness of the environment surpasses a certain point, the law becomes impotent. It then falls either into the hands of corrupt executors of justice, or becomes the subject of open or concealed trickery on the part of a corrupt environment.

Wine, gambling and sorcery - once widespread and deeply rooted vices throughout the entire Middle East - were eliminated for a lengthy period from an enormous region by a single Ayet of the Qu'ran, and by a single explanation: God had forbidden them. As soon as religion weakened, intoxication and superstition returned with unabated vigour, to which the incomparably higher level of culture by now obtaining offered no obstacle. America's Prohibition Law, proclaimed in the name of contemporary science and implemented with all the force of one of the most highly organized communities in the world, eventually had to be abandoned in the 'forties, after thirteen years of futile attempts, full of violence and crime. An attempt to introduce prohibition into Scandinavian countries ended in similar failure.

This and many similar examples clearly demonstrate that a society can be improved only in the name of God and by educating

man. We should take the one road which surely leads to this objective.

While in principle confirming the spiritual, interior approach in all of its manifestations, Islam, however, did not content itself with that. It endeavoured to tear the devil's weapon out of his hands. If, in what concerns man's relationship with the world, Islam did not start with man, it would not be a religion; if it were to remain at that, it would be simply a religion, merely repeating Jesus's teaching on the ideal and eternal aspect of man's being. Through Muhammad, (peace be upon him) and the Qu'ran, Islam addressed the real man, the outside world, nature, in order to evolve as a teaching on the complete man and on all aspects of life. Faith allied itself to the law, education and upbringing to power. Thus Islam became an order.

***

...ritual and physical life, or more precisely, that he must willingly and in full awareness accept both these aspects of life as the human definition and meaning of his life on earth (Qu'ran 28/77). Translating this requirement into the language of everyday life, we could say: he who believes that life should be ordered not only by faith end prayer, but by work and knowledge, whose vision of the world not only allows but demands that temple and factory stand side by side, who considers that people should not only be fed and educated, but that their life on earth should be facilitated and promoted, and that there is no reason to sacrifice either of these objectives to the other - this man belongs to Islam.

This, together with faith in God, is the main message of the Qu'ran, and in it is all of Islam. All else is mere development and explanation. This aspect of Islam, besides containing the principle of the Islamic order, the conjunction of religion and politics, leads to other significant conclusions of enormous fundamental and practical importance.

First and foremost of these conclusions is certainly the incompatibility of Islam with non-Islamic systems. There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions. The failure of

these institutions to function and the instability of the regimes in Muslim countries, manifest in frequent change and *coups d'etat*, is most often the consequence of their *a priori* opposition to Islam, as the fundamental and foremost feeling of the peoples in these countries. By claiming the right to order its own world itself, Islam obviously excludes the right or possibility of action on the part of any foreign ideology on that terrain. There is, therefore, no lay principle, and the state should both reflect and support religious moral concepts.

Every age and every generation has the task of implementing the message of Islam in new forms and by new means.

There are immutable Islamic principles which order relations between people, but there is no Islamic economic, social or political structure which cannot be changed.

This is only the first and most important conclusion in approaching Islam as an integrated order. The remaining three, equally important but less preclusive, are:

First: by opting for this world, Islam has opted for the best possible ordering of that world. Nothing which can make the world a better place may be rejected out of hand as non-Islamic;

Second: to be open to nature means to be open to learning. In order to be Islamic, any solution must fulfil two conditions: it must be maximally efficient and maximally humane. It must therefore reflect the reconciliation of religion and science in its highest form;

Third: by pointing to one link between religion and learning, morals and policy, the individual and the collective, the spiritual and the material - questions which divide the contemporary world - Islam regains its role as the intermediary of ideas, and the Islamic world as intermediary among nations in a divided world. By promising "religion without mysticism and learning without atheism", Islam can interest all people, no matter who they are.

***

ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE

Stressing the priority of the religious and moral renewal does not mean - nor can it be interpreted to mean - that the Islamic order can be brought about without Islamic governance. This means only that our way does not start by taking power, but by winning people, and that Islamic rebirth is first a revolution in education, and only then in politics.

We must therefore be first preachers and then soldiers. Our weapons are personal example, the book, the word. When is force to be joined to these?

The choice of this moment is always a tangible one and depends on a series of factors. There is, however, a general rule: the Islamic movement should and can start to take over power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough to be able to overturn not only the existing non-Islamic government, but also to build up a new Islamic one. This differentiation is important, because overturning and building do not require an equal degree of psychological and material readiness.

To act prematurely in this regard is just as dangerous as to delay.

To take power due to a fortunate set of circumstances, without sufficient moral and psychological preparation or the essential minimum of staunch and well-trained personnel, means causing another *coup d'etat*, and not an Islamic revolution. (The *coup d'etat* is a continuation of the un-Islamic policy on the part of another group of people or in the name of other principles). To delay in taking power means to deprive the Islamic movement of a powerful means of attaining its aims while offering the un-Islamic authorities the possibility of dealing a blow to the movement and dispersing its personnel. Recent history provides sufficient tragic and instructive examples of the latter.

***

potential forces, into active ones. Loyalty to the Qu'ran should grow into determination to apply it; the Islamic community of emotions should turn into an organized, aware community, and folk humanism into clear ideas, which will become the moral and social character of future laws and institutions.

Who will carry out this transformation, and how shall it be done?

Every action taken in relation to events is social action. Every successful struggle can only be a joint, organized struggle. The younger generation will be able to carry out its task of transformation only if its inclinations and idealism are poured into an organized movement, in which the enthusiasm and personal value of the individual will be correlated with methods of joint, coordinated action. The creation of this movement with a single basic aim and programme is an irrevocable condition and starting point for rebirth in every Muslim country.

---

*merhama: merey (*translator's note*)

This movement will gather together what is built, raise the unbuilt, elevate and call on people, define aims and find a way to attain them. It will introduce life, thought and action everywhere. It will become the conscience and will of a world awakening out of a long, deep sleep.

In sending this message to all Muslims throughout the world, we wish clearly to state that there is no promised land, no miracle-workers or *mahdis*. There is only the way of work, struggle and sacrifice.

In times of trial let us always have in mind two things: behind us stands God's blessing and the consent of our people.

YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SAY THAT YOU DIDN'T KNOW!

COMMENT:

Why this ultimatum of "*a civil state or a civil war*" of Mr. Alija Izetbegović? We had much better situation in the SFRY /Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ and nobody was satisfied and it all ended in aggression and bloodshed.

This gentleman again offers "brotherhood and unity" and, this time, the majority of his people. What about Switzerland, Canada and Belgium …?

Nothing.

It will be either a civil state or we will get into the fight. In the background, there are ideas from the "Islamic declaration" and evaluations of Sefer Halilović about who is a good Bosnian.

Have you ever heard that someone renounced his positions from this program? That someone offered an apology?

All precondition for war were fulfilled, if we add to it Serbian pretensions to the territory.

The Croats defended themselves and it remains unclear why do you call the aggression of BH Army against HVO an "unfortunate conflict", when that conflict is based on the views of the Muslim leaders: "Ustashas", "Chetniks", "civil state", "its territory", "to compensate what Serbs conquered by their army"….

Magazine

Elections 1990

"Stranke, programi, ličnosti"
/Parties, programs and personalities/

Edited by; Oslobođenje

Sarajevo, October 1990

Page 19

Alija Izetbegović, President of the Party of Democratic Action

"Civil republic, or civil war!"

Page 20, paragraph 3

Aleksandar Zinovjev, Soviet dissident, claims that, in several years, mujezin shall be learned from the Eiffel Tower. He says this shall be a defeat of European-centric Christianity as well as the conflict that shall, after the death of classes and bolshevism, characterize the century in front of us. What is your comment to Zinovjev?

Regarding Islam itself, I would love to hear mujezin from the Eiffel Tower. However, I am not convinced about the accuracy of this theory, even though bearing in mind that Islam is indeed the only religion, being expanded.

You wrote a book "Islam between East and West". Why did, according to you, the horizon of Islamic world, from Kashmir, over Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kosovo, Sandžak, all the way till Western Europe in time of bolshevism collapse, seek for the Koran? All these agitations, are they a part of one unique wave?

I think they could be envisaged as unique wave, among others, for the reason that Islam, as thought and philosophy, is indeed in the sign of renaissance. People that belong to Islam, belong to it entirely, for Islam is a thought that touches every field of life; you can't be Muslim, without being defined in every way. People in horizon of Islam were dominated by the foreign forces and when leading the battle for liberation, they do it regularly under the flag of Islam.

.....
Let me cite you a *sura* from Koran: "He who purifies himself, shall achieve what he desires for" Let's purify ourselves by question; would you find the creation of society, in this century, in the middle of Europe, based on religion, to be precise it is about Islam, a social progress? I am not talking about Bosnia only.

Yes, I do! Absolutely so, if this society is the Muslim society indeed. True, Islam is not an ideology but belief, that's why the system, in which people would accept Islam, as belief, as religion, precisely in that society, that system, the one of established Islamic norms and life standard, would mean a progress to me.

Could you copy it to Bosnia and Herzegovina?

No! Our party stands for creation of civil republic; in Kladuša, I have just invited my fellow citizens, Serbs and Croats to join us in the battle for creation of civil republic. Nothing can connect us better but the civil republic because we cannot make a national state out of Bosnia. Let Serbia and Croatia proceed with creation of such states, we however, have no conditions for it. We have got only the possibility to realize the ideal of civil republic or the civil war!

COMMENT:

Who is “the father of the Patriotic League”?

Is the “Patriotic League” a secret military organization?

Is the P.LEAGUE formed within the SDA, political party of the Muslims in BiH?

When was it established?

Who will those fighters defend?

Who do the fighters of the “Patriotic League” take an oath to?

All of this is alright, the Muslims organize themselves, they will defend themselves, they swear to Allah j.sh. /jalla shanuhu/, the only thing being awkward here is that three nations live in BiH and that “Islamic Declaration” and “SANU memorandum” are behind the whole story.

Much later, when they establish the HVO and the HZHB (Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia), the Croats will become the GUILTY ONES, permanent culprits even neither more nor less than for the “DIVISION OF BiH”.

Those Croats could have placed themselves “under the hat” of one or another idea and it would all be fine; they wouldn’t be guilty and presidents of the RH (Republic of Croatia) shouldn’t have to apologize to everyone for decades.

This logic is as pathetic as it can be.

PATRIOTIC LEAGUE

Patriotic League had a historical role in organizing people in a nationwide resistance against the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressors, the former Yugoslav Army and the Chetnic's hordes. With the vision, League was the first who, in the wake of the attacks on Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and an unprecedented genocide against the Bosnian people was organized and stood in front of patriots to lead them in battle. PL's spirit can be felt today by most people and by large number of soldiers of the BiH Army. This spirit should not disappear, it must be guarded and carried over to future generations. Our soldiers who gave their lives against a brutal enemy, our martyrs will not forgive us, if we do not continue the fight for free, independent and integral Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We pledge to them. We guaranty that PLs spirit will be nurtured and guarded forever.

FATHER OF PATRIOTIC LEAGUE

Mr. Izetbegovic, despite the troubles at the time, managed to gather the Bosnians, by forming the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and through other forms to mobilize the resistance against the aggressor. Patriotic League was the nucleus of the first military formations.



MAN WITH HUGE MERIT

The future will show everything that was done by Hasan Čengić for the Patriotic League and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Patriotic League was formed, organized and armed by the Democratic Action Party. The League is the military division of the DAP, and emerged from a military-political organization formed on 31st March 1991, while its roots reach back to the DAP division of "Herceg-Bosna", formed in late 1990. Father of the Patriotic League is the founder and President of DAP, Chairman of Presidency of Republic B&H, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. The man who has a huge merit in the organization and its operations is Mr. Hasan Čangić. When talking about the establishment and work of the PL one must mention the late Safet Hadžic. The name "Patriotic League" was created under the auspices of the DAP, in agreement of Mr. Hasan Čengić, Dr. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, and others. The first officer who left the JNA and came to the center of the DAP was Sulejman Vranje - Sule.

IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATION

Sulejman Vranje – Sule was the first officer who left the former JNA and put his service at the disposal of his people through the DAP

After the DAP victory in 1990 elections, the Bosnian people were allowed for the first time to get familiar with its past by studying it's the history, to assume what to expect, and to get organized as soon as possible. Before the attack on Slovenia, it was clear that Serbia and Montenegro have territorial aspirations towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nationalistic and chauvinistic settings of "Memorandum" SANU (Serbian Academy of Science and arts), displaying relics of Prince Lazar, recalling of the Kosovo battle, the events at Gazimestan, calling Serbian saints and heroes, excavation of common graves, public burials , public liturgy, singing of nationalist and chauvinistic songs , fiddle evenings and such, pointed to the great threat that hangs over Bosnia, and in particular against Bosnians.

PATRIOTIC LEAGUE IS A SECRET ORGANIZATION WHOSE EXISTENCE AND WORK WERE NOT EVEN KNOWN TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE DAP

Former Yugoslav Army (JNA) carried out serious preparations for the realization of the plan of ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and creating conditions for a "Great Serbia". Among other things, JNA significantly reduced the number of members in Territorial Defense, with a tendency to abolish it (the number of members has been reduced from 7 to 1.8 percent), while the weapons were placed under the control of the JNA in their warehouses. Also the command of the 7th Army Region, which was responsible for the units on the territory of BiH was abolished, while all command was concentrated in military centers located in Belgrade, ...

/facsimile of the Oath with signatures/



FAKSIMIL ZAKLETVE SA POTPISIMA

Ovo je jedno od svjedočanstava da su patriote ove zemlje pravilno ocijenili šta se sprema.

This is one of the testimonies that the patriots of this country judged rightly what is imminent.

THE OATH

I swear by Allah Jelleshanuhu that I shall always, in any time and every place, defend all interests of the Muslim people and all (two words illegible) at costs of my life! I also swear that I shall defend freedom and integrity of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, my only homeland, whose borders are historical, permanent and inviolable! As to it, I accept all commitments, emerging from the organizational needs in order to realize the above cited goals.

/signature/

Safet Hadzic

Kapidzija

7 signatures listed

Sarajevo, 17th of April 1991

10.

IZETBEGOVIĆ AND NATIONAL EQUALITY

IZETBEGOVIĆ AND CROATIAN ARMY – RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE



FACTS

COMMENT:

Honourable ladies and gentlemen, I hope Alija Izetboegović's fairness will become clear to you, his fair distribution of commanders according to nationality. Not one Croat. Really friendly and wise decision.

But this is not all.

In the first point of the Decision, he appoints Mato Šarlija as the Commander of Bosnian-Herzegovinian brigade "KRALJ TOMISLAV".

Trust me, and it is quite simple to verify, what I'm writing is true:

a) NIJAZ BATLAK, a Muslim by religion, Croat by national orientation, emigrated to US after the World War II as a young man, where he lived as a US citizen until 1989 when he returned to Croatia;
b) In US he changed his name, and his documents are issued on the name of MATE ŠARLIJA;
c) He joined the defense of the Republic of Croatia and received the rank of MAJOR GENERAL;
d) HE COMMANDED THE CROATIAN BRIGADE-REGIMENT "KRALJ TOMISLAV", which was formed as a Croatian brigade, receiving salaries from Croatian Ministry of Defense and executed orders issued by the General Staff of Croatian Army;
e) the brigade was engaged in the defense of Dubrovnik in Croatia.

How is that possible, mister IZETBEGOVIĆ? And the rest is the same.

When they needed to hold the 1st congress of the main Muslim party SDA (Party of Democratic Action), where was it held? In Zagreb. When people are displaced and expelled - they go to Croatia, when Alija Izetbegović needs to rescue his wife from Sarajavo and find a secure place – he chose Dubrovnik, Tihić chose Rijeka…

About this brigade-regiment "KRALJ TOMISLAV" → PLEASE READ THE TESTIMONY OF DRAGAN ČURČIĆ – cross-examination at ICTY in the Hague.

I, Slobodan Praljak, made sure that all soldiers from the regiment, both Croats and Muslims, keep their status as Croatian soldiers, whether they were from HVO or A BiH (CLEAR EVIDENCE OF HV AGGRESSION AGAINST BiH).

Previously they fought for Croatia, but it was very important for troops' moral that their families will be taken care of by Republic of Croatia and Croatian army in case they are killed.

Did we object object to Alija Izetbegović?

No, we didn't.

But don't be fooled by such acts – if they seem strange to you.

"JOINT CRIMINALS" ARE DECEITFUL.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA /Coat of arms/

OFFICE

OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Zagreb, Savska St. 41/XI

Tel. 041/537-161, 537-160, Fax 536-702

Zagreb, 12 October 1992

Our No.: 572/92

Your No.:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE A BiH /Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina/

OFFICE OF THE R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

SECTOR FOR MILITARY ISSUES AT THE OFFICE OF R BiH IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

A U T H O R I Z A T I O N

Whereby the General Mate Šarlija – DAIDŽA- is authorized to conduct storage and safekeeping as well as transport of arms and military equipment into the logistical centres in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The storage and transport of material and technical equipment should be done according to the schedule of the Supreme Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Military attaché in the Office of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia.

The equipment can be transported from the location where it is stored to the logistical centres only with the authorisations signed by the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia or the Military attaché in the Office of R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ in Croatia.

Military attaché of the Republic of BiH

Hasan Efendić, colonel

/signed/

/round stamp: REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES – SARAJEVO, OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BiH IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA – ZAGREB, Sector for Military Issues at the Office of R BIH in CROATIA/

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Pursuant to Article 9, related to Article 41 of the legal power Regulation on Armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the meeting held on 27th of May 1992 issues the following

DECISION

on the formation of territorial defence units

The following territorial defence units are going to be formed:

1. 1. Bosnia and Herzegovina brigade «Kralj Tomislav». For the commander of the brigade, General Mate Šarlija is appointed.
2. 1. Brigade of the Zenica Territorial Defence (further in text TO),. For the commander of the brigade, Duvak (son of Rasim) Enes is appointed.
3. 11. P.Brigade "Zmaj od Bosne". For the commander of the brigade, Zejnilagić Enver is appointed.
4. 12. P: Brigade "Hadži Lojo". For the commander of the brigade, Džaferagić Safet is appointed.
5. 13. Novosarajevska Brigade of the TO. For the commander of the brigade, Šehović Enver is appointed.
6. 14. Brigade Novi Grad Sarajevo. For the commander of the brigade, Zyrapi Bislim is appointed.
7. Military police Battalion of Sarajevo region. For the commander of the battalion, Topić Dževad is appointed.
8. Escort platoon for the security of the BH Presidency. For the commander of the platoon, Lukovac Haris is appointed.
9. TO squad "Husić Eniz". For the commander of the squad, Bukva Sejdalija is appointed.
10. TO squad "Sretno" – Breza. For the commander of the squad, Hodžić Džemal is appointed.
11. TO squad "Misoča" – Ilijaš. For the commander of the squad, Rožajac Avdija is appointed.
12. 1. Brigade of the Bihać Krajina. For the commander of the brigade, Butković Sakib is appointed.
13. OdTO (territorial Defence squad, further in text OdTO) Velika Kladuša. For the commander of the OdTO, Behrić Sulejman is appointed.
14. OdTO Kladuša – City. For the commander of the OdTO, Bajro Pajazetović is appointed.
15. OdTO Vrnograč. For the commander of the OdTO, Dukić Hasan is appointed.
16. OdTO Mala Kladuša. For the commander of the OdTO, Memić Hasan is appointed.
17. OdTO Bužin. For the commander of the OdTO, Kulauzović Fuad is appointed.
18. OdTO B. Otoka – Jezerski. For the commander of the OdTO, Kahrić Mustafa is appointed.
19. OdTO Bos. Krupa. For the commander of the OdTO, Palić Derviš is appointed.
20. OdTO Pećigrad. For the commander of the OdTO, Osmančević Murat is appointed.
21. OdTO Tržac. For the commander of the OdTO, Bećirević Hazim is appointed.
22. OdTO Ostrožac. For the commander of the OdTO, Pandžić Kasim is appointed.
23. OdTO Cazin – city. For the commander of the OdTO, Dizdarević Munir is appointed.
24. OdTO Ćoralići. For the commander of the OdTO, Mizić Muhamed is appointed.
25. OdTO Bihać – centre. For the commander of the OdTO, Salkić Ahmet is appointed.
26. OdTO Bakšić. For the commander of the OdTO, Vuković Fuad is appointed.
27. OdTO Prekounje. For the commander of the OdTO, Toromanović Sead is appointed.

28. OdTO Brekavica. For the commander of the OdTO, Skalić Mesud is appointed.
29. OdTO Vrata. For the commander of the OdTO, Adil Bešić is appointed.
30. 3. Brigade of TO Tuzla. For the commander of the brigade,….. is appointed.
31. 108. Brčko TO brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Mujkanović Ferid is appointed.
32. 2. TO Tuzla Brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Ljali Džemail is appointed.
33. 1.OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Džambić Muharem is appointed.
    2. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Aziri Ali is appointed.
    3. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Kurspahić Ševal is appointed.
    4. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Mujović Mirsad is appointed.
    5. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Đjordje Marko is appointed.
    Engineer battalion – for the commander of the battalion, Prcić Faruk is appointed.
34. 1. Lukavica TO brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Salihbašić Dževad is appointed.
35. OdTO Kalesija. For the commander of the squad, the existing commander is appointed.
    5. OdTO - Tuzla. For the commander of the squad, Đjordje Marko is appointed.
    Engineer battalion – for the commander of the battalion, Prcić Faruk is appointed.
34. 1. Lukavica TO brigade. For the commander of the brigade, Salihbašić Dževad is appointed.
35. OdTO Kalesija. For the commander of the squad, the existing commander is appointed.
36. 1. Spreča squad Živinice. For the commander of the squad, 1st class Captain Malkić Salih is appointed.
37. OdTO Olovo. For the commander of the squad, Vrbanac Nijaz is appointed.
38. OdTO. Solun. For the commander of the squad, Hasanspahić Akif is appointed.
39. OdTO – Careva Ćuprija. For the commander of the squad, Rotić Enver is appointed.

II

Minister of Defence shall organize the Seniors into the commands, Main Staffs of the above mentioned units and issue close Orders on number of men in compositions as well as the armament of the formed units.

PR number 1170
27th May 1992
Sarajevo, 27th of May 1992

President of the Presidency of the
Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Alija Izetbegović
/signed and stamped/


Dajdži i Zejnilu (odgovor na telex od 9.06.1992)
Treba da idete zajedno. Zejnil ostaje komandant svoje jedinice, ali dok ova operacija traje treba da sluša Dajdžina naređenja. Dakle, Dajdža objedinjuje akcija. Ostalo ćemo regulisati kad se vidimo u Sarajevu. Alija
Sar 10.06.1992

/handwritten/

To Dajdza and Zejnil (reply to 9th of June 199 / missing number/ telex)

You have to go together. Zejnil remains commander of his unit, or as long this operation is under way, he should obey Dajdza's orders, therefore Dajdza covers the whole operation. The rest will be regulated when we meet in Sarajevo.

Sarajevo, 10th of June, 1992

Alija

Commanders of TO (territorial defense) units in respect to the May 27th, 1992 decision signed by Chairman of the BiH Presidency Alija Izetbegović

Nationality	Number	%
Muslims	43	97.73 %
Serbs	1	2.27 %
Croats	0	0.00 %
TOTAL	44	100 %



Excerpt from transcript dated 13th October 2009 – witness Dragan Ćurčić in case IT-04-74

* * *

Q. [Interpretation] General Curcic, good morning to you once again.
A. Good morning, General Praljak.
Q. Now, Kralj Tomislav is a regiment which was established where?
A. Kralj Tomislav is a regiment founded in Croatia, in Dubrovnik and

Page 45949

then in Vrgorac.
Q. And you were the Croatian Army?
A. Correct.
Q. That particular unit, how many Croats were there in it and how many Muslims?
A. The unit had 60 per cent Croats and about 40 per cent Muslims.
Q. What percentage of people in that unit was born on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and was citizens of the republic or, rather, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina just like you are?
A. Over 90 per cent of the members were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Q. Were you a military conscript of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
A. I was an active military person in Belgrade.
Q. Very well, we know that. But afterwards, you were a military conscript of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
A. Had I stayed on in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I would have been.
Q. Correct. Now, the Prosecutor said the Croatian Army -- you were on loan. He used the term "on loan." You said that was a strange term to use. But isn't it correct to say that you were on loan from Bosnia-Herzegovina, both the Croats and Bosniaks, voluntarily to the Croatian Army to defend the south of Croatia? Would that be a more correct interpretation?
A. Yes. We first went to defend Croatia.
Q. General, Cepikuce, did you take part in the fighting for Cepikuce?

A. Not me, General, but members of our unit, yes, led by the late

Page 45950

Bozan Simovic.

Q. Against whom were you fighting in Cepikuce?

A. They fought there against the Serb army, the JNA.

Q. General, it doesn't matter whether you were there, personally. I'm talking about the unit. Now, had Cepikuce been lost at the time, where would the Serb -- what area would the Serb army have reached and what axis would it have taken?

A. Had Cepikuce fallen, automatically Dubrovnik would have fallen, and they would have advanced to Split.

Q. Thank you. Now, your commander, you say that your commander was General Daidza; right?

A. Yes.

Q. What was his full name, his real name?

A. We all knew him under the name of Mate Sarlija, nicknamed Daidza, but his real name was Nijaz Batlak.

Q. Was he a Muslim?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, please, after the truce that was signed, as far as Croatia is concerned, where did you have your training centres?

A. We had our training centres in Basko Polje and Vrgorac.

Q. That's in Croatia?

A. Yes.

Q. Who came from Bosnia-Herzegovina to be trained in your training centres, to be trained and go back? Were they Croats, Bosniaks? Were there more Croats than Bosniaks or more Muslims than Croats?

Page 45951

A. The prevailing number was among the Bosniaks. There were more Bosniaks.

Q. What was the name of the logistics man in your unit?

A. Kralj Tomislav logistics man was Nikica Raguz -- Nikica Raguz and Marko Potrebica.

Q. As far as you know, how many weapons were sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina via Kralj Tomislav unit? That's the first question. And how much of those -- how many of those weapons were sent to the Muslims and how many to the Croats?

A. I wouldn't know that, General. There were large quantities, we are talking about truckloads here, but most of those weapons went to the Bosniaks.

Q. General, can we agree that Mr. Nijaz Batlak or Mate Sarlija was a Croatian general, a general of the Croatian Army, and that he provided weapons in truckloads that were sent to the army -- or, rather, to the Muslims of the BH Army?

A. That's correct.

Q. Did Zuka also come for training to you?

A. Zuka was in Basko Polje with us for a while.

Q. We all know here who Zuka was, so we won't dwell on that any longer.

Now, my next question. Following this, what happened was an aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina; in other words, the JNA and the Serbian Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Before we go on to that, could we please have document 3D00420.

Page 45952

3D00420.

As you can see, this is a document from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it relates to a decision on the formation of Territorial Defence units. And you can see, under 1, that the person who signed this document, and as we will see, this will -- we will see in a moment that this was Alija Izetbegovic, well, where we see that he proclaims Kralj Tomislav unit and General Mate Sarlija as a Bosnian-Herzegovinian brigade.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, I have a question from the Chamber. The document is interesting, but was this mentioned in the cross-examination?

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the foundation for the questioning was the status of the brigade Kralj Tomislav or, rather, the regiment, where we see an order that Mate Sarlija, Daidza, is the commander, and the basis of that was to show that the Croatian Army -- that actually it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the orders of the Croatian Army.

But from this document, Your Honours, we can see that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic considers that brigade to be a brigade of the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that he considers Mate Sarlija, Daidza, a commander of his Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that he actually appoints him to that position. In other words, he appoints him as commander.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Laws.

MR. LAWS: I may well stand to be corrected, but I don't think I

Page 45953

asked any questions about the Kralj Tomislav Brigade at all at any stage, and I hope I've been quite patience, watching the transcript going by, but we haven't been dealing with topics that arose in cross-examination now for some few minutes.

MR. KOVACIC: I don't think that really a response is needed. The transcript could easily show whether this brigade was discussed or not.

And if I may add, since I'm on my feet, this is a classical example how documents and which kind of documents should be used on direct. Mr. Praljak precisely said what was inserted in the cross and precisely said why this document has to be shown in redirect. This is more than a clear example.

Thank you, Your Honour.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What's sure is that General Daidza was a topic mentioned by the Prosecutor. It seems that the real name of Daidza was Mate Sarlija and that we have a document mentioning him within the army -- the BH Army.

Let's move on. Please put your question, General Praljak.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. My question is very simple. Sir, are you aware -- do you know that at this time you were, in fact, under the command both of Alija Izetbegovic and the Croatian Army, as this document shows?

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. At this point, there was a clash in the army, the conflict broke out; and this brigade, this regiment, Kralj Tomislav, in

Page 45954

view of its composition, crossed over to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to fight for the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

A. That's correct.

Q. Is it true that it was split into two: A, Ludvig Pavlovic, numbering 92 members; and another number of Muslims who went to Konjic to create what?

A. To establish the regiment Nihad Kulenovic.

Q. Nihad Kulenovic was part of what?

A. Part of the BH Army.

Q. Of the original 92 members of the Ludvig Pavlovic Regiment, how many were Croats and how many Bosniaks?

A. I don't know exactly, but the ratio is about 70 to 30 per cent.

Q. Thank you. Is it true that these members, too, who had gone to join the Konjic Regiment, which was part of the BH Army, were they, too, retained -- or did they, too, retain the status as Croatian soldiers when their benefits are concerned and their pay?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it true that the 92 of you also retained that status?
JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Stop, General.
The Prosecutor showed you a good number of documents earlier. We spent a lot of time on this. But now I'm discovering that the soldiers who had left the Republic of Croatia to go to Bosnia-Herzegovina were split up in two. Some joined your Ludvig Pavlovic unit, and the others go to Konjic to join a BH Army regiment, the Nihad Kulenovic Brigade.

Page 45955

Now, I'd like to know the following: The soldiers that go to the BH Army, as far as you know, were they still paid by the Croatian Army?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, even General Daidza, in his case, he spent more time in Konjic than in Croatia or Herzegovina. In other words, they retained their rights, just like the 92 of us did.
JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I understand you correctly, General Daidza came to see you and then would go and visit the Muslim soldiers in the BH Army. He would go from one unit to the other; is that it?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, yes. It was only on the 6th of June that the Ludvig Pavlovic unit was established. Up until then, we were part of Kralj Tomislav, and I'm talking about 1992.
JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In 1993, could you tell us whether the Muslim soldiers in the BH Army who were stationed in Konjic were still -- were they still paid by the Croatian Army?
THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know because at that time we had lost contact, we were not in contact.
JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
Q. General Curcic, do you recall that you addressed me as well within the Ministry of the Republic of Croatia relating -- regarding the status and service-related matters?
A. Well, for the most part, we addressed you.
Q. Could you tell us -- so --
THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters request, could the question please

Page 45956

be repeated.

MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment.

General, would you please slow down a bit. A portion of your question, which is important, did not make it into the transcript. On page 72, lines 7 to 9, the General said that both sides addressed him, requesting assistance to resolve the status-related and service-related issues, and I would really appreciate it if the general could repeat his question because the transcript is unclear as it stands.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] I will repeat my question.

Q. General, did you address me in the Ministry of the Republic of Croatia to resolve the status and service-related issues of the 92 of you?

A. Yes.

Q. And also the issues that related to the men who had joined the regiment in Konjic?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell me, would I, perhaps, be the best source to provide an answer about the date up until when all the members of Kralj Tomislav who were members of the Croatian Army, regardless of whether later on they joined the HVO or the BH Army, up until what date they actually enjoyed the benefits of the Croatian Army?

A. I think so. I think that would be you.

Q. We saw that Mr. Nijaz Batlak was appointed, and this was his real name of Mato Sarlija, that he was appointed by Alija Izetbegovic?

A. Yes.

Page 45957

Q. Do you know that he received his pension, once he retired, from the Croatian Army and that he was buried at Mirogoj as a member of -- as a Croatian general?

A. Yes, I was at Mirogoj.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could we now see 3D00560. 3D00560.

Q. Please read this document. I don't know if you have ever seen the signature of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, but I think you had occasion to see it in Sarajevo.

My question is this: Do you know that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic trusted, to a large extent, and had intimate cooperation with General Daidza?

A. I never saw them personally together, but Mr. Izetbegovic's envoys often came to see General Daidza in Vrgorac.

Q. Do you know, General, that Mr. Alija Izetbegovic wanted to

entrust the operation for the liberation of Sarajevo to General Daidza?
A. Yes.
Q. Was this operation carried out? And we won't discuss how successfully.
A. Well, it was more an attempt at doing that.
Q. Did members of Kralj Tomislav participate in this attempt?
A. Yes.
Q. And the last question regarding this: When you were -- when you crossed over to the HVO, was it voluntary or did you ever receive an order to that effect?

Page 45958

A. Well, the easiest -- that's very easy to answer. We went back home. It was voluntary.
Q. Mr. Curcic, other than Bozan Simovic, your commander, who was killed in an operation, was there another commander of your battalion who was killed?
A. Yes, Ante Primorac was killed Kupres during an operation to liberate it.
Q. Well, let's clarify that issue. Did you -- let's talk about Urina Ravan and those events, we were together at that hut. Were we exposed? Could we have been killed because there was shooting going on some 30 metres away from us?
A. Yes, I remember it.
Q. Could you have been killed?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell us, is it true that the most important thing then was not death, itself, but what would happen to the families; in other words, to your mother, to your father, to your two sisters, what would happen to them after you get killed?
A. That's correct.
Q. So Croatia was already a state. Was it important, very important, to gain in any way possible a status so that the Croatian Army would take care of your family and your loved ones if anything should happen to you?
A. That was the most important question.

* * *

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oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

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a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
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s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

11.

WHAT DOES THE FIRST SOLDIER OF ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ WRITES ABOUT ALIJA'S POSITION

AFTER THE BOOK WAS PUBLISHED, THERE WAS AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON HALILOVIĆ IN SARAJEVO. HIS WIFE WAS KILLED.



FACTS

COMMENT:

This document can show you the relations between commander of the BH Army (Izetbegović) and his first soldier (Halilović).

Sefer claims the following:

a) Izetbegović claims there will be no war in BiH;

b) Izetbegović is neutral when Dubrovnik and other parts of Croatia are being destroyed from the territory of his state;

c) "This is not our war" – that is what Izetbegović is saying when village Ravno in BiH was destroyed (Croats live there and it is logical for the author of "Islamic Declaration" that "this is not his war");

d) On March 10th, 1992 to Izetbegović the aggression against Croatia is a "filthy war that ravaged Croatia" and after such war "the Yugoslav people wakes up from a nightmare";

When such Yugoslav people, according to Alija, wakes up from a nightmare, he will not wage war in BiH. Then, on March 17th, in the newspapers "DANAS" he explains to journalists of the same intellectual level that the YNA nowadays is different in its *"quality, quantity, psychology, even intentions and goals. The Army will not occupy BOSNIA (again there is no Herzegovina in the state title) and will not execute the coup d'état."*

Shortly and briefly, "with due consideration" and "smartly" "he advocates peace" and "he does not spread the ideas of war", "his policy is conciliatory" and when someone tells me that history is life's teacher, it makes me throw up.

e) On March 5th1992, the "situation is under control and it's safe to walk around town (of Sarajevo)";

Izetbegović, what about Mostar, Široki Brijeg and Ljubuški, Čapljina and Ravno…?

f) Sefer states that "BiH, along with Vojvodina, practically became a basis for carrying out operations against Croatia";

Later we will see what is the LAW saying about the use of army against attackers, what a battlefield is and what is a theatre of war and whose army could and was allowed to wage war and where.

g) Eventually: on April 26th when there are already 1000 dead people (according to Halilović) in Sarajevo, Izetbegović believes that the YNA will "turn into the Bosnian Army"!!

(Again BOSNIAN, probably because it will certainly not turn into the Herzegovinian army).

Please comment on this, my supremely noetic readers.

Sefer Halilović: Cunning Strategy*

Our first meeting in Hrasnica, on 2 December 1991 was actually our first misunderstanding.

***

The president encouraged me with his speech on that day, otherwise I was rather concerned: as Radovan Karadžić in late October publicly threatened that the Muslim people would disappear if the Parliament does not vote for the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the president himself took the Parliament stand and said: "I still wish to give the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina a message that there will be no war. My prognoses are based on tested facts. One should not be afraid, because there are two needed for a fight;" he promoted his position of neutrality even earlier, after destruction of Dubrovnik and aggression of the former JNA against Slovenia and Croatia and it reflected in a line of statements. In September 1991 he said: "This is not our war". Those days are over and now, apparently, everything is clear. Or, it at least seemed so to me. There will be no war if the bearers of the greatserbian policy estimate the possibility of loosing it. In the contrary, it can only become bloodier. "If we do not prepare ourselves, Karadžić's prognosis will come true" – I said to the president a day after.

* * *

I explained everything we did in the Sarajevo region and persisted on the claim that it is necessary to bring the organization procedure to the same level in all the regions, and then continue with the work even more intensely. The President looked at me and asked: "And what if the whole work is done in vain? In this way you will mobilize over 50,000 people. ""Not 50,000, Mr. President, but at least 250,000. And if you want a sovereign state, the job is not in vain: you will gain the backbone of the Bosnian Army, "I replied. Then he stated the historical: "Yes. Continue the work throughout the republic, the same way you did in Sarajevo"*. Shortly afterwards, while using a towel after ablution, he confessed: "Now, that I have heard and seen all of this, I feel safer. Until now, whenever I spoke with Karadžić and his people and when they were pushing me with threats, I had the feeling that even though I was sitting, the chair and carpet where slipping beneath me, as though the ground was sinking". He was not in this mood very long. He was persistent in his belief that there wouldn't be any war.

* * *

"Oslobođenje" released his statement for the New Year's Day 1992: "I think that the Army will not attack BiH, because it estimated that force "cannot do a thing"". The same newspaper, on 10 March 1992, transmits Alija Izetbegović's impressions from Brussels, given to the local "Soir": "Tormented by the tragic experience o f the filthy war that ravaged throughout Croatia, the Yugoslav people are waking up from a nightmare." He also then claimed there would be no war in BiH. He repeated it even on 17 March 1992 in the interview for "Danas" newspapers: "Above all, what are you talking about? Do we discuss the same matter – the army is no longer what it used to be several months ago. It is neither better, nor worse; it is different, regarding its quality, quantity, psychology, as well as intentions and goals. The army will not occupy Bosnia; it will not execute a coup d'etat."

I read such Izetbegović's statement in "Oslobođenje", given on 5th March 1992: "Take a walk, socialize, and go out on the streets. I would like to invite the citizens to accept this in a cold-hearted way and prevent them from falling to rumours and stories. There are powers that wish to provoke chaos and panic-do not fall for it. The situation is under control, you can walk through town calmly."

* * *

Izetbegović later admitted this profound conviction and misconception. No argument could convince him that the preparations for the attacks were being carried and in front of everybody. He strongly believed that there will be no war. It's true he finally agreed to prepare for Defense and approved the project of organization, tactics and strategies of defense, but after that he was gone. As if this did not concern him.

Our second disagreement erupted about the acceptance of the Directive for the defense of the BH sovereignty. When we finished it, and after the data regarding numbers of Chetnic - Ustasha forces was checked several and conversations about Tuđman and Milošević intentions, evaluation of Karađorđevo, we looked for ways to inform the state leadership. Karišik stated all red in the face"Behmen will not even hear of it". I used the given opportunity and after a few days I asked Behmen for an opinion on the Directive. All the red in the face he slammed his fist on the table and snapped: "Get the hell out of my office. You too want a war here. " I stayed calm, politely apologized and told him that there will certainly be a war, and it is my obligation, and the people at the headquarters of the Patriotic League to warn and to suggest ways of defense. Those who do accept or do not accept will assume the responsibility. He fell silent, and then I went away.

* * *

The third and a rather serious misunderstanding concerned a role of the former JNA in BiH and its relation towards BiH. The last man in BiH could tell that it was in function of Belgrade's imperialistic and aggressor's policy, as its most forwarded and most dangerous part, everybody could say it, but not Izetbegović. As the war started in Croatia and as BiH practically became a base, apart from Vojvodina, for execution of operations against Croatia, Izetbegović simply wanted to believe that JNA is not a possible occupant of BiH, respectively, that its presence in BiH is even necessary.

As the Bosnian Croats in Lištica stopped the tank convoy, Izetbegović said:" You must trust me and Tudjman." Apparently, it was still his opinion, as well as after the revelation of the RAM plan, in which all tasks of SANU memorandum realization are emphasized, that is, creation of Great Serbia, or, as the former generals used to justify it then: Yugoslavia for nations and republics who want it. The former JNA, Chetnik units of SDS and paramilitary formations from Serbia and Montenegro were the instrument of realization of this plan which should destroy the Bosniak state and Bosniaks, respectively the Muslims as the political factor. Munir Alibabić – Munja and Dr. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić testified on several occasions that the former Bosniak leadership talked about it in details, analyzed the condition and made an unambiguous conclusion: a severe war is in the store for Bosnia and Bosnian people. Nevertheless and besides, Izetbegović decided to make an agreement with the Army, further believing its alleged neutrality and possible transformation into the Bosnian Army. Till one established on 26th April that already more than 1000 people have been killed so far: hence, 20 days before the beginning of the bloodiest war. Yet then, in Skopje, along with the president of the inexistent presidency of the inexistent SFRY, Branko Kostić, in the presence of General Blagoje Adžić, chief of the main staff of already fascistic armada, the agreement on JNA's leaving from BiH has been signed.

According to Oslobođenje's release, he stated: "A process was initiated which will eventually lead to either the JNA's leaving from Bosnia and Herzegovina or to its radical transformation, therewith it should transform into the Bosnian army at the end of the process, respectively, the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

* Sefer Halilović, Cunning Strategy /orig. title: Lukava strategija/, Maršal, Matica Sandžaka, Sarajevo 1997

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

BH HDZ

CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

YOUR REFERENCE:

OUR LETTER DATED:

OUR REFERENCE: 335/91

DATE: 1 August 1991

Subject:

At the meeting in Sarajevo on 31 July 1991 on the issue of the current security and political situation in this country, the Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina made the following

STATEMENT

a. The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been advocating from its inception an independent, sovereign, and indivisible Bosnia and Herzegovina in its existing borders within a six-member confederal Yugoslav community. We do not recognize any violent change of Bosnia and Herzegovina's borders nor a violent annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to some rump Yugo-Federation. The Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina can and will defend the territories they live in. Indeed, Bosnia and Herzegovina has for centuries also been the Croats' homeland, and nobody shall take away this homeland from us without our consent.

   For us Croats the negotiations between some individuals regarding a so-called "historical agreement" between Serbs and Muslims means that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be dragged into a large-scale war. A peaceful Bosnia and Herzegovina may be preserved only by all of its nations together; however, peace can definitely not be preserved by means of an agreement of two nations behind the back of the third, namely the Croats.

b. The Presidency of the BH HDZ demands that the BH Presidency, the BH Government, and the BH Assembly condemn the cruel and criminal attacks of

   Chetnik renegades and parts of the so-called JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ on hospitals, schools, kindergartens, churches, Red Cross vehicles, and the savagery and killings of innocent civilians on the territory of the sovereign state of Croatia.

   The Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina reassures the state leadership of Croatia and its president, Dr. Franjo TUĐMAN, of its unreserved support for the defence of the sovereignty and integrity of Croatia as well as for the defence of peace and democracy.

c. The Presidency of the BH HDZ does not accept having the 14th Military Corps stationed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and will take all necessary steps to prevent this move. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there is already too much military potential; the arrival of new units would result in new costs and contribute to the creation of even greater tensions.

d. The Presidency of the BH HDZ explicitly demands that the BH Presidency, the BH Government, and the BH Assembly defend and protect those citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who did not respond to the call by the so-called JNA to participate in mobilization exercises for the purposes of the Grand Serbian policy of conquests, and do everything to suspend proceedings initiated by the Army against those citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; after all, we have a civilian and not a military government in this republic.

e. The Presidency of the BH HDZ condemns the frenzied anti-Croatian campaign constantly on display on TV Sarajevo, YUTEL, and in *Oslobođenje,* with its biased reports, out of place in modern, independent journalism.

The BH HDZ does not recognize the Croats who have been announced to be named to those newspaper agencies as their own, since decisions on personnel of Croatian nationality shall no longer be made by those appointed by the previous authorities, but rather by the Croatian representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which today is the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

cc. Presidency of the Republic of BiH

Government of the Republic of BiH

Assembly of the Republic of BiH

Media

/stamped/

CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF BiH

REGISTRY OF HDZ /CDU/ SARAJEVO

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

CROATIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Your file:

BH HDZ CENTRAL BOARD

Your correspondence of:

Our file: 38/92

Date: 9 February 1992

Re:

RECORD

of the 2nd session of the Central Board of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on 9 February 1992 in the *Dinara* Hotel in Livno

SESSION BEGAN AT: 1130 hours

IN ATTENDANCE: Attendance sheet attached

GUESTS: Perica JURIĆ, Vice President of the HDZ, and Ante BELJO, Deputy Minister of Information of the Republic of Croatia.

WORKING PRESIDENCY: Mate BOBAN, 1st Vice President of the BH HDZ, Vlado ŠANTIĆ, 2nd Vice President of the BH HDZ and General Secretary of the BH HDZ.

PRESIDING: Mate BOBAN

AGENDA: The following agenda was adopted:

1. Preparations for the referendum on a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina;
2. Various.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. It is confirmed that, according to the BH HDZ Statute, Mate BOBAN will preside over the 2nd session of the BH HDZ Central Board in his role as deputy of the resigning president of the BH HDZ, since the resigning president, Stjepan KLJUIĆ, did not attend the session due to illness.

2. Quorum — It was confirmed that 147 of the 167 members of the BH HDZ Central Board were in attendance, and thus the quorum for reaching legally valid decisions had been reached.

3. Referendum on a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina — The BH HDZ presidency recommends that the BH HDZ Central Board adopt the following question for the referendum on a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina:

"Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, a joint State of the constitutive and sovereign Croatian, Muslim and Serbian peoples in their ethnic areas (cantons)?"

YES **NO**

This question shall represent the starting point for further negotiations with our partner parties, the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ and SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/, on the referendum that will be held on 29 February and 1 March 1992, as well as on the future structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which must be confirmed by a special constitutional act.

Justification: The question of the BH HDZ Presidency represents the minimum sought by the Croatian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this question it wishes to guarantee the sovereignty and constitutive status of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the question adopted at the session of the Assembly on 25 January 1992, which reads as follows:

> "Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, a State of equal citizens and peoples – Croats, Muslims, Serbs and other peoples who live in it?"
>
> YES NO

refers to the sovereignty of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the equality of its citizens and peoples, but not the sovereignty of those nations, i.e. the Croats, Muslims and Serbs, which is below the level of the existing BH Constitution of 1974.

The presiding officer put up both questions for a vote.

There were 4 votes in favour of the question adopted at the BH Assembly on 25 January, 140 against and 3 abstentions.

Then the presiding officer put up the motion for the question of the BH Presidency for a vote.

There were 140 votes in favour of the question, 3 against and 4 abstentions.

It was concluded that if the SDA and SDS do not accept the proposal of the BH HDZ Central Board to amend the referendum question, the political organs of the BH HDZ shall take their own position in connection with the decision of the Croatian people in the upcoming referendum.

5. The session ended at 1705 hrs.

Record compiled by:

Anđelka STOJIĆ

Secretary
/signed/

Working Presidency:

1. Mate BOBAN
   1st Vice President of the BH HDZ
2. Vlado ŠANTIĆ
   2nd Vice President of the BH HDZ
3. Mr. Ivan MARKEŠIĆ
   General Secretary of the BH HDZ

/signed and stamped/

COMMENT:

Ravno is not Sarajevo; where is this Ravno after all, and who lives there in order to make killing people in Ravno somebody's war?

No "intellectual" was killed there, significant enough for further ordinary development of world history.

Alija Izetbegović's statement regarding the attack of JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) and TO (Territorial Defence Forces) on the village of Ravno

SERBS ATTACKED
THE VILLAGE RAVNO
15.09.1991. – 06.10.1991.



ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ'S STATEMENT:
"THIS IS NOT OUR WAR"

VILLAGE OF RAVNO IS LOCATED IN BiH, POPULATED BY CROATS.
IT WAS RAZED TO THE GROUND.

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
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KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

12.
MUJAHEDINS



FACTS

COMMENT:

After bringing his people into a catastrophic situation by series of wrong decisions, Alija Izetbegović invited fighters from Islamic states to help. As Max Frisch says in one of his books, speaking about foreign workers: "We invited workers and the people came"; so was the situation with Mujahedins.

They came to fight for Islam, not for the BiH, whether it was civil or differently structured BiH. They came with identification of humanitarian organizations.

When we tried to stop their convoy full of fighters with worthless goods they were driving casually, half of the "humane" world would have jumped on our back.

You are familiar with the consequences.

Some members of the "El mudžahedin" (Mujahedins) unit



Hećimović Esad: GARIBES-MUJAHEDINS IN BiH 1992-1999

***

Sheikh Abdel Aziz "Barbarossa", the second participant in the Zagreb meeting of humanitarian workers from the /?BH/ and the TWRA /Third World Relief Agency/, mujahedin from Bosnia and bin Laden's envoy from The Sudan, remained in Bosnia at least to the end of June 1993. On 21 August 1992, in Travnik, he was in charge of the lining up of the *Muslim Forces* unit in front of the *Madrasah* building in Travnik. A video recording of this ceremony shows that the review was attended by the key political and religious leaders of the Bosnian Muslims in the area of Travnik.[51] The internal organising of the BH Army had not yet been completed at the time. The *Muslim Forces* which Sheikh Abdel Aziz had lined up in Travnik were the forerunner of the subsequently formed 7th Muslim Brigade. It was only later that these units of the BH Army were split into the 7th Muslim Brigade, which comprised exclusively local Islamic volunteers and the *El Mudžahedin,* a unit which comprised both foreign and local Islamic volunteers. The 7th Muslim Brigade was formed in the autumn of 1992 and the *El Mudžahedin* on 13 August 1993. According to testimonies, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Barbarossa left Bosnia, pretending to be wounded, in the ambulance of a humanitarian organisation.

***

51 Video footage of the ceremony has been used by BH State prosecutor as prosecution evidence in case vs. Adbuladhim Maktouf, BH citizen with Iraqi origin who was indicted for a war crime against civilian population on 10th September 2004 – kidnapping of five civilians in Travnik on 18th October 1993

Hećimović Esad, GARIBES-MUJAHEDINS IN BiH 1992-1999 /orig.title: Garibi - Mudžahedini u BiH 1992.-1999./, Edition: Zenica: Fondacija Sina, 2006

Esad Hećimović
GARIBES
Mujahedins in BiH 1992 – 1999

Military commander of 7th Muslim brigade General Halil Brzina and leaders of "El Mudžahida" Abu Maali and Sheikh Enver Šaban, together with Halid Čengić and other SDA (Democratic action Party) politicians listening to Alija Izetbegović in September 1995 in Vozuća by Zavidovići.

Sheikh Enver Šaban, religious leader of the Unit; Alija Izetbegović Chairman of the BiH Republic Presidency; Abu Maali, military commander of the Unit and Sakib Muhmuljin, Commander of the 3rd Corps of BiH Army; photos taken in September 1995 in Vozuća by Zavidovići.

Abu Hamza Al Misri, leader of the Ensarija Sheriat from London and veteran of wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ali Hamad: Network of Evil - International terrorism and "Al-Qaeda"



***

He has always repeated the following words, showing satisfaction about his involvement in the mentioned attack: «Thank you, Allah Jalla Shanuhu, for enabling me to kill your enemies by your own hand. It is a great honour and pleasure for me»

Ali Hamad, Network of Evil - International terrorism and "Al-Qaeda" /orig.title: U mreži zla: međunarodni terorizam i "Al-Kaida"/, Glas Srpske, 2007

COMMENT:

We were rather swamped with such and similar messages – flyers in BiH, in the spring of 1993.

You will see, my readers, that such intentions should have been realized through offensive operation of A BiH, "Neretva 93".

Flyers

Bismilla-hirah-ma-nirrahim
/In the name of Allah, the most Gracious, the most Merciful/

Muslim brethren, the time has come to finally liberate our homeland. Like 500 years ago, the Muslim Corps will rule over its historic areas.
We have had enough of injustice, both from the *krst* /cross – Orthodox use/ and from the *križ* /cross – Catholic use/. Our holy mission is to liberate Mostar and Stolac. Sarajevo, Zvornik, Goražde, Banja Luka, Doboj, Foča, Nevesinje, Trebinje and other towns throughout our proud Bosnia will once again embark upon the path of Islam.
Let everyone be aware that Muslims die with the name of Allah on their lips and for the glory of their faith.

WE WERE NEVER STRONGER. MUSLIMS OF THE WORLD ARE WITH US.

We will take our part of the Adriatic coast. Ploče will be the first Bosnian port and Neum will be the new Constantinople.

THIS WILL BE OUR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
/a map/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
3 rd corps command
No: 01/2474-1
Date: 28lh of August 1993

/01/
29th of August 1993 /signed/
DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/POORLY LEGIBLE STAMP/
01/780-1
29th of August 1993

Order to resubordinate units, to be submitted

Attn: command of the OG "Bos. Krajina" Command of the 306th brigade Independent squad "El Mudžahid"

Pursuant to indicated need and in order to maximize the RTK /abbreviation unknown/ to units for carrying out combat activities, herewith I

ORDER

1. The unit, independent squad "EI Mudžahid" with entire manpower and MTS /material technical resources/ is to be resubordinated to 306th brigade for carrying out combat activities.
2. The commander of the 306th brigade and the commander of "El Mudžahid" unit arc responsible for the joint preparation and for planning further combat activities.
3. The deadline for execution of this Order is; immediately.

Commander
Enver Hadžihasanović
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
S A R A J E V O

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly Confidential no: 14/75-86
Sarajevo, 13 August 1993

Subject: formation of *ELMUDŽAHIDIN* unit
in 3rd Corps zone of responsibility, order.-

To: 3rd CORPS COMMAND

Pursuant to the Decision by the Presidency of the Republic of BH on the organisation of the armed forces of the Republic of BH number 02-011-461/92 of 4 July 1992, and to 3rd Corps Request Strictly Confidential no. 05/900-90 of 12 August 1993,

I HEREBY ORDER

I ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES

1 FORMATION

In the 3rd Corps zone of responsibility FORM the *ELMUDŽAHIDIN* detachment in accordance with a proposed establishment which you are required to submit to this Staff for approval. The newly formed detachment shall be assigned the number T-30030, the military unit (VJ) number shall be 5689, duration of mobilisation shall be 12 hours, and the mobilisation plan shall be conducted by the 3rd Corps Command.

II MOBILISATION PREPARATIONS

Recruit the *ELMUHADŽIDIN* detachment from the personnel, i.e. the foreign nationals – volunteers, who are in the territory of the 3rd Corps z/o / zone of responsibility/. These personnel shall bring with them the weapons and other MS /material supplies/ they have currently been issued.

/handwritten: OS [1]ŠVK[2] CV[3] - KZP[4]
sent to 3rd Corps
14 August 1993 at 1639 hours
/a signature//

III LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

[1] OS - Armed Forces
[2] ŠVK -Supreme Command Staff
[3] CV - Communications Centre
[4] KZP - cryptographic data protection

1. Logistical support of the RJ /wartime unit/ in item I/1 of this Order with all combat and non-combat requirements shall be conducted by drawing upon the 3rd Corps Logistics base.
2. Financial support for the RJ in item I/1 shall be conducted by a letter of credit with the 3rd Corps financial organ.

IV FINAL PROVISIONS

1. Commence execution of the tasks in this order IMMEDIATELY, and complete them by no later than 31 August 1993.
2. Enter the newly formed unit into the Army of the Republic of BH Schedule of the Basic Mobilisation Plan, 3rd Corps Section.
3. Appoint officers to establishment posts in accordance with the regulations in force.
4. Enter the order in the list of mobilisation documents.
5. Submit a written report on the implementation of this order to this Staff no later than 5 September 1993.

NF/MA

COMMANDER
OS SUPREME COMMAND STAFF
Rasim DELIĆ
/signed and stamped/

To:

- 3rd Corps Command
- files

COMMENT:

BH Army had in its Main Staff leadership two generals, YNA officers, a Croat Stjepan Šiber and a Serb Jovan Divjak.

Two tiny ornaments that waved in front of the very nose of the international community with a statement on the multinational composition of BH Army.

It is the same Šiber to whom Sefer Halilović is saying that general Petković was Ustasha as well, as all those down there in HVO, except Šiber, who is not Ustasha.

Šiber is quiet, does not respond, does not react and adjusts because it is not a small thing when Sefer grants amnesty to USTASHA IDEOLOGY.

What does On June 25th 1993, Stjepan Šiber write FOR THE ATTENTION of Alija Izetbegović and Sefer Halilović.

The meeting takes place in Zenica and president of the municipal government Ramiz Džaferović is speaking (if I misspelled the name, I apologize):

– as a citizen I am disappointed in 3rd Corps; the leadership of the corps is involved in pillaging and crime;

– there are seniors that erase people after pillaging.

Who is saying that and who is he saying it to? TO ŠIBER, KARIĆ AND VRANJ.

Read again.

The meeting takes place in Zenica and the district president Hodžić and the president of the municipal government HARAČIĆ says:

– Merdan is the chief in charge of religious units;

– Severe criminals are in command of Zenica and 3rd BH Army corps units who do not wish to do so, because they are not comfortable with the victory against Chetniks, but they are comfortable with the conflicts involving HVO.

Who is saying that, where and what is that all about; who is familiar with the situation? Izetbegović, Halilović?

FOR THE ATTENTION OF!

What changed?

In which village and when were 35 Croats killed and in which village and when were 30 Croats shot and who did it?

Read Šiber's report entirely in order to find an answer.

What is bothering Mr. Divjak, Delić's deputy on August 28th 1993?

Delić is now commander of BH Army.

Divjak is bothered with the fact that he is just a STATIONARY FIGURE, however he will continue to practice it quite persistently.

We shall protest a bit, politely, just to satisfy tiny moral doubts, however not even Šiber as Croat shall respond powerfully and consistently, like a "woman".

I shall not write down he should have reacted like a man, because it is actually very rare among men.
It is a type of human being who is, in order to keep a certain position, adaptable to the point of obnoxiousness.

Supreme Command Staff Communications Centre
Cryptographic protection department
Date and time:
25 June 1993, Friday, 2323 hrs

Source file: FAFGP6UC
Act received and filed by
Hari

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMED FORCES SUPREME COMMAND STAFF
FORWARD COMMAND POST
Str. conf. No. 102/03-67

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
VERY URGENT

Attn: PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY OF R BiH
RBH ARMY SUPREME COMMAND STAFF COMMANDER

Pursuant to note Str. conf. no. 102/03-51 which I sent you on 15 June 1993, I take the liberty to insist again on your visit to Zenica. Here are some additional reasons I have not cited in my note of 15 June 1993.

1. On 23 May 1993 the Supreme Command Staff Chief Sefer HALILOVIĆ said in the presence of DELIĆ and KARIĆ and before going to Sarajevo, that he had ordered the following:
   - the 3rd Corps must find and appoint to its Command several Croats within the next 24 hours;
   - within 48 hours illegal groups and formations (everyone knows who they are) must leave Zenica through Igman. (Responsible person: DELIĆ, assistant: MAHMULJIN);
   - the 3rd Corps must mobilise additional units;
   - the 3rd Corps must introduce 24-hour working, like in the Supreme Command Staff and other corps.

So far, nothing has been done.

2. On 26 May 1993 the president of municipal government, Ramiz DŽAFEROVIĆ, said in the presence of ŠIBER, KARIĆ and VRANJ:
   - as a citizen, I am disappointed with the 3rd Corps, and its commanders are involved in looting and crime;
   - there are officers who liquidate people after looting;
   - "I will not do anything in the name of the government for the army until there is order and discipline in town".

3. On 23 June 1993, HODŽIĆ, the district president, and HARAČIĆ, the president of the district government, said the following:

   - MERDAN is the main organiser of religious units: ŠUVALIĆ's, PURIĆ's, the 7th mbbr /Muslim Mountain Brigade/, etc.;
   - HADŽIHASANOVIĆ has been summoned to the session of the county assembly several times, but has never come;
   - Zenica and the soldiers of the 3rd Corps are ruled by commanders who are hardened criminals, who do not want victory over the Chetniks, but at the same time profit from conflicts with the HVO.

4. On 20 June 1993 I had a private talk with HADŽIHASANOVIĆ and asked him the following questions:
   - do you know that the anti-sabotage battalion is under MERDAN's command and that Zenica knows that it is his own private unit, not the 3rd Corps'? Answer: Yes, but not just him.
   - do you know that part of certain units are planning to secede and form the 8th Muslim Brigade? Answer: Yes, but it will not happen.
   - Do you know that preparations are being made to create a Muslim Corps, and the 3rd Corps command will be liquidated if it opposes? Answer: Yes, but that is just someone's wishful thinking. It will not happen.

In the meanwhile:

- On 8 June 1993, 35 Croats were executed in the village of Bikoši. Four witnesses were wounded but survived. They were shot by Mujahedin.
- On 10 June 1993, over 30 Croats were executed in the village of Sušanj near Ovnak by "some soldiers".
- On 22 June 1993, members of the Commission for the release of prisoners, ALIHODŽIĆ and NEGOVETIĆ learned from Salko BEBA from Operations group West, that on the previous day the Mujahedin executed about 50 civilians in the vicinity of the village Mehurići near Vlašić. Salko BEBA's unit is guarding 247 civilians in that village against the so-called "Death Brigade", which is mistreating even the local Muslim population, looting and killing. On the same day Mujahedin from that "Death Brigade", who are attracting our soldiers with money, almost shot at UNPROFOR vehicles carrying the Commission members with *Zolja* and *Osa* /handheld rocket launchers/.

I emphasise: looting and crime prevail. Soldiers from the "positions" are carrying bags full of goods through Zenica, and I have received information that some refuse to go to positions unless there is something to loot (the 309th bbr /Mountain Brigade/). The police of certain brigades are still arresting and beating up civilians in basements. The MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, that is, the Security Services Centre, and the 3rd Corps security service are not cooperating whatsoever, as was seen by Mr. GANIĆ during his meeting at the 3rd Corps on 15 May 1993.

On the basis of the above, I ask you again to react urgently, since personnel changes in the 3rd Corps Command are essential. I have specific suggestions regarding this matter. I have asked from the 3rd Corps commander to replace the assistants for morale, security and organisational, mobilisation and personnel issues, but he has not reacted.

Please appoint to the Joint Command, together with KARIĆ and ŠIBER, someone like KARIŠIK, VRANJ or NAJETOVIĆ instead of MERDAN, since MERDAN is a member of the 3rd Corps and because of what has been said about him above.

Best regards,

SŠ/AČ

DEPUTY COMMANDER

Stjepan ŠIBER, M.Eng.

COMMENT:

1. Stjepan Šiber is a DEPUTY COMMANDER OF A BiH – MUSLIM ARMY. He writes to Alija Izetbegović and to the A BiH commander;
2. TOP men of 3rd Corps of A BiH are implicated in looting and CRIMINAL acts;
3. Merdan is the main organizer of religious troops (ŠUVALIĆ'S, PURIĆ'S, 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade etc ...) ;
4. They plan to form 8th Muslim Brigade.

In the meanwhile: *

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- On 10 June 1993, over 30 Croats were executed in the village of Šušanj near Ovnak by "some soldiers".

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Best regards,

SŠ/AC

DEPUTY COMMANDER
Stjepan ŠIBER, M.Eng.

*Excerpt from document D-37

NO ONE SAW NOTHING, NO ONE HAS HEARD ANYTHING, NO ONE KNOWS ANYTHING

MUSLIMS ARE VICTIMS IN SARAJEVO, IN BIHAĆ, IN…, VICTIMS OF SERBS, BUT FOR POWERLESSNESS AGAINST SERBS THEY SEEK COMPENSATION WITH CROATS – BY KILLING, SCORCHING AND ATTACKING.

<u>BUT THE VICTIM CANNOT BE THE GUILTY ONE</u> – THAT IS AN AXIOM.
There is no evidence in the world that can prove otherwise.

HVO AND CROATS ARE THE GUILTY PARTY.
LET'S FIND "JOINT CRIMINALS".

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

13.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ'S DECEITS

HE WORKED AROUND ALL OF THE PLANS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, AND THERE WERE MANY.
HE SIGNED EACH ONE.
HE CHEATED OUT EACH TIME.



FACTS

COMMENT:

Izetbegović talks how and why he lied and cheated in Lisbon.

What he signed there – the constitutional establishment of the BiH – was a condition to recognize BiH and the only reason why Croats went out to referendum on independence of BiH.

With help from Franjo Tuđman who wanted once again to protect, secure and define the borders of RH.
Alija says; "Unwillingly, but we reached an agreement".

Why did he say yes?

Reply: "*If the Croatian community* (he doesn't say "Croatian people"??) *does not come out to referendum, the referendum goes down. Bear that in mind. Do not gamble with it. We have to pass at the referendum; if we don't, we remain down and there is no way for us to go up within the next 30 years.*"

Izetbegović further says something about the stone and the hill but cannot remember Sisyphus and concludes with: "*The referendum cannot be lost!*" So he will receive recognition and then, "*whatever happens on the inside, I cannot do anything about it*".

On October 8th 1992 the war is already raging and Izetbegović has talks differently. A bit more indulgent.
The situation is grave so we might consider changing our mask again.
HVO has military successes, each HZ-HB (Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia) document says that we are in the state of BiH, it says that all regulations are temporary, that we don't have our own assembly, our own Constitution, we have no ministers but heads of offices, we have no president of the government but …

We provide our own funds (mostly through contributions from Croats who work abroad, a great number of such people come from this region), we buy weaponry by ourselves, transport and accommodate refugees and displaced Croats and Muslims by using oil that we allegedly "nicked"; we transport 10 000 wounded BH Army combatants in cars that we (and that we "certainly" "have stolen"), Croatia helps us with money from the joint bag, that consists of contributions from Croats from BiH too, we provide armament and logistic help to the BH Army and Muslims in HVO… (later they will turn the guns against their army in the highest manner of treason).

From all those billions of dollars provided as aid to BiH from Islamic states we got shit.
Et cetera and similar.

For all that a Croat must apologize, because the servant is always GUILTY; he should apologize because that is the right thing to do, it is a humane gesture, a historically conciliatory gesture.

Apologize to the Sir even if he stepped onto your foot, you have to be GUILTY because the real question is what was your foot doing at that place at the time.

CUTILEIRO'S PLAN



Sarajevo, residence Konak, March 18th 1992

EU proposal on internal structure of BiH with three constituent units based on ethnic principles – Cutileiro's plan

Source: Vjesnik, March 19th, 1992

COMMENT:

Croats signed first - Izetbegović signed the document and later on denied signing the document

Alija Izetbegović: Speaking at a closed session of the SDA (Democratic Action Party) after returning from Lisbon negotiations, 25 February 1992.

Their views on the Lisbon declaration and negotiation, **Alija Izetbegovic** explained in a closed extended session of the Central Committee of the SDA, which was held on **25. February 1992** in the House of police in Sarajevo

Izetbegovic: First of all, to inform you because they misinterpreted what we did in Lisbon, we have not reached any decisions, we have not reached any agreement, in fact, we have not signed anything, we have after two days of talks for which I will tell you the circumstances that have taken place, and maybe some unknown facts to you. Kutiljero who conducted a meeting had with him another two men, a Portuguese Goreš who is a consul in Paris, and Darwin, an Englishman. The three of them were representing the European Union. Kutiljero lead the meeting as deputy chairman, not as someone from Portugal or the Portuguese officials, but as European Community representative.

So, at that meeting which lasted two days, one afternoon of intense four-five hour talks and the next day for five to six hours, somewhere up to about three in the afternoon, 9:00 to 3:00. We have after the first day of talks in the evening, received a paper from the European Community, the first version we have, we get two papers out there, I am now talking about the first paper that we got the first night that, we were just, if nothing else to say consternated but well surprised. This paper has provided a confederation Bosnia and Herzegovina and it came, to our surprise from the European Union, not as a suggestion of some of these partners, some of these parties, rather vice versa by the European Community. It was sometime after dinner, actually during the dinner because it was announced that we will get that paper after dinner, the paper was distributed. We returned to the hotel and read this text and stayed there for three-four hours. As you know, when I say we, I mean me, professor Mahmutćehajić and Haris Silajdžic, the tree of us represented our delegation there.

The situation was quite uncomfortable, after reading the paper, we did not know what to do, we felt we were pressed against the wall, simply because we knew that this paper suited the Serbs and Croats in its entirety but definitely not us. In fact, for the most part, I do not know if I could say definitely not, but it does contain some very inconvenient provisions.
After a lengthy discussion and since we talked to the HDZ, somewhere around midnight, we went our separate ways ...
... What is most problematic is the clear confederation option of Bosnia and Herzegovina, such independent but confederate Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it stated Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of three "status" - "states". There were other provisions that Sarajevo is to be exterritorial....

Cutileiro's plan: The text of the statement regarding the principles for the new constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo 18 March 1992.)*

Statement regarding the principles for the new constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina

A. Independence

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a state consisting of three units, based on principles of nationality and taking into account the economic, geographic and other criteria.
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will retain its current boundaries and neither the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor its constituent units of government will not encourage nor support the aspirations of any part of its territory by neighboring countries.
3. Sovereignty rests with the citizens of the Muslim, Serbian and Croatian nationality and other nations and nationalities, exercising its sovereignty in civic participation within the constituent units and the central authorities of the republic.

B. General principles

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina and its constituent units will be managed in conjunction with the following constitutional principles, in the manner they are understood and generally implemented in the democratic countries of Western Europe, and in the way they are presented in convention draft discussed at the conference:
   a. Respect for human rights as the highest standards required by the convention draft, respect for private property rights, market economy and free enterprise;
   b. general and equal right to vote, free elections and secret voting;
   c. Freedom for political and union activity;
   d. The secular state system with full freedom of religion, separation of church and state, separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, with respect for the law and effective system of democratic control and protection of constitutionality and legality;
   e. International oversight and jurisdiction over the protection of the rights and freedoms.

* SOURCE: Vjesnik, 19th March 1992. The document was adopted at the fifth round of talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina under the auspices of EC; Politika, 19.3.1992.

... They tell us - We know what is your goal - an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina - you have it. Their goal is the reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and you cannot dispute this. Keep in mind that the two nations are requesting this. I can tell you that this is the main argument for the two nations, because they didn't' but we had in mind, the issue was a referendum.

I hereby present our motives and our way of reasoning, what we are motivated by, the later notification that was issued for us to accept it as something we have agreed to. Reluctantly, but we have agreed. I'll tell you later to what this notification relates, because it should not be confused with this paper. As the paper was not accepted. We only accepted the notification consisting of three points. The rest we did not accept, we said - these are the issues for future discussions.

In fact, I had in mind and please you should also have it in mind, also in future discussions we'll have. Keep this in mind. If the Croatian community does not come out to the referendum, the referendum will fail. Keep this thing in mind. Do not gamble with this no matter what. We need a pass on referendum, if we do not pass we will get stuck in the well and there will be no way out for another thirty years. Who knows? There would probably be a phase, we would plumbed very deep, like when you push that stone, you know the one what they call it, you push it to the top of the hill and then it slips away again back to the valley, so you push it up to the hill again. A referendum must not be lost...

Such Bosnia as it is today in the case of a successful referendum, even with 55 percent, we already have a serial of recognitions during the next week, and during the following another serial and we can definitely have a strong position here.

Our reasoning was this - well, let me put rings around Bosnia, to preserve it, to throw back the primary threat and inside let the situation get stormy, what I can? Some transformations, and some regions, and some national ... So let the rings around the Bosnia be in place. That was our reasoning.

So, let's keep in mind in this debate what we will do now one thing. Don't, this morning I discussed with some people, very fine, prominent people and they only come to me with a wish list, we need this, we need that, a Muslim nation has a right to this and that and no one tells me how to realize this. So if you have any suggestions, tell me how to achieve them. Keep in mind one thing, that all of this must go before this Assembly. The Assembly must have the consent of the HDZ for any solution, otherwise we do not have a majority. Weight out this proposal, as they say twice, two or four times. The other day we barely pushed the referendum through. We had there this pure formula, are you for independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina? The delay was not only due to the refusal of the Serbs, I can tell it was also because of the HDZ. It took us another three or four hours of discussion, they did not want to go to a referendum. Then they came with the reformulation, so they created this issue, and they went to Livno and they reputed their own opinion, they disagreed with themselves so they threw in, if you remember those cantons. I think that with the above conditional acceptance, I think we got the Croatians for the referendum. Now they want to vote because they hope that in such Bosnia and Herzegovina they will get some sort of sovereignty, some kind of national recognition, some regions, etc., because it is a part of this agreement. And this agreement consists of three points. The first point, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains, guaranteeing the survival of intact historical and present borders. The second point - that Bosnia would be transformed Bosnia forming regions, the base of which would be the ethnic population, on the ethnic grounds, as they say. And the third point, that all this is implemented in the presence and with guarantees from the European Community. The first and third points are not in dispute, the second one is. The second one is the one that causes controversy and considerations should it be done this or that way, etc.

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

Excerpt from the testimony of Ambassador Jose Cutileiro on 19th February 2013 in the Karadžić case before the ICTY, The Hague, Netherlands

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Mr. Karadžić: On 16th of February, 1993, Ambassador Cutileiro wrote a commentary published in the "International Herald Tribune" which endorsed the Vance-Owen Plan and noted that President Alija Izetbegovic's reluctance to accept that the real Bosnia is utterly different from the Bosnia of his wishful thinking has contributed as much as have the dreams of Greater Serbia and the Croatian hegemony to the continuation of the war. Ambassador Cutileiro believed this to be true then and believes it to be true now. In a letter to "The Economist" in December 1995, Ambassador Cutileiro wrote:

"After several rounds of talks, our principles for future constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina were agreed by all parties - Muslims, Serbs and Croats - in Sarajevo on March 18th, 1992, as basis for future negotiations. These continued, maps and all, until the summer when the Muslims reneged on the agreement. Had they not done so, the Bosnian question might have been settled earlier with less losses of mainly Muslim lives and land. To be fair, President Izetbegovic and his aides were encouraged to scupper the deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state by well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew better." Ambassador Cutileiro believed this to be true then and believes it to be true now.

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Ambassador Cutileiro: What I'm trying to say is that the only way of getting an arrangement to Bosnia was to adhere to the -- what had been agreed in March. In that way or in some other way. And if you look at the Dayton Agreement, and if you look at the maps in the Dayton Agreement, you realize, as my letter to "The Economist" shows, that after three years of a lot of tragedies, you didn't move far from what we had foreseen. Bosnia is what it is. It's not another thing. And you -- the Serbs ideally would have preferred that Bosnia didn't become independent. The Croats would have preferred to annex part of Bosnia or to make it some kind of -- and the Muslims, in particular President Izetbegovic and his people, thought that they could have a unitary state. So the -- if you look at the agreement of March 1992 and you look at the Dayton Agreement slate, well, I was there and I didn't think that we could go into other thing –

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Ambassador Cutileiro: You cannot take bits of political discourse during some kind of meeting of an Assembly from one side or the other and present them. When I see that, I'm not surprised by that. I think the three sides had a discourse that was complicated with their own basis, if you want to –

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Ambassador Cutileiro : The idea was to introduce some kind of common-sense rationality into all that business. That's what the agreement is for. What they said in their Assembly, I wasn't there. I didn't hear him. I'm not surprised, but I'm not shocked either.

Mr. Tieger: The short answer, I take it, Ambassador, is that in fact the desire to or objective to unify the Bosnian Serb entity with Serbia and Montenegro was not envisioned by the Statement of Principles?

Ambassador Cutileiro : On the contrary. It's clear. I suppose it is said somewhere in Statement of Principle that they shouldn't try to -- neither Croats nor Serbs should try to get into either Croatia or Serbia.

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Mr. Tieger: For example, did you know that they considered areas where the Serbs had been a majority before World War II should be Serbian irrespective of which ethnic group was the majority in that area now?

Ambassador Cutileiro : Taken out of context. All that's affirmations of a very nonsensical nature, but we were in Bosnia. The three groups had their own historical memories that were sometimes were very peculiar to an outsider, and everybody was trying to scramble to get what he could from this. So I wouldn't -- I'm not surprised from -- by what I'm hearing, but I don't think that if there had been a strong political will from the top to -- to get this thing through, we might have gotten it through. By the way, in Dayton, if I may go back to that, in Dayton with different perhaps details, certainly many details are different, but we -- we got to that -- the point -- the basic point of this story is: Could we have a unitary Bosnia or did we have to have a tripartite Bosnia? My conviction in the end, during the time I was there, is that only a tripartite thing would work, and that was also the conviction of Dick Holbrooke in the end. That's all.

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Mr. Karadžić: [Interpretation] Yes. How is this in keeping with what you stated of me informing you of having issued such an order?

Ambassador Cutileiro : Yes, I suppose -- it's here. At least this is the English translation, so I believe it's an accurate translation.

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Mr. Karadžić: How is this in keeping with your understanding of my position during the negotiations?

Ambassador Cutileiro : It fits. I mean, what you told me is what is here.

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Mr. Karadžić: [quotes]"I, however, accepted that in its existing borders, Bosnia cannot be integral, but in its existing borders this means that we won't join a single part to either Serbia or Croatia."

Ambassador Cutileiro : That is actually touches that one fundamental aspect of the conference itself. The point of the conference was to give as much autonomy as possible to the Serbs and the Croats in the majority Muslim state without, without, infringing the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14.

GENERAL KLEIN, AMBASSADOR OKUN, AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH – STATEMENTS



FACTS

COMMENT:

Tuđman said to General Klein that Izetbegović offered him West Herzegovina, and Klein verified that assertion by asking Izetbegović about its accuracy.

Alija responded that it was true because Croats in BiH are a "huge problem", so he wants to get rid of them.

He already made an agreement with the Serbs how to divide what would be left once he gets rid of West Herzegovina.

The Serbs have already got rid of Croats and the BH Army wanted to cleanse what was left of Croats in Central Bosnia, Sarajevo and Neretva Valley, up to Neum, even up to Ploče.

Tuđman and Croats are an obstacle.

So, my dear reader, in this proposition it is not about the internal territorial structure of the BiH, certainly NOT. Mr. Alija Izetbegović offers West Herzegovina to Mr. Franjo Tuđman; let him annex it to Croatia.

General Jacques Paul Klein's statement - who was dividing and disintegrating Bosnia and Herzegovina

Večernji list- Tuesday 06. 03. 2007

Interview with Jacques Paul Klein, a former interim director of UNTAES:

IZETBEGOVIĆ OFFERED HERZEGOVINA TO TUĐMAN

Jadranka Jureško - Kero

Retired U.S. General Jacques Paul Klein, who from 1995 to 1997 was interim director of UNTAES for the Croatian Danube region, and then Deputy High Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations Office often speaks to American public about the experiences from this period. After the lecture held at Columbia University in New York regarding the economic problems in the new countries of Southeast Europe, Jacques Klein for Vecernji List commented current and former political events in Croatia and Bosnia.

VL: How do you comment on the verdict of the International Court of Justice which granted Serbia the amnesty from direct responsibility for genocide in Srebrenica?

KLEIN: Before making a final decision, I would like to study (review) the verdict, since I haven't had time to do it yet. I am confident that not all sides can be equally satisfied with the verdict, but the court decision should not disrupt the efforts to enhance political and economic relations in Southeast Europe. The term genocide is obviously interpreted differently. What happened in Rwanda (IZETBEGOVIĆ told me that Croats were a BIG PROBLEM so he wanted to get rid of them by offering them Herzegovina) is genocide over the genocides. Also in Srebrenica! Ratko Mladic is a criminal and I'm not sure that he needed the command from Serbia to kill because he wanted to kill anyway. No, it is not giving amnesty of responsibility to Serbia, I'm just telling the facts. It is a shame that he and Karadzic are not in The Hague!

VL: Well, why not? Many in Croatia and the former Yugoslavia claim the tribunal in The Hague has not fulfilled the role for which it was founded 14 years ago. Croatia met all the requirements, our generals are awaiting trial, and Serbian war criminals ...

KLEIN: Yes, I know. It is a political court! And while I was in Bosnia I reacted strongly to the fact that there is no political will to arrest Karadžić.

VL: At the lecture you emphasize that Tuđman, Izetbegovic and Milosevic were telling one thing when speaking with you alone, and another in front of their people or the public. What about the claim that Izetbegović offered Tuđman to affiliate Herzegovina!

KLEIN: In politics, there is the reality that many do not understand or do not want to see. There were many occasions when they used to say the same thing: I would have done as you suggest Mr. Klein, but if I tell this to my people, I will lose support. (I think that the BiH is an experiment, on paper everything looks good, but in reality implementation is SLOW) No, I will not single out anyone, I had a similar experience with all of them. And after I was told by President Tuđman, that Izetbegovic indeed offered a separation of Herzegovina, I openly raised this question to the President of Bosnia in Sarajevo. He replied that it Croats are big problem and he wanted to get rid of them and thought that this is the best way, but Tuđman declined the offer.

VL: And today, Tuđman and not Izetbegovic is accused of a dividing the Bosnia. Do you believe in the survival of this country!

KLEIN: I sincerely think that Bosnia and Herzegovina is still an experiment. Everything on paper, all the agreements and laws seem idyllic, but the implementation of it in reality is slow. Some say Dayton is dead. But I ask them: Do they really want an Islamic state in the heart of Europe? I think we need to accelerate the integration of Southeast Europe, including Bosnia, to the European Union. The Bosnian conflict in the nineties is not the only one in history. In America we had a civil war and afterword, we continued to live together!

Interview conducted by: Jadranka Jureško Kero (Večernji list, 06. 03. 2007)

AFFIDAVIT

I, Jacques Paul Klein, hereby declare as follows:

1. I am the former Transitional Administrator of the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), a position that I held from January 1996 to August 1997. From August 1997 to July 2001, I served as the Principal Deputy High Representative in the Office of the High Representative (OHR.) And from August 2001 to January 2003, I served as the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH.)

2. On 6 March 2007, the Croatian daily newspaper *Večernji list* published an article based on an interview conducted with me. In the course of the interview, I stated that:

> After President Tudman told me that Izetbegović indeed offered to give up Herzegovina during the war, I actually asked the Bosnian-Herzegovinian president in Sarajevo about this issue. He replied to me that, to him, the Croats had continued to be the major stumbling block in creating a Bosnian state and that without them a compromise might be found with the Serbs.

3. The article referenced above accurately presents my response to the interviewer and my statement is true.

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, all the information in this affidavit is true, correct, and complete, and is submitted in good faith.

Jacques Paul Klein — Date: 4 Dec 2007

County of Fairfax)
)
Commonwealth of Virginia)

The foregoing was sworn and subscribed before me by Jacques Paul Klein this fourth day of December, 2007.

Christian André-Albert Klein
Notary Public for the Commonwealth of Virginia

My commission expires on 30th day of June, 2009.

COMMENT:

Isn't it all clear in that speech of Mr. Okun?

Who was the first to be organized in BiH (Croats-HVO) and who successfully defended BiH (HVO) and who saved BiH (Tuđman – referendum, recognition, refugees, armament, training of policemen sent by SDA /Party of Democratic Action/, training of army and pilots, schools, wounded combatants).

How on earth would Izetbegović "kindly" ask the YNA (Yugoslav People's Army) to leave the BiH when it didn't want to become his state army, as he offered and proposed, this is known only to Croatian analysts.

Ambassador Herbert Okun's statement - who is responsible for the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina

78 OBZOR / Večernji list reminiscences
Interview with American Ambassador Okun

Interview by Jadranka Juresko-Kero in the Vecernji List, Zagreb April 15, 2006
Translated from Vecernji List by Hilda M. Foley

American Ambassador Herbert S. Okun speaks about Milosevic, Tudjman, the war, the negotiations...

Tuđman saved Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ambassador Herbert S. Okun has spent a full thirty six years in the service of the State Department and
American diplomacy. Born in New York 76 years ago to a immigrant Russian Jewish family, he did not continue his father's successful tradition in the food supply branch, the manufacture and distribution of food, but instead received his education at the prestigious American universities Stanford and Harvard and from his 25th year on devoted his life completely to diplomacy. He spent his first time in Croatia in 1957 as a tourist. He was immediately impressed by the beauty of Hvar and Dubrovnik. He returned to our country in 1990, first as the executive director of a nonprofit financial group that offered help in the establishment of a free market in the post-communist countries of the eastern block. Soon after, he exchanged his voluntary role with one of official duty as the deputy of Cyrus Vance, the special emissary of the United Nations' Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali., actively spending time in the areas of former Yugoslavia from 1991-1993. Today he lectures international relations at Yale and John Hopkins.

Interviewer: Once you commented that you already realized during the first meeting with Milosevic that one is dealing with a man of bad character, capable of anything!

- Yes, I met Milosevic in Belgrade on Dec. 12, 1990. I arrived with a group of business people and Cyrus Vance and I had a private meeting with Milosevic. Observing how he talked and acted I could not come to any other conclusion than Milosevic being a common gangster. You know, those types from Mafia movies with cigars in their mouths, who try to express themselves very theatrically but in reality are selling fog. The American ambassador at that time in Belgrade, Warren Zimmerman, spoke of Milosevic as a charming person. I was shocked. I said to him: "Don't you see that he is a gangster?" Unfortunately I was right, because it was soon apparent that the war and all the crimes were initiated by Milosevic, that he was a liar and a politician who did not honor agreements or his signature.

Interviewer: You were the vice-chairman of the International Conference for former Yugoslavia in the negotiations regarding the arrival of UNPROFOR in Croatia. Could the war have been prevented in Croatia if the West had intervened in time?

- When I was in Belgrade in 1990 I asked everyone - from Milosevic to ordinary people, taxi drivers, waiters - do they think it will come to war, they all answered, can you imagine, that this is not possible.
My experience told me that this was not correct, that war was coming because I did not trust Milosevic.
I asked him for instance on the eve of elections in Serbia if the JNA (Yugoslav National Army) has a considerable role in the country. He answered that it does not. "Mr. Okun", he said, "we are building democracy". The next day I saw his picture with the JNA generals in the Politika (newspaper).

I warned that one cannot trust him. But Milosevic knew how to manipulate the foreign media and politicians. He constantly kept repeating that "Croatians are making necklaces from fingers of Serb children". Just imagine such statements! The West tried to stop the war more than is known or deduced in public, but Milosevic did not want it. Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance offered a plan for the so-called peaceful separation of all sides in Yugoslavia, but while Croats accepted discourse plans, were signing everything and showing that they want peace, in Belgrade everything was the opposite.

Interviewer: What were your impressions of President Tudjman?

- I can say openly that I liked Tudjman because he was a serious politician who kept his word. True, he had a rigid style of behavior which many falsely interpreted, especially western journalists, but all my experiences with Tudjman are positive. After all, Tudjman, who led his country in war, with an imposed arms embargo, could not act like Gandhi. He was cooperative, wanted peace and actively participated in negotiations in the Haag, Geneva and Zagreb. They resented that he changed street names from the communist times and while he was doing that, Milosevic was killing Croatians in eastern Slavonia.

I was with Tudjman when the exodus of Croatians from Ilok began. He said to me: "Mr. Ambassador,
do something, it is terrible what my people are experiencing". Then Vance called Milosevic but he answered that he does not know what he is talking about, that he has nothing to do with Ilok. That man never spoke the truth. Tudjman was intelligent; he knew history, and speaking openly, with his leadership Croatians through Operation Storm and other military actions saved Bosnia Herzegovina. At a meeting in Sarajevo in 1991 Izetbegovic told me that he will demand of the JNA to leave BiH and I asked him: "Where is your army, who will defend you if the JNA does not comply?" I quickly realized that in Bosnia only the Croats offered organized defense and saved it from downfall, something often kept quiet by the media as well as politicians.

Interviewer: You created the Vance plan which stopped the war in Croatia. Did you have difficulties in the realization of the plan?

- After some fifteen armistices pronounced by the EC which no one honored, we turned to a different logic, and that was that the armistice is not declared by us but by the opposing sides. At that time the Serbs were already prepared for the Bosnia campaign and had therefore relatively quickly accepted the armistice. When I presented the contents of the plan to Tudjman, he immediately asked several questions, such as the status of the police which had warned about the vulnerability in the plan. Later on, these questions were shown to be correct, as the Serb side used it to evade their obligations.

COMMENT:

Mr. Galbraith speaks here about the humanitarian aid.

Signatures on each proposition of the international community, even the one in Dayton, harmful, unjust and unacceptable for Croats in BiH; what about refugees, armament, manpower for the BH Army, units, wounded combatants, schools with Bosnian Language program ...

GALBRAITH - Testimony in the case IT-04-74, dated September 13, 2006

Q: I'm sure you'll be able to confirm that in fact all the humanitarian aid, except for a negligible portion brought in on planes from Sarajevo, that all the humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina from the beginning of the Serb aggression right up to the Dayton Accords went through exclusively, exclusively went through the Republic of Croatia, that is to say the transport routes for humanitarian aid went by Croatia, at least from the port of Ploce to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, passing by many ports and airports. Is that true? Would that be correct?

A. That would be -- yes, that would be substantially correct. I think the air-lift into Sarajevo was not insignificant. I mean, it was very important, but overwhelming the humanitarian assistance that came to Bosnia came through Croatia. It was -- without Croatia, Bosnia would not have survived.

Q:....and please confirm that - that Croatia, the Republic of Croatia, on its own territory never, not at any single point in time, stopped any humanitarian aid convoys going to Bosnia-Herzegovina, did it?

A. I think that statement is correct.

COMMENT:

On January 24th 1991, Tuđman writes to the President of USA, G.Bush; Tuđman knows what would happen and seeks help to avoid the later casualties and enumerates republics as states ... AND CLEARLY SPEAKS ABOUT INTERNAL BORDERS.

President Tuđman's letter to President George Bush

President, George Bush
White House
Washington, DC 2 0500

24th of January 1991

Dear Mr. President,

We completely understand and we are aware of your concern regarding the bay crisis. However, as you already know, the situation in republics, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is unfortunately developing in a similar way as the events in Kosovo used to develop. At the moment, we find ourselves in a serious state of readiness.

It is the ultimate time for Yugoslav Army to stop its well known scenario of "threats, retreats, threats" by movements of tanks, aircraft and military units. We would also like to pay attention to redeployment of Croatian soldiers – reservists outside of Croatia. All this seriously destabilizes democratic governments of the aforementioned republics and prevents us from focusing to vital difficulties which would help us to fortify a free and democratic society, as well as the open market economy.

Mr. President, a path to stability has only one direction, which is a success of a democratic society. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia have elected democratic governments. An election of Marxian communist, Slobodan Milošević, cannot compare to elected democratic governments in North.

The catastrophe in Yugoslavia can be prevented by an explicit message of the United States of America, supporting the majority and referring to newly established democratic republics; inviting to a peaceful solution in order to ensure a future stability, as well as the respect of internal borders and cooperation among aforementioned national states.

Yugoslavia is not the USSR; Serbia is not Russia and the Yugoslav Army is not the Soviet Army.

It would be an unforgivable mistake, if we encountered the imposition of the communistic terror over the majority in Yugoslavia which established its democratic power in free elections. That would neither be the interest of the Yugoslav nations, nor the United States of America. It can be avoided by a decisive position of the United States of America.

If one doesn't stop the aforementioned intimidation immediately, we will feel long-lasting and fatal consequences. Therefore we expect support of the United States of America.

Respectfully,

Dr. Franjo Tuđman
President

Co; Senator Dole

COMMENT:

On December 11th 1992 Tuđman writes to the Security Council and among others, in item 2 he states:

"2. That UNPROFOR, according to the Resolution of the Security Council 769 (1992) should urgently introduce a strict regime of control over the international borders of the Republic of Croatia towards Serbia and BiH in order to prevent and especially to control the passing of armed troops or weaponry and war equipment supply;"

What division of BiH, what Banovina and annexation to Croatia, what nonsense, what "historical agreements"?

Gentlemen, stand on the borders of Croatia and protect the state that you recognized from aggression from:

a) Serbia

b) BiH

Games continued for a long time; who cares about Peruća, Maslenica, highway and 600 murdered Croats in UN and UNPA zones?

"The Storm" solved the problem!

HVO still managed to defend itself.

Letter of the President Tuđman to the UN Security Council 11.12.1992, HINA

Zagreb, 11 December – Today in Predsjednički Dvori /Presidential Premises/ Head of the office of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Jure Radić and President's adviser for foreign affaires, Dr. Željko Matić handed in a letter by the president of the republic, Dr. Franjo Tuđman to a group of ambassadors and charges d'affaires accredited in Croatia and presided by a doyen of the diplomatic Assembly Giulio Einaudi, which the president addressed to Chinmay Rajaninath Gharekhan, president of the UN Security Council regarding the engagement of UN peace corps in Croatia. We broadcast the message of president Tuđman in whole:

"Dear Mr. President,

The situation in Croatia forces me to address you with this letter, wishing to bring to your attention a line of flagrant problems which represent a true burden not only to Croatia but also to the international community which obliged itself with a task to actively participate in establishing and maintaining a peace in the territory of ex Yugoslavia. Already at the beginning, I must regretfully establish that the joint efforts of the United Nations and European Community haven't provided expected results so far. On the contrary, after few positive initial steps, a further progress was forestalled by the extreme elements of Serbian ethnicity in UNPA which had an encouragement and decisive political and material assistance of the Serbian (Yugoslav) powers in Belgrade.
Contrary to all expectations and hopes that we had, aggression against Croatia continues even after the international recognition of its independence and sovereignty and despite UNPROFOR's engagement, whose task was to secure the cease of armed fights, monitor the retreat of the Yugoslav Army, implement the disarmament of Serbian quasi-military irregular groups in UNPA, enable return of displaced persons and refugees in order to gradually bring legal order and power of the Republic of Croatia into those areas and in the so called "pink zones". The extreme Serbian elements, by receiving stimuli and continuous political and material support of powers in Belgrade and of Yugoslav Army and through their actions, almost completely disabled the Vance-Owen plan to be implemented. The Yugoslav Army keeps helping the rebellious individuals in manpower, war technique and equipment, including combat helicopters. A brutal terrorism still rules in 3 UNPA sectors (East, North and South) and murders, torching, destruction of houses, demolition of churches, killing of livestock and domestic animals occur daily and continuously. Helpless elderly who were being left in those areas especially suffer in those armed robberies. More than 600 Croatian citizens have been murdered before UNPROFOR came to those areas. Even some members of the so called "local police" are horrified at savagery of Serbian "special militias" which is also directed against "moderate" Serbs in those areas. Lately, one is trying to deteriorate modest results achieved so far in sector West by visits of Serbian extremists from Knin and Bosnia and Herzegovina who publicly speak they would establish a condition of cruel anarchy which is equal to those in other UNPA sectors.

It is very clear that the responsibility for non-implementing the peace plan undoubtedly lies with the "powers in Knin" which misused the trust, given to the "local powers" to implement the plan and which, in the contrary to it, created or maintained circumstances that enable anarchy and disorder, whereby they perfidiously used the presence of UNPROFOR and cease of armed conflicts in this area in order to realize their pretensions to "sovereignty and statehood", refusing to retreat and disarm their irregular troops according to 762 Resolution decision from 1992, with intentions to consolidate the usurped conditions.
All the aforementioned is confirmed by the report of the Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghalli, sent to the Security Council on 24 November 1992 (paragraph 24848). Reports of Special correspondent and other representatives of the United Nations

testify about disobeying the human rights and crimes that occur daily, on the basis of which the Third Committee of UN General Assembly made a 3 December 1992 resolution (A/C.4/47/L.79/Rev.1). That is the reason the European Community and the global public opinion are being more and more concerned, which is also and among others, supported by the joint statement of the Ministers of Foreign affaires of Balkan region states from last month's conference in Istanbul as well as the resolution of the 6th extraordinary session of Islamic conference dated early this month.

Taking into consideration that only initial part of the Vance-Owen plan was implemented, hence that the forces of the Yugoslav Army retreated from the area of the Republic of Croatia while everything else remained still, I find it is my obligation, Mr. President, to express my conviction, which is also a conviction of a certain number of world officials that more vigorous steps of the European Community are necessary to solve the existent crisis than the previous ones, especially those by the Security Council and United Nations.

Please allow me therefore, that I make a suggestion to the Security Council to do one thing that could stop this mad aggression which aims to conquer foreign ethnically "cleansed" territories. Those are efficient steps similar to those which were taken in case of an attack against Kuwait as well as in case of the present situation in Somalia. Therefore I suggest that the United Nations take the following measures in order to stop the war and create preconditions for a permanent peace in this area:

1. UNPROFOR should be given an authorization to realize its tasks within the frame of Vance-Owen plan when necessary and by use of force.
2. UNPROFOR, according to the Security Council Resolution 769 from 1992 should urgently introduce a strict regime of control over international borders of the Republic of Croatia towards Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to be able to prevent an uncontrolled movement of goods and population, especially the pass of armed units or delivery of armament and war equipment.
3. UNPROFOR should implement the disarmament of all Serbian para-military troops in UNPA and in the so called "pink zones" until 31 December 1992.
4. Return of displaced persons to the so called "pink zones" should be enabled until 31 December 1992.
5. Highway and railway traffic on direction Zagreb-Slavonski Brod-Lipovac should be enabled, being an integral part of communication from Europe towards the South-East Europe (Belgrade-Skopje-Athens-Istanbul) so that the existent blockade of the entire economic life of that area could be lifted until 31 December 1992.
6. Until 31 December 1992 the Croatian powers should be enabled to establish a temporary pontoon bridge across the gorge of Masleničko Ždrilo as well as to start with the construction of a new bridge and be able to finish it before the commencement of the tourist season of 1994.
7. Until 31 December 1992 the Croatian powers should be enabled to use the international airport of Zemunik (near Zadar) and Klis (near Osijek).
8. As soon as possible the Croatian powers should be enabled, with the assistance of UNPROFOR, to de-mine the dam of Peruča which would enable a normal work of the hydro plant and remove fear and uncertainty from a possible catastrophe with the population, located down from the dam.
9. A repair of the power-transmission line in UNPA North and South should be enabled which would secure the establishment of the entire power transmission system of Croatian Elektroprivreda which is very important for a general power supply in Croatia, especially concerning southern Dalmatia and UNPA sectors of North and South.

10. Opening of the railway and road communication Split-Knin-Karlovac-Zagreb and further towards Europe should be enabled until February 1993.
11. Under the supervision of UN observers and European Community, elections for the County Assembly of the Republic of Croatia should be enabled in UNPA as well as for the bodies of the local self-government in municipalities and districts, which was also requested by the Serbian National Party and the majority of the Serbian population in UNPA which opposes to the extreme policy of "imposed" leaders which removed the legally elected representative bodies;
12. in order to normalize the life in UNPA, one should urgently prevent a resumption of the Serbian extreme resistance towards Vance-Owen plan implementation, which is politically and materially supported by the Serbian powers in Belgrade and in Bosnia and Herzegovina; it is a precondition for establishment of administrative, social and health services functioning (post offices, banks and others) of the Republic of Croatia in those areas, supply of provisions, arrival of doctors and medical teams, as well as arrival of spiritual leaders of all religions in order to assist the population, being exposed to a terror of Serbian extremists and para-military troops.

The Republic of Croatia on its behalf obliges to provide an unconditional support and assistance to the implementation of Vance-Owen plan and the aforementioned requests. It will unconditionally protect the human rights as well as the rights of ethnical communities in UNPA based on its Constitution, Constitutional Law on Human rights and rights of ethnical minorities and all other Laws in its legal system, including the Law on Abolition.
The Republic of Croatia supports the efforts of the United Nations which establish the ad hoc international Tribunal for convicting the war crimes and investigating cases of committing the criminal acts against the international humanitarian law through the UN Commission for war crimes and on the basis of the 771 Security Council Resolution from 1992.

Eventually I want to convince you, Mr. President, that all efforts of the Croatian powers are directed towards creation of preconditions in order to terminate the crisis and cease of bloodshed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia as well as to establish a permanent peace in this part of Europe.
Mr. President, please accept my deepest respect" it says in the letter of the president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tuđman to the president of the UN Security Council.

HINA, December 11, 1992

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

Dr. Franjo Tuđman, President of the Republic of Croatia:
Decision on the recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state
(Zagreb, 7 April 1992) *

Mr.
Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ
President of the Presidency of
THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

It is with great honour that I inform you that in the capacity of the President of the Republic of Croatia, pursuant to Articles 94 and 99 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, and in keeping with the conclusion of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia of 27 March 1992 and the proposal of the Government of the Republic of Croatia of 6 April 1992, I have adopted the following

D E C I S I O N
on the recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state

1. The Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent state hereby recognizes the independence and sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia as Herzegovina as a union of its three constituent peoples.

   International recognition implies guarantees of the sovereign rights of the Croatian people as one of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. With this act of recognition we at the same time offer dual citizenship to members of the Croatian people who wish it, and propose that this issue be resolved by a bilateral agreement.

3. I propose that the governments of our countries begin talks as soon as possible on the establishment of diplomatic relations and comprehensive cooperation between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

In Zagreb, 7 April 1992

President of the Republic of Croatia
Dr. Franjo TUĐMAN

*Source: Photocopy of signed document is in author's archives.

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

Joint statement of the Ministers of foreign affairs of the EC on the recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bruxelles, 6 April 1992)*

"The Community and its member states decided to recognize the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as of 7th of April 1992. The implementation measures of this decision shall be taken by each state individually, according to the international practice.

The Community and its member states also decided that the privileges of the positive measures, similar to those, guaranteed to other republics on 2nd of December 1991 and on 10th of January 1992 should be expanded to the Republic of Serbia. The Presidency, Commission and the Chairman of the Conference on the former Yugoslavia have been asked to discuss the implementation conditions of the decision with the Serbian authorities, according to the principles agreed between the Community and its member states.

The Community and its member states are also familiar with the report of its Presidency, related to efforts to achieve the solution of other republic matter. They expect those efforts will soon display results."

*Source: Vjesnik, 7th April 1992

15.

CROATIAN AID TO MUSLIMS-BOSNIAKS IN BiH AND MUSLIM ARMY – A BiH



FACTS

COMMENT:

And now, my distinguished reader, here are magnificent, wonderful, beautiful, splendid and crystal clear evidence of criminal actions of political and military leadership of the Republic of Croatia against BiH, against Muslim-Bosniaks and against A BiH (Muslim army) in BiH.

It is a fact that Croatia is attacked, it is a fact that Croatia has four million inhabitants, it is a fact that Croatia is under embargo for purchase of weapons (brilliant, reasonable, just and humane decision by UN Security Council), it is a fact that one third of Croatian territory is occupied, and what about traffic, economy, tourism, … but nothing, not a thing, can stop "joint criminals" to act in the way substantiated by the following EVIDENCE (MINIMAL SELECTION OF EVIDENCE).

Because, they were conceiving and devising an action plan on how to achieve their goal – seize a piece of BiH, expel Muslims and all the rest that indictment claims.

There is no need for me to give you directions; you are smart and wise people, inclined above all to the truth, so PLEASE, YOU ARE WELCOME.

MY PREFACE (COMMENT) PUBLISHED EARLIER WITH THESE DOCUMENTS I LEAVE TO YOU AS THE EVIDENCE THAT JOINT CRIMINAL IS LYING.

Preface*

Never in the history of warfare, has one nation - (Croats) helped the other - (Bosniak-Muslims) so much– even when the latter turned their army - (BH Army) - against Croats - (HVO) – in BiH.

And the Croats were" led" by Dr. Franjo Tuđman, as they say in "authoritarian" way.

Never in the history of warfare, has a commander of one army (HVO) permitted convoys of weapons (and other things) of the other army (BH Army) to pass, even when that same army (BH Army) had used those same weapons (and other things) to attack those who gave the permission .

And convoys for BH Army included:

Weapons

Ammunition

Soldiers

Petrol

Raw materials

Food

Medications

Mujahedeen („humanitarian workers")

Etc.

Even when Croats were forced out of the municipalities, BH Army received almost all of its logistics from Croatia or through Croatia and through Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia.

Even when some units from BH Army and some members of that Army were killing Croats, civilians and captured members of HVO, this army (BH Army) received almost all of its logistics from Croatia or through Croatia and through Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia.

This kind of behavior was never before recorded in the history of warfare.
Everything has its measure, even war crimes.

The factual ratio of crimes in HVO and BH Army conflict is as follows:
1. At least seven times more Croatian civilians and members of HVO were killed by "some" members of BH Army, then Muslim-Bosniak civilians and captured members of BH Army were killed by members of HVO.
2. At least seven times more Croats for forced from their homes by BH Army then Muslim-Bosniaks were forced from their homes by HVO.
I really do not care about the fact that this data does not correspond to manufactured lies. This is or will become a problem of those who lied, those who kept the truth from being told?

You thought that I'm justifying crimes and revenge?
No, I'm only establishing material facts.

* *Excerpted from Slobodan Praljak's Book 1, Chapter II: "THE TRUTH ABOUT THE AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO MUSLIMS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (MUSLIM-BOSNIAK ARMY)", Zagreb, March 2014*

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

16.

AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IN ARMING BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ARMY



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
2092 (Of which 881 document with the quantified arming data for A BiH, with 3820 military items)

Excerpt from the table of quantified data regarding arming of A BiH TO /Territorial Defense/ from the Republic of Croatia

Category:	Category name:	Arms type:	Arms type name:	Full name:	Calibre:	Quantity:
2	Ammunition	5	Missile	Delivery note no.7	MINE RPG-7	2
1	Weapons	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.95	MINE TMA-3	3
1	Weapons	8	Landmine materials	Delivery note no.95	MINE TMRP-6	37
1	Weapons	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.95	MINE TMM-1	36
2	Ammunition	5	Missile	Delivery note no.95 (missile for multi-pipe missile launcher)	107 mm	200
2	Ammunition	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.24/93 (nitrocellulose)	Kilogram	11500
2	Ammunition	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.24/93 (acetone 95%)	Kilogram	5040
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.1	7,62*54 mm	1069200
1	Weapons	5	Missile	Delivery note no.1 (hand missile launcher)	RPG-7	84
3	Military equipment			Delivery note no.1 (battery)		476
1	Weapons	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.1 (stand for machine gun „MPG“)		9
1	Weapons	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.1 (rifle)	7,62*39 mm	28
1	Weapons	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.1 (rifle)	7,62*39 mm	20
1	Weapons	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.1 (light machine gun)	7,62*54 mm	10
3	Military equipment	7	Communication equipment	Delivery note no.1 (radio station)	PRC-25	20
1	Weapons	4	Antiaircraft	Delivery note no.1 (ANTI-AIRCRAFT cannon, 2-pipe)	23 mm	2
2	Ammunition	2	Artillery	Delivery note no.1 (gunpowder for howitzer 105 mm)	Kilogram	2850
2	Ammunition	2	Artillery	Delivery note no.1 (gunpowder for howitzer 105 mm)	Kilogram	7525
2	Ammunition	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.1 (plastic explosive)	Kilogram	6720
2	Ammunition	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.1 (TNT explosive)	Kilogram	36143
2	Ammunition	4	Antiaircraft	Delivery note no.1	23 mm	7056
2	Ammunition	2	Artillery	Delivery note no.1	MINE 120 mm	2102
1	Weapons	6	Anti-armour	Delivery note no.1/94 (training hand grenade)		33
2	Ammunition	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.10 (TNT explosive)	Kilogram	27965
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.10 (detonation plug 1/100)	TIP-1101	3500000
1	Weapons	5	Missile	Delivery note no.10 (launcher)	SPG-9	7
2	Ammunition	5	Missile	Delivery note no. 10	MINE RPG-7	696
2	Ammunition	5	Missile	Delivery note no.10	MINE SPG-9	1272
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.105	7,62*39 mm	1000000
2	Ammunition	5	Missile	Delivery note no.108	MINE RPG-7	40

2	Ammunition			Delivery note no.11 (black gunpowder no.1)	Kilogram	1275
2	Ammunition	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.3 (explosive „heksolit“)	Kilogram	6965
1	Weapons	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3 (light machine gun)	7,62*39 mm	140
2	Ammunition	5	Missile	Delivery note no.3	MINE RPG-7	5094
1	Weapons	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.3 (igniters)	UTU-M78	12
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3	7,62*39 mm	1394000
1	Weapons	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.3 (igniters)	PD M-572	700
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3 (cartridge cap (1) BERDAN)	7,62*39 mm	11200000
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3 (cartridge cap (6))		70000
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3 (cartridge cap (7))		70000
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3 (cartridge cap (8))		139776
3	Military equipment	5	Missile	Delivery note no.3 (missile laser scope)	TF-B ATEM	14
1	Weapons	5	Missile	Delivery note no.3 (launcher)		14
1	Weapons	5	Missile	Delivery note no.3 (stand for missile launcher)		14
2	Ammunition	2	Artillery	Delivery note no.3 (powder charger for bullets)	122 mm	3300
2	Ammunition	2	Artillery	Delivery note no.3 (powder charge for mines)	130 mm	300
2	Ammunition	5	Missile	Delivery note no.3 (missile)	SA-16 IGLA	14
1	Weapons	5	Missile	Delivery note no.3 (launcher)	SA-16 IGLA	3
3	Military equipment	5	Missile	Delivery note no.3 (power supply source for launcher)	SA-16 IGLA	40
1	Weapons	5	Missile	Delivery note no.3 (hand missile launcher)	RPG-7	112
2	Ammunition	4	Antiaircraft	Delivery note no.3	23 mm	14280
2	Ammunition	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.3 (TNT explosive)	Kilogram	49397
2	Ammunition	2	Artillery	Delivery note no.3	MINE 82 mm	100
2	Ammunition	2	Artillery	Delivery note no.3	MINE 60 mm	96
1	Weapons	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3 (automatic rifle „AK-47“)	7,62*39 mm	160
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3	7,62 mm	40600
1	Weapons	8	Mines and explosive materials	Delivery note no.3 (hand grenade)	M-91	2990
1	Weapons	4	Antiaircraft	Delivery note no.3 (ANTI-AIRCRAFT machine gun, 2-barrel)	14,5 mm	2
1	Weapons	4	Antiaircraft	Delivery note no.3 (ANTI-AIRCRAFT machine gun, 4-barrel)	14,5 mm	1
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3	7,9 mm	49400
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3	7,62 mm	9800
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3	7,62 mm	49000
2	Ammunition	1	Infantry	Delivery note no.3	7,9,mm	49400

Transport of weapons and military equipment for BH Army by aircrafts

Transport of weapons and military equipment for BH Army by helicopters

Transport of weapons and military equipment for BH Army by land from Split



BULLET, 12.7 mm	100000	60000	25000	15000
BULLET, 14.5 mm	50000	30000	12500	7500
BULLET, 82 mm BST	500	300	125	75
MISSILE, 107 mm	3000	1800	750	450
MISSILE, RPG-7	990	600	250	140

EQUIPMENT THAT WAS TRANSPORTED FOR THE PURPOSES OF BH ARMY /1. KRAJIŠKA BRIGADE AND HVO JAJCE / ARE LOCATED IN WAREHOUSES DRINOVCI AND GABELA SLoB/central logistic base/ GRUDE. CLASS 003-05/92-01/252, REFERENCE NUMBER 512-07-06/92-01/252, ORDER OF THE CROATIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, FROM 29th OCTOBER 1992.

1. BULLET 7,62 x 54 ..... 30000 pcs.
2. BULLET 12,7mm DŠK ..... 30000 pcs.
3. BULLET 14,5mm ..... 20000 pcs.
4. MISSILE 107 mm ..... 800 pcs.
5. MISSILE RPG-7 ..... 30000 pcs.
6. LASER RANGEFINDERS ..... 2 pcs.
7. L R L - 107 mm ..... 4 pcs.
8. MACHINE GUN, 14,5mm ANTI-AIRCRAFT .. 3 pcs.

ASSISTANT COMMANDER

FOR LOGISTICS

/Stamp: CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
-General Stuff-/

/ signed /
Ante Jelavić

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMED FORCES /OS/ SUPREME COMMAND STAFF /ŠVK/
RV AND PVO /Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence/ COMMAND

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
OFFICIAL SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly Confidential Number: 07/1600/93
Zagreb, 18 February 1993

TO: SUPREME COMMAND CHIEF OF STAFF
SARAJEVO

1. Two medium-sized Mi-8T transport helicopters were purchased for the needs of the BH Army. The helicopters were received in accordance with regular procedures and on 17 February 1993 our crews flew them to Visoko Airport where they were received by the Tuzla Air-Force Group and subsequently transferred to Tuzla Airport.

Since Tuzla Airport meets all material and personnel criteria required for regular operation I propose that the helicopters be stationed at Tuzla Airport.

Limited amounts of fuel and lubricants dictate that helicopters be used economically. It has therefore been regulated that their use can only be authorised by the Supreme Command Staff.

2. The purchase of two more Mi-8T helicopters is under way and should be completed by the end of this month. Owing to considerable obstructions and hindrances encountered in the process due to well-known reasons, exact delivery dates cannot be guaranteed with any degree of certainty.

I propose that, initially, these two helicopters also be stationed at Tuzla Airport.

3. The purchased AB-206 helicopter is undergoing repairs and should be ready soon. It will then be sent to you. The crew have completed training and are waiting for the flight.

4. Airlifts to the Bihać Krajina have been disrupted since 30 December 1992. We are doing everything in our power to reactivate them but are failing due to political reasons. Taking into consideration the information and reasons we have been given, I cannot tell you with certainty when this will be resolved.

The crews are undergoing a training programme to increase their level of flying competence and the results are very good.

5. I will remain at this location until the above has been carried out, after which I should immediately leave for Tuzla in order to organise the activities there.

COPY:
1. Files
2. Chief of ŠVK

CHIEF OF RV AND PVO ADMINISTRATION
Salko BEGIĆ
/signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Zagreb, Savska cesta 41/XI,
Phone: 041/537-161, 537-160, fax: 536-702
MILITARY DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Zagreb,

TO PROCUREMENT SERVICE

Our no.: 05-215/93

Your no.:

Subject: Request for procurement of combat materials for purposes of 5th Corps

In order to maintain positions and create conditions for the extension of offensive actions, it is necessary to immediately and urgently obtain and deliver the following items to the 5th Corps:

Nitro-glycerine powder NGP 0,51 ..... 1000 kg
NGP 0,21 ..... 1000 kg
NGP161 ..... 500 kg
NGP 261 ..... 5000 kg
Black powder of fine granulation up to 0.5 ..... 300 kg
Trinitrotoluene ..... 5000 kg
Mortar 120 mm ..... 20 pcs
Mines for mortar 120 mm ..... 800 pcs
Mine igniters for mortar 120 mm ..... 1000 pcs
Missiles LRC 107 mm ..... 300 pcs
Bullet for 100mm tank gun, tank T-55 current ..... 100 pcs
- //- armoured ..... 100 pcs
- // - cumulative ..... 100 pcs

Preferably large quantities of bullets for AP/PAP 7.62 mm and 7.9 mm for Mortar

When procuring, take into consideration listed sequence of demands indicating the urgency for procurement of gunpowder and mortar 120 mm.

Assistant military attaché for 5. Corps
/stamp: illegible/brigadier
Hajrudin Osmanagić
/signed/

NO. 4/92

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ARBiH
4th Corps Command
Number: 01-1398/93
Mostar February 26th 1993

Defence of the Republic
Military secret
Confidential
U R G E N T!

Delivers information
Response to the request.-

To the Headquarters of Military Command Operational Sector Republic of BiH
To: Sefer Halilović

Regarding your act nr. 14/75-14 from the February 25th 1993 we inform you on following:

1. Commander of the First Mostar Brigade did not introduce me to the information which he received from you. On my request for the mentioned information he replied that he received it from you and that it's for him only.
2. On the day of February 27th 1993 ARBiH 4th Corps Main Coordinator for the logistical security on the relation ARBiH 4th Corps and SDA Center at Zagreb (Hasan Čengić) delivered the documentation and he doesn't want to coordinate any longer because of the parallel distribution of the money by the VK headquarters.
   Mr Oručević Safet successfully performed major jobs for us until now regarding the entrance of the goods with HVO.
3. Please, you did not answer me in writing regarding my conversation to you about the behavior of the 1st Mostar Brigade Commander.
4. Regarding your act 02/16-104 from February 24th 1993 I inform you that the President of the regional committee for Herzegovina Mr. Zijo Demirović publicly stated that the military leaders are engaged in politics and that applies to the 1st Mostar Brigade Commander who is publicly saying that he received a power from Sarajevo (ARBiH Headquarters and Government) for

the organization of the administration and the economy at the Mostar territory.

I am of the opinion that you should clear up the situation and inform us in writing what is behind the Mr. Hujdur Midhat's visit as a 1st Mostar Brigade Commander which he performed at the ARBiH Headquarters and BiH Government.

Commanders of the 7th Brigade "Suad Alić", Brigade "Neretvica" and Brigade "Neretva" are already expressing disapproval regarding the presentation of medal "Zlatni Ljiljan*" and awarding the money to the 1st Mostar Brigade.

Commander
Mr Arif Pasalić
/Signed/

/Round seal/

* Zlatni Ljiljan – Golden Lily / most prominent military medal for the accomplishments at the defence of BiH.

Date, 22nd March 1993 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

ŠVK R BiH Armed Forces – Sarajevo

To the attention of

Chief of ŠVK R BiH Armed Forces Sefer Halilović

I am sending a proposal for unloading of MTS which will depart from Zagreb tomorrow (maybe). Total quantity of MTS is reduced for 25%, portion which should be taken by Croatia or in Grude.

Upon arrival, the resources for Tuzla would be partially returned to Visoko for distribution among 3rd Corps and other formations.

This would be done in cooperation with Hazim and resources in Pazarić would be distributed among 1st and 8th Corps (based on the agreement).

Type of MTS (Materials and equipment)	TOTAL	PAZARIĆ	2ND CORPS TUZLA
RPG – 7	75	25	50
Mine for RPG – 7	7500	2000	5500
Laser distance finder	38	10	28
Launcher for S-2M	9	3	6
Rocket S-2M	50	15	35
Launcher TF-8	8	3	5
Device for control of launcher	3	1	2
Rocket TF-8	190	50	140
Round 7,63 x 39	750.000	250.000	500.000
Automatic rifle	75	75	
Round 12,7 DSSK	30.000	10.000	20.000
Mine PMA-1	1500	300	1200

Possible purchase 4.000.000 round 7,62 x 39 * 25% = distribution 1.000.000 Pazarić + 2.000.000 Tuzla.

RD/HA/HH

Commandant

Rasim Delić

/round seal of Croatian State Archive/

Requisition slip number 288 Date: 30 March 1993

Goods delivered : 0000 SPECIAL PURPOSES
From the warehouse : 20 VP /Military Post/ 1085/14 Zagreb - Duboki Jarak, Zagreb

No.	Code	G O O D S	Unit	Authorised	Issued
1	/?381/	Shaped charge shells for RPG-7 launcher	pcs	240.0	240 ✓
2	966	9K14 M-K *Maljutka* rockets	pcs	50.0	50 ✓

Order - Authorisation : 512 - 21 - 02 - 93 - 473 Date : 30 March 1993
NOTE: The equipment will be collected by Mr Šuajb ŠETA.
The equipment is meant for the Grude CPoB /Central Logistics Base/
/stamped/

GOODS RECEIVED BY:	ISSUED BY:	CHECKED BY:	RECORDED BY:
S/illegible/r LOKVANČIĆ	Mirsad MALAGIĆ	/a signature/	/a signature/
7310/89 Ilidža	/signed/		
/signed/			

/stamp: The Republic of Croatia, /?Ministry of Defence/ /illegible//
/initialled/

www.slobodanpraljak.com

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CROATIA /RH/
CONFIDENTIAL
COPY _____

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE /MORH/
CROATIAN ARMY /HV/ MAIN STAFF
COMBAT ARMS ADMINISTRATION

CLASS: 213-01/93-02/04
NUMBER: 512-06-04-93-87

Zagreb, 5 March 1993

Subject: Order to issue MTS /material and technical equipment/

To: Maintenance and Transport Administration, MORH

Immediately issue the following MTS for the Grude Logistics Base:

- 7.62 x 39 mm bullets, ordinary	100,000
- 152 mm rounds, TFG /contact-fuse shell/ and p/p /expansion unknown/ for M43 gun	2,012

BI/ČG
Done in 2 (two) copies
Sent to:
- Addressee
- Archives

Chief
Major General
Ivan BASARAC
/signed and stamped/

/handwritten:
5 March 1993, 1710 hours
Verbal order by Mrs ŠIPRAK and Mr PRIBIĆ that 1,000 be issued. Items?
/initialled//

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BH ARMY
ZAGREB LOGISTICS CENTRE
Zagreb, 6 March 1993

THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Colonel Vladimir ZAGORAC, attn.

Dear Sir,

We are sending you the list of trucks and drivers who will collect the following material and technical equipment /MTS/:

1. 100,000 bullets, 7.62 x 39 mm
2. 1,000 x 152 mm shells (howitzer)

Metković border crossing.
Materiel and technical equipment under item number one will be delivered to Pazarić and under item number two to meet the needs of the 1st and 2nd BH Army Corps and the 106th and 107th HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ units.
Mr Šuajb ŠETA from Sarajevo will be in charge of collecting the MTS, and Mr Emir BEŠLAGIĆ from Visoko and Mr Galib MULIĆ, ID number 600/91, from Gradačac for escorting the convoy.
List of trucks:

1. Driver: Enver FEJZIĆ, ID number 9850/89, Zenica
   Vehicle: Truck, registration ZE 113-758/82-72 ZE.

2. Driver: Emin DŽINIĆ, ID number 698/83, Žepče
   Vehicle: truck, ZE 873-15/85-31 ZE.

3. Driver: Munib ALISPAHIĆ, ID number 167/91, Busovača
   Vehicle: Truck, registration ZE 847-05/20-98 ZE.

4. Driver: Stipo BLAŽEVIĆ, ID number 803/89, Busovača
   Vehicle: Truck, ZE 846-02/85-32 ZE.

5. Driver: Bedrudin OMERAGIĆ, ID number 1689/91, Gradačac
   Vehicle: Truck, registration MD 413-60.

6. /handwritten: Driver: Sulejman KALAJDŽIĆ, ID number 3539/87, Sarajevo
   Vehicle: Mercedes truck, registration DAH 571E, trailer registration DAH 569E.

Thank you for your assistance,
Regards,

BH ARMY
ZAGREB LOGISTICS CENTRE
Co-ordinator
Azim KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ

17.

FORMATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ARMY TROOPS ON CROATIAN TERRITORY



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
158

www.slobodanpraljak.com

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
SARAJEVO
Number:
Sarajevo, 2 June 1992 FAX 041/451-226

To: General STIPETIĆ

Citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina who are residing in the Republic of Croatia have informed us that organised activities are under way to form units that would join the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In connection with this, we ask for your help in receiving these men at the *Borongaj* barracks in Zagreb (there are 300 men from Rijeka, 300 from Ljubljana and around 5,500 from Germany). These men should rally at the *Borongaj* barracks and be provided with uniforms and prepared for movement to Bosnia and Herzegovina by Saturday (6 June 1992).

The men who have already rallied in Zagreb have made a request for the units to be manned with military personnel. As we are unable to transfer men from Sarajevo to Zagreb, we ask you, if you can, to man this unit with 10 officers, if possible those who were born in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (because of their familiarity with the territory).

Thank you for your cooperation.

MINISTER
Jerko DOKO
/signed and stamped/

/circled number 283/
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HEZEGOVINA
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
SARAJEVO
Strictly confidential no.: 02/1445-1
Sarajevo, 18. December 1992

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
OFFICIAL SECRET
Strictly confidential

To the Command of the 3rd Corps OS RBiH
ZENICA

In relation to your 17th December 1992 letter no. 05/233-1, referring to the engagement of a certain number of seniors, being part of the Croatian Army, having expressed their wish to join the OS RBiH, our stand is as follows:

1. The offer should be accepted, if this act does not disturb the relationship with the OS R Croatia.
2. The invitations of the seniors should be carried out by you.
3. After the arrival of the seniors and conducted interview, please submit a proposal for adequate duty appointment.

/Illegible/

handwritten

/for the/ CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE OS RBiH
Sefer Halilovic
/stamped and signed/

Made and delivered in one copy:

1. To the Command of 3rd Corps, by modem
2. To the archive

/handwritten:/
CV ŠVK RBiH
Department KE
Delivered 01 04
19 December 1992
/signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMED FORCES OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
COMMISSION FOR CROATIA - ZAGREB

Number:___8/92__
Date: __3 August 1992__
/stamped/

S U B J E C T : AUTHORIZATION

Mr Nijaz HADŽIOSMANAGIĆ from Zagreb is hereby authorized by the *Handžar* Division - Lukavica 2nd Forward Squad, to collect, with full material and legal responsibility, military and medical equipment on its behalf.

C O M M A N D E R
Logistics Service
Tasim KRČEVIĆ
/signed and stamped/

O P E R A T I O N S O F F I C E R
Nijaz HADŽIOSMANAGIĆ-TADIĆ
/signed/

/Handwritten document/
Plešivica: Tuesday, 22 September 1992

RECORD

MTS /material and technical equipment/ - left over after a group from Slovenia (165) visited – A group staying in Plešivica between 8 September and 22 September 1992

1. 60-mm MB /mortar/ - 4, and 8 cases of charges
2. M53 PM /light machine-gun/ - 15 (3)
3. PAP /semi-automatic rifle/ - 47
4. AP /automatic rifle/ - 78
5. *Zolja* /hand-held rocket launcher/ - 32 (2)
6. Makarov pistol – 40
7. RB /?hand-held launcher/ - 2, and 18 shells
8. BR /?rocket launcher/ - 450 (50)
9. 7.62-mm ammunition - 18,000
10. 7.9-mm ammunition – 20,000
11. pistol ammunition – 1,200
12. Binoculars – 3
13. Magnetic compass – three

/Written sideways on page:/
Note: This MTS was transferred from Plešivica to Lučko, escorted by VP /military policeman/ Jasko in a Borongaj HV /Croatian Army/ lorry. For VP Jasko's service, and in the presence of Aladin, 1,000 ATS Austrian schillings/ were given(four /unclear/).

The weapons listed under nos. 1-13 were handed over by Safet HOZANOVIĆ and taken over by Silvija MITREČIĆ-PALIĆ. The handover was witnessed by Safet PAJALIĆ, Meho HUSETIĆ, Emin TATAREVIĆ and Muhamed ALIĆ.

Handed over by:
Safet HOZANOVIĆ

Taken over by:
Silvija MITREČIĆ-PALIĆ

Witnesses:
/four signatures/

PS The weapons listed under nos. 1-13 will be transferred to a warehouse, and it is the responsibility of Nijaz BIBANOVIĆ and Senad PALIĆ to transfer the weapons to the Bihać regional headquarters, to Commander Hajrudin OSMANAGIĆ. Safet HOZANOVIĆ, Silvija MITREČIĆ-PALIĆ and the aforementioned witnesses have been notified of this. Also inform Mr Vinko TONDINI.

BH Army officers from HV with emoluments

4th January 1993

05-6/93

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

ZAGREB

Military delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia expresses its high appreciation to Croatian Ministry of Defence and is requesting, in order to achieve better professional services, organization and greater efficiency in the fight against Serbo-Chetnik aggressor, and for the purposes of Armed forces of BiH Republic, to allow the engagement of the following HV officers:

- AVDIĆ ISMET, Colonel who works in the area of Rijeka - Gospić
- AHMET PUŠKAR, Major of the Western brigade in Dubrovnik
- Dr. RAKANOVIĆ SADIK, Colonel who works in the military hospital in Split.

Please solve the status of these officers as before, by freezing (to have all emoluments as HV officers), and upon completion of the tasks enable their further engagement in HV.

Thank you in advance.

Sincerely!

SECRETARY FOR MILITARY AFFAIRS IN
THE OFFICE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
/signed/
Colonel Hassan EFENDIĆ

Number / 1810/92
Date; 29 October 1992

Pursuant to decision of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the proclamation of general mobilization, herewith I

ORDER

Driver Agović Fahro from Hrasnica, shall, by bus of «Centrotrans», Sarajevo enterprise, registration plates SA 279-597, transport soldiers, according to Armed forces of HV command, under the command of Dedić Senad, member of the HV for the Republic BiH, Ministry of Defence of the Main Staff of Armed forces-Special unit, to the hotel «FAMOS», Igman, as follows:

1. Blagajčević Muhamed
2. Dog Đina, property of Blagajčević Muhamed
3. Ljubijanac Mehmed
4. Ramić Husein
5. Midža Kasim
6. Dadić Senad
7. Crnkić Hajrudin
8. Čelenka Atif
9. Blagajčević Esad
10. Konjić Damir
11. Christopher James Watkins
12. Kaltak Samir
13. Šahinović Samir
14. Osman Sabre
15. Plamen Končev Penev
16. Kesađić Enver

Military Attaché of the R BiH in the
Republic of Croatia
Hasan Efendić
/signed and stamped/

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/The Croatian coat of arms/

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ZAGREB

CHIEF INSPECTOR OF DEFENCE

Class: 822

Ref.No. 512-10-92-01

Zagreb, 7th April 1992

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Attn: Mr. G. Šušak
Minister

The emergent situation in BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ demands of us, apart from the measures already undertaken, additional measures. The Serbian aggressor and its aggressive politics on the Balkans should finally be annihilated on the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I toured the OZ /Operational Zone/ Rijeka, where I was given an insight into the possible assistance in the fight of the Croats and Muslims in BiH. The Rijeka OZ can set aside around 1,200 of its soldiers, mainly Muslims and Croats from BiH, who are willing to be recruited within one volunteer brigade and set out for BiH.

I am in agreement with the above and I ask of you to enable the realization of this idea in the way that this group, with all the military gear, arms and munitions, under the command of Major Mustafa Porobić and other officers sets out by an appropriate route to assist in the fight of Muslims and Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Likewise, I ask that the families of these volunteers (they are mostly permanently resident in the Rijeka area) continue to receive monthly financial support from the Croatian Army.

For the front which the OZ Rijeka keeps, the dispatch of this number of soldiers-volunteers doesn't represent a particular difficulty, especially in the light of the arrival of the units of UNPROFOR.

Major Mustafa Porobić is the organizer of this idea and he works in the Headquarters of OZ Rijeka. He is a very professional and dedicated officer.

This issue is one of urgency. I warmly recommend the realization of this idea. I am prepared to help on my own part.

Respectfully yours,

CHIEF INSPECTOR OF DEFENCE
General M. Špegelj
/signed/

/Round seal: Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, Chief Inspectorate of Defence, Zagreb/

P.S. I kindly ask you to include in the assessment and realization of this idea also other sectors of the Ministry of Defence and the Headquarters.

Republic of Croatia
Ministry of Defence
General Headquarters HV

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

ENCRYPTED

Class: 8/92-01/23
Office registry no: 5120-03-92-9
Zagreb, 9 April 1992

OZ Rijeka

Attn: commander

The request of the Chief inspector of the defence, General Martin Špegelj, for sending a part of the soldiers and officers of OZ Rijeka, mainly Croats and Muslims ready to voluntarily go to BiH to help the struggle of the people of BiH, has been accepted by the top ranking military authorities.

The General Headquarters of Croatian Army concurs and supports this idea, with a suggestion that this group, for a start, numbers 300 - 400 soldiers and officers.

They are to be sent under the command of Major Porobić Mustafa and other officers, with different military equipment, weaponry and ammunition.

All who go retain all the rights of HV soldiers, including monthly salaries. They cannot wear HV insignia on their uniforms, nor can they hold other documents used by members of HV.

The task is an urgent one, and the execution of it is to be commenced immediately. Should the situation develop favourably, sending of other groups, ie reinforcement of this one, is not to be excluded.

Enclosure:

The request of the Chief inspector of the Defence

Deputy Chief of Staff of
General HQ of HV for combat sector
Major General Petar Stipetić

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
MAIN STAFF OF HV (Croatian Army)

URGENT
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Class: 8/92-01/23
No: 5120-03-92-8
Zagreb, 8th of April 1992

OZ SPLIT (Operative zone)

Re: your act, class 81/92-02/56, no: 1080-01-92-1 dated 8th of April 1992

The formation systems of the Croatian Army are not valid outside of the territory of the Republic of Croatia. The departure of volunteers, organized in adequate units, is granted. The men cannot carry the HV insignias or any other documents.
Providing all kind of material help is allowed, as well as the expert help in defence organization and other kinds of resistance. The arrival of men from other Croatian Army compositions, therefore the said ones should be collected in the rayon of Imotski and engaged according to the plan of the operative group.

Deputy of the Head of
The Main Staff of HV for the
Combat sector
General-major
Petar Stipetić
/signed and stamped/

CODED

/stamp of receipt/
Received on 8th of April 1992 at 16:10 hours /signed/
523(number of telegram) 200(number of group) pp (urgency) 31(processing)
Submitted on 8th of April 1992 at 16:40 hours /signed/

Response concept of HVO to the Decision dated April 9th, 1992

The Presidency and Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the "Decision on unification of all armed forces in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (April 9th, 1992) with the aim of all armed groups in the country brought under a unified command of the relevant government authority or TO (Territorial defense) Headquarters of BiH.

HVO, in principle, agrees with this decision, but insists on the respect for international and internal circumstances regarding its implementation.

Internally HVO is a form of self-organization of the Croatian and Muslim population in the territory of the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna municipalities, as a form of defense against aggression and genocide that is carried out by the so-called Chetnik formations supported by JNA against Croats and Muslims.

HVO is organized as the only possible response to terrorism, massacres, expulsion (over 130,000 people), burned and destroyed villages (Ravno, Zlosela, Kupres); HVO defends Croats, Muslims and other citizens on the territory of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna municipalities.

HVO is committed to peaceful coexistence of all residents in the area and did not attack or take any conquest actions. HVO protect the entire population of HZOHB (Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna municipalities) regardless of their nationality and religion, the evidence of which is the fact that no one has fled from this area under duress.

With all of its activity HVO proves that it supports an independent and sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, consisting of three sovereign nations.

The European Community and many other countries have recognized the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state of three sovereign nations. What's more, at a conference in Brussels it was agreed that the sovereign people of BiH have their own governments and defense forces.

Bearing in mind the causes which led to the formation of the HVO, and respecting the international agreements on the structure of BiH, it is completely unacceptable to abolish HVO and to completely merge it within TO; This is contrary to the interests of the Croatian people and the agreement on Bosnia as a state of three sovereign nations.

From all this it follows that the formation of the HVO is legitimate form of territorial defense of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna municipalities, and only as such formation under the command of General Headquarters of the HVO, can they enter into the composition of the defense forces of a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. On these principles, we suggest further agreements on consolidation and organization of defense of our common state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
MUNICIPAL STAFF MOSTAR

Ref. No. 01-286/1099/92
Mostar, 21 August 1992

MILITARY SECRET
strictly confidential

ORDER

Officers and soldiers of the Croatian army (currently engaged in the HVO Mostar) are to report to the Municipal HVO Staff Mostar in order to return equipment, weapons, radio communication and other Material and technical Equipment they were issued by the HVO Mostar and in order to be sent to their original units in the HV.

NOTE:
Issuance of all external documents for soldiers from the HV is prohibited.

The order is to be carried out by 23 August 1992.

COMMANDER
Brigadier:
/Signature/
(Miljenko Lasić)

cc:
- commanders of all units
- archive

/Seal/ /Seal/

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
IPD MANAGEMENT

/handwritten annex 2/

CLASS: 804-04/92-02
NUMBER: 5120-25-92-593/B
ZAGREB, 31 AUGUST 1992

Command of the operative zone /OZ/ OSIJEK
Command of the operative zone BJELOVAR

Subject: Instructions for operations of the commands of the Croatian Army /HV/ troops and the military-judicial bodies

Regarding your query on implementation of the criminal responsibility of the HV combatants on disobedience of the order execution, class: 035-01/92-01/01, number: 1076-01-92.37, dated 22 August 1992, we submit you our opinion (instructions) on operation of the military-judicial bodies and the commands of the HV troops. We are in accordance with your estimation that the Republic of Croatia has got every interests in Bosnian Posavina, as temporally, so in the future.
The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia is aware of the fact that you have got many problems regarding the departures of HV troops to the Bosnian Posavina. Other operative zones encounter the similar problems.
Understanding the fact that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a foreign state as a starting point, being confirmed by the Minister of Defence through the public statement related to HV, we recommend you to avoid the repressive measures.
At the same time, it is necessary to continuously emphasize that the Republic of Croatia and its suzerainty is also being defended in Bosnia and Herzegovina zones, populated by the Croats that should be protected from the Chetnick genocide in the same manner they defended the Republic of Croatia.

Try to solve the above cited problems in ways that wouldn't lead to a misunderstanding. Having in consideration the soldiers resistance to leave to Bosnia and Herzegovina, as far as the Bosnian Posavina is concerned, we advise you to send the volunteers or to discuss the issue within the troops by conducting a survey among soldiers and research who is willing to go to Bosnian Posavina under the conditions of a contract. The contract could solve all status issues of a soldier. The contract could be signed by the soldiers at 3 or 6 months period, within which they would have a status of a professional soldier. Regarding this matter, it is most urgent to regulate it by decision of the personnel department.

Assistant of Minister of Defence
General Major
Slobodan Praljak

Submitted to:
- Minister of Defence
Mr. Gojko Šušak

/stamp of receipt mostly illegible
recorded
handed over/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

/coat of arms/ CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA

CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ MAIN STAFF /GS/ DEFENCE

Number: 02-2/1-01-1679/93 MILITARY SECRET

Mostar, 4 August 1993 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

RE: Accommodation of volunteers from the RH /Republic of Croatia/

Personally to: Colonel Ivica PRIMORAC

3rd Brigade – for information

I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. Colonel PRIMORAC shall organise the reception and accommodation of volunteers' formations from the RH, as well as the logistical support.
2. All the newly-arrived volunteers' formations shall be accommodated in the barracks at Heliodrom. The formations that have arrived so far are: Brigadier J. MILIČEVIĆ's (90 /men/) and Major I. MANDIĆ's (114), while the arrival of a formation from Brod (between 200 and 250 /men/) is still expected.
3. The HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ GS /General Staff/ shall determine the combat use of these volunteers' units.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE HVO GS

/signed/

Major General

Stanko MATIĆ

/stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

[redacted]

MOSTAR MUNICIPAL HEADQUARTERS

3rd HVO BRIGADE
Conf. number: 02-01-11/92
Mostar, 9 December 1992

DEFENCE
MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

In regards to the strictly confidential order concerning south-eastern Herzegovina Operative Zone no. 01-286/1514 of 27 November 1992 regarding various insignia and symbols on HVO unit uniforms worn as opposed to the symbols stipulated by the Decree on Herceg-Bosna Armed Forces which, as such, compromise the reputation of HVO and HV members by implying ideas which the world media may interpret as fascistic, I hereby

O R D E R

1. Commanders of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna HVO to ensure that unit members wear only HVO insignia and remove all other emblems.

2. commanders to point out to the individuals that wearing such emblems compromises the reputation of the HVO in the world.

3. Wearing HVO insignia is linked to accusations against the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna regarding a direct deployment of HV units in the territory of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. Ask HV members (with explanation) to wear HVO insignia during their deployment in our area.

4. that the Brigade Command make a special effort to ensure HVO emblems in sufficient quantity. However, should there be a shortage of emblems, members may wear uniforms without any insignia.

5. /missing/

6. that only unit commanders make contact with UNPROFOR and EC members and provide information following the approval by the HVO Main Headquarters of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.

Battalion and independent company commanders shall be responsible to me for implementation of this order.

COPIES TO:

- 6th Široki Brijeg Battalion
- Tihomir MIŠIĆ 4th Battalion
- 9th Battalion
- 8th Battalion
- 7th Battalion
- Buna Independent Company
- MTD /Motorised Division/
- Engineering Company
- Logistics Company
- Security Service
- Files

COMMANDER OF THE
3RD HVO BRIGADE

Mr. Ivan PRIMORAC
/signed/

/stamp: Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, Mostar, 3rd Brigade, Defence Office/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

Ref. Num: 02-2/1-01-1522-/ 93
Mostar, July 24, 1993

Record Stamp:

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN COUNCIL OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
MOSTAR
Received on: July 24, 1993
Receipt Record Num: 02-1/2-622/93

General FRANCIS BRIQUEMONT
UNPROFOR Commander
for Bosnia and Herzegovina
K I S E L J A K

Dear General,

I feel free to bring to your attention some important facts regarding the assessment of the spokesman of Your Command, Mr. Barry Frower, about alleged presence of the Army of Republic of Croatia (HV) in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the units of Croatian Council of Defense (HVO) are trying to stop the offensive of Muslim forces.

Yesterday, on July 23, at regular press conference in Zagreb, Miss Shannon Boyd, the spokeswoman of the Command of UNPROFOR for ex-Yugoslavia, made a comment regarding the above-said statement of Mr. Frower, and I quote:
'We surely would not confirm something like that before we get absolutely specific reports made out of many different reports and from many different UNPROFOR sources, and not from just a few of them. Chief Commander is very cautious before saying something as significant as that. We keep following up on that with lot of interest, but it is not always easy to make a judgment. I am sure you understand the UNPROFOR's need for caution with that kind of events…' [End of quote]

Two days ago Republic of Croatia Department of Defense issued a special statement in which it completely denied allegations of Reuter agency, based on statement made by the spokesman of Your Command, on the alleged engagement of the armed forces of Croatia in the territory of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH).

British radio (BBC) broadcasted two days ago an extensive interview with well known military expert, Mr. Jan Visnar, regarding this issue. According to Mr. Visnar our armed forces (HVO) posses sufficient potential for conducting defensive war, and there is absolutely no need for additional engagement of HV. With no reflect as to the accuracy of numbers presented by Mr. Visnar, as a commander of HVO forces, I agree with his general assessment on adequacy of our forces when it comes to effective combat against any aggressor on areas with autochthonous Croatian people in BiH.

I would take this opportunity to warn You about one possible confusion, which is however very often (depending on the conditions in the battle field, political or propaganda conditions of Muslim side in the first place) deliberately not recognized or is intentionally stated in the form of accusations on part of the Republic of Croatia.

Namely, during the Homeland war of Republic Croatia against Serbian aggressor, a large number of Croatians from BiH participated as volunteers, especially those from West Herzegovina. These numbers are estimated to count several thousands of people. After the same aggressor commenced aggression here, and with the lower intensity of combat activities in

Republic of Croatia, these men gradually returned to their native homes and joined HVO units. This process especially intensified since the beginning of Muslim aggression against Croatian areas. So, yes these men were soldiers of armed forces of Croatia, but they are now joining units of Croatian Council of Defense, as an organizer and bearer of the defense of Croatian settlements, their homes and overall survival of Croatians in BiH. Please have this in Your mind, because incorrect presentation of this fact does not only inflict harm to Croatian Council of Defense and Republic of Croatia, but also to those ones who state or interpret these facts in a non-detailed context.

Mr. General,

I hope that you understand our need to jointly correct the effects imposed by statements of Your spokesman, Mr. Frower, regarding the accusations against Republic of Croatia for the alleged participation in the territory of another, sovereign state, in this case RBiH. Multiplication of this incorrect assessments (or mistakes, whichever it is) in media definitely aggravates already complex enough context of further peace negotiations in Geneva.

That is why I kindly ask you to, in accordance to your authorizations, judge these our remarks and check those facts, and then take appropriate measures.

I will use this opportunity to wish you a successful mandate in a very responsible military position of a Commander of UN Peace Forces for BiH. I would personally be very happy if I could share along with you, and for the benefit of all people in BiH who have already suffered enough, the joy of peace that is to be achieved in these areas.

Respectfully yours,

Signee:
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF HVO
Major General, MILIVOJ PETKOVIC

Stamp: **REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
- COAT OF ARMS -
2
MOSTAR
GENERAL STAFF
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

CO:
"SPABAT" Medjugorje

/coat of arms/

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT FOR COOPERATION
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Zagreb, Mesnička 23
Phone; (01) 63 03 044
Fax; (01) 63 03 862

Class: 018-04/06-909
Number: 514-09-01-06-892
Zagreb, 9th of June, 2006

Subject: Mr. Slobodan Praljak, Accused before the ICTY
- information delivery

Dear Mr. Kovačić,

Related to General Praljak's Defence letter, dated 20th of May 2006, regarding the participation of persons in compositions of ZNG (National Guard), HV (Croatian Army) and MUP RH (Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia), born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we inform you as follows:

1. In the MUP RH, till 15th of January 1992, there were 2246 members, born in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. 320 members of MUP RH, born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, participated in defence of Dubrovnik; nine of them got killed at Dubrovnik battle field.

We also inform you that we are still in expectation of further notifications, as requested by the above said Defence letter.

Sincerely yours
MT

Assistant of Minister
mr.sc. Jakša Muljačić
/signed/

LIST OF SPECIAL UNIT POLICEMEN COMPOSED FROM EX-ATTENDANTS OF THE VI. CLASS COURSE WHO FILED A REQUEST FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

1. MUHAREMOVIĆ SENAD
2. POCRNJA JOSIP
3. PURIVATRA MUJO
4. KOŠAK ZORAN
5. ZIRDUM ZDRAVKO
6. ĐAKOVIĆ STJEPAN
7. GAVRAN DAMIR
8. VIDOVIĆ PEŠO
9. ALIBEGIĆ IBRO
10. ĐAKOVIĆ IVICA
11. VIDOVIĆ BRANKO
12. JAJČEVIĆ ANTO
13. JAKOVLJEVIĆ MARKO
14. ĐAKOVIĆ BLAŽAN
15. DUJMIĆ IVAN
16. KAREŠIK NUSRED
17. KASALO IVICA
18. HNJKAŠ GORAN
19. TRUMIĆ MIRALEM
20. KOLČAKOVIĆ RAMIZ
21. RASPUDIĆ VLADO
22. RAJIĆ MILENKO
23. BABIĆ ANĐELKO
24. SULJIĆ MIRZO
25. TALETOVIĆ ZIJAD
26. SALKIĆ RUSMIR
27. BEDROVIĆ HASAN
28. ZEKO HRVOJE
29. ŠUVAKIĆ HUSEIN
30. HAJDAREVIĆ KIRAM
31. MIJATOVIĆ MATO
32.MAHMUTOVIĆ ADEM
33. VUK PILE
34. JANIĆ MUJO
35. ŠEKLJA IVAN
36. OKIĆ SAKIB
37. HALILOVIĆ NEVZES
38. NUKIĆ MEHMED
39. MEŠAH AHMET
40. KOŠIĆ RIFET
41. IŠERIĆ NIJAZ
42. DELIĆ EKREM

CRISIS STAFF FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA /BH/
Strictly confidential
Split, Tolstojeva street 28

Number: 02-290/92
Split, 18 October 1992

REPORT
On the work of the Crisis Staff for BH – Split
Between 6 April until 18 October 1992

The Crisis Staff for BH – Split was established as part of the Split branch of the Party of Democratic Action /SDA/ of Croatia, on 6 April 1992, on the day enemy aggression against BH began. From 29 September 1992 onwards, following a decision of the Main Committee of the Crisis Staff for BH – Split, the Crisis Staff was working independently of the SDA, i.e. the Split branch of the SDA, as a result of a non-statutory assembly session which was attended by only 6% of Split SDA branch members.

Very brisk activity in the following sectors ensued immediately after the BH – Split Crisis Staff was established, mobilizing volunteers, Muslims and Croats born in BH and starting a record of their details, equipping and sending them to battlefields throughout the Republic of BH, collecting humanitarian aid, technical equipment and materiel and other kinds of aid for BH, organising a reserve communications system oriented toward BH and laying the basis for logistics support for several municipalities in BH and coordinating this support from within the zone of Split. Activities also included coordinating medical and humanitarian aid, encouraging the international public to help BH, dismantling the information blockade of BH and launching the war information service "Republic of BH", establishing the *Merhamet* MDD /Muslim Charitable Society/ and cooperation with all domestic and international humanitarian organizations, cooperation with the IVZ /Islamic Religious Community/ on religious and educational mztters; cooperation with social and political organizations and parties of the Republic of Croatian through the Split branch of the SDA; cooperation with military and civil authorities in Split and in the Republic of Croatia; reception and housing of refugees in cooperation with the Regional Social Welfare Office and reception of refugees and displaced persons; cooperation with foreign and Croatian news services.

1.

Military issues – Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The organisation of calling and receiving volunteers, Muslims and Croats who were born in BH, with the help of all mass media (Radio Split, TV Marijan, *Slobodna Dalmacija* and others) started immediately once the Crisis Staff for BH was established. The help of the 6th Split Operations Zone was significant during these activities. Precise records, lists and documents of volunteers were kept. The plan and programme of the Crisis Staff were drafted and approved by the military and civil authorities of the town of Split and the Republic of Croatia. Close communication was established which is still in place to date.

By 18 April 1992, the 1st Split independent company had been established as the first military formation to help the BH Armed Forces. It was despatched to the areas of Livno and Tomislavgrad on the same day, consisting of 81 volunteer and eight officers. They were transferred in three phases. The 6th Split Operations Zone lent its direct support in establishing the company, supplying it with arms, ammunition, military outfits and daily rations.

Logistics, lead by Mr. Muhamed MUHAREMOVI], and a medical board first lead by Dr. Džemal HOZO and later by Dr. Omer STUPAC were established as part of the work of the KVŠ / Military Crisis Staff/.

Following the departure of the 1st Split Company all volunteers and later on the conscripts who had signed up were recorded and registered in proper lists and sent to the following units according to their own wishes: OS /Armed Forces/ BH and OS of the Republic of Croatia:

- OS BH, Visoko volunteers' admission camp – 142 volunteers;
- OS BH, Livno – Tomislavgrad – 89 volunteers;
- HV /Croatian Army/ @rnovnica rocket base - 12 volunteers;
- OS BH, Northern Bosnia, Zagreb – Borongaj barracks – 34 volunteers;

(all from the *Ivan Lu~i} – Lav~evi}* GP /construction company/ Split;

- OS BH, 1st Bosnia and Herzegovina *Kralj Tomislav* Corps– Ba{ko Polje – 157 volunteers;

- OS BH, 1st Mostar Independent Battalion – 118 volunteers;
- HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ Grude – 22 volunteers;
- HV – 126th Sinj Brigade – 12 volunteers;
- OS BH, Te{anj, ^apljina and Stolac – 56 volunteers;
- OS BH, Tuzla – 31 volunteers;
- Other towns and places in BH – Bugojno, Jajce, Zenica, Doboj, Zavidovi}i and Biha} – over 70 volunteers and conscripts;
- HRM /Croatian Navy/ - Northern Bosnia – Biha} and Cazin – 120 volunteers (with the help of officer Adem HAMZI]);

Eight-hundred and sixty-two volunteers altogether were recorded and despatched to battlefields and into units in BH. /handwritten/ (Over 2000 volunteers were recorded and despatched in the OS BH and the /?HVO/ by the end of 1992)
Through the K[/Crisis Staff/ volunteers registered and mobilised in Pula, Rijeka, Vara`din and Zadar were transferred. This was a significant number of fighters.
Among the volunteers despatched through the KV[Split were also women and foreign citizens from Algiers, France and Turkey who were sent to the volunteers' admission camp of the OS BH.
The main task of the KV[was to realise the plan and programme which it still holds at present. The basis of this programme was the reception and transport of humanitarian and other aid to places which the aggressor had not occupied. A special aspect of the KV[welfare service was helping the families of fighters and the injured by visiting them and giving them aid with the support of the Split *Merhamet.*
A successful blood donation drive to meet the needs of the forces of the OS BH and the OS RH was successfully organised in May with the help of the Split Red Cross. The response was excellent, with refugees from BH taking part.

Successful cooperation was established with companies in Split whose workers joined the OS BH and the OS RH as volunteers. They are the following companies: GP *Ivan Lu~i} Lav~evi},* the shipyard, *Konstruktor, Vijadukt* Zagreb and the *Djale* hydroelectric power plant. All their workers who joined as volunteers have been kept on their payroll and their salaries are being paid out to their families on producing certificates issued by us. They have received and housed some of the families at their own expense and provided them with healthcare and social benefits.
Cooperation with the military and civil organs of Split and the Republic of Croatia is maintained daily and is beneficial to both sides. Several actions of calling-up and transporting conscripts who had left BH or were stranded in the RH were realised jointly.

President of BiH Crisis Headquaters

Split

Alija Džafo

Delivered
- R BiH Government
- Hasan Efendić, military attache
- Office of R BiH in RH
- Archive

Testimony of the witness Miroslav Crnković in case IT-04-74

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, before we move on to Posavina, what you're telling us is very interesting. You are one of the few witnesses we've had who volunteered and who actually is telling a story now.

So you went to Mostar with these nine other lads that you selected. I note that there is five Croats, three Serbs, and two Muslims. But you're going to Mostar, but could you tell us what you're going to defend over there? Mostar is in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is not located in the Republic of Croatia. So why are you going there, yourself? Could you tell us what motivated you to go there? Is it General Praljak who said, I need you, and if -- you would have jumped over a bridge for him, or did you go there, you know, to really defend something? But if it's the latter case that prevails, could you tell us exactly what you were going to defend?

Page 45140

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not have any reason to go and defend anybody or anything. Nobody told me to go and wage a war there. I was told to try and establish units there, to train their commanders, and that was all. We were not engaged in any war operations down there at all.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fair enough. I agree with what you just said. However, this was -- was this a foreign state or was this a notion that you just did not take into account -- that was not taken into account at the time?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what you mean. In the Croatian Army, there were also lads from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the time we all thought that we were fighting the same enemy, the JNA. And to put it simply, it was only after the conflicts between Croats and Muslims when questions started being asked. At the time in question, nobody thought in those terms. We simply went to help the people down there to prevent the things from happening as they did to us, to help them prepare themselves. We just wanted to pass on our experience, our knowledge, to apply our experiences to prevent some things from happening to them, because they had already happened to us and we didn't want to see that repeating.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You are telling us that according to you, the enemy was the JNA, and you didn't really think about anything else, and that's why -- that's the reason why you went to

Mostar?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course. That's how the two

Page 45141

Muslim lads went with me, to help their friends defend themselves from the JNA, and that was the only motive they had.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] When General Praljak asked you to come, did he say, The JNA is around Mostar, it's in jeopardy, we have to go there, or did he say, We have to go to Mostar because there are Croats in Mostar, Croats who might be in jeopardy? What exactly did he say?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak sent a message asking us to come and help people organise themselves. He didn't mention either Croats or Muslims. It was well known who was attacking everybody. He didn't have to tell me that the JNA was down there and that they were getting ready to prepare to attack Mostar. We knew it, even without him telling us.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I thought I understand -- I thought I understood, and please correct me if I'm wrong. It would be a favour. But I thought I understood that when you arrived there, you executed your mission, but that you found that the Muslims were hardly cooperative, whereas they should have worked hand in hand in order to achieve a common goal. So you found that -- you perceived the Muslims as being a bit reluctant, as far as this common defence was concerned; is that it?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm a soldier. I'm not a politician. I don't want to go into the reason why they refused to cooperate. I came down there and tried to explain to them how to establish lines. They refused to listen. I returned, I reported back to

Page 45142

the general, and he said, Okay, you don't have to go there anymore.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You had selected two Muslims, so I would like to know whether you discussed with them in order to try and find out why the Muslims didn't want to cooperate? Did you ask them? Did you ask these two Muslim lads that you had selected, what their opinion was on this?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't ask them anything.

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] At the time, did you try and understand what their motivations were or was this really way beyond the

scope of what you were supposed to do?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not feel that I could influence them in any way, and I just did not give it a second thought.

Q. We know that you went to Posavina. When was that, under what circumstances? And I'm also interested in the time-frame of your departure there.

A. We left on the 3rd of July, 1992. At that moment, that's how it functioned in the army. Lads, get on the buses. We are taking you on a field mission. It was never announced two days ahead. And then in the second village, we were told that we would be heading for Slavonia or, to be more precise, Slavonski Brod. We arrived there, Mr. Praljak was waiting for us there, and he told me to get onto one of -- onto the bus,

Page 45143

and informed the lads that it was their own choice whether they wanted to cross or not. I did that. 50 per cent of the soldiers crossed, and the other 50 per cent didn't.

Q. And do you know whether the 50 per cent that did not cross -- were they subject to any disciplinary procedure, were they punished because of that?

A. No, nobody was punished. The men continued to work. Some of them work to this very day, some have been pensioned off, some were killed. In any case, nobody was punished on account of that. Nobody had any problems. They were given a choice, to cross or not.

Q. Why did you cross? Tell us, please.

A. The then company commander told us, and we obviously saw that Slavonski Brod had been destroyed. Shells were falling on us as we approached it, and he told us that under the military law, we could go 30 kilometres deep into the enemy territory if somebody shelled our cities and towns from that territory, that was the most compelling reason, the fact that the Croatian territories were shelled from that area. And another reason was the general was there, of course.

Q. You've just said that the general was there; yes?

A. Yes.

Q. When you arrived in Posavina, did you meet with the general? Can you describe the situation for us? Did you go to the front-line on your own? Were you shown where to go? Did you know already where the front-line was? How did that happen?

A. Of course we didn't know where the front-line was. We went there

Page 45144

during the night, we arrived during the night, and the general, himself, took us around the front-line and showed us what we could see in the dark.

Q. So what did that look like, when you were looking for the line? Do you remember, as you sit there? If you don't remember, never mind, it's not a big problem.

JUDGE PRANDLER: I'm sorry, Madam Pinter, to interrupt you, but I would like to clarify one issue here.

It was not very clear, when you asked about going to Slavonski Brod and when the witness answered to you. I believe that the issue was, indeed, that they may have crossed to Serbian territory, not to Slavonski Brod, itself, but to Serbian territory, because he spoke about -- now let me quote:

"Shells were falling on us as we approached it, and he told us that under the military law, we could go 30 kilometres deep into the enemy territory if somebody shelled our cities and towns from that territory, and that was the most compelling reason, the fact that the Croatian territories were shelled from that area ."

My question is that: What was that area? And as I understood it, it was that that action was taken against the Serbs, or JNA, from Serbian territory, but I stand to be corrected if I am wrong.

Thank you.

MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Maybe the witness should answer instead of me testifying. I believe that there has been a misunderstanding.

Page 45145

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. To the point where we crossed, that was Croatian Posavina, those were Croatian villages, Croatian population.

MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

Q. In what state is Posavina?

A. In Bosnia-Herzegovina.

JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you. But again, of course, then I'm saying that Sunja was, of course, and is Croatian territory, and then you crossed through Posavina, that is Bosnia and Serbian -- sorry, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is what I would like to clarify. Thank you.

MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

Q. Was that part of the Serbian territory or was this the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. It was not the Serbian territory. It was the Bosnian and Herzegovinian territory.

Q. And who resided in that territory of Posavina?

A. The majority Croatian population, Muslim population.

Summary of testimony of Miroslav Crnković in the case IT-04-74

The witness came to greet him. Praljak dragged him aside and said: "Crni, enter the bus and tell the guys who wants to leave, leave and who doesn't go back in the bus, and is returning back." The witness entered, and said these words: "Guys we need to go across. "When you defend a city, three, four, you can even go 30 kilometers in depth ... So if there is shelling, such as the one in Slavonski Brod, day and night, children are dying, people, innocent civilians - you should go over to Bosanski Brod. Some 50% returned. They were volunteers. They were all volunteers. Our troops were already there. They crossed Sava. The command was stationed in a school. In Bosanski Brod.

Praljak went with the witness to show him the line. They went down the highway on foot, all night they were on the road.

It was not a line, there were too many holes in between. This was a real war, death and gunfire. You see them on 20 meters. Sunja - we later laughed when we said that we were in war in Sunja.

Situation in regards to the troops was the same as in Mostar: locals - week. There were some Muslim units down, one Muslim, local. I think there were from Koliba. I think it's a totally Muslim. You know, scorched land. There is nothing there. We were at a village called Žeravica. There were 30-40 houses. No house was spared, none, absolutely none. Everything was burnt. We did not have a place to sleep. We slept in a pigsty. Each house had a basement.

The witness was present when two or three houses away from him grenade hit the window of the basement where guys from Vukovar were stationed. There were six of them inside. The fights went on day and night. Late Sven Lasta, the actor, was wounded here. The witness was with Praljak at the meeting and when he returned to the yard where he usually was, he saw that everybody is lying down - not knowing that they were shelled with VBR (multiple rocket launcher) few seconds before he entered the yard. He saw the wounded and dead. That was an hour before my injury...

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

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eljeŠac i o.

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ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
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eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

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vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
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i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
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23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

18.

TRAINING OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PILOTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
Documentation consolidated in subcategory – Training centres of the BH Army in the Republic of Croatia

Training centres in the Republic of Croatia in which BH Army pilots were trained
1991 - 1992
Names of places:
- Zagreb
- Velika Gorica
- Pula
SLOVENIJA
HRVATSKA
BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
FEDERACIJA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
SLAVONIJA
DALMACIJA
DINARA
Ljubljana
Zagreb
Trieste
Rijeka
Pula
Split
Sarajevo
Banja Luka
Mostar
Zenica
Tuzla
Prijedor
Adriatic Sea
Mediterranean Sea

PRESIDENCY
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
THE PRESIDENT

Sarajevo, 9 August 1992

TO THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA /RH/

ZAGREB

Please authorise the persons listed below to stay in the Republic of Croatia and attend the training required by the BH Air Force.

1. Major Nedžad SULJIĆ, MIG-21, former squadron commander
2. Major Goran BULUT, "Orao" /Eagle/, former squadron commander
3. Major Antun SOMBORAC, MIG-21, former squadron commander
4. Captain 1st Class, Josip BARUNOVIĆ, MIG-21, former squad commander
5. Captain 1st Class, Mirzan SEČIĆ, MIG-21, former assistant squadron commander
6. Captain Mirsad FAZLIĆ, MIG-21, former assistant regiment commander
7. Captain Hidajim GAZIBEGOVIĆ, MIG-21, former squad commander
8. Lieutenant Goran STANOJEVIĆ, MIG-21, former assistant squadron commander
9. Lieutenant Suad NIJEMČEVIĆ, MIG-21, squadron pilot
10. Lieutenant Jasminko BEŠIĆ, MIG-21, pilot
11. Lieutenant Anto GRGIĆ, MIG-21, pilot
12. Captain Meho MERDANIĆ, MI-8 helicopter pilot
13. Captain Hajrudin AGIĆ, Gazelle helicopter pilot
14. Lieutenant Besim KORČIĆ, MI-8 helicopter pilot
15. Lieutenant Samir SULJEVIĆ, Gazelle helicopter pilot
16. Lieutenant Šemsudin BEŠLAGIĆ, Gazelle helicopter pilot
17. Lieutenant Samir BEGANOVIĆ, G-4 (*Super Galeb* /Super Seagull/) pilot
18. Lieutenant Edvin IFTIĆ, *Galeb* /Seagull/ pilot
19. Lieutenant Zejto RASTODER, Gazelle helicopter pilot
20. Reserve Lieutenant Suad PEČENKOVIĆ, pilot, propeller aircraft and *Galeb*
21. Reserve Lieutenant Tedi BAIER, pilot, propeller aircraft and *Galeb*
22. Civilian employee, Zvonko BIRJUKOV, pilot, propeller aircraft

As you can see from the above data, most of the men were members of the former JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/. We have carried out preliminary checks and selection.

Please inform us of your decision as soon as possible.

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Jerko DOKO
/signed and stamped/

PRESIDENT OF THE
BH PRESIDENCY
Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ
/signed and stamped

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF of OS
MANAGEMENT RV AND PVO
NO. 516/92
27 December 1992
ZAGREB

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
strictly confidential

Files

TRAINING OF PILOTS AND TECHNICIANS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

ORDER:

Based on the needs that have been pointed out, as well as realized agreements with the command of RZ and PZO of the Republic of Croatia, the following pilots and technicians from the RV and PVO of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be directed to the Republic of Croatia for training and task execution.

1. Pilots for AN-2 airplanes;
- IFTIĆ EDVIN
- PEČENKOVIĆ SUAD
- GAZIBEGOVIĆ HIDAJEM
- BEŠLAGIĆ ŠEMSUDIN
- GRGIĆ ANTE
- NJEMČEVIĆ SUAD
- BEŠIĆ JASMIN

2. Pilots for the Casa-212 airplanes;
- BULUT GORAN
- BEGOVIĆ SAMIR
- SINANOVIĆ ESAD
- BARALIĆ AMIR

3. Technicians for the maintenance of the Casa-212 airplanes;
- GRIGIĆ ŽELJKO
- ALAGIĆ MUHAMED

4. Technicians for the maintenance of the AN-2 technicians;
- MEHMETAGIĆ AMIR

5. Bulut Goran shall be appointed commander of the group, responsible for the coordination of all tasks, related to the training and security of the groups work. The training shall be executed according to the agreed plan of training between HRZ and PZO and RV and PVO OS R BiH.

DELIVERED to:

- Files
- Supreme Command Staff Sarajevo (The RV and PVO management)
- Airforce Bihać
- Airforce Tuzla
- Bulut Goran
- Command of HRZ and PZO
- Military delegation of the RBiH in the Republic of Croatia

Chief of the management of RV and PVO
Salko Begić

/stamped and signed/

/stamp:
Armed Forces of the Republic of
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Air Force Group Command
B I H A Ć
Strictly confidential number 02/3-11
Date: 23 November 1992/

Retraining pilots in the
Republic of Croatia.- Brigadier Goran BULUT

Based on the recently observed requirements, with a view to the most efficient possible functioning of airlifts between the Republic of Croatia and the Bihać region, and based on the information received from our representatives and co-ordinators in the Republic of Croatia on the possibilities of retraining pilots for CASA-212 and AN-2 aircraft, I hereby issue the following

O R D E R :

1. Retrain the following pilots on CASA-212 aircraft:
   - Goran BULUT – Commander of a group of people in Zagreb, in charge of organisation
   - Mirzan ŠEČIĆ – in charge of flight issues
   - Hidajim GAZIBEGOVIĆ – pilot

2. Retrain the following pilots on AN-2 aircraft:
   - Samir BEGANOVIĆ – pilot
   - Suad NIJEMČEVIĆ – pilot

Retraining will be carried out in agreement with the Command of HRZ and PZO /Croatian Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence/, in accordance with their abilities, requirements, plans and retraining programmes.

AS/AM

Done in two copies and
s e n t :
- Brigadier BULUT
- archives

C O M M A N D E R
B R I G A D I E R
Nedžad SULJIĆ
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF OS
MANAGEMENT RV AND PVO

Zagreb, 8 March 1993
07-1242/93

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
OFFICIAL SECRET
Strictly confidential

TRAINING OF PILOTS AND TECHNICIANS
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

ORDER:

Based on emerged needs and realized agreements with the Command RZ and PVO of the Republic of Croatia, the following pilots and technicians from the RV and PVO of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be directed to the Republic of Croatia for training and task execution;

1. To the higher level of training and execution of the specified tasks for the airplane, the following pilots:

- BULUT GORAN
- BEGAVOIĆ SAMIR
- SINANOVIĆ ESAD
- BARALIĆ AMIR

For the maintenance of the simulator on the CASA-212 airplane, the pilots:
- Capt. Kulić Omer, flight instructor
- Capt. Taševac Osman, flight instructor

For the maintenance of the CASA-212 airplane, the technicians:
- GRIGIĆ ŽELJKO
- ALAGIĆ MUHAMED

2. For the execution of the specified tasks and maintenance of the simulator on the An-2, pilots:

- IFTIĆ EDVIN
- PEČENKOVIĆ SUAD
- GAZIBEGOVIĆ HIDAJEM, also a flight instructor
- TAŠREVAC NUSRET, also a flight instructor
- NJEMČEVIĆ SUAD
- BEŠIĆ JASMIN

For the maintenance of the An-2, technicians:

- MEHMETAGIĆ AMIR

3. All the pilots shall go through training and maintenance of the simulation on the UTVA-75 and PAJPER-18. The following persons are appointed as flight instructors:

   - SINANOVIĆ ESAD
   - PEČENKOVIĆ SUAD
   - TAŠEVAC NUSRET

4. Bulut Goran shall be appointed commander of the group, responsible for the coordination of all tasks, related to the training and security of the groups work.

   The training shall be executed according to the agreed plan of training between HRZ and PZO and RV and PVO OS R BiH.

   By this order, the order, strictly confidential no. 516/92 dated 27 December 1993, is declined.

DELIVERED TO:

1. Files
2. Staff VK OS RBiH / The RV and PVO management
3. Command of HRZ and PZO
4. Military delegation of the RBiH in the RH
5. Commander Bulut Goran

Chief of the management of RV and PVO
Salko Begić

/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF OS /ARMED FORCES/
DIRECTORATE OF RV /AIR FORCE/
AND PVO /AIR FORCE DEFENSE/
Top secret number: 07/1600/93.
Zagreb, 18th February 1993

REPUBLIC DEFENSE
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP SECRET

SUPREME COMMAND CHIEF OF STAFF
SARAJEVO

1. Two medium transport helicopters Mi-8T are purchased for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Army. Helicopters are received according to the regular procedure and on 17th February 1993 were transferred by our crew to the Visoko airport, where they were received by the Aviation Group Tuzla, and then transferred to the Tuzla airport.

Since Tuzla airport has all necessary material and human resources for regular /? exploitation/, we suggest that helicopters should be based at Tuzla airport.

Limited quantities of fuel and lubricants require rational use of helicopters, their use is therefore regulated and may only be used with the prior approval of the ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/.

2. Procurement of two additional helicopters Mi-8T is in progress, which should be finished by the end of this month. Due to relatively harsh obstruction and obstacles in purchasing due to known reasons, the exact procurement term can not be guaranteed.

We suggest that the initial location of the base for these two helicopters should also be Tuzla airport.

3. Procured AB-206 helicopter is being repaired, and will be ready very quickly, after which it will be transferred to you. The crew has completed their training and is waiting for the overflight.

4. The air bridge to the Bihać region is disconnected as of 30th December 1992. We are doing everything to reactivate it, but without success. The reasons are of political nature. I cannot say with certainty when this will be resolved taking into consideration the intelligence and reasons given to us. The crew is being trained and educated for a higher level of flight qualification. Results are very good.

5. I will remain at this location until the above issues are resolved, and then I should go to Tuzla immediately to manage the organization of work.

HEAD OF AIR FORCE AND AIR FORCE DEFENSE
/signature/
Salko BEGIĆ

DELIVER TO:

1. Archive

2. Chief of ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/

19.

WEAPONS PACKED IN FOOD PRODUCTS' PACKAGING AND LOADED INTO UNHCR TRUCKS



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
Documentation consolidated in subcategory – support in arming BH Army by the Republic of Croatia

/handwritten 10th of August, at 1600 hrs
10th of August 1993/

EMBASSY OF THE R BIH IN RH
SP, Zagreb, 10th of August 1993
Strictly confidential 05-02-07/93

Subject: notification on the sent shipment, to be delivered

To the Command of the 5thCorps
Attn Commander R Dreković

On 9th of August 1993, 10500 kilograms of rice was sent to the address of "Bijeli Mantil" by the UNHCR truck, no 10376.

Further on, by the UNHCR truck no 10465 – 6 packages of fish
- 4 packages of soya-bean – 1344 kilograms
- 3 packages of flour – 2400 kilograms

By the UNHCR truck 10368 – 8 packages of fish

The following was packed within the same shipment and in the same truck:

1. Round 20 mm	180 pieces
2. Round 14.5 mm	1213 pieces
3. ROB "kašikara" weapon	192 pieces
4. Starter for ROB	4130 pieces
5. Round 12.7 mm	2325 pieces
6. Round 7.62 mm x 39	75640 pieces
7. Round 7.62 mm x 54	5850 pieces
8. Round 357 MAGNUM	75 pieces
9. Round 9 mm PARA	1100 pieces
10. Round 7.62 mm TT	140 pieces
11. Round 9x18 mm for a gun	50 pieces
12. Round 6.35 mm	100 pieces
13. AP 7.62x39	9 pieces
14. Round 7.62 mm x 51	913 pieces
15. Round 7.9 mm	36584 pieces
16. MRUD	10 pieces
17. RBR 64 mm "wasp"	10 pieces
18. PEP	82,5 kilograms
19. Trotil 100 and 200 grams bullet	136,7 kilograms
20. Initial hunter cap pistol?	3000 pieces
21. PPRM-2A /mines/	8 pieces
22. Starter 1 cap	16 pieces
23. EDK no 8	425 pieces
24. DK no 8	100 pieces
25. BRK M-79	15 pieces
26. SD-2	300 metres
27. Markers with springs	6 pieces
28. PAT 14,5 mm KPL	1 piece
29. MGL 40 mm – round	30 pieces
30. Cumulative trombone mine	2 pieces

31. Temporary trombone mine 3 pieces
32. Ammunition box for round 14.5 mm with cartridge cases 4 pieces
33. Browning machine gun 1 piece
34. AP 7.62 x 51 FAL with optics 1 piece
35. PM M-72 7.62 mm x 39 1 piece
36. PM 7.9 mm M-53 1 piece
37. PAP 7.62 x 39 mm 8 pieces
38. Artillery scope PAB 2 AT 1 piece
39. /illegible/ gun-carriage MB 120 mm 6 pieces
40. /illegible/ camouflage 99 pieces
41. Conductor for "wasp" 7 pieces
42. Optical scope for "wasp" 2 pieces
43. Camouflage hat 50 pieces
44. Reconnaisance hat 8 pieces
45. Frame for AP 7.62 mm x 39 15 pieces
46. Slow-burning fuse 39 m
47. APi 9 mm PARA AGRAM 1 piece
48. MAKAROV gun with two frames and 16 bullets 1 piece
49. APi 9 mm ERO with 3 frames 1 piece
50. Silencer for AGRAM 2 piece
51. Motorola "RADIUS P210" 1 piece
52. Frame for AP 7.62 mm x 51 4 pieces
53. Charger for Motorola GP 300 30 pieces
54. PTR "Maljutka" 30 pieces
55. MGL 40/6 1 piece
56. Plastic explosive 2,5 kilograms
57. Set of "APHA" uniforms /for the Commander of Breza/ 3 pieces
58. Purses for frame 7.62 mm with RAP 2 pieces
59. Beret 2 pieces
60. Truncheon for the military police 28 pieces
61. Shoulder straps for military police 60 pieces
62. Battery lamp with implants 2 pieces
63. Belt for VP (white) 60 pieces
64. Combat and military literature with manuals
65. Small package for BRKO the informer in Cazina brigade
66. Daily press and a box for RIZO ĆATIĆ from Bos. Krupa

Concluded with number 66

Delivered to:

1. The Command of the 5th Corps
2. Archive of the military attaché and Bihać district office

Remark: The list was made by Breza 13/7

FOR FREE, INDEPENDENT AND INDIVISIBLE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Military Attaché of R BiH in RH
Hajrudin Osmanagić

/handwritten 27th of January 1994/

STATEMENT

I, Senad Palić, born on 7th of July 1957 in the village of Oštrožnica, SO Bosanska Krupa, under full moral and material responsibility, fully aware of a meaning of this statement, confirm the following:

1. On 20th of June 1993, in the barrack of the Croatian Army, at request of Mr Šeta Šuajb and by approval of Mr Ibrahim Hadžić, I started to pack the military equipment, weapon and ammunition with a group of people, dedicated to the Republic of BiH, for the needs of ŠVK of the BH Army.
   Weapon, ammunition and equipment were packed as follows:
   On 21st of June 1993, within two palettes of cold meat tray, 1 palette of beans and 1 palette of soups, the following was packed:

Wasp (weapon) containers	15 pieces
RPG 7	4 pieces
PPM pâté	2 pieces
Round 7.65 for the gun	50 pieces
EP IDAO M /!	1 piece
TN 500	1 piece
Round 243 Winchester	500 pieces
Round 308 Winchester	20 pieces
MRUD	2 kpl
MRUD	2 pieces (incomplete)
Round 12.7	54 pieces
Artillery lanyard	6 pieces
Trombone bullet 7.62	20 pieces
Trombone bullet 7.9	29 pieces
"Man" round 7.9	15 pieces
ICU "sljemofon"	1 piece
ROB	37 pieces
RBR 64 mm "wasp" weapon	27 pieces
EK	11 pieces
Additional charging for 120 mm	3 bags
Drunken Ustasha	2 pieces
PEP	5 kg and 250 grams
Trotil corks	5 pieces
Trombone mine, temporary	54 pieces
Trombone cumulative mine	29 pieces
BRK M 79	5 pieces
Base for Maljutkas	2 kpl
Maljutka shell	18 pieces

Box for launching the Maljutka	4 pieces
DK 8	5000 pieces

On 2nd of July 1993, within 12 palettes of cold meat tray, the following was packed:

RPG 7	351 pieces
ROB	999 pieces
SP 12.7 MAKS II	9 pieces
IC helmets?	2 pieces
IC optics – passive scope	1 kpl
Caesium 133	1 box

On 14th of July 1993, within 4 palettes of cold meat tray with a red ribbon, the following was packed:

Cumulative RPG 7	280 pieces
Caesium 133	1 can

On 21st of July 1993, within 8 palettes of powdered milk, the following was packed:

Round 7.62 x 39	49625 pieces
SP 12.7 MACS II	3 pieces
Cumulative RPG 7	62 pieces
Temporary RPG 7	28 pieces
IC helmets?	1 piece
Mine-detector	1 piece
Battery refill 4.5 V	10 pieces

On 26th of August 1993, within 10 palettes of children packages, the following was packed:

RPG 7	345 pieces
Round 12.7	4280 pieces
Round 14.5	2890 pieces
Green vest	87 pieces
Shoulder straps	3 pieces
Military disguise shirt	6 pieces
Winter wool gloves	99 pieces
Military belt	113 pieces
Epaulettes	49 pieces
Military shirts	90 pieces

I emphasize that the job, that was supposed to be done, was often risky and dangerous for all the people, although we took all the necessary measures of safety.
The storage was officially entitled to GS HVO of the Bihać region.
I could do my work unobstructedly, due to valid papers that I was in possession of. Besides, before my arr val to Zagreb, I used to perform responsible duties in the armed forces of R BiH.
I was the Chief of Staff of 511 Bosanska Krupa brigade and Assistant Commander for the moral education. I was directed to Zagreb from the Bihać region in order to help the supply and delivery of combat material to the Bihać region. I perform the same job nowadays, according to the 5th BH Army corps task.
Within this statement I cannot write about people in Croatia that were generously helping us in these issues for the reasons of their safety.
Besides me, other participated in performing these jobs:

Nijaz Bibanović, having performed command duties in the BH Army
Faruk Omanović, currently involved in command duties in the 5th corps of the BH Army
Aladin Beširević at the time of performing the cited jobs was the manager of our warehouse.
Osman Omanović – Hega, currently Deputy Commander of the 1st Bosnian-Herzegovina Liberation brigade within the 5thCorps of the BH Army.

I am not forced to give this statement, fully aware of the situation. I also state that we were handing over the fully packed palettes to the group, being in charge for the transport and loading to plains for Sarajevo. Further destiny of the transport remains unknown to me.
All the above cited people within this statement can confirm my words and also provide written statements that they were performing this job, including a remark that, apart from me, nobody knew that the job is being performed for the needs of SARAJEVO, but they thought that the job is being done for the needs of the 5th corps of the BH Army.
I managed this job for the needs of the 5th BH Army corps, as well as the cited packages for ŠVK in Sarajevo all the way till September 1993, as we had to switch to other working methods, which are not the subject of this statement, for the reasons of safety.

I provide this statement at request of Mr Šeta Šuajb

In Zagreb, 27th of January 1994

Sui manu of the statement provider
/Senad Palić signed/

/coat of arms/
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BIHAĆ DISTRICT OFFICE
/stamp of receipt/
Military delegation of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
In the Republic of Croatia
Received-delivered by TLF, RRV, RV, PACIDA, Package
On 29th of May 1993
/signed/ /handwritten 29/

5thCorps of BH Army
Attn. Commander

41 000 Zagreb, Našićka no 12
Tel: 041/ 33 44 84
041/ 33 33 82
Fax: 041/ 33 79 06

Your mark Our mark Date

Within our last shipment we sent you the following:

EK	3570 pieces
Basic charging for 120	3096 pieces
DK	31000 pieces
Additional charging for 120	3804 pieces
Starter for 120 mm	487 pieces
Round 7.62 x 39 mm	50050 pieces
Round 7.62 x 51	2931 pieces
Round 12.7 mm 100 pieces in cartridge case	185 pieces
Round 5.45	300 pieces
Round for gun 7.62	1400 pieces
Round calibre 45	345 pieces
Round 38 special	50 pieces
Round for gun 7.65	100 pieces
Round 76 mm for ZIB	1 piece
Starter for round 76 mm	3 pieces
UN-illegible	12 pieces
Plastic explosive 5 x 500 gr	2,5 kg
Starter IMA-4	6 pieces
ROB SUZ	1 piece
Explosive IDAC	8 pieces
TNT 92 pieces x200 grams	18400 grams
SED-2	325 pieces
Starter for ROB	94 pieces
Scope for RB M-57	3 pieces
Scope for RBR 90 mm	3 pieces
NSB-3	2 pieces
Trombone bullet	12 pieces
Drunken Ustasha	45 pieces
Cylinder for 7.9 mm	3 pieces
Ammunition box for 7.9 mm	1 piece
RAP for NSB-4A	1 piece
Round 7.9 mm SONIC	2625 pieces

/handwritten/

We kindly ask for confirmation of MTS delivery and difficulties if any in relation to reception.
The UNHCR truck number 10379.

Breza
Biban
/signed/

/handwriten:/
Packed merchandise till 15th of March 1993 within a humanitarian aid and driven to Kadija Alagić.

1. El. igniter EDK-8 5000 pieces
2. UTMA-4 starter 6 pieces
3. "Maljutka" guidance system (with periscope) 1 piece /handwritten 15th of March 1993/
4. Starter for the temporary 60 mm and 120 mm mine 20 pieces
5. Nitro-glycerine "TNT" 50 pieces
6. Round 7.9 mm 10600 pieces
7. Temporary mine M-73 60 mm 132 pieces
8. Temporary mine 82 mm 28 pieces
9. Trombone mine 42 pieces
10. MRUD 3 pieces
11. Training clock starter 2 pieces
12. Trombone bullet 300 pieces
13. Basic charging for 120 mm 16 pieces
14. Additional charging for 120 mm bags, 24 pieces
15. Doboš for PM M-53, 7.9 mm 6 pieces
16. School mines with starters and wire 10 pieces
17. "Drunken ustasha" bombs (package) 131 pieces
18. Round 7 x 64 mm (for carbine) 80 pieces
19. Boxes with lids for brewery 5 pieces
20. Rocket charging 3 pieces
21. Round 12.7 mm (in cans and cartridge cases) 3600 pieces
22. Round 7.92 mm (7 cans x 450 pieces) 3150 pieces
23. Round 7.62 x 54 mm 1850 pieces
24. Starter for the hand training bomb M-75 288 pieces
25. EP IDAO M-71 Illegible
26. Round 7.62 mm x 51 mm (NATO) 4300 pieces
27. Hand bomb "Kašikara" 45 pieces
28. Round 5.56 mm 60 pieces
29. Round 7.62 mm (for the gun) 30 pieces
30. Mortar 60 mm 1 piece
31. Military shirt (short sleeve) 180 pieces
32. Military disguise hat (winter hat) 300 pieces
33. Officer coat 10 pieces
34. Military sock (winter sock) 390 pairs
35. Scarf (under hat) 399 pieces
36. Reconnaissance military hat 20 pieces
37. Military gloves 200 pairs
38. Round 7.62 x 39 mm 680000 pieces

Till 25th of February 1993 the following has been driven to K.

1. Box "PLIVA" Zagreb, Croatia 1175 pieces
2. Boxes of haring 20 pieces
3. Boxes with corks 5 pieces
4. Mail in the PTT bags 1 piece
5. Socks, hats, under-hats, gloves, coats, shirts etc (in boxes) 12 pieces
6. Bihać mail (boxes) 3 pieces
7. Big boxes, addressed to Š.O. Bihać district, att. Babić Nermin 2 pieces
along with 2 boxes containing:
a) small boxes for air group 3 pieces
b) small boxes for 111. BK 1 piece
c) small boxes for Š.O. Bihać district, att. Babić Nermin 4 pieces
8. Box for Šehić Sead 1 piece
9. Box for Husić Šemso 1 piece

In total 1218 boxes packed
/stamp/ REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BIHAĆ DISTRICT
HEADQUARTERS ZAGREB

EMBASSY OF THE R BiH IN RH
Zagreb, 16th of August 1993
Strictly confidential number 05-02-12/93

Notification on the sent shipment

Attn Commander of the 5thCorps
Ramiz Dreković

We inform you that on 16th of August 1993 a shipment of the following content and by following vehicles was directed to you:

1. UNHCR Truck, registration plates 10345 – fish cans (4 palettes) 6200 kg
   Flour (3 palettes) 2100 kg
2. - - - - 10343 – fish cans 82 palettes) 3100 kg
   kids package (6 palettes) 1200 pieces
3. - - - - 10073 - fish cans (2 palettes) 2790 kg
   kids package (4 palettes) 800 pieces

In the above cited shipment, we sent the following for the "Bijeli mantil":

1. PAN 14.5 mm	4 pieces
2. Round 14.5 mm	248 pieces
3. Military disguise pants	248 pairs
4. Disguise hat	8 pieces
5. Reconnaissance hat	3 pieces
6. Packages for Ismet Mujanović	2 pieces
7. Packages for Dr Sabulić	1 piece
8. Mine for MB 60 mm	386 pieces
9. Trombone mine	4 pieces
10. PB mine "pâté"	3 pieces
11. ROB	390 pieces
12. Round 12.7 mm	17230 pieces
13. PPM a-3	1 piece
14. Underpants	1 piece
15. RPG-7	8 pieces
16. MB 82 mm basis	2 pieces
17. USA bullet-proof helmet	37 pieces
18. Frames purse	20 pieces
19. Wool socks	120 pairs
20. Military belt	50 pieces
21. T-shirt (short sleeve)	17 pieces

Remark: on 11th of ? the group from Bihać arrived to Zagreb:

1. Čović Uzair - Delija
2. Kličić Husnija from Kličić
3. Dizdarević (other unknown)
4. Dizdarević Nisvet – Rambo
5. Dervišević Senad from Cazin
6. Pasin (other unknown)

II. N RV and PVO Neđad Suljić, if he arrives with UNPROFOR, let him come to Zagreb and report to the Embassy of R BiH in RH, Pantovčak 96, for the reasons of security of other conditions to travel to Sarajevo. The information should be handed over IMMEDIATELY.

III. The reporters from USA shall contact the commander in the next few days:

1. Ms Samantha Power
2. Ms Laura Litter
3. Mr Ben Lohen
4. Mr George Stankovski

The persons under numbers 1 and 4 show sympathy for the R BiH, having a recommendation from Breza 13/7, written on the small paper.

IV On 10th of August 1993, at 1635 hrs we sent you a notification on the previous shipment and repeated it on 16th of August 1993.

FOR FREE and INDEPENDENT BiH

On behalf of military attaché
Hajrudin Osmanagić

EMBASSY OF THE R BIH IN RH
MILITARY ECONOMY REPRESENTATIVE BODY
Zagreb, Savska road 62 E/V

No 05- 4147/93
14th June 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Association of Bihać district citizens

Attn. 5th Corps of the BH Army Bihać

SUBJECT: report and notifications

1. On 3rd of June 1992, by an UNHCR truck 10367, the following equipment has been directed to the address of the International humanitarian organization to help the Muslims of BIH:
   T-shirt – long sleeve 4 000 pieces
   T-shirt - short sleeve 2 000 pieces
   Boots and shoes 790 pairs
2. We kindly ask you to reply what have you received and the quantity of the received by the fax sent on 4th of June 1993 and signed by Mr. Kadija Alagić.
3. On 9th of June 1993, 7 packages of fish (5.480 kg) have been directed by the UNHCR truck, registration plates 10352 to the address Bijeli mantil. Within this shipment from UB9, the following was present:

Trotil bullets 200 grams	10 pieces
Round 7.62 x 54	555 pieces
Round 7.9	450 pieces
Round 7.62 x 51	1500 pieces
MRUD	1 piece
Temporary trombone mine	20 pieces
Cumulative trombone mine	1 piece
Flashing trombone mine	4 pieces
ROĐ tear gas	1 piece
"Drunken ustasha"	36 pieces
Launcher charging	3 containers
Digital clock mechanism mine	4 pieces
Round 7.62 x 39	143.515 pieces

We have been notified that you received the above cited shipment.

4. Referring to your letter "Notification on MTS reception", evidentiary number 03713-182/1 /illegible/, dated 2nd of June 1993, we inform you that the error occurred during packing; therefore we revised the list according to your corrections in the above cited letter, for those corrections, as well as the MTS quantity in storage, match your inventory lists.
5. Referring to your letter confidential number 02/illegible-1672-1, dated 19th of May 1993, we inform you that we are not able to find 1st degree detector and system battery TR B ATEM at the moment and that we are searching for it as well as the for the detector for detection from the air.

* * *

EMBASSY OF R BiH IN CROATIA
VEP/military economic mission/
TOP SECRET NO. 05-4258/93

REPUBLIC DEFENCE
Military secret
Top secret

SUBJECT: Notice of transport to 5th Corps of BH Army

DELIVERS

By gasoline tank truck (aluminium tank), license plate UNHCR 10236, on 24th June 1993 we have delivered to you the following:

1. Spare barrel for light machine gun M 53	14 pcs
2. RPG7 launcher	4 pcs
3. RB M 57	5 pcs
4. Light machine gun M 53	18 pcs
5. Machine gun BROWING 7.9 mm	4 pcs
6. Machine gun stand 7.9 mm	3 pcs
7. Machine gun BROWING 12.7 mm	2 pcs
8. Stand for BROWING 12.7 mm	1 pcs
9. Machine gun 7.9 DSK	1 pcs
10. SP MAX II 12.7 without optics	6 pcs
11. SP Anti-Materiel Rifle without optics	1 pcs
12. Mortar 60 mm	1 pcs
13. Mortar 82 mm	3 pcs
14. Mortar 120 mm	6 pcs

Concluded with number 14.

Note:
Do not use more than five additional charges in the 120mm mortar.
Please give one 12.7 mm rifle to Major General Vlado Šantić since good cooperation is established between GS HVO and Bihać.

Delivered to:

1. 5th Corps
2. VEP/Military economic mission/

13
Breza
7
Biban
Bajo

stamp:
Military delegation of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in the Republic of Croatia
RECEIVED - /illegible/
Date: /illegible/
Received by: /illegible/

We are forwarding the act of Bihać county office
for the military attaché Hajrudin Osmanagić.

Packing ammunition and weapons in the food products' packaging and loading to UNHCR trucks going to Bihać
Places of packing
– Zdenčina – Konjušnica
– Sesvete – Pig farm
Sesvete
Zdenčina
Bihać
HUNGARY
CROATIA
Vojvodina
(Autonomous
Province
of
Serbia)
BOSNIA
AND
HERZEGOVINA
SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
SLAVONIJA
Maribor
Čakovec
Varaždin
Kaposvár
Pécs
Krapina
Zlatar
Koprivnica
Đurđevac
Bjelovar
Virovitica
Čazma
Pavlovac
Daruvar
Popovača
Kutina
Pakrac
Našice
Osijek
Vukovar
Sisak
Novska
Nova Gradiška
Požega
Slavonski Brod
Vinkovci
Novi Sad
Karlovac
Vojnić
Hrvatska Dubica
Dvor
Ogulin
Josipdol
Novi Vinodolski
Plaški
Senj
Otočac
Umag
Klana
Rijeka
Poreč
Badema
Rovinj
Brijuni
Pula
Cres
Krk
Rab
Pag
Unije
Lošinj
Susak
Ilovik
Silba
Olib
Premuda
Ist
Sestrunj
Molat
Karlobag
Gospić
Udbina
Lovinac
Gračac
Zadar
Obrovac
Benkovac
Knin
Vodice
Šibenik
Sinj
Trogir
Split
Omiš
Imotski
Mostar
Čiovo
Šolta
Brač
Makarska
Ploče
Metković
Hvar
Vis
Svetac
Biševo
Korčula
Pelješac
Šipan
Dubrovnik
Mljet
Lastovo
Sušac
Palagruža
Galijula
Banja Luka
Tuzla
Sarajevo
Drina
Una
Sava
Bosna
Vrbas
Neretva
Trebišnjica
Piva
Tara
Dunav (Danube)
Mura
Drava
Kupa
Korana
Lika
Gacka
Dobra
Mrežnica
Žrnovnica
Cetina
Zrmanja
Krka
Unica
Sana
Una
Vrbas
Ilova
Martin
Žirje
Murter
Kornati
Ugljan
Pašman
Dugi otok
Iž
Olib
Premuda
Molat
Silba
Lošinj
Susak
Ilovik
Unije
Cres
Krk
Rab
Pag
Brijuni
Pula
Poreč
Umag
Rovinj
Badema
Klana
Rijeka
Ogulin
Josipdol
Novi Vinodolski
Plaški
Senj
Otočac
Karlobag
Gospić
Udbina
Lovinac
Gračac
Zadar
Obrovac
Benkovac
Knin
Vodice
Šibenik
Sinj
Trogir
Split
Omiš
Imotski
Mostar
Čiovo
Šolta
Brač
Makarska
Ploče
Metković
Hvar
Vis
Svetac
Biševo
Korčula
Pelješac
Šipan
Dubrovnik
Mljet
Lastovo
Sušac
Palagruža
Galijula
Gru
15°
17°
19°
45°

20.

LOGISTICS CENTRES OF THE ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ESTABLISHED IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
834

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Sarajevo

Str. confidential number: 02-80-149/93
Sarajevo, 12th July 1993

Ministry of Defence, deciding on the request of the Armed Forces Supreme Command for the provision of the issuance of credentials for the personnel of Military economic mission, on the basis of Article 18 / Decree on defence (R BiH Official Gazette no. 4/92, 9/9 and 19/92), issues this

DECISION

1. In order to perform activities and tasks within the scope of the Armed Forces Supreme Command outside of the territory of the Republic, following persons are appointed, namely:

- In Zagreb Military Economic Mission

1. Hajrudin Osmanagić
2. Dževad Topić
3. Muradif Pajt
4. Haris Karamehmedović
5. Senad Kubat
6. Blanka Vučak

- In the Logistics Department of the Armed Forces Supreme Command R BiH Zagreb

1. Hasan Čengić
2. Azim Karamehmedović
3. Šeta Šuajb
4. Senaid Memić
5. Nešad Šabić
6. Emir Bešlagić
7. Ejub Husika
8. Samir Lokvaničić
9. Tarik Šabić
10. Mustafa Behmen
11. Enis Memić
12. Mustafa Rizvanović
13. Mevludin Sinanangić
14. Abdulkarim Šeta
15. Fadil Zorluk
16. Muzafer Memić
17. Elvedin Močević
18. Alem Mujezinović
19. Haris Zametica
20. Faruk Fojzić
21. Mustafa Povlakić

- In the Logistics Department of the Supreme Command of BH Armed Forces Split

1. Refik Duran
2. Zahid Muhamerović

2. The persons referred to in Item above shall be appointed for a limited time until the moment of the election and appointment of permanent staff in the Mission - Logistics department, or until there is a need for their work.
3. To the persons from Item 1 of this decision, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will issue temporary credentials and they will be limited to the period referred to in previous Item.

Reasoning

Supreme Command of BiH Armed Forces has submitted an application for the issuance of credentials for the Military economic mission personnel in Zagreb and Logistics Departments in Zagreb and Split. The application requests the issuance of the aforementioned credentials of a temporary nature and its limitation to the period up to the definitive appointment in the Mission, or Logistics department.

Pursuant to the above, and based on the Article /illegible/ Decree on Defence, it was to be decided as stated in the disposition of this decision.

DELIVERED TO:
1. /illegible/ RBiH
   Sarajevo
2. Supreme Command of BH Armed Forces
3. For the Records
4. Archives

DEPUTY MINISTER
Munib Bisić
/signed/

/round stamp: illegible/

Embassy
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Zagreb

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
521 – MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AMB/ZAG/2146

Stamp:

Received: /handwritten:/ 16th July 93		
Classification mark	/illegible/	
314		0316
Reference number	/illegible/	/illegible/
521/0316-53-2935		

Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina expresses appreciation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia and has the honour to ask to forward the information to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and other responsible institutions of the Republic of Croatia.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has appointed a number of persons to work in a) Military economic mission in Zagreb and b) in Logistics department of the Supreme Command of Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb.

Following persons are working in the Military economic mission:

1. Hajrudin Osmanagic
2. Dzevad Topic
3. Muradif Pajt
4. Haris Karamehmedovic
5. Senad Kubat
6. Blanka Vucak

In the Logistics department of the Supreme Command of Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb:

1. Hasan Cengic
2. Azim Karamehmedovic
3. Suajb Seta
4. Senaid Memic
5. Nesad Sabic
6. Emir Beslagic
7. Ejub Husika
8. Samir Lokvancic
9. Tarik Sabic
10. Mustafa Behmen
11. Enis Memic
12. Mustafa Rizvanovic
13. Mevludin Sinanagic
14. Abdulkarim Seta
15. Fadil Zorluk
16. Muzafer Memic
17. Elvedin Mocevic
18. Alem Mujezinovic
19. Haris Fejzic
20. Mustafa Pavlakic

And in the Logistics department of the Supreme Command of Armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Split following persons:

1. Refik Duran
2. Zahid Muharemovic

Necessary actions will be taken in the forthcoming period to regulate the residency of the persons employed in these departments, in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Croatia.
Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina uses this opportunity to repeat the expressions of the deepest respect to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia.

Zagreb, 15th July 1993 /Round Stamp of Embassy/

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the Republic of Croatia

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Military Mission
Zagreb, 31 July 1993

P A Y R O L L
for JULY 1993

Number	FULL NAME	POST	AMOUNT IN DEM /Deutschmark/
1.	Hajrudin OSMANAGIĆ	Assistant Military Attaché	950
2.	Dževad TOPIĆ	Assistant Military Attaché	900
3.	Senad KUBAT	Assistant Military Attaché for IPD /information and propaganda/	900
4.	Blanka VUČAK	Secretary of the Military Attaché	350
5.	Avdo HALILOVIĆ	Chief for Mobilisation /on standby/	400
6.	Stjepan KOZJAN	TC /expansion unknown/ Commander /on standby/	400
7.	Dr Himzo TURKANOVIĆ	Assistant VA /Military Attaché/ for Medical Service /on standby/	400
8.	Fabijan BENO	Assistant VA	500
9.	Fikret BUNIĆ	driver /on standby/	300
10.	Vahida UŠTO	Finance Administrative Officer	500
11.	Amir JAGANJAC	Deputy Chief of CV /communications centre/	500
12.	Dražen BONJAŠ	CV operator	500
13.	Haris KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ	CV operator	500
14.	Sabahudin KAIM	CV operator	500
15.	Nail HUIĆ	Assistant Chief of the Split Branch Office	350
16.	Abid IZMIRLIĆ	Deputy Chief of the Split Branch Office	350
17.	Zahid MUHAREMOVIĆ	Assistant Chief of the Split Branch Office	350
18.	Razija SARAJLIĆ	Chief of General Services	400
19.	Suada PAŠIĆ	typist	350
20.	Almedina HAURDIĆ	Administrative Officer	350
21.	Edhem VUKOVIĆ	Driver in the General Services	300
	total		10,050

For payment by this payroll 10,050 /ten thousand and fifty DEM/. That employees are actually employed and that their salaries are individually paid in accordance with the receipts attached to this payroll, is certified and approved by

drawn up by
Vahida UŠTO
/a signature/

for the MILITARY ATTACHÉ
Hajrudin OSMANAGIĆ
/a stamp and a signature/

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Military delegation

Zagreb, 06th August 1993

SPECIFICATION

of expenditure of funds received from Mr. HASAN ČENGIĆ

Input

29th July 1993 — 20.000 DEM (Deutsche Mark)

Output

31st July 1993	personal income of employees	8.711.- DEM
5th August 1993	phone bill for July 1993	3.864.- DEM
5th August 1993	rent for August 1993	7.425.- DEM

Total: 20.000.- DEM

Debt balance on 06th August 1993 Ø

Drafted by

Ušto Vahida

/handwritten text in German, rounded:
Hasan Čengić has telephoned for the salaries for BiH
Embassy in Croatia 20 000 DM,
Mü, 8th December 1995, PAV /

/handwritten: 1./

ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CENTER FOR LOGISTICS SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

ZAGREB — SAMOBOR GROUP

Received from Hasan Čengić through Šeta Šuajb:

NR.	NAME AND LAST NAME	DATE	CURRENCY	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
1.	HUSIKA EJUB	8 JAN 1993	DEM	500	SALARY FOR 12/92
2.	ZORLAK FADIL	6 JAN 1993	DEM	200	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
3.	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	7 JAN 1993	DEM	1000	WAGES FOR DRIVERS
4.	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	7 JAN 1993	HRD	12000 (1 DEM= 560 HRD)	WAGES FOR DRIVERS
5.	KALAJDŽIĆ SULEJMAN	8 JAN 1993	DEM	6000	CONVOY FOR VISOKO
6.	BUBIĆ MUHAMED	8 JAN 1993	DEM	7900	SECOND PORTION OF THE COST FOR VESTS FOR / illegible/
7.	HORMAN IZET	5 JAN 1993	DEM	500	TRANSPORT OF TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT /illegible/
8.	KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ AZIZ	22 DEC 1992	DEM	300	FUEL AND TRIP TO AUSTRIA
9.	SELIMOVIĆ MIDHAT	23 DEC 1992	DEM	2500	CONVOY FOR VLASENICA
10.	ŠAHBAZ ŠEMSUDIN	21 DEC 1992	DEM	1800	CONVOY AND WAGES FOR DRIVERS TO VISOKO
11.	MAHMUTOVIĆ SELVER	21 DEC 1992	DEM	900	BILL FOR HOTEL IN ZAGREB
12.	MUJEZINOVIĆ ALEM	22 DEC 1992	HRD	350000 (1 DEM= 520)	WAGES FOR WAREHOUSE WORKERS
13.	ZORLAK FADIL	22 DEC 1992	HRD	50000 (1 DEM=520)	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
14.	ZORLAK FADIL	21 DEC 1992	DEM	1000	GAS FOR THE HOUSE
15.	ZORLAK FADIL	9 DEC 1992	HRD	200000 (1 DEM = 470)	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
16.	KALAJDŽIĆ SULEJMAN	6 JAN 1993	DEM	500	SALARY FOR 12/92
17.	RIZVANOVIĆ MUSTAFA	3 JAN 1993	DEM	500	SALARY FOR 12/92
18.	MUJEZINOVIĆ ALEM	31 DEC 1992	DEM	300	SALARY FOR 12/92
19.	HORMAN IZET	31 DEC 1992	DEM	300	TRANSPORT OF TRUCKS (1) FOR /illegible/
20.	ZORLAK FADIL	31 DEC 1992	DEM	200	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES

/handwritten: ∑ = 24.400 DEM ; 612.000 HRD/

/handwritten: 2./

ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CENTER FOR LOGISTICS SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

ZAGREB — SAMOBOR GROUP

Received from Hasan Čengić through Šeta Šuajb:

NR.	NAME AND LAST NAME	DATE	CURRENCY	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
1.	ZORLAK FADIL	31 DEC 1992	DEM	500	SALARY FOR 12/92
2	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	31 DEC 1992	DEM	700	SALARY FOR 12/92
3	SINANAGIĆ MEVLUDIN	31 DEC 1992	DEM	500	SALARY FOR 12/92
4	MEMIĆ MUZAFER	31 DEC 1992	DEM	500	SALARY FOR 12/92
5	KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ AZIM	30 DEC 1992	DEM	200	TRIP TO AUSTRIA

6	KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ AZIM	28 DEC 1992	DEM	110	FUEL AND OFFICE SUPPLIES
7	LOKVANČIĆ SAMIR	30 DEC 1992	DEM	7000	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS AND CONVOY WITH EQUIPMENT FOR VISOKO
8	MEMIĆ MUZAFER	30 DEC 1992	DEM	350	BILLS AND CAR REPAIR
9	RIZVANOVIĆ MUSTAFA	30 DEC 1992	DEM	700	DEBTS ACCORDING TO BILLS /illegible/ CONVOY FROM 11/92
10	MEMIĆ MUZAFER	30 DEC 1992	HRD	400000	WAGES FOR WAREHOUSE WORKERS
11	FEJZIĆ FARUK	28 DEC 1992	DEM	1500	OFFICIAL TRIP ZG-VI-ZG
12	ČEPALO ABDULAH	28 DEC 1992	DEM	400	WAGES FOR DRIVERS FOR DONJI VAKUF
13	ŠABIĆ TARIK	28 DEC 1992	DEM	1000	OFFICIAL TRIP ZG-ST-ZG
14	ZORLAK FADIL	27 DEC 1992	HRD	100000 (1 DEM= 550)	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
15	LOKVANČIĆ SAMIR	27 DEC 1992	DEM	150	PAYMENT ACCORDING TO BILLS FOR /illegible/
16	LOKVANČIĆ SAMIR	27 DEC 1992	HRD	10000 (1 DEM=550)	PAYMENT ACCORDING TO BILLS FOR /illegible/
17	PALISLAMOVIĆ ALIJA	26 DEC 1992	DEM	840	WAGES FOR 12+1 DRIVERS FROM VISOKO
18	VEHABOIVĆ MIRHAD	17 DEC 1992	DEM	1700	WAGES AND ARRIVAL OF 3 TRUCKS FROM SPLIT
19	VEHABOVIĆ MIRHAD	17 DEC 1992	DEM	1000	WAGES AND ARRIVAL OF 3 TRUCKS FROM SPLIT
20	FEJZIĆ FARUK	17 DEC 1992	DEM	700	OFFICIAL TRIP ZG-VI-ZG

/handwritten: ∑ = 17.850 DEM; 510.000 HRD/

/handwritten: 3./

ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CENTER FOR LOGISTICS SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

ZAGREB — SAMOBOR GROUP

Received from Hasan Čengić through Šeta Šuajb:

NR.	NAME AND LAST NAME	DATE	CURRENCY	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
1	KALAJDŽIĆ SULEJMAN	17 DEC 1992	DEM	8000	CONVOY OF MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT FOR VISOKO
2	ŠABIĆ TARIK	16 DEC 1992	DEM	2000	DEBT FOR PERSONAL EXPENSE FOR CONVOY ON 23RD OF NOVEMBER
3	MEMIĆ MUZAFER	17 DEC 1992	HRD	200000	WAGES FOR NINE WAREHOUSE WORKERS
4	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	21 NOV 1992	HRD	300000 (1 DEM = 400 HRD)	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS
5	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	21 NOV 1992	DEM	1000	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS
6	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	22 NOV 1992	DEM	300	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS
7	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	18 NOV 1992	DEM	300	REPLACING THE BROKEN DRIVER'S WINDSHIELD
8	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	24 NOV 1992	HRD	135000	CAR MAINTENANCE
9	KALADŽIĆ SULEJMAN	26 DEC 1992	DEM	4000	CONVOY OF 6 EIGHTEEN WHEELERS /ILLEGIBLE/ FOR VISOKO
10	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	26 DEC 1992	DEM	1300	ARRIVAL OF 4 EIGHTEEN WHEELERS (ŠAJA'S TRUCKS)
11	HUSIKA EJUB	16 DEC 1992	HRD	2000000 (1 DEM = 400 HRD)	CONVOY FOR VISOKO
12	HUSIKA EJUB	16 DEC 1992	DEM	5000	CONVOY FOR VISOKO
13	LOKVANČIĆ SAMIR	16 DEC 1992	DEM	2500	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FOR CONVOY FOR VISOKO
14	MEŠETOVIĆ SAUDIN	13 NOV 1992	DEM	1300	SECOND-HAND TIRES FOR TRUCKS
15	MEŠETOVIĆ SAUDIN	14 NOV 1992	HRD	2704000 (DEM = 390 HRD)	SECOND-HAND TIRES FOR TRUCKS
16	KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ AZIM	14 NOV 1992	DEM	250	EXPENSES
17	FRLJAK VEJSIL	21 NOV 1992	HRD	45000	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS
18	ČIZMO ŠEMSUDIN	21 NOV 1992	HRD	150000	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS
19	HEDŽIĆ MURADA	13 NOV 1992	HRD	40000	WAGES FOR THE FIVE WAREHOUSE WORKERS
20	ŠAHINPAŠIĆ SENAD	15 NOV 1992	DEM	5000	EXPENSES

/handwritten: ∑ = 30.950 DEM; 5.574.000 HRD/

/handwritten: 4./

ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CENTER FOR LOGISTICS SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

ZAGREB — SAMOBOR GROUP

Received from Hasan Čengić through Šeta Šuajb:

NR.	NAME AND LAST NAME	DATE	CURRENCY	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
1.	HADŽIĆ IBRAHIM	13 NOV 1992	DEM	150000	PURCHASE OF WHEAT FOR KRAJINA
2.	TINJIĆ DŽEVDET	13 NOV 1992	DEM	250000	NEEDS FOR TUZLA AND BUGOJNO
3.	TINJIĆ DŽEVDET	13 NOV 1992	USD	250000	NEEDS FOR TUZLA AND BUGOJNO
4.	ALIĆ ESAD	14 NOV 1992	HRD	45000	ADVANCED PAYMENTS FOR WAGES IN WAREHOUSE
5.	ZORLAK FADIL	22 OCT 1992	DEM	900	GAS FOR THE HOUSE
6.	ZORLAK FADIL	22 OCT 1992	HRD	50000	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
7.	ZORLAK FADIL	3 NOV 1992	DEM	400	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
8.	ŠABIĆ NEŠAD	9 NOV 1992	DEM	12000	CONVOY FOR GRADAČAC
9.	MUŠANOVIĆ MIRALEM	9 NOV 1992	DEM	400	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS
10.	ZORLAK FADIL	9 NOV 1992	DEM	300	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
11.	ŠAHIĆ DŽEMAL	2 NOV 1992	DEM	300	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FROM BREZA
12.	GANIĆ ASIF	2 NOV 1992	DEM	300	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FROM VISOKO
13.	MUŠANOVIĆ MIRALEM	3 NOV 1992	DEM	400	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FROM ‘’CENTARTRANS”
14.	ZORLAK FADIL	3 NOV 1992	DEM	400	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FROM ILIDŽA
15.	ZORLAK FADIL	25 OCT 1992	DEM	1800	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FROM ILIDŽA
16.	ZORLAK FADIL	25 OCT 1992	HRD	80000	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FROM ILIDŽA
17.	ČIZMO ŠEMSO	25 OCT 1992	HRD	50000	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FROM VISOKO
18.	ČIZMO ŠEMSO	25 OCT 1992	DEM	1000	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FROM VISOKO
19.	ŠAHIĆ DŽEMAL	25 OCT 1992	DEM	400	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FROM BREZA
20.	ŠAHIĆ DŽEMAL	25 OCT 1992	HRD	80000	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS FROM BREZA

/handwritten: ∑ = 418.600 DEM; 250.000 USD; 350.000 HRD/

/handwritten: 5./

ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CENTER FOR LOGISTICS SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

ZAGREB — SAMOBOR GROUP

Received from Hasan Čengić through Šeta Šuajb:

NR.	NAME AND LAST NAME	DATE	CURRENCY	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
1.	MUŠANOVIĆ MIRALEM	25 OCT 1992	DEM	400	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS ‘’CENTARTRANS”
2.	MUŠANOVIĆ MIRALEM	25 OCT 1992	HRD	20000	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS ‘’CENTARTRANS”
3.	KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ A.	12 NOV 1992	DEM	5200	RENT FOR THE WAREHOUSE
4.	LOKVANČIĆ SAMIR	18 OCT 1992	DEM	14000	CONVOY
5.	ČIZMO ŠEMSO	20 OCT 1992	HRD	56000	WAGES FOR 14 DRIVERS FROM VISOKO
6.	SKULIĆ MUKIB	20 OCT 1992	HRD	15000	WAGES FOR 14 DRIVERS FROM TEŠANJ
7.	MANDRA SALEM	20 OCT 1992	DEM	200	REPARATION OF TRUCK
8.	ZORBIĆ NIJAZ	25 OCT 1992	DEM	16000	PURCHASE OF MT EQUIPMENT AND /illegible/ FOR PDV
9.	LOKVANČIĆ SAMIR	21 NOV 1992	DEM	100	FUEL
10.	MEMIĆ MUZAFER	18 NOV 1992	DEM	200	WAGES FOR WAREHOUSE WORKERS

11.	MEMIĆ MUZAFER	18 NOV 1992	HRD	150000 (1 DEM = 460 HRD)	WAGES FOR WAREHOUSE WORKERS
12.	ALIĆ ESAD	18 NOV 1992	HRD	70000 (1 DEM = 460)	WAGES FOR WAREHOUSE WORKERS
13.	KALAJDŽIĆ SULEJMAN	12 DEC 1992	DEM	350	TRIP AND REPAIR OF ''MERCEDES"
14.	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	16 DEC 1992	DEM	7700	CONVOY OF MT EQUIPMENT
15.	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	16 DEC 1992	HRD	5150000	CONVOY OF MT EQUIPMENT
16.	SINANAGIĆ MEVLUDIN	6 DEC 1992	DEM	250	CURED MEAT
17.	SINANAGIĆ MEVLUDIN	6 DEC 1992	DEM	850	CAR MAINTENANCE, TIRES
18.	EFENDIĆ HASAN	5 DEC 1992	DEM	10000	SALARIES FOR MILITARY /illegible/
19.	JAŠARPAHIĆ MUNIR	5 DEC 1992	DEM	650	CONVOY TWO DRIVERS VISOKO
20.	EFENDIĆ HASAN	5 DEC 1992	DEM	1600	CONVOY, 3 TRUCKS /illegible/ FOR HRASNICA

/handwritten: ∑ = 57.500 DEM; 5.461.000 HRD/

ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CENTER FOR LOGISTICS SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

ZAGREB — SAMOBOR GROUP

Received from Hasan Čengić through Šeta Šuajb:

NR.	NAME AND LAST NAME	DATE	CURRENCY	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
1.	ŠAHIMPAŠIĆ SENAD	4 DEC 1992	DEM	40000	100 PCS MORTARS, 130 MM
2.	MEŠETOVIĆ SAUDIN	4 DEC 1992	DEM	35000	SPARE PARTS FOR TRUCK, VISOKO REGION
3.	MEŠETOVIĆ SAUDIN	7 DEC 1992	DEM	15000	SPARE PARTS FOR TRUCK, VISOKO REGION
4.	POŠKOVIĆ ASAF	18 NOV 1992	DEM	100	ADVANCED PAYMENT FOR WAREHOUSE WORK
5.	HEDŽIĆ MURADA	18 NOV 1992	HRD	40000 (1 DEM = 400)	SECOND ADVANCE PAYMENT FOR WAREHOUSE WORKERS
6.	SELMANOVIĆ ALIJA	18 NOV 1992	DEM	400	WAGES FOR 4 DRIVERS FROM HRASNICA
7.	HAVIĆ IBRAHIM	18 NOV 1992	HRD	38000	ADVANCED PAYMENT FOR WAGES FOR WORKERS / illegible/
8.	ZORLAK FADIL	8 DEC 1992	HRD	50000 (1 DEM = 470)	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
9.	HAVIĆ IBRO	20 NOV 1992	DEM	800	WAGES FOR WORK IN THE WAREHOUSE
10.	POŠKOVIĆ ASAF	20 NOV 1992	DEM	100	WAGES FOR WORK IN THE WAREHOUSE
11.	ZORLAK FADIL	18 NOV 1992	HRD	50000 (1 DEM = 400 HRD)	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
12.	ZORLAK FADIL	21 NOV 1992	HRD	60000 (1 DEM = 415 HRD)	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
13.	MUJEZINOVIĆ ALEM	29 NOV 1992	HRD	20000 (1 DEM = 430 HRD)	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
14.	KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ AZIM	3 DEC 1992	DEM	200	EXPENSES FOR TRIP TO WIENA
15.	RIZVANOVIĆ I MEMIĆ	14 NOV 1992	DEM	350 (each 175,00)	WAGES FOR 19 WORKERS, IN 2 DAYS, /illegible/
16.	HUSIKA EJUB	3 NOV 1992	DEM	3200	CONVOYS AND WAGES FOR DRIVERS
17.	MEŠETOVIĆ SAUDIN	17 NOV 1992	HRD	4375000 (1 DEM = 398 HRD)	OIL AND FLUID FOR /illegible/ FOR LC VISOKO
18.	JAŠARSPAHIĆ MUNIR	17 NOV 1992	DEM	1500	SPARE PARTS FOR TRUCKS FROM VISOKO/ PHONE BILL
19.	ČELEBIĆ NIHAD	20 NOV 1992	DEM	1850	17-DAYS /illegible/ FOR 5 TRUCKS FROM VISOKO AND / illegible/
20.	JAŠARSPAHIĆ MUNIR	19 NOV 1992	DEM	2200	PAYMENT OF RESIDUAL DABTS FOR DRIVERS AND / illegible/ FROM VISOKO

/handwritten: ∑ = 100.700 DEM; 4.633.000 HRD/

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ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CENTER FOR LOGISTICS SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

ZAGREB — SAMOBOR GROUP

Received from Hasan Čengić through Šeta Šuajb:

NR.	NAME AND LAST NAME	DATE	CURRENCY	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
1.	POVLAKIĆ MUSTAFA	15 APR 1993	DEM	2300	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS
2.	PECIKOZA FAHRUDIN	19 APR 1993	DEM	5000	EXPENSES FOR ''FAZLA"
3.	KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ AMIR	19 APR 1993	DEM	300	HONORARIUM FROM 10 FEB TILL 10 MAR
4.	SINANAGIĆ MEVLUDIN	19 APR 1993	DEM	3000	DEBT ACCORDING TO BILL FROM 10/92
5.	POVLAKIĆ MUSTAFA	21 APR 1993	DEM	2200	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS
6.	DŽELILOVIĆ MUSTAFA	21 APR 1993	DEM USD	9400	CIGARETTES AND /illegible/ FOR 8 AND 9 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE OF RBIH ARMED FORCES
7.	DŽELILOVIĆ MUSTAFA	21 APR 1993	USD	6300	FOR DEPUTIES 8 AND 9 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE
8.	HUSIKA EJUB	22 APR 1993	DEM	6000	CONVOY, 6 EIGHTEENWHEELERS FOR GORAŽDE
9.	KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ AZIM	22 APR 1993	DEM	330	EXPENSES ACCORDING TO THE BILLS
10.	ZORLAK FADIL	23 APR 1993	DEM	500	HOUSEHOLD
11.	MEMIĆ MUZAFER	23 APR 1993	DEM	200	WAGES FOR WAREHOUSE WORKERS
12.	PAJT BURADIF	24 APR 1993	USD	11900	2 TACTICAL SNIPERS 12,7 FOR /illegible/
13.	NEDŽAD ŠADIĆ	24 APR 1993	USD	18600	FOR MT EQUIPMENT FOR 208 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE OF RBIH ARMED FORCES
14.	POVLAKIĆ MUSTAFA	26 APR 1993	DEM	2500	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS (22) CONCLUDED WITH 26 APRIL
15.	ZORLAK FADIL	27 APR 1993	DEM	500	HOUSEHOLD
16.	MOČEVIĆ ELVEDIN	29 APR 1993	DEM	800	OFFICIAL TRIP TO PLOČE
17.	RIZVANOVIĆ MUSTAFA	29 APR 1993	DEM	200	PARTS FOR CARS AND BILL FOR THE FUEL
18.	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	29 APR 1993	DEM	1000	ADVANCED PAYMENT FOR CONVOY IN GRUDE
19.	REĐEDOVIĆ TAHIR	29 APR 1993	DEM	1040	/illegible/
20.	LOKVANČIĆ SAMIR	29 APR 1993	DEM	6200	DEBT ACCORDING TO THE BILLS FROM /illegible/ CONVOY
21.	BEŠLAGIĆ EMIR	29 APR 1993	DEM	2000	DEBT ACCORDING TO THE BILLS FROM /illegible/ CONVOY
22.	POVLAKIĆ MUSTAFA	1 MAY 1993	DEM	2000	DEBT FOR 18 DRIVERS CONCLUDED WITH 1 MAY 1993

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ARMY OF REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CENTER FOR LOGISTICS SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

ZAGREB — SAMOBOR GROUP

Received from Hasan Čengić through Šeta Šuajb:

NR.	NAME AND LAST NAME	DATE	CURRENCY	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
1.	ČEDOMIR NOVAK	4 MAY 1993	DEM	15000	RENT UNTIL 12 DEC 1993
2.	ŠABIĆ TARIK	3 MAY 1993	DEM	7000	TO BE DELIVERED TO BEŠLAGIĆ AND /illegible/
3.	POVLAKIĆ MUSTAFA	4 MAY 1993	DEM	2000	WAGES FOR THE DRIVERS (20) CONCLUDED WITH 6 MAY 1993
4.	ŠABIĆ TARIK	4 MAY 1993	DEM	3000	TO BE DELIVERED TO HUSIKA
5.	ZORLAK FADIL	8 MAY 1993	DEM	300	HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES
6.	UŠTO VAHIDA	10 MAY 1993	DEM	12000000 HRD 9000 DEM	RENT AND PHONE FOR /illegible/ MISSION
7.	POVLAKIĆ MUSTAFA	11 MAY 1993	DEM	2000	WAGES FOR 20 DRIVERS CONCLUDED WITH 11 MAY 1993
8.	SINANAGIĆ MEVLUDIN	13 MAY 1993	DEM	2000	1320 FOR SUFA'S APARTMENT AND 680 FOR EXPENSES
9.	MEMIĆ MUZAFER	13 MAY 1993	DEM	200	WAGES FOR WORKERS AND 100 FOR EXPENSES FOR / illegible/

21.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ARMY TRAINING CENTRES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
120

Training centres in the Republic of Croatia in which members of BH Army were trained
1991 - 1992
Names of some places:
- Zagreb – Borongaj
- Zagreb – Sljeme
- Zagreb – Svetošimunska
- Jastrebarsko
- Zdenčina
- Plješivica
- Kutina – Žutica
- Sisak – Žažina
- Rijeka – Klana
- Delnice
- Đakovo – Zelengaj
- Vrgorac – Dragljan
SLOVENIJA
HRVATSKA
MAGYARORSZÁG
Ljubljana
Zagreb
Rijeka
Trieste
Split
Zadar
Sisak
Osijek
Vukovar
Sarajevo
Mostar
Zenica
Prijedor
Bihać
Knin
Šibenik
Dubrovnik
Kranj
Celje
Gorizia
Novo Mesto
Karlovac
Ogulin
Rovinj
Pula
Senj
Gračac
Benkovac
Sinj
Livno
Konjic
Foča
Pljevlja
Trebinje
Nikšić
Vis
Blato
Stolac
Bjelašnica
Maglić
Pécs
Baja
Mohács
Sombor
Apatin
Vinkovci
Slavonski Brod
Nova Gradiška
Derventa
Vlasenica
Bugojno
Donji Vakuf
Travnik
Tuzla
Brčko
Bijeljina
Loznica
Sremska Mitrovica
Vrbas
Požega
Daruvar
Virovitica
Bjelovar
Križevci
Koprivnica
Kočevje
Črnomelj
Monfalcone
Kvarner
Sea

/Fax marks/ July 00 1000 14:04 headquarters SDA Sarajevo fax: 071 510007
page 1

Party of democratic action
Sarajevo
Maršala Tita street no. 7-a/IV

/stamp/
SDA
Party of Democratic Action Sarajevo
NO: 1258/91
Date: 8th of July 1991

List of candidates for training of specialists in MUP of the Republic of Croatia

/handwritten:/
Dr. Brajko Brnčić

/round stamp of SDA/

Secretary of the SDA
/signed/

Sarajevo, 8th of July 1991

Party of Democratic Action
Sarajevo
Maršal Tito st. No. 7-a/IV

List of candidates for training of specialists in MUP of the Republic of Croatia
/ list of persons with their names, father's name, date of birth and address/

1.	Sofić (Safet) Naim	born	19.12.1962., St. Partizanska Fojnica 139
2.	Mukoča (Ibrahim) Samir	″	21.05.1969., Pločari Polje Fojnica
3.	Mukoča (Alija) Halid	″	21.05.1962., Pločari Polje Fojnica
4.	Omerčević (Refik) Amir	″	18.09.1964., Ragole 25, Fojnica
5.	Bukvić (Adem) Samir	″	07.02.1969., Pločari Polje nn, Fojnica
6.	Tulumović (Ibro) Maid	″	08.01.1969., Sčitovo Polje nn, Fojnica
7.	Mešić (Fadil) Mustafa	″	20.03.1963., Rike Vrička 35, Fojnica
8.	Huzbašić (Mustafa) Ibrahim	″	23.05.1969., Pridola nn, Fojnica
9.	Fejzić (Avdo) Munib	″	16.09.1968., Dusina nn, Fojnica
10.	Kurta (Alija) Muradif	″	01.01.1969., Ostružnica 34, Fojnica
11.	Nuhanović (Alija) Haris	″	20.12.1969., Sčitovo Polje nn, Fojnica
12.	Bigdanić (Ibro) Rusmir	″	09.09.1963., Alanporka 38, Fojnica
13.	Pašić (Behazija) Refik	″	16.06.1969., Pridola nn, Fojnica
14.	Ramić (Ibrahim) Zihnija	″	28.04.1969., Cemernica, Fojnica
15.	Durić (Avdo) Latif	″	20.11.1971., Rijeka 24, Fojnica
16.	Mujin Nijaz	″	03.08.1970., Kozica nn, Fojnica
17.	Čehajić (Esad) Suad		1970., Orodjac, Visoko
18.	Genjac (Sulejman) Zihnija		1963., Podrinje, Visoko
19.	Spahić (Ibrahim) Fuad		1964., Podvinjci, Visoko
20.	Imamović (Ćamil) Ibrahim		1967., H. Muzaferija 8, Visoko
21.	Javorovac (Hilmo) Sele		1966., Selo Čitluk, Visoko
22.	Sehić (Avdo) Selver		1963., Selo Kološići, Visoko
23.	Bašić (Nusret) Dženan		1970., Selo Srhinje, Visoko
24.	Džafić (Muhamed) Sead		1968., Selo Ginje, Visoko
25.	Mahmut Spahić (Husein) Hasan		1967., Selo D. Seoča, Visoko
26.	Bučuk (Ismet) Izet		1965., Selo M. Trnovci, Visoko
27.	Huseljić (Halid) Adem		1971., Selo Tušnjići, Visoko
28.	Šaljić (Derviš) Dževad	″	01.01.1971., St. Sulje Jahića 59, Sar
29.	Bašović (Islam) Behudin	″	25.09.1963., St. Izeta Čamore 100, Ilidža
30.	Bašović (Islam) Fahrudin	″	28.10.1974., St. Izeta Čamore 100, Ilidža
31.	Bašović (Islam) Džemko	″	14.01.1967., St. Izeta Čamore 100, Ilidža

***

456. Hukić Safet	1971., Bijelašnička 124, Ilidža
457. Hukić Sulejman	1968., Bijelašnička 124, Ilidža
458. Kasapović Mevsudin	1969., Barska 30L, Ilidža
459. Mrakoviović Šahim	1959., Sl. Suha, Živinice
460. Huseinović Ibrahim	1965., Sl. Zelenika, Živinice
461. Zukić Fuad	1963., Sl. Bašigovci, Živinice
462. Dedić Fahudin	1968., G. Dubrane, Živinice
463. Bešić Ševal	1969., Gračanica-Živinice

/handwritten:
Concluded with ordinal number 463 you shall receive the resumption to this list in 7 days.
Rasim Muharemović
SDA Sarajevo /

/signed and stamped/

D-91a

Fax header: 24 June 1992 0125 hours 041 451 511 Republic of → Croatia GS001/001

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

S A R A J E V O

Number: 01-389/92
Sarajevo, 23 June 1992

To: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
ZAGREB

We hereby inform you that today, 110 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina were sent from Kumanovo to Zagreb, departing at 1900 hours on 23 June 1992, under the organisation of the Macedonian Red Cross. Considering that a state of war has been declared in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we hereby ask you to equip these citizens of ours in an appropriate way and help them join the Territorial Defence units of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

MINISTER
Jerko DOKO

D-91b

/coat of arms/
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
41 000 ZAGREB

/handwritten enclosure no 1/

7 July 1992

INSTRUCTION OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE TO
ALL COMMANDS OF THE CROATIAN ARMY

Directing or usage of the Croatian Army is not allowed to any commander outside the Croatian borders. All those who do so, without the explicit order from the Supreme Commander, shall bear the consequences for their actions. If the volunteers from the Croatian troops, originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina, wish to go to the battlefield and defend their homes, the commanders are not allowed to stop them within these intentions.

Minister of Defense

Gojko Šušak
/signed and stamped/

(Coat of arm)

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
OFFICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Zagreb, Savska cesta 41/XI
phone: 041/537-161,537-160, fax: 536-702
MILITARY DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

GENERAL STAFF OF CROATIAN ARMY
COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD
Mr. General Janko BOBETKO

Zagreb, 26th January 1993
Our No.: 05-829/93
Your No.:

Military delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia express their high admiration of the Commander of the National Guard, Mr. General Bobetko and kindly request for an emergency meeting regarding resolution of the following issues:

1. Continuation of the arrangement and establishment of the Collection Centre - Camp in the areas of contact of Croatian-Serbian inhabitants of Lika and Kordun, and consequent formation of larger centres and groups up to the size of a battalion-brigade, entering in the area of the 5th Corps responsibility;
2. Purchase and other forms of procurement of military equipment;
3. Elements of combat cooperation and collaboration between Croatian Army and 5th Corps in order to achieve penetration and maintenance of the Croatia corridor - area of the 5th Corps responsibility;
4. Maintaining an air connection Croatia – 5th Corps;
5. Other issues.

Assistant Secretary for Military Affairs of the 5th Corps, Brigadier Hajrudin Osmanagić will attend the meeting.

Thank you kindly in advance.

With sincere regards,

MILITARY DELEGATION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
/signature/
SECRETARY FOR MILITARY AFFAIRS
Brigadier Hasan EFENDIĆ

/stamp illegible/

NO: 4/92

Testimony of the witness Filip Filipović in case IT-04-74

Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General Filipovic. I'm going to do my best to make my questions clear, as precise as a Swiss watch. So just say, Yes, No, or you don't know; affirmative, negative, or you don't know about what I'm going to ask you.

Here's the first matter: You said that in May 1992, in Travnik, 50 buses arrived with roughly one and a half thousand Muslim soldiers. Now, my question is this: From which country had they come to Travnik?

A. They came from Croatia. They couldn't have come from any other country.

Q. Do you know, the buses that they came in, did they mostly have Croatian license plates or BH license plates?

A. Exclusively Croatian license plates.

Q. Do you know which the last town they rallied in before they went to BH was?

A. No.

Q. Do you know which route they took towards Travnik? Where did they pass by?

A. I do know that. They could have come in from Prozor, Makljen, Gornji Vakuf, Novi Travnik, Travnik.

Q. Across Mount Vran, following the salvation road; right?

A. Yes, Tomislavgrad road of salvation.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. The people up there, were they wearing military uniforms when they arrived and did they have weapons?

A. They had both uniforms and weapons, and were already a unit.

Q. Can we, therefore, conclude that they received weapons in Croatia, and uniforms, too, and became a unit when there was an embargo enforced by the United Nations?

A. Correct.

Q. Now my question: Do you know whether anybody from Sarajevo, the government, the ministers, or whatever, gave any money to procure the weapons, uniforms, buses, the dredges along the road of salvation, or did you, yourself, ever, as a soldier of the HVO or anybody else, any remuneration or any material resources, weapons and so on, from what we call the government in Sarajevo?

A. The government in Sarajevo had nothing to do with this subject, the arrival of the units in Travnik.

Q. Did you, as the HVO of Central Bosnia, at any time receive any salaries from the central government, or weapons, shoes, uniforms; anything?

A. Never, nothing.

Q. Yesterday, we saw a document on the type of weapons in possession of the Army of BiH. My question would be this: In Bosnia-Herzegovina, was there, under the control of the BH Army or the HVO, any factory which

Page 47613

manufactured rifles, automatic rifles, light machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns, cannons with one, two, or three barrels, or four barrels, Bofors weapons, ZIS multi-barrelled rocket-launchers, cannon or howitzers, 105, 122, 150-millimetre howitzers, Zolja missiles, malutka missiles, Osa missiles, RPGs or shoulder-propelled rocket-launchers, anything like that? Could any of this be produced in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

A. Nothing except in the Bratstvo factory which I referred to yesterday. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, none of those could have been produced in Bosnia-Herzegovina, except for the large-calibre artillery pieces at the Bratstvo factory in Novi Travnik.

Q. But if it's -- was it possible to find some --

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Ms. Pinter has kindly invited you to wait until a question is interpreted, including allowing some time for translation also. You have been overlapping totally.

Please continue.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So when I said Bratstvo and large-calibre artillery, I meant those that had been manufactured previously. But in 1992 or 1993, it wasn't possible. I don't know about 1994, however.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Mr. Filipovic, the stock of finished products at Bratstvo, how was this divvied up between the HVO and the BiH Army?

A. I think I explained this already. Well, the basic thing was this: We had to agree on a single opinion, in view of the distribution of those numerous pieces there and in terms of political and military

Page 47614

actors on both sides, such as Genjac, Tamburic, and some other individuals. So one-third went to the southern front-line, as per agreement, because down there Muslims and Croats fought together, hand by hand. One-third went to the Army of BiH, to Visoko, to their central depot. And one-third was left to me in the area where I was accepted as commander, to be shared with the Muslims, and this is what happened.

Q. So the last third you divvied up between the Army of BiH and the HVO in the area where you were responsible; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. My question is as follows: If we were to -- if that -- weapons that you saw in the possession of BH Army could have been taken from the Chetniks, could have been there from previous times, or could have arrived from Croatia? Out of those three possibilities, what would be the correct answer, A, B, or C?

A. Well, each of them, in part, but 90 per cent is the answer C or the latter.

Q. So 90 per cent of the weapons came from Croatia; is that your answer?

A. Yes, that's my answer.
Q. Did the Army of BiH have communications such as packet radio service or satellite telephones?
A. Yes, they did have.
Q. Did those complicated, sophisticated electronic equipment -- was it manufactured in Bosnia or was it procured through Croatia?
A. It wasn't manufactured in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It came from the

Page 47615

territory of Croatia.
Q. Fine. General Filipovic, šir, 1993, Jajce fell -- or 1992, Jajce fell. Did you immediately -- after the fall of Jajce, did you see me in Travnik?
A. In Travnik.
Q. Tell me the following, please: The Travnik HVO, where did it end up? Did it stay in the area of Travnik and Bugojno? And the Jajce HVO, the HVO forces from Jajce, after being defeated, did they stay in Travnik or did they go towards Croatia?
A. Since up to that point Jajce saw fierce battles and manned 100 kilometres of front, and there were 4.000 fighters, half of them HVO, half of them BiH Army or the Territorial Defence, those 4.000 fighters came to the area of Travnik. And with respect to the HVO, although we tried to stop them there, make them stay there, they went and took the salvation road to Croatia, and those Muslim fighters from Jajce stayed in the area of Travnik, and some of them in the area of Zenica.
Q. Did the same thing happen with the Croatian and Muslim civilians, the population? So is it true that civilians, Croats from Jajce, went to Croatia, and Muslim civilians left in the area of Travnik, Bugojno, Zenica, et cetera?
A. The fighters would not have left had the civilians stayed. Fighters left because of the civilians leaving, and the Muslim civilians stayed in the area.
Q. You just discussed this. It disrupted the ethnic balance and gave rise to a host of problems, that fact. So is it true that the

Page 47616

refugees who were driven out of Central Bosnia by the Serbs, additionally complicated and brought this problem to a head?
A. The problem of refugees arriving from other areas was already present there. But when the Jajce Muslims came to the area, and we're talking about more than 20.000 people from the whole municipality of Jajce, was the final blow to the relations among the peoples in the Lasva River Valley.
Q. So we are faced with a thesis of the Prosecution to the effect that Praljak came up there so that we could occupy that area, drive out the Muslims, and annex the whole area to Croatia. My question to you is this: Logically speaking, how could it be possible for us to leave a

whole armed brigade to enter the area, leave our people and fighters and civilians, to leave and let the alleged opponent to stay, all in order for us to attack the Muslims and drive them away? Isn't it logical, in your opinion?

A. The fall of Jajce did not mean just the fall of the Jajce municipality, but also part of the Travnik municipality, and another 10.000 people, and in an area which was exclusively defended by the TO or the Army of BiH. And the front-lines of the HVO were held firm, and they repelled further advances from the Serbs. And when you came to that area, you helped the Muslims more than the Croats, because the Croats had held firm, although you did help us as well, because personally you visited two prominent elevations with me where you could see that the HVO was holding firm in the defence of the area of Central Bosnia.

Q. Now, Mr. Filipovic, could you please tell Their Honours whether I

Page 47617

managed to assist more the Army of BiH and create co-operation up there - that's under A; under B, was Travnik shelled by the Serbs, and to what extent? Please relate that situation to Their Honours, what we did and what I did in that area, briefly. Did we manage to save Travnik, for instance?

A. Well, the Territorial Defence or the Army of BiH in Travnik was on the brink of complete disarray because exactly happened what I just explained. One-third of the territory of Travnik municipality was cleansed of its population, and particularly the inability of Hamandjici [phoen], Softici and other units who were holding the front-line there. There was panic in that area. The HVO was not cool-headed about that, because the situation was very grave.

Two days after the fall of Jajce, Alija Izetbegovic stated that the HVO was to blame for the fall of Jajce, which was blasphemous, as some other of his statements.

I personally took it the hardest throughout the war, the fact that Jajce fell, because I've invested quite a lot of time and my life force, and I was wounded, and my investment was in the defence of the Jajce area. And the fall of Jajce brought into question the defence of Travnik, which until that point had not been jeopardised.

Q. Mr. Filipovic, I was a volunteer, a high officer in the Croatian Army, assistant minister of defence. Which high officer of the BiH Army walked with me on the hilltops, forced people to dig trenches, organised the defence? Who, among the ranks of the BiH Army, was there with me?

A. Nobody, nobody, not a single person.

Page 47618

Q. And where were Valenta's [as interpreted] three battalions, and why didn't they attack Komer [phoen] and extend the corridor towards Jajce? Who was Lendo? Did he have three reserve battalions, and why didn't he attack Komer earlier on, thereby expanding the corridor towards

Jajce.

MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] A correction to the transcript. Line nine, it says "Valenta's three battalions." It's "Lendo's three battalions," just to avoid any misunderstanding later on. So could that be corrected. "Lendo" is the name.

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said that there was disorganisation in Travnik and Novi Travnik, so Novi Travnik wasn't supposed to have any consequences from the fall of Jajce. And the battalions that you're referring to, they should have been active. Now, why they weren't active, I can't say at this point in time. But they had such a favourable position because we held Mravinjac, which is three to four kilometres as the crow flies, and Komer is a strategic bend from the Lasva River Valley to Vrabac.

Q. Do you happen to know where Lendo's family was when this fighting was going on?

A. I don't know. I know that the Lendos are a large family in Opara. Now, where his family was, I really can't say.

Q. Now, while we were organising all this, how many shells did the Serb Army use against Travnik on a daily basis? How many shells were falling on Travnik from the Serb side?

A. The Army of Republika Srpska had positions around Travnik, and

Page 47619

long-range artillery and medium-range artillery was deployed, and there were about a hundred heavy artillery shells falling on the town every day.

Q. Very well. That's what I wanted to learn from you about Travnik. Did we pull out the wounded, all the wounded, did we take care of them, and afterwards did I remain in the area? And to the best of your knowledge, how energetic was I in working towards a rapprochement between the HVO and BH Army?

A. I couldn't follow all your activities, there were so many of them, but I do know that you had an overall influence, or your arrival did, with respect to the defence of Central Bosnia.

Q. Was it negative or positive?

A. I don't think there can be any dilemmas on that score. It was all positive, your positive involvement in matters of defence.

Q. Now look at document 4D01611, please.

Yesterday, there was a question as to where Izetbegovic's signature was.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. On the 14th of June, Mr. Filipovic, had Travnik already fallen? June 1993.

A. From Kiseliak. on the 10th. I crossed over. and on the 11th. I

was engaged in heavy fighting to stabilise the line and to prevent the opposite side from breaking through deeper.

Page 47620

Q. Tell me, at the end of March and beginning of April 1993, did you see me again in the town of Travnik?

A. Yes. I was surprised to see you moving around quite normally in Travnik, without any escorts or anything like that. I came across you, and you were sitting in front of a cafe where nobody usually sat, and you were sitting there alone. That's not the kind of thing we did over there, any of our commanders over there or anybody else.

Q. That's correct. I remember that, too, Mr. Filipovic. But in Travnik, what was the ratio of HVO soldiers compared to the BH Army of the 17th, 7th, or whatever unit? What was the ratio, the proportion of the two sides' soldiers in Travnik in 1993, April?

A. It was a ratio of 5:1, roughly, to the advantage of the BH Army.

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

22.

TREATMENT AND HOSPITALIZATION OF WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF BH ARMY AND CIVILIANS (MOSTLY BOSNIAKS – MUSLIMS) IN HOSPITALS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 1992 – 1995



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
1180 + lists of Croatian hospitals

/logo/ Association of Croatian Physicians Volunteers 1990 – 1991

Zagreb, Ksaver 200, phone: 01 4603 710, fax: 01 4677 087

E-mail: uhld90_91@unhld.hr

Ref. no. 01-11-05/048 no. 124/05

Lieutenant General

Slobodan Praljak

Kraljevec 35, Zagreb

SUBJECT: DATA DELIVERY

Dear Sir,

In line with your request received through the Office for cooperation with Haag tribunal within the Ministry of Justice in Republic of Croatia, we are submitting in the attachment:

1. Preliminary report for the project "Efficiency analysis of war health care" – project leader prof. dr. Andrija Hebrang

2. Data about treated BH citizens during the warfare in BiH in the period between 1992 and 1995, which were treated in health institutions in the Republic of Croatia, namely: Clinical Hospital Dubrava, General Hospital Slavonski Brod, General Hospital Karlovac, General Hospital Vinkovci.

With best regards,

President of the UHLD 90/91

Dr. Juraj Njavro

/signature illegible/

/stamp: ASSOCIATION OF CROATIAN PHYSICIANS VOLUNTEERS 1990 – 1991/

/coat of arms/
/handwritten MK 520/3/
(on the left side Croatian text, on the right English)
CLINICAL HOSPITAL SPLIT
58 000 SPLIT, Spinčićeva 1
CROATIA
Telephone (058) 515-055
Fax: 365 738
Principal's office
Class: 052-01/98-01/08
Operational number: 2181-147-98-01-01-1

Split, 17 June, 1998

The Government of the Republic of Croatia
Department for cooperation with international criminal court
Attn Snježana Bagić, Chief

Dear Madame,

Pursuant to your 15 June 1998 letter, number 15-06/98, we shall fulfil your request; therefore we deliver you information on patients and wounded soldiers from 1992 and 1993, presuming they are Muslims.
Nevertheless, within our medical documentation there is no field "nationality", therefore we decided to cite those patients and wounded soldiers that came from the area of BIH, or were refugees from BIH in Croatia, bearing characteristic Muslim names.
During 1992 and 1993, the employees of health care centre KB "Firule" in Split, in composition of organizational units "Firule", "Križine" and Spa, provided medical services, actually, implemented hospitalization of civilians and military persons of Muslim nationality.
A protocol was conducted for each individual patient, whereby the same were evidenced in protocol books of reception with all relevant indicators. Regarding that all protocols and entire documentation should have been processed digitally, in information centre of KB "Firule" Split, a programme has been created, and accordingly, all relevant indicators (identification data, time of reception and release, diagnosis, patient condition by release etc) were put in the system.
Pursuant to processed material, it is visible that during 1992 and 1993, 3.991 persons of Muslim nationality have been registered, hospitalized and released to obtain the home care after necessary medical treatment, according to the following localities:

Locality "Firule".....3.329
Locality "Križine".....619
Locality Spa.....45

In total: 3.991

All cited data can be used before the International criminal court in The Hague, following the usual procedure.

Sincerely yours,

Principal of the KB Split
Dr. sci. Mihovil Biočić
/signed and stamped/

D-96

FROM PHONE NO. : 00 871 1446255 PØ2

/Bosnian coat of arms/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

President of the Presidency

CLINICAL CENTER FIRULE – SPLIT

Dr. Mihovil Biočić ----------

In the name of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I thank you personally and the staff of your clinic, as well as all others who have helped to care for dr. Ejup Ganić and his entourage who got hurt in a serious car accident. As many times before, your competence and commitment to the humanly vocation of a doctor has given results when it was most needed. This will not be forgotten here.

With expressions of reverence and best wishes,

Sarajevo, July 9th 1995

/signed/

Alija Izetbegović

D-97

JZU MEDICAL CENTER
GRADAČAC
Number: 34/94
Date, 31st March 1994

CLINICAL HOSPITAL CENTER
SPLIT

LETTER OF APPRECIATION

JZU /Public Medical Institution/ Medical center Gradačac, as well as all Medical center's employees express their warmest and most earnest gratitude for the wholehearted and selfless help given to us by the CHC /Clinical Hospital Center/ Split.

In these hard times for an entire BiH and for this suffering people every help is most welcomed, and especially knowing that we're not forgotten and alone in these hard times.

Our staff and our patients are aware of everything that you do and that you have done for us, and we express our big and warm gratitude for everything that you're doing and what you have done in the past times for this entire area.

We also thank Mr. Buna Zanini for his selfless sacrifice and hard work that he's undertaken in these hard times.

D I R E C T O R:

Mehić dr. Sead

/signed/

/round seal with an inscription – PUBLIC MEDICAL INSTITUTION
MEDICAL CENTER GRADAČAC/

SERVICE OF GENERAL MEDICINE /handwritten: 468/

PAZARIĆ

Medical staff for Central and Northern Dalmatia

SPLIT

LETTER OF APPRECIATION

To the citizens of Split, people of the Republic of Croatia and your humanitarian organization, we send expressions of appreciation from the people of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina who are forced to reside on the territory of Pazarić and surrounding villages. Thousands of needy people will be informed who to thank for the medicines and medical material which was delivered to us by your kind people in good condition and precisely as listed.

The respectable quantities delivered to us by you are of course valuable, but our thankfulness would be no smaller should those quantities have been much less. Your gesture makes us aware that we're not alone and that is what's most important today and which gives our people the energy to finish what has been started.

Withal, we're asking you to receive our representative, pharm.tech Izmirlija Ismet, and to arrange future modalities of cooperation.

With respects and gratitude

Med.univ. IBLIZOVIĆ Dr. MIRZA

71243 Pazarić, Tel. 898 668

Pazarić, 12th August 1992 /signed/

HOSPITAL SPLIT-FIRULE								
R. BROJ	MBR	PAC	JMBG	DAT_RO	SPOL	KAT_OS	ZANIM	ZAPOS
1	ANI-92-123679	BARJUŠAJ NISAD			M	A		
2	ANI-92-134197	PAJEVIĆ HASIBA		18.07.53	F	IS1	housewife	husband works at elementary school "BRATSTVO I JED." MOSTAR
3	ANI-92-143719	KURTOVIĆ OMER		08.06.51	M	A	worker	
4	ANI-92-156638	NOŽIĆ ALIJA, OSMAN		10.06.49	M	JZ	soldier	TO BIH - MOSTAR /territorial defence/
5	ANI-92-161661	BEGIĆ ŠEFIK, EMIR		04.10.88	M	IS1	child	
6	ANI-92-175158	POBRIĆ MUJO, BAJRO		13.10.70	M	A	policeman	MUP-MOSTAR / ministry of interior/
7	ANI-92-180083	MUSA GRACIJELA		11.11.72	F	J		
8	ANI-92-182196	KAPIDŽIĆ AGNESA, RAMIZ	1012967155022	10.12.67	F	IS1	mechanical technician	
9	ANI-92-187955	ZEC SENAD		28.10.79	M	I	pupil	
10	ANI-92-200477	BAJRAMOVIĆ ELHAD		16.06.64	M	A	soldier	HVO - STOLAC
11	ANI-92-209056	PEHILJ ALIJA, P.ŠABAN	0702945150003	07.02.45	M	A		HEP "HERCEGOVINA" MOSTAR
12	ANI-92-215145	LETO IBRAHIM, AHMET		01.01.59	M	JZ	soldier	HVO - ČAPLJINA
13	ANI-92-227132	BULJINA NERMIN		01.01.81	M	A	pupil	
14	ANI-92-233221	BIJELIĆ SEAD, ALIJA		01.01.65	M	JZ	soldier	HVO - MOSTAR
15	ANI-92-239764	HORMAN HAMID		01.01.54	M	A	soldier	HVO - KONJIC
16	ANI-92-250050	VUK MUSTAFA	0602942150016	06.02.42	M	D	pensioner	
17	ANI-92-251173	FIŠIĆ RAMIZ, HUSO		17.02.63	M	J	soldier	HVO - MOSTAR
18	ANI-92-267138	GAĆANIN ALMEDIN		10.08.86	M	IS1	child	
19	ANI-92-269340	MRAKOVIĆ AMIR, MUJO		19.01.91	M	IS1	child	
20	ANI-92-274027	PECO ELVEDIN, P.MUSTAFA	1110960150035	11.10.60	M	JZ	painter	
21	ANI-92-277897	MRŠA ĐENAD, P.FIKRET		30.03.70	M	A	soldier	HVO - LIVNO
22	ANI-92-293910	GAŠTAN FIKRET		01.01.60	M	IS1		
23	ANI-92-304808	MARIĆ EDIN		01.01.65	M	A	soldier	TO BIH - MOSTAR
24	ANI-92-322834	HODŽIĆ SALIH, ĆAMIL		07.11.57	M	JV	soldier	TO BIH - SARAJEVO
25	ANI-92-324244	SALIĆINOVIĆ ENIZ, ZIHNIJA		01.01.80	M	A	pupil	
26	ANI-92-324707	MULIĆ ISMET, ŠERIF		03.06.57	M	A	mason	artisan
27	ANI-92-355149	OMANOVIĆ FIKRET		24.12.71	M	A	soldier	TO BIH - ZENICA
28	ANI-92-358044	ZUHRIĆ NIHAD, SAFET		01.01.87	M	A	child	
29	ANI-92-376921	DAHIĆ ADIL, ADIL	2204960173068	22.04.60	M	J	soldier	TO BIH - OLOVO
30	ANI-92-418921	GOLOŠ MURAT, HALIL		23.01.69	M	J	soldier	HVO - MOSTAR
31	ANI-92-428508	ALIŠIĆ MURIS, MEHMED		03.07.90	M	IS1	child	
32	ANI-92-446625	ĐUGUM ENISA, P.MEHO		14.04.36	F	IS1	housewife	
33	ANI-92-449488	KEBO ALMIR, MEHMED		01.10.78	M	IS1	pupil	father Mehmed construction company Herzegovina
34	ANI-92-470161	POTUROVIĆ FIKRET		01.01.60	M	JV	soldier	HVO - JAJCE
35	ANI-92-480905	KRAJINIĆ SABINA, NURIJA	1909927196257	19.09.27	F	IS1		
36	DJK-92-60806	ŠEHIĆ ADMIR, SALKO		28.07.81	M	PRA	pupil	father Salko SOUR "INGRO"-BUGOJNO,TRGOPROMET
37	DJK-92-74054	JERLAGIĆ ZINA, NIJAZ		05.06.90	F	PRA	child	father works at SDK TOMISLAVGRAD
38	DJK-92-80820	ČAKAR EVELIN, EFED		25.03.90	M	PRA	child	father works at RO "BOSNA" LIVNO
39	DJK-92-105890	PAJEVIĆ IRFAN, EMIN		01.05.91	M	NEZ	child	
40	DJK-92-111484	RAMIĆ AMILA, ŠEFIK		27.08.91	F	SAM	child	enterpreneur
41	DJK-92-121855	BUREK ERVIN, DERVIŠ		29.11.88	M	IS1	child	
42	DJK-92-124651	BOŠKAILO MAK, ESAD		28.09.91	M	IS1	child	

www.slobodanpraljak.com

HOSPITAL SPLIT-FIRULE								
R. BROJ	MBR	PAC	JMBG	DAT_ RO	SPOL	KAT_ OS	ZANIM	ZAPOS
3303	INT-93-262485	SENDIĆ FATIMA, SALIH		01.01.46	F	A		
3304	KIR-93-262220	SENDIĆ FATIMA, SALIH		01.01.46	F	A		
3305	DJK-93-267260	REDŽIĆ HASIB, ŠERIF	0705989190028	07.05.89	M	IS1	child	
3306	DJK-93-266585	REDŽIĆ HASIB, ŠERIF	0705989190028	07.05.89	M	IS1	child	
3307	PLU-93-281840	KAPETANOVIĆ JASMINA, OSMAN		24.10.42	F	IS1		
3308	ODK-93-259853	HASANBEGOVIĆ MIRZA, ESAD		01.02.84	M	IS1	pupil	
3309	ZAR-93-290718	PLAVUŠKIĆ FAHRUDIN, SMAJO		26.08.64	M	IS1		
3310	ZAR-93-290130	ĆUSTOVIĆ ARNELA, AVDO		10.12.91	F	IS1	child	
3311	ORT-93-301754	ISAK SEMKA		15.03.08	F	A	housewife	
3312	NEO-93-316539	JURIĆ M, LEJLA		03.10.93	M	IS1	child	
3313	INT-93-325472	DELIĆ SMAIL, SMAIL		20.08.41	M	IS1		
3314	INT-93-325399	GRĐO FADILA, P.MEHO		25.08.16	F	IS1		
3315	NRL-93-342113	ĆUSTOVIĆ ARIF, BEGO		13.03.32	M	IS1		
3316	DJK-93-6593	ČOLAKOVIĆ AMRA, EKREM		10.09.73	F	IS1		
3317	DJK-93-6577	ČOLAKOVIĆ ARMIN, ALIJA		03.01.93	M	IS1	child	
3318	ONK-93-59717	KEVRIĆ SABIRA, TAHIR		12.07.30	F	D		
3319	KIR-93-387845	ŠEHIĆ ŠEMSO, ŠERIF		05.06.33	M	IS1		
3320	PSH-93-376434	KASANOVIĆ ALMA, SULEJMAN		05.11.76	F	IS1		
3321	URO-93-376350	SMAILHODŽIĆ AMAR		05.07.70	M	IS1		
3322	ORL-93-376012	ŠPUREN AHMO, MEHO		15.12.55	M	IS1		
3323	GIN-93-397752	HEGANOVIĆ ZILHA, IBRAHIM		10.08.71	F	IS1		
3324	PLU-93-306910	ŠAHBAS HASAN, SELIM		24.04.34	M	IS1	precision mechanic	ŠAHBAZ HASAN ARTISAN LIVNO
3325	NEO-93-404079	HEGANOVIĆ M, ZILHA		23.12.93	M	IS1	child	
3326	GIN-93-407676	DERVIŠIĆ LATIFA, HASAN		25.10.56	F	IS1		
3327	ORL-93-409078	ŠPUREN AHMO, MEHO		15.12.55	M	IS1		
3328	PSH-93-414151	OSMANOVIĆ MAIDA			F	IS1		
3329	NEO-93-414854	DERVIŠIĆ Ž, LATIFA		30.12.93	F	IS1	child	

D-100

Number of wounded soldiers and civilians dominantly Muslims-Bosniaks in some hospitals in the Republic of Croatia 1992 – 1995

Split – Firule	3.329
Split – Križine	619
Split – Toplice	43
Zagreb	2.982
Karlovac	849
Slavonski Brod	2.730
Vinkovci	81
TOTAL:	**10.623**

D-101

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
/coat of arms/
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG BOSNA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
MEDICAL CORPS
Number: 02-5/2-65/93
Mostar, 8 June, 1993

WAR HOSPITAL OF HVO MOSTAR
CENTRAL STORAGE OF MEDICINES AND AMBULANCE MATERIAL OF HZ HB
MEDICINES AND AMBULANCE MATERIAL SHIPMENT FOR THE BH ARMY

1. Penbritin amp 500mg 9x50 pieces 3sc
2. ……..
3. ….
4. ……
5. ……
6. …..
7. ……..
23. Canesten vag crème 1% 35 gr 5sc
24. Infusion saline 1 palette
25. Current medicaments 2 boxes

Chief of Ambulance Staff of HZ HB
Colonel
Dr. Tugomir Gverić
/signed and stamped/

/author's remark: I enclose the original document D-101/

REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA
HRVATSKO VIJEĆE OBRANE
ODJEL OBRANE

SEKTOR ZA ZDRAVSTVO
Broj: 02-5/2-65/93
Mostar, 08.06. 1993. god.

RATNA BOLNICA HVO MOSTAR

CENTRALNI MAGAZIN LIJEKOVA I SANITETA HZ HB

POSILJKA LIJEKOVA I SANITETTSKOG MATERIJALA ZA ARMIJU BiH

1. Penbritin amp 500mg	9x50kom	3so
2. Penicillin VK tbl 500mgx500		1sc
3. Zinnat susp 125mg/5mlx35kom		4sc
4. Axoren tbl10mg	15x360kom	2so
5. Netimicin amp		40kom
6. Phenobarbiton amp 200mg x 10C		1 so
7. Phenobarbiton tbl 30mg x 1000		1so
8. Phenitoin tbl 100mg x 1000		1so
9. Heparin amp		80so
10. Nizatidin amp 100mg x 60		1so
11. Trental amp 4 x 15ml		4so
12. Lasdol amp 900mg x 100		1so
13. Syntocinon 5	6x1ml	20so
14. Methergin amp	6x1ml	20so
15. Paracetamol tbl	48kom	50so
16. Ergomimet tbl 5mg x 10		20so
17. Metronidazol sol	35 x 100ml	2 so
18. Dettol sol	12 x 500ml	5so
19. Amonij sol 1%	5l	2so
20. Citrosil sol	12 x 1l	1so
21. Benzalkonij klorid 50%	1l	2 kom
22. Benzil benzoat sol	1l	2kom
23. Canesten vag krema 1%	35gr	5so
24. Infuzione otopine		1 paleta
25. Rinfuz lijekovi		2 kutije

REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA HERCEG-BOSNA MOSTAR SEKTOR ZA ZDRAVSTVO OBRANE

NAČELNIK SANITETSKOG STOŽERA HZ HB
pukovnik
dr Tugomir Gvozdić

MEDICAL STAFF FOR CENTRAL

AND NORTH DALMATIA

Split, July 24th 1992

DELIVERY NOTE

For the needs of DZ /Health Center/ Visoko, and for the needs of the War Hospital, on dr. Sead Mehičević's request, and on dr. Goran Dodig's approval, the following is issued:

I. 1.Medicines, various……....……..10 cardboard boxes
(part of the donation from "Sestra Ančela")

II. 2. Medicines, various……7 cardboard boxes
(part of the donation from Lyon and Crelmont Ferrant from Mrs. Miray Petric
and Mr. Ivan Čulić)

III. 3. Medicines, various……..48 cardboard boxes
(Most of the donation from "Santa Lucija" parrish from Perrugia, in organization
of Mirjana and Marko Soldo, via dr. M.Rakić).

IV. 1. Medicines, various……1 cardboard box
(contents from various donations)

NOTE: honored addressee, we were not able to realize the request per your specification, and we have advised Mr. Šefik Sablica to take unprocessed donations which were intended for KBC /Clinical Hospital Center/ Split from donators from diaspora.

Hence, the subject material is a donation received from donators but it has not been processed. We hope that you will have at least some use from it.

RECEIVED BY:
Dr. Sead Mehičević
Šefik Sablica
/signed/

DELIVERED BY:
Mr.ph. Mina Rašetina
M. Županović, senior nurse
/signed/

/stamp: CLINICAL HOSPITAL CENTER – SPLIT
1 – national crest/

MEDICAL STAFF FOR CENTRAL

AND NORTH DALMATIA

Split, July 3rd 1992

DELIVERY NOTE

For the needs of DZ /Health Center/ Vareš, at the request of Health Center director Dr. Jasenka Karamehić and director of RZ /Working Community/ of DZ Sarajevo, Nenad Babić, on the recommendation of the commandant of the operational defense staff of the Vareš municipality Borivoje Malbašić and pastor Mijo Muljić, the following is issued:

1. Medicines (specification attached)
2. Consumable medical material (specification attached)

NOTE: We are asking the Above mentioned individuals as same as other DZ Vareš commissioners, before picking up the medicines and medical materials at KBC /Clinical Hospital Center/ Split, to come by Medical Staff for Herceg – Bosna in Tomislavgrad so we could realize their needs in agreement with us.

RECEIVED BY:

Dr. Jasenko Karamehić

Mr. Hišam Elaquad

/signed/

DELIVERED BY:

Mr.ph. Jadranka Portolan

M. Županović, senior nurse

/ signed /

/stamp: CLINICAL HOSPITAL CENTER – SPLIT

1 – national crest/

MEDICAL STAFF FOR CENTRAL

AND NORTH DALMATIA

Split, 1st September 92

DELIVERY NOTE

For the purposes of KMC /Clinical Medical Center/ Tuzla, at the request of dr. H. Efendić Hilmija and at the approval of mr.sc.dr. Goran Dodig we issue the following:

1. Medications (specification attached)
2. Medical supplies (specification attached)
3. Pads 10x10 à 120 pcs — 18 boxes
4. Pre Nidal milk à 330 g — 12 pcs

NOTIFICATION: Listed materials are submitted to Mr. Esad Tutundžić, authorized by the MUP /Ministry of Interior/ Brčko.

RECEIVED BY:

Dr. H. Efendić Milmija

Esad Tutundžić

/signed/

ISSUED BY:

Mr. ph. Mina Rašetina

M. Županović, senior nurse

/signed/

/stamp: CLINICAL HOSPITAL CENTER – SPLIT

1 – national crest/

MEDICAL STAFF FOR CENTRAL

AND NORTH DALMATIA

Split, 12th June 92

DELIVERY NOTE

For the purposes of DZ /Health Center/, respectively RB / War Hospital/ Tešanj, and at the request of prof. dr. Ekrem Ajanović and at the approval of mr.sc.dr. Goran Dodig we issue the following:

1. Medications (specification attached)
2. Medical supplies (specification attached)
3. Powder milk, various 1 box

NOTIFICATION: Listed items are submitted to Mr. Atif Nakić, authorized by prof. dr. E. Ajanović and the President of HVO Tešanj.

RECEIVED BY:

Prof.dr. E. Ajanović

Atif Nekić

/signed/

ISSUED BY:

Mr. ph. J. Portolan

M. Županović, vms

/signed/

/stamp: CLINICAL HOSPITAL CENTER – SPLIT

1 – national crest/

MEDICAL STAFF FOR CENTRAL

AND NORTH DALMATIA

Split, 15th May 92

DELIVERY NOTE

For the purposes of Tešanj Hospital, at the request of dr. Mehmedalija Ajanović, and at the approval of dr. Goran Dodig we issue the following:

1. Medications (specification attached)	
2. Sterile pads 33 x 35 à 10 pcs	50 pcs
3. Bandages 8 x 5	100 pcs
4. Bandages 12 x 10	200 pcs
5. Sterile pads (JOHNSON) 10 x 10 à 1200 pcs	2 boxes
6. Cramer splint (cotton coated)	15 pcs
7. Milu mil à 300 g x 12	10 boxes
8. Milu mil à 1000 g	10 pcs

NOTIFICATION: On recommendation of dr. Mohamed Članjak, President of Tešanj municipality, materials are submitted to Mr. Azem Bašić. Mr. Bašić has received the material in vehicle with license plates: DO-155-821.

RECEIVED BY:

Dr. Mehmedalija Ajanović

Azem Bašić

/signed/

ISSUED BY:

Mr. ph. Jadranka Portolan

Marija Županović, senior nurse

/signed/

/stamp: CLINICAL HOSPITAL CENTER – SPLIT

1 – national crest/

MEDICAL STAFF FOR CENTRAL
AND NORTH DALMATIA
Split, 5th January 93

DELIVERY NOTE

For the purposes of DZ /Health Center/Pazarić (Ambulance), at the request of dr. Mirza Iblizović we issue the following:

1. Medications (specification attached)

NOTIFICATION: Items are issued as humanitarian aid.

RECEIVED BY:
Dr. Mirza Iblizović

ISSUED BY:
Mr. ph. M. Rašetina
M. Županović, senior nurse
/signed/

/stamp: CLINICAL HOSPITAL CENTER – SPLIT
1 – national crest/

/handwritten: 975-1/

Effendi Adem SMAJIĆ
Rijeka
Fax: (051) 36 098

9 November 1992

Dear Effendi Adem,

We have been in contact with Mr Rasim IMAMOVIĆ and Mr KENAN since Saturday regarding the takeover of seven tonnes of intravenous fluids and medicines. We would be grateful if you could keep the goods, because it is difficult to hire a lorry to go from Rijeka to Mostar.
Hauliers are not eager to take goods to Mostar, because it is in a war zone.
We wish to inform you that we need the goods very much, because operations at Podvelež are under way.
We wish to inform you that we will contact you by telephone.

Mahsuz Selam /warm greetings/.

Assistant Commander for Logistics
Edin BATLAK
/signed and stamped/

MEDICAL STAFF FOR CENTRAL

AND NORTH DALMATIA

Split, 19th June 92

DELIVERY NOTE

For the purposes of DZ /Health Center/ Maglaj, at the request of dr. Abdulkerim Mulasmaić, and at the request of Pharmacy Maglaj, and at the approval mr.sc.dr. G. Dodig we issue the following:

1. Medications (specification attached)

NOTIFICATION: Material is submitted to Safet Smaić, authorized for Merhamet Maglaj by Isić Mujo.

RECEIVED BY:

Dr. Abdulkerim Mulasmaić

Safet Smaić

/signed/

ISSUED BY:

Mr. ph. J. Portolan

/signed/

/stamp: CLINICAL HOSPITAL CENTER – SPLIT

1 – national crest/



Humanitarian aid in form of medications delivered to the Clinical Hospital Center Split and distributed to BiH as humanitarian aid for Bosniaks.



Humanitarian aid for Bosniaks (Muslims) in the form of medications:

- **Bugojno**
- **Breza**
- **Banovići**
- **Gradina**
- **Gradačac**
- **Ilida**
- **Jablanica**
- **Konjic**
- **Kreševo**
- **Kladanj**
- **Livno**
- **Maglaj**
- **Novi Travnik**
- **Prozor**
- **Pazarić**
- **Rama**
- **Tešanj**
- **Tuzla**
- **Vareš**
- **Visoko**
- **Gornji Vakuf**
- **Zenica**
- **Zvornik**
- **Žepče**

23.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS FROM BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
511 + tables of refugees and displaced persons

UNHCR ROAD CONVOYS PRIMARY DESTINATIONS AND MAJOR WAREHOUSES



MAJOR WAREHOUSE LOCATIONS		
Zagreb	Cazin	Belgrade
Metković	Sarajevo	
Split	Zenica	
Rijeka	Banja Luka	
Ploče	Tuzla	

This map is not to be taken as necessarily representing the views of the UN on boundaries of political area

UNHCR Office of the Special Envoy for former Yugoslavia - External Relations Unit



Croatian role in the care for refugees and displaced persons from BiH

Number of Displaced persons and refugees in Croatia 1991-1995

YEAR	MONTH	DISPLACED PERSONS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
1992	JANUARY	324.238	872	325.110
	FEBRUARY	330.787	1.276	332.063
	MARCH	336.627	16.579	373.206
	APRIL	247.278	193.415	440.693
	MAY	258.064	274.366	532.430
	JUNE	269.351	299.197	568.548
	JULY	265.786	363.270	629.056
	AUGUST	262.690	362.306	624.996
	SEPTEMBER	262.642	364.154	626.796
	OCTOBER	263.779	367.366	631.145
	NOVEMBER	264.194	370.371	634.565
	DECEMBER	260.705	402.768	663.493
1993	JANUARY	252.703	401.412	654.115
	FEBRUARY	253.246	399.566	652.812
	MARCH	252.458	386.284	638.742
	APRIL	250.328	269.003	519.330
	MAY	254.263	271.096	525.359
	JUNE	254.791	272.869	527.660
	JULY	248.206	277.054	525.260
	AUGUST	246.989	279.049	526.034
	SEPTEMBER	246.451	276.548	522.999
	OCTOBER	246.801	278.383	525.184
	NOVEMBER	248.888	281.462	530.350
	DECEMBER	249.972	281.318	531.290
1994	JANUARY	249.011	281.455	530.466
	FEBRUARY	248.352	284.155	532.507
	MARCH	248.244	281.817	530.061
	APRIL	247.185	272.383	519.567
	MAY	247.078	267.140	514.219
	JUNE	247.419	266.728	514.147
	JULY	247.068	266.056	513.124
	AUGUST	196.870	183.038	379.908
	SEPTEMBER	197.507	184.851	382.358
	OCTOBER	196.075	184.299	380.374
	NOVEMBER	196.512	187.188	383.700
	DECEMBER	195.189	187.680	382.859
1995	JANUARY	195.255	187.784	383.039
	FEBRUARY	195.626	188.230	383.856
	MARCH	195.802	188.230	384.409
	APRIL	195.825	189.531	385.356
	MAY	197.592	188.672	386.264
	JUNE	198.661	188.606	387.267
	JULY	200.782	188.217	384.938
	AUGUST	197.337	187.038	384.373
	SEPTEMBER	197.510	208.646	406.156
	OCTOBER	197.510	208.663	406.173
	NOVEMBER	198.672	214.746	413.418
	DECEMBER			

Government's Administration Office for displaced persons and refugees, Analitical department

CROATIA


REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN CROATIA IN 1992
800.000
600.000
400.000
200.000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
REFUGEES
DISPLACED PERSONS
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN CROATIA IN 1994
600.000
400.000
200.000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
REFUGEES
DISPLACED PERSONS
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN CROATIA IN 1993
800.000
600.000
400.000
200.000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
REFUGEES
DISPLACED PERSONS
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN CROATIA IN 1995
500.000
400.000
300.000
200.000
100.000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
REFUGEES
DISPLACED PERSONS

ŠEFKO OMERBAŠIĆ
Zagreb
October 2005

The conversation was recorded, the tape is stored under the name

somerbasic

Size:
31.9 MB
Duration:
01:39:57

Transcript of the conversation and the tape are kept in the Central military archive of the Ministry of Defence of Croatia

The conversation took place in Zagreb

Who else was there, Čermak, Zagorec? Did president Tuđman know of all this?

Yes, he knew.

Šušak was there also, am I right?

Šušak was the one who decided on all of this. I don't know who else was involved in this, the three of them and president Tuđman. And these arms, this is the help by which from Croatia Bosnia was saved, what could be saved. There was an enormous Serbian force there, immense quantity of arms, it was difficult. I forgot to say this, the trains that were impounded in Croatia, a large part of these arms went to Bosnia, it went to the Patriotic League, i.e. the TO /Territorial Defence/ which was still in the preparatory phase. And this went with the knowledge of the top state officials, because the people were called to arm themselves as much as they could, to organize themselves. The financial transaction with dinars that went to Bosnia also helped us. This money didn't go only into Croatian hands, but it went to Muslims too. Of course, there was a lot of embezzlement here, there was theft, but the greatest part went in favour, i.e. for the purchase of arms and everything else. I know at the very beginning, before the war started in Bosnia, men were coming selling cows, selling anything to obtain a rifle to defend themselves, because there in Bosnia the memories of the World War II are still fresh, when the greatest number of war casualties were the Muslims. You wanted to ask something?

I just wanted to ask, the events that we are mentioning now, which period was it?

This was 1992. Especially from the beginning to the very end. This crisis headquarters was active until September 1992 when Alija Izetbegović came here in the first, state, official visit. On that occasion the agreement with Tuđman was signed, and then the crisis headquarters ceased to function and the mission came, first the diplomatic one, then the military, and then the military mission took over everything. But the Islamic community, the humanitarian "Merhamet" continued functioning with the humanitarian organizations from the Arab, Islamic world to provide care for this huge number of refugees. 300 thousand Croatia, especially in Zagreb, only in Zagreb there were 17 refugee camps.

How many people passed through these camps?

In Zagreb? In Croatia around 300 thousand, in Zagreb I think there were more than 170 thousand. We in the mosque had 25 thousand accommodated. On an area of 10 thousand square metres everything was packed. When the war began in Bosnia quite a number of volunteers went on their own initiative, and some through the HV /Croatian Army/, they went to defend Bosnia. There were more Croats then Muslims. But Muslims were also coming and going there. The mosque was the centre, the focal point where people were coming and going, because here this complete help was functioning. I met oftentimes with the late Šušak particularly over this help. 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, all the way to his death.

/handwritten: (89)/

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA /RH/
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

CLASS: 008-02/92-02/01
Number: 5120-25-92-04

Zagreb, 1 April 1992
0935 hours

Ministry of Information
(to be sent to the media)

STATEMENT

To all media and journalists reporting on military activities and the displaced people: please take into account certain elementary issues which are of relevance for our defence and security. It is necessary to protect the identity of the Croatian soldiers in combat positions and the people in war zones, particularly those under temporary JA /Yugoslav Army/ occupation or in camps outside of Croatia.

We hereby appeal to all editors and journalists not to include in their pieces, reports or programmes the names of people and places or other similar information which could harm the defence of the Republic of Croatia or cause even greater suffering and tragedy to the people and families of those who remain captive. Certain reports based on conversations conducted with a group of exchanged men from Vukovar failed to do so, which could have severe consequences for those who are still in captivity.

The Ministry of Defence therefore expects all media staff in positions of responsibility not only to act in accordance with the principles of their profession and within the legal regulations, but also with a feeling for the situation and the time in which seemingly trivial details can cause even greater human tragedy.

Assistant RH Minister of Defence
for Brigadier
Slobodan PRALJAK
/a signature/
/stamped/

/national crest/

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
OFFICE FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES

REPORT ON THE CARE FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES

1. **INTRODUCTION**

Frequent cases of forced emigration of Croatian citizens at the beginning of May 1991 from the crisis area (Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac etc.) have stimulated the organization of activities for their care, primarily as part of social welfare.

First displaced persons found their refuge elsewhere in Croatia or abroad, followed by the most massive persecution during the summer and early autumn of the same year. The largest number of displaced persons accommodated in Croatia and other countries was in mid-January 1992 – 700,000 persons, which is more than 15% of the population according to the 1991 census.

Across the Croatia, displaced persons were accommodated in hotels, sports halls, renovated army barracks, institutions of social welfare, educational boarding institutions, barracks of construction companies for accommodation of workers, resorts, wagon settlements and numerous families that showed the highest degree of humanity and solidarity by accepting the majority of displaced persons in their homes.

In addition to taking care of displaced persons, in the midst of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia also cared for refugees, regardless of their nationality and religion. Through the Government Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees, over 600,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina were accommodated, among them were 425,000 Muslims and 170,000 Croats and 5,000 others.

Pursuant to the authorization given by Croatian Government, in 1993 the Office has issued a permission for transit of 36,422 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina through Croatia, and at the same time approvals allowing a temporary stay of 24,858 persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia were issued.

7. Loans for reconstruction and return of displaced persons

Loans were not always distributed according to fair criteria, and were especially not fairly and purposefully used, and the funds were used for expending of houses, and therefore could not qualify for a return, for buying apartments, cafes or were kept for too long. In the future, loans should be granted with more caution, and the criteria should be more fair and demanding.

8. The funds given by the international community to overcome the refugee crisis in the former Yugoslavia namely Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia were not always used cost-effectively. Large portion of funds are used by the organizations (UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, WFP, ICRC etc.) for their operation (staff, hotels, transportation), and the smaller portion of funds is used on displaced persons.

We have noticed that Serbia is receiving larger amounts for refugees then Croatia. This fact should be given more attention at the international level.

9. Return of displaced persons, especially refugees is not going as planned. Since April 1992, 50,000 displaced persons returned to their homes (the largest number in Dubrovnik region, followed by Lipik, Pakrac, Osijek, Karlovac, Sisak, Zadar…), but only a small number of refugees (especially Croats) is returning

to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those refugees that could return are not returning because their homes are uninhabitable, because the majority of population are Muslims, or they do not wish to return because they are better off staying in Croatia where they have everything provided by the state. This could have serious consequences for the future of Croatia: for how long can the state support such large number of refugees? Especially if UNHCR and EU withhold the financial and humanitarian aid! Croatia itself has over 300,000 socially vulnerable citizens. The country is gradually converting to the state of socially vulnerable citizens, which will have to be supported by the inadequate number of employees and productive citizens.

At this moment we have 144,000 Croat refugees (74%) from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and only 46,500 Muslim refugees (24%). A year ago we had roughly 70% of Muslims and just 30% of Croats. This leads to conclusion that Croats are not returning to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Large number of Muslims had settled in third countries, that is true, but large number is also returning to Bosnia.

REPORT PREPARED BY:
/signature illegible/
M.Sc. Sanja Mikloš, assistant to Head of Department
for humanitarian aid for transportation operations

HEAD OF THE OFFICE
/signature illegible/
prof. dr. Adalbert Rebić

/stamp: Republic of Croatia

GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
OFFICE FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES
ZAGREB/

Zagreb, October 14th, 1994

Some of the facilities in the Republic of Croatia (mostly hotels and resorts) in which displaced persons and refugees were accommodated in the period from 1991 to 1997

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
1	HOTEL PALME	OPATIJA
2	SCHOOL DORMITORY TOMISLAV HERO	BAKAR
3	HOTEL DUBRAVKA	BAŠKA VODA
4	HOTEL SLAVIJA	BAŠKA VODA
5	HOTEL URANIA	BAŠKA VODA
6	RESORT AGROEXPORT	BAŠKA VODA
7	RESORT CROATIA	BAŠKA VODA
8	RESORT NAPUTICA	BAŠKA VODA
9	RESORT OBOR	BAŠKA VODA
10	RESORT TUZLA	BAŠKA VODA
11	RESORT VATROSTALNA	BAŠKA VODA
12	APARTMENT COMPLEX URANIA	BAŠKA VODA
13	HOTEL HRVATSKA	BAŠKA VODA
14	HEALTH RESORT DJEČJE SELO	BAŠKA VODA
15	RESORT OBOR	BAŠKA VODA
16	RESORT VATROSTALNA	BAŠKA VODA
17	RESORT KERAMETAL	BETINA
18	RESORT ELEKTROKOVINA	BETINA
19	RESORT JELŠINGRAD	BIOGRAD NA MORU
20	SCHOOL DORMITORY	BJELOVAR
21	T. VINKOVIĆ M.Z.	BJELOVAR
22	HOTEL PARK	BOL
23	DOMINICAN MONASTERY	BOL
24	RESORT FRUCTAL	CRES
25	HOTEL EDEN	CRIKVENICA
26	HOTEL PARK	CRIKVENICA
27	CROATIAN TEACHERS' HOME	CRIKVENICA
28	RESORT VERIGE	CRIKVENICA
29	RESORT SESTRE MILOSRDNICE	CRIKVENICA
30	INSTITUTE FOR SOC. HEALTH CARE	ČAGLIN
31	HOTEL PARK	ČAKOVEC
32	RETIREMENT HOME	ČAKOVEC
33	SCHOOL DORMITORY	ČAKOVEC
34	SDP HALL	ČAZMA
35	FIRE HALL	ČAZMA
36	CASTLE ADAMOVIĆ	ČEPIN
37	RESORT DONIT	DRAMALJ
38	RESORT DRAŠNICE	DRAŠNICE
39	CARITAS	DUBRAVA-DUBEC
40	HOTEL BELEVUE	DUBROVNIK
41	HOTEL EPIDAURUS	DUBROVNIK
42	HOTEL IMPERIAL	DUBROVNIK
43	HOTEL LIBERTAS	DUBROVNIK
44	HOTEL PALLACE	DUBROVNIK
45	HOTEL PARK	DUBROVNIK
46	HOTEL PETKA	DUBROVNIK
47	HOTEL PLAKIR	DUBROVNIK
48	RETIREMENT HOME	DUBROVNIK
49	CHILDREN'S HOME MASLINA	DUBROVNIK
50	HOME FOR THE INFIRM	DUBROVNIK
51	VIS II	DUBROVNIK
52	SINGLES' HOTEL DALMACIJA	DUGI RAT
53	CATERING FACILITY ĐAKOVAČKI VEZOVI	ĐAKOVO
54	CZD BOSO ĐAKOVO	ĐAKOVO
55	PINETA FAŽANSKA ŠUMA	FAŽANA
56	VILLA SAN LORENZO	FAŽANA
57	RESORT V. LENAC	FUŽINE
58	GEST HOUSE FUŽINE	FUŽINE
59	RESORT ROS	FUŽINE
60	HOTEL ĐURO SALAJ	GRADAC

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
61	HOTEL GRADAC	GRADAC
62	HOTEL LAGUNA	GRADAC
63	RESORT VALTER PERIĆ	GRADAC
64	RESORT VALTER PERIĆ	GRADAC
65	BiH COMMUNITY RESORT	GRADAC
66	CHILDRENS' RESORT KRAGUJEVAC	GRADAC
67	HOTEL BILOGORA	GRUBIŠNO POLJE
68	HOTEL BODUL	HVAR
69	H.P. "CROATIA"	HVAR
70	RESORT B. TOPOLA	IČIĆI
71	VILLA MINTZ	IČIĆI
72	HOTEL IGRANE	IGRANE
73	SCHOOL DORMITORY	IVANIĆ-GRAD
74	WAGONS' SETTLEMENT	IVANKOVO
75	INSTITUTE LOPAČA	JELENJE
76	HOTEL JADRAN	JELSA
77	RESORT ZENČIŠĆE	JELSA
78	RESORT TREŠNJEVKA	KARLOBAG
79	SINGLES' HOTEL NOVOTEHNA	KARLOVAC
80	RETIREMENT HOME	KARLOVAC
81	MREŽNICA	KARLOVAC
82	P.N. GAZA	KARLOVAC
83	TEMELJ	KARLOVAC
84	SCHOOL DORMITORY	KARLOVAC
85	BOSNIAN RESORT	KAŠTEL GOMILICA
86	RESORT SLOVENSKO	KAŠTEL KAMBELOVAC
87	CAMP ŠULAVI	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ
88	HŽP's RESORT	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ
89	RESORT ILIRIJA	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ
90	RESORT POŽEGA	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ
91	PTT's RESORT	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ
92	CHILDREN'S RESORT	KAŠTEL NOVI
93	RESORT VRŠAČKO	KAŠTEL NOVI
94	KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	KAŠTEL STARI
95	RESORT VRŠAČKO	KAŠTEL STARI
96	RESORT ZENICA	KAŠTEL STARI
97	SCHOOL DORMITORY KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIĆ	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIĆ
98	HOTEL RESNIK	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIĆ
99	ATOCAM AS	KOLAN
100	H. CRVENI KRIŽ	KOPRIVNICA
101	HOTEL BON REPOS	KORČULA
102	HOTEL KOMODOR	KORČULA
103	HOTEL GROZD	KOTRIBA
104	ZAGREBAČKA BANK'S RESORT	KRALJEVICA
105	RESORT HRV. ŽELJEZNI.	KRALJEVICA
106	KRILO JASENICE	KRILO – JASENICE
107	RESORT SUMPETAR	KRILO – JASENICE
108	RETIREMENT HOME M. KARTEC	KRK
109	INDUSTROGRADNJA DUGA UVALA	KRNICA
110	ZELENA PUNTA TN	KUKLJICA
111	HOTEL KUTINA	KUTINA
112	HOTEL KATURE	LABINE
113	HOME FOR ELDERLY MARINO SELO	LIPIK
114	P.N. TOPLIK	LIPIK
115	DANISH RED CROSS COMPLEX	LIPOVLJANI
116	BUREAU FOR SAFETY	LOBOR
117	HOTEL RUSKAMEN	LOKVA-ROGOZNICA
118	RESORT MIMICE	LOKVA-ROGOZNICA

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
119	MERIDIOINAL HOTEL LOVRAN	LOVRAN
120	HOTEL MIRAMARE	LOVRAN
121	HOTEL PARK	LOVRAN
122	VILLA SLOVENKA	LOVRAN
123	HOTEL SPLENDID	LOVRAN
124	SL. ŽEM. LOVRAN	LOVRAN
125	BIOKOVO	MAKARSKA
126	HOTEL ELBIH	MAKARSKA
127	METEOR	MAKARSKA
128	HOTEL OSEJAVA	MAKARSKA
129	HOTEL PARK	MAKARSKA
130	HOTEL RIVIJERA	MAKARSKA
131	RESORT KONJIC	MAKARSKA
132	RESORT CROTEK	MALI LOŠINJ
133	CASTLE MARUŠEVEC	MARUŠEVEC
134	HOTEL PANORAMA	MATULJI
135	HOTEL SLOBODA	MEDVEJA
136	TERMOTERAPIJA	MOKOŠICA
137	ZATON TN	NIN
138	KONUS	NOVI VINODOLSKI
139	LIVARA	NOVI VINODOLSKI
140	RETIREMENT HOME	NOVIGRAD
141	TOBAČNA LJUBLJANA	NOVIGRAD (CITTANOVA)
142	HOME NUŠTAR	NUŠTAR
143	BJELOLASICA	OGULIN
144	SCHOOL DORMITORY	OGULIN
145	HOTEL PLAŽA	OMIŠ
146	RESORT ROS	OMIŠALJ
147	HOTEL AGAVA	OPATIJA
148	HOTEL BRIJUNI	OPATIJA
149	HOTEL CONTINENTAL	OPATIJA
150	HOTEL ROYAL	OPATIJA
151	HOTEL ZAGREB	OPATIJA
152	VOLOSKO-BEČELJ	OPATIJA
153	RESORT BEČEJ	OPATIJA
154	RESORT BOR	OREBIĆ
155	RESORT FOR VISUALLY IMPAIRED	OREBIĆ
156	RESORT PIK TAMIŠ	OREBIĆ
157	RESORT RIVIJERA	OREBIĆ
158	SUBOTICA'S RESORT	OREBIĆ
159	RESORT VENTILATOR	OREBIĆ
160	VRANICA	OSIJEK
161	FRIENDSHIP SETTLEMENT	OSIJEK
162	HOME SVETA HELENA	OSIJEK
163	RETIREMENT HOME	OSIJEK
164	STUDENTS' DORMITORY	OSIJEK
165	SCHOOL DORMITORY	OSIJEK
166	HOTEL BELLEVUE	PAG
167	PAZINSKI KOLEGIJ	PAZIN
168	P.N. DUMAČE	PETRINJA
169	P.N. MALA GORICA	PETRINJA
170	P.N. PISAROVINA	PISAROVINA
171	HOMA MELANIJA	PIŠKOREVCI
172	HOTEL AURORA	PODGORA
173	HOTEL SALINES	PODGORA
174	HOTEL SIRENA	PODGORA
175	BANJA LUKA's RESORT	PODSTRANA
176	RESORT KEKEC	PODSTRANA
177	RESORT KULA	PODSTRANA
178	VINKOVCI's RESORT	PODSTRANA
179	LJUBLJANA's RESORT	PODSTRANA
180	HOTEL PARK	POSTIRE
181	SUBOTICA's RESORT	POSTIRE
182	RESTAURANT KOLODVOR	POŽEGA
183	SCHOOL DORMITORY	POŽEGA

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
184	RETIREMENT HOME	POŽEGA
185	MISLAV	POŽEGA
186	MARINA HOTEL LUČICA	PRIMOŠTEN
187	HOTEL ALEM	PROMAJNA
188	RESORT PROMAJNA	PROMAJNA
189	RESORT FOR ORGANIZATION NAŠA DJECA	PRVIĆ LUKA
190	SCHOOL DORMITORY	PUČIŠĆA
191	RESORT PUNTIŽELA	PULA
192	CHILDREN'S HOME RUŽA PETROVIĆ	PULA
193	I.C. KAMENJAK	PULA
194	I.C. KARLO ROJC	PULA
195	RESORT VALBADON	PULA
196	SINGLES' HOTEL 3. MAJ	RIJEKA
197	SINGLES' HOTEL HŽP	RIJEKA
198	HOTEL JADRAN	RIJEKA
199	HOTEL LUCIJA	RIJEKA
200	HOTEL NEBODER	RIJEKA
201	HOTEL PARK	RIJEKA
202	TORPEDO	RIJEKA
203	RED CROSS HOME	RIJEKA
204	D. GERVAIS HOME	RIJEKA
205	HOME PODMURVICE	RIJEKA
206	HOME SV. ANA	RIJEKA
207	RETIREMENT HOME	RIJEKA
208	GDP PRIMORJE	RIJEKA
209	STUDENTS DORMITORY I.G. KOVAČIĆ	RIJEKA
210	SCHOOL DORMITORY VUKOVARSKA	RIJEKA
211	BARRACKS SETTLEMENT BLACA	ROKOVCI
212	RETIREMENT HOME	ROVINJ
213	CHILDREN'S RESORT KARLOVAC	SELCE
214	SLANA	SELCE
215	MILITARY CAMP	SELCE
216	PINJO TEREZIJA	SIBINJ
217	WORKERS' BARRACKS KONSTRUKTOR ĐALE	SINJ
218	RAILWAY INN	SISAK
219	BARRACKS TEHNIKA	SISAK
220	RESORT A. CAR. STEPINAC	SKRAD
221	RESORT V. NAZOR	SKRAD
222	HOTEL BROD	SLAVOSNKI BROD
223	HOTEL PARK	SLAVONSKI BROD
224	RAILWAYS' RESORT	SLAVONSKI BROD
225	RETIREMENT HOME	SLAVOSNKI BROD
226	YOUTH AND CHILDREN'S HOME	SLAVOSNKI BROD
227	KONSTRUKTOR	SOLIN
228	BARRACKS SV. KAJO	SOLIN
229	HOTEL CENTRAL	SPLIT
230	LAV	SPLIT
231	SINGLES' HOTEL LAVČEVIĆ	SPLIT
232	HOTEL MARIJAN	SPLIT
233	HOTEL OLINT	SPLIT
234	HOTEL SLAVIJA	SPLIT
235	HOTEL SPLIT	SPLIT
236	HOTEL ZAGREB	SPLIT
237	RESORT DIOKOM	SPLIT
238	CAMP STOBREĆ	SPLIT
239	SCHOOL DORMITORY	SPLIT
240	HOLIDAY APARTMENT COMPLEX LAVICA	SPLIT
241	BARRACKS LAVČEVIĆ-METROJAK	SPLIT
242	HOME GŠC	SPLIT
243	RETIREMENT HOME	SPLIT
244	SINGLES' HOME	SPLIT
245	HOME ZENTA	SPLIT
246	BARRACKS PIS	SPLIT
247	STUDENTS DORMITORY SPINUT	SPLIT

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
248	HEALTH EDU. CENTAR	SPLIT
249	HOTEL ADRIATIC	STARIGRAD
250	HOTEL HELIOS	STARIGRAD
251	BARRACKS T.T.T.S.	STOBREČ
252	HOTEL COMPLEX PALMA	SUPETAR
253	RESORT BISTRICA	SUTIVAN
254	RESORT LEWIS	SVETI FILIP I JAKOV
255	ANDRIJA HOTEL SOLARIS	ŠIBENIK
256	BOTIĆ REŠAD	ŠIBENIK
257	JURE HOTEL SOLARIS	ŠIBENIK
258	NIKO HOTEL SOLARIS	ŠIBENIK
259	ETERNA	ŠIBENIK
260	CENTER FOR UPBRINGING AND EDUC.	ŠIBENIK
261	I.C. OBONJAN	ŠIBENIK
262	RESORT INA	TIJESNO
263	RESORT NANA	TIJESNO
264	HOTEL BOROVIK	TISNO
265	P.N. ŠAŠNA GREDA	TOPOLOVAC
266	RESORT IVANEC	TRIBUNJ
267	RESORT POŽEŠKA DOLINA	TRIBUNJ
268	RESORT ZAMALIN	TRIBUNJ
269	HOTEL JADRAN	TROGIR
270	HOLIDAY APARTMENT COMPLEX KAIROS	TROGIR
271	HOTEL MEDENA	TROGIR
272	MOTEL SOLINE	TROGIR
273	CAMP BELVEDERE	TROGIR
274	BORAC	TROGIR
275	RESORT SEGET	TROGIR
276	RESORT ĐURO SALAJ	TRPANJ
277	RESORT KONIS	TUČEPI
278	RESORT NAFTAGAS	TUČEPI
279	SLAVONSKA POŽEGA	TUČEPI
280	RESORT NOVA POŠTA	TUČEPI
281	HOTEL ISTRA	VARAŽDIN
282	P.C. VARAŽDIN 1	VARAŽDIN
283	P.C. VARAŽDIN 2	VARAŽDIN
284	P.C. VARAŽDIN 3	VARAŽDIN
285	SCHOOL DORMITORY	VARAŽDIN
286	RESORT HRVATSKE CESTE	VARAŽDINSKE TOPLICE
287	RESORT ISKRA	VARAŽDINSKE TOPLICE
288	HOTEL "JADRAN"	VELA LUKA
289	HOTEL KORKYRA	VELA LUKA
290	HOTEL POSEJDON	VELA LUKA
291	RESORT BGZ	VELI LOŠINJ
292	BISTRO GRIČ	VELIKA
293	RETIREMENT HOME	VELIKA
294	OLD SCHOOL	VELIKA
295	HIDROELEKTRA'S BARRACKS	VELIKA GORICA
296	DISPLACED PERSONS' CAMP	VELIKA GORICA
297	I.C. VINICA	VINICA
298	CROATIAN RAILWAY FACILITIES	VINKOVCI
299	TECHNICAL SCHOOL	VINKOVCI
300	BARRACKS CAMP	VIROVITICA
301	SCHOOL DORMITORY	VIROVITICA
302	HOTEL SLAVONIJA	VIROVITICA
303	RETIREMENT HOME	VIS
304	I.C. SAMOGOR	VIS
305	IMPERIJAL HOTEL VODICE	VODICE
306	HOTEL OLIMPIJA	VODICE
307	RESORT BOROVO	VODICE
308	CARE CANADA STATIONER	VODICE
309	CENTER FOR THE DISABLED	VODNJAN

	NAME OF FACILITY	LOCATION
310	ADRIATIC HOTEL VRBOSKA	VRBOSKA
311	SCHOOL DORMITORY I. L. RIBAR	ZADAR
312	GORTAN	ZADAR
313	SINGLE'S HOTEL INDUSTROGRADNJA	ZAGREB
314	YOUTH HOTEL	ZAGREB
315	SINGLES' HOTEL VOLTINO	ZAGREB
316	SCHOOL FOR NURSES	ZAGREB
317	SCHOOL DORMITORY M. JAMBRIŠAN	ZAGREB
318	CENTER SLAVA RAŠKAJ	ZAGREB
319	CENTER VINKO BEK	ZAGREB
320	SINGLES' HOTEL GORANIN	ZAGREB
321	YOUTH HOTEL TOC	ZAGREB
322	SCHOOL DORMITORY A. B. BUŠIĆA	ZAGREB
323	SCHOOL DORMITORY A. G. MATOŠ	ZAGREB
324	SCHOOL DORMITORY I. MAŽURANIĆ	ZAGREB
325	SCHOOL DORMITORY FOR HIGH SCHOOLS	ZAGREB
326	SCHOOL DORMITORY H U K	ZAGREB
327	SINGLES' HOTEL HŽ-ČRNOMEREC	ZAGREB
328	SCHOOL DORMITORY FOR MIDWIFES	ZAGREB
329	BARRACKS BOROVO-DUBRAVA	ZAGREB
330	COO DUBRAVA	ZAGREB
331	YOUTH TOWN JP	ZAGREB
332	SCHOOL DORMITORY TIN UJEVIĆ	ZAGREB
333	SCHOOL DORMITORY D. PEJAČEVIĆ	ZAGREB
334	SINGLES' HOTEL INDOSTAND	ZAGREB
335	STUDENTS DORMITORY LAŠĆINA	ZAGREB
336	CENTER FOR AUTISM	ZAGREB
337	STUDENTS DORMITORY I. MEŠTROVIĆ	ZAGREB
338	SCHOOL DORMITORY GRAD. STRUKA	ZAGREB
339	CHILDREN'S CENTER BREZOVICA	ZAGREB
340	PROGRES' BARACKS	ZAGREB
341	RADNIK NOVSKA'S BARRACKS	ZAGREB
342	SINGLES' HOTEL – RANŽIRNI K.	ZAGREB
343	VIJADUKT'S BARRACKS IN RAKITJE	ZAGREB
344	HPT'S SCHOOL DORMITORY	ZAGREB
345	SCHOOL DORMITORY SELSKA	ZAGREB
346	CDBOSO TREŠNJEVKA	ZAGREB
347	CHILDREN'S HOME A. G. MATOŠ	ZAGREB
348	S.D. "ANTE STARČEVIĆ"	ZAGREB
349	S.D. "STJEPAN RADIĆ"	ZAGREB
350	SCHOOL DORMITORY FRANJO BUČAR	ZAGREB
351	RETIREMENT HOME TRNJE	ZAGREB
352	STUDENTS DOR. CVJETNO NASELJE	ZAGREB
353	SCHOOL DORMITORY LUKA BOTIĆ	ZAGREB
354	ENIKON'S BARRACKS	ZAGREB
355	CROATIAN RAILWAYS INN	ZAGREB
356	HOTEL NOVOGRADNJA	ZAGREB-NOVI ZAGREB
357	RESORT SISAK	ZAOSTROG
358	AUTO-CAMP DALMACIJA	ZAOSTROG
359	HOME KRO ZAPREŠIĆ	ZAPREŠIĆ
360	VIJADUKT'S BARARCKS POJATNO	ZAPREŠIĆ
361	HOTEL NIMFA	ŽIVOGOŠĆE
362	RESORT VIŠEGRAD	ŽIVOGOŠĆE

/handwritten: B.Č./

/Coat of arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
Embassy
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Zagreb

UNHCR, Zagreb
Att. Mr. Jacques Mouchet, High Commissioner
Fax. No. 530 101

AMB/ZAG/04/-12203/94 Zagreb, 19 April 1994

Subject: RESETTLEMENT BOSNIAKS TO THIRD COUNTRIES

We've received a report from an associate of the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on intensified activities of the UNHCR staff on islands of Brač and Hvar. UNHCR staff is grouping refugees explaining them that the conditions are not yet right for their safe return to Mostar. They point out that Mostar is not safe neither for Croats nor for Serbs, not to mention, as they emphasize, for Muslims. They point out that Muslims cannot even enter Mostar and that they should be patient and not to be fooled by the prepared return convoys.

UNHCR staff is promising refugees that, should the Social services centers of the Republic of Croatia cancel their refugee status, that special convoys to some other countries will be organized for Muslim refugees.

We also have information on continued UNHCR activities in collective refugee camps : "Gašinci", "Savudrija", "Učka", "Varaždin", "Obonjan" and others, which refer to daily UNHCR work on relocating and resettling of Bosniak people – refugees (with regulated refugee status) from the Republic of Croatia to third countries.

We are asking you to deliver us prompt information on your representatives' work with the refugees in the field. We also want to know the reasons and aims for relocation of refugees and the grounds for UNHCR's evaluation of refugees being unsafe in the Republic of Croatia so that their relocation is being continually executed.

Given that the information we receive from refugees are correct, in our opinion, UNHCR acts contrary to its mandate, stirs political instability, unsettlement and panic within refugees, and unfoundedly stimulates and performs further resettlement.

According to some documents we've received, an increasing number of civilians, Bosniaks and Croats, with the help of UNHCR , are leaving Banja Luka, Prijedor, Teslić and other towns of Bosanska Krajina. After transitory stay at the collective refugee camp "Gašinci", they leave for third countries through UNHCR resettlement programs. We also ask for information regarding the above.

Ambassador
Bisera Turković
/signed/

/round seal with an inscription: "AMBASADA ZAGREB, 2, Coat of arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina /

Cc:
- UN – CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
- INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATIONS
- INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE
- INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT ORGANIZATIONS

/memo marks/: Zagreb, Pantovčak 96, p.p. 1056, Telephones: (+385 41) 449-528, 449-655, 429-831, 429-832, Fax: (+385 41) 441-899

/coat of arms/
Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Zagreb

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
OFFICE FOR THE EXPELLED PERSONS AND REFUGEES
Professor Ph.D. Adalbert Rebić, Head
ZAGREB
Republic of Austria 14

Zagreb, 19 April 1994

AMB/ZAG/04-12204/94

Dear Mr. Rebić

Once more we would like to express out gratitude on today's phone call from the Office for the Refugees of the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb as well as on the information on increasing number of the Bosniak-Herzegovina citizens, which, by the help of UNHCR, keep arriving on the border of the Republic of Croatia, with aim to reach the third country.

We appreciate and accept, in the most special manner, the offered cooperation between the Office for the expelled persons and the refugees, and the Embassy, by which the control of organizations work should be introduced, dealing with forwarding civilians from the Bosnia and Herzegovina. It shall be our pleasure to present you the report on the substantial proposals of the Ministry for Refugees, work and social protection of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the future cooperation in this area.

Hereby, we submit you the copy of our memo number AMB/ZAG/04-12203/94, addressed to the UNHCR, as information on some activities of UNHCR on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

Sincerely yours

Ambassador
Bisera Turković
/signed and stamped/

/memo marks/: Zagreb, Pantovčak 96, p.p. 1056, phones; (+385 41) 449-528, 449-655, 429-831, 429-832, Fax: (+395 41) 441-899

Archive of the Administration Office for Displaced Persons, Returnees and Refugees contains digitalized data and documentation on at least 235,819 individuals from BiH.

Data about refugees from BiH during 1994

S. NO.	FILE TYPE	MUNICIPALITY OF REGISTRATION	FILE	FILE ISSUED	LOCATION/TOWN OF ACCOMMODATION	STREET & HOUSE NUMBER OF ACCOMMOD.
235741	IN TRANSIT	NOVI ZAGREB	4662	11.6.1994	ZAGREB	BUNDEK 7
235742	IN TRANSIT	NOVI ZAGREB	4663	11.6.1994	ZAKREB	BUNDEK 7
235743	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4664	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235744	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4665	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235745	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4666	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235746	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4667	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235747	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4668	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235748	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4669	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235749	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4670	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235750	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4712	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL SUĆURAC	KAŠTELANSKA CESTA 35
235751	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4713	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL SUĆURAC	KAŠTELANSKA CESTA 35
235752	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4714	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL SUĆURAC	KAŠTELANSKA CESTA 35
235753	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4715	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL SUĆURAC	KAŠTELANSKA CESTA 35
235754	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4716	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL GOMILICA	BRUNA BUŠIĆA 1
235755	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4717	10.6.1994	KAŠTEL KOMILICA	BRUNA BUŠIĆA 1
535756	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4727	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235757	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4558	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235758	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4728	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235759	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4729	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235760	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4730	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235761	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4731	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235762	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4732	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235763	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4733	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	CESTA 55
235764	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4734	1.1.1991	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	CESTA 55
235765	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4739	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	CESTA 55
235766	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4740	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	CESTA 55
235767	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4735	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235768	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4736	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235769	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4737	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235770	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4738	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235771	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4741	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 33
235772	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4742	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235773	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4593	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235774	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4594	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235775	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4749	11.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235776	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4750	23.6.1994	KAŠTEL ŠTAFILIŠ	NEHAJSKI PUT 55
235777	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	Illegible	30.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	/illegible/ 15
235778	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4520	30.6.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	/illegible/ 15
235779	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	Illegible	6.12.1994	KAŠTEL STARI	/illegible/ 15
235780	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	Illegible	27.1.1995	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ	MURTINICA 15
235781	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	Illegible	14.2.1995	KAŠTEL GOMILICA	CESTA 55
235782	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4940	14.2.1995	KAŠTEL KAMBELOVAC	K. CESTA 59
235783	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4941	2.12.1995	KAŠTEL KAMBELOVAC	K. CESTA 59
235784	IN TRANSIT	KAŠTELA	4942	3.3.1995	KAŠTEL STARI	OBALA K. TOMISLAVA 24
235785	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4949	3.3.1995	PODSTRANA	KAŠIĆEVA 5
235786	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4950	3.3.1995	PODSTRANA	KAŠIĆEVA 5
235787	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4951	3.3.1995	PODSTRANA	KAŠIĆEVA 5
235788	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4952	24.3.1995	PODSTRANA	KAŠIĆEVA 5
235789	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4957	24.3.1995	KAŠTEL STARI	UZVRTLE 66
235790	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4960	30.3.1995	KAŠTEL STARI	UZVRTLE 66
235791	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4953	30.3.1995	KAŠTEL SUĆURAC	KAŠTELANSKA 33
235792	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4954	30.3.1995	KAŠTEL SUĆURAC	KAŠTELANSKA 33
235793	IN TRANSIT	ŠIBENIK	4955	30.3.1995	PRVIĆ LUKA	PRVIĆ LUKA
235794	IN TRANSIT	ŠIBENIK	4966	30.3.1995	PRVIĆ LUKA	PRVIĆ LUKA
235795	IN TRANSIT	ŠIBENIK	4957	30.3.1995	PRVIĆ LUKA	PRVIĆ LUKA
235796	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4958	30.3.1995	KAŠTEL SUĆURAC	VICE JERČIĆA 17A
235797	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4959	11.4.1995	KAŠTEL LUKŠIĆ	KAŠTELANSKA CESTA 33
235798	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4971	13.4.1995	PODSTRANA	CINDROVA 9
235799	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4972	13.4.1995	PODSTRANA	CINDROVA 9
235800	IN TRANSIT	SPLIT	4973	13.4.1995	PODSTRANA	CINDROVA 9

OWNER/TITLE OF ACCOMM.	TYPE OF ACCOMM.	CAMP	YOUNGER THAN	PERSON IS AN ORPHAN	ACCOMM. WITHOUT PARENTS	CONTACT WITH PARENTS?	CHECKOUT FROM ACCOMM.	RETURNEE STATUS SINCE	EMIGRANT STATUS SINCE
INDUSTROGRADNJA BARAKE	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0	20.04.1996		
INDUSTROGRADNJA BARAKE	OTHER	0	1	0	0	0	20.04.1996		
KRIŠTO LUCA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KRIŠTO LUCA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
ŠERIĆ MATE	OTHER	1	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
ŠERIĆ MATE	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
CRNKOVIĆ JOZO	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0			
CRNKOVIĆ JOZO	OTHER	0	1	0	0	0			
CRNKOVIĆ JOZO	OTHER	0	1	0	0	0			
SPAHA IVAN	APARTMENT	1	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
SPAHA IVAN	APARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
SPAHA IVAN	APARTMENT	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
SPAHA IVAN	APARTMENT	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
PAVLOV KUZMA	RENTAL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
PAVLOV KUZMA	RENTAL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
JURIĆ ILIJA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0			
JURIĆ ILIJA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0			
JURIĆ ILIJA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0			
JURIĆ ILIJA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0			
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0			
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KAŠTELANSKA RIVIJERA	HOTEL	0	0	0	0	0			
KRIŠTO LUCA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KRIŠTO LUCA	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KRIŠTO LUCA	OTHER	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
ŠERIĆ MATE	OTHER	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
ŠERIĆ MATE	OTHER	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
KLJUČ /illegible/	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
MARKOTIĆ VLADO	HOUSE	1	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
MARKOTIĆ VLADO	HOUSE	1	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
SAVIČEVIĆ	APARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0			
/illegible/ TEODOR	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0			
BRNJAKOVIĆ ALOJZIJE	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
BRNJAKOVIĆ ALOJZIJE	HOUSE	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
DRAGOJEVIĆ PETAR	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0			
BULIĆ IVKA	APARTMENT	1	0	0	0	0			
BULIĆ IVKA	APARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
BULIĆ IVKA	APARTMENT	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
BULIĆ IVKA	APARTMENT	0	1	0	0	0	1.5.1996	1.8.1996	
BAŠIĆ VALENKA	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0			
BAŠIĆ VALENKA	HOUSE	0	1	0	0	0			
DELIĆ SMAIL	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
DELIĆ SMAIL	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
COMMUNITY RESORT NAŠA DJECA	RESORT	1	0	0	0	0	4.5.1996		
COMMUNITY RESORT NAŠA DJECA	RESORT	0	1	0	0	0	4.5.1996		
COMMUNITY RESORT NAŠA DJECA	RESORT	0	1	0	0	0	4.5.1996		
BOŽIDAR DELIĆ	HOUSE	0	1	0	0	0			
GAREŠIĆ ZDENKO	HOUSE	0	1	0	0	0		1.8.1996	
ROGIĆ IVAN	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0			
ROGIĆ IVAN	HOUSE	0	0	0	0	0			
ROGIĆ IVAN	HOUSE	0	1	0	0	0			

One of 3931 pages from the database of registered refugees on the territory of Republic of Croatia

Refuge from east Herzegovina over Neretva River near Čapljina at the end of April 1992

List of units located in Međugorje, role and significance of Ševać Polje in resistance to the enemy in 1991 and 1992, Ševać Polje, October 1992

On 10 April 1992, a heavy front line was open on Bivolje Brdo. The tank unit moves from Pijesci towards the Bivolje Brdo and hits Bivolje Brdo by artillery. On that day, around 10 am, artillery fire has been opened towards the Bivolje Brdo from tanks and mortars and lasted till 19:30 in the evening, non-stop and without any single interruption. This was a day in hell at Bivolje Brdo but also on Ševać Njive and Ševać Polje for the reason of vicinity. That day, 10 April 1992, around 4 pm, Jozo Popović and Andrun Drago arrive to Ševać Njive and seek for help to dig trenches for the first line of fire on Bivolje Brdo. Šabanović Zulfo and Musair, as well as Zijo Veledar arrive to Vinko Andrun's house and negotiate where to dig, whom to report to and etc. It has been agreed that Dadić Luka and Toni Andrun come to the Harem on Ševać Njive, take over men and lead them to the spot, where they would dig. Šabanović Musair takes the men by his truck, the following men being from Počitelj: Merdan Alija with a nickname The Hero, Dizdar Zijo and Alagić Alaga, whereas from Ševać Njive the following persons: Šabanović Musair, Džemil, Kemo, Enver, Rijad, Bojčić Ibraga and Rahić Ibro son of Salko. On 10 April 1992 at Bivolje Brdo, Beno Frano and Beno Martin from Hodanj got killed, as well as Raguž Dragan from Bivolje Brdo.

***

All the members of the Crisis Staff in Počitelj are way too occupied. A large number of people should be provided with medical help being in great panic, fuel for boat engines on Neretva should be secured, a large number of people should be accommodated on that night on 11/12 April 1992, as well as the following nights. The Crisis Staff organizes shelter for children – babies in Počitelj, it organizes young women to milk the village cows in hamlets of Gradina, Ševać Polje, Hodanj and Veledar. It also organizes help in kitchens of the "Staklenik" restaurant in Počitelj to boil milk and provide it to mothers with small children. In this night, on 11/12 April 1992, the people keep coming in continuously and in masses. The day after, on 12 April 1992, Dr Esad Boškailo from the Crisis Staff in Počitelj negotiates with the local government in Čapljina and chiefs of Serbs in Tasovčići in order to establish the convoy of vehicles in Počitelj and Ševać Polje to be passed through Tasovčići, heading south. The agreement has been reached and a large vehicle convoy full of refugees is formed in Počitelj and Ševać Polje and moves towards Tasovčićići. The convoy front arrives to the new intersection and bumps into a barricade that the Serbs do not want to remove. The convoy stops here. The negotiations were going on for a while. After that, Serbian extremists threatened to open fire on the convoy, therefore the entire convoy returns to Počitelj and Ševać Polje, leaving the vehicles behind and moving across Neretva. The Crisis Staff estimates that back than approximately 10 000 people were in Počitelj and Ševać Polje.

***

On 13 April 1992, the Chetnicks are attacking Čapljina. This is the first attack to Čapljina. From Modrič and Muminovača, they hit bunkers on Gradina by tanks, as well as the entire Čapljina. In Ševać Polje there has been an agreement to move all elderly inhabitants of the Ševać Njive along with the rest of refugees from Dubrave, whereas all younger men, able to fight, remain in the village. On 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 April 1992, almost everybody leaves the village, almost all elderly persons. Till the 17 April 1992, all refugees were transported across Neretva. Large number of vehicles remained in Ševać Polje. According to our evaluation, approximately 3000 vehicles were placed along the tunnel in Hauz, till the tunnel that was struck down, closer to the "Sunce" restaurant, also from both sides of the road. Apart from this, many vehicles were in front of private houses in the field, everywhere where a vehicle could be left, along the entire road from the street at the village passage, over the road (*magistralni put*)?, till the boat on Bare, whereas many vehicles were placed on the meadows of Bare.
As the watch by Atrij stopped, following the agreement that the young men do not leave the village, new watches are organized in the village. Nevertheless, on 17 April 1992, all the refugees, those who arrived, as well as majority of elderly from Ševać Njiva, hills and fields, were transported. That day, on 17 April 1992, a second major attack on Čapljina took place. The passage over Neretva is closed for several days; however, new refugees begin to arrive from Dubrave, which opens the passage in order to transport the refugees.

***

In the meantime, the rest of the refugees from the entire Dubrave arrive in waves, depending on occasions in Dubrave and possibility on crossing roads from Dubrave to Počitelj, being transported over Neretva, along with their vehicles. The refugees' transportation, along with their vehicles lasts till the 22 May 1992.

Statement of Željko Ostojić in case IT-04-74 from November 29, 2005

Željko Ostojić

A: PERSONAL DATA

1. My name is Željko Ostojić, I was born on 25th of August 1960 in Mostar

2. I attended the elementary school in Međugorje. I graduated from the high school of electrical engineering in Zagreb, as well as from college of electrical engineering, VII degree.
3. I am currently employed in HT Mostar.

B: THE INDICTMENT AGAINST JADRANKO PRLIĆ ET AL

By the Counsel who works on the preparation of Slobodan Praljak's defence in view of the indictment against Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Valentin Ćorić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković and Berislav Pušić before the Tribunal in The Hague, I was asked to provide a statement referring to acceptation and accommodation of major number of expelled persons, Bosniaks-Muslims, in the area of Bijakovići and Međugorje during 1992, in occasion of which I give the following

S T A T E M E N T

1. In the period from September 1991 till late August 1992 I performed duty of the Commander of Bijakovići company which was in the composition of the "Brotnjo" battalion which again was and acted as part of HVO HZ HB.
   The company I commanded had a zone of responsibility in the south-eastern part of Čitluk municipality, that is, in the area of Bijakovići, Krućevići and Šurmanaci settlements, to be precise, immediately by the Neretva river, whereby the zone of responsibility was extended to the marginal settlement of Šurmanci which, in terms of the territory, belonged to the vicinal municipality of Čapljina. The company had 180 soldiers and throughout the time of war in its composition, it had at least 3 or more Bosniaks-Muslims.
2. In the second half of April 1992, I was invited to a meeting of the HVO Main staff in Čitluk. The meeting was called and presided by the commander of the Main staff, Slobodan Praljak; the meeting was also attended by my immediate commander of the "Brotnjo" battalion, Pero Pehar. Apart from me, other captains from the "Brotnjo" battalion were present at the meeting, however I am not sure whether captains of all companies were present as well. After we, the captains presented short reports by companies, commanders Slobodan Praljak and Pero Pehar introduced us to the course of preparation of a major JNA and Republika Srpska Army's offensive on the eastern side of Neretva river, to be precise, in the area of Stolac, Ravno and Čapljina municipalities and that that offensive is taking place in order to expel and ethnically cleanse Bosniaks-Muslims from the area of those municipalities, that is, from the entire space eastern from the Neretva river. Since the JNA and the army of Republika Srpska already in 1991 exiled all Croats that lived in this area, commanders Slobodan Praljak and Pero Pehar warned us that we can expect a huge wave of expelled persons, Bosniaks-Muslims already tomorrow, after which they issued an order to organize acceptation and accommodation of all expelled Bosniaks and to use all disposable accommodation capacities in Bijakovići, Međugorje and Čitluk.
   Our attention was especially concentrated to disposal of accommodation capacities of highest quality, food provision and other necessary care for the expelled persons, as well as the respect of will of each individual in terms of intention to stay in the area of Čitluk municipality or to be accommodated in some other locality.
3. Since I was the commander of the company in whose zone of responsibility, that is, in the settlement Šurmanci, was an improvised "ferry" on the river Neretva, which could transport people, cars and cattle over the river, I was

issued with an order to organize acceptance, along with the military police from Čapljina of all expelled persons who at this point cross the Neretva river, while the commander of civil protection was issued with an order to organize shelter, provide food and other care for the expelled persons. In the following 10-15 days, to be precise, from 15th of May 1992, my company accepted several thousands of expelled Bosniaks and after the acceptance, the accommodation, nutrition and expelled persons care was taken over by civil protection who accommodated expelled persons in mobilized tourist settlement "Kompas-Međugorje" and several private pensions in Međugorje. I know that more than 200 expelled persons were accommodated in mobilized tourist settlement "Kompas-Međugorje", some 40 of them in the pension "Europa", certain number in private houses of Ivan Ivanković, Nada Čilić and Žarko Ostojić, while about the rest of them I am not sure in which houses they were placed in. The procedure of acceptance and accommodation of expelled Bosniaks in the area of Čitluk municipality was monitored by the commanders of the staff, Slobodan Praljak, commander of the "Brotnjo" battalion, Pero Pehar, deputy commander of the battalion, Zoran Buntić and commander of the civil protection, who did not have any objections to the task that was executed by my company. I most surely know that the certain number of expelled persons, that is, one military unit, whose commanders were Bajro Pizović and Mr. Mahumtćehajić expressed wish to join Daidža's military unit because I personally and by their specific wish took this group to Vrgorac where they joined Daidža's unit. I also know that certain number of expelled persons, mostly women, elderly and children, expressed their wish to leave for Croatia or third countries, which was enabled to them, while mostly military capable men remained in the area of Međugorje and Čitluk all the way till the end of military action "Čagalj", known as "Lipanjske zore" /The Aurora's of June/ in which HVO liberated the taken areas of Stolac, Ravno and Čapljina municipalities. Out of expelled Bosniaks which I accepted then, I can remember names of Bajro Pizović, later commander of the "Bregava" brigade, Mahmutćehajić and Šabanović who was accommodated by Ivan Ivanković and who I contacted to at the occasion, while other names I cannot remember.

4. Already the day, after HVO liberated the area of Stolac and Čapljina municipalities, the expelled Bosniaks-Muslims established the headquarters of "Bregava" brigade in the liberated area, to be precise, in Počitelj in Fika's house. After the HVO, in the marked military action, liberated the taken areas of Stolac and Čapljina municipalities, the expelled Bosniaks-Muslims returned to their home, along with expelled Croats.
5. I state that this statement is given in good faith, that it is true and given according to my best recollection.

Čitluk_____

Željko Ostojić
/signed/

/stamp/
It is confirmed that Željko Ostojić /handwritten/ /illegible/

4.00 KM
7955/05
9th of November 2005

/round stamp and signature/

COMMENT:

After we have spent days and nights (see on the photo D-120) transporting 15,000 people (Muslims-Bosniaks) and 3,000 cars on rafts and once we have placed them in the municipality which numbers less inhabitants than the number of newcomers, once they were transferred and accommodated to suitable, free, indoor space, once all involved in this work both Croats and Muslims (including me) were whip tired – then what?

The last group, 50-60 people, was transferred around 2 a.m., and they have spent the rest of the night on a meadow.

It was warm.

In the morning one humanitarian activist, from the civilized world, came and saw those "unattended " people.

Dear reader, you should read her report. In her report she writes that we Croats (HVO) are somewhat better than the Nazis.

And 3,000 vehicles equal 50 ferries with 60 vehicles.

It's easy to perform this task sitting in the armchair in front of TV and complain.

About people, what can one say about 15,000 people?

1. **NOTE**: I believe there is an error in the statement given by Željko Ostojić

   It didn't start on May 15th, 1992 but rather on April 15th, 1992.

2. **NOTE:** There was one more raft.

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

24.

REFUGEES DURING SERBIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 1992



FACTS

D-124a



POPULATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 1991

- 4,377,033 HABITANTS
- 760,853 CROATS
- 1,902,956 MUSLIMS
- 1,366,104 SERBS
- 347,121 OTHER AND UNKNOWN

D-124b

- 400,000 RELOCATED PERSONS
- AT LEAST 201,000 IN CROATIA
- MINIMUM 125,000 IN AREAS UNDER BiH ARMY AND HVO CONTROL


1,500 CROATS FLED FROM VISOKO MINICIPALITY
8,000 CROATS FLED FROM SARAJEVO MUNICIPALITY
10,000 CROATS FLED FROM MOSTAR
2,500 CROATS FLED FROM KREŠEVO MUNICIPALITY
1.500 CROATS FLED FROM ČAPLJINA MUNICIPALITY
SITUATION OVERVIEW IN THE REPUBLIC OF BiH, FROM APRIL TO DECEMBER 1992
– TERRITORY UNDER VRS AND JNA CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER BiH ARMY CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER HVO CONTROL
– "SALVATION WAY" from SPLIT to TUZLA and towards SARAJEVO
– ALTERNATIVE ROUTS OF REFUGEE MOVEMENT
– UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)
– CONFLICT AREA
In April, May and June of 1992, following the Serbian attack from Montenegro, approximately 11,500 Croats fled to Croatia, and by the end of 1992 from Municipalities Kreševo and Sarajevo another 12,000 Croats flee.
23,500 Croats in total
GOSPIĆ
ŠIBENIK
SPLIT
DUBROVNIK
DOBOJ
JAJCE
KREŠEVO
MOSTAR
ČAPLJINA
METKOVIĆ
GRUDE
LIPA
KONJIC
ORAŠJE
GRADAČAC


- FALL OF JAJCE ON 31st OCTOBER 1992 AND EXPELLING OF 15,800 CROATS AND 17,300 MUSLIMS
- OF WHICH 800 MUSLIMS AND 8,000 CROATS TO CROATIA
- THE REMAINING 7,800 CROATS AND 16,500 MUSLIMS ARE LOCATED MAINLY IN TRAVNIK AND LAŠVANSKA VALLEY AREA
AT THE END OF 1992, IN BUGOJNO, THERE IS STILL ARROUND 20,000 MUSLIMS EXPELLED FROM THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
IN TRAVNIK, 15-20,000 MUSLIMS EXPELLED FROM RS
AND IN ZENICA, 15–20,000 MUSLIMS EXPELLED FROM RS
SITUATION OVERVIEW IN THE REPUBLIC OF BiH, FROM APRIL TO DECEMBER 1992
– TERRITORY UNDER VRS AND JNA CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER BiH ARMY/TO /Territorial Defence Forces/ CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER HVO CONTROL
– "SALVATION WAY" from SPLIT to TUZLA and towards SARAJEVO
– ALTERNATIVE ROUTS OF REFUGEE MOVEMENT
– UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)
– CONFLICT AREA
– DIRECTION OF REFUGE WITHIN BiH
AT THE END OF 1992 IN TRAVNIK, BUGOJNO, ZENICA AND IN LAŠVANSKA VALLEY AREA, THERE'S A CONFIRMED NUMBER OF MINIMUM 70,000 MUSLIMS EXPELLED FROM REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA. ANOTHER 16,000 MUSLIMS FROM THE MOSTAR AND ČAPLJINA AREA SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE ABOVE NUMBER
SPLIT
DUBROVNIK
MOSTAR
SARAJEVO
TUZLA
JAJCE
KONJIC
LIVNO
GRUDE
ČAPLJINA
METKOVIĆ

D-125a

Aggression of JNA, Serbia and Montenegro, then attack of Muslim Army (A BiH) on Croats (HVO) 1992-1995 "minority" population have been cleansed from the area occupied by the aggression





National enclaves	
1.	Goražde
2.	Žepa
3.	Srebrenica
4.	Orašje
5.	Lašvanska valley
6.	Vareš
7.	Žepče and Usora
8.	Bihać - V.Kladuša

D-125b



SITUATION OVERVIEW IN THE REPUBLIC OF BiH in DECEMBER 1992

– TERRITORY UNDER BiH ARMY and HVO CONTROL

– TERRITORY UNDER VRS AND JNA CONTROL

– TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AREAS IN CROATIA

– UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)

AT THE HEIGHT OF HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN DECEMBER OF 1992, THERE ARE 402,768 REFUGEES FROM BiH AND 206,705 PERSONS EXPELLED BY VRS AND JNA, LOCATED IN CROATIA.

25.

REFUGEES DURING AGGRESSION OF A BiH AGAINST HVO



FACTS

D-126a


7,000 CROATS FLED FROM GORNJI VAKUF
5,100 CROATS FLED FROM NOVI TRAVNIK MUNICIPALITY
3,500 CROATS FLED FROM PROZOR
TOTAL OF 15,600 CROATS
SITUATION OVERVIEW IN THE REPUBLIC OF BiH IN OCTOBER 1992 AND JANUARY 1993
– TERRITORY UNDER VRS AND JNA CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER BiH ARMY CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER HVO CONTROL
– "SALVATION WAY" from SPLIT to TUZLA and towards SARAJEVO
– ALTERNATIVE ROUTS OF REFUGEE MOVEMENT
– UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)
– CONFLICT AREA
SARAJEVO
MOSTAR
SPLIT
DUBROVNIK
ZADAR
GOSPIĆ
TUZLA
DOBOJ
ORAŠJE
GRADAČAC
TRAVNIK
ŽEPČE
JAJCE
KAKANJ
BUGOJNO
BUSOVAČA
LIVNO
KREŠEVO
KONJIC
JABLANICA
POSUŠJE
GRUDE
ČITLUK
LJUBUŠKI
ČAPLJINA
STOLAC
METKOVIĆ
PLOČE
MAKARSKA
OMIŠ
TRILJ
LIPA
BIHAĆ
SENJ
BIOGRAD
ŽEPA
SREBRENICA

D-126b


10,000 CROATS FLED FROM KONJIC
14,000 CROATS FLED FROM ZENICA
2,500 CROATS FLED FROM KISELJAK MUNICIPALITY
2,000 CROATS FLED FROM JABLANICA
TOTAL OF 28,500 CROATS
SITUATION OVERVIEW IN THE REPUBLIC OF BiH IN APRIL AND MAY OF 1993
– TERRITORY UNDER VRS AND JNA CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER BiH ARMY CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER HVO CONTROL
– "SALVATION WAY" from SPLIT to TUZLA and towards SARAJEVO
– ALTERNATIVE ROUTS OF REFUGEE MOVEMENT
– UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)
– CONFLICT AREA
SARAJEVO
MOSTAR
SPLIT
DUBROVNIK
ZADAR
DOBOJ
TRAVNIK
ŽEPČE
JAJCE
KISELJAK
KONJIC
JABLANICA
POSUŠJE
GRUDE
ČITLUK
LJUBUŠKI
ČAPLJINA
STOLAC
METKOVIĆ
PLOČE
MAKARSKA
OMIŠ
TRILJ
LIPA
BIHAĆ
SENJ
BIOGRAD
ŽEPA
SREBRENICA


5,500 CROATS FLED FROM VITEZ
3,000 CROATS FLED FROM ŽEPČE
FALL OF TRAVNIK AND EXPELLING OF 25,000 CROATS
FALL OF KAKANJ - 15,000 CROATS FLED FROM KAKANJ MUNICIPALITY
END OF JULY 1993 – 15,000 CROATS FLEE FROM BUGOJNO
2,500 CROATS FLED FROM BUSOVAČA
6,000 CROATS FLED FROM FOJNICA MUNICIPALITY
SITUATION OVERVIEW IN THE REPUBLIC OF BiH IN JUNE AND JULY OF 1993
– TERRITORY UNDER VRS AND JNA CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER BiH ARMY CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER HVO CONTROL
– "SALVATION WAY" from SPLIT to TUZLA and towards SARAJEVO
– ALTERNATIVE ROUTS OF REFUGEE MOVEMENT
– UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)
TOTAL OF 72,000 CROATS
BIHAĆ
GRADAČAC
TUZLA
MAGLAJ
ŽEPČE
JAJCE
KAKANJ
BUGOJNO
BUSOVAČA
G. VAKUF
FOJNICA
KREŠEVO
LIVNO
PRozor
LIPA
KONJIC
JABLANICA
TRILJ
POSUŠJE
MOSTAR
OMIŠ
IMOTSKI
GRUDE
ČITLUK
LJUBUŠKI
ČAPLJINA
STOLAC
PLOČE
METKOVIĆ
DUBROVNIK
SREBRENICA
ŽEPA
ORAŽDE


4,200 CROATS FLED FROM MAGLAJ
4,000 CROATS FLED FROM ZAVIDOVIĆI
8,500 CROATS FLED FROM VAREŠ
SITUATION OVERVIEW IN THE REPUBLIC OF BiH UNTIL THE END OF 1993
– TERRITORY UNDER VRS AND JNA CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER BiH ARMY CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER HVO CONTROL
– "SALVATION WAY" from SPLIT to TUZLA and towards SARAJEVO
– ALTERNATIVE ROUTS OF REFUGEE MOVEMENT
– UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)
– CONFLICT AREA
TOTAL OF 16,700 CROATS
FROM THE END OF 1992 TO THE END OF 1993, DURING CROATIAN-MUSLIM CONFLICT, APPROXIMATELY 130,000 CROATS HAVE BEEN EXPELLED FROM STATED TOWNS AND MUNICIPALITIES.
BIHAĆ
ORAŠJE
GRADAČAC
GOSPIĆ
DOBOJ
MAGLAJ
TUZLA
ŽEPČE
JAJCE
ZAVIDOVIĆI
TRAVNIK
VAREŠ
KAKANJ
ZADAR
BUGOJNO
BUSOVAČA
SARAJEVO
G. VAKUF
FOJNICA
KREŠEVO
LIVNO
PRozor
SINJ
SIBENIK
LIPA
KONJIC
JABLANICA
TRILJ
SPLIT
POSUŠJE
MOSTAR
OMIŠ
IMOTSKI
GRUDE
ČITLUK
LJUBUŠKI
ČAPLJINA
STOLAC
ŽEPA
ORAŽDE

D-127a


1993.
VRS
VRS
A BiH
HR H-B
HVO
Areas in BiH with majority population
CROATS
SERBS
BOSNIAKS
1995.
RS
RS
FBiH

D-127b

VELIKA KLADUŠA MUNICIPALITY
BIHAĆ
ORAŠJE
GRADAČAC
GOSPIĆ
DOBOJ
MAGLAJ
TUZLA
JAJCE
ŽEPČE
TRAVNIK
VITEZ
ZENICA
SREBRENICA
ZADAR
BUGOJNO
N. TRAVNIK
SARAJEVO
G. VAKUF
LIVNO
KREŠEVO
PROZOR
ŠIBENIK
SINJ
LIPA
KONJIC
GORAŽDE
TRILJ
JABLANICA
POSUŠJE
MOSTAR
SPLIT
OMIŠ
IMOTSKI
GRUDE
ČITLUK
LJUBUŠKI
MAKARSKA
ČAPLJINA
STOLAC
METKOVIĆ
PLOČE
DUBROVNIK
SITUATION OVERVIEW IN THE REPUBLIC OF BiH IN AUGUST OF 1995
– TERRITORY UNDER VRS AND JNA CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER BiH ARMY AND HVO CONTROL


23,500 REFUGEES, MUSLIMS FROM BiH FROM THE AREA OF CAZINSKA KRAJINA, HAVE BEEN SITUATED IN THE CAMP IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
VOJNIĆ
Kuplensko


DAVOR – REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
DAVOR
ORAŠ
GRADAČAC
BIHAĆ
GOSPIĆ
DOBOJ
TUZLA
MAGLAJ
JAJCE
ŽEPČE
TRAVNIK
VITEZ
ZENICA
SREBRENICA
ZADAR
BUGOJNO
N. TRAVNIK
G. VAKUF
SARAJEVO
LIVNO
KREŠEVO
PROZOR
ŠIBENIK
SINJ
LIPA
KONJIC
GORAŽDE
TRILJ
JABLANICA
POSUŠJE
SPLIT
MOSTAR
OMIŠ
IMOTSKI
GRUDE
ČITLUK
LJUBUŠKI
ČAPLJINA
STOLAC
METKOVIĆ
PLOČE
DUBROVNIK
SITUATION OVERVIEW IN THE REPUBLIC OF BiH IN EARLY OCTOBER 1995
– TERRITORY UNDER VRS AND JNA CONTROL
– TERRITORY UNDER BiH ARMY AND HVO CONTROL


20,836 CROATS AND MUSLIMS-BOSNIAKS HAVE FLED ACROSS THE TOWN OF DAVOR TO CROATIA IN THE PERIOD FROM AUGUST TO DECEMBER 1995

26.

HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTING AID FOR BOSNIAK PEOPLE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
276

D-128a

List of domicile countries of humanitarian organizations

1. Austria
2. Australia
3. Belgium
4. BiH
5. Denmark
6. Egypt
7. GB
8. Finland
9. France
10. Italy
11. Iran
12. Ireland
13. Israel
14. Japan
15. Canada
16. Qatar
17. Kuwait
18. Hungary
19. Malaysia
20. Monaco
21. Nigeria
22. Netherland
23. Norway
24. Germany
25. Pakistan
26. Saudi Arabia
27. Sudan
28. Slovenia
29. Spain
30. Sweden
31. Switzerland
32. United Arab Emirates
33. USA
34. Vatican

Out of 234 foreign humanitarian organizations based in Croatia, 114 were active in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which only 31 exclusively in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 117 humanitarian organizations operated on the territory of the Republic of Croatia that dealt with refugees and displaced citizens of BiH.

D-128b

1. Austria
2. Belgium
3. BiH
4. Denmark
5. Egypt
6. GB
7. Finland
8. France
9. Italy
10. Iran
11. Ireland
12. Israel
13. Kuwait
14. Hungary
15. Monaco
16. Nigeria
17. Netherland
18. Norway
19. Germany
20. Pakistan
21. Saudi Arabia
22. Sudan
23. Slovenia
24. Spain
25. Sweden
26. Switzerland
27. United Arab Emirates
28. Vatican
29. Qatar

States that have sent humanitarian aid to their missions in the Republic of Croatia for Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatian cities from which humanitarian organizations operated providing aid to Bosniaks

- Zagreb
- Split
- Rijeka
- Pula
- Lipik
- Šibenik

Italian cities from which humanitarian aid for Bosniaks was sent to Croatian cities

- Milano
- Rome
- Monte san giusto
- Bologna
- Latina
- Verona

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Ministry of Labor and Welfare
Welfare department
Section for humanitarian aid

Register

of representative offices of foreign legal entities
registered in the Republic of Croatia
for humanitarian activities

With data on:
Registration
Branch offices
Legal representatives
Number of employees
Custom exemption certificates
Field of activities
Activities/form of aid
Storage area
Operation supervision

(for official use only)

Zagreb, May 1996

X

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Ministry of Labor and Welfare
Section for humanitarian aid

LIST
of representative offices of foreign legal entities
dealing with humanitarian aid
with addresses / alphabetical index

No./pg	Name and address of the representative office	
1.	A.D.E.H, Rennes	
	Miševac 53	Phone: 021/888-038
	21220 Trogir	Fax: 021/888-038

2. A.I.C.F (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AGAINST HUNGER), Washington
Begovićeva 1 Phone: 021/356-816
21000 Split Fax: 021/356-972

3. A.I.C.F., Paris
Svetog Martina 12 Phone:
21312 Podstrana Fax:

4. A.T.L.A.S., Paris
Kralja S. Držislava bb Phone: 021/373-790
21311 Stobreč Fax: 021/373-790

5. ACTION NORD SUD, Lyon
Sunčana ulica 1 Phone:
20000 Dubrovnik Fax:

6. AiBi, Milano
Ilica 147/149 Phone:
10000 Zagreb Fax:

7. AIDE DIRECTE, Geneva
Josipa Anića 21 Phone:
10000 Zagreb Fax:

8. AL HARAMAIN, Pakistan
Vrtlarska 4 Phone: 01/172-218
10000 Zagreb Fax: 01/171-454

In the period 1992 – 1995, 234 humanitarian organizations from 34 foreign countries operated on the Croatian territory

Along with local humanitarian and government organizations, these organizations were the most important factor in providing help to citizens of BiH, especially to Muslim people.

STRUCTURE OF USERS OF CUSTOM EXEMPTION CERITIFICATES AND NUMBER OF ISSUED CERTIFICATES BY CATEGORIES OF USERS

User category	certificates for goods				certificates for vehicles			
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1992	1993	1994	1995
Humanitarian organizations	1	64	213	203	5	33	17	21
Foreign legal entities	-	7	20	18	-	-	-	1
Religious groups	1	47	168	68	1	18	-	16
Other domestic legal entities	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1
Red cross	4	34	50	27	2	35	37	19
HVIDR-a	-	8	3	-	-	14	7	3
Caritas	-	7	97	67	5	34	61	45
Welfare services and institutions	4	31	64	35	2	14	17	6
Others (municipalities, schools, Fire departments)	1	26	5	10	1	18	11	11
TOTAL NO OF CERTIFICATES	**11**	**224**	**622**	**428**	**16**	**166**	**150**	**123**

* humanitarian aid in form of food, hygiene supplies, cloth and footwear, furniture, technical equipment, heating supplies etc.

MILITARY ECONOMIC MISSION
Savska Cesta 62E/V
Number: 05-3946/93
Zagreb, 26 May 1993

/in English: COORDINATION COUNCIL
FOR HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES
Dr Mohamed Abdel Hay Soliman /as in original/
GENERAL SECRETARY/
Mr Ibrahim HADŽIĆ, Office of Bihać District
Mr Fadil MUHIĆ, Logistics Centre of the 2nd Corps
Mr Azim KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ, Deputy Chief of VEP /Military Economic
R /Republic of/ BH Embassy in the RH /Republic of Croatia/ Mission

RE: Information concerning institutions and people who are authorised to contact humanitarian organisations and to take over humanitarian aid for the R BH Army

Organised aid to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is of vital importance to its inhabitants and its Armed Forces.

In order to improve the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid to R BH Army units, organs of the State Administration and the military command have divided municipalities and towns by territory into zones of responsibility of the five R BH Army corps.

1. The 1st Corps, with its headquarters in Sarajevo, will include the following towns: Breza, Centar Sarajevo, Čajnice, Foča, Kreševo, Novi Grad-Sarajevo, Novo Sarajevo, Olovo, Pale, Rogatica, Rudo, Sokolac, Stari Grad – Sarajevo, Trnovo, Visoko, Vareš, Višegrad and Vogošća.

2. The 2nd Corps, with its headquarters in Tuzla, will include the following towns: Banovići, Bijeljina, Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Šamac, Bratunac, Brčko, Derventa, Doboj, Gračanica, Gradačac, Kalesija, Kladanj, Lopare, Lukavac, Maglaj, Modriča, Odžak, Orašje, Srebrenica, Srebrenik, Teslić, Tešanj, Tuzla, Šekovići, Ugljevik, Vlasenica, Zvornik and Živinice.

3. The 3rd Corps, with its headquarters in Zenica, will include the following towns: Banja Luka, Bosanska Dubica, Jajce, Kakanj, Kotor Varoš, Laktaši, Mrkonjić Grad, Novi Travnik, Prnjavor, Skender Vakuf, Srbac, Šipovo, Travnik, Vitez, Zavidovići, Zenica, Žepče and Bosanska Gradiška.

4. The 4th Corps, with its headquarters in Mostar, will include the following towns: Bileća, Čapljina, Čitluk, Gacko, Grude, Jablanica, Konjic, Široki Brijeg, Livno, Ljubinje, Ljubuški, Mostar, Neum, Nevesinje, Posušje, Prozor, Stolac, Tomislavgrad and Trebinje.

5. The 5th Corps, with its headquarters in Bihać, will include the following towns: Bihać, Bosansko Grahovo, Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Cazin, Drvar, Glamoč, Ključ, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Velika Kladuša.

The R BH Army civilian and military institutions have specified offices and persons who are the only ones authorised to collect humanitarian aid donated for the towns in their corps' area and to confirm the identity of the people to whom the aid is handed over as members of the R BH OS /Armed Forces/ and whose families are currently in the Republic of Croatia.

With this in mind, we hereby inform you of the following:

- The Office of Bihać District and Mr Ibrahim HADŽIĆ, Našićka 12, Zagreb, tel.-fax: 041 334-484 and 041 317-938, will be the only ones authorised to take over humanitarian aid for the R BH Army on behalf of the 5th Corps, with its headquarters in Bihać.

The Logistics Centre of the 2nd Corps and Mr Fadil MUHIĆ, Ilica 150, Zagreb, tel.-fax: 041 578-623, will be the only ones authorised to take over humanitarian aid for the R BH Army on behalf of the 2nd Corps, with its headquarters in Tuzla.

Since the procedure of selecting institutions and authorised persons to take over humanitarian aid for the R BH Army is ongoing for the other three corps, we would like to inform you that we will let you know on time as soon as they are selected. Until then, you may get in touch directly with the aforementioned offices, the Military Economic Mission or Mr Azim KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ, Deputy Chief of VEP.

To:
1. Coordination Council for
Humanitarian Agencies
2. Office of the Bihać District, Našićka 12
3. Logistics Centre, 2nd Corps, Ilica 150
4. Mr Azim KARAMEHMEDOVIĆ,
Deputy Chief of VEP
5. R BH Embassy in the RH, Zagreb
SK/SP

For the MILITARY ATTACHÉ
Hajrudin OSMANAGIĆ

/handwritten 16 September 1993/

PROCLAMATION

We, below signed, would like to publicly state that Croatian Caritas, Merhamet and Mešihat cooperate in many various ways, in spite of all those who keep deny the existence of this cooperation.

Since the beginning of the war, Merhamet, Mešihat and Croatian Caritas work together and make joint efforts in order to ease sufferings of numberless victims, successfully performing their duties.

Since the political interests of the world are in conflict and malicious, we are decisive in our obligation to ease this tragic hurt of innocent individuals, no matter whether they are Orthodox, Muslims or Catholics.

This proclamation concerns those whose intentions are to break the good will among people of various origins. We intend to preserve the pre-war relations that enabled a peaceful coexistence with other individuals of various affiliations, ethnic or religious.

Therefore, eventually, we would like to express once again our deepest concern over permanent actions that only make this holocaust difficult, which includes the innocent ones. Once again, we most sincerely invite all those to whom this may concern in order to reconsider detrimental consequences of such actions.

In Zagreb, 16 September 1993

On behalf of Mešihat Mr Šefko Omerbašić /signed and stamped/	On behalf of Merhamet Doctor Izet Aganović /signed/	On behalf of Croatian Caritas nun Andjelita Šokić /last name illegible/ /signed and stamped/

27.

EXTRATERRITORIAL EDUCATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA STUDENTS (MUSLIMS-BOSNIAKS) IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
67

Extraterritorial Bosniak schools in the Republic of Croatia 1992–1994



/coat of arms/
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
Class: 019-04/92-01/03
Number: 5030104-92-7

Zagreb, 27 April 1992

/stamp of receipt/
/Republic of Croatia
Ministry of Culture and education
1 July 1992
602-01/92-01-05/128
532-05/3-92-01

Ministry of education, Culture and Sports
Ministry of Finance

Subject: Obligatory instruction on comprehension of expelled and children refugees of pre-elementary, elementary and secondary school age from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the adequate education programs in the Republic of Croatia

At the meeting, held on 24 April 1992, the Government of the Republic of Croatia has been notified on directing the obligatory instruction to the competent bodies and educational institutions, related to the comprehension of expelled and children refugees of pre-elementary, elementary and secondary school age from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the adequate education programs in the Republic of Croatia. At the meeting, held on 23 April 1992 the coordination for social activities supported the directing of the obligatory instruction, in order to organize an every day' life and education for the expelled children and refugees as soon as possible.

For the Government of the Republic of Croatia meeting, in agreement with the vice President, Dr. Mate Granić, it has been agreed that the preliminary list of expenses should be made, related to the costs of accommodation of 70,000 children, because these expenses cannot be settled by means for the school system, provided by the state budget. The monthly expenses count 84 millions HRD (Croatian Dinar), whereas for the manuals, additional 116 million HRD should be provided.

The Government has brought the following conclusion:

-the expenses of comprehension of expelled children and children refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the education and schooling system of the Republic of Croatia in total of 84 millions HRD per month, as well as the expenses of manual in amount of 116 millions HRD are necessary to be included in the sum-total of the accommodation of the expelled children and refugees and request the help from the international community as well.

-the Ministry of Finance is obliged to provide the loans in dynamics, mutually agreed with the Ministry of education, Culture and Sports, in order to promptly organize the comprehension of children in the system of education and schooling of the Republic of Croatia.

Secretary
Gordan Radin
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORT
Zagreb, Trg Burze 6
Telephone: 041/411-122•Fax 041/410-492

Class: 602-01/92-01-05/128
Number: 532-05/3-92-01
Zagreb, 1 July 1992

MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Zagreb
Katančićeva 5

Subject: Payment of costs for internally displaced students of elementary and secondary schools incurred between January and April 1992.

At its session held on 24 April 1992, the Government of the Republic of Croatia adopted a conclusion in which the Ministry of Finance in coordination with the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport is tasked with providing funds to pay for the costs incurred from enrolling displaced and refugee students in elementary and secondary schools in the Republic of Croatia.

Since the Funds for elementary and vocational education have paid from their regular sources (material expenditure funds) for the costs incurred for the enrolment of these students in elementary and secondary schools, you should provide funds to pay for these costs.

If the Funds are not given this money, they will be unable to continue their regular work.

Please find enclosed the materials from the Elementary Education Fund and the Vocational Education Fund with a detailed list of costs for displaced and refugee students for the period from January to April 1992.

MINISTER

Vesna GIRARDI-JURKIĆ

/signed/

List of requests for for payment of costs for displaced pupils from 01 January to 28 May 1991

No	Name of muncipality or school	Food	Transport	Request to pay costs of other material costs (heatin, cleannig etc.)	Writing materials and textbooks	Total
1.	Brač	26,600	-	-	-	26,600
2.	Buje	-	-	-	16,069	16,069
3.	Buzet	283,500	-	-	-	283,500
4.	Cres-Lošinj	-	64,200	182,070	-	246,270
5.	Crikvenica	-	4.422,460	1.620,137	-	6.042,597
6.	Čakovec	1.400,000	-	-	-	1.400,000
7.	Delnice	118,000	120,885	-	-	238,885
8.	Donja Stubica	-	-	545,740	-	545,740
9.	Drniš	-	-	965,000	-	965,000
10.	Hvar	-	-	-	18,285	18,285
11.	Kaštela	830,720	1.375,000	3.375,000	1.250,000	6.830,720
12.	Klanjec	188,695	-	-	-	188,695
13.	Križevci	283,000	-	-	-	283,000
14.	Krk	-	1.602,917	886,000	-	2.488,917
15.	Kutina	1.455,552	3.581,754	-	-	5.037,306
16.	Labin	210,440	548,118	-	-	758,558
17.	Našice	682,500	-	-	-	682,500
18.	Opatija	1.652,025	-	782,400	-	2.434,425
19.	Osijek	1.452,994	-	-	-	1.452,994
20.	Pakrac	-	-	1.015,000	-	1.015,000
21.	Pazin	243,350	-	-	-	243,350
22.	Petrinja	-	-	870,000	-	870,000
23.	Poreč	-	1.028,000	505,000	-	1.533,000
24.	Pula	-	350,592	-	-	350,592
25.	Rab	232,200	210,900	-	-	443,100
26.	Rovinj	885,100	1.164,464	-	-	2.049,564
27.	Senj	598,500	593,176	-	-	1.191,676
28.	Split	-	-	1.616,040	-	1.616,040
29.	Šibenik	47,400	-	-	29,140	76,540
30.	Virovitica	376,050	380,610	-	-	756,660
31.	Županja	409,500	200,000	-	-	609,500
32.	Zagreb	27.006,008	-	-	-	27.006,008
33.	Sisak	-	-	-	316,337	316,337
Total-municipalities		38.382,134	15.643,076	12.362,387	1.629,831	68.017,428
34.	Školska knjiga (unpaid invoices)	-	-	-	29.727,707	29.727,707
Total		38.382,134	15.643,076	12.362,387	31.357,538	97.754,135

Costs for displaced and refugee pupils in elementary schools for the period from January to June 1992

Between January and June 1992, the professional service of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport - Elementary Education Fund has received requests (invoices) to pay costs incurred by displaced and refugee pupils in elementary schools, as follows:

The invoices related to displaced pupils were for the following costs:

- Increased cost of feeding pupils - 38,382,134 Croatian dinars;
- Increased cost of transporting pupils - 15,643,076 Croatian dinars;
- Increased material costs in elementary schools with an increased number of classes - 12,362,387 Croatian dinars;
- Obligatory textbooks for displaced pupils - 31,357,538 Croatian dinars.

This came to a total of 97,745,135 Croatian dinars.

All these sums have been taken from invoices sent by the municipal secretariats for social activities and *Školska Knjiga* IP /Publishing Enterprise/, Zagreb.

The requests related to increased material costs of elementary schools (municipalities) who enrolled a greater number of refugee pupils from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to recorded requests, came to 43,359,238 Croatian dinars.

The Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees of the Government of the Republic of Croatia has been informed of these facts in a dispatch (CLASS: 431-03/92-01-230, Number: 532-05-3/9-92-01) of 15 June 1992. The officials of the Office informed us verbally that the Office would not be able to provide funds to pay these costs. Since no special resources were set aside in the state budget of the Republic of Croatia for 1992 so that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport could pay these costs, please take this fact into consideration and ensure that these invoices are paid.

We would add that we were forced to pay 29,727,707 Croatian dinars for textbooks for displaced pupils from the funds for joint programmes at Republic level.

Please find enclosed a list of requests to pay costs for displaced pupils, received from 1 January to 28 May 1992.

* * *

/Coat of arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/

Embassy

of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Zagreb

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
OFFICE FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS
Republike Austrije 14
41 000 ZAGREB

==========

AMB/ZAG – AK – 7097A – 02/93 Zagreb, 17th December 1993

Subject: Data on children/students - citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina who are attending regular classes in the Republic of Croatia
(Link: Our memo No. AMB/ZAG – AK – 6804A – 02/93 from 17th December 1993)

We request again, for the purposes of the Government and the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to submit the data on students who are attending regular classes in the Republic of Croatia.

NUMBER OF CHILDREN/STUDENTS – BiH CITIZENS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

STUDENTS ATTENDING REGULAR CLASSES

TOTAL NUMBER	IN PRESCHOOL INSTITUTIONS	IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS	IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS	AT UNIVERSITIES

Please note that we are asked to collect and deliver the data urgently, preferably until 1st January 1994.

Ambassador
Biserka Turković

/signed/

/round seal with an inscription: AMBASADA ZAGREB, 2,

Coat of arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina /

41000 Zagreb, Pantovčak 96 *Phone: (385 41) 449-528, 449-655, 429-831*

(*handwritten:* R. Lalić)

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
OFFICE FOR DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES
Ulica Republike Austrije 14, 41000 Zagreb, Croatia
Phone: ++385 41 173 699; fax ++ 385 41 173 109

Class: 019-04/93-06/6 (*handwritten:* Urgent Ms. Olga Lui
No: 50407-01-93-2 Ms. R. Šimunović)

Zagreb, January 12, 1994

Stamp:
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND SPORT
Received: 17-01-1994
Class: 022-03/94-01-07
Number: 380-2-2/4-94-01

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND EDUCATION
Attn. Minister, Ms. Vesna Girardi - Jurkić

Dear Minister,

The Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested from us via Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deliver them the data on the number of children attending regular school program. Since the pupils who attend regular school program are not within the competence of the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, we do not have any data on them.

Please send the requested information to the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a copy of reply both to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and this Office.

With best regards,

HEAD OF THE OFFICE

Prof. dr. Adalbert Rebić *(signed)*

Round seal: Republic of Croatia
Government of the Republic of Croatia
Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees
Zagreb

Copy to be sent to:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Consular Affairs Department

Class: 022-03/94-01-07
Number: 532-02-2/4-94-01
Zagreb, 18 January 1994

The GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
OFFICE FOR DISPLACED PERSONS
AND REFUGEES

Zagreb
Ul. Republike Austrije 14

Subject: Number of pupils from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia

Pursuant to your memo (Class 019-04/93-06/6), by which you are requesting the information on education of pupils refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia, for the needs of the Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we inform you as follows:

The pupils refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Republic of Croatia continue their education in two ways, as follows:

1. Most pupils are comprehended (voluntarily and upon the personal request) in the schooling system of the Republic of Croatia, within the existing facilities and human capacities of schools, where they are being educated according to the education programs of the Republic of Croatia, that provide the exact education expenses as they provide for the pupils of the Republic of Croatia (teachers wages and other material expenses). In such manners, 32.006 pupils refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are educated in the academic year 1993/94, whereas 25.012 in the elementary schools and 6.994 in the secondary schools. 2.800 children from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been comprehended in the pre-elementary institutions (the information are dynamic and change in continuum).
2. Part of the pupils is comprehended in special organization of schools of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, on which the above cited Ministry hasn't got any information, for the reason of spontaneous organization of such schools. The Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina disposes on information on such schools and pupils and most probably, the engaged humanitarian organizations. Smaller number of pupils, willing to attend some secondary school that is already full capacity, are given this possibility, just like the pupils citizens of the Republic of Croatia, by matriculation in educational programs by personal needs, separately paid, accordingly. The Ministry of Science and Technology disposes on information on students from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, accordingly, the information can be obtained in the cited Ministry.

Sincerely yours

Minister
Mr. Vesna Girardi-Jurkić
/signed/

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

28.

AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO THE BIHAĆ ENCLAVE DURING THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
1790

REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA
ZAGREB
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
UN
RIJEKA
PULA
VRS
VRS
BIHAĆ
PROTECTED UN ZONE
SERBIAN FORCES FROM SO CALLED. KRAJINA
BiH
UN
Weapons for Bihać have been smuggled in UN trucks.
Bihać hasn't experienced the destiny of Srebrenica only thanks to the weapons from Republic of Croatia and liberating operation of Croatian Army in 1995 - after the "STORM"



Index:
CP – command post
mbr – mountain brigade
gmbr – glorious mountain brigade
reg – regiment
RH – Republic of Croatia
VRS – Army of Republic of Srpska

MIXED TRANSPORTATION
SQUADRON LUČKO

25th November 1992

COMMANDER OF THE CROATIAN AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENCE
major general
IMRA AGOTIĆ

Transportation of cargo to the
airport Ćoralići, REPORT.-

In the period from 16th November untill 25th November 1992 following tasks have been performed at the airport Lučko: transportation of weapons, uniforms and sanitary material to the airport Ćoralići in Cazin.

Flying for the purposes of HVO BiH: (flying done by the aircraft type AN-2)

1. Polanec – Rastija	1 flight	2.10 hours
2. Polanec – Rastija	2 flights	2.00 hours
TOTAL	3 flights	4.10 hours
TOTAL CARGO:	1 tonne	

Flying for the purposes of BiH Territorial defence: (by the aircraft C-212):

1. Rajtar – Hrgović	2 flights	1.20 hours
2. Rajtar – Zrna	2 flights	1.20 hours
3. Hrgović – Zrna	1 flight	0.40 hours
4. Zrna – Hrgović	1 flight	1.30 hours
5. Hrgović – Zrna	1 flight	0.40 hours
6. Rajtar – Hrgović	2 flights	1.20 hours
7. Rajtar – Zrna	2 flights	1.20 hours
TOTAL	11 flights	8.10 hours
8. Pečenković - Bešlagić (AN-2)	2 flights	2.00 hours
TOTAL	13 flights	10.10 hours
TOTAL CARGO:	11 tonnes	

-2-

On the return flight from the airport Ćoralići, 53 passengers were transported (including 10 wounded), 12 shell cases for howitzer of 203 mm, and a certain quantity of various goods.

JH / SH

COMMANDER
Major
JOSIP HRGOVIĆ

/signed/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BIHAĆ VG /Air-force group/
Confidential number: 12/24-2
Date: 6 December 1992

MILITARY SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

List of passengers for the Republic of Croatia, for authorisation.-

MILITARY MISSION IN
RH /Republic of Croatia/
Assistant Military Attaché
Brigadier H. OSMANAGIĆ

In accordance with your request and the request submitted by the authorities in the Republic of Croatia, we are sending you the list of potential air passengers for Zagreb. The list was drafted on the basis of requests submitted by regional institutions.
We ask that you URGENTLY inform us which of the persons listed we may send to Zagreb and that you see that they be received.

List of passengers with documents:

1. Dane ŠAMAC
2. Kata ŠAMAC
3. Sandra ŠAMAC
4. Danijela ŠAMAC

– permission issued by the Office for Expelled Persons and Refugees and authorisation issued by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia

5. Emina ŽIVNIĆ
6. Snježana ŽIVNIĆ-DOLIĆ
7. Igor DOLIĆ
8. Iva DOLIĆ

– letter of guarantee (Mara KARAMATIĆ, ID number 9415047, Samobor)

9. Anela ORAŠČANIN
10. Merima ORAŠČANIN
11. Zlata LIPOVAČA

– transit visa

12. Tanja JURIĆ
13. Mile OREŠKOVIĆ
14. Milka OREŠKOVIĆ
15. Kristina JURIĆ

– authorisation of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia

16. Stjepan ŽIVKOVIĆ

– construction permit (of 26 November 1982, Republic of Croatia)

List of persons-passengers as requested by the 5th Corps Command, the Bihać GS HVO /Main Staff of the Croatian Defence Council/ and the Bihać municipality, without the required documents

1. Nura MUSETA – 5th Corps request of 24 November 1992
2. Sadika MIDŽIĆ – 27 November 1992
3. Elvis MIDŽIĆ
4. Alvis MIDŽIĆ
5. Dr Ibrahim MUJIĆ – request of Fikret ABDIĆ and 5th Corps, 3 November 1992
6. Alma HOSIĆ – request of 5th Corps of 22 November 1992
7. Sead KURTIĆ – District Assembly, 26 November 1992
8. Indira JURIĆ
9. Ćamila ĆEHIĆ
10. Adem MUSTEDANAGIĆ
11. Mario KA/SS/ILASI
12. Sead KURTOVIĆ – 25 November 1992
13. Amir BEGIĆ
14. Zehra BEGIĆ
15. Alma BEGIĆ

Patients for medical evacuation from Bihać District, proposal of the Medical Evacuation Commission - we do not have the required documents for these patients:

1. Senija ŽIRIĆ – of 11 November 1992
2. Redžo NUHANOVIĆ – of 18 November 1992
3. Enes ERDIĆ – of
4. Selma MUSLIĆ
5. Rasema BRAKIĆ – of 25 November 1992
6. Irma MIŠKIĆ
7. Emina MIŠKIĆ
8. Husein GRAŠIĆ
9. Ernad BEGIĆ
10. Mirsada BEGIĆ
11. Medžid SULEJMANOVIĆ
12. Meho JAPIĆ
13. Zlatan SALIHOVIĆ
14. Zuhdija JUSIĆ
15. Mumin BAJRIĆ
16. Fatima REDŽIĆ
17. Mihajlo MASLIĆ
18. Zuhdija MAHMIĆ
19. Zlatka ŠEHIĆ
20. Smail ALAGIĆ
21. Ajša DINKO
22. Atif FERIZOVIĆ
23. Hasan ŽDRALIĆ
24. Ilijaz VELADŽIĆ
25. Alvin DURAKOVIĆ
26. Dino DERVIŠEVIĆ
27. Aida DERVIŠEVIĆ
28. Adem VELADŽIĆ
29. Kasim VELADŽIĆ – of 2 December 1992
30. Kenan HAJDAREVIĆ
31. Indira HAJDAREVIĆ
32. Anel KULENOVIĆ
33. Sadeta CENANOVIĆ
34. Merima KAJTEZOVIĆ
35. KAJTEZOVIĆ - mother
36. Edhem MUJDŽINOVIĆ
37. Zejna ALIJAGIĆ
38. Dževad ICANOVIĆ
39. Halida ICANOVIĆ
40. Aladin SULEJMANOVIĆ
41. Dejana STEVIĆ
42. Rajko STEVIĆ
43. Emina DOLIĆ
44. Mahmut DEMIROVIĆ
45. Zlatko ČANDAR with family – of 19 November 1992 - Military Attaché H. OSMANAGIĆ

Done in two copies and
sent to:
– Military Attaché
– a/a /files/

COMMANDER
Brigadier
Nedžad SULJIĆ

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
B H A R M Y
5TH C O R P S
Strictly Confidential number: 02/1738-1
Date: 6 December 1992

MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Priority for ub/s /war materiel/
in air transport

MILITARY MISSION IN RH /Republic of Croatia/
Assistant Military Attaché
Brigadier H. OSMANAGIĆ

For the needs of the 5th Corps and in order to continue with successful combat operations, as a priority for air transport from the Republic of Croatia, send us as many 107 mm LRL /light rocket launcher/ missiles as possible, which we are in dire need of at present.

For a free R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/

BZ/IM

Two copies made and send to:
- VM /Military Mission/ in the RH
- files

C O M M A N D E R
Ramiz DREKOVIĆ

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BIHAĆ DISTRICT
BIHAĆ DISTRICT ASSEMBLY

Number: 01/S-012-19/?8//92
Bihać, 3 November 1992

Pursuant to Articles 6 and 13 of the Bihać District Statute, taking into consideration the proposal of the Bihać District Executive Committee for the opening of the Bihać District Office with its headquarters in Zagreb, at its session of 1 November 1992, the Bihać District Assembly adopted the following

DECISION
on the opening of the Bihać District Office with its headquarters in Zagreb

Article 1

The Bihać District shall open an office with its headquarters in Zagreb in order to carry out activities which are of relevance for the Bihać District.

Article 2

The scope of activities of the Office shall be defined by the District Executive Committee.

The Office will carry out activities which fall within its scope of activities in accordance with the instructions provided by the Bihać District Executive Committee and Assembly.

Article 3

Ibrahim HADŽIĆ from Bihać, residing in Zagreb, is hereby authorised to take all steps necessary to set up and open the Bihać District Office with its headquarters in Zagreb.

Article 4

This decision shall come into effect on the day of its adoption.

PRESIDENT OF THE DISTRICT ASSEMBLY
Irfan LJUBIJANKIĆ
/signed and stamped/

/Coat of arms of the Republic of Croatia/

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ZAGREB

HRZ /Croatian Air Force/ AND PZO /Air Defence/ COMMAND
MIXED TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON LUČKO

CLASS:
REF. NUMBER:
Zagreb, 17th December 1992

COMMANDER OF THE CROATIAN AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENCE
major general
IMRA AGOTIĆ

Transportation of cargo to the
airport Ćoralići, REPORT.-

In the period from 1st untill 15th December 1992 following tasks have been performed at the airport Pleso - transportation of weapons, uniforms and sanitary material to the airport Ćoralići in Cazin.

Flying for the purposes of HVO BiH:

1. LALIĆ – SOKIĆ	2 flights	2.10 hours
2. PEČENKOVIĆ – IFTIĆ	1 flight	1.10 hours
TOTAL:	3 flights	3.20 hours

Flying for the purposes of TO BiH /Territorial Defence/:

1. MARKAČ – SOKIĆ	2 flights	2.30 hours
2. ŽAGAR – MARKAČ	2 flights	2.00 hours
3. LALIĆ – ŽAGAR	2 flights	1.30 hours
4. HRGOVIĆ – ZRNA	2 flights	1.30 hours
5. RAJTAR – ZRNA	2 flights	1.30 hours
6. RAJTAR – ZRNA	2 flights	1.30 hours
7. RAJTAR – ZRNA	2 flights	1.30 hours
8. RAJTAR – ZRNA	2 flights	1.30 hours
TOTAL:	16 flights	13.30 hours

9. PEČENKOVIĆ – IFTIĆ	2 flights	2.10 hours
10. RAŠTIJA – IFTIĆ	2 flights	2.10 hours
11. PEČENKOVIĆ – BEŠLAGIĆ	2 flights	2.10 hours
12. IFTIĆ – BEŠLAGIĆ	2 flights	2.00 hours
13. PEČENKOVIĆ – BEŠLAGIĆ	2 flights	1.30 hours
TOTAL:	10 flights	10.00 hours
TOTAL FOR BiH TERRITORIAL DEFENCE: 26 flights		23.30 hours
TOTAL FLIGHTS:	29 flights	26.50 hours

Flying for the purposes of HRZ and PZO:

1. RAJTAR – HRGOVIĆ	1 flight	1.00 hour (ZAGREB – ĐAKOVO)
2. ZRNA – HRGOVIĆ	1 flight	1.00 hour (ĐAKOVO – ZAGREB)
3. RAJTAR – ZRNA	2 flights	1.20 hours (ZAGREB – KRK – ZAGREB)
4. RAJTAR – HRGOVIĆ	2 flights	5.30 hours (ZAGREB – TIRANA – ZAGREB)
5. RAJTAR – HRGOVIĆ	1 flight	2.30 hours (ZAGREB – TIRANA)
6. HRGOVIĆ – RAJTAR	1 flight	3.00 hours (TIRANA – ZAGREB)
7. HRGOVIĆ – RAJTAR	2 flights	5.30 hours (ZAGREB – TIRANA – ZAGREB)
8. POLANEC – SOKIĆ	2 flights	3.00 hours (dr. BAJIĆ)
9. Terminated flights	5 flights	3.20 hours
TOTAL:	17 flights	26.10 hours
TOTAL FLIGHTS: FROM 1st -15TH DECEMBER 1992	46 flights	53.00 hours

JH/DH

COMMANDER
Major
JOSIP HRGOVIĆ

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ZAGREB

HRZ AND PZO /Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence/ COMMAND
MIXED TRANSPORT SQUADRON - PLESO /AIRPORT/
Zagreb, 4 January 1993

HRZ AND PZO COMMANDER
Major General
Imra AGOTIĆ

Report on cargo transport
to Ćoralići airport.-

In the period between 15 and 31 December 1992, the following tasks were carried out from Pleso and Pula airports: transport of weapons, uniforms and medical materials to Ćoralići airport near Cazin.

Transport was done by AN-2 and C-212 aircraft with the assistance of HRZ /Croatian Air Force/ and RZ BH /Air Force of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ crews.

In the same period, the following flights were carried out for the purpose of retraining crews for C-212 aircraft:

C-212	173 flights	37.50 hours (daily)

For HVO BH /Croatian Defence Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina/:

AN-2	2 flights,	2.00 hours - 1 ton of cargo,	6 passengers	+ 3 wounded
C-212	4 flights,	2.40 hours - 5 tons of cargo,	22 passengers	+ 8 wounded
TOTAL:	6 flights	4.40 hours - 6 tons of cargo,	28 passengers	11 wounded

Crew:

AN-2	MARKAČ - ŽAGAR	2 flights, 2.00 hours
C-212	RAJTAR - ZRNA	2 flights, 1.20 hours
	RAJTAR - ZRNA	2 flights, 1.20 hours

For BH TO /Territorial Defence/

AN-2	14 flights,	14.00 hours - 6.5 tons of cargo,	22 passengers +	8 wounded

C-212	12 flights,	8.40 hours - 15 tons of cargo, 68 passengers + 27 wounded
TOTAL:	28 flights	22.40 hours - 21.5 tons of cargo, 90 passengers + 35 wounded

Crew:

AN-2	MARKAČ - ŽAGAR	2 flights, 2.00 hours
	PEČENKOVIĆ - GAZIBEGOVIĆ	2 flights, 2.00 hours
	MARKAČ - ŽAGAR	2 flights, 2.00 hours
	PEČENKOVIĆ - IFTIĆ	2 flights, 2.00 hours
	MARKAČ - ŽAGAR	2 flights, 2.00 hours
	IFTIĆ - GAZIBEGOVIĆ	2 flights, 2.00 hours
	IFTIĆ - GAZIBEGOVIĆ	2 flights, 2.00 hours
C-212	RAJTAR - HRGOVIĆ	2 flights, 2.00 hours
	RAJTAR - ZRNA	1 flight, 2.00 hours
	RAJTAR - ZRNA	2 flights, 1.20 hours
	RAJTAR - ZRNA	2 flights, 1.20 hours
	RAJTAR - ZRNA	2 flights, 2.20 hours
	RAJTAR - ZRNA	2 flights, 2.20 hours
	RAJTAR - ZRNA	2 flights, 2.20 hours

For recording purposes (for Dr BAJIĆ)

AN-2 aircraft, crew POLANEC - SOKIĆ 2 flights, 3.50 hours

In this period, a total of 208 flights and 71.00 hours of training flights were carried out, 27.5 tons of useful cargo flown to Ćoralići Airport and 118 passengers and 46 wounded transported to Croatia.

JH/SH

COMMANDER
Major
Josip HRGOVIĆ
/signed/

ARMED FORCES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA
5th CORPS
Strictly Confidential Number: 06/2-1880-1
Bihać, 5 June 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Request for the purchase of
powder and explosives.–

BIHAĆ DISTRICT OFFICE
with its seat in Zagreb
Našićka Street 12
Fax: 337 - 906

You must URGENTLY purchase and deliver the following types of powder and explosives:

- TRINITROTOLUENE (TNT or TROTYL) ..... 10,000 kg
- NITROGLYCERINE POWDERS /NGB/:
  - NGB, type 021 ..... 400 kg
  - NGB, type 051 ..... 400 kg
  - NGB, type 081 ..... 400 kg
  - NGB, type 231 ..... 400 kg
- NITROCELLULOSE POWDERS /NCB/:
  - NCB, type 35 ..... 200 kg
  - NCB, type 37 ..... 200 kg
  - NCB, type 40 ..... 200 kg
- CELLULOIDE (material used for packing and storing additional powder charges, resistant to outside humidity) ..... 500 m^2
  ROCKET PROPELLANT CHARGE, for 107mm and 128mm LRL /light rocket launcher/ projectiles ..... 500 kg

Items under number 1 are to be given priority and be delivered urgently.
FOR A FREE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA !
/illegible/S/IM

Done in two copies and
s e n t to:
- a/a /files/
- Addressee
/stamp:

MILITARY MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
RECEIVED - SUBMITTED by
TLF - RRV - RV - PACTOR - PACKET - SAT*
Date: 5 June 1993
Received by /a signature/
/handwritten: *2147/

* TLF /telephone/
RRV /Radio Relay Communication/

C O M M A N D E R
5th CORPS
Ramiz DREKOVIĆ

RV /Radio Communication/

/handwritten document/

Embassy of R BiH in R Croatia
VEP
Pg. No. ---- 05-4258/93

DEFENSE OF REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
URGENT
/handwritten: 25th June/

SUBJECT: Information about the transport of 5th Corpus of A BiH
- to be delivered

On 24 of June 1993, by the oil tank truck, license plate UNHCR 10236 (aluminum cistern) we delivered to you the following:

1.	Spare tube for PM M 53	14 pcs
2.	RP 67 launcher	4 pcs
3.	KB M 57 (hand launcher)	5 pcs
4.	PM M 53	18 pcs
5.	Machine gun Browing 7,9mm	4 pcs
6.	Base for machine gun 7,9mm	3 pcs
7.	Machine gun "Browing" 12,7mm	2 pcs
8.	Base for machine gun Browing 12,7mm	1 pcs
9.	Machine gun 7,9mm DSK	1 pcs
10.	SP MAX II 12,7mm without optics	6 pcs
11.	SP HAND GUN without optics 20mm	1 pcs
12.	Mine thrower 60 mm	1 pcs
13.	Mine thrower 82mm	3 pcs
14.	Mine thrower 120mm	6 pcs

Concluded with number 14.

REMARK: In MB 120mm do not use more than 5 (five) of additional loadings.
Please, hand one of the guns 12,7mm to Major General Vlado Santic, for there has been a good cooperation between HVO and the District Office of Bihac.

DELIVERED TO:

1. 5. Corpus
2. VEP

Breza 13
7

Biban
Bajo

ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
5th CORPS
Strictly confidential number: 06/801-2
9 February 1994

/handwritten: I. HADŽIĆ/

Information on the shipments
received from the Bihać District
Office in Zagreb, AMENDMENT

Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina /RBiH/ in the Republic of
Croatia /RH/,
V.E.P. /Military Economic Mission/

As our document, strictly confidential number 06/801-1 of 3 February 1994, with reference to the request submitted by Mr Bajo HADŽIĆ on 1 February 1994, failed to include the shipments handed over directly to the members of the NVI /expansion unknown/, please find the data listed below:

Goods arrived on 7 September 1992
==========

1.	Training round for M-57 RB /rocket launcher/: 5 x 192		960
2.	Training round for M-66 impact rifle grenade:		
		4 x 240	960 basic charges
		4 x 240	960 mine simulators
			4 x 240 .....
3.	Gunpowder :	30 x 2.5 kg	75 kg
4.	Erze /expression unknown/ :	18 x 1,000	18,000
5.	Detonating caps, No. 8 :	30 x 100	3,000
		1 box	10,000
6.	Hand grenade fuse :		4

Goods arrived on 9 September 1992
==========

1.	Training round for M-57 rocket launcher :	8 x 192	1,536
2.	Training round for impact rifle grenade:		
	a) original boxes:	6 x 240	1,440 basic charges
		6 x 240	1,440 mine simulators
			6 x 240 ..... 1.
	b) unpacked boxes (mine simulators, coils, basic charges)		10
3.	Gunpowder :	13 x 2.5 kg	32.5 kg

Goods arrived on 19 November 1992
==========

1.	Basic charge for 7.62 mm impact rifle grenade,.....	5,040
2.	Mine simulators	10,050
3.	Coils	10,050
4.	Electric detonating caps No 12	1,260
5.	Electric detonating caps No 8	1,300
6.	Detonating caps No 8	4,000
7.	Basic charge for 82mm and 81 mm round	1,980
8.	Basic charge for 60mm round	2,000
9.	Basic charge for 120 mm round	2,000
10.	Additional charge (60, 82 and 81 mm) boxes	10

FOR A FREE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA !

BS/ZL

Copy:
- Addressee,
- a/a /files/, 5th Corps Command
- a/a, Logistics

COMMANDER
Brigadier
Atif DUDAKOVIĆ

10119409

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BiH
5TH C O R P S
BIHAĆ KM /Command Post/
Strictly confidential no. 01/7251-3
10 November 1994

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Request for assistance in TMS /materiel and technical equipment/.

To: PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,
Mr Franjo TUĐMAN

Under a complete blockade, Croats and Muslims organised in the units of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and the 5th BH Army Corps in the Bihać area have been fighting constant Chetnik attacks for the third year running. A counteroffensive announced by the criminal KARADŽIĆ is being carried out by the united Serbian forces from the quasi-state creations of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina (the Lika, Banija, Kordun and the Slavonia Corps). Artillery and tanks have been re-grouped because, based on the Zagreb agreement, they were pulled out 20 kilometres from the line of contact and taken to the Željezno Polje and Ličko Petrovo Selo sectors.
In recent days, several thousand artillery and tank shells have fallen on the villages of Skočaj, Zavalje, Vedro Polje and the suburbs of Bihać and the Chetnik air force attacked the town itself with rockets.
It is clear that Chetniks intend to capture
Željava airport and the plateau above Bihać via Zavalje village and link up with the forces from Ličko Petrovo Selo putting the whole town and the area into a very difficult situation.
HVO and 5th Corps soldiers are determined to fight the Chetniks and prevent them from achieving their goals.
In order to prevent the Chetniks from achieving their goals and protect the population of the area, the following should be done:

1. The HVO should use their helicopters to transport the MTS to a new area.
2. Enable Colonel Senad PALIĆ to contact UNPROFOR (UKBAT) commanders through HV /Croatian Army/ liaison officers.
3. Send us the intelligence information on Chetnik activities directed against us, which you manage to obtain, in a timely fashion.
4. We need the following types of ammunition:

a) Infantry weapons: 7.62 mm bullets; 7.62 mm M-30 bullets; 7.9 mm; RPG /anti-tank grenade launcher/ shells.
b) PA /semi-automatic/ ammunition: 12.7 mm; 14.5 mm; 20 mm; 30 mm (PRAGA).
c) Tank shells: 76 mm ZIS;
d) Tank shells: 100 mm (T-55).
e) Explosives (TNT).

Sent to:
- Addressee
- Files

COMMANDER
Brigadier General Atif DUDAKOVIĆ
/signed and stamped/

29.

AID SENT TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA THROUGH PORTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
223

PORTS:
- Raša
- Pula
- Rijeka
- Split
- Ploče

Humanitarian aid sent to BiH through Croatian ports 1992 – 1995

Traffic in port of Ploče during the war amounted to 601,133,307 kg of humanitarian aid.

D-151

/handwritten: January 1993/

No.	Arrival date	Departure date	Ship registered in	Ship's name	Cargo type	General cargo	Bulk cargo	Liquid cargo	Agent Forwarder	Direction of movement
1.	03.1.	5.1.	Malta	EIPIDA	Beans pallets	1,000,020 28,250			Jugoagent	Transit
2.	1.11.	14.1.		Atlantic moon	Potatoes	3,631,320	2,179,800 1,451,520		Jadroagent	Import Transit
3.	4.1.	9.1.		Cecilia	Potatoes	2,841,473			Jadroagent Interšped	Hvar
4.	11.01.	14.1.		Tavros	Wheat flour	2,446,281			Adriaagent Interšped	Transit
5.	14.01.	16.1.	Croatia	Hvar	Flour	600,00			Jadroagent Transadria	Transit
6.	3.01.	13.1.	Croatia	Primošten	Beech sawn timber	2,400,847			Jadroagent Interšped	Transit
7.	13.01	14.1.	Spain	Aragon	Hum. Aid	113,800			Jadroagent	Transit
8.	5.1.	12.1.	Russia	Sibirskiy	Flour	3,019,800			Adriaagent Intereuropa	-II-
9.	2.1.	3.1.	Croatia	Podunavlje	Fuel Dz			2,170,019	Jadroagent	-II-
10.	22.12.	9.1.	Turkey	Admiral Sadik Altincan	Hum. Aid	4,538,129			Transadria Interšped	-II-
11.	25.1.	26.1.	Croatia	Transporter 2	Tank wagon	290,000 118,270				-II-
12.	17.1.	18.1.	Croatia	Orjula	generalni	955,880			Jadroagent	-II-
13.	11.1.	11.1.	Croatia	Transporter 2	Wagons	290,00			Transadria Plo	-II-
14.	18	18.1.	-II-	-II-	Wagons	312,000			-II-	-II-
15.	15.1.	15.1.	-II-	-II-	-II-	290,000			-II-	-II-
16.	22.1.	22.	-II-	-II-	-II-	340,000			-II-	-II-
17.	16.1.	23.1.	Italy	Genca Otawo	Flour	2,490,173			Adriaagent	-II-

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
01.01.93	EIPIDA	BEANS PALLETS	1,000 28 ">R	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
01.01.93	ATLANTIC MOON	POTATOES	3,631		
04.01.93	CECILIA	POTATOES	2,841	INTERŠPED	IMPORT TO CROATIA
03.01.93	PRIMOŠTEN	BEECH TIMBER	2,400	INTERŠPED	EXPORT TO BIH
13.01.93	ARAGON	HUM. AID	113		
13.01.93	IRIS	FLOUR	1,000	INTERŠPED	BIH
16.01.93	GENCA OTTAVO	FLOUR	2,490	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
17.01.93	ORJULA	GENERAL CARGO	955		
22.01.93	BILBYS	WASHERS	772		
02.01.93	PODUNAVLJE	DIESEL FUEL	2,170	INTERŠPED	ENERGOPETROL PLOČE FOR BIH P1.0F.7.ARIH
05.01.93	SIBIRSKIY	FLOUR	3,019	INTEREUROPA	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
09.01.93	EARLY BIRD	FLOUR	5,550	INTEREUROPA	HIGH SAUDI COMMISSARAT PLOČE
20.01.93	SAETTA	DIESEL FUEL	19,116	INTERŠPED	ENERGOPETROL PLOČE FOR BiH
26.01.93	VALE	BEANS	904	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
03.01.93	PRIMOŠTEN	BEECH SAWN TIMBER	2,400	INTERŠPED	EXPORT TO BIH
09.01.93	ADMIRAL SADIK ALTINCAN	HUM. AID	4,538	INTERŠPED	BIH
11.01.93	TRANSPORTER 2	WAGONS	290	TRANSADRIA	REFUGEE CAMP – RAIL. STATION ČAPLJINA
11 01 93	TAVROS	FLOUR	2,446	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
14.01.93	HVAR	FLOUR	600	TRANSADRIA	CARITAS MEĐUGORJE
15.01.93	TRANSPORTER 2	WAGONS	290	TRANSADRIA	
18.01.93	TRANSPORTER 2	WAGONS	312	TRANSADRIA	REFUGEE CAMP – RAIL. STATION ČAPLJINA
22.01.93	TRANSPORTER 2	WAGONS	340	TRANSADRIA	REFUGEE CAMP – RAIL. STATION ČAPLJINA
15.01.93	PUĆIŠĆA	BLANKETS TIN METAL STRIPS	41 168	TRANSADRIA	UNHCR METKOVIĆ ENERGOINV. ČAPLJ.
26.01.93	GEORGIOS 2	HUM. AID	1,459	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
25.01.93	TRANSPORTER 2	WAGONS TANKS	290 118	TRANSADRIA	REFUGEE CAMP – RAIL. STATION ČAPLJINA
25.01.93	ADMIRAL SADIK ALTINCAN	HUM. AID	952	INTERŠPED	BIH
08.01.93	URTE	FLOUR	2,850	INTERŠPED	BIH

FEBRUARY

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
19.02.93	PODUNAVLJE	PETROL 98	3,379		ENERGOPETROL PLOČE
14.02.93	LIPA	HUM. AID	606		
06.02.93	IVA	EMPTY BOXES	136		TRANSP. WITHIN REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
01.02.93	ZVIJEZDA MORA	HUM. AID	452	INTEREUROPA	
16.02.93	RIJEKA	CONSTRUCTION	936	INTERŠPED	EXPORT FROM BiH
24.02.93	SV. JOSIP	EQUIPMENT	703	TRANSADRIA	EQUIPMENT FOR UNPROFOR
21.02.93	SV. JOSIP	EQUIPMENT	703	TRANSADRIA	EQUIPMENT FOR UNPROFOR
18.02.93	ANI	EMPTY BOXES	170		TRANSPORTATION WITHIN REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
22.02.93	KAPETAN VIJEKO	SUGAR	505	INTERŠPED	BiH
15.02.93	PUĆIŠĆA	BLANKETS	79	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
09.02.93	KAPETAN VIJEKO	SUGAR	505	INTERŠPED	BiH
17.02.93	ČIKOLA	FLOUR	3,222	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
25.02.93	DIMITROS G	FLOUR	900	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ

MARCH

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
19.03.93	BOSUT	COAL	4,302	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
04.03.93	PUĆIŠĆE	BLANKETS	84	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
19.02.93	CRIMMITSCHAU	FLOUR	9,252	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
28.02.93	SV. JOSIP	VEHICLES	941	TRANSADRIA	EQUIPMENT FOR UNPROFOR
26.02.93	SV. JOSIP	EQUIPMENT	1,152	TRANSADRIA	EQUIPMENT FOR UNPROFOR
05.03.93	SV. JOSIP	EQUIPMENT	659	TRANSADRIA	EQUIPMENT FOR UNPROFOR
01.03.93	LEON	FLOUR	450	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
20.03.93	PUĆIŠĆE	OIL RISE FLOUR	113 101 320	TRANSADRIA	CARITAS METKOVIĆ

APRIL

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
07.04.93	HRELJIN	HUM. AID	340	JADROAGENT	IRC METKOVIĆ
20.04.93	BOSUT	COAL	4,389	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
25.04.93	SV. JOSIP	VEHICLES	771	TRANSADRIA	VEHICLES FOR UNPROFOR
13.04.93	BOBARA	BEECH SAWN TIMBER	405	INTERŠPED	EXPORT TO BiH
18.04.93	OSOR	BEECH SAWN TIMBER	885	INTERŠPED	EXPORT FROM BiH
21.04.93	ANI	FLOUR	108	INTERŠPED	BiH
10.04.93	JAMES LYKES	HUM. AID	1,017	INTERŠPED	RED CROSS CROATIA GREEN CRESCENT BiH
25.04.93	DOLI	SUGAR	853	INTEREUROPA	
25.04.93	STELLA LYKES	HUM. AID	3,714	INTERŠPED	RED CROSS CROATIA GREEN CRESCENT BiH
16.04.93	SPRANTE DIAMOND	FLOUR	7,852	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ

MAY

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
01.05.93	LABOR	DIS. HOUSES	690		
15.05.93	DANALITH	HUM. AID	1,061		
21.05.93	HRELJIN	HUM. AID	170	JADROAGENT	
11.05.93	BEATA LEONHARCDT	HUM. AID	1,875	INTERŠPED	RED CROSS CROATIA GREEN CRESCENT BiH
08.05.93	PUĆIŠĆA	THIN METAL STRIPS	600	TRANSADRIA	ENERGOINVEST ČAPLJINA
03.05.93	GREENLAND SAGA	POTATOES ONIONS	1,312 50	INTERŠPED	BiH
17.05.93	PUĆIŠĆA	WOODEN PALLETS	96	INTERŠPED	PORT OF PLOČE
07.05.93	NAISSAAR	HUM. AID	2,985	CRO TRADE	HIGH SAUDI COMMISSARIAT PLOČE
24.05.93	MAKSIM RILSKIY	ANIMAL FEED	2,095		

JUNE

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
05.06.93	VICKO	FLOUR	5,033	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ
05.06.93	VIJERA	BEECH TIMBER	1,554		EXPORT TO BiH
11.06.93	SAN EVANS	HUM. AID	3,764	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ BiH
02.06.93	OBROVAC	SODIUM LYE	841	TRANSADRIA	IMPORT TO REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
02.06.93	ALEX	WINE	1,341		IMPORT TO REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
17.06.93	LETILIA LYKES	FLOUR	2,262	INTERŠPED	RED CROSS CROATIA GREEN CRESCENT BiH
28.06.93	VIDEMIA	WINE	1,339	DELBAR	IMPORT TO REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
30.06.93	BRIBIR	HUM. AID	538		

JULY

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
02.07.93	ALEX	WINE	1,250		IMPORT TO REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
08.07.93	VEŽICA	COAL	3,411	INTERŠPED	
10.07.93	PUĆIŠĆA	CANNED FISH	389	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ BiH
14.07.93	MAONA MA 5	CONTAINERS	722		IMPORT TO REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
13.07.93	KAPETAN VIJEKO	FLOUR,PASTA	465	TRANSADRIA	CAR1TAS MEĐUGORJE
18.07.93	VEŽICA	COAL	3,520	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
21.07.93	VEŽICA	COAL	3,479	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
02.07.93	PUČIŠĆA	CANNED FISH	428	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ BiH
17.07.93	TRAGARA	FLOUR	4,028	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ

AUGUST

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
16.07.93	ARAB HIND	WHEAT FLOUR BLANKETS	3,025 1.2	TRANŠPED (NO LONGER EXISTS)	HIGH SAUDI COMMISSIONER PLOČE
09.08.93	VEŽICA	COAL	3,556	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
14.08.93	SUE LYKES	FLOUR LENTIL	1,197 75	INTERŠPED	BIH
14.08.93	COLUMBIA ERRE	DIESEL FUEL	4,783	LUKA PLOČE	ENERGOPETROL PLOČE
16 08.93	VEŽICA	COAL	3,559	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
20.08.93	VEŽICA	COAL	3,512	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
05.08.93	BRIJ	FLOUR	14,562	INTERŠPED	UNHCR METKOVIĆ BIH
17.08.93	LATANIA	SUGAR	1,415 100	INTEREUROPA INTERŠPED	BiH
25.08.93	BOBARA	SUGAR	808	INTERŠPED	BiH

SEPTEMBER

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
05.09.93	KAPETAN VIJEKO	SUGAR	1,010	INTERŠPED	BiH
20.09.93	MLAKA	COAL	3,297	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
26.09.93	MLAKA	COAL	3,281	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
31.08.93	ARAB HIND	WHEAT	6,548	TRANŠPED (no longer exists)	HIGH SAUDI COMMISSIONER PLOČE
12.09.93	CRES	CONTAINERS	322		PORT OF PLOČE
31.08.93	USTRINE	SUGAR	202	INTERŠPED	BiH
03.09.93	PODUNAVLJE	DIESEL FUEL	3,523		ENERGOPETROL PLOČE
29.09.93	TRANSPORTER SILNI	ELECTRIC-MOTOR TRAIN	143	TRANSADRJA	IMPORT TO REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
30.09.93	OLIB	SODIUM LYE	418		TRANSPORT WITHIN REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
22.09.93	HVAR	SUGAR	1,019	TRANSADRIA	PRODEX GRUDE

OCTOBER

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
02.10.93	MLAKA	COAL EMPTY CONTAINERS	3,262 240	TRANSADR1A	RIJEKA UNPROFOR, CANADA
04.10.93	OŠLJAK	DIESEL FUEL	1,158		IMPORT TO REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
03.10.93	SV. JOSIP	VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT	480	TRANSADRJA	EQUIPMENT UNPROFOR
02.10.93	VALIO	DIESEL FUEL	1,587	DELBAR	ENERGOPETROL PLOČE
10.10.93	MLAKA	COAL	3,297	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA

10.10.93	BOBARA	WHEAT	1,022		METKOVKA METKOVIĆ
16.10.93	OŠLJAK	DIESEL FUEL	1,193		IMPORT TO REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
17.10.93	MLAKA	COAL EMPTY CONTAINERS	3,365 420	INTERŠPED TRANSADRIA	RIJEKA UNPROFOR, CANADA
24.10.93	MLAKA	COAL EMPTY CONTAINERS	3,327	INTERŠPED TRANSADRIA	RIJEKA UNPROFOR, CANADA
17.10.93	SV.JOSIP	VEHICLES	355	TRANSADRIA	EQUIPMENT UNPROFOR
26.10.93	SANTA NINA	VEHICLES	3,488		
07.10.93	LESL1E LYKES	HUM. AID	10,354	INTERŠPED	RED CROSS CROATIA GREEN CRESCENT BiH
23.10.93	LOUISE LYKES	HUM. AID	1,856	INTERŠPED	BiH
13.10.93	RUTH LYKES	OIL	453	INTERŠPED	BiH
26.10.93	VEŽICA	COAL	3,610	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA

NOVEMBER

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
17.11.93	VEŽICA	COAL	3,568	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
19.11.93	OBROVAC	SODIUM LYE	710	TRANSADRIA	IMPORT TO REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
14.11.93	KAPETAN VIJEKO	FLOUR OIL	501 71	INTERŠPED	BiH
22.11.93	VALIO	DIESEL FUEL	1,530	DEL BAR	ENERGOPETROL PLOČE
27.11.93	MLAKA	COAL	3,326	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
06.11.93	ANDREY BUBNOV	BAUXITE	3,024	PORT OF PLOĆE	EXPORT FROM REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
18.11.93	COSTAS S	FLOUR	5,263	INTERŠPED	BiH
08.11.93	JOHN LYKES	HUM. AID	7,348	INTERŠPED	BiH
02.11.93	LETITIA LYKES	HUM. AID	2,386	INTERŠPED	BiH

DECEMBER

DATE	SHIP'S NAME	CARGO TYPE	TONS	FORWARDER	SHIPPED TO
03.12.93	PUČIŠĆA	FLOUR	600	NERETVAŠPED	METKOVKA METKOVIĆ
06.12.93	MLAKA	COAL	3,307	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
11.12.93	MLAKA	COAL	3,300	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
23.12 93	KNIN	COAL	22,968	INTERŠPED	RIJEKA
02.12.93	MARJORIE LYKES	HUM. AID	3,618	INTERŠPED	BIH
03.12.98	ARAB HIND	HUM. AID	927	TRANŠPED (no longer exists)	HIGH SAUDI COMMISSARIAT PLOČE
24.12.93	KAPETAN VIJEKO	BOVINE MEET	596	INTERŠPED	BiH
29.12.93	SABRI	CRYOLITE	1,025		

30.

AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE AREA OF SPORT



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
3

SPORTS – BARCELONA 1992

10 representatives from BiH, who were preparing in Croatia at the expense of the state budget, participated at the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona:

- ARCHERY
  - Mirjana Horvat – air rifle
- ATHLETICS
  - Dragan Mustapić – discus throw
  - Kada Delić – 10 km race walk
  - Mirsada Burić – 3 and 5 km running
  - Zlatan Saračević – weight throw
- SWIMMING
  - Janko Gojković 100 m freestyle and 100 m butterfly
  - Anja Margetić 100 m freestyle and 100 m butterfly
- JUDO
  - Vlado Paradžik up to 60 kg
- KAYAK AND CANOE FLATWATER
  - Aleksandar Đurić
- WEIGHTLIFTING
  - Mehmed Skender over 100 kg

Mediterranean Games
June 1993

/round seal with an inscription:

BASKETBALL FEDERATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Coat of arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /

BASKETBALL FEDERATION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

71000 SARAJEVO, Mis Irbina 10 Phone: 071/272-312 & 216-182

24th May 1993 105/93

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE

Please issue visas for our basketball players who are participating at the Mediterranean Games in your country, France - Montpellier, in the period from 10th June 1993 to 27th June 1993, namely:

1. AVDIĆ SAMIR, BH 000059
2. FIRIĆ GORDAN, BH 026503
3. BEČIRAGIĆ ADIS, BH 026508
4. BEGOVIĆ SENAD, BH 026419
5. MAŠNIĆ ILIJAS, BH 026666
6. PRIMORAC MARIO, BH 106641
7. MUTAPČIĆ EMIR, BH 106641
8. HALIMIĆ EMIR, BH 026579
9. BILALOVIĆ SABAHUDIN, BH 078589
10. SELESKOVIĆ SAMIR, BH 026667
11. KRUPALIJA ADNAN, BH 292105
12. OVČINA ELVIR, BH 292105
13. BUKVA SEJO, BH 289755
14. MRŠIĆ DAMIR, BH 289752
15. MARKOVIĆ NENAD, BH 289753
16. BAJRAMOVIĆ MENSUR, BH 289754
17. ALIHODŽIĆ DŽEVAD, BH 09972786
18. DELIBAŠIĆ MIRZA, BH 000055
19. KREHIĆ IBRAHIM, BH 026134
20. ĐURIĆ RANKO, BH 039646
21. MIHALJČIĆ JOVAN, BH 026248
22. ROKVIĆ JOVICA, BH 000040
23. RADONJIĆ GORAN, BH 026213
24. KNEŽEVIĆ ZDRAVKO, BH 026437
25. DELIBAŠIĆ SLAVICA, BH 288627
26. ĐELILOVIĆ HUSEIN, BH
27. RAGUŽ VLADO, BH

Secretary General KS /BASKETBALL FEDERATION/ R BiH

Knežević Zdravko

/signed/

/stamp: BASKETBALL FEDERATION

OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SARAJEVO, logo/

/round seal with an inscription:

BASKETBALL FEDERATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Coat of arms of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /

BASKETBALL FEDERATION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

71000 SARAJEVO, Mis Irbina 10 Phone: 071/272-312 & 216-182

Date_____ Number _____

Handwritten:

2. BIH HOO

1- AVDIĆ SAMIR 000059
2- FIRIĆ GORDAN 026503
3- BEĆIRAGIĆ ADIS 026508
4- BEGOVIĆ SENAD 026419
5- MAŠNIĆ ILIJAS 026666
6- PRIMORAC MARIO 106641
7- MUTAPČIĆ EMIR 106641
8- HALIMIĆ EMIR 026579
9- BILALOVIĆ SABAHUDIN 078589
10- SELESKOVIĆ SAMIR 026667
11- KRUPALIJA ADNAN 292105
12- OVČINA ELVIR 292105
~~13- BUKVA SEJO 289755~~
~~14- MRŠIĆ DAMIR 289752~~
~~15- MARKOVIĆ NENAD 289753~~
~~16- BAJRAMOVIĆ MENSUR 289754~~
~~17- ALIHODŽIĆ DŽEVAD 09972786~~
18- DELIBAŠIĆ MIRZA 000055
19- KREHIĆ IBRAHIM 026134
20- ĐURIĆ RANKO 039646
21- MIHALJČIĆ JOVAN 026248
22- ROKVIĆ JOVICA 000040
23- RADONJIĆ GORAN 026213
24- KNEŽEVIĆ ZDRAVKO 02643
25- DELIBAŠIĆ SLAVICA 288627
~~26- DELILOVIĆ HUSEIN 026~~
~~27- RAGUŽ VLADO~~
~~28- AKŠAMIJA ALMIR~~

This is how Croatian leadership helped BiH to present itself as a Mediterranean country in the summer of 1993, all this as part of the plan of the President Franjo Tuđman about "dividing" BiH and "annexing" its southern (Mediterranean) part to Croatia???

31.

AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE AREA OF CULTURE



FACTS

Total number of documents on www.slobodanpraljak.com
4

COMMENT:

After the outbreak of war and the siege of Sarajevo, a large number of artists from Bosnia and Herzegovina temporarily sought shelter or stayed in the Republic of Croatia or after a short stay went to third countries. Let us mention just some of them:

Writers Mile Pešorda, Miljenko Jergović, Dževad Karahasan, Darko Lukić, dramatist and Vice Dean at the Academy of Dramatic Arts in Zagreb (came in January 1993).

Actors: Hasija Borić, Jasna Beri, Daria Lorenci, Tarik Filipović, Sandra Bagarić (arrived to Zagreb in 1992), film director Antonio Nuić (author of "Sve džaba", arrived to Zagreb in 1992), a film producer Boris T. Matić (refugee from Doboj), actor and director Zijah Sokolović ("Glumac je glumac") who works as an artist between Austria and Croatia and constantly acts and directs at the theatre in Zagreb "Teatar Exit".
Popular singers: Kemal Monteno, Senad od Bosne, Indexi, Edo Maajka.
Painters: Mersad Berber, Ljubo Perčinlić (refugee from Zenica).
Architects: couple Sejo and Lejla Kurtić (refugees from Cazin).
Athletes: tennis player Ivan Ljubičić (refugee from Banja Luka), "Cibona" basketball player Damir Omerhodžić-Markota, basketball coach Jasmin Repeša.

Minister of Culture, Zlatko Vitez, helped the popular singer Kemal Monteno, Senad od Bosne and vocal-instrumental group "Indexi" to get a certificate of citizenship upon arrival to Croatia and on the basis of that to also get Croatian passports which enabled them to freely travel the world. "Indexi" held a successful concert in the hall "Lisinski" in Zagreb.

Rebelled Serbs destroyed the house of painter Mersad Berber in Sarajevo, rich library and many paintings disappeared in flames, he found safety in Zagreb, where he freely created and collaborated with the director Georgij Paro on the scenography for "Osman" by Gundulić in the Croatian National Theatre (1992).

Director Tomislav Durbešić, directed Giraudoux's play "The Trojan War will not take place" in besieged Sarajevo in 1994/1995 at Kamerni teatar 55, which was performed on the same day and the same hour in Sarajevo and Zagreb. Sarajevo's play was performed in Zagreb (in Zagreb Theatre "Kerempuh") in 1995.

Minister of Culture in the government of the Republic of Croatia, Zlatko Vitez, accepted the invitation to attend the premiere of this piece as a head of delegation of the Croatian Ministry of Culture. He prepared for the trip to besieged Sarajevo where he was to attend Durbešić's play. Due to fierce shelling of Sarajevo, flight by UNPROFOR's plane was cancelled and the delegation did not arrive to the premiere.
After Tomislav Durbešić, Croatian director Peter Veček also directed in 1996 at Kamerni Teatar 55 in Sarajevo.

Sarajevo war theatre SARTR performed the play "Sklonište" in 1994 in Zagreb (Marija Grgičević "Sarajevans delighted Zagreb", Večernji list, 19th September 1994, and Dalibor Foretić "Theatre as a fact of life," Novi list, 20th September 1994 "Humour of the war theatre").

Zagreb Theatre group "Histrion" had a guest appearance in 1995 in Mostar with the play "Krležijada", in the part of the city mostly settled with Croats and were prepared to perform the play on the left (Bosniak) coast. Mr. Amir Bukvić, director of the Cultural Centre in Zagreb, mediated in the organization of the guest appearance. Performance did not take place on the other side of the city due to the refusal of the Bosniak side.

A group of actors from Zagreb (Zvonko Trojanac, Mladen Crnobrnja, Ena Begović, Branko Vukušić) engaged in gathering aid for colleagues from endangered theatres in BiH. They responded to the call for help of the Bosnian theatre director in Zenica, Radovan Marušić, and the Mostar Theatre, and were sending them food aid, cigarettes and construction material (for the theatre in Mostar, asbestos panels for damaged roof) in the war years 1992-1995.

Guest performances of Sarajevo "Kamerno pozorište 55" and SARTR during the 1992-1995 war in Croatia, continued in peace with performances of the National Theatre from Sarajevo, Young Theatre from Sarajevo, Bosnian Theatre from Zenica, Theatre from Tuzla and Mostar ("Tvrđava "by Meša Selimović and" Hasanaginica ") in the Republic of Croatia.

The first Cultural Centre of BiH in the world was opened in 1994 in Zagreb, a writer and actor from Zagreb, Amir Bukvić, became the first director and at the same time the cultural attaché at the Embassy of BiH in Zagreb. The following year, on 21st August 1995, the Croatian Cultural Centre was opened in Sarajevo.

When asked why the Bosnians occupied prominent positions in culture and arts specifically in Zagreb, popular singer (rapper) Edo Maajka answered: "Zagreb was the largest refugee centre (...), Zagreb is at a fine position, there is no language barrier, Ljubljana and Vienna are close, Bosnia is close, so why go any further"!?

32.

AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR



FACTS

AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN THE ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR

Electric power systems of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina remain connected after the aggression against Croatia and BiH - in parts that were not occupied.

In addition to enabling the stability of the electric power system of unoccupied territory of BiH, Croatian electric power company Elektroprivreda has supplied more electricity to BiH then vice versa.

Dispatchers were negotiating this constantly and protocols were arranged between the two internationally recognized countries.

ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM OF BiH



ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM OF YUGOSLAVIA

JP /Public Company/ "ELEKTROPRIVREDA HZ /Croatian community/ HERCEG-BOSNA" MOSTAR

OVERVIEW OF PRODUCTION, DELIVERY AND COLLECTION OF ELECTRICITY handwritten: IN 1992

Month	Production of hydropower	Delivery to HEP*	Collected from HEP			Trade balance	Delivery to Bosnia			Consumption				
			Herzegovina	Trans. Bosnia	Total	JP HZ HB-HEP	From SP KT HB	From HEP	Total	Opuz.-Čaplj.-Lj.-Ci.-Mo.	110 KV Kralj.-Grud.	110 kV B.Blat.-Liv.	110 kV Neum	Total
VII	157.391	55.504	17.284	978	18.262	37.242	101.887	978	107.863	6.571	7.494	2.464	439	17.294
VIII	175.758	103.938	23.567	3.243	26.910	77.029	71.820	3.243	75.063	13.813	6.639	2.777	438	23.667
IX	180.226	109.913	23.405	273	23.678	86.235	70.313	273	70.595	13.415	6.978	2.330	486	23.409
X	140.588	73.938	30.544	20.339	50.883	22.975	75.710	20.339	96.019	18.127	8.547	3.338	532	30.544
XI	212.981	78.913	41.109	22.076	18.162	15.729	139.068	22.076	156.144	25.124	11.369	3.915	701	41.109
XII	227.239	102-278	37.397	6.053	26.910	39.419	124.361	6.063	130.426	30.837	20.108	5.369	1.083	57.397
Total	1.103,163	525.904	193.406	52.972	23.678	279.627	578.159	52.972	631.131	107.983	61.135	20.593	3.695	193.406

Month	Production of hydropower	Exchange "JP EP HZ HB"			Delivery to Bosnia Transit		
	NEUM-PREG	Delivered	Received	Trade balance	From EP HZ HB	From HEP	Total
VII	157.391	55.504	17.284	39.220	101.587	970	102.865
VIII	175.758	100.9388	23.667	30.271	71.020	3.243	75.064
IX	180.226	109.913	23.405	86.508	70.319	233	70.506
X	149.568	77.958	30.544	43.314	75.710	20.339	96.049
XI	212.981	78.913	41.109	37.068	134.068	22.076	136.144
XII	227.239	102.378	57.397	45.991	124.361	6.063	130.424
Total	1.103.163	525.004	193.406	331.598	578.159	52.972	631.131

Note:

Total supply of electricity from "JP EP HZ HB" for Bosnia should be reduced for the amount of 31.359 MWh, the amount that was spent by Prozor, Jablanica and Konjic during the period from July to December 1992.

From this follows that 546,800 MWh of "JP EP HZ HB" and 52,972 MWh of HEP (Croatian Electricity Company) was delivered to Bosnia during the period from July to December 1992, or a total of 599,772 MWh.

*HEP /Croatian Elektroprivreda/

EDIN OMERAGIĆ
Born on 31st of July 1944 in Mostar, son of Muhamed,

At request of General Slobodan Praljak's defence team, against which the criminal procedure is conducted before the International criminal tribunal for the crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, I was warned that my statement must be true, according to my best knowledge and recollection, therefore, on 20th of July 2005 in Mostar, I give the following

STATEMENT

I have known Slobodan Praljak since the school days as he came to Mostar in the 3rd grade.
After graduating from the Faculty of electric engineering in Sarajevo, at the very beginning of 1970, my first position was in UNIS, factory Konjic (Igman Konjic). In late 1971, I was transferred to EDP Elektro-Hercegovina Mostar, economic unit Konjic, where I stay till early 1977, as I was elected Assistant manager for technical matters in RO Elektro-Hercegovina Mostar, a position to which I was elected several times. I was at this position at the beginning of the war, in 1992. In the time of these mandates, I was the member of the Executive Board of Elektroprivreda BiH Sarajevo, and after the 1990 reform, I was elected President of the Administration Committee of Elektroprivreda BiH Sarajevo.
By decision of the Crisis staff Mostar, confirmed by the decision of HVO from 15th of May 1992, I become Manager of Elektro-Hercegovina.
I was not a member of any political party.
By establishing the Elektroprivreda of HZ-HB, I was appointed Head of Management for Exploitation and management in November 1992.

During 1992, in the war with JNA and the Serbs, the aforementioned controlled the hydro plant Mostar, which, by its production, enabled electric power for the left Mostar bank and through the TS /transformation station/ 110/35/10 kV Mostar 2 (Opine) for Nevesinje, and in very small quantities, for the right Mostar bank through one 10 kV cable which was connected from the aforementioned power transformer station to the right Mostar bank through the Hasan Brkić bridge. When the Hasan Brkić Bridge was destroyed, the entire right Mostar bank remained without electric power-supply. Earlier, the JNA and the Serbs damaged the TS Mostar 4 (Čule) as well as TS Mostar 1 (Raštani), so that the right Mostar bank remained without any possibility to get electric power-supply.
In the war with Serbs, all who successfully crossed from the left Mostar bank to the right Mostar bank, whereas on the left bank, only Serbs and detained Muslims remained.

Mostar received electric power on 23rd of June 1992 at 15:15 hrs through 110 kV power-transmission lines Opuzen-Čapljina-Ljubuški-Čitluk-TS Čule-Mostar, which were repaired immediately after liberation of Čapljina and Mostar. Not all consumers in

Mostar received electric power with bringing power-transmission lines into operation, regarding that the significant number of plants and lines of 10 kV and 0,4 kV voltage, especially aerial ones, were damaged.
The damages on the left Mostar bank were significantly bigger, since the consumers on the left bank were supplied with electricity, most often through the air networks, the repair of which started immediately, however, lasted longer, which resulted in displacing the JNA from the left Mostar bank.
Municipalities of Grude, Široki Brijeg and Posušje had electric power through the 110 kV power transmission line Imotski-Grude. While visiting the electric power plants, many power failures were established on all power transmission lines, by which the hydro plants Rama, Grabovica and Salakovac were connected to the electric power system. In agreement with the Croatian electric power industry (HEP), which should have made certain adjustments on some power transmission lines, connection of 220 kV network has been executed in order to enable the mutual exchange and delivery of electric power and secure the electricity for these areas through 220/110 kV transformation as well as 110 kV power transformation line in Croatia, since in these areas there wasn't any TS 220/110 kV that would run properly. This was the only way of enabling electric power for these areas, regarding that with the rest of the electric power system in BiH the necessary connections were not possible.
The TS Mostar 1 (Raštani) was completely destroyed by the JNA and the Serbs. The headquarters of Elektroprijenos (Electric transmission) were in the same station before the war. This TS has been gradually repaired, including the construction of temporary connections, and on 30th of December the switch on the power transmission line 110 kV TS Mostar 1 – TS Mostar 2 was repaired, which represented safer electric supply of the left bank.

EPHZHB was paying the personal incomes (salaries) to employees whole time, in distribution, transmission and production from Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor towards Mostar, regardless the national affiliation.
In early April 1993 I was in Jablanica together with the Head of Management for transmission and Deputy Head for Management for production of electric energy due to hand over of disjunction plant 220 kV in Jablanica (RP Jablanica). This plant should have been transferred, in record, from the Management for production to the Management for transmission of electric power, along with the employees and crews which managed this centre according to the orders from the dispatch centre. The hand over meant only the change in authority, not the change of the crew, regardless the fact that the crews were mainly Bosniaks. During the hand over itself, resistance by the present employees could be felt. The hand over was eventually executed in record, after which, along with the aforementioned persons I left this plant. The deputy Head of management for production had an office in Jablanica to which he returned immediately and the Head of Management for transmission and I, following the short stay in TS 110/10 kV Jablanica, headed towards Mostar. We were in the hydro plant Salakovac, as the deputy Head of Management for production came and told us that we must abolish the record on hand over because he was visited by the BH Army commander for Jablanica immediately after he returned to the office and ordered him to abolish the hand over, threatening that he would blow up the plants if he does not do it so.

The electricity transmission system and discontinuation of the operation of certain plants starts to be jeopardized by a diversion on 220 kV TS Mostar 3 (Jasenica) – Salakovac power transmission line. The diversion has been carried out by the Bosniaks on 8th of May 1993. The pillar, damaged by the diversion, was repaired in 3 or 4 days.
Due to damage of the power transmission line by which the hydro plant Rama is connected to 220 kV RP Jablanica, on occasion of the combat actions on 9th of May 1993, the hydro plant Rama stopped operating and could not supply the electric power system with electric power all the way till the end of Bosnian-Croatian conflict, as well as after that, regarding the fact that the several months long repair was necessary.
I remember the date exactly, it was 10th of May 1993, as the crew from the hydro plant Salakovac was taken to detention in Jablanica by the BH Army and another crew was brought. The hydro plant Grabovica was still running for a while, however,pursuant to orders of the centre, forwarded from Sarajevo to Kakanj; EPHZHB did not have any ability to control its production at the time.
I remember that, in late May 1993, we received a warning and the information that the BH Army intended to inundate Bijelo Polje, therefore the Elektroprivreda /Electric power system/ of HZ HB reacted by opening the basic vent to the hydro plant Salakovac and decreased the level of water and disabled the flood. The hydro plant Salakovac was operating for the last time in early June 1993. After cessation of the hydro plant Salakovac production, Elektroprivreda of HZ HB had at disposal only the possibility of production of CHE Čapljina.
Disablement of the transmission lines, which also means the inability of production of hydro plants, resulted in shortage of electric power in these areas. From the aforementioned it is visible that the BH Army, through its activities, was practically cutting off electric power in the areas where EPHZHB was managing electric power supply. Due to inability of production and delivery of the electric power in June 1993, the limits of electric power delivery were introduced in all municipal areas in which the EPHZHB was managing supply. That was the case with Mostar, as on the west, so on the east side.

With taking Raštani, as well as the TS Mostar 1, the BH Army side did no longer have the possibility to enable the electric power for the left Mostar bank.
After only CHE Čapljina was capable of producing and regarding that, the major number of power-transmission lines of various voltage levels were disabled, the volume of work on exploitation and management, the volume of work in the board for exploitation and management was significantly decreased, Board for exploitation and management was abolished in terms of organization and the rest of the work volume on exploitation and management was transferred to Management for transmission of electric power.
I had findings, although I was not performing this work, that later, the left Mostar bank was insured by a certain quantity of electric power through the 10 kV power-transmission line, connected to TS 110/35/10 kV Mostar 5 (Rodoč).
Approvals for leaving Mostar, as well as crossing the border for civilians were given by the civil authorities and for the soldiers, by the HVO commanders. I personally was obtaining permits from the HVO due to the need of managing affaires.
I did not see Slobodan Praljhak during the war, but only in June 1992 in Široki Brijeg, as he told me; “You can go now to Mostar through Žovnica”, by which he meant that the road was free and that JNA was pressed from Mostar.

Edin Omeragić
/signed/

33.

AID OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IN MAINTAINING AND ENABLING TELECOMMUNICATION CONNECTIONS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA WITH THE WORLD

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA ENABLED FREE TELECOMMUNICATION NOT ONLY TO CROATS IN BIH, TO MUSLIMS-BOSNIAKS AS WELL



FACTS



PTTV - Telecommunication and Postal channels

RRV - Radio-Relay link

Excerpt from the testimony of the witness Ibrahim Šarić on 17th August 2006 in the case Prlić et al. at the ICTY, The Hague

Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:

Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Saric, for the sake of time, as regards telecommunications in the former Yugoslavia, the centre for communications with the world was Belgrade, yes?

A. No. There was also Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Skopje, who had direct lines to other countries. The largest international switchboard was in Belgrade, but there were also international switchboards in Ljubljana with direct connections to Austria and Italy, in Zagreb with connections to Hungary, and in Skopje which had connections with Greece and Bulgaria.

Q. But Belgrade controlled all communications?

A. Yes, Belgrade had absolute control.

Q. So the network was concentrated towards the republican centres; Sarajevo, Popo [phoen], Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zagreb for Croatia, and so on. These were the transit centres.

A. Yes.

Q. And they were connected with coaxial cables to start with?

A. Yes.

Q. And these are cables which can transmit large numbers of telephone conversations all at once.

A. Yes.

Q. After that, electromagnetic waves, high frequency electromagnetic waves were used, and let it be said they have a very small angle. They cannot go behind a hill.

A. Yes.

Q. So they need relays from hill to hill until they come to the end user; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. In 1992, the Serbs destroyed the bridge in Rastani and the relay at Velez, thereby cutting off all communication between Mostar and the world; is that correct?

A. No. There was also the western part towards Stolac, but I know what you're trying to say.

Q. Well, but for the most part towards Sarajevo, Jablanica, Konjic there was nothing, and then they hit the AXI central switchboard.

A. Yes.

Q. So then it was moved -- it was moved to avoid being completely destroyed by bombing, and in this way communication between Mostar and the rest of the world disappeared.

A. Partly, yes.

Q. And the two lines which we call "parica," which were going underneath the customs bridge, and when that fell, there was a cut-off in telephone communications.

A. Yes.

Q. So the HVO brought a coaxial cable which they set up between Mostar and Siroki Brijeg and then they set up a relay towards Sveti Juraj overlooking Makarska, and from Makarska to Split.

A. Yes.

Q. A coaxial cable can have a greater or smaller capacity; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. It's expensive.

A. Yes.

Q. It's sensitive.

A. Yes.

Q. So a smaller capacity cable was laid. It wasn't very well-protected.

A. It was portable.

Q. Yes, and a very small number of numbers, starting 058 Mostar,existed for links to Split and so on.

A. 120 at the most.

Q. Yes, 120 at the most. All communications with Central Bosnia had also been cut off.

A. Yes.

Q. So you couldn't reach that by phone, that area. You -- well,there were attempts in Tomislavgrad and elsewhere to try and link up because they had been oriented towards Sarajevo and now they were trying to reach Split.

A. Yes.

Q. That was the situation in 1992 when we managed to beat back the Serbs.

A. Yes.

Q. There were no public telephone lines. Those 120 telephone numbers were very fiercely contested. People vied for those numbers, and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had some of those telephone numbers; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. In that army, in Vranica, you concentrated the two strongest, most important headquarters of the 4th Corps, which from -- went from Konjic and Jablanica to Stolac and the 41st Mountain Brigade, and you put that -- and you were one of the most important people in that staff. You were the chief of communications; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. I have no further questions. Thank you for this information.

34.
FOUR DOCUMENTS FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING



FACTS

Letter of Prime minister of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina mr. Mile Akmadžić to the Senator Joseph Biden

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
GOVERNMENT / VLADA
PRIME MINISTER / PREDSJEDNIK

February 24, 1993

The Honorable Senator
Mr. Joseph Biden
Chairman, European Affairs Subcommittee
of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee
United States Congress
205 Russell Office Building
Washington, DC 20010

Dear Senator Biden:

This letter concerns the testimony of Mr. Haris Silajdzic, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, before the European Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on February 18, 1993. As Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I wish to advise you that Mr. Silajdzic's testimony as a whole did not represent fully the position of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The position was established in its November program by consensus in the Government and the Presidency functioning as Parliament. As set forth in this program, the Government fully supports the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance and Lord David Owen, and their pursuit of a negotiated solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We seek to achieve a just peace through this process. In our view, a just peace includes: (1) the return of all refugees and displaced persons who wish to return to their homes, (2) the establishment of an international criminal tribunal to try those accused of war crimes, (3) non-recognition of changes achieved by aggression, including ethnic cleansing; and (4) payment of reparations to those who were damaged as a result of the war.

The Government has also determined that Bosnia and Herzegovina can be politically arranged as a decentralized state. The proposals concerning establishment of provinces are an acceptable solution if not based only on ethnic principles, but rather on a combination of ethnic, geographic, historic, economic and other principles developed through negotiations. Our program includes full equality for the three peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Croats, Muslims and Serbs, as recognized by the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations
PO Box 1896 / New York, NY 10163 / (212) 867-6743 phone / (212) 867-5412 fax

The Government has also agreed upon a delegation from Bosnia and Herzegovina which is empowered to negotiate with other countries on all matters that concern our foreign relations. The delegation which represents the Republic in discussions with other countries is a delegation made up of two Croats, two Muslims and two Serbs. The issues concerning internal matters, including internal political arrangement under auspices or with necessary arbitration of the international community through United Nations or the European Community, are to be negotiated among its three peoples. This is the case with Vance/Owen peace talks, where three parties negotiate and no one party is the Government.

I therefore ask you to keep in mind that the testimony of Mr. Silajdzic on the current stage of the Vance/Owen talks and on the national history of Bosnia and Herzegovina is representative of the view of some Muslim members of the Government, and not of the Government as a whole.

Furthermore, please be advised that the mandate of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic as President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina expired on December 20, 1992. He is presently without constitutional authority to act in that capacity. The Presidency, and not the President alone, is the representative body of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only the Presidency can invoke constitutional emergency powers, not the President alone. The President is merely *primus inter pares*. Like Mr. Silajdzic, Mr. Izetbegovic does not speak for the Presidency as a whole with respect to the current stage of the Vance/Owen talks, but only as one Muslim member of the Presidency.

I regret having to be so blunt in light of the immense suffering of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Muslims. I am nevertheless compelled as Prime Minister to bring the foregoing facts to your attention.

My Government welcomes the support of the United States and we are very grateful for such help. I will be available to discuss these matters and other issues of concern to you.

May I request your kind assistance in circulating this letter to your honorable colleagues in the United States Senate and entering this letter as a record of your esteemed Committee.

Sincerely,

Mile Akmadzic
Prime Minister

cc: President of the United States
President of the Security Council of the United Nations

COMMENT:

Mile Akmadžić is the Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
What a miracle, he is not an "illegal" Croat from HZ-HB or HVO or any military or political part.
Please read what Akmadžić is writing, to whom and why.

Letter of the Prime minister of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina mr. Mile Akmadžić to the UN secretary general Boutros Boutros Ghali

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
GOVERNMENT / VLADA
PRIME MINISTER / PREDSJEDNIK

March 1, 1993

H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

Excellency:

I have the honor to present to you the attached letter, dated February 24, 1993, addressed to Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the European Affairs Subcommittee of the United States Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.

The purpose of my letter was to inform the Committee about the position of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to the Vance/Owen peace talks, which is often confused with the position of the Muslim part of the Government. The issues concerning internal matters of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including internal political arrangement under auspices or with necessary arbitration of the international community, are to be negotiated among its three peoples: Croats, Muslims and Serbs. While the Government as a whole supports the Vance/Owen peace process, there is no single position of the Government on the current stage of the Vance/Owen talks. Each of the three negotiating parties has its own position on the proposal as it currently stands.

I also advised the Committee that the mandate of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic as President of the Presidency had expired. This is to demonstrate the immediate need for the international community to assist, not only in protecting Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also in assuring that the country is governed in accordance with its democratic and constitutional principles.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 143, and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Mile Akmadzic
Prime Minister

Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations
PO Box 1896 / New York, NY 10163 / (212) 867-6743 phone / (212) 867-5412 fax

COMMENT:

This document shows how it looks in practice when each agreement and signed proposition of the international community on the internal structure of the BiH is being reduced to its components.

BH Army pursues a certain policy, to be more accurate, the BH Ministry of Defense makes certain districts operational when the Vance-Owen plan has just been signed and it should be implemented.

What districts, where do those districts come from, where and when did talks about districts take place, what republic committees for those districts and how is that related to the Ministry of Defense?!

A man must be polite and due to this politeness he cannot ask: "Who is fooling whom around and to which end?!"

Munib Bisić and those similar to him should be asked about those things.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
No. 13-42-14/93
Sarajevo, February 25th 1993
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
SARAJEVO

Case: putting the districts of Mostar and Livno into operation

Under the provisions of Article 19 of the Decree with legal power on Education and Work of Districts (Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 12/92, 14/92, 18/92 and 21/92) the District Assembly educates the district presidency. At the same time, Article 60 of this provision regulates that the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina appoints the Republic's district commission whose main task is to execute the preparations and organize the constitution of district assembly.

In accordance with stated provisions the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina has brought a decision on educating of Republic's district commissions (Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina no. 16/92 and 19/92) which, among other things, indicated that the Republic's district commission shall function as s district presidency until the constitution of the district presidency.

According to latest information from the districts, received before February 25th 1993, district authorities were formed in districts: Bihać, Goražde, Tuzla and Zenica, while in districts Banja Luka, Doboj, Sarajevo and Travnik Republic's commissions appointed for these districts perform the function of presidencies of these districts.

Mostar district for the areas of municipalities: Bileća, Čapljina, Čitluk, Gacko, Grude, Jablanica, Konjic, Mostar, Ljubinje, Ljubuški, Mostar, Neum, Nevesinje Posušje, Stolac and Trebinje and Livno district for the area of the municipalities Glamoč, Kupres, Livno, Prozor, Tomislavgrad have not yet been put in function.

Due to known reasons, primarily political in nature relating to the establishment of the so-called "Herceg-Bosna" authorities, the constitution of Mostar and Livno districts in accordance with the applicable laws of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been immediately started.

However, with an aim of putting these districts into function the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina sent a letter to Mr. Mate Boban on September 27th 1992. which regards the question of putting these districts into operation, and inter alia states: "... at the beginning of the war, in very complex conditions in the Mostar and Livno region the provisional authorities of Herceg-Bosna have been formed.

It was determined by the Agreement of July 27th 1992 between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the interim government of Herceg-Bosna shall comply with the legislation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore we suggest that in order to ensure uniform practice of organizing war authority throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina you initiate the proceedings of relabeling of Herceg-Bosna temporary

authority for the regions of Mostar and Livno into district authorities of Mostar and Livno district, in accordance with that provision. At the same time, by this letter it is requested from Mr. Boban to propose candidates for the most responsible positions in the organs and bodies of those districts.

According to the findings of this Ministry there was no official response or position on this issue received from Mr. Mate Boban. For these reasons, the Ministry of Defense is re-launching the initiative for districts Mostar and Livno to be put into function, and proposes to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with Article 56 and 60. of the regulation, to forward to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina the proposal on the adoption of a

d e c i s i o n

1. Districts Mostar and Livno are being put into function with March 1st 1993.

2. With the aim of constituting the district Assembly of Mostar and Livno and other organs the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is appointing the Republic's commissions for stated districts, with three members from among members of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the areas of these districts.

DEPUTY MINISTER
Munib Bisić
/ signed and stamped /

COMMENT:

HVO HZ-HB, being the political part of HVO, answers to such and similar documents within this one.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

Mostar, 27 February

STATEMENT FROM AN EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE HVO /CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL/ OF THE HZ-HB /CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA/

At an emergency session held on 27 February 1993, the Croatian Defence Council of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna discussed the security and military situation following the latest incidents by the BH Army in Central Bosnia, which might lead to renewed fighting between the Croats and the Muslims and a deterioration in the overall situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Consistently pursuing the struggle against the Chetnik aggressor, the HVO of the HZ H-B has concluded that the Muslim forces are provoking incidents in areas where they are not engaging the aggressor's forces. Symptomatically, this is happening in areas where a lot of their troops and technical equipment are being concentrated. Thus, in Central Bosnia the Muslim forces number about 25,000 soldiers, while at the same time they lack manpower to defend Sarajevo and the whole of Eastern Bosnia, and the towns in the Bosna river valley are not secured and the Serb forces have already captured them or are persistently attacking them.

In assessing the overall situation, the HVO of the HZ H-B has arrived at the following conclusions:

1. Simultaneously with the incidents involving the BH Army, some ministers from the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting independently or in association with parts of the BH Army Military Command, are arbitrarily taking over the competences of the legitimate authorities and are making moves that objectively represent elements of a classic coup d'etat. For that purpose, lower levels of command in the BH Army are being used /several lines illegible/, attempts to establish a parallel government in areas where provisional government bodies are already functioning, as is the case in the territory of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. People responsible for such activities are bypassing the leaders of the SDA /Democratic Action Party/ in the field, particularly in areas where those leaders have achieved the necessary level of cooperation with representatives of the Croatian people and with the already established forms of provisional executive authority, as is the case in Mostar and several other places in the HZ H-B. This is being done despite the evident fact that such cooperation has resulted in successful resistance to the aggressor.

2. The HVO of the HZ H-B is warning the general public, the Muslim people and their political leaders that such attempts by the coup forces within the legitimate leadership of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina are made, as a rule, when the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and leader of the Muslim people, Mr Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ, is out of the country participating in internationally supervised negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact tells a lot.

Considering the common goal of the Muslim and Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the freedom and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the HVO of the HZ H-B believes that the legitimate authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, all political stakeholders from among the Muslim people and Mr Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ personally, must declare their position on the following:

- Is there a coup going on, at which several attempts have been made by individuals from the BH Army leadership and their followers from various government bodies?

- Can incidents and the behaviour of individual units of the BH Army be stopped, because they are evidently undermining the common struggle of the Croats and the Muslims and are causing serious tension between the two peoples? (The latest such incident occurred on the 26th of this month near Bugojno when, despite the joint Croatian-Muslim escort of a convoy, BH Army troops seized a large amount of food, valuable equipment, weapons and 80 million HRD /Croatian dinars/ in cash, which was intended for the defenders of Central Bosnia).

- How long will the media in Sarajevo, primarily RTV BiH /Radio and Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina/, ignore the fruits of the common struggle of the Croats and the Muslims and every successful move towards rapprochement between the national parties and political leaderships of the two peoples?

3. The HVO of the HZ H-B finds it essential for the improvement of the effectiveness of the common struggle against the aggressor and for the further development of Croatian-Muslim relations that there should be changes in the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this end, it recommends that the Defence Minister in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina suspend the Chief of the Main Staff, Mr Sefer HALILOVIĆ.

4. The HVO of the H-B is of the view that the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been adopting illegitimate decisions for a while now, because the Prime Minister and ministers of Croatian ethnicity are not participating in their adoption. For this reason, the HVO and the Croatian people do not recognise the decisions by the incomplete Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the reasons for such a position of the HVO is a recent letter from the Minister for Energy, Mining and Industry in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Rusmir MAHMUTĆEHAJIĆ, with countersignatures from the Minister of the Interior, Mr Jusuf PUŠINA, and the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Sefer HALILOVIĆ, addressed to the Commander of the BH Army 4th Corps in Mostar. Elements of a classic coup d'etat are visible in this letter, under its innocent (economic-related) heading, because military units are being asked to form the new civilian authorities and appoint leading people in businesses.

5. The HVO of the HZ H-B views as very harmful and dangerous attempts by such forces to blame the Croats or to apportion the blame between the Serb aggressor and the Croats, although everyone is aware of the contribution the Croats and the HVO have made, not just in the joint liberation operations but also in providing assistance to Muslim units in different parts of the Republic. The Command of the BH Army Tuzla Corps, which has received considerable defence aid in recent days despite difficult access through Central Bosnia, might testify to this.

6. In the light of the latest developments, the HVO of the HZ H-B has decided to close the border crossings in its territory towards the Republic of Croatia for all cargo and people in the service of the BH Army. This decision has been made in consultation with the Regional Board of the Mostar SDA and will be rescinded in consultation with them.

7. Because of the ongoing blackout in the Sarajevo media on reports from the HZ H-B and the positive results of cooperation between the Croats and the Muslims in the Tuzla, Mostar and Usora areas, the HVO of the HZ H-B demands that the media in the Republic demonstrate a professional attitude towards such reports, and that this statement be published in its entirety.

8. These views and measures of the HVO of the HZ H-B are directed at encouraging those forces among the Muslim people that are in favour of cooperating with the Croats. At the same time, their aim is also to stop those sowing dissent and advocating intolerant political options, which we are certain the international community will never accept or support.

The HVO of the HZ-HB takes this opportunity to stress once again its full readiness to cooperate in all fields and to settle all disputed issues through negotiation. In this regard, humanitarian and other organisations of both peoples are called upon to promote peace and restore trust.

President, HVO HZ H-B
Jadranko PRLIĆ
/signed and stamped/

COMMENT:

Who will "urgently take steps in order to make district of Mostar and Livno operational?"
Arif Pašalić, commander of the 4th Corps of the BH Army, in cooperation with some others.
So much from Lagumdžija.
Where is the BH Prime Minister?
He writes letters worldwide, brethren do not give a shit about him, he plays his game and they make fools of us Croats.
An apology should be offered.

Crest of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Government

Sarajevo, March 3rd 1993
Number:

ARMY OF BOSNIA AND HEZEGOVINA
4th CORPS COMMAND
Mr. Arif Pašalić, Commander
MOSTAR

Mr. Pašalić

We are sending you the conclusion of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the implementation of emergency measures for the purpose of putting the district of Mostar and Livno into operation. We are asking you to, in cooperation with the Security Services Center Sarajevo and other political actors in this field, make contacts and consultations on the election of three commissioners from among the members of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (list attached), so that these commissioners could carry out the necessary activities in order to activate the district of Mostar and Livno.

In addition to the above conclusion and list, we will send you an instruction on the application of regulations on organization and functioning of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in war conditions.

Sincerely,

Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Dr. Zlatko Lagumdžija
signature /illegible/
(official seal with the inscription in Latin and Cyrillic - Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sarajevo, the Crest of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

copy delivered to:

CSB Mostar
(Mr. Ramo Masleša, Chief)
-Mr. Jadranko Prlić
(commissioner of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

35.

AGGRESSION OF A BiH AGAINST HVO AND CROATS IN KONJIC



FACTS

Aggression - attack of the A BiH units against HVO

KONJIC MUNICIPALITY - SITUATION IN THE PERIOD FROM APRIL 13, 1993 UNTIL APRIL 25, 1993



The remaining enclaves under HVO defense - after A BiH attack

KONJIC MUNICIPALITY - SITUATION FROM MAY 1993 UNTIL JULY 10, 1993



KONJIC MUNICIPALITY - SITUATION FROM JULY 10, 1993



COMMENT:

To all those who knew about the sentence of the 3rd BH Army Corps commander that he wrote to the command of Bugojno Defense staff and 307th BH Army brigade on January 20th 1993.

It is perfectly clear and it should be read carefully and clearly.

"Write reports in a manner to reflect the combat situation, instead of being political lessons.

IT IS TOO EARLY FOR CONFLICTS IN ALL TOWNS OF HERZEG-BOSNIA ALTHOUGH THAT OPTION IS ENVISAGED, TOO".

January 20th 1993 is a date when the ATTACK option AGAINST CROATS (HVO) was already envisaged.

Please, continue with apologies for a "mistaken" Croatian policy in BiH which "with certainty" prepared conflicts with BH Army.

You are not lacking brains, knowledge, not even sycophantic submissiveness for that kind of work.

Apologize with "dignity" and in a European manner, but please, not on my behalf.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
3rd CORPS COMMAND
Strictly confidential number 02/33-181
Zenica, 20.01.1993.

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/hand written number 38 circled/

Engagement of forces toward Gornji Vakuf- response -

To the Command Headquarters of Bugojno defense and 307th Brigade

We appreciate your thoughts and suggestions, but we draw your attention to the performance of the assignments in the area of responsibility. Do not engage in activities that are not in your domain. Write reports so as to reflect the combat situation and not to be a political lesson.

For conflicts in all towns of Croatian Community Herceg Bosna is still premature, although this option is also foreseen. Try to do everything you can and help Vakuf.

COMMANDER
Enver Hadžihasanović
Verified by stamp
stamp with crest of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the sign 3rd corps /signature illegible/
/circled by hand/

COMMENT:

ORDER BY SEFER HALILOVIĆ THAT CANCELS THE COOPERATION BETWEEN BH ARMY AND HVO

In the document D-165a, signed by Enver Hadžihasanović, commander of the 3rd Corps of BH Army we saw this at that time (January 1993) it is too early for the attacks against HVO in urban areas.

Assumptions for attack should have been made, which means, to remove all those Muslims that cooperate with Croats and political and military part of HVO.

Those Muslims, legally and democratically elected representatives of a nation, which in many places (Mostar, Konjic, Jablanica, Rama, Bugojno ...) set up an administration together with Croats, became an obstacle in realization of already made plans on the "liberation" of those areas from Croats.

BH Army and SDA /Party od Democratic Action/ policy plan; in spring 1993 Alija Izetbegović, without a legal stronghold and by imposed will, dismisses elected Muslims in Jablanica, Konjic and Rama and appoints Dr. Safet Ćibo.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Supreme Command Staff of the RBH Armed Forces
Sarajevo

Office of the Chief of Staff

No. 111-1
Date: 28 January 1993

To the Fourth Corps Commander

We have information that a small part of the RBH Army, Police and other authorities in the areas of Jablanica, Konjic, Pazarići and Tarčin and probably in other areas within the Fourth Corps zone of authority, have fully sided with the Great-Croatia policy and are implementing orders received from the leadership of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna thus directly undermining our /illegible/ struggle for a united and democratic RBH and, both directly and indirectly, bewildering and confusing some of our members. This refers in particular to Dr. R. HADŽIHUSEINOVIĆ, Chairman of the Konjic Municipality; Jasmin GUSKA, Chief of the Konjic Police; Tufo REFA, Chief of the Hadžići Police; Midhad CEROVAC, Commander of the 7th Konjic Brigade.

To get an overall picture of the situation as a whole and to plan the adequate measures, I hereby

ORDER

1. To visit Igman as soon as possible and to talk to the IGMAN OG Commander Dževad RAĐA, to Zulfikar ALIŠPAGA and others.

2. To engage all the other available sources to find out the truth and the overall situation. The truth shall be the sole criterion in this matter.

3. To study the problem in all its aspects and do all that you are authorised to; to propose any necessary personnel changes to be made by the RBH Army Supreme Command, the Ministry of the Interior, the RBH Presidency or the party.

4. If necessary, to propose criminal proceedings or to plan special actions for which funds and manpower will be provided in due time.

5. Check whether similar phenomena have also occurred elsewhere.

CHIEF
SUPREME COMMAND
RBH ARMED FORCES

S. HALILOVIĆ
/signed and stamped/

COMMENT:

BH Army in Konjic started with a general reckoning with "Ustashas", according to from words of Sefer Halilović.

The political leadership of SDA prepared a field and the propaganda will do its thing – HVO always attacks.

Muslims are victims in Sarajevo and since they once became victims – a victim cannot be guilty.

How and why would 20% of Croats in Konjic, with a military power equal to one HVO battalion in town (on lines towards the VRS – Army of Republic of Srpska) and one battalion from Kostajnica (in total 600-700 soldiers) attack 4 times stronger BH Army forces?

But who cares about logic and facts?!

Let's continue reading the documents.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BH ARMY, 4th CORPS
7TH BRIGADE "SUAD ALIĆ" KONJIC
Number: 02-211/93
Date: 23rd of March, 1993
/stamp of receipt/

4th corps Mostar

Special operative report

We inform you that the condition in our zone of responsibility is the following:

- 150 HVO members are captured
- town is blocked
- life in the city is paralyzed
- we continue with arrestment

Commander
Cerovac Midhad

4th corps – communication centre

COMMENT:

April 16th 1993, Esad Ramić puts together a combat report:

a) Zlatar establishment is surrounded and HVO seeks help; they are "on the ropes";

b) Babin Nos is blocked;

c) "*It is interesting that HVO Konjic screams for help through the radio communication…*"

There you have it: it is "*interesting*" that HVO seeks help.
At the end, a clear message how long will BH Army do this: "UNTIL THE FINAL VICTORY!"

But not in Sarajevo, or Srebrenica or Bihać … , they should try to break the weaker one, while the entire armament was provided to them from Croatia and from HVO.
Please do not forget that this aggression was hiding under a mask of "*Unfortunate Muslim-Croatian conflict in the BH*".
Who are you screwing with, you makers of that lie, nonsense, deception and for long are you going to keep doing it?
Who are you trying to trick?

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BiH

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
Strictly confidential

/handwritten: 43rd bbr /Mountain Brigade/
02/1/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BiH
IGMAN OG /Operations Group/ COMMAND
Igman, 16 April 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/stamp:/

4th Corps
COMMAND
____ No. 02/1-3173/93
Date: 17 April 1993

COMBAT REPORT

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 4th CORPS
M O S T A R

During the day in the Konjic area fighting has continued throughout the municipality. Since a piece of equipment was not in working order, I do not have much information from Klis. We received a piece of equipment from Mt. Igman and re-established communication. I have been informed that there are no major problems there and that the Neretvica Brigade is fighting the aggressor HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ successfully.
In the area of the 7th Brigade, the situation is as follows:
The Zlatar feature is encircled and operations continue. The HVO forces are forcefully requesting assistance and, with regard to this feature, their strength is ebbing. From this feature, however, they are relentlessly shelling the town and all the Muslim villages.
We have introduced fresh forces along the Podorašac – Ovčari village axis and succeeded in lifting the blockade on the village and helping the civilians. According to the report, the sector south-west of the viaduct towards Zlatar has been mopped up.
- Our forces have continued their operations along the Homolje village – Repovica axis and are currently mopping up Galjevo village. The HVO forces there are putting up fierce resistance and two of our soldiers were killed there. Operations will continue until the end because taking control of Repovica is a condition for the movement towards Babin Nos. The Zlatar feature dominates everything and the operations aimed at taking control of this feature are commanded by CEROVAC, who is very slow, which affects everything else.
The HVO forces have been pushed back from Ovčari and Borovac villages and withdrew to the DC /dispatch centre/ warehouse, towards the town. The HVO forces are blocked from the direction of the town by the VP /Military Police/ forces under the command of ŠAHIĆ, who commands the battalion with much success.
- The Babin Nos feature is blocked and the operation to capture it will be launched only after Zlatar and Repovica.
- It is interesting that, via communications, the Konjic HVO is pleading for help, which has been promised from Kreševo and Kiseljak. Ambushes have been laid on these routes. Incidentally, your address to the public has met with positive reception, and /word/s/ missing/ said quite openly what the Croats are doing.

UNTIL FINAL VICTORY!!!

PNŠ /Assistant Chief of Staff/ FOR ONP /Operations and Training/
Esad RAMIĆ

COMMENT:

Forget about signed agreements in Geneva, Vance-Owen, agreements on cessation of fights when Arif Pašalić on April 17th 1993 gives out the following order:

Item 3: "*In respect to all other issues, adhere to previous orders and instructions.*"

On the same day, April 17th 1993 Esad Ramić reports to his commander Pašalić (4th Corps of BH Army):

"WE SHALL INTEND TO FINISH THE WORK IN KONJIC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND THEN MOVE TO COUNTER ATTACK WITH ALL BRIGADES IN TWO DIRECTIONS"

1. Konjic-Jablanica-Mostar

2. Konjic-Prozor-Rama

What kind of an attack was that on HVO, against whom and from which direction, with which effects and from which army? HVO WAS NOT ATTACKING!

Pathetic, seedy lies.

They went on endlessly and both buyers and sellers were redundant for many reasons.

It is hence correct that HVO paid VRS in oil to pull out civilians and saved them from a massacre, to accommodate wounded combatants and save them from death but VRS shelled Konjic for its own military reasons.

What is contestable about that "oil", what is contestable in that "trade" – to give oil to save people, for that was the only possibility?

When human lives are being saved, "the only possibility" is the best possibility.

Do you, readers, think this shouldn't have been done?

If your son had been there, if he had been wounded, would you have done that?

Despise those criticize something when it's not their concern – in the name of your stupid and idiotic ideas, principal ones, of course.

Forthcoming documents will show that the strategic agreement between Muslims and Serbs regarding the movement towards the sea starts at that time.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
4TH CORPS COMMAND
Reg. no. : 01-3191/93
Mostar, 17.04.1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
Strictly confidential
URGENT!

ORDER

ADDRESSEE: ALL UNITS OF THE 4TH CORPS

Based on the newly-arisen situation, and the development of events and combat activities in the 4th Corps Area of Responsibility, and with the purpose of overcoming the situation and establishing a situation as favourable for us as possible,

I ISSUE THE FOLLOWING ORDER:

1. Units in contact with the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and HV /Croatian Army/ forces are obliged to continue their b/d /combat operations/, and all measures should be taken with that end.
   The centre of activity should be focused on facilities and axes that endanger you the most.
   Initial successes should be maximally exploited.
   Occupy dominant facilities (unless you have already occupied them) from which you will be able to control larger territories and wider areas.
   Carry out mutual linking and coordination. Do the task of continuous reconnaissance and monitoring of axes from which the b/d are carried out toward your units.
   Make the units logistically independent as much as possible. The focus should be on the technical security (this means the materiel equipment which ensures independent execution of combat operations).
2. Units that keep positions towards the Chetniks must not let them break through in their zones of responsibility.
3. As for the rest, adhere to the previously received orders and directions.
4. Immediately submit all information about captured members of the HVO and HV, as well as members who were killed.
5. You are also obliged to keep an accurate register about your wounded members, or members who were killed, and submit it to us.
6. Regular reports should be submitted every 6 hours, and special when need arises.

COMMANDER
Mr. Arif PAŠALIĆ
/signed/
/stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BH ARMY
Command of the 4th corps of the BH Army
Bradina, 17 April 1993, 2000 hours

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Combat report

To the Commander of the 4th corps Mostar

Today, we continued with combat actions towards HVO in zones of both brigades in Konjic. The situation in the zone of 7th brigade is the following:
Pursuant to information, reported by the commander of the brigade.
/illegible/ today, in the s. Bradina from 1800 till 2000 hours, the situation is as follows:

The position of HVO "Stari Grad"
The object is surrounded. The forces of 7th brigade managed to capture 5 HVO soldiers. In the city, there are 11 combatants remaining, along with the commander Mikulić Dragan. /illegible/ the commander of the "resistant point" is the so called "Berko", who is not from Konjic and does not allow the combatants to surrender. Related to the weapon, we have got 2 PAMs, one MB 82 mm and one MB 120 mm. There is a mine field around the object.

The position of HVO "Zlatar"
The object is fully surrounded. It is surrounded by 60 men of "Crni Labudovi", members of the special MUP unit Hadžići and 80 soldiers of the 7th brigade Konjic. The object is rather resistant, well set and fortified. Within prevailed oppression of the object, we captured 20 soldiers of HVO, two deathmakers /"sijač smrti, interpreter's remark/ and one 20/3 on the vehicle. We shall continue with surrounding and oppression of the object, and, as the communications of HVO are concerned, we hear requests to surrender.

The position of HVO "Spiljani"
Our units disarmed and detained 15 members of HVO and the entire line towards Chetnicks in this area is held by the BH Army.

The position of HVO "Polje Bijela"
Our forces disarmed 15 HVO soldiers. These combatants asked to joint the /illegible/ BIH. 8 of them are approved to pass and now, they are in BH Army. At this line, the line towards the Chetnicks is held exclusively by the BH Army. Yesterday, the HVO soldiers intensively shelled the unit that holds the line towards Chetnicks on s. Prevlje. /illegible/ captured our crew and took the line. I ordered from Igman, by the communications, to attack them and re-conquer the line. First battalion of the 7th brigade executed my order and took the line by the morning of the day after, whereby the HVO soldiers were kept detained, in order to prevent the shelling of this area by HVO. Within this activity, we had two slightly wounded BH Army combatants.

The position of HVO "Babin nos"
It is the extremely well fortified object, wherefrom the city of Konjic has been brutally destroyed and civilians killed. The object is surrounded by the forces of BVB of the 4th corps and the forces of Konjic. We hit it by "samohotka" from the distance. The infantry does not want to move to /illegible/ till we liberate Zlatar and Repovica, wherefrom the object has been protected by the back fire. All significant objects in the city are controlled by us. Now, we have got 4 killed combatants in the 7th brigade, one heavily wounded and 5 slightly wounded soldiers. By Zuka, one killed and two wounded. One platoon of the brigade was surrounded at the stadium, however, during the night, they managed to reach the city.
The object of the HVO "S. Radešine"

The village is well fortified and presents the spot, wherefrom the HVO hits by 3-barrells weapon and MB 120 mm.
The village is surrounded by our forces from direction of s. Ribići, s. Seljani and s. Idbar. The commander of the brigade has been issued by substantial tasks, therefore the brigade continues with its activities. The commander of the Neretvica brigade reported the following:
Within an efficient action, the village of Trešnjevica has been disarmed and the inhabitants were left alone. The brigade forces took the Bušak object. We captured 40 000 rounds, 1 PAM of 12,7 mm and two MBs of 82 mm. Our forces liberated the villages of Lukšije, Šagolje, Prijeslop, Goransko Polje and Mirosavci. There are battles going on for the liberation of Buturović Polje. The "Neretvica" brigade managed to liberate the travel corridor Seonica-Buturović polje and Parsovići. There have been 3 killed combatants in the brigades so far and one wounded soldier. We are in the middle of forcing the Jablanica lake on direction Ostrožac-Gorica with intention to impact the S. Obrić. The brigade set 300 combatants on the line towards Prozor behind the positions of Here, Šćipe and Kute and does not allow the break of forces, invading from Prozor. We shall try to end our affaires as soon as possible and than move, with all our brigades, to perform a counterattack in two directions.

1.Konjic-Jablanica-Mostar
2. Konjic-Prozor-Rama

In addition, I inform you that we made an excellent cooperation with all brigades of OG "Igman". They assist us in men and MTS. The legendary Zuka stands out. HVO evidently cooperates with the Chetnicks. Proofs for it are 30 trucks with men and MTS brought to Hadžići and selective artillery activity on the Muslim villages from Borak. There is no doubt on the open aggression of Serbs and Croats on the sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. We shall persist till end in its liberation, East and West. Do not stop us, we kindly ask, and do not send any negotiators. However, we remind you that we would obey to every order, issued by you. We are in touch with your negotiations in Medias and you enjoy the full support of this nation.

If you want to send me any despatches, send them to CV OG "igman", wherefrom I send you reports as well.

Till the final victory"!!!

PNSS FOR ONP of the 4th corps
Esad Ramić

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Bradina, 18 April 1993, 10:00 p.m.

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
TOP SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/stamp impression/
COMMAND OF THE 4TH CORPS
No. 02/1-3257/93
Date: 19 Apr. 1993

COMBAT REPORT

TO THE COMMANDER
OF THE 4TH CORPS

For the whole day liberation operations have been led by our forces in Konjic. The situation is as follows:

Zlatar:

The facility was under siege and at 5:00 p.m. our forces managed to take control over the same. At Zlatar we captured: 2 mortars 120 mm, 1 cannon B-1, 1 multiple rocket launcher, 1 anti-aircraft cannon 20/3, and 2 heavy machine guns. We found no dead bodies in the facility because they managed to take the bodies with them while escaping.

The town:

The facility was also concentrically under siege and two hours ago it was taken. In the facility we captured 2 anti-aircraft heavy machine guns and one mortar 82 mm.

Our forces were efficient on the route village Galjevo – village Homolje – Repovci. The entire route with the point Repovci was liberated completely.

The villages of Ovčari and Vrbići as powerful strongholds of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) were also liberated today. This means the liberation of the corridor Bradina – Konjic.

At this moment the "Neretvica" brigade is liberating the strongholds of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Pokoriši and Cerići. By this, the entire right bank of the Neretva will be free.

The remaining strongholds on the left bank of the Neretva to be liberated are: Turija, Zabrđe, Pomol and Ljubinja. The action has been prepared and will be carried out tomorrow. All operations of both our brigades have vigorously started and are moving forward. Our goal is to liberate them as soon as possible and to help Jablanica and further.

According to your order, Mr. Mustafa Handžo, Bachelor of Political Science, has been designated for negotiations with the Chetniks on 23 April 1993 at Butmir.

ASSISTANT TO HEAD OF
ONP SERVICE:

Mr. Mustafa Handžo

ARMY OF THE R BiH
Konjic, 22 April 1993

MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET

COMBAT REPORT

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 4TH CORPS

During the day intensive attack operations have been carried out in Konjic. We gave up from the liberating of the villages Turija, Zabrdje and Zaslivlje until we liberate the village Radesine. After that the conditions will be created for the strike on the HVO forces from the hills in the direction Ljubina – Turija village and for the takeover of the lines towards chetnicks.

During the day the operation for liberation of the village Radesina was carried out and so far it went well and we had no casualties. The same is in the village Vrce, while in the village Budisina Ravna the situation is more difficult. There we had three killed fighters and the action goes more difficult.

Today, during a day, we listened secretly to the conversations of the chetnics' commander from Bijela. From those conversations it could be seen that they accept and take care of the HVO wounded men while, in return, they transport Serbs from Konjic over Turije. Now this corridor is cut through.

PNS (Assistant of Chief of Staff) for ONP
Esad Ramic

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
v.Bradina April 21st 1993, 21:15h

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
-URGENT-

Combat Report

to 4th CORPS COMMANDER
MOSTAR

During the day our units have taken the line: village Prevlje - below the village Turija - Old Town - Pomol - Babin nos - village Orahovica - Lisina and hence surrounded the remaining part of the HVO on the left side of the Neretva river. On this shore on the way to Jablanica there is still a HVO stronghold in the Radešine village. That stronghold is also surrounded. During the night a part of the forces from the city will be brought to rayon Radešina with a mission to crash HVO forces in the village Radešina rayon, conquer the place and in that way unblock the Konjic – Jablanica road. In parallel with this action the action to liberate the village Unca and Ljesovina facility in Klis will take place tomorrow. As for the "Zlatar" object the major part of it is preserved in technical sense while the building is considerably damaged due to the Chetnik shelling. In an underground part almost all of the equipment has been put into operation so for now we have these capabilities:

- Maintaining KT UKT connections

- Maintaining wire post and telecommunication and inductor connections

- Eavesdropping Chetnik's and HVO's radio relay connections

- Other which is not for the public because neither this way of me reporting to you is safe .

Today I eavesdropped on a conversation which the Chetnik Colonel Risto Lazarevic from village Bijela had with a certain Colonel Djeram. Risto reported to him that the Croats who were suppressed by our forces have asked him to receive them in Bijela and through Nevesinje to transfer them to Mostar. Djeric hasn't approved it and ordered to be shot at HVO and the ABiH. Djero has informed Risto of coming of the reinforcements in sight of the army and artillery led by Boro Antelj, commander of the local Chetnik brigade.

Otherwise I have already reported here we captured a number of very important HVO documents, which speak of cooperation with the Chetniks, bargains regarding Konjic, ultimate goals of the HVO, etc. For that reason I have moved the documentation to a safe location and the team with Sejo Branković should break their way to you so I can give this to him and this closes the circle and here are the answers to all questions related to the HVO.

Today, the Chetniks were intensely bombarded the city in order to support the HVO. Risto Lazarevic supports the HVO with the artillery because he knows what awaits them in Bijela and Borci when we finish this with the HVO. The ground part of the „Zlatar" facility was shelled with no major damage.

I'm sending the forces to help Jablanica today.

PNS for ONP

Esad Remić

COMMENT:

Žarko Keža's report from April 23rd 1993 will provide you the results and success of the Muslim aggression against Croats in Konjic.

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian Union Herzeg Bosnia
Croatian Defense Council

HVO Main Headquarters
V O S
Strictly confidential nr. 03-370/93
Mostar, April 23rd. 1993.

Defense
Military Secret
Strictly confidential

Information
Supplement about Konjic

We are submitting to you a list of villages that were burned down from where Croats were driven out and we have no information about them.

a) Konjic district - Klis area /Neretvica valley/

1. Village Trusina, Croats exiled, some of them were shot and village was set afire.
2. Village Sultić, Croats exiled and village set afire.
3. Village Bušćak, Croats exiled, part of the village burned down, man were shot.
4. Village Orlište, Croats that were found there were all killed, village completely burned down.
5. Village Mrkosovica - Lukšije, Croat exiled, we have no information on casualties, and also do not know whether the village was set afire.
6. Village Jasenik, Croats exiled.
7. Village Slavkovići, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
8. Village Dobričevići, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
9. Village Bare, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
10. Village Prijeslop, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
11. Village Solakova kula, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
12. Village Goransko polje, Croats exiled and village ransacked.
13. Village Gorani, Croats exiled and 10 houses were ransacked.
14. Village Ljesovina, Croats are resisting, they are exposed to ten day attack.
15. Village Budišnja ravan, Croats exiled and they are currently at Ljesovina.

b) Territory of the city of Konjic and surrounding villages.

1. City of Konjic itself is completely under the Muslim control; Croats were either exiled or detained at the village Čelebići, according to our knowledge there is approximately 300 Croats at the detention camp over there.

2. Croats that were exiled from the city are concentrated at the villages: Turija, Zabrdje and Zaslivlje. We know nothing about their destiny.
3. Croatian village Dubravice, Croats exiled, were used as human shield during the occupation of Zlatar facility which was held by HVO. We know nothing about destiny of soldiers end civilians.
4. Village Galjevo, Croats exiled, village ransacked and then set afire.
5. Village Ovčari, Croats exiled, village ransacked, we dont know whether the village was burnd down.
6. Village Radešine, Croats surrounded for ten days now, they are on left bank of Jablaničko lake completely surrounded.:

NOTE

Village Vrci /across the way from Radešine/ is completely surrounded. Croats are holding up well.

Village Obri is completely souranded, they are isolated from Vrci and Butorović polje. Croats are holding up well at this village.

Chief of VOS* HVO Main Headquarters

ŽARKO KEŽA

"Signature"

*VOS - Military Intelligence Service

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

36.

AGGRESSION A BiH AGAINST HVO AND CROATS IN CENTRAL BOSNIA



FACTS

COMMENT:

What kind of a military document was signed in New York and between whom?
What about March 10th 1993?
It's important what Sefer thinks about the document and Sefer doesn't think well about the document. Tis continues, sign a document and then think about what you have just signed and then one gives up from what was signed.
Sefer proposes items 2, 4, 5 and 6.:
4 - The Republic of Croatia –this "Ustasha" state should finally be dealt with; logistics for the needs of BH Army;
5 – RH – all friendly states (which ones?) must put pressure to this country to "give up on supporting the Herzeg-Bosnia and actively work on its abolition.
It has already started, dear Sefer, in Konjic with aggression against Croats and it continues severely because…
6. Secure that PORT OF PLOČE and direction PLOČE-MOSTAR-SARAJEVO-ZENICA is constantly operational for the needs of the BH state.
And he continues with content and style that only few people in Zagreb think about it. Neither they cared, nor they knew or understood. The majority minds its own business in self-governing papers persistently and boringly. Until nowadays.
And SEFER CONTINUES:
" If it's necessary, engage international forces, if necessary secure the space to our forces as well".
IN CASE YOU FORGOT – PLOČE IS IN CROATIA.
So BH Army moved towards Ploče and Neum because, save for Mujahedins, Sefer Halilović didn't manage to engage other international forces, American or French army, for example.
Every semi-literate idiot was accusing Croats and, pissing by their own ignorance on the entire nation with imperial supremacy of ideological judgment.
Pathetic.

Excerpt from the tape recorded session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the parliamentary parties that is presidents or party representatives of parties held on March 10th 1993. The discussion was led with regards to the preparation for the session of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was supposed to comment on the Vance Owen plan.

IZETBEGOVIĆ: I would like to have a useful conversation. ... So, are you familiar with the contents of the military document that was signed in New York, or do you think it would be good to read the introduction? Well, then it will be brought and we will read it ....

HALILOVIĆ: Mr. President, gentlemen, I would just give certain opinions related to the military paper ....

It comes out from it that one of the basic problems of the entire, even the military part of the agreement, is the fact that the solution to the war would not follow as a consequence of basic military victory over the aggressor, which would cause that the party who actualized the massacres and other forms of genocide against the Muslim and Croatian people, to remain in the role also of the organizer of the part of government in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Especially in three provinces. They as such would further pose a great threat to the security of citizens who support Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslims and Croats in particular.

***

2. Freeze the activities of political parties and form a patriotic front of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the defense of sovereign state.

***

4. On the political agenda, finally resolve the most important issue with the Republic of Croatia, and that is the logistics for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that is the armed forces.

5. At the international level to animate all friendly countries to exert pressure on Croatia to drop support for "Herceg-Bosna" and work actively to its abolishing.

6. To ensure that the port Ploče and direction Ploče - Mostar-Sarajevo - Zenica is in constant function for the needs of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If it is necessary, engage international forces for this cause and if needed secure that space with our own forces.

***

COMMENT:

It is best to read the entire book, but here it is little something about problems that emerge when war disturbs a sensitive national balance in a certain place or area.
The same topic is being discussed by Margaret Thatcher in a way where a great mind understands the problem.

MAPS 1-14:
1. SITUATION IN BiH IN APRIL – MAY 1992
2. SITUATION IN HERZEGOVINA UNTIL AND AROUND APRIL 10th 1992
3. JOINT ACTIVITY OF HVO AND BH ARMY, SITUATION FROM APRIL 10th 1992-JUNE 7th 1992
4. JOINT ACTIVITY OF HVO AND BH ARMY FROM JUNE 1992 UNTIL OCTOBER 29th 1992
5. JOINT ACTIVITY OF HVO AND BH ARMY OCTOBER 29th 1992, VRS TAKES JAJCE
6. RELATIONS BETWEEN HVO AND BH ARMY – JANUARY 1993
7. ATTACK OF THE BH ARMY AGAINST HVO – APRIL 1993
8. ATTACK OF THE BH ARMY AGAINST HVO – MAY 1993
9. ATTACK OF THE BH ARMY AGAINST HVO – JUNE 1993
10. RELATIONS BETWEEN HVO AND BH ARMY – JUNE 30th 1993
11. ATTACKS OF THE BH ARMY AGAINST HVO – JULY 1993
12. SITUATION IN THE AREA UNDER CONTROL OF BH ARMY AND HVO ON JULY 30th 1993
13. RELATIONS BETWEEN HVO AND BH ARMY – NOVEMBER 8th 1993
14. RATIO OF FORCES BH ARMY AND HVO, MARCH 1993, STRUCTURE AND ARRANGEMENT OF OZ SB /Operative Zone of Central Bosnia/, APRIL 1993

Charles R. Shrader: The Muslim-Croat civil war in Central Bosnia, a military history 1992-1994

Prologue

In October, 1992, Jajce, an important town northwest of Travnik on the main road to Banja Luka, had been under siege by the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) for nearly five months. A mixed garrison of Croatian Defense Council and Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina soldiers defended the town and its two important power stations. They were supported from Travnik over a tenuous, narrow, twenty-five-mile-long corridor through Serb-held territory. Reinforcements, food, ammunition, and other vital supplies were brought forward by truck, usually at night. Constantly under fire, the nightly convoys that snaked from Travnik along the primitive road through rough mountain terrain barely sufficed to keep Jajce's beleaguered garrison and civilian population alive. On October 27, 1992, the BSA's I Krajina Corps acted to end the siege of Jajce with an all-out attack preceded by several air strikes. The following day, Jajce's HVO defenders evacuated their sick and wounded along with the Croat civilian residents before abandoning the town that evening. The Muslim soldiers and civilians soon followed when, on October 29, the BSA entered the town and began a program of "ethnic cleansing" that resulted in what has been called "the largest and most wretched single exodus" of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[1]

3

For many of the thirty thousand refugees who fled over the mountains or down the by-then notorious "Vietnam Road" toward the relative safety of Travnik, it was not the first time they had been forced to flee before the BSA. Many had fled earlier to Jajce from Banja Luka, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Kotor Varos, and other towns and villages in the Bosanska-Krajina region. For the most part, the HVO soldiers and Croat refugees who fled Jajce filtered down into the relative safety of Herzegovina or even into Croatia itself. The twenty thousand or so Muslim refugees, on the other hand, had no place else to go and therefore remained in Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, or villages near Bila and Zenica. Amidst mutual accusations of having abandoned the defense of the city, both the HVO and the ABiH were forced to repair the substantial military damage suffered while their respective civilian authorities were faced with the problems caused by a major influx of refugees into the central Bosnia area.

Therein lay the seeds of the coming conflict. The Muslim refugees from Jajce posed both a problem and an opportunity for Alija Izetbegovic's government. The problem was where to relocate them. The opportunity was a military one: the large number of military age males, well motivated for revenge against the Serbs and equally ready to take on the Croats, provided a pool from which the ABiH could fill up existing units and form new mobile ones that would then be available to undertake offensive missions. Until the last months of 1992, the lack of mobile units trained and motivated for offensive operations had prevented the ABiH from mounting a sustained offensive action—against the BSA or anyone else.[2] However, the influx of refugees from Jajce, combined with large numbers of military-age refugees from eastern Bosnia and the arrival of fundamentalist Muslim fighters (mujahideen) from abroad, made it possible for the ABiH to form such mobile units and to contemplate offensive action on a large scale for the first time.[3]

Thus, contrary to the commonly accepted view, it was the fall of Jajce at the end of October, 1992, not the publication of the details of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in January, 1993, that precipitated the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia. It was the Muslims, who had both the means and motive to strike against their erstwhile ally. The United Nations–backed VOPP proposed the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten provinces, each of which—except for the one surrounding Sarajevo—would be dominated by one of the three principal ethnic groups. The plan's details were announced in December, 1992, and the supporting map was released the following month. The common but nevertheless erroneous argument is that the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia arose from the Bosnian Croats' premature and ruthless efforts to implement the plan in the central Bosnian provinces assigned to them.[4] However, that argument rests on faulty *post hoc propter hoc* reasoning unsupported by convincing factual evidence as to means, motive, and opportunity. Nor does it take into account the time required to plan and execute an offensive campaign. Open conflict between the Muslims and Croats in Central Bosnia broke out on January 14, 1993, just two days after the VOPP cantonal map was finalized in Geneva but two and one-half months after Jajce fell.

On the other hand, the temporal and causative connections between the massive influx of Muslim refugees into central Bosnia following Jajce's fall and the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat conflict are clear. Their disruptive presence in central Bosnia's towns and villages, their incorporation into the ABiH's new mobile offensive units, and the urgent need to find them living space are well-known and widely accepted facts. The role they played as the catalyst for the Muslim-Croat conflict was pointed out by Franjo Nakic, the former HVO Operative Zone Central Bosnia chief of staff, and many other witnesses appearing before the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-

And many other witnesses appearing before the Intenational Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. As Nakic succintly stated, „The Croats and Muslims, the local ones, would never have entered into a conflict were it not for the influx of these refugees who sought a space for themselves, having lost their own in Western and Eastern Bosnia. [5]

Charles R. Shrader,
The Muslim-Croat civil war in Central Bosnia, a military history 1992-1994,
Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga Zagreb - 2004

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1. Edward Vulliamy, *Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War,* 179–80.
2. The ABiH as it existed in late 1992 was composed almost exclusively of forces raised on the old Yugoslavian National Army Territorial Defense pattern. Its units were generally tied to a given geographical area and were not "mobile" in the sense that an American or British infantry battalion is mobile (i.e., available for deployment outside the immediate vicinity of its home station).
3. The infamous 7th Muslim Motorized Brigade, composed in part of mujahideen and the principal assault unit of the ABiH's III Corps, was formed on November 17, 1992, and the mobile 17th and 27th Krajina Mountain Brigades were formed from Muslim refugees in Croatia in November, 1992, and June, 1993, respectively and subsequently moved into Bosnia-Herzegovina.
4. The unsubstantiated opinion that the Muslim-Croat conflict in central Bosnia was precipitated by Croat insistence on early implementation of the VOPP surfaced early in the conflict. For example, Lt. Col. Robert A. Stewart, commander of the British UNPROFOR battalion in the Lasva Valley, recorded in his diary that he had expressed to the Equerry to the Prince of Wales his belief that "the HVO were causing problems in order to force the Muslims to agree to the Geneva Peace Plan" (Stewart diary, Jan. 29, 1993, sec. 3, 12, KC D56/1 and KC D104/1). It has also been promoted by journalists (e.g., Peter Maas in *Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War,* n 286); by human rights organizations (e.g., Helsinki Watch [Human Rights Watch] in *War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina,* 2:379–81); and in other Western publications (e.g., Jane's Information Group, *Jane's Bosnia Handbook,* sec. 2, 3–4).
5. Franjo Nakic, Kordic-Cerkez trial testimony, Apr. 13, 2000. Nakic was chief of staff of the HVO's OZCB from December, 1992, to December, 1996.

Situation in BiH - April-May 1992



Situation in Herzegovina until and around April 10th, 1992



Mutual operations by HVO and A BiH, situation in the period from April 10 until June 7, 1992



Mutual operations by HVO and A BiH in the period from June 1992 until October 29, 1992



Mutual operations by HVO and A BiH on October 29, 1992 VRS occupies Jajce



Relations between HVO and A BiH - January 1993



A BiH attack on HVO - April 1993



A BiH attack on HVO - May 1993



A BiH attack on HVO - June 1993



Relations between HVO and A BiH on June 30, 1993



A BiH attack on HVO - July 1993



Situation in the territory under A BiH and HVO control on July 30, 1993



XI STANJE NA PROSTORU POD KONTROLOM ABiH I HVO – 30.7.1993. /Situation on areas under control of ABiH and HVO – July 30, 1993./
Enklave u Središnjoj Bosni /HVO' enclaves in Central Bosnia/ :
1. Vitez - Busovača; 2. Kiseljak – Kreševo; 3. Vareš; 4. Žepče;
5. Usora; 6. Konjic pocket.

XI – a
ABiH zauzela i očistila od HVO i Hrvata /ABiH took over and cleansed from HVO and Croats/ :
1. Zenica; 2. Travnik; 3. dio Novog Travnika (part of); 4. Kakanj;
5. Fojnica; 6. Bugojno; 7. Konjic (osim manjeg džepa – except small pocket)

Relations between HVO and A BiH on November 8,1993



Ratio of forces A BiH and HVO, March 1993, structure and arrangement OZ CB, April 1993

Structure and arrangement of OZ CB /OPERATIONAL ZONE CENTRAL BOSNIA / April 1993

STRENGTH IN NUMBERS OF OZ CB:

1. Travnik brigade approximately 800 solders
2. Brigade Frankopan approximately 600 soldiers
3. Stjepan Tomašević Brigade approximately 700 soldiers
4. Viteška Brigade approximately 1100 soldiers
5. N. Šubić Zrinski Brigade approximately 1400 soldiers
6. B. Josip Jelačić Brigade approximately 1900 soldiers
7. Jure Francetić Brigade approximately 850 soldiers
8. II. Zenička Brigade approximately 400 soldiers (in formation)
9. Kotromanić Brigade approximately 600 soldiers
10. Bobovac Brigade approximately 700 soldiers
11. 111. XP Brigade approximately 1400 soldiers
12. 110. Brigade approximately 650 soldiers

- 4. /Light transport rocket division/Ltrd AAD approximately 170 soldiers, MTD / Mixed artillery division / approximately 170 soldiers
- 4. bVP / battalion MP / approximately 300 soldiers, PPN / Unit for special purposes / Vitezovi 60 soldiers
- LOB / logistic base / approximately 150 soldiers, West OZ CB approximately 50 soldiers

---

TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 12,000 SOLDIERS THEREOF:

- **In Lašvansko-Lepenička valley approximately 7,400 soldiers**
- **Outside Lašvansko-Lepenička valley approximately 4,600 soldiers**

Ratio of forces A BiH and HVO March 1993.

NUMBER OF BRIGADES OF BH ARMY DIRECTED TOWARDS LAŠVANSKO-LEPENIČKA VALLEY

- From 3. Corps 15 Brigades with approximately 45,000 soldiers
- From 6. Corps 2 Brigades with approximately 4,000 soldiers
- From 1. Corps 2 Brigades with approximately 4,000 soldiers
- From squad for special purposes approximately 1000 soldiers

---

TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 54,000 SOLDIERS
Ratio of forces in Lašvansko-Lepenička valley 7 : 1

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

37.

AGGRESSION A BiH AGAINST HVO IN MOSTAR ON MAY 9, 1993



FACTS

Location of the A BiH military premises in Mostar after June 30, 1993

1. Military units A BiH - Bulevar, Cemica
2. Arms and Ammunition storage - M.Tito Street across the street from the "Standard" store
3. Military and Civilian Prison - IV Elementary School - M.Tito Street
4. Garage for repairment of military vehicles - Fejić Street (building in which the Secretariat for National Defense is also located)
5. Arms and Food storage of A BiH - Fejić street - "Šipad" store
6. Headquarters of A BiH - "Stari grad", behind the building of "Šipad" store
7. Military equipment storage and military uniforms production plant for A BiH -basement of the "Razvitak" department store
8. A BiH artillery grenades storage -Ivan Krndelj Square - building "Bejrut" - tunnel
9. A BiH military store equipped with lathes - Opine, behind Modna konfekcija "Zlatka Vuković", owned by To fa Sefić
10. The mentioned military workshops of A BiH were moved into premises of:
    a) Tobacco factory
    b) Lesnina
    c) Unis
11. Artillery unit of A BiH motorized brigade - IV Elementary school in M.Tito Street

11. a) The artillery unit of A BiH motorized brigade was moved to Brankovac
12. Warehouse "krmača" - explosive weapons of great destructive power - shed in North Camp
13. Warehouse "krmača" A BiH - explosive from the mentioned bombs was used for making car-bombs -Hotel Ruža
14. 1100kg of explosives A BiH, Hotel Ruža
15. Artillery unit MB A BiH - above Sanitary Bureau - War Hospital building A BiH
16. Artillery unit AM A BiH - Fejić Street

16. a) Artillery unit MB A BiH - Mladen Balorda Street
17. ZIS A BiH on the truck FAP - location Šehovine

17. a) ZIS A BiH on the truck FAP - location Orthodox cemetery
18. Artillery unit MB and BST-Šantić Street
19. Position of A BiH in Adem Buća Street - use of "bosanski lonci" by throwing them in front of the "Colorservis" shop
20. Bunker A BiH - Restaurant Petica
21. Bunker A BiH - Corner of Adem Buća Street - between "Borovo" shop and the Mosque
22. Bunker A BiH - Krpić Street - Aero club
23. Bunker A BiH - Krpić Street - Velmos building
24. Position of A BiH - Bulevar- Mikačić house
25. A BiH Soldiers- Cafe Benon - Adem Buća Street Cernica
26. A BiH Soldiers - house of Karlo Džeba - Cernica
27. Snipers- demolished buildings on Bulevar-near Health Care Centre



9
10
14
3

COMMENT:

Who is in control of the Bijela Bridge?

Who is blocking the main road?

Why? Against whom?

In order to give to all this ado an even greater significance of danger to Muslims "that are being attacked by two types of fascism: – "Ustashas and Chetniks" – HV must always follow HVO.

BH emblem BH Army emblem

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
FIRST MOSTAR BRIGADE

Command 41. mtbr
Name of the unit
Number: /handwritten/ 469-2/93
Mostar, April 19th, 1993

REPUBLIC DEFENSE
MILITARY SECRET
Strictly confidential
confidentiality level
Deliver immediately

Based on orders from Commander of Fourth Corps of the BH Army and the deteriorating situation in the region of Mostar, crossing and retraction of HVO forces as reinforcement for the units in combat operation in Jablanica against the R BH Army

I hereby command

1. Block and close the main road Mostar -Jablanica in the region Bijela and on the bridge at the entry of village Drežnice
2. At any cost stop the crossing of vehicles to and from Jablanica, especially if transporting forces of HVO and HV. At each crossing attempt respond with appropriate measures.
3. Crossing from and to Jablanica is allowed for vehicles of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and Read Cross (international).
4. Execution of this order IMMEDIATELY upon receipt. Report to me through KT connection, encrypted.

Delivered:

- 4. Battalion
- ONO
- Archive

Commander

Mr. Midhad Hujdur

/signed and stamped/

COMMENT:

Bajro Pizović, commander of BH Army brigade deployed in the area of Stolac – Dubrava Plateau prepares attack against HVO of Stolac and Čapljina.

"Secure control on direction Buna – Gubavica, control the area of Stanojevići village, control and close direction Žitomislići – Pijesci – Bivolje Brdo – Pijesci".

"Control the following directions with forces deployed in villages on direction Čapljina – Domanovići; Tasovčići – Domanovići, Počitelj – Muminovače, Ševač Polje – Bivolje Brdo".

Where are the positions of VRS?

What are the units doing in villages 20 km away from positions of VRS?

The "plan to use units of brigades for combat activities ... and a deadline to carry out the said tasks is April 19th 1993 until 12:00", when the documents should be brought to commander Bajro Pizović to be inspected and attested.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BiH
4TH CORPS
42nd Mountain Brigade
Number: 01- /handwritten: 1025/ /93
Date, 18 April 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Preparation for brigade
combat operations,
order

/handwritten: 1/1 /

Pursuant to 4th Corps Command Order Strictly Confidential no. 01-5191/93 of 17 April 1993, and in consequence of the situation that has developed, the course of events and combat operations in the 4th Corps and 42nd Mountain Brigade zone of responsibility, and in order to prevail over the situation and establish as favourable a situation as possible for units,

I HEREBY ORDER:

1. Place the Command and all units of the Brigade on full combat readiness.
2. Apart from the positions in direct contact with the aggressor already occupied in the Rotimlja sector, undertake the following:

- 1st pb /Infantry Battalion/, organise defence (facing the permanent positions) in the Rotimlja and Podgradina villages with one company at the position, one company at readiness in the Rotimlja village sector and one company resting. Organise complete combat security in the redeployment sector with a part of the personnel from the company at readiness. Organise contact with the company that is resting through their officers, so that they can be mobile and at readiness to execute combat tasks in line with the agreed plan of engagement, as soon as possible.
  Engage the other units of the battalion in line with the existing plan and as required;

- 2nd pb, with one pč /infantry company/, be in the redeployment sector at full b/g /combat readiness/ for use on my order. With one pč, establish control of the Buna-Gubavica axis using part of the personnel, and with part of the strength of this unit control the Stanojevići village area and be at readiness for b/d /combat operations/ at the Buna checkpoint. Engage the other units of the battalion as required;

- 3rd pb, with forces of one platoon strength control and close the Žitomislići-Pijesci axis, and with part of the forces control the axis bordering the Bivolje Brdo-Pijesci road. With the forces deployed in the villages on the Žapljina-Domanovići axis, control the Tasovčići-Domanovići, Počitelj-Muminovača, Ševaš Polje-Bivolje Brdo axes. Maintain permanent contact through persons assigned in the villages in order to exchange information and have personnel in the battalion records at full readiness.

- Brigade units: Command platoon, communications platoon, reconnaissance platoon, VP /Military Police/ platoon, MAD /Mixed Artillery Battalion/, POV /anti-tank platoon/, engineering platoon and logistics platoon are to operate in line with the plans of platoon and service chiefs, and on the orders of the NŠ /Chief of Staff/, assistant commanders for security and logistics.

/handwritten: /illegible//

Tasks of Brigade Command Organs

The Operations and Training Organ (ONO), coordinating with the PNŠ /Assistant Chief of Staff/ for ObP /Intelligence and Security/, the security organ, the morale and /?IPD/ /Information and Propaganda/ organ and the logistics organ, will prepare a Plan for the use of brigade units for combat activities, a Brigade Command Work Plan, a Command security plan, a unit control plan and a plan for cooperation and communications with adjacent Army units. Prepare and propose a Plan to coordinate the operations and engagement of the forces in the villages in the territory.
Draft a Communications and TKT /secret commanding of troops/ Plan, an engineering security plan, draw up a 1:50,000 scale operational map, and a unit and command training plan.

- The PNŠ for ObP will draft an Intelligence Security Plan, a Reconnaissance Platoon Engagement Plan and documentation to accompany the operational map.

- The recruitment and personal affairs organ will update the personnel files/records, fill positions where personnel is below strength, especially specialist VES /military occupational speciality/. Carry out recruitment in the municipalities of Mostar, Čapljina and Stolac.

- The organ for moral affairs, IPD and VP /information. propaganda and religious affairs will draft a Plan for informing the personnel, the members of the brigade, the inhabitants of Mostar, Čapljina and Stolac municipalities, and the Muslim soldiers in HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ units in these municipalities. When drafting the plan, exchange views and proposals with SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ municipal boards, and if necessary in agreement with other institutions of Muslim in the territory. Organise regular monitoring of radio and Sarajevo Radio News in commands and units, and if necessary organise explanations of events for the soldiers. Prevent the spread of rumours and disinformation affecting the morale of soldiers and the public, discipline, etc, and ensure that incidents and events are correctly interpreted.
Prepare the personnel morally and psychologically for the tasks before them on a daily basis in a planned and organised fashion, especially before engaging the personnel in the execution of combat tasks.

4. Undertake all necessary measures through the Command organs and the commanders to prevent alcohol being obtained and consumed, injuries and self-inflicted wounds, unauthorised activities and leaving the unit without the approval of a superior officer.

- The Security Organ will compile an Engagement Plan for the VP platoon, and propose measures for security and command and unit protection. Initiate coordination with the relevant security organs in the territory.

- The Logistics Organ will compile security plans by service, and draft an Engagement and Combat Security Plan for the logistics units. Survey the options for provisioning with food items from local sources in the event that their use is required.

5. When drafting these documents and plans, establish mutual coordination, and address the deputy commander where clarification is required.

6. The deadline for the execution of these tasks is 1200 hours on 19 April 1993, when all documents drafted are to be given to me for inspection and verification.

To:
NŠ, Assistant Commander for Morale, Snč /Medical Company/, OB /Security Organ/, Assistant Commander for Logistics, 1st pb, 2nd pb, 3rd pb.

Commander:
Bajro PIZOVIĆ
/signed and stamped/

COMMENT:

On the same day, April 19th 1993, an order on the attack of BH Army against HVO was written in Mostar. All is set and "at signal – CANCER 625 – commence the general attack on all locations and on given directions".
Signed by commander Midhad Hujdur.
On which direction they attack and who they attack, you may read in the order and see on the map, given to your disposal.

/amblem lillies/ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA/amblem of the army/

Command of the 41st motorized brigade
(unit name)

Defence of the Republic
Military secret
Strlicly confidential
(confidentiallity degree)

Number:----------

Mostar, 19 April 1993

On signal «Sicily-126» prepare the defence positions. Act in case of direct jeopardy.
Colour of the stripe: «GREEN»

Commander
Mr. Midhad Hujdur

/emblem lilies/ ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
/emblem of the army/

Command of the 41st motorized brigade
(Unit name)

Defence of the Republic
Military secret
Strictly confidential
(confidentiality degree)

Operational number
Mostar, 19th of April 1939

On signal "Cancer 625", start the general attack in all places and in given directions.
Colour of the stripe : "BLUE"

Commander
Mr. Midhat Hujdur

/emblem lilies/ ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
/emblem of the army/

Command of the 41st motorized brigade
(Unit name)

Defence of the Republic
Military secret
Strictly confidential
(confidentiality degree)

Operational number
Mostar, 19th of April 1939

On signal "Equator - 304", start the active performances, come out and take the given line according to the defence order. Start the combat actions after receiving the signal "Cancer-625".
Colour of the stripe "WHITE"

Commander
Mr. Midhat Hujdur

/RBiH coat of arms/ /ABiH coat of arms/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
FIRST MOSTAR BRIGADE
41st MOTORIZED BRIGADE

41st MOTORIZED BRIGADE COMMAND
(name of unit)
No: 470

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
(degree of confidentiality)

Mostar, 19-Apr-93

ORDER FOR THE DEFENCE, Op. No: 1
Map: 1:25, 000 Mostar 2-1, 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4

Pursuant to the Order of the Commander of the ABiH 4th Corps and due to the worsening of the general military and political situation in the territory of the Mostar Municipality, and because of the reliable information that the HVO units, supported by HV, are to attack the city of Mostar and its environs, I hereby

ORDER:

1. All units of the 41st motorized brigade, as well as elements of units from the composition of the 4th Corps, take up positions for decisive defence with the task of defending allocated regions, as follows:

1.1. 1st BAT has the task of taking up positions for the defence in the region of *Južni logor* /South Camp/, closing down the axis from the village of Rodoč towards Mostar by using anti-armoured weaponry. On creation of conditions, launch an attack at the Mostar-Buna, Mostar-Blagaj junction, take up the defence positions and close down the passage across the aviators' bridge. In future combat activities, aim to link with the Blagaj Independent COY in the region of the village of Buna. Transfer elements of troops on to the right bank of the river Neretva and place yourselves under the command of the 2nd BAT Commander.

1.2. 2nd BAT has the task of taking up positions for the defence in their zone of responsibility, the closing down of the axis from the village of Rodoč towards Mostar in the Čekrk region. Aim to take up the Čekrk- *magistrala* /main road/-Šerovac-Bulevar-Dr.S.Mujića Street-Bank (the new one)-"Vaha" coffee shop-Garrison Outpatients Clinic-Old Hospital-Dairy Plant-Centar II axis. In the rear of the reached line, block the HVO troops and neutralise them. Dispatch elements of troops from the 4th COY to the 41st motorized brigade Command in order to strengthen the defence. As a future activity, launch an attack from the wings along the Šerovac-Podhum-Balinovac and Centar II – Rudnik axes. Select elements of troops for the capturing of the Hum hill.

1.3. 3rd BAT has the task of taking up the defence positions in their zone of responsibility, closing down the axis from Vrapčići towards Mostar, in the

region of Sutin and preventing the crossing over the HE /hydro-electric plant/ "Mostar" damn, as well as totally blocking and capturing the *Sjeverni logor* /Northern Camp/ Barracks. Transfer elements of troops (approximately 30 men), with weaponry, on to the right bank and place them under the command of the 2nd BAT Commander. Dispatch the complete RBR /?Air-Defence rocket system/ "OSA" crew to the Command, with the containers, as well as the RPG /rocket grenade launcher/ crew.

1.4. "Nevesinje" BAT is placed under the command of the 3rd BAT Commander who will issue it a task and elements of troops (30 armed troops) are to be transferred onto the right bank and deployed in the *Djački Dom* /Pupil's Club/ and *Ekonomska škola* / High School of Economy/ where they will take up positions for the defence. The Commanding Officer leading the people onto the right bank is obliged to report to the Command of the 41st motorised brigade to receive more precise details about the task.

1.5. "Šargan" BAT is placed under the command of the 1st BAT Commander, who will assign it with a task.

1.6. MTD /motorized tank division/ is tasked to, from its current VP /fire positions/, open fire at targets specified by the NA /Chief of Artillery/ of the 41st motorized brigade, as well as upon the needs and requests of the brigade. 82mm mortars open fire from their VP at targets specified in the Fire Plan of the 41st motorized brigade NA, as well as per the requests of the BAT Commander.

1.7. "Blagaj" Independent COY has the task of taking up the defence positions in its zone of responsibility and, on creation of conditions /for it/, launch an attack along the Blagaj-Kosor-Buna axis and capture the bridges over the Buna river along the Mostar-Čapljina and Mostar-Domanović roads and in the decisive defence, prevent the penetration of the HVO units from the direction of Čapljina and Domanovići towards Mostar. Aim to link with the 1st BAT troops.

1.8. MUP R BiH has the task of taking up the positions and defending the *Stari Most* /Old Bridge/ and the newly built bridge on Musala. With elements of forces, launch an attack at the MUP HZ HB premises and the Mostar Police Station, capture them and defend them fiercely. Aim to keep the *Hirurgija* /Surgery/ building in our zone. Troops to be used in the attack on the MUP building and the Mostar Police Station are to be on standby in the "Mostar" Hotel.

1.9. Recce Pl has the task of capturing the *Elektro-Herzegovina* premises. On capturing them, they must be defended decisively and the electricity is to be cut off as per the requests of the brigade.

1.10. Sabotage Pl has the task of attacking the Žitopromet premises, capturing them and defending them decisively. Carry out a sabotage action at the crossing from the *Sjeverni logor* /North Camp/ across the Neretva river.

1.11. Military Police COY has the task to defend KM /Command Post/ of the brigade with a reinforced manpower. Elements of forces are to be utilised as per an agreement with the 2nd BAT Commander for the defence in the region of Šenovac as well as for the control and the check up of the area in the zone of responsibility of the 2nd BAT.

1.12. The weaponry of the POČ /anti-armoured COY/ is attached to the 1st and 2nd

BAT for the closure of the axis (one BsT /recoilless gun/ with crew each).
1 POLO "Crvena Strijela" /?anti-tank wire-guided weapons system/ is attached to the 3rd BAT. Position the malyutka /sagger anti-tank missile/ in the most favourable region for sending fire into B. Brijeg settlement.
1.13. The weaponry of the PAM /?anti-aircraft machine gun/ Platoon is attached to the 1st and 3rd BAT and receives tasks from the BAT Commander.
1.14. Other units take up positions for the defence in the region of deployment and are on standby to be used on the order of the 41st motorized brigade Commander.
2. Be on standby for the defence by 17:00 hrs on 19th April 1993 by when the transfer of men and ordnance from one bank of the Neretva river onto the other should have been completed.
3. Maintain regular b/g /combat readiness/ at the line of the defence against the Četniks.
4. Manpower attached to other units, on arrival to the same, will be given tasks and will remain in them until further notice. Troop rotation will be scheduled by the Commanders under whose command the men have been placed.
5. Use the radio communication during the taking up of the defence positions and the execution of combat activities only by using the communications documents. Send coded messages.
6. Movement of units should be covert during the taking up of the positions and on the taking up of the same, reduce it to the minimum.
7. In case the enemy approaches, stop him and open fire as the need arises from all weaponry on disposal simultaneously. Pay close attention to expenditure of ammunition and do not waste it.
8. Reports from the BATs and other units are to be send every two hours, with an emphasis on the changes in the enemy disposition.

COMMANDER
Mr. Midhad HUJDUR
/affixed by stamp/
/signature/

MD/FI

Submitted to:
- 1st, 2nd, 3rd BATs
- "Nevesinje" BAT
- "Šargan" BAT
- "Blagaj" Independent COY
- MTD
- MUP R BiH
- Recce Pl
- Sabotage Pl
- MP COY
- Anti-armoured COY
- PAM Pl
- 4th Corps Command
- Archives

COMMENT:

As soon as general Bo Pellnas left Mostar, convinced that he achieved something, Arif Pašalić and company from BH Army continue with their plans.

It has all been planned much earlier on higher political and military levels and it cannot be stopped.

Item 3.

I indeed ask for your patience and attention while reading this document.

Hence, "at the meeting held on April 17th 1993 at 22:00, the following is orally stated (ordered):
- DO NOT START ACTIVITIES WITHOUT AN ORDER

- LINK-UP WITH OUR MEN IN HVO WAS CARRIED OUT!!!"

What does it say here and what does that mean?

Muslims from BH Army linked-up with Muslim members of HVO, planning to attack Croats and HVO.

Everywhere in the world, in every army and at any given time, this was TREASON and HIGH TREASON.

COURT-MARTIAL JUDGMENT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SHORT – DEATH, BY

a) SHOOTING

b) HANGING

Depending on the tradition of the sentence.

Further on in the text, after they enumerate what must be taken and blocked behind HVO's back, in the background, Arif Pašalić writes:

"Taking of the town of Stolac with our men in HVO".

What about people in HVO that aren't "ours", aren't Muslims?

They should be either captured or killed because the plan cannot be implemented differently.

Documents that follow will present further development of the story.

Yes, and:

"MB-60 and MB-82 were set for activities against HVO".

I request that some president of RH gives his urgent apology to the Muslims, on behalf of Croats, of course.

Please, by the way, let him apologize to the Serbs as well, because we must have done something wrong to them too, nonetheless we did not surrender just like that and we did not move like livestock to be slaughtered, which was rather expected from Croats.
Everything else is either nationalism or Ustasha ideology.

FUCK YOU COMRADES!

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ARMY (further in text BH Army)
Command of 4th corps
Strictly confidential, number /handwritten/ 05-3573-93
Mostar, 02.05.1993.

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
Strictly confidential

ŠVK OS of the REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Management for operative and strategic planning and instruction of the OS (Armed forces)

Report on situation and events within the 42. b.br., to be submitted

Pursuant to your act number strictly confidential number 02/369-1 dated 29 April 1993, we submit the 42 b.br. (Mountain brigade) situation analysis before and after the HV (Croatian Army) and HVO (Croatian Defence Council) intruding in sector Gubavica.

1. The 42 b.br. units were located in sector x 4782 – 4786, y 6496 – 6492, chart 1.100 000 meter, edition 1986. the 42 b.br. command was partially in the village Gubavica, and partially in the village Rotimlje. The brigade was made of men from the area of Gubavica, Pijesci, Stanojevići, Rotimlje, Hodovo, Bivolje brdo, Domanovići, Počitelj and of slight number from the city area Stolac. Men, who weren't present at the first defence line, were placed in their houses.

2. On 12 April 1993, pursuant to inspection of the 4th corps command, during regular circulation of the 42 b.br., an Order number 01-2922/93 was issued, in order to remove the spotted failures and weaknesses. The Order, among others, contained instructions for splitting apart the command of the brigade and the command of the battalion, physical security of the both commands, improvement of work and units and commands control, information relation, coordination and exchange, all in aim to strengthen the subordination, order and discipline.

3. According to the report of the 42. b.br. command dated 17 April 1993, directed to the 4th corps command, after the received ultimatum by the 1. brigade of the HVO "Knez Domagoj" to leave the village Gubavica commands and units, the necessary measures have been taken in order to confront fiercely, in case of HVO attack. In Order, issued to the battalion commanders and narrow part of the 42 b.br., at the meeting held on 17 April 1993 at 2200 hours, the commander of the 42 b.br. orally stated the following:
   a. do not act without an Order
   b. connection with our men in the HVO has been done
   c. with minor forces occupied are:
   d. bridge in Žitomislići
   e. two dominant points that dominate Buna
   f. positions towards Domanovići
   g. positions towards village Stanojevići
   h. Hodbina is under control
   i. the most of forces is in stand-by, resting from the task
   j. to close the bridge in Žitomislići
   k. to take the point and the bridge on Buna with one part of Blagaj forces
   l. to take Domanovići
   m. men from HVO Čapljina has got the task to take Tasovčići and the bridge in Čapljina with aim not to allow the forces gathering from direction Metković
   n. villages are maximally safe and connected through the courirer connection
   o. taking the town Stolac with our men in the HVO
   p. taking points and the villages Prenj, Nakovanj and Aladinići
   q. bridge control on route Bregava in the village Prenj and prevention of introducing HVO forces from direction Kruševo – Prenj and Svitava – Prenj.

r. to close the route towards villages Drinovac and Kruševo
s. Mortars 60 and 82 are set to act against HVO
t. Given targets at the right bank of Neretva to the launcher
u. PO materials are in stand-by

4. On 19 April 1993,an attack on the parts of the 42 b.br. has been conducted, that you were informed about through the operative report dated 19 April 1993, the report of the Int5elligence organ dated 24 April 1993 as well as through the Security Sector report dated 29 April 1993.
5. On 26 April 1993, an Order has been issued by the commander of the 4th corps, number 01-3427/93 with aim to connect and consolidate the 42 b.br. units and to secure the conditions for RiK. By this act, the VD – commander of the 42 b.br. and the commanders of the battalion, as well as their members, were appointed.
6. Since the responsible men from the 42 b.br. command are in captivity, we are not able at this moment to answer the first and second question of your memo. Related to this fact, we inform you that the activities regarding the question of captured persons are current.

After the collection of all relevant facts, we shall submit to you the complete report.

Commander of the 4th corps
Arif Pašalić/signed and stamped/

MAP 1.


Angažirane snage Armije RBiH u napadu na Mostar (engaged AR BiH forces in Mostar's attack):
1. Prvi bataljon
2. Bataljon „Šargan“
3. Drugi bataljon
4. Snage MUP-a BiH
5. Četa Vojne policije
6. Izviđački vod
7. Treći bataljon
8. Bataljon „Nevesinje“
9. Diverzantski vod
10. Četa „Blagaj“
HVO objekti /HVO Objects
I Odjel obrane – Glavni stožer HVO (Defense Dep. – HVO Main Staff)
II Operativna zona JIH (Military district South-East Herzegovina)
III Vojarna Heliodrom HVO
IV Strojarski fakultet – VP (Military police HVO – Mechanical Faculty)
V Druga brigada HVO – Sjeverni logor (Second brigade HVO – North barrack)
1. Buna
2. Blagaj
3. Rodoč
4. Čekrk
5. Magistrala
6. Šemovac
7. Ulica dr. Safeta Mujića
8. Banka Nova (New bank)
9. Cafe „Vaha“
10. Stara bolnica (Old Hospital)
11. Centar II
12. Podhum
13. Balinovac
14. Rudnik
15. Hum
3. Drugi bataljon
4. Snage MUP-a BiH
5. Četa Vojne plicije
6. Izviđački vod
7. Treći bataljon
8. Bataljon „Nevesinje”
9. Diverzantski vod



Dio objekata rekviriranih / mobiliziranih od strane A BiH
(Few objects mobilized / requisitioned by AR BiH):

a) Cafe Index
b) Vranica
c) Hercegovina – auto-putevi
d) Asfaltna baza „Bišće polje“ (asphalt base)
e) Interšped
f) TP „Merkur“ Ulica Alekse Šantića
g) Boutique „Razvitak“ Splitska ulica 17
h) Uprava „Hidroelektrane na Neretvi“ Ulica Alekse Šantića 106 a
i) Restaurant „Jagnje“
j) Restaurant „Petica“
k) Privredna banka Sarajevo – PJ (branch) Mostar
l) Zgrada općine (Municipal Hall)
m) Željeznički kolodvor (Railway station)
n) Hercegovina auto
o) Fabrika duhana
p) Velmos – skladišta (warehouses)
q) SDK
r) Vinarija (wine production plant)
s) Zgrada Komiteta (former Communist party headquarter)

MAP 1.

MAP 1.

MAP 2.

Location and positions of HVO which were on June 30, 1993 and later in July of that same year attacked by the units of A BiH and HVO soldiers (Muslim-Bosniaks) - classic act of betrayal

MAP 2.


LEGEND:
Places with extreme population
Possible places of gathering of armed extremists and number
Headquarters of MUP /Ministry of internal affairs/
Alternate checkpoint of VP / Military Police/
Checkpoint of VP / Military Police/
Control pass checkpoints of VP /Military Police/
Control pass checkpoint
Checkpoint of MUP /Ministry of internal affairs/
Alternate control pass checkpoint of VP/Military Police/
Patrol of VP/ Military Police/
Minor conflicts

MAP 3.


4D00035 - Order by Bajro Pizovic, Army RBiH,4th corps, 42nd Mountain Brigade,18 April 1993, no: 01-1025/93
4D00036 - Report about conditions and events in 42nd mountain-brigade, Mostar, 02 May 1993., no: 01-3573-93, signed by Arif Pasalic
PLAN ZA ZAJEDNICKO DJELOVANJE 42.bbr ABiH I MUSLIMANA U HVO (JOINT ACTIVITY OF 42. bbr ABH AND MOSLEMS IN HVO)- 18/04/1993
Legenda (explanation)
VRS - crveno (red)
HVO - plavo (blue)
ABH - zeleno (green)
MHVO –muslimani u HVO (Moslems in HVO) - zeleno/plavo (green/blue)
MHVO
METKOVIC
OPUZEN
YH

MAP 3.


2. pb
1. pb
42.bbr ABH
3. pb
MHVO
MHVO
NERETVA
DERANSKO JEZERO
SVITAVSKO BLATO

COMMENT:

BH Army and units of the 4th Corps attacked HVO troops on May 9th 1993 in Mostar, after long preparations.

Several days before, some sort of psychological demarcation line was agreed (Bo Pellnas) in order to prevent incident turning into a conflict of the armies. The line Bulevar – along Šantićeva street and Carinski Bridge.

Deep on the west side in "Vranica" building, the command of the 4th Corps as well as the command of the 41st motorized BH Army brigade and RADIO MOSTAR – Arif's radio and his propaganda, remained there and worked without being disturbed.

It is all accurately and truly recorded by Mr. Hadžiosmanović (Religion: Muslim, the member of SDA).

Dr. Ismet Hadžiosmanović: Bosniak-Croatian political reckoning /orig. title: Bošnjačko-hrvatski politički obračun/, Mostar 2006

Chapter XIV. 1. The war in Mostar

It started on 9th of May 1993 in the early morning hours, as around 5 o'clock one started a severe shooting and detonations from heavy artillery. By this act, all illusions that the war in Mostar will not happen, were dispersed. That morning, the war entered Mostar by the front door.

All appeals, political agreements, warnings and international accusations became history and that history shall verify general share of some politicians – those who were pro war and those who truly worked hard for a democratic solution of the Croatian-Muslim political relation in BH.

I was the eyewitness of that war in Mostar. From the spot where my apartment is located, in settlement Centre II, I could clearly see heavy machine guns of HVO firing from the locality of Hum hill towards the locality of Šemovac, Bulevar, around health care centre and than towards the gymnasium building where units of the 4th corps cross Bulevar in infantry assault and enter small alleys towards the locality of Liska street. The most intense infantry attacks of the 4th corps combatants were Musala – new pontoon bridge – former street Korzo, as well there were some smaller attacks from Cernica Street, across Bulevar, towards the health care centre and vicinal gardens. In those moments of the 4th corps combatants infantry attack, heavy machine guns of HVO fired towards Bulevar and buildings located by the road itself. Other part of heavy machine guns fired towards localities of Vranica building in S. Radića Street, where the command of the 4th corps was situated. Heavy artillery weapon of HVO severely fired towards the temporary establishments of the BH Army between 8 and 9 o'clock, the building of the hygienic institute, SDK and Konak. Artillery fire towards those localities alternated in waves. At the same time, one could hear artillery explosions on localities of B. Brijeg towards Cim and Rudnik. That was coming from the left bank and one was hitting targets which were marked by previous orders of the 1st Mostar brigade commander, dated 20th of April 1993.

Already around 11 o'clock one could hear a concentrated infantry fire on the following localities: Mujaga Komadina houses, part of the former Lenin's Boulevard street, Liska park and Rondo. Later on, one could see that those were camouflaged infantry breakthroughs of the 4th corps. They were even roughly kept on that broader locality. Heavy machine guns kept concentrating its fire to the Vranica building. One was shooting, using the incendiary ammunition, and afterwards, a fire occurred in several apartments, where clouds of smoke could be seen clearly. In that locality, artillery fire continued throughout the night and the day after, in the early morning hours. At that moment, the units of HVO took this building by infantry and entered the headquarters of the 4th corps.

* * *

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL
OPERATIVE ZONE JIH
Strictly confidential, number: 03-0401
Mostar, 8 May 1993
/handwritten 1877/

-CODED-

Report at 0800 hrs

1. On the battlefield of OZ JIH, the night of 7/8 May 1993 was relatively calm. 3 MB 82 mm mines fell to Vranjevići around midnight. The enemy directed 3 MB 120 mm mines from Dobro Dublje to the area of Lišani. Vranjevići and Rotimlje suffered activities from PZS and PZT. On the battlefield of Konjic, the Muslim forces keep attacking the Croatian villages by all disposable weapons. Foreign mercenaries participate in attacks as well. Three of our combatants have been massacred (cut ears, fingers and muscles) the civilians have been arrested.
2. Our forces protect own lives as well as the civil population by infantry weapon.
3. In the area of Konjic we have got one killed, four wounded soldiers and three civilians.

Delivered to:
-GS HVO
-ONO (Files)

Commander
Brigadier
Miljenko Lasić

/stamp of receipt/
GS HVO
681
8 May 1993, at 0820 hrs
/signed/

OZ JIH Mostar
Operational number: 03-0403
Mostar, 9 May 1993

Report at 2000 hrs

1. The chronology of events:
   - at 1420 hrs, Mario Matić, combatant from 1st battalion, 2nd HVO brigade got killed while running across on Rondo.
   - At 1440 hrs we were informed that the Lillies are attacking prison (Ćelovina)
   - At 1445 hrs Primorac was ordered to hit the "Partizan" cinema and Ričina Street (former Šantićeva street).
   - Pero Marijanović from military police got slightly wounded.
   - Marinko Knezović from 3rd battalion of the 2nd HVO brigade got slightly wounded in Drežnica.
   - Commander of the 2nd HVO brigade asked for BOV and transport vehicle. He reports that Jasenjani are cleansed, whereby the manpower from Ravni switches to Jasenjani.
   - Rudolf Jaranić and Himzo Nazdrajić from the police management by Vranica, got wounded. Mensudin Boškailo from the police management got wounded.
   - Željko Prskalo from HVO got heavily wounded.
   - Dragan Džidić got slightly wounded.
   - It has been demanded to fire on Brankovac and the area around the Old Bridge. A reinforcement for Drežnica has been demanded, counting two groups of 20 men, transport vehicle and PAM 14,5 mm. Barrage fire for the area around hotel "Ruža" has been requested.
   - Dragan Marić from 3rd battalion got killed.
   - Dražen Buhovac got heavily wounded.
   - Dražen Komadina got slightly wounded.
   - Ivan Babić got killed.
   - Around 1700 hrs we managed to repulse an attempt of the BH Army to climb the hill Hum.
   - Marin Vidović got slightly wounded.
   - Robert Miljko succumbed to wounds.

General situation in Mostar is very difficult and the fights are still going on. HVO shall try to fortify position on Boulevard. According to Chief of In.Sl. OZ JIH report, the situation in HVO is the following:

- killed combatants	6 defenders
- wounded combatants	17, 5 of them heavily
- civilians	1 killed and 4 wounded

2. As far as the line towards the Chetnicks is concerned, the situation is the following:
   - at 1215 hrs, three grenades fell to Ravnice (Podveležje)
   - at 0830 hrs one MB mine to Ošanići (Stolac)
   - around 1630 till 1700 hrs, 7 MB mines fell to Kute (B. Polje)

3. Bokševica in Konjic is attacked from all sides. They seek for cannon fire, help in manpower and ammunition.

Delivered to:
- GS HZ HB Mostar
- Grude, fax 662 384
- OZ JIH (Files)

Commander
Brigadier
Miljenko Lasić

/stamp of receipt/
GS HVO MO
2597
9 May 1993, at 2015 hrs
signed Miljko

Considering current situation in Mostar, Executive Committee of the SDA Mostar and Muslim democratic party Mostar, at the joint emergancy meeting held on June.30th.1993 in Mostar, are issuing a following

ANNOUNCMENT

1. *Regarding the ARBiH attack AT the HVO units in Mostar, which was announced yeasterday, on June 29th.1993, at the 4th Corps of ARBiH Command press conference, uncovers all dirty political games by which Muslim people are to be brought inside some new Jugoslavija or Great Srbija.*
   Muslim people and its politics, at the BiH territory, shall never accept political solution exacted by force, by suffering and loss of life of innocent ones among the Muslim and Croatian people.

2. *At the moment when leadership of SDA Mostar and Muslim democratic party Mostar in coperation with leadership of HZ H-B, HVO Main Headquarters, HDZ County Comettee Mostar as well as the representatives of the international institutions are undertaking particular activities to end the hostilities, creating conditions for communication between two sides in town, delivering humanitarian help, electric power and water, it comes to new confrontation, new casualties and destruction of the city by which Muslim and Croatian people at Mostar are brought to the state of hopelesness.*

3. *We are asking of Muslims in Mostar to recognize on their own those who are leaders of confrotations and divisions between Muslim and Croatian people and are turning Mostar in to Beirut, and are artificially dividing, not only the city itself, but also muslim people among themselves, and we are asking that you take your own stand towards those.*

   In such conditions, political scene should be entered by people who are prepared to peacefully resolve all issues in Mostar.

Number 883/93
Mostar June.30th.1993.

Democratic Action Party (SDA)
Dr. Ismet Hadziosmanovic
"Signed"
Muslim Democratic Party Mostar
Dr. Muhamed Alic
"Signed"

"Round Seal" *"Round Seal"*

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
GOVERNMENT / VLADA
PRIME MINISTER / PREDSJEDNIK

11 May 1993

H.E. Mr. Yuliy Vorontsov
President of the Security Council
United Nations
NEW YORK

Excellency:

While I remain deeply disturbed by the recent developments in Mostar and while my offices are taking all possible measures to halt the grossly irresponsible acts of all parties and to prevent similar incidents from spreading elsewhere, I must address Your Excelency with respect to the Presidential Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/25746) adopted by the Security Council in connection with the conflict in Mostar.

Memebers of the Presidency and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, meeting in Citluk on 11 May 1993, have found it necessary to bring to the attention of the Security Council and the public, certain inexplicable errors in and omissions from the aforementioned Presidential Statement.

The Statement's description of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) as "Bosnian Croat paramilitary units" misconstrues the role of HVO. HVO is a legitimate army, recognised by the Government and the Presidency, which for a long period of time constituted the only regular defence force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. HVO's tie to the Government in Zagreb is exaggerated. No one denies that this relationship became necessary, as the last option, only when the Government and the Presidency in Sarajevo were reluctant and noncooperative in joining Bosnian Croat members of the Governemt in taking necessary measures to protect the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina from obvious threats of war from Serbia and Montenegro.

The Statement condemns the alleged Bosnian Croat offensive against Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica. UNPROFOR forces can easily enter Jablanica and Drezmica to confirm that no conflicts whatsoever are occurring there. UNPROFOR's access to these towns is possible, in contrast to Konjic and 18 other Croat villages in that region, in which the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABH) has forbidden access to media and all international personnel, for over a month. This, I fear, is done in an apparent cover-up of crimes committed against the Bosnian Croat population there.

With respect to the tragic situation in Konjic Countey, I humbly request that the Security Council take all necessary steps to end the blockade of Konjic to UNPROFOR and all other parties, with all due urgency.

The Statement erroneously describes the signatories to the cease-fire as the "Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and the "Bosnian Croat party".

The president of the Government (Prime Minister) of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, four current ministers in that Government, the deputy and assistant to the Minister for Forgein Affairs, as well as three members of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, meeting in Citluk, vigorously object to the Council's use of the term "Government of Bosnia and Herzeovina" when referring solely to the Muslim part of that government. This objection has been previously noted in my letter to the Secretary Geneneral and the President of the Security Council dated 19th of February 1993, (S/25320).

We, as Bosnian Croat members of the Government and the Presidency, dispute the legality of the extreme members of the Muslim part of the Government in Sarajevo treating the institutions of government, including the right to represent and use official titles of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the right to name ambassadors of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an exclusive domain.

We also humbly remind the Council that the "Bosnian Croat party" does not exist. The Bosnian Croats articulated their political desires in electing representatives of the Croatian Democartic Union (HDZ) during democratic elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991. This party continues to receive a clear mandate to express the political views of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina with greater support than ever before.

Mr. Mate Boban, leader of Bosnian Croats, is a member of the Republic's Parliament, as well as the legally elected president of HDZ of Bosnia and Hezegovina. He is currently serving his electorate as president of the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia.

The Statement is indeterminate in its charge that the actions of the Bosnian Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been in keeping with their signature to the Peace Plan for the Republic of Bosnia and Hezegovina. In the course of negotiations and since executing the Peace Plan the Bosnian Croat side has shown a high degree of cooperation and willingness to carry out provisions of the Plan as soon as possible. Ample evidence exists however, which suggests that the conflict in Mostar resulted precisely because extreme members of the Muslim population do not wish to have anything to do with the Peace Plan and its implementation.

The aforementioned errors contained in the Statement may be a result of limited information. However, such errors and charges are not in keeping with the noble principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

We sincerely hope that these errors will be corrected in due time. The Bosnian Croats, one of the three constituent peoples of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through its legal representatives, continue to seek cooperation with all international factors, and especially with the United Nations, in a most constructive manner, in order to promote peace in and assure the establishment of sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Further, we sincerely hope that the Council will consider the situation in Konjic Country, with all due urgency, as it rightfully did regarding the situation in Mostar.

Excellency, I regret having to be so blunt in light of the immense suffering of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Muslims and in respecting the immense integrity of the Council's decisions. I am nevertheless compelled as Prime Minister to bring the foregoing facts to your attention.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Mile Akmadzic
Prime Minister of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

cc: Co-Chairman of the ICFY

To the General Secretary of the UN /United Nations/
To the Chairman of the Security Council of the UN
To Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

Dear Sirs,

This is to inform you that the Muslim forces of the Army of BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ conducted an armed attack on the town of Mostar and the surrounding area. The attack commenced on 30 June 1993 and is still ongoing, with all available weaponry and equipment being used, and over 4,000 soldiers participating.

In the said aggression on Croatian people and a province predominantly populated by Croats, a large number of people have already been killed or wounded, and more Croats have been expelled from their homes.

After a similar aggression in Central Bosnia, this is yet another attempt by the Muslim army to use military force to seize control of provinces considered predominantly Croatian, according to the Vance-Owen plan.

The objective of this aggression is to impede implementation of the already existing peace agreements, prevent further development of the peace process, and postpone talks on the future political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In its essence, this is a battle for territories in which results of ethnic cleansing could be considered fait accompli at future peace negotiations.

We, representatives of Croatian people in state organs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereby express our commitment to finding a peaceful solution to all conflicts, and our support for a sovereign and independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which all three constituent nations will have equal rights and decide on the internal structure of their state through negotiations.

We ask that you review the current situation and take all necessary measures to prevent further aggression on Croatian people and its territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that the peace negotiations under your auspices could continue.

Mostar, 1 July 1993

Prime Minister
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mile AKMADŽIĆ
/signed/

38.

THREE DOCUMENTS WHICH TESTIFY THAT ALIJA IZETBEGOVIĆ IS AN UNPRECEDENTED LIAR AND A MAN WITHOUT HONOR



FACTS

COMMENT:

"A secret agreement on the confederation" was signed in Geneva on September 14th 1993, between Dr. Franjo Tuđman and Alija Izetbegović. It says what it says there and it is all well written in that agreement.

However, it is necessary to read the next document as well.

ICFY/ International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia/:
Secret agreement on the confederation of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman and the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović
(Geneva, 14 September 1993)*

Secret agreement on the confederation

"Starting from the results of the Peace Conference on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its constitution as Union of the Republics, as well as the general regional and international fluctuations and historical interests of the Croatian and Muslim people in the area of the South-East Europe, the Presidents Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegović are in accordance that:

the relations between the Bosniak-Muslim Republic and the Croatian Republic within the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina develop in all areas in order to create a joint state that shall enter the co federal relation with the Republic of Croatia at the same time.

In light of this aim the both Presidents shall enable an urgent and integral implementation of all regulations from the Joint declaration unable to be postponed, signed on 14 September in Geneva.

The both Presidents are in accordance to maintain the ongoing consultations regarding the development of the regional and international opportunities in light of the emphasized readiness to establish the joint state of Croats and Muslims within the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its contemporary entrance into the co federal relation with the Republic of Croatia.

The both Presidents are in accordance to start the adequate political and diplomatic activity in order to question the international circumstances and support this joint initiative.

The both Presidents are in accordance to found a permanent working group in order to create political, legal and other institutional assumptions for the concretization of this initiative."

(Signatures of the President Tudjman, President Izetbegović and their associates)

*Source: *Večernji list*, January 30, 1994

COMMENT:

Two days later the same Izetbegović in that same Geneva on September 16th 1993, in the same year and month, prepares a completely different story with Serbs and Momčilo Krajišnik.

a) Cease with all hostilities between BH Army and VRS "IN ACCORDANCE with agreement from July 30th 1993".
   Hence, you have, my dear gentlemen, already on July 30th agreed to refrain from carrying out an attack – so that the Army can easily go against HVO.
b) What is with the territory under control of HVO; you already share the Neretva Valley and who cares about the Croats.
   You, my BH Army gentlemen, have already counted on the victory against HVO.
   A BIT TOO EARLY!
c) You divide BiH, talk about a Union, anticipate a referendum, whereas the Muslim state, when it all goes to hell, would keep all international rights of the BiH, for example a membership in the UN.

Now, you can go on with feasts (symposiums) and discuss the topic who and how divided BiH, continue with blabbering, monkey business, stammering and sell your damned ideas around.

So many deceptions, political lies and quick-buck schemes in this BOSNIAN stew.

Please, produce one single deception and lie from the Croatian side!

ICFY /International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia/:
Joint Serbian-Muslim Declaration of
Alija Izetbegović and Momčilo Krajišnik
(Geneva, 16 September 1993)*

Joint Serbian-Muslim Declaration

Adopting the principles of the London Conference and taking into consideration the solutions proposed at the Geneva Peace Conference for the constitutional order of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, determined to put an instant end to hostilities and to create conditions for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and convinced that the crisis must be resolved by political and not military means, we are prepared for an immediate normalisation of relations with the Croatian people in light of the solution proposed at the Peace Conference in Geneva, we have agreed to the following:

I

1. Ensure an instant end to all hostilities and military conflicts between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army in accordance with the agreement of 30 July 1993, immediately if possible and no later than by 1200 hrs on 18 September, and ensure the establishment of direct communications (hotline) between the military commanders at all levels.

2. Ensure the bilateral and unconditional closure of all prisoner-of-war camps and the release of all prisoners in territories under the control of the Army of BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ and of the Bosnian Serbs, and immediately, starting from the release of the prisoners in Tarčin camp (207 prisoners) and Kula (207) prisoners. This ought to be done no later than by 1200 hrs on 21 September, on the proviso that both sides take full responsibility for the protection and care of the prisoners.

3. Create conditions on both sides for an unhindered and safe passage of humanitarian convoys and for the activities of humanitarian organisations, and for the safe and unhindered movement of all civilians.

4. Form working groups for the supervision and insurance of human rights in the territories under the control of the Army of BiH and the Bosnian Serb army, in accordance with the principles and solutions proposed at the Peace Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. Form a working group for unresolved issues pertaining to territorial demarcation between the two republics in the imaginary Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the territories of Brčko, Bosnian Krajina, the Neretva valley, eastern Bosnia and Mt Ozren, and taking into consideration the natural right of access to the sea of these two republics. This is added to the already undertaken obligations to seek a permanent solution for administration of the territory of Sarajevo in the next two years. After finding a mutually acceptable solution to the territorial demarcation of the three republics making up the Union, and in the first two years of the existence of the Union, a referendum must be prepared and held. All three sides must agree to the date of its holding and the question posed to the citizens of each of the republics will be whether they agree to remain in the Union or want to leave it.

In the event of a break-up of the Union, all the rights of the Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including membership in the United Nations, shall automatically be transferred to the republic with a majority Muslim population.

II

In order to create stable relations and as a joint contribution to peace in the region, the signatories decided to form the following:

1. A working group which will deal with the humanitarian status and material and financial issues related to refugees and displaced persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. A working group for drafting agreements, including agreements on the use of energy, harbours, arterial roads, communications and other economic potential.

III

With a view to a speedy, comprehensive and authentic implementation of al the measures and activities envisaged by this Joint Declaration, the signatories decided to appoint commissioners with full powers and responsibility for the implementation of the agreements envisaged by this Declaration. Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ has appointed Haris SILAJDŽIĆ as his commissioner and Radovan KARADŽIĆ has appointed Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK as his commissioner. The signatories and the commissioners shall request and shall be ensured assistance and cooperation with international political, humanitarian and other organisations and factors, and all with the aim of a comprehensive implementation of all measures envisaged by this Declaration and in the interest of lasting peace and stability in that part of the world.

Finally, an agreement was reached for the co-chairmen of the International Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to invite the three sides in BiH to a meeting to be held at the Sarajevo airport at 1100 hours on 21 September, which will review the signing of a peace package as a whole, and which will, among other things, contain this Joint Declaration and the Joint Declaration the Croats and Muslims signed on 14 September. The co-chairmen will meanwhile tour the sides in the former Yugoslavia in an endeavour to reach further agreements.

(The Declaration was signed in Geneva on 16 September 1993 by Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and Momčilo KRAJIŠNIK instead of Radovan KARADŽIĆ. Thorvald STOLTENBERG and David OWEN signed as witnesses. The signatures of Slobodan MILOŠEVIĆ and Momir BULATOVIĆ are not on this Document. A facsimile of the signatures was published in *Večernji List*.)

*Source: *Večernji list*, September 17, 1993

JOINT DECLARATION

Momir Bulatovic, Alija Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic and Slobodan Milosevic

Accepting the principles of the London Conference and taking into account the solutions proposed by the Geneva Peace Conference on the constitutional arrangement of the future Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Determined to immediately arrive at the cessation of hostilities and to create the conditions for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Convinced that the solution of this crisis has to be found through political, not military, means

Prepared to immediately approach the normalization of relations with the Croatian people in the light of the solutions proposed by the Peace Conference in Geneva

Have hereby agreed to:

I

1. Provide for the prompt cessation of all hostilities and military conflicts between the units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army in accordance with the Agreement of July 30, 1993, immediately and by no later than September 18, 1993 at 12.00 hours, and establish direct communications (hot lines) between military commanders at all levels.

2. Provide for the bilateral and unconditional disbanding of all detainee camps and for the release of detainees in territories under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army immediately, commencing with the release of those detained in Tarcin (207 detainees) and Kula (207 detainees), and by no later than September 21, 1993, at 12.00 hours, and bilaterally assume the responsibility for their protection and care.

3. Create bilaterally the conditions for free and unhindered passage of all relief convoys and activities of humanitarian organisations, and the free and unhindered movement of all civilians.

4. Form a working group for the supervision and safeguarding of human rights in territories under the control of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Army in accordance with the principles and proposed solutions of the Peace Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. Form a working group for outstanding matters related to the territorial delimitation between the two Republics in the envisaged Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the areas of Brcko, Bosanska Krajina, the Neretva Valley, Eastern Bosnia and the Ozren mountain, including the natural right of the two Republics to access to the sea. This is in addition to the commitment already made to find a permanent solution to the governance of the Sarajevo District within two years. After reaching a mutually acceptable resolution to the territorial delimitation of the three republics within the Union, and during the initial two year period of the Union's existence, there shall be a provision for a referendum to be held on a mutually agreed date within the Republics of the Union on the question of whether citizens of any particular republic agree to remain in the Union or to leave the Union.

In the case of a dissolution of the Union, all the rights of the Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including membership of the United Nations, shall be automatically vested in the Republic with a predominantly Muslim majority.

III

For the sake of a prompt, comprehensive and credible implementation of all the measures and activities envisaged in this Joint Declaration, the signatories have decided to appoint trustees having full authority and responsibility for the complete implementation of the accords envisaged in this Declaration.

Alija Izetbegovic has appointed as his trustee Haris Silajdzic.

Radovan Karadzic has appointed as his trustee Momcilo Krajisnik.

The signatories and the trustees will seek and secure the assistance and cooperation of international political, humanitarian and other organisations and factors for the sake of the comprehensive implementation of all measures envisaged in this Declaration, and in the interest of establishment of permanent peace and stability in this part of the world.

To this end, it is agreed that the three Bosnian parties will be invited by the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to meet on Tuesday 21 September at 11am at Sarajevo Airport to consider signing the peace package as a whole with this Joint Declaration and the Joint Declaration signed on Tuesday 14 September by the Croats and the Muslims annexed to the Peace Package. The Co-Chairmen will, in the intervening days, seek further agreement by shuttling among the parties in the former Yugoslavia.

Momir Bulatovic

Alija Izetbegovic

Radovan Karadzic

Slobodan Milosevic

Witnessed by

Thorvald Stoltenberg

David Owen

39.

A BiH PLAN FOR THE OCCUPATION OF THE CENTRAL BOSNIA AND BREAKING INTO NEUM AND PLOČE



FACTS



SPRING-AUTUMN 1993

Attacks by A BiH on Mostar and the valley of the Neretva river/ Offensive of A BiH against HVO - "Neretva 93"



Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina Summer – Autumn 1992

Legend:

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
- Directions of operation
- HVO defence (Croatian Defense Council)

Situation: November 2nd 1992

Legend:

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
- HVO defence lines (Croatian Defense Council)

Situation: November 2nd 1992

Legend:

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
- Directions of Croatian exodus
- Directions of Muslim exodus



Review of the HVO operational zones December 1992

Legend:

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- ABiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
- Lines of HVO operative zones

O.Z. - Operational / Operative Zone

Organization and deployment 3rd Corps A BiH December, 1992



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Structure and arrangement

OPERATIONAL ZONE CENTRAL BOSNIA

April 1993



OPERATIONAL ZONE CENTRAL BOSNIA STRENGTH IN NUMBERS
1. „Travnička“ Brigade app. 800 soldiers
2. „Frankopan“ Brigade app. 600 soldiers
3. „Stjepan Tomašević“ Brigade app. 700 soldiers
4. „Viteška“ Brigade app 1100 soldiers
5. „N.š.Zrinski“ Brigade app. 1400 soldiers
6. „Ban J.Jelačić“ Brigade app. 1900 soldiers
7. „Jure Francetić“ Brigade app. 850
8. II. „Zenička“ Brigade app. 400 soldiers (in forming)
9. „Kotromanić“ Brigade app. 600 soldiers
10. „Bobovac“ Brigade app. 700 soldiers
11. 111. XP Brigade app. 1400 soldiers
12. 110. Brigade app. 650 soldiers
- 4. Ltrd Anti Aircraft Defense app. 170 soldiers, MTD app 170 soldiers
- 4. bVP app. 300 soldiers, PPN Vitezovi 60 soldiers

LOB app. 150 soldiers, Command of the OPERATIONAL ZONE CENTRAL BOSNIA app 50 soldiers

TOTAL app. 12 000 soldiers

OF WHICH:
In Lašvansko-Lepanička valley app 7000 soldiers
Outside Lašvansko-Lepanička valley app. 4600 soldiers

Strength ratio A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and HVO (Croatian Defense Council) March 1993.



Legend:

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)

Number of ABiH Brigades directed towards Lašvansko – Lepinička valley

15 Brigades from 3rd Corps app. 45 000 soldiers
2 Brigades from 6th Corps app. 4000 soldiers
2 Brigades from 1st Corps app. 4000 soldiers
1000 soldiers from the Special Unit for special operations

TOTAL app 54 000 soldiers

Strength ratio in Lašvanska valley is 7 : 1

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Ideas - Intentions A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Legend:

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
- Blockage by A BiH
- Operational directions A BiH
- Conflict location



Situation: January 1993

Legend:

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
- Operational directions A BiH
- Conflict location



Situation: March/ April 1993

Legend:

VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)

A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

HVO (Croatian Defense Council)

Operational directions A BiH

Place of conflict



Situation: June 1993

Legend:

VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)

A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

HVO (Croatian Defense Council)

Operational directions A BiH

Place of conflict




Situation:
July 1993
Legend:
VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
Operational directions A BiH
Place of conflict
Zavidovići
Tuzla
Žepče
Jajce
Travnik
Zenica
Vitez
D. Vakuf
N. Travnik
Vareš
Kakanj
Busovača
Bugojno
Kupres
Visoko
Fojnica
G. Vakuf
Kiseljak
Sarajevo
Kreševo
Livno
Prozor
Tomislavgrad
Jablanica
Konjic


Situation:
September
1993
Legend:
VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
Operational directions A BiH
Place of conflict
Zavidovići
Tuzla
Žepče
Jajce
Travnik
Zenica
Vitez
D. Vakuf
N. Travnik
Vareš
Kakanj
Busovača
Kupres
Bugojno
Visoko
Fojnica
G. Vakuf
Kiseljak
Sarajevo
Kreševo
Livno
Prozor
Tomislavgrad
Jablanica
Konjic

Situation: October 1993

Legend:

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
- Operational directions A BiH
- Place of conflict



Situation: November 1993

Legend:

- VRS (Army of Srpska Republic)
- A BiH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- HVO (Croatian Defense Council)
- Operational directions A BiH
- Place of conflict



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



Muslim and Croat armed conflict in the period from April 1993 until February 1994

Armed aggression of A BiH against HVO

www.slobodanpraljak.com

COMMENT:

Despite all, in June 1993, HVO is a multi-national army (unlike VRS and BH Army).

Go trough the document.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HUMAN RESOURCE ADMINISTRATION OFFICE
Number: 02-3/1 44/93
Mostar, 09.06.1993.

DEFENSE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONF.

Office of The President of HZ H-B

SUBJECT: Overview of the national structure
of the members of the HVO -delivered-

On your requested, enclosed to the letter we deliver to you the „Overview of the national structure of the members of the HVO", (appendix num. 1)

Records were made based on the condition with the day of 08 June 1993 for the units under ordinal numbers: 14, 15, 16, 17, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34 and for the remaining units based on newly made military identification cards.

Note: For the part of the units from OZ „Central Bosnia" due to know reasons we are not able to deliver the required records.

HEAD
signature
Jure Brkić

Appendix num. 1

OVERVIEW
of the national structure of the members of the HVO

Ord.num.	NAME OF THE UNIT	TOTAL	CROATS	MUSLIMS	% OF MUSLIMS
1.	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE	247	238	9	3,64
2.	MAIN STAFF OF THE HVO	65	64	1	1,53
3.	ZMIN	88	88	0	0,00
4.	COMMAND OF THE OZ POSAVINA	44	37	7	15,90
5.	101. BRIGADE	798	547	251	31,45
6.	102. BRIGADE	713	311	402	56,38
7.	103. BRIGADE	459	300	159	34,64
8.	104. BRIGADE	1180	992	188	15,93
9.	105. BRIGADE	214	89	125	58,41
10.	106. BRIGADE	2909	2592	317	10,89
11.	108. BRIGADE	297	254	43	14,47
12.	115. BRIGADE	1261	1135	126	10,00
13.	COMMAND OF THE OZ JIH	180	164	16	8,88
14.	1. BRIGADE	4686	3027	1659	35,00
15.	2. BRIGADE	2400	1900	500	20,83
16	3. BRIGADE	1470	1269	201	13,60
17.	4. BRIGADE	4153	3953	200	4,82
18.	MTD	324	324	0	0,00
19.	2.lardPZO	344	344	0	0,00
20.	COMMAND OZ CENTRAL BOSNIA	89	88	1	1,12
21.	TRAVNIK BRIGADE	1224	1211	13	1,06
22.	JURE FRANCETIĆ BRIGADE	1216	1211	5	0,49
23.	MTD	84	83	1	1,12
24.	LOGISTIC BASE	37	37	0	0,00
25.	4. lard PZO	330	315	15	4,54
26.	COMMAND OF THE OZ SZH	41	41	0	0,00
27.	E. KVATERNIK BRIGADE	1537	1499	38	2,47
28.	H. VUKČIĆ BRIGADE	770	750	20	2,59
29.	ARMOURED BATTALION	8	8	0	0,00
30.	RAMA BRIGADE	2023	1552	471	23,30
31.	KRALJ TOMISLAV BRIGADE	3054	2745	396	9,69
32.	P. KREŠIMIR IV BRIGADE	3086	2312	767	24,85
33.	KUPRES BATTALION	249	244	5	2,01
34.	POSUŠJE BATTALION	266	266	0	0,00
35.	REGIMENT BRUNO BUŠIĆ	331	329	2	0,60
36.	CONVICTS' BATTALION	280	164	116	41,42
37.	ATG "BAJA KRALJEVIĆ"	107	105	2	1,86
38.	KNIGHTS	138	138	0	0,00
	TOTAL:	36797	30841	5956	16,19

COMMENT:

June 30th 1993 BH Army again attacked HVO in Mostar, Stolac, Dubrava Plateau, Bijelo Polje and Livno.

This time, even Muslims in the HVO turned their arms against their fellow combatants.

Pathetic!! Treason!!

Do not get excited, for another decade and a half Haris Silajdžić will tell you a different story and mess up with your brain until you go crazy. Fed-up with his "spices" you shall come to him and apologize to him and his army and his obnoxious arrogance.

Bravo, bravissimo!

Arif Pašalić's speech on the War radio BiH on June 30th 1993 at ł1.00

I am turning to citizens of Mostar, Muslims, honest Croatians and loyal Serbs, and other people and citizens of BiH and I am introducing you to the following:

Ustasha's forces, early this morning, kept with their aggression on ARBiH and citizens of Mostar by strong artillery fire and infantry attack at the positions of ARBiH 4th Corps units. We are determined in our defence and loyal to BiH and Muslim people and other honest citizens. We retaliated fiercely and we beat ustasha's forces. We took over notorious "Tihomir Misic" barracks, liberated confined citizens and imprisoned large number of ustasha soldiers, confiscated significant quantities of equipment and materials and ammunition.
At the notorious "Tihomir Misic" barracks we found a significant documentation with signature of gentleman, war criminals, Petkovic, Lasic, Ile Vrlic – of my friend until yesterday with whom I sat at the bar in the free time – about planned attacks and conducted battles against enemy forces of ARBiH as they called us from the April 16th of this year. Mr. Vrlic – Corak
Loss of the Midhat Hujdur Hujke Commander of the Famous 41st motorized brigade is a irrecoverable loss for us, but from today Mostar is richer for hundreds and thousands of likes of Hujko, who are going to fight against ustasha war criminals, against ustasha who in my opinion spawned again after 1944 - 1945 in our homeland. This city, these people, this Army will never forget our celebrated, legendary commander "shehid" (fallen Islamic fighter) Hujko, but they are not going to forget you, ustasha whose mortar shell infamely hit him.
Citizens of Mostar, Muslims and other honest citizens, beat ustasha on every step. Cant you see that this is about your survival, cant you see that they are extraditing you, cant you see that they are taking you under arrest, cant you see that they are holding press conferences and weep on humanitarian organizations and they do not allow the same to bring food to the left side of the town, not to the left bank, gentleman, we hold right bank too, cant you see that they are humiliating you. Cant you see that in the figure of ustasha Boban they trade with leader of chetnik's Karadzic they trade with Muslims with honest Croatians and loyal Serbs. Gentleman they sell and they offer an exchange of Gornji Vakuf and Bugojno for Jablanica. From whom that is gentleman. Poor are those who are willing to trade their people and their land. They are miserable. And even more miserable are people who follow them. Ustasha forces announcement in the Mr. Puljic Slavko speech in exclusive speech, I salute you Mr. Puljic, until yesterday we worked together in the function of joint mixed commission. Did duty to give an exclusive announcement about this

morning's shameful defeat fall on you? Understand that we finished same schools. We did not learn that you are mine and I am your aggressor. Others forced us in to that. Think about it and if exclusive conference of HVO, actually of ustasha forces fell on you Mr. Puljic then it is clear to me what is your level in governing and commanding. We are going to fight against you, you can be sure of that; you announced a war against us. You announced a war this morning by chasing away UNPROFOR, military observers and other officers of international factors. Actually you did not give them any evidence. You beat them with snipers, you killed them, and I am inviting them to come to me, to deploy and to observe how you shoot at the poor and innocent people.
Not for long, be sure of that, because your own people are going to prosecute you as a criminal, which I told to you, and Mr. Petkovic, and Mr. Lasic, and Mr. Vrlic, and Mr. Tuta for many crimes and homicides.
People, citizens of Mostar, you have to understand that this is a judgement day when you have to start with fight. I am inviting each citizens who can to bear a rifle, who can bear a rock, to kill ustasha criminals because there is no life with ustasha here accept life with Muslims, honest Croatians and loyal Serbs. We, citizens of Mostar announce a national sorrow, for the loss of our soldiers, who honorably, and especially loss of legendary commander Hujko. But gentleman, you have to know hundreds and thousands of likes of Hujko are going to be born tonight directly in in the fight against you who imposed a war on us.

/All handwritten/

Strictly confidential No: 03-0420
Mostar: May 16th, 1993.

GS (Main Staff) Report at 8:00 am

1. As far as Mostar is concerned, Serbs and Muslims are attacking. We must defend ourselves.

Delivered to:

GS Mostar
ONO OZ BiH

Commander
brigadier
M. LASIĆ
/signed/

REPUBLIC BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERCEG-BOSNA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

THE TRUTH ABOUT ARIF PAŠALIĆ AND HIS "FIGHT"

This morning at 11 o'clock, across the Muslim radio station in Mostar, Mr. Arif Pašalić, commander of the 4. Corps of the Muslim army or what is pompously called the Army of BiH addressed his people. The reason for his speech is that this morning at 3:45 am started the Muslim offensive, undertaken with the goal of controlling the entire urban area of Mostar. To avoid any possible confusion about who is who in this tragedy, we consider it to be appropriate to present the average Croatian reader and listener what has Mr. Pašalić said this morning.

For those, however, that even after reading or listening to this angry pamphlet, it is not clear what and who is the man for whom there is only coexistence "of Muslims, honest Croats, and loyal Serbs", someone who believes that the "Ustashas have spawn back again in our homeland after the 1944-45, "one more information should be added. Mithad Hujdur - Hujke, about whose death by "Ustasha" shell Mr. Pašalić is talking, is actually in reality the victim of Mr. Pašalić conflict with those who were engaged in fighting for Mostar during the Serbian aggression, that is with all those in Muslim ranks who have raised hopes in the possibility of peaceful resolution of existing conflicts. In all this, the same Hujke was the first person who Mr. Pašalić encountered when in JNA officer uniform and with officer's bag over his shoulder, at the end of July 1992 have crossed the old bridge. On this occasion Hujke was merciful. And year later Arif showed his gratitude by shooting him in the back (according to statements of four captured soldiers of the Muslim army: Mirsad Bektić - Pike, Safet Bijedić - Nuno, Abdurahman Spahić - Didi and Dželaludin Junuzović - Dželo).

We submit Mr. Pašalić speech in full. Conduct the processing in a way your professional awareness and conscience requires.

Information Department
Slobodan Lovrenović
Mostar, 30 June 1993, 16:45
Ref.: 01-010/93

The findings of observers of the international community about the events in Mostar on June 30th, 1993

Observers of the international community had a very accurate insight into these events and knew with certainty that BiH Army during the night carried out the assault on the northern part of Mostar and that fighting continued throughout the day, and that the shelling temporarily weakened in the afternoon.

The same day observers of the international community knew with certainty that during the night hours, coordinated attacks with the support of the Mostar First Brigade(BiH Army) were carried out, in which Muslim soldiers of the HVO Battalion located in Bijelo Polje, attacked Croatian troops and their positions in village Raštane and North military barracks.

The commander of the Mostar First Brigade (BH Army) Midhat Hujdur died in the battle.

According to the medical information that the observers of the international community had, during the same day there were many more dead soldiers, three dead soldiers of HVO - who were brought to the HVO hospital, in which during that day another 30 wounded soldiers and 2 wounded civilians were brought.

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna
Croatian Defense Council
Department of Defense

MAIN STAFF
Number: 02-2/1-01-1245/93
Mostar, 30 June 1993

DEFENSE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Report on the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ attack north of Mostar

At 0300 hours this morning, the Muslim forces attacked the North Camp barracks and the HVO /Croatian Defense Council/ units in Bijelo Polje. The Muslim forces in Bijelo Polje have been together with the HVO so far and did not take part in earlier fighting.

At 0300 hours, the Muslims from Bijelo Polje attacked HVO soldiers at rest and soldiers on the lines facing the Serbs.

There was also an attack on Croatian civilians. The balance of forces in the Bijelo Polje area is 60:40 in favour of the Muslims, while the ratio of the population is 80:20 in favour of the Muslims.

In the course of the day, the Muslims "look control" of the area north of Mostar to the Salakovac dam, while the HVO is holding positions in the northern part of Bijelo Polje (Željuši, and the convent).

We had to pull the HVO forces, about 90 men, out of the barracks because of the encirclement (the barracks is on the left bank).

We still do not have precise details of the soldiers and civilians that have been killed.

The HVO forces have set up defence on the right bank, from the village of Raštani to the village of Vrdi. and on the left hank of the Neretva, in the area of Bijela and Ravni.

The main task is to prevent the Muslim forces from Jablanica and Mostar from joining up.

In all units, measures have been taken to remove Muslims from the HVO.

Additional mobilisation has been carried out in the municipalities of Široki Brijeg, Čitluk, Ljubuški and Grude.

Chief of the Main Staff of the HVO
Major General
Milivoj PETKOVIĆ
/signed and stamped/

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

Republic of BH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/
BH Army
Command of the OG /Operations Group West
Strictly confidential number: 01/546-93
Bugojno, 30 July 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
Strictly Confidential

ORDER

To: Commander of the Gornji Vakuf
OKM /main command post/

During the day I received information that the Ustashas had left Pajić Polje. We are currently reconnoitring that area. Jupi has also come today to the area of Voljice, so you do not have to worry about that direction. I ordered Senad ABAZOVIĆ to increase the intensity of sabotage actions on Marjanove Kuće and to prepare by tomorrow offensive operations on the entire area. I have sent Hasib JUSUFSPAHIĆ again to Bistrica village with the old assignment. I will free up one of the units during the day which I will send to the Grnica-Bistrica sector tomorrow with the task of attacking the Alibegova Gruda-Krupa line. In order to increase pressure and to create more favourable conditions to drive back successfully the remaining HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ forces.

I HEREBY ORDER:

1. The 317th bbr /Mountain Brigade/ Commander – Carry out an attack in the morning on the area of Crni Vrh, which is currently under HVO control, and after carrying out your operations man the captured lines with our forces.

2. Gornji Vakuf OpŠO /Municipal Defence Staff/ Commander – If my previous order is not implemented by the end of today, prepare forces and equipment for operations on Glavica, Grebine and Zvizde.

3. The persons charged with carrying out these assignments shall be responsible for the implementation of this order. You shall be responsible for supplying me with a report on the completed preparations and the readiness to go into action today, by 2300 hours at the latest.

Till our meeting!

KJ/EI

Commander of the OG West
Selmo CIKOTIĆ

To:
Commander of the G.V. OKM
Files

URGENT

IMMEDIATELY fire artillery at Raduški Kamen.

COMMANDER
Selmo CIKOTIĆ

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

ARMY OF THE R BiH
42ND MOUNTAIN BRIGADE
1st mountain battalion
Number: 01-01/62
Date, 9 August 1993

MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET

PROVISIONAL ORDER Op. No. 1
Map of Mostar 4, section 1 : 50 000
Edition 1982

By 24,00h 13 August 1993 prepare groups for carrying out an attack. Carry out reinforcement of MTS (material and technical means) pursuant to requests and select men. Immediately carry out reconnaissance activities in order to verify information on the HVO forces on the direction M. Polje – Buna, especially in the sector K-1 and TT 182.

Inform me on the performed preparations by 10,00h on 13. August 1993.

Delivered:
- commanders of the groups
- a/a

COMMANDER
Esad Sejtanic
/signed and stamped/

COMMENT:

Documents under this number are the documents of BH Army and show us that BH Army is attacking, that BH Army is attacking HVO, and that the forces of the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th BH Corps are engaged - heavy artillery, helicopters … and that the aim is Neretva Valley, Mostar, Neum, etc.

This is just to make sure we learned the lesson in a proper manner in order to start to "make peace".

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA /RBH/
RBH OS /Armed Forces/ SUPREME COMMAND STAFF
SARAJEVO
Strictly confidential number: 02/1029-1
Sarajevo, 26 August 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To the 6th Corps Command
The Commander, personally

Despite the agreed truce, HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ and HV /Croatian Army/ forces continued to besiege and attack Mostar. They have deployed their main forces towards the *Mostar 1* HE /hydroelectric plant/, which they captured during the night of 25/26 August 1993, destroyed the sluice at the dam, and destroyed bridges downstream in Mostar by releasing a large volume of water.

A large build-up of HV and HVO forces in the western part of the city of Mostar continues. An even stronger attack on the defenders of Mostar is expected. In order to provide URGENT help to the defenders of Mostar, I hereby

ORDER

1. Engage your forces that have been sent to the defenders of Mostar as soon possible in a joint attack with 4th Corps forces on HVO units on the Vrdi village – Domazet village axis. Crush enemy forces on this axis and advance as soon as possible to the Planinica village – Podine village line. In further operations, attack the northern outskirts of Mostar and the village of Raštani.

2. Allocate as many appropriate artillery pieces as possible from your units and support as successfully as possible the attack by forces engaged as per item 1 of this Order.

3. Establish the closest possible cooperation with the 4th Corps Command in implementing the above tasks.

4. In the areas of responsibility of the 44th and 45th bbrs /Mountain Brigades/ engage the HVO as closely as possible with the objective of tying down their forces and, if possible, achieving success on the axes of operations of these units.

5. Report to this Staff on the measures undertaken and the implementation of this Order.

ZS/SB

COMMANDER
Rasim DELIĆ /signed and stamped/

/handwritten:
RBH OS ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/
CV /Communications Centre/
KZ /Cryptographic Protection/ DEPARTMENT
Sent:
26 August 1993 at 1409 hours/

THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA /R BiH/
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
S A R A J E V O

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Copy No. 1

Strictly confidential No. 1/297-230
Sarajevo, 29 August 1993
File No. 31-2-03-302-7/6-42/99

Conclusions and tasks adopted at the meeting of senior officers of the Main Staff and Corps Commanders, held in Zenica on 21 and 22 August 1993

On 21 and 22 August 1993 in Zenica a meeting was held with the topic "Most prominent achievements, problems and development perspectives in the armed struggle of the Army of RBH".

Those from Supreme Command Main Staff present:
Commander Rasim DELIĆ, Chief Sefer HALILOVIĆ, Chief of Operative Command Centre Zićro SULJEVIĆ, SSC /Staff of Supreme Command/ member Rifat BILAJAC, SSC member Vehbija KARIĆ, deputy chief of combat arms administration Zaim BACKOVIĆ, chief of logistics administration Rašid ZORLAK and chief of personnel administration Sulejman VRANJ.

Those from Corps present:
Commander of the 1st Corps Vahid KARAVELIĆ, Commander of the 2nd Corps Hazim ŠADIĆ, Commander of the 3rd Corps Enver HADŽIHASANOVIĆ, Commander of the 4th Corps Arif PAŠALIĆ and Commander of the 6th Corps Salko GUŠIĆ, Commander of the Tuzla military garrison Mevludin BEŠIĆ, Esef NURKIĆ from Zenica hydroelectric power plant, Chief of combat arms administration Mustafa POLUTAK.

The first day of the meeting, Minister of the Interior of BH Bakir ALISPAHIĆ was also present.

After an introductory speech by the Main Staff Commander, Corps commanders reported on their Corps' personal achievement and the situation regarding combat activities in their respective responsibility zones.

I. CONCLUSIONS

1. The war we have been waging for the last 17 months against the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressor and the former JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ has been in essence a liberation war, deeply humane and founded on the awareness and choice

of the people of BH that they must defend their country with dignity and earn the right to bare survival. The war imposed on us by the extreme faction of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ is actually a knife in the back of the RBH Army, and its brutality is even worse than the war waged by Chetniks.

The HVO attack has seriously slowed down the impetus of our liberation struggle.

2. The goals of our Army's fight remain the same: a struggle for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, indivisible and within recognised borders.

3. The war for territories will continue, even if peace on the basis of Geneva Agreement is reached. The continuing war will be aimed against both types of fascism, Serbian-Montenegrin and Croatian, either individually against each of them or against the joint forces of both aggressors.

***

6. The loss of free territory in Drina river valley, on the territory of Trnovo municipality, Bjelašnica and Igman is not the result of the aggressor's strength, but more due to rather unsuccessful command in our units and individual cases of treason and cowardice in certain Army units in those areas.

7. The units of our Army are hampered by a lack of discipline, both individual and group, and general military lack of structure. Training of senior officers at all levels (KO /detachment commander/, KV /platoon commander/ and KČ /company commander/) is incomplete, which has a negative impact on discipline and successful execution of combat actions.

8. Logistical support of the Army may continue along existing lines. Weapons supply will concentrate as before on war booty and local production. Purchase of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, despite complicated delivery across the aggressor's territory, may be effected through the involvement of all available factors and methods – from friends to enemies, from patriots to war profiteers and traitors from the aggressor's armed units.

9. Collection of financial resources has, up to now, been extremely disorganised, open to question, and uncoordinated with actual needs. There are also suspicions about people handling these issues for their own profit. These resources were not reaching the state budget, and their amount remained a secret. There is no doubt that larger sums of money have been collected and that the major part of that money is now in Zagreb. To get hold of that money and to use it in the most efficient way for equipping the RBH Army would be one of the most important tasks of the Main Staff of Supreme Command in the near future.

10. The existing media in RBH (TV, radio and the press) so far have not been active enough in popularising our struggle. Their lack of professionalism, principles and patriotism were more damaging than useful to the RBH Army.

11. The organs of state authority of the RBH Army have, throughout the period of armed combat, been out of touch with the general directions of the armed forces. State authorities have only partially switched to wartime functions, which has resulted in inadequate logistical support of the armed forces.

In certain areas, state authorities were acting in a destructive way, detrimental to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by siding with separatist forces, especially the HVO.

***

II. TASKS

***

5. The combat morale of soldiers and units shall be built on the patriotism and traditions of the Bosnian nation and heroic examples of combatants and units from this war.

***

9. By a special order of the Main Staff, the previously independent units *"Zulfikar"*, *"Crni labudovi"*, *"Silver fox"*, *"Akrepi"*, *"Muderiz"* and other independent units shall be attached to Corps. If necessary, Corps Commands shall put forward a plan of reforming and enlarging the units in question.

10. For forthcoming combat actions alterations to corps' zones of responsibility have been made as follows:

***

15. Corps Commands and administrations of the Supreme Command Staff shall regularly report on the execution of tasks discussed at this meeting.

ZS/JP

COMMANDER
OF THE STAFF OF SUPREME
COMMAND OF ARMED FORCES OF RBH
Rasim DELIĆ

/signed and stamped/

Copied in ___ copies and delivered to:

Commands of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Corps (KZ)
Command of the 1st Corps
Deputy commanders of Supreme Command Staff (3)
Education administration
Morale, information and propaganda activity administration
Combat arms administration
Operative Centre of Staff of Supreme Command
Organisation and mobilisation administration
Security administration
Intelligence administration
Personnel administration
Legal administration
Files

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /BH/
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BH
44th MOUNTAIN BRIGADE COMMAND
J A B L A N I C A

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Jablanica, 29 August 1993
Number: 01/1015-1/93

Proposal for planning and carrying out b/d /combat operations/

To: 6th CORPS COMMAND
- personally to the Commander -

Based on data gathered on Ustasha forces in the z/o /zone of responsibility/ of the 44th and 45th bbr /mountain brigades/ and the *Prozor* SB /independent battalion/, and activities of the command organs of the above-mentioned units, in order to carry out coordinated offensive b/d in the general area and take part of the temporary occupied territory, I

P R O P O S E

1. To carry out an attack on Ustasha forces in order to cut off parts of the Ustasha destroy them part by part and seize parts of the occupied territory.

   Axes of Attack:

   1. for the *Prozor* SB
      - Here – Jurići – Glibe – Blace
      - Šćipe – Uzdol – Kranjčići
   2. for the 45th bbr
      - Urijina ravan – Kućani – Klečke Stijene
   3. for the 44th bbr
      - Rodići – Duvnice – Ustirama

   The axis of the dam - Gornja Slatina is being prepared and will be activated, depending on the achieved results at this axis.

   By attacking along these axes, the forces on Bukva, Lisina, Popove Glave, Majan and Hudutsko would be cut off and the axis of Pisvir – tt. 889 /trig. point/ – Klečke Stijene – Kranjčići – Blašačko Brdo would be taken. This creates conditions for further operations towards Prozor (to reach Blašačko Brdo is to reach the gates of Prozor) and Risovačka Visoravan. At the same time, pressure would be taken off some of the forces because the line would be "straightened" and I also believe that there would be positive effects on raising morale.

2. Time of carrying out operations:
   - As the 1/sb /?1st company of the/ *Prozor* independent battalion and the 1st Battalion of the 45th bbr, which were planned to carry out these operations are active at the Konjic front, the time of carrying out operations depends on the time of their return to their original units.

3. Manner of carrying out operations:
   On D-1, our forces would be inserted along these axes behind the lines of the Ustasha forces and surprise attacks would be carried out on Ustasha (intervention and mobile) forces at places where they are stationed, with

security provided for these groups, who would then emerge at the lines planned.
Simultaneously, as the surprise attacks begin behind the lines, artillery attacks would commence on Ustasha artillery positions. Infiltration of forces behind the lines would block and tie up the prominent features seized by Ustasha forces, such as Bukva, Lisina, Popova Glava, Kostreš, Majan, Gornja Slatina. I believe this manner of carrying out operations enables forces small in number to achieve substantial results and at the same time minimum casualties are to be expected.

4. Engagement of forces:

a) for the *Prozor* SB axis
- along the Here – Jurići – Glibe – Blace axis, infiltration of forces /of the strength of/ around one company, which would be active in 3 groups for setting up obstacles on roads in the enemy's depth.
- along the Šćipe – Uzdol – Kranjčići axis, forces /of the strength of/ around one company would be infiltrated to carry out surprise attacks, set up obstacles on roads and ambushes.
- Simultaneously, forces from the existing defence lines and setting up ambushes would block off and tie up prominent the features of Lisna and Bukva.

b) for the 45th bbr axis
Forces of the strength of about 1 company would be infiltrated along the Urijina Ravan – Kućani – Klečka Stijena axis, attacking the forces in Kućani, setting up obstacles on roads in the depth and seizing the positions in Klečke Stijene. Simultaneously, forces from the existing defence lines would be tying-up forces in Popove Glave and Kostreš.

c) for the 44th bbr axis
Infiltration of around one company on the Duvnice – Ustirama axis, attack on the Ustirama sector.

Depending on results achieved on this axis, attacks on Gornja Slatina from the direction of Ilijine Grude and the HE /hydro-electric power plant/ *Rama* dam are planned.

d) Artillery fire on Ustasha artillery and major Ustasha strongholds, which is regulated by artillery fire plan.

5. Materiel support:
- The above-mentioned units sent their requests to the 6th Corps Command for materiel replenishment.

6. Command and control
- These combat activities would have to be controlled from the central KM /command post/ (probably in the sector of the 45th bbr) and along the attack axes, each unit by its own command.
Communications for all units would be organised in four radio networks.

7. Requests to the superior command:

- Provide replenishment of ammunition and explosives to units in accordance with the requests already sent.
- Provide replenishment to the above-mentioned units of PTM /anti-tank mines/, 20 per unit.
- Provide replenishment to the 1st Battalion of the 45th bbr with 1 PAT /anti-aircraft gun/ and crew because of the operation at Popove Glave and Kostreš.
- Provide 105 mm Howitzer shells for the 44th bbr and 105 mm Howitzer shells for the *Prozor* SB

- Bearing in mind the existing equipment in units (support equipment), I would ask you to increase the replenishment of MB – 82 /mortar/ shells.

8. After success has been achieved, counterattacks by Ustasha forces, particularly against the forces of the *Prozor* SB are to be expected, where possible air attacks should not be excluded.
   In this proposal I am also presenting the basic concept for the implementation of this task.

Basic Concept

By taking advantage of the terrain and gaps in the deployment of the Ustasha forces, insert forces along the axes of Here – Jurići – Glibe – Blac; Šćipe – Uzdol – Kranjčići; Urijina Ravan – Kućani – Klečke Stijene and Duvnice – Ustirama, block and tie up the forces in Bukva, Lisna, Kostreš, Popove Glave, Gornja Slatina, and Pomen, set up obstacles along the roads in the enemy's depth, split Ustasha forces by surprise attacks and destroy them part by part, surround the Ustasha on these features and then seize the line of Pisvir - tt. 889 – Klečke Stijene – Kranjčići – Blašačko Brdo and dig in there to carry out defence.

Combat formation: forces for insertion, forces for setting up ambushes, forces for surprise attacks, forces for security, blocking forces, support forces, forces for PVO /anti-aircraft defence/, KM /command post/ and logistics units.

Member of the ONO G.K. /Operations and Training, Main Command/
Enes ZUKANOVIĆ
/signed/

COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF THE ŠVK
/Supreme Command Staff/ -
Cryptographic Data Protection Department
SARAJEVO
Date and Time:
3 September 1993, Friday 01:09 /handwritten:/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /R BH/
ŠVK of the OS /ARMED FORCES/
Strictly Confidential Number: 2-1
Date, 2 September 1993

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
URGENT !!!

/stamp:/ STAFF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND
OF THE OS OF THE R BH
Number 02/879-111
2 September 1993
2

/handwritten:/ archive no. 226/5

Request for units of the
1K /1st Corps/ to move, to

1st Corps Command
(personally to the Commander)

We request that you send us an urgent response regarding the order for your units to move into the Neretva valley. Indicate when a unit will move and state its numerical strength so that its reception and transport can be organised.

SH/VK

CHIEF OF THE ŠVK

Sefer HALILOVIĆ

/handwritten:/ SENT /4th and 1st K/
030993 /illegible/ 0/12
/signed/

ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE – Department of Cryptographic data protection
SARAJEVO

Source file: FAMB29/?1/
Document received and processed

Date and time:
2 September 1993, Thursday 1114 hours
/circled/ 254
/handwritten/ Vejzagić /?/ /signature/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina /RBH/
RBH Army
44 / 6th CORPS

DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Str. conf. no.: 01/563-1-3/93
Jablanica, 2 September 1993

/stamp/
RBH ARMED FORCES SUPREME COMMAND STAFF
Number: 02/1594-469
1 March 1994

TO THE 6TH CORPS COMMAND

Pursuant to Decision of GŠVK /Supreme Command Main Staff/ of 21 August 1993 in Zenica, and with the aim of building up the units, I hereby

ORDER

1. The units: *Handžar divizija* and *Sliver-Fox* shall become part of special purposes detachment (*Zulfikar*).

2. The above-mentioned units shall join the ranks of the *Zulfikar* unit with all their equipment and weapons.

3. The deadline for these units to join up with the *Zulfikar* unit is 2000 hours on 3 September 1993.

DELIVERED TO:

1. GŠVK (for information)
2. 6th Corps Command
3. Commanders of units:
- *Silver-Fox*
- *Handžar divizija*
- *Zulfikar* detachment

CHIEF OF GŠVK
(deputy commander)
SEFER HALILOVIĆ

/handwritten/

SENT TO THE COMMANDER ON 2 SEPTEMBER 1993. /signature/

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
1st Corps Command – Sarajevo

Military Secret
Strictly Confidential

Strictly confidential number: 05/7-402
Sarajevo, 06.09.1993.

In accordance with the entire combat situation in the area of Jablanica and Mostar, and in accordance with the written order of the NŠ /Chief of Staff/ of the ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ Strictly confidential number: 01/563-1-2/93, dated 02.09.1993. from Jablanica, I

O R D E R

To the 2nd Independent Motorised Battalion Command
To the attention of the Commander

1. Immediately carry out all organisational preparations, prepare and send a company with between 100 and 120 soldiers to the area of Jablanica on 06.09.1993.

ASSIGNMENT: In co-operation with the units of the 4th and 6th Corps, in that area, carry out offensive combat operations with the purpose of liberating the Jablanica – Mostar communication. Combat activities in that area are carried out under the command of a group from ŠVK, led by NŠ R BiH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ OS /Armed Forces/ VK /Military Command/.

2. Realise movement along the Sarajevo – Hrasnica – Igman – Pazarić – Konjic – Jablanica direction using the /above-mentioned/ company. Movement is to be carried out at 1900 hours on 06.09.1993. Movement in both ways is to be carried out using motor vehicles in accordance with the verbal order.

3. Company carries out the stated assignment not longer than 7 days after the day of reporting to the ŠVK IKM /Forward Command Post/ in Jablanica.

Commander

Vahid KARAVELIĆ
/signed/

/Illegible stamp. /

COMMENT:

In the course of the aggression of BH Army against HVO form Bugojno onwards, many crimes against Croatian civilians were committed in its conquering movement towards the sea.

The documents are here.

There is no Central Bosnia here, whereas those crimes against Croats, committed by someone from BH Army were published by me in another book.

Well, now, who committed those crimes, individuals, units, groups, according to an order (oral or written), or by encouraging, approving, in a planned manner, or by covering up or keeping it secret …

I HAVE NO IDEA.

However, in the name of God, look at the data, look at the numbers, names and last names and ask yourselves where the processes are, where the culprits are and who should apologize to whom and on behalf of which policy and ethnicity?

If you care about the truth!

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Army of BiH - 6th Corps
Military Police Battalion
Register number: Ol/P-05-319
Konjic, 13.09. 1993.

Defense of the Republic
Military Secret
Strictly Confidential

Submitted to.-

- 6th Corps Security Organ
- to the attention of Nermin EMINOVIĆ

I was in Jablanica on 10.09.1993. with the intention to control and assist in the work of the subordinated unit (Jablanica Military Police Company and Military Police Department for Service).

While I was in the Department for Service, Comander Đelmo ZENAID informed me that allgedly, a genocide over Croatian population occured in the town of Grabovica, done by the unknown perpetrator from the ranks of the Army of BiH. We immediately went to Grabovica and found out from our source that the genocide indeed took place and that, on that occasion, 20/twenty/ civilians were „slaughtered" and "killed". He also showed us (from distance) houses from where the civilian victims were and he claimed that there were fresh graves below the houses and traces of blood on the bridge. This confidential source pointed our attention to the fact that it was dangerous to do that now because the military that was in that area, kept everything under control, which we verified ourselves. We went to Jablanica, where I earned out consultations with Namik ĐANKOVIĆ from Sarajevo UVB /Military Security Administration/ and he told me that ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ IKM /Forward Command Post/ knew that and that it had been ordered not to do anything because of the planned operation. He received this order from Vehbija KARIĆ.

Commander
/signed/
Mr Nusret ŠAHIĆ

/Stamp, reading: "Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
/illegible/ Corps
/illegible/" /

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA /R BiH/
R BiH ARMY
6th CORPS COMMAND

No. CV-92-09
Date: 16 September 1993

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/circled:
To:
3rd CORPS COMMANDER/

According to the official operative report from the site of the battles for Uzdol village in Prozor municipality, about 60 HVO /Croatian Defense Council/ members were killed. Among the dead there were civilians who had weapons in their hands, and probably due to a shortage of soldiers, they fired on R BiH Army members. All other statements and fabricated facts in the above information are not true,

/circled:
COMMANDER
Salko GUŠIĆ/

COMMENT:

Documents of BH Army with orders to attack HVO show it all clearly, like on a clear summer day at noon.

The formula is simple, we sign the agreement with VRS(Serbs), liberate the units for the attack against HVO; let's even sign truce and confederation with Croats and please the international community which can further on be proud of its peaceful success, let's continue to "defend" ourselves from HVO (because "as it is known") HVO always strikes first, let's conquer the territory and then we will again sit

around the negotiating table, now with completely different military and political conditions.

It is all ok, there are no problems, except that Croats swallow this shitty tricks like oysters, like strawberries and drink that hodgepodge that smells of deceiving odour which has been brought to perfection in these areas throughout centuries; they drink that bad drink like it was a French champagne (whereas champagne can only and exclusively be French), smile like Indian cows and pop their eyes like

"Hera the cow-eyed".

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND OF THE 317TH MOUNTAIN BRIGADE

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly confidential number: 02/2-337
Date: 15 September 1993

On the basis of the Order of the NGŠ /Chief of General Staff/ and the Command of the Commander of the 6th Corps OP /operative/ 01/1500-27 of 11 September 1993, as well as the intelligence collected from contact with the Ustashas, I hereby i s s u e a

ORDER TO ATTACK

section 1:25000 Sheets Konjic 1, 2

1. The Ustashas took up a line for defence on time on the Jurići village, Glibe village, Brizovača (tt /trig point/ 1274) features, with the probable deployment of firing positions and troops the strength of one reinforced company. The firing positions noticed are in the Jurići village, Mejnik village, Brizovača and Brajke village sectors. The firing positions are probably PAMs /anti-aircraft machine guns/ and PATs /anti-aircraft guns/ and there is a possibility of armour being brought in from the Makljen and Dobroš sectors. The Ustashas have most probably laid groups of mines in all the above-mentioned sectors.

2. Our forces consist of the 2/317 bbr /2nd Battalion of the 317th Mountain Brigade/, the Sutjeska Battalion, the Prozor SB /Independent Battalion/ and one battalion from the 45th bbr /Mountain Brigade/.

   Task: After prior reconnaissance and timely infiltration of our forces close behind the line, by encircling actions from the wings and flanks, rout the Ustasha forces, inflict as many casualties on them as possible, capture the Jurići village, Lopatačka Glava (tt 940), Glibe village, Klupa, Stožine (tt 1078), Brizovača (tt 1274) and Golušnica (tt 1301) features, create conditions for the main operations on the Zgon, Slime, Makljen axis and in that way coordinate actions with the forces acting towards Volića Guvno. Begin fortifying on the lines reached and constructing obstacles in front of the forward line immediately.

3. Neighbours: forces of OG /Operations Group/ West shall operate on the right on the axis towards Vilića Guvno, and the 44th bbr shall operate on the Doljani axis.

4. I have decided to draw as close as possible to the targets of the attack under the cover of night, grouping the main forces on the Mejnik, Brizovača, Zgon, Makljen axis, and the auxiliary forces on the Klisac, Jurići, Stožine, Gmić axis, while

securing the flank of the main forces in the Stožine (tt 1078), Tribelj (tt 1032) and Debelo Brdo (tt 1321) sectors
Goal: To rout the Ustasha forces on the axes of attack, inflict as many casualties on them as possible and break out as soon as possible to the Makljen and Gradina sectors, cut off the Prozor – Gornji Vakuf road and dig in on the line reached.

Combat disposition: Forces to create conditions for the attack by the main forces, forces of the 1st echelon, support and reserve forces. Readiness for attack at 0600 hours on 16 September 1993. Command post in the Voljevac sector, next command post, Brdo sector.

5. TASKS OF THE UNITS

5-1 Tasks of groups

5-2 Tasks of the 1st echelon: to regroup during the night, secure the left flank, extend operations from the Brizovača, Golušnica line on the Zgon, Slime, Makljen axis.
Reserve 1st bč /Mountain Company/ of the 45th bbr in the Lokve sector on standby to be introduced on the following axes: a) Cvitkovine, Zgon, Slime, b) Lokve, Brizovača, Klupa, c) Lokve – Brdo (tt 1376), Stubić (tt 1303), and d) Slime -Makljen.

5-3 Support: the mixed 120 mm and 82 mm MB /Mortar/ Battery from the basic V.P. /firing positions/ in the Kolića Vrilo, Begina Krča, Gradina and Tura sectors shall provide fire support according to the plan of artillery fire, the next firing positions in the Lokve sectors /as printed/ MB 120 mm and MB 82 mm in the Repušnice sector to provide support for our forces in the general Makljen area.

6. POB /anti-tank combat/: POB shall focus on the main axis of the attack, while intervention groups shall be kept on other axes passable by tanks.

7. PVO /Anti-Aircraft Defence/: focus PVO protection on the axis of operation of the main forces.

8. Moral Support: in the course of the day, provide detailed information to all the soldiers in the units in order to ensure that the forthcoming combat task is clear to all of them. Most vigorously oppose the spread of rumours and the destruction and weakening of our morale. Forcibly isolate and take legal measures against all individuals who act destructively in units and develop a competitive spirit of patriotism among all the soldiers.
I most strictly prohibit unauthorised abandonment and withdrawal from combat. Most vigorous measures should be taken to disarm and arrest perpetrators. Maximum care should be devoted to all soldiers and especially to pulling out the wounded and sick. A wounded soldier must not be left in the battlefield without an attempt to pull him out.

9. Intelligence Support:
   In the course of 15 September 1993, all units shall send IP /reconnaissance patrols/ and IG /reconnaissance groups/ to reconnoitre the axis of attack towards the enemy.

10. Security Support:
    The focus shall be on providing Bo Os /combat security/ for units and protecting the wings and flanks of own units, and ensuring full protection of the existing KM /command posts/ and CV /communications centres/.
    I most strictly prohibit looting, slaughtering and killing of innocent civilians, while prisoners of war shall be treated according to the regulations on prisoners of war.

11. Engineering support:
    Focus on supporting movements and manoeuvres. Each unit shall make passages through obstacles for itself.

12. PNHB /Anti-Nuclear, Chemical and Biological/ Support:
    Focus on the possible use of h/o /chemical weapons/. Develop ABHO /nuclear, biological and chemical defence/ at the battalion KM.

13. Logistics Support:
    Logistics support for the battalion shall be established as follows:
    Sn St /Medical Station/ in the _____ sectors
    St Tob /Technical Support Station/ in the _____ sector.
    In St /Quartermaster Station/ in the _____ sector.

    Supply and evacuation routes _____.

    - ammunition and infantry weapons 1 b/k /combat set/
    - po /?anti-armour/ equipment

    During the attack, use dry rations. The priority in supply shall be on replenishment of ammunition.

14. To secure the left flank up to the line of the immediate task, the Prozor SB KM in Voljevac village, the next sector of the KM in the Brdo sector. Readiness of communications IMMEDIATE. Regular reports shall be sent every two hours and special reports according to need.

Sent to: requiring signature
- Prozor SB Commander
- Sutjeska Battalion Commander
- 2/bbt /?Mountain Battalion/ Commander
- 45th bbr Commander
- NGŠ
- 1 x files
- 317th bbr Personnel Service

Axis commander
C O M M A N D E R
317th bbr
/a signature/
Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ

No. 5

-TASKS OF GROUPS-

2/317th bbr /2nd Company of the 317th bbr/

- The first group, Sevko OŽEGOVIĆ, consisting of 25 soldiers from the 2/2nd bb /2nd Company of the 2nd Mountain Battalion/ and 15 soldiers from the Prozor SB. Task: to destroy VT /firing positions/ in Jurići village and, in coordinated action with parts of the company from Here village, capture the general area of Jurići village.
  Position a POG /anti-tank group/ in Poda village in order to obstruct and destroy armour and p/n /infantry weapons/ from that axis.

- The second group from the 45th bbr 30 soldiers strong, with five soldiers from the 2/2nd bb. Task: to cut off the Jurići village – Glibe village road, cover the area in the Lopatična Glava (tt 940) sector and secure fire support in the Jurići village and Glibe village sectors.

- The third group, Muhamed MUSLIĆ, consisting of 20 soldiers from the Sutjeska Battalion. Task: to rout the Ustashas in Glibe village and secure the left flank of our forces entering the Klupa and Stožina sectors.

- The fourth group, Ekrem KORMAN, consisting of 50 soldiers, 20 from the 7th Muslim Brigade and 30 from the 2/317th bbr, including ten for pulling out the wounded.
  Task: to capture the Klupa and Stožine (tt 1078) sectors and create conditions for the introduction of the main forces on the Makljen feature.

- The fifth group, Nedžad KIČIN, consisting of 20 soldiers from the 2/317th bbr, has the task of coordinating action with the fourth group and capturing the Brizovača (tt 1274) - Golušnica (tt 1301) line and creating conditions for further operations towards the Makljen feature.

- The sixth group, consisting of 14.5 mm PAM /anti-aircraft machine gun/ crews in the Tur (tt 1072) sector. Task: to neutralise the Ustasha PAM in Brajke village and provide support for the operations of other groups, and especially the group in the Brizovača sector.

  Keep a strong reserve for intervention purposes on the level of all groups.

Command of the 4th corps
Strictly confidential no. 958-06
On 15th of September 1993

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/handwritten 307 06-746-2/

COMBAT ORDER OP. 2-9/93

1. The enemy-the Ustasha forces of HVO carried out heavy artillery fire on positions of our forces in order to disable the active defence, by causing losses in men and MTS. Destructions are huge and the number of killed civilians is still not familiar. We can expect that the enemy would use all weapon at disposal ever more in further activities; VBR, tanks and especially the mortar fire on all positions of 4th corps units of the BH Army. After they fire from artillery, they will try the breakthrough at all directions that enable them to divide and encircle our forces in parts.
2. Our forces, command and 4th corps units of BH Army have taken the protection measures and reduced the number of wounded and killed persons to a minimum. The measures of combat readiness are at the highest level in all units. The forces of OG SOUTH – 1 and 1/42 bbr have caused significant losses in manpower and MTS to the inserted groups in deep enemy background. The forces of OG NORTH, along with forces of 6th corps of the BH Army started with activities at direction Vrdi – Goranci, directed towards Đubrani – Planinica and Mostar ravine.
3. TASK OG NORTH – 1 a) hold the existing lines towards the Chetnicks with forces of 47th bbr and Self-Standing battalion Nevesinje only to observe and, if necessary, to stop the Chetnicks. The lines towards the Ustashas are to be active at following directions: - after arrival of OG NORTH – 2 forces in grip of river Neretva: - perform the combat activity from direction of HE Solakovac – Vojno – Raštani. Perform the activity towards Đubrani with one group, and with the other, towards Planinica (group force, up to one platoon), cooperation from the left wing is performed by the 41st motorized brigade – The Glorius. After arrival to Raštani, direct the main forces to control the object Orlac. In the closer task/as written/, control the line : Đubrani – Raštani and in the next one the object Orlac.
   B) OG CENTRE: Hold the line towards the Chetnicks with forces of 41st motorized brigade – The Glorious, by observing the situation; be on stand by to be able to refure the possible attack by one part of forces.The lines towards the Ustashas are to be active according the following: perform the combat activities in cooperation with the 47th bbr at direction: HE Mostar-Raštani-Orlac water-gate. At the left wing in cooperation with OG SOUTH – 1 forces (force of one

company) and OG SOUTH – 2 (force of one reinforced platoon) perform the activities at direction: Stotina – Hum. At the right wing in the closer task, control the line Raštani and in the next task, the line Orlac. At the left wing in the closer task control the line Stotina and in the next one the object Hum.
At the central part of line towards the Ustashas, perform the activity in the following: plan the attack at direction Podhum and attack at direction Šantićeva, with usage of AG-1 and AF-1. The battalion of the military police uses the AG-1 and AF-1 that carries out the task at direction of city line towards the Ustashas. C) OG SOUTH-1 – hold the line towards the Chetnicks only by observing and stopping the possible attack. The line towards the Ustashas is to be active at direction: Kosor-Buna-Lakševine with task to control the Ortiješka Kosa and break out to the left bank of Neretva River. Perform the activity in cooperation with OG SOUTH -2 from the right wing. In the closer task control with Lakševine and in the next one secure the left wing and disable the breakthrough of Ustasha forces. Keep the forces on the left wing in the zone of responsibility active only to stop the breakthrough of the Ustasha forces. Subordinate one reinforced company OG CENTRE for activity at direction: Stotina – Hum. After breaking out to the Neretva bank, demolish the bridge in Žitomislići that makes the road to Čitluk. D) OG SOUTH -2: hold the line towards the Chetnicks by observing and be ready to refuse the possible attacks by the Chetnicks. Separate one reinforced platoon and subordinate it to the OG CENTRE for activity at direction Stotina – Hum.
TASK: perform activities at direction Ortiješ-river Neretva and in the closer task control Ortiješ, whereas in the next one, break out to the left bank of Neretva river.

4. The activities of 4th corps units are supported by the artillery group from the area of Rošac Mountain and artillery unit at disposal, by the activity according to artillery fire plan and request of the subordinated units to newly spotted targets.
5. SECURITY of the b/d – a) Before the beginning of combat activities at level of basic tactical units and sabotage groups, hold short meetings and introduce the soldiers to the situation and significance of the forthcoming activities. Introduce the soldiers to successes of our units in the area of s. Vrdi and Makljen passage. B) From the level of operative groups till the lowest level of units exchange the intelligence information and the rest of the time till the beginning of combat activities use for completion of data on disposition of Ustashas by observing and reconnaissance by force. C) Details on the preparations and time to begin with the activities, as well as the tasks to units are to be hold in absolute secrecy. Especially pay attention, within units, to hesitant and hectic soldiers in order to prevent fear and panic. Collect all combat documents and plans, captured from the enemy by the soldiers and hand them over to the Safety body of the corps. D) Before the units begin with the attack, prepare substantial engineering tool for fortification among companies. During the attack, use the natural shelters up to the maximum in order to be able to move, open fire and protect men. After the general task is carried out and after you break out to the ordered lines, set the engineering equipment on reached positions as soon as possible, manage the fire system and defend the taken line in absence. In case of organized counterattacks of the aggressor, request the artillery fire from the principal senior. E) Before you

start the attack within basic tactical units, examine and prepare all protection resources at disposal. Usage of chemical weapon of short term effect is expected during fight, therefore, keep the protection instruments ready and order the usage of those instruments by the slightest suspicion of chemical warfare usage. If possible, provide the sabotage groups with these devices. Organize the decontamination systems for the operative groups in cooperation with ABHO corps body, if necessary. F) Be maximally precise in determination of background safety system within the operative groups. Organize liquid meals within units till the beginning of combat activities and before performance of attack, divide SDO to the soldiers for…..days. to carry out the task, I approve the following amount of ammunition and fuel:
For the artillery weapon …….
For the weapon, determined to shoot…..
For vehicles…… reservoir load

Pay special attention to organization and functioning of ambulance service before and during the b/d.
Pursuant to regulations, organize and dispose the temporary ambulance behind the front line, and direct one paramedic- cursor manager within each sabotage group, with ambulance set. Organize ambulance accommodation and evacuation of wounded soldiers; the Chief of ambulance service of the corps and command OG are personally responsible to me regarding this matter.

6. Collect the war prey, captured by the units, register it at logistics and store it as such in magazines or use for combat purposes if necessary. Use the fire weapon against those who treat the war prey illegally.
7. Attack readiness in……./handwritten: perform activities only by the signal "WEST"/
8. My command post – the basic one shall be in the area of…. And the KM-forthcoming in the area of…..

In the corps, I shall command according to the communication plan.

Made in 6 examples and delivered to:
-OG CENTRE
OG SOUTH-1
OG SOUTH-2
OG NORTH-1
OG NORTH-2
Files

Commander
Arif Pašalić
/signed and stamped/

/hand-written:
15.09.1993./

I HEREBY APPROVE
COMMANDER Arif PAŠALIĆ

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 5

/stamp reads:
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
4 Corps; Mostar/

ORDER FOR ATTACK

Operative number: 02-174-15

Section: 1 : 25000

1. On the line of attack covered by Operative Group CENTAR /Centre/ there are: HVO 2nd Brigade; parts of HVO 3rd Brigade which has been reinforced by a battalion from Osijek of the "Bruno Bušić" Regiment; "Tigrovi" /Tigers/ Company; and several ATGs /Anti-Terrorist Groups/, each consisting of 20-40 soldiers. They are most probably deployed in the following way:

- In the Sector of Raštani-Electric Power Plant Mostar: reinforced Company equiped with 60 mm and 82 mm mortars, two anti-aircraft machine-guns 12,7mm, T-55 tank and recoilless gun;
- In Šantićeva Street Sector: 2nd Battalion of HVO 2nd Brigade, reinforced with an anti-terrorist group, with 82mm and 120mm mortars and occasional engagement of a tank from the sector of Mita and armoured tank from the sector of the Home for Retired:
- In Sector of HIT /department store/- health Care Center-Šemovac: 4th Battalion, reinforced with HR HB MUP /Ministry of Interior of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia/, two anti-terrorist groups, a Battalion on stand-by; 60mm, 82mm and 120mm mortars; and powerful POG /anti-tank shell/;
- In Sector Hum:
  gun, each consisting of four soldiers, and three bunkers with three soldiers each. The artillery pieces were positioned at trig points 412, 379, 436, 393, Pivorac.
- In Sector Stotina-Rodoč-Heliodrom: 9th Battalion and parts of HVO 3rd Brigade.

The most probable objective of the enemy is to prevent a breakthrough of our forces by persistent defence, establishing conditions for offensive activity.

Hastily performing engineering work to fortify the defence sector and for that purpose they are using civilians and prisoners of war. In their activities so far, the enemy used prisoners of war as a human shield and they are expected to do the same in their forthcoming combat activities.

Should HVO engage human shields, attempt must be made to eliminate guards and if guards cannot be incapacitated – the assignment still must be accomplished at any cost.

In their activities so far, the enemy forces have suffered great losses, which - in view of the general situation has affected the morale, (both militarily and politically).

The enemy forces have at their disposal chemical combat equipment, which they have been using so far, therefore it is to be expected that they will use it again.

In their activities so far, the enemy forces have been using pieces of artillery of all calibres, engaging them selectively against the entire town area.

2. The task of Operative Group CENTAR is to launch an attack on the downtown area and to take over the following lines:
- Electric Power Plant Mostar – Raštani – Orlac
- Šemovac – Podhum – 1st Elementary School
- HUM facility
- Donja Mahala – Stotin – Rodoč.

The following units have been attached to the Operative Group CENTAR to assist them in completing the assignment:
- from the formation of Operative Group SOUTH - 1 120 fighters
- from the formation of Operative Group SOUTH - 2 40 fighters
- from the formation of Operative Group NORTH – 1 40 fighters
- from the formation of MUP BiH 80 fighters

Upon the takeover of the above-mentioned directions, start engineering work on Positions and get ready for ready for repelling the counter-attack-
Readiness for attack is scheduled for 2400 hours on 19.09.1993.

3. On our right side: combat activities are to be carried out by Operative Group NORTH – 1 , which is tasked to take over the Đubrani-Krčevine-Platido /as written/sector;
To our left side: combat activities are to be carried out by Operative Group SOUTH – 2, which is tasked to take over the sector Aviation Bridge- Mostar

4. Having assessed the situation and the submitted proposals, I decided to launch an energetic attack by concentrating the main forces along the lines:
- Hum facility left of Stotin – Rodoč - Podhum to the right;
- Electric Power Plant Mostar – Raštani - Orlac; and auxiliary forces on the axes:
- Šantićeva Street – Home for Retired
- BNR /expansion unknown/ - High School Health Care Centre.

The enemy forces are to be crushed along the lines of advance of our forces, inflicting losses in manpower and technical equipment and materiel, and at the same time creating conditions for launching final operations, the purpose of which is definite liberation of the town.

5. 2nd Battalion of the Glorious /Slavna/ 41st Motorized Brigade, together with the reinforced Platoon from the 47th Mountain Brigade, attacks along the direction Mostar – Raštani – Orlac. Immediate assignment is to take over the Electric Power Plant Mostar and Raštani and get to the Savića Kuća Sector. Upon arrival at the above-mentioned Sector, conditions are to be created for introduction of

reserve forces and from there to extend the attack and take over the Orlac facility. Preparations are to be made there for repulsion of counter-attack from the direction of Rudnik .Mine/. person in charge: 3rd Battalion Commander.

6. 2nd Battalion of the Glorious /Slavna/ 41st Motorized Brigade, with the following units attached:

- Bomber Regiment Platoon	30 fighters
- 42nd Mountain Brigade Company	120 fighters
- reinforced 48th Mountain Brigade Platoon	40 fighters
- R BiH MUP	80 fighters
- Slavna /Glorious/ 41st Motorized Brigade special unit	45 fighters

Attack along the lines of advance:

a) Donja Mahala – Hum, the assignment is as follows: immediate assignment is to take over points of resistance at trig points 412, 379 and 436 and then, by introducing reserve forces, to take lines on the west and south-west side of Hum and get ready to prevent a counter-attack from the direction of Čitluk-Miljkovići and Mostar-Đikovina.
Upon completion of the assignment, the central town area and the sector around Heliodrom should be kept under control.
The person in charge is Deputy Commander of 42nd Mountain Brigade.

b) Donja Mahala – Sotin – Rodoč, the assingment is as follows: immediate assignment is to crush the enemy forces in the Sector of Stotin (trig point 81) and, in a co-ordinated action with 1st Battalion of Glorious 41st Motorized Brigade, take over the sector of Gatačka Kuća – „Soko“ Hotel – Višnjice: conditions should then be established to introduce reserve forces and extend the attack towards the sector Štamparija /Printery/ - Eementary School – settlement above the school and then fortify there and be ready to repet a counter-attack from the direction of Heliodrom.
Person in charge: Commander of 2nd Battalion

c) Šemovac – Podhum. Immediate assingment is to take over the sector that covers M. Bjelavca Street, M. Gupca Street and the Monastery. Create conditions for Introduction of reserve forces and then extend the attack and take over the sector between the 1st Elementary School and the multi-storey building. Get ready to repel counter-attack from the direction of Rondo, Balinovac and Panjevina.
Person in charge: 6th Company Commander.

d) Upon receiving of a signal for attack, start demonstrative attack at the sector of Šantićeva street and sector BNR /expansion unknown/, with an objective to rout enemy forces and strike them with disorientation and panic. Following assessment of 2nd Battalion Deputy commander, break into the defence facilities of the enemy.

7. In co-ordination with 2nd Battalion, 1st Battalion launches attack along the axis South Camp – Rodoč. Upon forcing the river, the immediate assignment is to take over the sector of Gatačka Kuća, and then the sector of the Printery building and link with 2 Battalion.
Get ready to repel a counter-attack from the direction of EAL /Aluminium Factory/.
Person in charge: Commander of 1st Batallion.

8. Artillery support for the attack will be provided by BVG /Battalion Fire Group/ along all lines of their battalions, while Motorized Tank Division of Glorious 41st Motorized Brigade will provide fire support in accordance with the plan worked out by Operative Group CENTAR Command.

9. Auxiliary Company of Glorious 41st Motorized Brigade will provide support as follows:
- in the direction of Raštani: Sagger anti-tank missile */maljutka/* and one recoilless gun, as per decision of 3rd Battalion Commander;
- in the direction of Šantićeva /Street/: nine rocket-propeleld grenades, as per decision of 2nd Battalion Deputy Commander;
- in the direction of Donja Mahala – Rodoč: one recoilless gun and one Sagger anti-tank missile, as per decision of 2nd Battalion Commander;
- one Sagger anti-tank missile, one red arrow, one 128mm LLR /expansion unknown/, as per decision of Operative Group CENTAR Command.

10. Anti-aircraft machine-gun – Glorious 41st Motorized Brigade Platoon provides support as per the following:
- one 14,5mm anti-aircraft machine-gun and one 12,7mm anti-aircraft machine-gun, as per decision of 3rd Commander;
- two 14,5 anti-aircraft machine-guns together with V.P. /Military Police/ provide support at the central town area, as per decision of Operative Group CENTAR Command;
- two 12,7mm anti-aircraft machine-guns provide support for 1st and 2nd Battalion, as per decision of 1st Battalion Commander.

11. Morale-related security should focus on preparation of units for completion of the assignment and explanation of objectives of the enemy propaganda-

12. All units should ensure observers on a permanent basis, and make sure that they report on every change regarding deployment of enemy forces.

13. Provide full control of deployment sector and movement directions of units. All Occurrences regarding enemy activites are to be reported immediately, while Suspicious individuals should be isolated.
Special attention is to be paid to ensuring protection against activities of sabotage-terrorist groups.

14. Engineering works must focus on setting barriers along the taken lines, including reinforcement of natural and installation of artificial barriers.
Fortification is to be built at the taken lines, in order to establish more favourable conditions for completion of future assignments.

15. Anti-nuclear chemical and biological support is to be focused on the use of protective means available for all soldiers.

16. Ensure ready-to-eat meal for all units for two days.
For completion of assignment I approve issuance of the following:
- ammunition for infantry weapons - 1,5 combat set
- support artillery – 1 combat set
- anti-tank group - 1 combat set

As regards supplying, replenishment of ammunition is a priority.
Facilities should be secured for admittance and treatment of the lightly wounded, whereas heavily wounded are to be transported to the 4th Corps war hospital.

17. My Command Post will be in the Public Auditing Service building, the Forward Command Post will be in the sector of "Ruža".

Readiness of communication is scheduled for _____.
Readiness for attack is scheduled for _____.
As concerns Operative Group CENTAR, it shall operate in accordance with the communications plan.

C/c:
- 1st Battalion
- 2nd Battalion
- 3rd Battalion
- 4th Corps Command
- Operations and Training Organ of 41st Motorized Brigade

COMMANDER
Samir DRLJEVIĆ
/signed and stamped/

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MILITARY SECRET
OPERATIVE GROUP SOUTH -1 TOP SECRET

Ref. Num: 01-25/93 *Stamp:* Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Date: September 17, 1993 4th Corps, Operative Group SOUTH – 1,
Mostar

COMBAT ORDER OP. 1-2/93

1. Ustasha forces and parts of Croatian Army (HV) conducted fierce artillery attacks against positions of our forces and civilian objects in the zone of responsibility of the Operative Group for the purpose of inflicting as greater losses to our manpower as possible and to destroy as much of technical-material resources as possible.
   Devastation of civilian objects was huge; fortunately the number of killed and wounded people was minimal.
   In the days to come it is to be expected for the enemy to intensify barrage activities through utilization of all available artillery weaponry and rocket systems, probably accompanied with infantry advancement in certain directions, and all that for the purpose of cutting of, besieging and destroying our forces. They have ...[1] combat resources and they will probably use it against all defense regions.

2. Forces of Operative Group SOUTH – 1 strongly hold the achieved lines in the current deployment regions.
   Task: Use part of the forces to reinforce the forces of Operative Group CENTER for the purpose of launching offensive activities in the town of Mostar, use the part of the forces to strongly preserve the achieved lines towards ustashas and chetniks.
   Conducting of combat activities is supported by VG[2] from the region of Blagaj.
   Combat readiness at 05:00 AM on September 20, 1993.
3. On the right side, in winery-Castija coffee shop direction, attack is to be carried out by the parts of Operative Group SOUTH -2, and other parts of the forces will be used to capture lines towards chetniks and ustashas.
4. I have decided to launch operational activities at the sides and into the depth of ustasha's forces, cave in the roads to Buna, use one reinforced company to actively support offensive activities of Operative Group CENTER, and use remaining forces to conduct active combat activities in cooperation with the forces of Operative Group SOUTH -2 .
   Combat deployment in reserve line of I VG[3].

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[1] Text partially visible
[2] Original abbreviation

5. The 1st, 2nd and 5th Mountain brigade shall detach units equaling the size of an reinforced company, for the purpose of conducting operational activities within Operative Group CENTER. Reinforce the lines towards chetniks and be ready for joint action with forces of Operative Group SOUTH – 2 in order to conquer .....[4] spur and Laksevine and reach the left bank of Neretva river. Sabotage team shall cave in the roads in Rotimlje- Buna and Capljina-Buna directions, and one Sabotage team shall conduct activities in the region of Aladinici.
6. Reconnaissance-sabotage platoon shall, upon being signaled, launch sabotage attack from the current location towards ustasha forces in the region of Grab and Dolovi.
7. Mortar battalion will from its current fire position support operational activities in the above said directions and will be ready to repel infantry attacks of ustasha forces along Buna-Blagaj direction.
8. Anti-Aircraft machine gun squad will intervene from their current positions upon request made by battalion commander.

9.a. Prior to launching operational activities, brief meetings are to be held at the level of basic units where soldiers will be informed with the situation and the importance of upcoming activities for the destiny of Muslim people.
9.b. All so far collected intelligence is to be processed and forwarded in written form to unit commanders, and continue to actively recon every move and activity of ustashas in the depth of the territory and at p/k[5].
9.c. All details on the course of preparations and operation timing, as well as tasks assigned to the units should be kept secret. All combat documents and plans that soldiers capture from ustashas during combat activities should be collected in organized manner and handed over to the security authorities of the Operative Group SOUTH -1.
9.d. In the course of the activities, natural covers are to be used for protection, while the defense line units will use the existing covers.
9.e. All units in the field are to be provided with 2 ....[6] for active combat activities, while the units in current regions will be provided with liquid meals.

Soldiers who going for the tasks will get 1 b/k[7], and manpower in active defense 0,5 b/k[8].Medical support will be carried out by Snv[9], and units will assign carriers for wounded and dead.

10. Within the Operative Group SOUTH -1, I will command through existing communications system. My command post is in D. Vranjevici and advanced command post in the region of Materi.

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[3] Original abbreviation

[4] Name of the spur not clearly readable in the original document
[5] Original abbreviation.
[6] Original abbreviation kept
[7] Original abbreviation kept
[8] Original abbreviation kept
[9] Original abbreviation kept

DELIVERED TO:
- battalion commanders, 3x
- commander of Anti-Aircraft machine gun squad
- commander of mortar battalion
- deputy commander for rear
- deputy commander for security

COMMANDER
Esad Sejtanic
Stamp: Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The 4th Corps, Operative Group SOUTH -1, Mostar

COMMENT:

And now, again, let's see what the commanders of BH Army write about?

This time it is Esad Šejtanić, commander of BH Army OG /Operative Group/ "SOUTH" – Mostar, 4th Corps of the BH Army.

Correction:

Unfortunately, they had more than 70 killed combatants in that attack and not because of the truce and retreat. Those are Esad's excuses for failures. And it is not the same, not at all, my dear reader – HVO "did cooperate" with VRS in order to pull out civilians and wounded combatants and to treat wounded combatants in their hospitals, because we couldn't transport them to our hospitals and in order to defend from BH Army aggression – Vareš, Konjic (Turija, Zabrđe) – but we have never, ever cooperated with VRS in order to attack someone or carried out a certain action together.

Never, ever.

That is what Esad Šejtanić, COMMANDER OF THE OPERATION GROUP "SOUTH", 4th Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina wrote.

Friendship and NONAGGRESSION PACT with Serbian side signed in June 1993, confirmed and locked by the Serbo-Muslim declaration signed by Alija Izetbegovic and Momčilo Krajišnik in Geneva on 16th September 1993, followed by the Serbo-Muslim declaration of 18th September 1993 signed by: Izetbegović, Karadžić, David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, continues to thrive.

Money and cannons for "tremendous Serbian artillery support" to attack Croats.

A year earlier, Army of the Republic of Srpska (VRS) have expelled the entire Muslim population living east of the Neretva River – and in Stolac and Dubravska plain, and East Mostar.

They took shelter among the Croats, and once HVO had liberated these areas, they came back.

Never mind what Serbs (VRS – Army of the Republic of Srpska) are doing to Sarajevo, Bihać, Žepa, Tuzla, Srebrenica, never mind.

BH Army does not attack Serbs, they want to expel Croats and share BiH with Serbs.

That is what it's all about. Everything else is nonsense.

NOTE:

Šejtanić, you had 70 casualties on the HUM hill. THAT'S WHY YOU STOPPED. Your offensive has failed.

Esad Šejtanić: Herzegovinians at the igneous gate of Bosnia

* * *

The established defence lines towards the Serbian forces weren't active in combat sense; however, there was a black market of all kinds of goods blossoming, especially in lack of food (flour, salt, sugar, oil, rise and others).

* * *

For this purpose, the commander of the 4th Corps at stayed in Sarajevo at the end of August, where assistance in material and men was arranged for the implementation of the forthcoming combat operations, and CCCH (Chief of Command of Central Headquarters) Sefer Halilović was sent to the field in order to coordinate all combat activities of forces planned for the operations.

According to combatants' findings that Sefer Halilović, along with forces from Bosnia was present in Jablanica, a spontaneous singing could be heard:

Sefer Pasha is walking through Bosnia, cleansing Bosnia from Ustashas.

Many things in the Command of the 4th Corps did not function very well, so at the proposal of us commanders, Miralem Jugo, commander of the 47th Mountain Brigade was supposed to take up the post of deputy commander in order to improve the operations and coordination of all units. Unfortunately, Miralem Jugo never took over this post, because he died in a car accident under very "suspicious circumstances" on highway M-17, arriving at the command post of fourth Corps. A number of incidents occurred in this period that could have resulted in the deaths of key officers of Army units, and had elements of deliberate assassination of commanders (Avdo Idriz, Esad Šejtanić, Ibrahim Demirović - Hećim), or have caused the death of a number of officers such as death of Ahmed Špage-Doktor, safety commander at 48th Mountain Brigade and Husa Imamović, newly appointed commander of the 50th artillery brigade.

Within planned combat activities preparations, a possibility that the Serbian side helps in direct artillery support and delivery of critical MS, started to be openly discussed, as well as, primarily, selling of significant number of artillery projectiles of various calibre.

I was present at one of the meetings, at the tangent line with the Serbian forces in the village of Busak, where Safet Oručević, Fatima Leho and Šefkija Džiho defined conditions under which the Serbian side would help in our combat activities.

Serbian side has agreed to deploy one 122 mm howitzer with a crew and 200 corresponding missiles on our positions in the region of mountain Rošci, from where in the course of combat operations they provided artillery support in line with orders of the 4th Corps commander.

I and Hasan Karadžić were deployed on the observation position in lower Vranjevići and Podveležje in order to command and coordinate artillery attacks from that area, all in line with the requirements of commanders of units performing combat activities.

As expression of care / page 182/ for the existing cooperation, to the Commander of Brigade Nevesinje, Novica Gušić, Safet Oručević gave almost a brand new Golf JX as a present.

All of us expected a lot from this reached agreement and this might have stimulated us to plan the next combat activities more audaciously that, to be honest, could not provoke a great result considering our strength and conditions on the field. Nevertheless, my unit, in cooperation with the 48th Mountain brigade, has been given a task to attack the key object in HVO-hill Hum defense, the hill that was dominating the city of Mostar. Deaths of Miralem Jugo, Hus Imamović and Ahmed Špage have somewhat slowed down our preparations as well as events immediately before and after the funeral, but the complex military-political situation forced us to urgently do something, because HVO will exhaust us so much in this way, that we would probably not be able to withstand their serious attack.

Once again, we analyzed the given information during 19th September, summarized how the preparations were realized and informed each other on course of combat activities, performed by the BH Army units at direction Drežnica-Vrdi-Goranci. It was very important that units in Mostar valley begin with their activities as soon as possible in order to facilitate further attacks of units from the North and to bring more confusion within the HVO and HV lines.

In the night, we managed to bring units to the city of Mostar with any difficulties whatsoever; Mostar was the point they should move from in the early morning towards the attack objects. The unit that was supposed to attack the Hum hill was commanded by my deputy, Tahir Turajlić.

The combat activities started in the early morning on 20th September and were carried out according to the planned dynamics, especially on wings, where we expected to succeed and than use it for extension of significant activities to the city core itself. Combat activities were especially well implemented in Višnjica, Hum, Raštani, Jedreni, and objects around Vrdi. Around 6.15 pm, Tahir informed me that he gained control over the right and left tower on the hill of Hum and that only the entrance tower from direction of Brkan hill is left and that it too will quickly fall.

The units in the city core were initially successful at direction towards the settlement of Balinovac, along with substantial Serbian artillery support, the success was rather expected.

Based on listening to the conversation over the radio network, the panic was visible in HVO and HV ranks and they were further shocked to learn that the Serbian side is directly assisting us in the operations. And when it was expected to move more decisively to combat operations and make final blow, the order from the commander of the 4th Corps came that the same are seized and we are to return to the starting position. Until then, the minimum losses in the units have increased tremendously during the redraw, so in my unit I had 4 dead (Tahir and Edin Turajlić, Selvedin Đono and Adis Šabanović) and 2 seriously wounded soldiers (Zulfo Rahić and Kemal Hasić). We did not understand why commander stop successful combat operations, but we found out during the night briefing that the request came directly from President Izetbegović, who during that day led the peace talks on British warship somewhere on the Adriatic Sea. The Croatian side conditioned the continuation of negotiations with the cessation of all combat operations of the 4th Corps and other Bosnian units against Mostar and its surroundings.

We attacked commander Pašalić for the disruption of combat operations and virtually accused him of being in cahoots with the official Sarajevo policy of digging the grave for Herzegovina, and that our trust in him as commander was still questionable. The commander "justified" his actions with the fact that he as a soldier had to carry out the order of the Supreme Commander, whatever the consequences may be. A consequence of combat operations to the units of 4th Corps were truly devastating. During the retreat to the starting positions, we had more than 30 people killed, about 100 wounded more or less seriously, and the high moral tumbled to the lowest level.

Šejtanić Esad,
Herzegovinians at the igneous gate of Bosnia,
/orig.title: Hercegovci na ognjenim vratima Bosne/,
Mostar, 2005

In A BiH terrorist action in the background the following persons were killed and massacred:

Marinko Vidić

Pero Puljić

Rudo Pavlović

Viktor Križanović

Vlado Vidić

Taken from photo elaborate of investigation on killed and massacred soldiers of HVO.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA /HZ HB/
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL /HVO/

HR /CROATIAN REPUBLIC/ OF HB
HVO GS /MAIN STAFF/
Reference number: 02-2/1-01-2570/93
Čitluk IZM /Forward Command Post/,
20 September 1993

DEFENSE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

In view of the new situation - the infiltration of the Mostar, Buna, Žitomislić and Čapljina territory by MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/ terrorist groups, and with regard to the Order from the Head of the Defense Department, number; 02-1-1296/93, dated 20 September 1993, I hereby

ORDER

1. Immediately mobilise all men and material means and all available military police and police forces, hunting associations and other available forces in this area in order to destroy, in an uncompromising manner, the MOS terrorist groups that have infiltrated the area.
2. Assemble these forces urgently and immediately place them under the command of the 1st Sector of the OZ JIH/Operative Zone of Southeastern Herzegovina/ which is under the command of Colonel OBRADOVIĆ.
3. Carry this Order out IMMEDIATELY.
4. The Chief of the VP /Military Police/ Department, the commanders of the Čapljina, Čitluk and Ljubuški police stations and the presidents of the hunting associations in the above-mentioned municipalities shall be responsible for carrying out this Order
5. The commander of the 1st Sector, Colonel OBRADOVIĆ, shall send me regular reports on the implementation of this Order.

Forward to:

- Colonel OBRADOVIĆ's 1st Sector
- Chief of the VP Department
- Ljubuški, Čitluk, Čapljina police stations
- presidents of the Ljubuški, Čitluk and Čapljina hunting associations

HVO GS COMMANDER
/signed/
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK

/stamp:/ Republic of BiH, HZ HB, 2, Mostar
Main Staff, Defense Department/

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ MAIN STAFF
No.: 02-2/1-01-2010/93
Mostar, 17 August 1993

Violation of agreement on cessation
of hostilities in BiH UN Međugorje

The Sarajevo agreement on the cessation of hostilities in BiH is violated by BH Army forces daily.

On 14 August 1993 BH Army forces violated the agreement to such an extent that they went into an all-out offensive on the Blagaj-Buna-Gubavica-Domanovići axis with only one goal – to capture the area of the Dubrava plateau.

The attack by BH Army forces began at 0430 hours on 14 August 1993 against the features of Hadialagića Kičin, Buna and Gubavica. By 0900 hours BH Army forces succeeded in capturing these parts.

In order to frustrate the intentions of the BH Army, HVO forces went into a counter-offensive and by 2100 hours on 14 August 1993 succeeded in recapturing the lost positions.

Unable to come to terms with their failure, BH Army forces went into a new offensives in these parts, and on 15, 16 and 17 August 1993 more intense battles took place.

HVO units have no intention of going into an offensive in the direction of Blagaj, but they will defend the line on River Buna and Bunik with all their might.

We are not expecting the BH Army to stop its attacks, because we have information that it has been issued an order by Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ to capture the Dubrava plateau at any cost and to break through to Tasovčići and Klepci and then to continue to Neum.

Please inform the co-chair of the Conference in Geneva about this and send a warning to the BH Army Staff to respect the agreement.

We also ask you to prevent unscheduled BH Army helicopter flights, which are not for humanitarian but for combat purposes.

Yours faithfully,

HVO MAIN STAFF
Major General
Milivoj PETKOVIĆ
/stamped and signed/

COMMENT:

In my opinion it is the right thing to do if we put documents of the aggressors, rivals and attackers in front of the reader.

Read what is Šefko Hodžić saying about the aggression against HVO because he follows the operation "Neretva 93" directly; he hangs with Sefer Halilović and company and reports to the public daily.

From D-204 I shall quote several paragraphs:

1. "We spoke about battles and commanders. I asked Delić whether he believed that those peace talks would indeed bring peace or they were merely "the war ornaments".
   - I think they are merely ornaments and that the war would go on – he responded.
   - Only damage comes from negotiations – Sefer added – the moral of combatants is decreasing …
   - What are you saying there, Sefer: "We shall reach Ploče too" – says Delić, smiling to Sefer, making allusion to a recent Sefer's statement that our army would "reach Ploče". Huge waves were made in Croatian press after his statement.

   Also smiling, Seefer explains to us how did this faux pas of his come into being?
   - I spoke on the gathering of Podrinje inhabitants – he told us – I said that we would liberate each part of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that our army will reach Bosnian borders and reach Neum too. At that moment someone from the first row shouted: "We will reach Ploče too!". And I said, "Well, so be it, we will reach Ploče too"!
2. "So far this is our biggest operation – says Sefer – if it succeeds, we shall completely change the strategic situation in our country. So shall President Izetbegović have strong aces in negotiations for the first time."
3. "In front of the Prozor battalion command Sefer again held a speech to the combatants of Prozor and Neretvica. He spoke about the significance of this "first offensive of ours".
   And then he added that this offensive that starts tomorrow "coincidently corresponds to the date when I, two years ago, on September 13th 1991 secretly started to organize the Patriotic League."

Tis coincidence with the date of our first offensive and the date of establishing the Patriotic League was also effective.

However, Sefer was not saying the truth, because, later, in that huge interview with them, he stated that he left YNA on 18th, 19th or 20th of September 1991 and after several days of checks, he joined the work with the Patriotic League. Hence "it is not quite the date when the first offensive starts".

When Sefer finished his speech, everyone remained silent for a short while. And then one of the combatants screamed: "Long live comrade Tito!". We all laughed. The combatants were pleased that Sefer was with them, and so was Sefer, for being among them. Sefer tells them:

- "This is the real thing – to be on the field with the combatants! I want to take the brigade and command it.

He was thrilled with the combat motivation of the fighters.

- "We will free entire Bosnia, isn't that right, Ćibo? – He addresses Ćibo who was standing next to us – There is no division of Bosnia. We shall wage war for ten years but we shall liberate it entirely.
- Not a chance! What division?! – says Ćibo.

4. "So far there hasn't been any bigger operation since the beginning of the war – says Sefer. –This is, actually, our first offensive, because in the morning, the front from Bugojno to Mostar shall burst into flames."
5. "Since the front length in operation "Neretva" was some 200 kilometres, I decided to follow battles from the forwarded command posts where information flow in, in order to send them to the redaction immediately. It was completely different to follow battles on Žuča where the commanders managed battles from the first lines."

6. " BH Army Main Staff reported on the battles. On Tuesday, September 21st, BH Army Main Staff reported more than I did; apart from liberation of Medved, they reported on liberation of Velika Vlainja and Vratnice village.

Of course, there were also reports on liberation of Hum, Raštani and Semovac in Mostar, as well as on pushing away HVO forces from Vojno mountain, which was one of the strongholds "of HVO extremists on the left bank of Neretva River, from Drežnica to Blagaj".

However, immediately after we returned to Sarajevo, on Wednesday, September 22nd, at 13:00 hrs Radio BiH broadcasted information that a truce was signed between BH Army and HVO in Vrdi, as well as that fighting in Herzegovina is stopped. It was also mentioned that present Zagreb Mufti, Šefko Eff. Omerbašić took part in those truce negotiations in Herzegovina.

That news confused us. Having that information, the command of the 4th Corps on the same day requested from the Main Staff an explanation "what does that mean regarding further activities in the zone of responsibility of the 4th corps". It has never been determined who launched that false news.

On that exact day, in the evening I met Dr. Safet Ćibo. He went to see Sefer Halilović. Dr. Ćibo tells me that he spent 4 hours with president Izetbegović yesterday. "The president is eager to fight", says Ćibo and adds that president Izetbegović yesterday said the following to him: "Liberate Stolac as soon as possible!". He also added several times "hurry, hurry!".
Ćibo went along to see Sefer in order to inform him about the conversation he had with president Izetbegović. So, there is no question about some truce that was, allegedly, signed.

7. "I asked Ćilić and Zajka whether they stick to this order and whether they would attack HVO on Pišvir the day after.
   – We do not believe that HVO would respect the truce. Do you? – says Ćilić.

I went to the command of Zulfkar unit in Donja Jablanica to ask Sefer, who probably got the order on cessation of combat actions between BH Army and HVO, whether we go back to Sarajevo. Sefer, however, was not in Zuka base. Nihad Bojadžić was there though. He tells me that they prepared "a severe war trick" for this new battle towards Vrdi and Mostar.

– What kind of trick" – I ask

– The one that Tito prepared here in the 4th offensive – says Nihko.

8. "Indeed, how did the truce between BH Army and HVO come into force last night at 18:00 hrs, what the radio reported constantly yesterday and this morning. I guess I should start my report with HVO attacking first. Besides, the rule of war reporting was in force at the moment – that "they always attack first and we always defend ourselves."

9. "And while the two of them talked, "Zoka" interrupted the communication and informed Sefer that Haris Silajdžić wanted to talk to him, being at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs. "Zoka" put Silajdžić and Sefer through.

Silajdžić said:

- Please Sefer, reduce the activities down there, because they are not in accordance with president Izetbegović's peace initiative. You know that president is in peace talks with president Tuđman…
- But HVO stroke first and we had to strike back –Sefer interrupted him. We laughed."

Reader! Think on your own, make your own conclusions!

I will merely say that their OFFENSIVE went to hell.

I will show you how many men they have lost in one of the forthcoming documents.

And I again kindly ask you to forget about stories about an "unfortunate conflict between Muslims and Croats"!

Hodžić, Šefko „UNSEALED ENVELOPE"

/orig.title: OTPEČAĆENI KOVERAT/

Sarajevo, DES, 2000

The Last Supper at "Ark"

It is Saturday, 4 September '93. Following the agreement we gathered in the garden of Dr Safet ĆIBO in Jablanica, beneath a grape arbour with ripe grapes: Sefer, KARIĆ, BILAJAC, SULJEVIĆ, ĆIBO, Hamo MASLEŠA and myself. KARIĆ immediately informed Sefer that a telegram came for him from Arif PAŠALIĆ from Mostar. PAŠALIĆ wrote that "the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ was preparing an all-out attack on Mostar" and that the attack "was to take place within five to seven days".

- We will hit them first – says Sefer. – Units are gathering on Sunday, reconnaissance is taking place on Monday and Tuesday, and we are starting off on Wednesday.

That was the first time I heard that some units should have arrived from Sarajevo, as reinforcement, but that they failed to arrive, and that Sefer, when requesting some Sarajevo units, he had difficulties to get them, for that would weaken the defence of Sarajevo. Immediately upon our arrival in Jablanica, on 2 September, Sefer sent a dispatch to the First Corps Commander Vahid KARAVELIĆ about exceptionally serious situation in Mostar, about the expulsion of Muslims, about how the HVO have proclaimed Mostar their capital and how they are taking measures to seize it.

For that reason Sefer ordered KARAVELIĆ to dispatch "a Delta Brigade, parts of the 9th and 10th Mountain Brigade and SOLAKOVIĆ's unit – manpower totalling to over 300 combatants, with complete equipment and weapons" to Herzegovina. In conclusion of the dispatch Sefer wrote this as well: "If you reckon that the Sarajevo defence is jeopardised through this secondment – I shall take the full responsibility."

***

DELIĆ and Sefer agreed to meet again at 12 hrs at the Command of the unit "Zulfikar" in Donja Jablanica. DELIĆ proceeded towards Jablanica, and we did so towards Neretvica.

DELIĆ's arrival put Sefer in a bad mood. From the front seat he turned towards Dr ĆIBO and me and we could clearly observe his fine facial features changing. He addressed ĆIBO:

- ĆIBO please tell DELIĆ to go to central Bosnia. I do not need him to mess around here. I am the one coordinating combats and I do not need him. I will take responsibility too should I fail. I will not be here if DELIĆ will. Let him go to central Bosnia.

***

We returned to the base of the unit "Zulfikar" in Donja Jablanica, where DELIĆ, VRANJ, BILAJAC, SULJEVIĆ, KARIĆ, ZUKA and several low-ranking commanders, came earlier. They held a meeting in a separate room. In a lobby with me sat commanders of units "Akrepi" /Scorpions/, "Silver Fox", Handžarci" and Drežnica Battalion. All those units were to be joined and, in the operation "Neretva", put under the command of the unit "Zulfikar". Everyone agreed to it save for Džeki, Handžarci Commander. In vain were attempts of Sefer and KARIĆ to persuade him.

- You want to have a private army – Sefer told him.

- I waged war in Croatia, I am on the warpath in Bosnia, but the true war for me will be in Kosovo – replied Džeki, who was an Albanian.

***

We were also talking about combats and commanders. I asked DELIĆ if he believed that these peace negotiations were really going to bring peace, or they were just "war ornaments".

- I reckon they are ornaments and that the war continues - he replied.

- From negotiations we suffer damage only – Sefer added. – The morale of combatants is dropping…

- Sefer and what you say: "We will reach Ploče too!", DELIĆ, smiling, says to Sefer, alluding to the recent Sefer's statement on how our army was going "to reach Ploče". Because of that statement of his huge fuss was created in Croatian press.

Sefer, also smiling, explained how that gaffe had occurred.

-I took the stage at a rally in Podrinjača – he narrated to us. – I was talking how we were going to liberate every part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and how our army was going to reach Bosnian borders, reach Neum… Then someone from the front row added: "Ploče too!" So I said, so be it, "Ploče too!"

***

In Dobro Polje Sefer held a meeting with commanders on preparing an offensive along the Prozor axis. Salko GUŠIĆ, Selmo CIKOTIĆ, Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ, Haso HAKALOVIĆ, Zaim BEŠOVIĆ, Munib MILIŠIĆ Barba and the host Enver BUZA, Prozor Battalion Commander, were there. As they were planning the combat, ĆIBO and I went with a Prozor combatant to Boban's "salvation path" which crossed through this part of the Zec Mountain.

***

Caco told us how he had problems with the enrolment of his combatants and their children to university and high schools and that he had to intervene personally and then they would be all admitted.

We asked him how he intervened.

- Well, fine – he said. – For instance thirty people of mine competed for a university. Afterwards they complained to me – nobody was admitted. How come? No? "Make me a list of all those who competed!" – I told them. They brought the list and I wrote few words with it and sent the letter to the dean through messenger.

- "What did you write to the dean, Caco? – we interrupted him.

- Two, three words to inform me through the messenger in writing that all of them were admitted. He signed it and really the messenger came and brought it in.

***

From the War Hospital, I went down to Jablanica centre. I met two acquaintances from the Jablanica MUP.

- "Have you heard what happened in Grabovica this morning?" they asked me.
- "No! What happened?"
- "Someone killed five-member Croatian family."

We went to MUP together. I asked if any of them would go to Grabovica, that I would go too.

- "No one can enter Grabovica" they told me. – "The army has blocked the road and they don't let anyone go through."

I went to the Command of the Zulfikar Unit in Donja Jablanica. Soon after Sefer HALILOVIĆ arrived and sat next to me. On that day he was going to Konjic, that is Buturović Polje. As some soldiers and commanders were coming close to our table, I asked him silently if he had heard what happened in Grabovica. He said he did.

Back then, we both thought that the motive of that crime was probably someone's personal revenge on the Croats from Grabovica who didn't have anything to do with his destiny, the destiny of the expelled Muslims or the released prisoners.

***

Before long, Sefer HALILOVIĆ and Dr Safet ĆIBO came to our base in Donja Jablanica. We went together towards Dobro Polje near Prozor and to Voljevac, where the Command of the Battalion of the 317 Mountain Brigade from Gornji Vakuf was located.

While we were travelling towards the northern part of the battlefield, I asked Sefer and ĆIBO about the massacre and the meeting in Konjic that was held two nights before. They both condemned the massacre, but they didn't agree with Bakir ALISPAHIĆ who they said, at the meeting in Konjic suggested to stop the operation because of the massacre and to pull back the Sarajevo units to Sarajevo. Dr ĆIBO said that he interrupted ALISPAHIĆ and told him, "Are you crazy? To stop the operation? The destiny of 100.000 Bosniaks from Herzegovina is at stake."

- "Let's make it clear", said Sefer. "I don't approve what happened in Grabovica. However, there is a sequence of moves. First, the offensive should be carried out and..."

- "And 100.000 people saved" said ĆIBO.

***

People are talking a lot about our offensive "up to Neum", and it is still far from being launched.

The time limit, during which it ought to have been terminated, had already expired, and it has not started yet.

As I was hungry, I stopped at the Command in Donja Jablanica. Sefer also came. He was also hungry. They brought us tomato salad, and we ate from the same plate. I asked him why we were running behind schedule.

- We have been carrying out final preparations – he said. – We are currently resolving some disagreements in Konjic, primarily those between Salko GUŠIĆ and Doctor Safet ĆIBO. ĆIBO wants to be in charge and to interfere with the Army, but he should be a logistical support to the army instead.

- Sefer, I have heard many versions about the scale of the offensive – I said to him. – That the plan is to go all the way to Neum. What is the truth in that?

This has hitherto been our greatest operation – Sefer said. – If we succeed, it will completely change the strategic situation in our country. For the first time, President IZETBEGOVIĆ will also have a strong hand during the negotiations.

II

Sunday morning, September the 12th. Sefer HALILOVIĆ with an escort, Doctor ĆIBO and I set off towards Dobro polje and Voljevac. We visited Haso HAKALOVIĆ in Neretvica. Haso went to Dobro polje, since one of his battalion, which was to take part in a battle along the Prozor axes, was already up there. Sefer advised Haso and an intelligence officer, Jusuf HADŽAJLIJA HOMEINI, to be careful to whom they were selling ammunition because "that ammunition can easily end up in the lake with the intention of making our army weaker".

***

Let us go back to Dobro polje and September the 12th, 1993.

We left the combatants from Neretvica and went to see the soldiers from Prozor, who were being deployed some hundred metres further down all over the plateau, and were taking target practice. When we approached them, they stopped with the practice and gathered around Sefer and their commander Enver BUZA.

Sefer held a brief, effective speech before them. He just told them:

- You must carry out this assignment. You must liberate Vilić guvno and Makljen, and then Prozor as well. I have nothing more to say to you.

We continued towards Voljevac, up to the combatants of the Second Battalion of the 317th Mountain Brigade from Gornji Vakuf. Together with them, there was a unit, comprised of Foča men who fought at Proskok, on Igman. The combatants lined up on a clearing by a rivulet. Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ, the 317th Brigade Commander, was also with them. Sefer held a brief speech before them, as well.

- Can we carry out what we are expected to do? – Sefer asked the formation.
- We can! – the combatants answered with one voice.
- So, shall we join the offensive?
- We shall!
- Your task is to liberate Crni vrh tomorrow – Sefer told them. – You will be accompanied by the combatants from Neretvica.

Sefer thought that he should meet again with the combatants and the commanders of the Prozor Battalion and Neretvica. Therefore, we immediately returned to Dobro polje.

In front of the Command of the Prozor Battalion, Sefer held another speech before the combatants from Prozor and Neretvica. He talked about the importance of this "first offensive" of ours. Then he added that that offensive, which was to start the day after, "coincidentally coincides with the date when I began to clandestinely organise The Patriotic League with my friends two years ago, on 13 September 1991."

That coincidence between the date of our first offensive and the date of the PL /Patriotic League/ founding was also effective. But Sefer was not telling the truth. Because, afterwards, in the course of that great interview with them, he stated that he had left JNA on 18, 19 and 20 September 1991, and that he joined the PL not until after a few days of checking. Therefore, it is not exactly on "the next day when the offensive is to be launched".

When Sefer finished his speech, there was a silence prevailing for a while. And then one of the combatants exclaimed: "Long live Comrade Tito!" We all laughed. The combatants were pleased to have Sefer there, and Sefer was pleased to be with them. Sefer told me:

III

- This is the real thing – to be with the combatants in the field! I am tempted to take over the brigade and the command. III

He was thrilled with the combatants' motivation to fight.

- We will liberate the whole Bosnia, won't we, Ćibo? – he addressed Ćibo who was standing next to us. – Bosnia will not be divided. We will make war for ten years but we will liberate it entirely.

- Out of the question! Forget about division! - Ćibo said.

***

- From the beginning of the war to this point, there has not been a greater operation – Sefer said. – And this is, in fact, our first offensive. Because, tomorrow morning, fighting will break out on the front from Bugojno to Mostar. IV

We have reckoned that there might be five thousand combatants taking part in the offensive. Vilić guvno is to be attacked by the combatants from the West Operative Group from Bugojno. The combatants from Neretvica and Gornji Vakuf, as well as the unit of Foča men, will be engaged at Crni vrh, and the Prozor people somewhere between Vilić guvno and Makljen.

And some units of the Sixth Corps, reinforced with the soldiers from Sarajevo, will be engaged on the southern part of the front, as well as the entire Fourth Corps. And those are many units, small and big ones.

Sefer appointed Zuka commander of the units that are to attack Mostar from Jablanica. I asked Sefer what his role would be the following day.

- I co-ordinate combat activities from Bugojno to Mostar – he said.

And he chose to observe the battle of Vrdi the next day.

And Ćibo has begun to imitate my combat reports, which "we will hear tomorrow".

"Ustashas are attacking with all their strength! Where is the NATO pact, where is the world community?.. Nevertheless, our men are fighting bravely" – he repeated a couple of times those "reports" of mine, while we were driving through the night.

***

Why BUZA failed to move

Operation "Neretva" began on Monday morning, 13th of September 1993. Hollow shelling detonations that could be heard from the direction of Prozor were a signal that our guys had moved on the north-west part of the front towards Crni Vrh, Makljen and Vilića Guvno.

***

Crni Vrh was on fire with explosions and infantry fighting. We arrived in Voljevac, which was also being shelled.

At the Command of the Gornji Vakuf 317th Brigade's 2nd Battalion were Vehbija KARIĆ, Zićro SULJEVIĆ, Rifat BILAJAC, Haso HAKALOVIĆ and Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ. They announced the happy news: our guys at Crni Vrh were holding up well. They liberated an important elevation of Gvozd and were advancing. However, they were all angry with BUZA who "once again failed to move". Sefer told SULJEVIĆ that tonight he goes with the men from Prozor, because he does not trust BUZA to move if one of us is not with him.

SULJEVIĆ accepted this unreservedly.

I asked Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ, the Commander of the 317th Mountain Brigade, to find me a soldier whom I could go to Crni Vrh with and monitor the battle.

"What Crni Vrh?", ZEJNILAGIĆ asked. "I need a whole company of men to get you to Crni Vrh alive. Can't you see it is hell now at Crni Vrh?"

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Towards evening at the IKM /Forward Command Post/ in Voljevac new unpleasant news arrived. In the battle at Crni Vrh, our soldiers came across a minefield and there were both dead and wounded. Ahead of that minefield the soldiers paused. The second unpleasant piece of news: the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ was attacking with tanks from the flank, which was unprotected because the Prozor men did not move in and close that axis. The HVO was firing from tanks not only at our guys at Crni Vrh, but also at Voljevac.

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Tuesday, 14th of September '93. I got up early and got ready to go to Glogova and find Zuko, whom Sefer had appointed to command over the southern part of the front - towards Mostar. However, not a single shot could be heard from the south even though the fighting was to start early. The unit's logistics officer "Zulfikar" ŠPAGO told me that the communications men hadn't rolled out the telephone cable yet, but that the fighting will most certainly start today in the direction of Mostar as well.

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"All quiet at Zuko's, while Prozor is on fire. Prozor is "calling" me again."

I wanted to persuade Sefer to change the decision and to set out today towards Dobro Polje and Voljevac, instead of Mostar. He phoned to check the situation at the southern part of the front.

"Nothing is going on down there yet. We are going to Voljevac" - he said. And we all set off.

At about 1 o'clock in the afternoon we reached Dobro Polje. There were only a few

older soldiers and women gathered in front of the headquarters of the Independent Prozor Battalion. They immediately started bragging about how their soldiers had captured the village of Uzdol that morning. We went to the Prozor Battalion Communications Centre.

The communications officers confirmed that early that morning their soldiers had "surprised Ustashas at Uzdol, found them in their pyjamas", how they "killed quite a few Ustashas" and liberated the whole village, but that the HVO reinforcements were on their way to help Uzdol, so that the soldiers from their battalion had to withdraw. That was the latest news from "the field".

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HAKALOVIĆ, who did not have answers to many of the questions the soldiers were asking, told Sefer how his soldiers had withdrawn from Crni Vrh. This was shocking news. Enver ZEJNILAGIĆ, who was standing beside me, said: "My men had withdrawn too." But seeing how furious Sefer was about the withdrawal of soldiers from Klis, he didn't dare tell him at that moment that the soldiers from Gornji Vakuf had also withdrawn from Crni Vrh.

"ZEJNILAGIĆ, where are your soldiers? Are they at least holding what we liberated yesterday?", Sefer asked, all shocked and pale.

"My soldiers retreated, too", ZEJNILAGIĆ answered in a low voice.

A hush fell.

"So, we're now back at our initial positions?" - asked Sefer, looking at ZEJNILAGIĆ.

"At the initial ones", ZEJNILAGIĆ answered in a low voice.

But then the Neretvice soldiers took the floor.

"Our reconnaissance was insufficient", said one soldier. "We should have spent longer on reconnaissance. Even late Seid had asked for another day or two of reconnaissance before the move. Once the fighting had started, they should have at least sent us to the side of the Crni Vrh we had carried out the reconnaissance on. Instead we were sent to a completely different area."

"We didn't even get the stretchers and we had both killed and wounded men", another soldier added.

"And why did you withdraw from Crni Vrh?", Sefer asked.

"We want to go to Seid PADALOVIĆ's funeral", soldiers replied.

And they all want to go to the funeral in Klis.

"There will be no retreat, the action continues", Sefer told them. "Who else will liberate us if we do not do it ourselves?"

Sefer managed to calm the soldiers.

We continued towards Voljevac. We saw Vehbija KARIĆ and Rifat BILAJAC beside a small river washing their feet.

"We just took our shoes off after three days", KARIĆ said.

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And what did happen in Uzdol on 14th of September 1993? I know only what I read in the Croatian press, which mentioned a massacre of 41 Croats from Uzdol (12 HVO soldiers and 29 civilians), and what Enver BUZA and Zićro SULJEVIĆ had publicly said. They claimed that there was no massacre and that instead "it was a military victory".

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Thursday, 16 September 1993. Despite the fact I was tired and sleep deprived due to yesterday's events in Drežnica and due to last night's slow and dangerous drive in transportation vehicle to Zukin base, I went to the command of 44. Mountain Brigade in Jablanica to write and send to redaction a broader report on the battle for elimination of blockade of Drežice. And to see what is happening around Lake Jablanica. Because, roars are coming from this direction.

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After the meeting, Sefer told me that tomorrow we would attack all together: soldiers from Bugojno towards Vilića Guvno, men from Gornji Vakuf, Klis and Prozor towards Makljen, and these units towards Mostar. Since Valter was hanging about, he gave him some order and Valter left.

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Silent war Sefer-Pašalić

Saturday, 18th of September 1993. This morning I again stopped by the Command of the 44th Brigade in Jablanica. At the Communications Centre they showed me a telegram sent to Sefer by Selmo CIKOTIĆ, Commander of the Operative Group "Zapad". In his telegram CIKOTIĆ wrote about his soldiers' triumph in a battle towards Vilića Guvno, stating that they had liberated the 1409 metres high Karaulica elevation, dominating over Vilića Guvno.

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Since the length of the front line in Operation "Neretva" was approximately 200 km, I decided to monitor the battles from the forward command posts where information poured in, which I could then immediately send to the editorial office. It was completely different to monitor the battles at Žuč where the commanders had led the battles from the front lines.

V

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"Operative Group "Zapad", in the context of joint activities of 6th Corps units, was tasked with breaking through towards Vilića Guvno and taking over Vilića Guvno. The 6th Corps units were to take over Makljen, hence practically liberating the territory of Gornji Vakuf. During the Operation "Neretva" the units of OG "Zapad" took over the region of Maljevina, AREŽAN's and PRSKALO's stables, captured Ostrožac, Barakovac, Tica and Karaulica and by doing this practically reached Vilića Guvno. The fighting was constant for three days and the activities stopped when we found out that the 6th Corps units did not take Crni Vrh, so we, afraid of being wedged

in, stopped at those lines. We kept all the liberated elevations and heights until winter when we withdrew from Karaulica, Barakovac and Tica. We kept the other elements as a basis for the next potential battle for Vilića Guvno."

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In the afternoon of the 18th of September 1993, the fighting continued on the southern part of the front, towards Mostar. I went with Sefer to a 105 mm howitzer artillery position at Grabovica. We listened to the explosions and infantry fire. Sefer failed to establish connection with Zuka and Nihad BOJADŽIĆ. In the evening, Nihad returned to the base and said that it was "impenetrable", that we had not broken through any HVO lines, that two soldiers were killed and quite a few wounded. Nihad also was lightly wounded.

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Besides, during the Operation "Neretva" and even before, there was some sort of "silent war" going on between Sefer and PAŠALIĆ. Since we embarked on Herzegovina, some soldiers from Mostar would visit Sefer and there was always talk of PAŠALIĆ. Sefer was on the side of those who were against PAŠALIĆ and did not get on well with those who praised him. Even during the preparations for the offensive, Sefer told me how in March that year he had given Mithad HUJDUR Hujka 300.000 marks to "buy weapons from Ustashas, without PAŠALIĆ knowing", but with the agreement of the President IZETBEGOVIĆ." With that money, he said, Hujka bought weapons from the HVO ("Ustashas took weapons off APCs and sold them to Hujka") And, he added, Mostar was saved with those weapons.

"It is true that Sefer gave Hujka money, but it was 600.000, not 300.000 marks", PAŠALIĆ later told me. "When I found out that Hujka got that money, I called him and he admitted that Sefer had given him the money, but "without PAŠALIĆ knowing." "I immediately went to Sarajevo with Hujka, past the runway, to see Sefer. "Tell me, who gave you the money", I asked Hujka in front of Sefer. Sefer told Hujka: "Well, I told you to tell PAŠALIĆ!"

"You told me that PAŠALIĆ must not know", Hujka replied. Sefer could not say a word.

There are more interesting stories about the "silent war" between Sefer and PAŠALIĆ. I spoke to both of them about it, but here I will only mention that part of their "war" which took place during the Operation "Neretva".

Of course I spoke to PAŠALIĆ on a number of occasions about Operation "Neretva". "I participated in the planning of this operation in Sarajevo", PAŠALIĆ said. "BILAJAC, Sefer and I planned it, and partly Commander DELIĆ who signed it. However, Sefer was late to come out of Sarajevo."

The impression I got was that there was no communication between Sefer and PAŠALIĆ during this offensive, the main aim of which was to break the blockade, that is to liberate entire Mostar. I asked PAŠALIĆ about it.

"I had no contact with Sefer and this was strange to me", PAŠALIĆ said. "Something strange is going on", I told my associates and wanted them to witness it all. In fact, we too were guided by your reports which we listened to over the radio. When you reported that Medved was liberated, I concluded it was time for us to move and I issued an order to attack Hum. And we liberated it. However, the units from Jablanica stopped and the plan of Operation "Neretva" was that when I reach Hum, Sefer should be in Đubrani. Since the units from the Jablanica direction stopped, we also had to retreat from Hum. We lost a few soldiers, one brigade commander, had quite a few wounded."

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Later on, I again asked Sefer why he returned to Sarajevo after a series of brilliant victories and the liberation of Medved.

"To ask for reinforcements", he told me. "Because the soldiers down there were already tired of fighting and we needed to introduce fresh forces to finish the job. It seems to me that at that point the most ideal opportunity to "finish the job" in Operation "Neretva was missed.

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False news on truce

Even the ABiH Main Staff reported on fights. The Main Staff gave more information than me on Tuesday, the 21st of September: together with liberation of Medved, they informed on the liberation of Velika Vlainja and the village of Vratnica.

Of course, they informed on the liberation of Hum, Raštani and Šemovac In Mostar and on the rejecting of HVO forces from the Vojno hill that was the only base of "the HVO extremists on the left side of the river Neretva from Drežnica to Blagaj".

But as soon as we returned to Sarajevo, the BiH radio announced on Wednesday, 22nd of September at 13.00 hrs that the truce has been signed between ABiH and HVO in Vrdi and that the fights in Herzegovina had been stopped. It was mentioned that the present Zagreb Mufti Šefko ef. OMERBAŠIĆ participated in the discussions on the truce in Herzegovina.

We got confused by that news. Following that information, the command of the 4th Corps requested the explanation from the Main Staff on the same day about "the meaning of that for the further activities in the 4th Corps area of responsibility". It was never known who announced that false news.

In the evening of that same day, I met dr. Safet ĆIBO. He went to visit Sefer. Dr. ĆIBO told me that he spent four hours yesterday evening in president's IZETBEGOVIĆ'S residence.

"The president is aggressive", said ĆIBO and it seems that president IZETBEGOVIĆ told him last night: "Liberate Stolac as soon as possible!" And then he added several times: "Hurry up, hurry up!" ĆIBO then went to see Sefer to inform him on his

VI

discussion with president IZETBEGOVIĆ. VI

That means no discussion about the truce that was allegedly signed.

I went to the Main Staff on Friday to see Sefe HALILOVIĆ. He sat in his big office where fateful decisions for the defense of the country had been made for over a year. Three to four months ago, there were always many commanders there. In the office and in the hall. One could reach Sefer with great difficulty.

Now there was only his little son Samir in his office, with whom he was playing. Although it was day, his at this moment "peaceful" office was dark, with the candle burning. The atmosphere was mystic. He was happy to see me. I asked him when we shall go to Herzegovina.

-We won't go before Monday, he said.

And then he started immediately to complain that the politics and the 1st Corps Command are plotting against him.

-I can not find 300 fighters for Herzegovina. They won't let me!, Sefer said.

I went to Holiday Inn on Monday, 27th of September where the Bosniac-Muslim congress had to begin with the main topic whether to accept or reject the newest peace plan for BiH. I approached the commander DELIĆ, who was sitting in the first row, between Enver HADŽIHASANOVIĆ and Sulejman VRANJO before the start of the Congress.

-What you did is no good, I heard it on the radio, DELIĆ said to me.

In other words, I was reporting from the battlefield not only for "Oslobodjenje", but also for BiH radio. On this very morning they broadcast one of my programs from the Herzegovina battlefield.

-What was not good?- I asked commander DELIĆ.

-Well, that direct broadcasting of the combat with Sefer- explained DELIĆ.

-That was not a direct broadcast of the combat. The program was broadcasted several days after the combat-I said.

-You are broadcasting the combat as if it was a football match, and that is not good- Djedo added.-I was always against such reporting from the battlefield.

In the congress break I approached Fikret MUSLIMOVIĆ and Osman BRKA.

-This thing with Sefer was not necessary. Some people reproached it to you. When I listened to your reports from Herzegovina and when you mentioned some commanders, I thought whether it was the same reporter who reported from Žuč about ŠEHOVIĆ and ZAJKO...

-No, you didn't have to write in that way about Sefer- said BRKA.

-But, there are big combats in Herzegovina, a big area was liberated and I reported the same way as I did it from Žuč- I said.

-One more thing- continued MUSLIMOVIĆ. –Sefer is saying bad things about the president and you are listening to that. You should have returned from Herzegovina when you heard it for the first time.

-Sefer did not say anything against the president, but about the conceptual differences between the two of them regarding the defense of the country- I said.

Commander DELIĆ approached us and I told him that these people are criticizing me too.

-They shouldn't have to, said DELIĆ.

BRKA had a disagreement with Sefer on the 15th of April 1993 when there was a celebration of the first anniversary of our Army, where Sefer had a speech. Sefer approached BRKA after the celebration and asked him if he liked his speech. "Half of it was good, half of it was bad", said BRKA. "What is not good?" asked Sefer. "You did not mention the role of SDA and Alija in the defense of the country", replied BRKA.

I reached an agreement with Djedo to come and see him in Central Bosnia right after the congress and follow the combats, but not to report on the war as if it was "a football match". I gave up on going to Herzegovina consequently.

But in the evening, while the congress was still going on, Safet ĆIBO told me that one of the Sefer's men was looking for me regarding Sefer's departure to Herzegovina on the same evening; so if I am willing to go with him, I should get ready immediately since he is leaving at eight. I immediately remembered what ĆIBO told me few days ago. In this new combats in Herzegovina they could not only de-block Mostar, but also liberate Stolac. There was no force so strong to stop me going again to Herzegovina.

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We arrived to Donja Jablanica at the dawn of 28th of September.

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Sejo DJULIĆ said that they were all the time broadcasting my reportage on the battle for Medved on the radio that caused the people in western Mostar to "panic and run away". He said that the Croatian Radio in Mostar tried to calm the people down saying the truce was signed and that IZETBEGOVIĆ pulled Sefer HALILOVIĆ to Sarajevo.

-Two or three days later, said DJULIĆ, the Croatian radio from western Mostar started to talk about the victory against the units commanded by Sefer.

Djulic told me that "the Ustasha's legs are shaking" when Zuka and Sefer are mentioned and that it would be good if I could mention them more frequently in my reportages.

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A new deception on Neretva

Wednesday, 29 September 1993. I went again to the Command of 44. Mountain Brigade to see what's going on Pisvir, most of which is now in the hands of HVO. Since yesterday people in Jablanica live in fear. Because, if HVO takes the entire Pisvir, Jablanisa is also threatened. But Chief of Staff Semiz Čilić and security Zajko Sihirlić say that today there are no fights in Pisvir, our troops as well as HVO are

digging in. They say, tomorrow, our troops will move into action to regain lost positions on Pisvir.

Sihirlić gives me the paper across the table says: "This we have just received from the Commander Gušić. Read "

It is the order from the Commander of the Sixth Corps Salke Gušić to all units of the Corps to terminate the combat operations on HVO forces. The order comes into force tomorrow on 30 September 1993 at 6 p.m.

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I asked Čilić and Zajko if they will comply with this order and whether they will attack tomorrow HVO on Pisvir.

- We do not believe that HVO will comply with the ceasefire. Do you? - Said Čilić.

VII

I went to the Zulfikatr unit headquarters in Donja Jablanica to ask Safer, who probably received the order for ceasefire between the Army and HVO, if we are returning to Sarajevo. Safer was not at Zukin's basis. But Nihad Bojadžić was. He tells me that for this new battle towards Vrda and Mostar they have developed a "cunning deception".
- What kind? I ask.
- The kind Tito here prepared in the Fourth offense - Nihko says.

He explained to me what's the reasoning behind this new deception on Neretva River.
We will not start the operation with attacks on Vrda and Mostar, where HVO expects us, but towards the West - by Rakit's and Boban's "road of salvation." Croats would think that the Bosnian army is moving to Lištica and Posušje, and we expect them to transfer their troops from Mostar and Vrda to the west in order to stop the progression of our units. And then in a day or two we'll strike with full force towards Vrda and Mostar.

As reinforcements from Sarajevo, 150 soldiers from the First Mountain Brigade arrive in Jablanica. On Thursday, September 30th, they were waiting for helicopter from Zenica the whole day in full combat readiness on helipad below Zukin base. But the helicopter was not coming, which made soldiers angry. They were led by Samir Muhić Švabo. He tells me that they were looking for 150 volunteers for Herzegovina and that even more soldiers volunteered.
Their assignment was to attack Vrda together with units of the Fourth Corps from the east side. They were supposed to be transferred by helicopter this morning to Glogovo, and then continue on foot.

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Mutual accusations of the commanders

Friday, 1st October 1993.

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VIII

Since at 18:00 hours last night the ceasefire against HVO indeed went into effect, and the Radio was continuously reporting on that last night and this morning, I had to start the report telling that HVO was the first to attack. Otherwise, it was still a rule of reporting on the war by saying that "they always attack first, and we are always on the defence".

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In the feuilleton published in the autumn 1993, which devaluated results of the operation "Neretva", "*Ljiljan*" announced that, due to that and the next report, President IZETBEGOVIĆ contacted the BiH RTV Director Mufid MEMIJA. MEMIJA indeed confirmed that to me. The President told him then that my reports from Herzegovina were "fanning the war-flame".

A close associate of President IZETBEGOVIĆ also told me that he had been in IZTEBEGOVIĆ's cabinet when my report was broadcast. Several high-ranking military officers were present too. When the report was broadcast, Fikret MUSLIMOVIĆ, the then Counsel of the President, said: Ah, my Sefer and my reporter, what are you doing on those mountains? Why aren't you going towards Mostar?"

Everything was therefore happening at an inconvenient time (several hours after the ceasefire), like in a Shakespearean "tragedy of errors". And even those elevations were "dubious", so that in the preparations of the "Sefer affaire" the news was launched that not only had the elevations not been liberated, but that they had not existed at all!?

From the 44th Brigade Command I returned to Zuka's base in Donja Jablanica and found Sefer there. Sefer was enthusiastically telling me how everything was "exceeding the plan" and talked about the main attack in the direction of Mostar that was to begin the next day. We were alone and he took two documents out of his briefcase.

Take a look at this, please, he said to me.

He first read to me a telegram that Commander Rasim DELIĆ sent him on 25th September. DELIĆ wrote: "I received an alarming telegram from Arif (Pašalić, note by ŠH) regarding the situation and the pressures he endures on the part of HVO and HV. He claims that you are doing nothing on that line of attack to alleviate his position. Do everything you can to help him, if not by a combat on the Drežnica -Vrdi line, then by sending manpower directly to Mostar."

Sefer also read to me the answer he sent Commander DELIĆ as late as today, on 1st October.

At the beginning of the letter Sefer stated that Arif PAŠALIĆ's telegram on the whole did not reflect the true situation in the field, "because, in the last five-six days, HVO was unselectively shelling Mostar and with a much lower intensity than before." Sefer then wrote to DELIĆ that the "Ustasha and Croatian Army focused their attacks on Jablanica via Pisvir", and that they were continuously targeting Jablanica. "Pisvir, as a domineering facility", wrote Sefer, "was almost seized twice and reclaimed by the engagement of the 4th Corps' Reconnaissance-Sabotage Brigade (Zuka's unit), and partially by engaging the units that had come out of Sarajevo, so that a very small forces was left for the offensive actions due to the subjective

weaknesses of the 1st and 6th Corps."

Sefer then listed all "subjective weaknesses of the 1st and 6th corps commands.

"Now, listen", Sefer told me and continued reading slowly, emphasizing every word.

He read: "From the1st Corps, 300 soldiers (one battalion) were to come to this area so as to complete the Vrdi action, although one to two brigades were needed for taking Vrdi. Around 150 men came to Hrasnica, of whom 50 returned to Sarajevo due to the shortage of fuel.

Although, with your agreement, I told 6th Corps Commander Salko GUŠIĆ to meet me in Jablanica on Saturday, he has not appeared by the present day and there are no contacts from him either. That has become his practice. For 4-5 days I was looking for him in the 6th Corps zone of responsibility, and on the sixth day I accidentally met him in the 6th Corps Command, although if Pisvir is lost, it will be difficult to defend Jablanica and the Neretvica valley. It seems that he quite seriously understood that I cannot issue orders to him, which basically I neither will nor want to do. But, it would be a matter of courtesy for him or someone from the Command to contact me at least because fierce combat actions are in progress here."

Sefer briefly stopped reading and said:

"Something is wrong with GUŠIĆ. While I was creating the Patriotic League, he was in JNA."

Sefer continued reading his letter to DELIĆ: "I have sent four orders, and even requests, for a helicopter to come to transport heavy wounded soldiers and one company to the region of Bijelo Polje, and it came at last after my and your interventions. A company of 150 men was transported to Bijelo Polje for the purpose of helping Mostar.

A lot more could have been done in the 44th and 45th brigades' zone of responsibility and in the direction of Prozor and Mostar too. The 6th Corps Commander and Command organs avoid any contact with me only to prevent any advance while I am here. It seems to me that someone, and I do not who, does not want success while I am in this region. If that is indeed so, I am immediately going back to Sarajevo, but it is a pity for several thousand men (around 7.000) to sit still in the Neretvica valley and Ustashas are at Gašino Brdo so that the Jablanica – Konjic road cannot be used."

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What a lucky day on the eve of tomorrow's decisive battle for Mostar!

But Sefer's letter to DELIĆ was on my mind all the time.

Later on I spoke to General Rasim DELIĆ about Sefer's letter and the accusations, that circulated for a long time, that it was "Sefer HALILOVIĆ's private operation".

"A private operation does not exist in the Army", said DELIĆ. "HALILOVIĆ was the Chief of Staff and did not act privately, even if he had organized something in my absence. However, that operation had been planned. He was the head of the team that planned it. It was approved on the meeting of the commanders in Zenica. The goal was to help the 4th Corps as much as possible, since, in respect of the opening of another frontline, it was in a very difficult situation. I signed the Order and it defined the obligations of the team in the domain of the preparations, command and control. The operation lasted for some time and produced some results. It ceased because of the signed ceasefire which we had to observe. And we wanted to end it."

DELIĆ also rejects Sefer's thesis about the obstruction of the operation. He says that the group with Sefer HALILOVIĆ departed for Herzegovina with all the good wishes. "Sefer got the units from Sarajevo he had asked for", says DELIĆ, "although the 1st Corps Commander suggested to him to take other units. From the Konjic-based "Igman", he got a maximum quantity of ammunition, he got helicopters at his disposal and mortars. I don't know what else! It was not enough, but it was the maximum in that situation when we were all under a full blockade, so that our possibilities were limited, Now, Sefer's feeling that someone did not want his success...If only God had been willing for him to succeed! But, the time, conditions and the manpower he had at his disposal were not sufficient for him to do it. That is why in one Order I asked him to adjust the swing of the operation to the realistic possibilities."

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And while the two of them were talking "Zoka" jumped into the communication and informed Sefer that Haris Silajdžić who was at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs, wanted to talk to him. So "Zoka" connected Sefer and Silajdžić.

"Please Sefer decrease those activities down there. That does not go along with the peace initiative of President Izetbegović. You know that the President is leading peace negotiations with President Tudman..."

"But, the HVO attacked us first and we had to respond" Sefer interrupted him. We had a laugh.

"I still ask you to decrease the activities and stop them if possible. We have a chance to establish truce with the Croats and we should use it ", continued Silajdžić.

Silajžić said to Sefer that Delić Rasim was there with him and wanted to talk to him too.

IX

Delić repeated to Sefer what Silajdžić already told him on peace talks between President Izetbegović and Tuđman.

"That's why the activities should cease immediately and return to Sarajevo" said Delić.

"Fine. I will be back in Sarajevo tomorrow" responded Sefer.

That's how the operation "Neretva 93" was definitely stopped. The order on stopping the operation was made through the radio amateurs. It was precisely 19.00 hours on 4th October 93 when Delić and Sefer finished their conversation.

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Sefer Halilović: Cunning strategy

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On 21 and 22 August 1993 a military conference was held in Zenica, where I contributed to the discussion.

Present: ŠVK Commander Rasim DELIĆ; NGŠ /Chief of the Main Staff/ Sefer HALILOVIĆ; Chiefs of Administrations: Zićro SULJEVIĆ, Rifat BILAJAC, Rašid ZORLAK, Vehbija KARIĆ, Mustafa POLUTAK, Sulejman VRANJ; Corps Commanders: Vahid KARAVELIĆ, Hazim ŠADIĆ, Enver HADŽIHASANOVIĆ, Arif PAŠALIĆ, Salko GUŠIĆ; some of the officers from 3rd and 4th Corps Commands, Mevludin BEŠIĆ from Tuzla; and NURKIĆ from the RV and PVO Administration. The meeting was also attended by the Minister of the Interior, Bakir ALISPAHIĆ.

Honourable colleagues, dear comrades-in-arms,

My warmest welcome to you all, and at this meeting I should like to set forth my conclusions and, naturally, proposals to resolve these problems.

In these times when the survival of the state of BiHand the Bosnian people hangs in the balance, we need find the answers to some fundamental questions today, from which we must determine the tasks, through the execution of which we could turn the situation greatly to our advantage and thereby seize the strategic initiative, which we have largely lost, and after that proceed to a certain goal – the crushing of Chetnik and Ustasha fascism and the liberation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I am thoroughly convinced that the basic reason for our defensiveness and the loss of the strategic initiative lie in our weaknesses, not at all in the strength of the Chetniks. An analysis of the situation in the theatre in the last two months suggests a few unambiguous conclusions:

1. The loss of much free territory in the 1st and 6th Corps' zones of responsibility, stretching from Rudo to Igman, and parts of the 3rd Corps' free territory around Žepče is not the result of Chetnik strength and power. If that were the case, the

the Chetniks would be more successful in the Brčko corridor, and particularly at the Sarajevo front where they are using their most powerful forces, and credit for this must be given to the commanders and units defending Žuč, Golo Brdo, Stupsko Brdo, etc. The loss of these territories is the consequence of failures in command and control from the Presidency, which gave the order to form the 6th Corps at an inauspicious time, that is, at the time the Chetnik offensive was in progress. And then Commander GUŠIĆ took the entire body of the Igman Operations Group away from Mt. Igman.

Zaim IMAMOVIĆ, the newly-appointed commander of the Igman Operations Group, could not find his feet, and this is only one of the reasons. They are innumerable – from Igman, all the way to Staro Rudo, as far as our free territory in eastern Bosnia extends, and there are indications which suggest there was blatant treason. The commanders of the 1st, 6th and 3rd Corps are responsible for all these matters, the consequence of which was the loss of free territory in eastern Bosnia and Žepče. I have to tell you that the information that the main job in eastern Bosnia was carried out by Chetnik forces of three battalions' strength is shocking, and what is especially shocking is the fact that we lost on the Žepče and Maglaj front because of late intervention by the 3ru Corps commander. The success of the commanders of the Mostar Brigade at the Neretva front and the liberation of some of the territory deserve congratulations, and indicate how defence, losses or gains take place at the front.

2. Our Army came into being in circumstances which are unparalleled anywhere in the world: a dual aggression from two aggressors, a powerful internal Chetnik and Ustasha rebellion, and the creation of an army in such circumstances, with a completely confused leadership. Our Army, then, deserves historic credit for the survival of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosniaks/Muslims in this part of the world, and recognition for this needs to be given to the keen workers of the PL /Patriotic League/, all those present here, commanders the length and breadth of our country, and eternal thanks need to be given with particular respect to all the brave soldiers in our Army. Our Army, then, deserves historic credit, but also the responsibility for its own weaknesses and shortcomings that it contains, which we have to confront courageously, and about which I would like to say a few words.

We have created a large and unwieldy Army of about 260,000 people, which in the majority of cases behaves like a unit of a locally-based Home Guard, and we have a small number of flying manoeuvre units and a very small number of reconnaissance and sabotage units.

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Sefer Halilović: "CUNNING STRATEGY" /orig.title: "LUKAVA STRATEGIJA"/, Maršal, Matica Sandžaka, Sarajevo,1997

COMMENT:

Yes, Mr. Izetbegović (may Allah j.sh. give you peace), that kind of BiH that you wanted both politically and territorially structured is impossible. It is not even possible with YNA aggression and Mladić's cleansings not even with a desire that Serbs rein 70% of the territory.

In late 1993, you had to again blame Ustashas and Chetniks, Serbian and Croatian fascism which breaks you in half.

You are not fair, you are an ignorant, in both political and military sense.

You foraged, made agreements that you broke the day after each time, denying them and betraying them from the beginning to the end.

All this was mostly paid by your people, unfortunately by Croats too and without their help you wouldn't have had BiH long before this speech of yours, whereas sufferings of your people would have been far scarier.

And believe me: you should be grateful to these Croatian people, both in BiH and in Croatia, not to mention how grateful you should be to Dr. Franjo Tuđman.

There are also Šušak and the RH Government, doctors, citizens, Parliament and, and …

TAPE RECORDING

S T A T E M E N T
by
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
14 NOVEMBER 1993

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ:

The beginning itself was not recorded.

It cannot be like that any more. It can be like this, but not like that as … a Serbian-Croatian-Muslim Bosnia as a joint state, with joint governments, joint Presidency to which these would delegate Chetniks, those would delegate Ustashas, to the government that we have been trying to maintain because of some legitimacy, it is impossible. That is my conviction after all hardships that we have experienced with them. This is only a detail. Listen, we are forming the government and they say - here minister of finance is this person, he is a true Bosnian etc. Then he comes and we have obstruction after obstruction, PELIVAN, then the bank governor ANDRIJIĆ. A state in which there is no loyalty of a large, a huge number of people cannot exist, it cannot function. This is not only about loyalty; this is about the fact that a whole series of people homed in on this state. Those who should protect it have gone to the mountains and started shooting, destroying. And there is still insistence that this is possible. I am telling you that it is impossible. A new Bosnia and Herzegovina is possible, one day, a different one. But with them it is impossible. I was for a year-and-a-half in peace-time and a year-and-a-half in war-time and my experience, and I think it is also your experience, you have to be honest to yourselves, is that such a state is impossible. Here, I would like to take this opportunity to tell you how I think it is possible. I do not think that we should give up on BiH, god forbid. When we made such sacrifices, when we experienced all that suffering, we should continue to fight to have BiH finally as a state, we have a right to it. We have paid a very high price for it. I think that we should wage that battle in two phases. In the first phase we should secure the military liberation of the areas in which a majority Muslim population resides. Because that is the people that suffered most, after all, it is most interested in that kind of BiH. The people that is definitely loyal, as it does not have another homeland and the people that paid the highest price for that BiH

The second part of the battle for BiH, because of BiH's integration, should be fought, in my opinion, by political means. I am not sure whether we shall be able to capture Drvar, Banja Luka, Trebinje etc by military means. I am not sure. Maybe we shall be able to. I am even sure that we would be able to if we had weapons. However, if the same international situation, better to say adverse situation, continues, we shall most probably have to wage this second part in a way, taking into consideration a factor that is called time, in the same way as West Germany for example fought for the reintegration of Germany. Not by military means, but by the supremacy of the political model that was in place there. Now, when we look at Bosnia, we have the so-called bright and dark parts. Those dark ones, they are under fascism, one or the other,

does not matter, Serbian or Croatian fascism. Here we have what is controlled by our army and our government, that part in which... not with complete result, but a certain result to maintain some level of democracy, civilization, a level of human liberties which naturally is subject to the same limitations because of the objective war conditions, but in which attempts are persistently made /to prove/ that it is possible to build a civilized life. In Vareš, despite the fact that they evicted that population, not we, but they, they drove the population away. I will tell you why. There are 1,000 Croats there. A number of Croats are returning there. Nobody will be hurt. We would not be what we are, we would not be the democratic government if we evicted these people. We shall try, in the liberated part of BiH, never giving up on the remaining part, we shall try to organize a government which will be dignified and which will respect a minimum of fundamental, elementary standards of civilization, a civilized way of living. That means, translated into political jargon, that we have a Bosnia and Herzegovina in which nobody will be persecuted because of their religion, because of their ethnicity or their political affiliation. Nobody will be persecuted because of these three things. That could be the constant nature of it. Everything else can perhaps change here and there and be somewhat differently defined, but I think that this will remain and I think that this, coupled with the principle of a free market and what it can produce, because we hold the most industrialized part and the most developed part of BiH, can defeat that darkness in which parts of Bosnia live nowadays. This is approximately the reasons to tell you that we cannot live like that. Because, to have that kind of BiH again, because what does a Muslim-Serbian-Croatian BiH or a Bosnia of three constituent nations mean today; we are not those who will appoint the Serbs who will be part of it, they will determine it. They will appoint Chetniks. Others will appoint Ustashas. How can you have a democratic government with Ustashas and Chentiks who will then either directly destroy that state, or obstruct it every step of the way. Drill holes wherever they can. And you will they take pains to fill up that bottomless pit. You will never be able to create a relatively normal level of life there, a standard, because that will constantly be stolen, obstructed etc. I think that we have to, as a very good journalist of ours has said, unfortunately we have to burn down some dear illusions. If we fail to do so I am afraid that we shall continue to pay a high price. We have to /give up/ some illusions, no matter how dear, finally look reality in the face and I think that we do not owe anything to anybody. We do not owe anything to anyone.

COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE HSS BH /Croatian Peasant's Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina/

The content and messages of the statement given by Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ, the President of RBH /Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ Presidency, on 14 November in Zenica, and in the interview that followed on BHTV on 18 November, caused a great deal of mistrust and even serious fear among the members of the HSS and a large segment of the Croatian population. The assessments and statements uttered by Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ on these two occasions have been interpreted by the HSS and the Croatian population as advocating the continuation of the war, primarily against the Croats, but also as a serious about-turn in the defining of the BH state and legal system.

Not only did IZETBEGOVIĆ's statements dwell on mere explanations of the organisation of power in the Bosnian (Muslim) republic, they also expressed a number of opinions on individual peoples without necessarily separating wheat from the chaff.

He thus did not merely imply but spoke explicitly of the "most interested" and "most deserving" peoples, excluding others and their rights to and interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a common and democratic community of equal peoples with indivisible collective and individual rights and freedoms.

Members of the HSS are wondering what it means to advocate a "reduced" Bosnia and Herzegovina and whether, once reduced, it will still be Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ denying other people the benefit and the right of building Bosnia and Herzegovina as their own state - because he wonders what a Muslim-Serb-Croat Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of three constitutive peoples, means today, but the answer he provides is not in keeping with the position he occupies. He says, you see, that "it cannot be that".

This may be inappropriate, but the HSS must warn the President of the Presidency that Bosnia and Herzegovina can only exist as a unity of three equal peoples, three constitutive peoples, because the right of the Muslims to their own state is equal to the right of the two other peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The fact that the leaders of this or that people "went to the mountains and started shooting" does not mean that the people no longer have the right to and interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina being their homeland and their state.

The HSS qualifies Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ's persistent use of terms such as "we" and "they", i.e. his failure to refer to the Croats and the Serbs by their real names, as offensive. Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ has the right to represent the interests of the Muslim people but the position he fills still obliges him to protect the rights of the other two peoples. Particularly unacceptable are his imputations that the Croats and the Serbs would "appoint Ustashas and Chetniks" to the future bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shows that the President is unable to distinguish between normal people and degenerates. Members of the HSS and Croats in general are wondering whether this reveals his intention to have somebody else, somebody who is not a member of these peoples, determine who is suitable to represent the interests of the Croats or other peoples.

In our view, IZETBEGOVIĆ's opinion that "we will break them in Bosnia" encourages further war against the Croats and a definitive settling of accounts between the Croats and the Muslims. Even when Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ says that he will regain the majority Muslim territories by war, he /?is still not referring to/ Zvornik, Foča, Kozarac or Prijedor but the Croat enclaves in central Bosnia. If we add to this his claim that the Croats have "committed worse acts than the Chetniks" we cannot but notice that he has crudely falsified facts on the number of the killed, auctioning off victims and forgetting statements he has given but a month or so ago.

Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ's claim that "everyone owes us" leads one to conclude that the "debt" has to be collected, which instills additional fear of revenge and persecution that will not flinch even from repeating what happened in Fojnica. At the same time, his "attempts" to create "a degree of democratic civilisation" and respect for "minimal" civilisational standards in the Bosnian (Muslim) republic provide no comfort at all. A president should not attempt but guarantee human and ethnic rights and freedoms, and not just minimal ones – those we already have!

At best, we consider the President's comparison of the position of the Croats and the Serbs in the future Bosnian (Muslim) Republic to the position of the Arabs in France inappropriate because the Muslims cannot and must not have such rights in the future two states. The Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not, nor will they ever be, an ethnic minority but a people, regardless of whether they are a statistical minority.

Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ has shifted his positions many times so far. What is new this time is that for the first time ever, he has fully declared himself a Muslim leader, announcing the organisation of the future central republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a purely Muslim one, without other peoples sharing in the power. This not only imitates the BOBAN-KARADŽIĆ model, but could have far-reaching political consequences too. This orientation obliges the HSS to adopt a position and decide whether it is useful for HSS representatives to remain in the bodies of authority, and

to launch an initiative in the international community for the protection of Croat interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The HSS cannot but notice that Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ has promised democracy to the Croats who remain in the Bosnian (Muslim) republic, telling them that "not a hair on their heads will be harmed". At the same time, we have information that the Croats are being persecuted, robbed and detained in Travnik, Kakanj, Zenica, Bugojno where not even the International Red Cross has managed to enter, let alone any foreign journalists.

We do not what the simplified story of Chetniks, Ustashas and Partisans, or the statement that "we will not kill women and children", means. Does it mean that it is open season for hunting men, i.e. other civilians like, for instance, the shooting of civilians in the villages around Zenica, the case of the Franciscans in Fojnica, the cases in Bugojno.

The global media have already reacted to the President's visit to the *El Jihad* unit, the UNHCR is pointing to *Merhamet's* inappropriate behaviour, the Bugojno Croats are not receiving humanitarian aid (they are being told to go to their *Caritas*!), and we are linking all this to Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ's statements that the Croats in Bosnia are in the same position as the Arabs in France. How can we otherwise explain that the discussion on the legal regulation of the Sarajevo HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ took place only after HVO had been abolished? Is somebody here privileged or above the law?

Unfortunately, the HSS would like to point out many cases where behaviour in practice coincided with the most recent statements of Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ, seriously restricting the rights, and consequently also the safety, of the Croats in Bosnia. The interview where Mr IZETBEGOVIĆ plays down certain issues but does not even try to refute others, proves that things that were said in Zenica were not mere lapses or accidental imprecisions. We have observed that he has given such statements in Zenica but not, for instance, in Tuzla, which in all probability indicates a new political philosophy of the ruling party and its leaders.

All this has forced us to make serious conclusions and rethink our overall position. This is our duty, not only because of all the Croats who have died for this country as members of the HVO, the BH Army and the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/, but also because of all those who are still fighting for these ideals, because of all those religious, cultural and political institutions which have invested all their authority and moral credibility on behalf of this country, and last, but not least, because of our history, for the Croats have been living in this area for more than 1,300 years, much longer than anyone else.

HSS MAIN BOARD
/stamped/

COMMENT:

Again a certain BH Army general, along with the facts.

It could have been a lie if I would say it; like this, how could you not believe in the accuracy of presented assertions.

1. HAKALOVIĆ, AKA "Homeini" is an Islamic religious official and he became commander of BH Army brigade.

Check on the website www.slobodanpraljak.com the line-up of that brigade in Jablanica and tell me whose army this is and what does it fight for and what its fighters will fight for in the future?

Who is more important to Izetbegović, who is he talking to and who is he leaving in front of the door?

Even back then you didn't want to know, neither can you discern the signs of the time, nor you are interested in hearing the truth. For supreme "communist" minds the facts are a banality which deserves no attention at all.

2. Dreković precisely quotes the power of BH Army 6th Corps, starting from the manpower and finishing with the artillery.

And they were "barehanded"?!

Who gave them or yielded to them heavy artillery, where did they get it from?

3. Same topic!
4. Look at the table of killed and wounded members of BH Army 4th Corps in 1992. They fought against VRS – 103 killed, 99 wounded combatants. In 1993 they attacked HVO – 312 killed and 523 wounded combatants of BH Army.

Who was at the end the main enemy of BH Army 6th Corps –VRS or HVO?

5. Dreković writes about pushing Croats and HVO away from the remaining enclaves around Konjic and offering money, as well as the fact that the Army combatants did not allow the implementation of the agreement on the "great Serbian" and "great-Croatian" policy on division of the Republic of BiH.

That is the reason why they, after the 1993 spring attack against HVO and Croats (along with crimes they committed which are at your disposal) now expelled the rest of them too from the enclaves that managed to sustain in terms of military.

When the guys from HVO didn't want to receive money and went away bribed "as gentlemen", Dreković found it rather strange and peculiar.

And who was the big boss of that ethnic cleansing of the remaining Croats from Konjic for money?

Haris Silajdžić, the money ruler from Islamic states, billions of money, which had been agreed in Zagreb, Vienna and Graz, the money that was taken and divided exclusively by the MUSLIM state officials of the BiH.

Look at the document, examine this document and you will understand that you cannot, not ever, apologize to that man or his policy.

Ask the Croats from Konjic whether it makes sense.

When a bomb exploded in Mostar, set by a certain Islamic fundamentalist, on the same day Haris Silajdžić, without and before any investigation, without court and law he publicly accused Croats for blowing their own device up.

That man, an evil spirit of the Bosnian policy towards Croats still sells his ideas as European.

He will never apologize to anyone, because Haris Silajdžić is a PILLAR OF MORALITY.

6. Table; strength of the BH Army 4th Corps.

7. It is very important, after Šejtanić, to read what Dreković is saying about it – does BH Army, 6th and 4th Corps, actually have soldiers turned against VRS.

No, they don't, from Konjic to south of Mostar they've got watchtowers (for negotiations, trafficking and others), they have no army.

It is because, my dear reader, they have a joint military and political plan – to divide coast from Ploče to Dubrovnik between themselves.

You find it unusual? There is time, you will find out about it.

International community? Remember the plan Z-4, those players didn't care about anything else expect for the termination of hostilities. When it came to principles and conditions for peace, nobody cared about that unless it was the question of one's own skin, instead of some Balkan guys who those humanists see as unable to resist the mutual bloodshed.

Don't they keep doing it from Berlin Congress onwards, being utterly stupid and persistent in it?
To our detriment.

8. Please read, in order to avoid "wrong assumptions" and "reduction" as basic logical errors of every bad judgment in future analyses of the war.
9. Table; losses of BH Army 4th Corps. 579 killed and 1168 wounded combatants in attacks against HVO in 1993. It is the year when they did not wage war against VRS.

Look at those numbers.

DREKOVIĆ, RAMIZ: In the stranglehold: Krajišniks and Herzegovinians in battle on two fronts /orig.title: U obruču: Krajišnici i Hercegovci u borbi na dva fronta/, Zenica, Dom štampe, 2004

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In autumn 1994, president of the presidency visited the zone of responsibility of the 4th corps with the staff commander, especially considering the situation in Mostar. The plan of visit and stay embraced the visit to 45th brigade in Buturic Polje. Escorted by Mr. Izetbegovic, along with general Delic, there was Minister of MUP, Bakir Alispahic, me and my associates, associates of General Delic as well as associates of Minister Alispahic. By arriving to the command post of the 45th brigade, commander of the brigade Hakalovic reported to Mr. Izetbegovic. Before the meeting in the office of the brigade commander, Homeini stepped forward and said:

"Commander and I will have a meeting with the president exclusively! Nobody else can attend the meeting! Neither General Delic, nor the Minister Alispahic! I hope General Drekovic will not be offended, for he can't be present as well. We want to present the president personally with some issues which do not allow your presence. It is not about you, general Drekovic and we kindly ask you not to blame us!"

While Homeini was saying those words, Mr. Izetbegovic already entered the office and the military police placed themselves on doors. The meeting lasted for hour and a half. Commander of the army staff, commander of the corps and Minister of MUP of one country remained standing in front of the doors.

We were looking at each other with distrust.

"Is this possible? I asked general Delic and he responded, as you can see, it seems to be so!"

General Delic was most hit among us in front of the doors, so it seemed to me. It is something that couldn't happen in my 5th corps. Delic said he will address Mr. Izetbegovic. Whether he did it, he knows it. After the visit, I asked commander Hakalovic and his assistant, Hadzajlija to talk. I told them not to do it again and this is not the way to behave.

I did not have problems in further management and commanding of this brigade, while I remember the episode with Homeini from Herzegovina in order to illustrate problems that we met during establishing our army.

6th corps

The 6th corps, save the corps command that counted 112 members, had 5 brigades, 4 independent battalions, mixed artillery division (MAD), logistic base and educational centre on Bradina. In the composition of the 6th corps there were the following units: 43rd mountain brigade, 44th mountain brigade, 45th mountain brigade, 649th light brigade (lbr), 601st olbr, SB /independent battalion/ "Prozor", SB "Bjelasnica", 6th bVP, 609th independent engineering battalion, 6th mixed artillery division and logistic base.

The numeric situation of the BH Army 6th corps units on the day of duty takeover was 8 463 members.

Table

Overview of number of manpower of 6th corps units on 19th of January 1994

Unit	Number of manpower
1. corps command	112
2. 6th bvp	174
3. 609th independent engineering battalion	331
4. 6th MAD Igman	244
5. 6th loB	88
6. 43rd mountain brigade	2 451
7. 44th mountain brigade	1 545
8. 45th mountain brigade	1 631
9. 649th l brigade	976
10. 601 ol brigade	186
11. independent battalion "Prozor"	599
12. Independent battalion "Bjelašnica"	126
Total	8 463

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The 6th corps artillery men

The 6th mixed artillery division "Igman" (6. MAD) was established on 23rd of October 1993, with the command post on Bradina and in Konjic. Reuf Sidran commanded the division. On 13th of February 1994 the division was re-established into 4th mixed artillery regiment (MAP), 4th and 6th mixed artillery division is in the composition of. The 4th mixed artillery regiment, after establishment, was commanded by a young and experienced senior, professional artillery combatant, Edin Cajic. Under his command, this regiment became a strong artillery unit. Combatants and seniors of the 6th MAD, up to the establishment of 4th MAP, had a remarkable credit for the artillery support to units of the 6th corps.

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Overview of total losses oft the sixth Corps until Juanuary 19th, 1994:

UNIT	1992		1993 until Jan 19th 1994.		Total	
	dead	wounded	dead	wounded	dead	wounded
1. Corps Command		2		13		15
2. 6. bVP	1	1	10	47	11	48
3. 609. ind. eng. bat.						
4. 6. MAD						
5. 6. LoB						
6. 43. bbr.	47	49	93	93	140	142
7. 44. bbr.	5	13	87	182	92	195
8. 45. bbr.	38	13	53	75	91	88
9. 649. lbr.	11	18	29	22	40	40
10. 601. olbr.						
11. SB «Prozor»	1	3	40	91	41	94
12. SB «Bjelašnica»						
UKUPNO	**103**	**99**	**312**	**523**	**415**	**622**

Realizing the importance of the Washington Agreement and the future coexistence with the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, while respecting human relations during the struggle, and after them, the Corps Command, after the release of dominant structures and positions in which HVO soldiers were located, has taken all measures to avoid revanchism. It was not at all easy, but we have succeeded.
Command of the 56. dp. HVO has not accepted any cooperation with the Fourth Corps. Their sole demand was departure from these areas in the zone of responsibility of the HVO military area in Mostar. I accepted their request, but I have not allowed that 56. Homeland regiment transports ordnance and weapons, with which, until yesterday they were killing innocent population of Konjic and surrounding villages, over Konjic and Jablanica to Mostar. We have For soldiers and chieftains we provided transportation with buses but they had to surrender weapons and material-technical resources (MTS) to the logistic base of the Fourth Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among other means they had to surrender mortars and canons with which they were shelling us just the night before we successfully performed this operation.

Overview of MTS according to type and quantity surrednered by 56.dp HVO before it was dislocated

TYPE OF MTS	QUANTITY (pcs)
1. Bullet 7,62 x 39	13.300
2. Bullet 7,62 x 54	2.400
3. Bullet 7,9	15.800
4. Bullet 30-06	4.500
5. Bullet 12,7 DŠK	34.500
6. Bullet 14,5	3.960
7. Hand Grenade	128
8. TTM	52
9. TKM	17
10. Grenade za ZIS 76 mm	58
11. Grenade za B1 76 mm	20
12. Missile za RB M57	20
13. Missile za RPG 7	46
14. Mine za MB 60 mm	128
15. Mine za MB 82 mm	146
16. Mine za MB 120 mm	180
17. Raketa 128 mm	43
18. Maljutka	4
19. Grenade for BsT	4
20. PM M53	1
21. PAM 12,7 DŠK	1
22. PAT 20/3	3
23. JLR 128 mm	1
24. Canon 76 mm ZIS	2
25. Canon B1	1
26. BsT 82 mm	1
27. RB M57	2
28. Morter 82 mm	5
29. Automatic rifle	30

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350 000 DEM for 56 dp HVO

On the occasion of duty takeover, Commander Salko Gusic informed me, *inter alia*, that the corps command signed for 350 000 DEM. The funds were received from the BH government. As to the query, what purpose do the funds have, he informed me that this money was intended to be paid to 56th command of the dp HVO in order to leave the villages Drecelj, Turija, Zaslivje and Zabrdje calmly, respectively that – after all what they did to inhabitants of Konjic- without fight, as gentlemen, fairly bribed, leave this area.

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When I received the duty of the Commander, Fourth Corps numbered 8.544 soldiers and chieftains. Regardless of the relatively small numbers, problems which they were facing, strength and force of the aggressor, soldiers the Fourth Corps didn't give up. They managed to preserve the area and did not allow the implementation of goals and agreements „the Great Serbia" and "Greater Croatia" policies on the division of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina

Overview of the number of manpower of the BH Army 4th corps units on 19th of January 1994

Unit	Number of manpower
1. corps command with communication platoon	123
2. 4th bvp	213
3. 41st smtbr.	2 274
4. 42nd mountain brigade	2 386
47th mountain brigade	1 533
6. 48th mountain brigade	1 901
7. independent battalion "Šargan"	311
8. independent battalion "Nevesinje"	270
9. 4th MAD	72
10. 4th Lob	168
11. war hospital	199
12. Cargo platoon	34
Total	8 544

The units of the BH Army 4th corps, in their zones of responsibility towards the Serbian-Chetnik aggressor, on 19th of January 1994, were in possession of the following: right, including the elevation 413 (Vranjevići) – Stjepangrad – Ravnice – Guberača – Fortica – Šljeme – Potporim – Rošce Mountain – Borova Glava – Plavac, including and towards the HVO ; left, elevation 413 Malo Polje – Kosor – Velmos – Neretva River – Donja Mahala – Boulevard – Šantićeva street – Carinski bridge – Neretva river – Hydro plant Mostar – Šljunkara – convent – M17 road – bridge towards Vojno – Neretva river – hydro plant Salakovac – Neretva river – Vrda – Drežnica, including.

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While visiting units, I established that positions towards the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor bear more guard but organized military activity character. I was rather surprised by it, it was especially expressed in the zone of responsibility of the former 4th corps. In the zone of responsibility of the 6th corps, save in area of Konjic municipality, a narrow area, the area of Prenj was uncovered, as well as the area of a broader part of Treskavica, which also caused problems. It seemed to me that there was accordance on mutual non-attacking. By establishing why is it so, in talks with seniors, I was introduced to something inexplicable to me so far, but probably necessary at the time, especially expressed in the zone of responsibility of the 4th corps – there were such agreements and cooperation, although not in their classic forms, but there were some. There was purchase of ammunition, armament and other equipment from Chetniks, as well as coordinated activities towards the positions of HVO on the right Neretva bank. True, combatants and seniors in this part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regarding the situation in which they were, were left with anything else. Actually, they remained, thanks to their wit, cunning, realistic comprehension and sagacity of combatants, senior and power bodies, as well as the firm commitment of the people to remain on one's own.

***

It was extremely hard to take the units, combatants and senior out of their settlements and villages, put them into formation and dislocate them to Bjelimica plateau for preparations and carrying out combat activities; it was especially not easy to explain them that the fight on Bjelimica plateau is indeed a fight for the town of Mostar, or that the fight in Konjic for Konjic is harder than the fight for Konjic which takes place on Bjelimica plateau.

Such condition of relations and behaviour of the most responsible ones in the zone of responsibility of the 4th corps reminded me much of 1992 and the defence staff in Bihać, as we had problems to take soldiers and seniors to dominant positions outside of town and establish the Bihać defence. Overcome of such difficulties in the beginning period of organization resistance in further course of the war provided results. I find that we used plenty of energy to solve the internal problems, which took plenty of time and space to prepare for the fights.

The issue of establishing the system and responsibility is especially difficult. There are no results without systematic work and clear responsibility. With the system, one can win, without it, one can loose. Unfortunately, today, after 7 years of war, we encounter a non-systematic functioning, without clearly observable responsibility. Even today one feels the lack of organization among Bosniak people. This lack of organization is especially reflected in return of our people to their centenarian homes. It is constantly expected that these issues will be solved by somebody else, instead of us. There are no more central committees; there are no more federal institutions which would provide new solutions. Nobody will enable Foča people, Višegrad people, and people from Trebinje, Čapljina and other town to return if they do not organize themselves. Even today, there is lack of organization on the field. Everyone is leading high politics. An example of good organization and persistence in returning are Bosniaks from Kozarac near Prijedor. Oblivion and short memory keeps repressing us.

As an example of illustration, I asked the 42nd mountain brigade combatants:" Why aren't you accepting Nusret Šahić, a professional officer and a Bosniak from Bosnia? If you do not accept him, I am not clear how would you accept me, a Bosniak, originating from Bosnia, a man who loves Bosnia and considers it his homeland?"

I did not get an answer, but I knew it. Should it be a criterion at all? Absolutely not. During the commanding the 5th corps, I used to meet people who were saying; "Bihać to Bihać people!" I heard the same reactions in Mostar; "Mostar to Mostar people!" I repeated the question to myself; what about those who are not from Mostar, or BIhać, and were expelled from Nevesinje, Gacko, Ljubinje, Stolac, Livno, Trebinje, Sanski Most, Ključ, Bosanski Novi, Banja Luka? I couldn't not understand it regardless the explications, standing behind these slogans which did not reveal the truth actually.

The time of local people with power is going away, fortunately, but there were tones of people with power in the war. The time comes in which the effort of combatants and BH Army seniors will be valorised in its full capacity. If this does not happen, it shall be necessary to erect the monument to "an unknown hero", for he would actually symbolize those who gave much but who remained unknown. I heard about a saying; "in war, the government gives cannons, rich people oxen and poor people sons". Today's social structure of federal army personnel, as it seems, fully corresponds to this popular proverb. It is our duty to make the army invitation popular in Bosnia and Herzegovina which especially refers to Bosniaks.

There is another popular saying: "Who does not want to feed the army, he will feed the foreign one." It would not be good to make this one true as well, especially not through us, Bosniaks. By looking at modern social structure of the federal army members, I haven't noticed a single soldier or a senior with a father manager, professor, prime minister, General.

Total losses of the 4th corps till 19th of January 1994, as I was appointed to duty, were the following:

Unit	1992	wounded	1993, till 19 January 1994	Wounded	Total	Wounded
	Killed		Killed		Killed	
1. corps command		4	18	27	18	31
2. 4th bVP			20	96	20	96
3. 41st smt brigade	119	150	340	638	459	788
4. 42nd mountain brigade	8	24	95	126	103	150
5. 49th ih mountain brigade	11	40	99	281	110	321
6. war hospital Mostar					7	
Total	138	218	579	1168	717	1 386

Total losses of the 4th and 6th corps till 19th of January 1994

Corps	Killed	Wounded
1. 4th corps of the BH Army	717	1 386
2. 6th corps of the BH Army	415	622
Total	1 132	2 008

COMMENT: NO COMMENT!

THE SHELLING OF THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE NERETVA RIVER

REVIEW
OF EXPLOSIONS IN EASTERN MOSTAR REGISTERED BY SPABAT IN 1993

Document No.	Date of report	Date of event	Number of registered explosions
P2572	30.05.1993.	30.05.1993.	20
P5416	27.09.1993.	27.09.1993.	5 *
P5537	30.09.1993. (SITREP 312)	30.09.1993.	25
P5629	05.10.1993.	04./05.10.1993.	91
P5680	04.10.1993. (SITREP 317)	04.10.1993.	11
P5899	15.10.1993. (SITREP 326)	15.10.1993.	54
P5921	17.10.1993. (INTREP 328)	17.10.1993.	40
P6113	25.10.1993. (INTREP 336)	25.10.1993.	20
P6149	26.10.1993. (INTREP 337)	26.10.1993.	35
P6452	05.11.1993. (INTREP 347)	05.11.1993.	4
P6872	25.11.1993. (SITREP 367)	25.11.1993.	18
P6894	26.11.1993. (INSUM 368)	26.11.1993.	29
P6957	29.11.1993. (INSUM 371)	29.11.1993.	36
P7114	11.12.1993. (INSUM 68)	10.12.1993.	51
P7119	11.12.1993. (SITREP 383)	11.12.1993.	39
P7137	13.12.1993. (SITREP 385)	12.12.1993.	34
P7176	14.12.1993. (INSUM 386)	14.12.1993.	31
P7118	15.12.1993. (INSUM 387)	15.12.1993.	39
P7241	18.12.1993. (SITREP 389)	18.12.1993.	20
P7283	20.12.1993. (INSUM 392)	20.12.1993.	43
P7335	25.12.1993. (INSUM 397)	24./25.12.1993.	86
P7338	25./26.12.1993. (SITREP 398)	25./26.12.1993.	40
P7362	28.12.1993. (SITREP 400)	27./28.12.1993.	20
TOTAL			cca 791

* 285 EXPLOSIONS HAVE BEEN COUNTED IN EASTERN SIDE OF THE NERETVA RIVER IN THE PERIOD WHEN SLOBODAN PRALJAK WAS THE COMMANDER OF THE HVO MAIN STAFF (24 JULY 1993 to 8 NOVEMBER 1993)

COMMENT:

These soldiers, members of SPABAT (Spanish Batallion) of UNPROFOR /United Nation Protection Forces/, could not differentiate the shells fired by the HVO from those coming from the positions of the VRS, and according to a realistic assessment of the HVO of that time 25% - 30% of the shells counted in that way were fired at the town by the artillery of the VRS.

They were provoking and inciting in such a way A BiH and HVO to a further conflict.

Every artillery sergeant knows that the number of around 600 shells which the HVO fired on military targets on the eastern side of the battle front in Mostar in the period of 5 – 6 months, the beginning with 30 June 1993, suffices as an artillery preparation of a military offensive action of one battalion of any modern army.

(791 listed explosions minus the number of shells fired by VRS)

One should look at the artillery tables (enclosed) about how many shells (and of which calibre) should be fired on a military target in order to achieve a certain military effect. All of this points to the fact that the use of HVO artillery in the defence from A BiH in Mostar during the second half of 1993 was absolutely minimal.

During the offensive of A BiH on the HVO, with the aim of breaking out on the western borders of BiH towards Republic of Croatia (Neum – Ploče), the Fourth Corps of A BiH, positioned on an area from Drežnica to Mostar numbers more than 8000 fighters without attached units.

Their artillery positions were immediately alongside the War Hospital and on other densely populated parts of the town (civilian residents), they were driving anti-aircraft guns and mortars on trucks through populated areas of the town and opened fire toward the positions of the HVO.

The Command of the Fourth Corps, Command of the First Mostar Brigade, Command of the Military Police, kitchen for the A BiH, radio station, ammunition depots and other logistics as well as the commands of battalions were in the very centre of the eastern part of Mostar.

The intermingling of soldiers from the A BiH and civilian residents was a routine, everyday affair, easily observable. A large number of civilians were wearing military clothes, children were carrying arms. All of these are, according to the valid war law, legitimate military targets.

The right and duty of the Command of the HVO – the other side in the conflict, was to destroy these military targets. For the realization of that aim it is allowed to fire a proportionate number of artillery shells. Law relating to a war conflict does not define precisely the word "*proportionate*", which is a legal avoidance of precision. "*Proportionately*" in war means to achieve an aim – destroy, incapacitate an enemy bridge, connection, headquarters, etc.

If the commanders of HVO, with me as their leader, upheld that right and duty the number of artillery shells fired on the area of East Mostar should have been at least 1000 times greater than the number counted by the members of SPABAT, even without subtracting the artillery shells of the VRS.

The commanders had clear instructions that they are allowed to target only military targets, and they did not even do that, by way of command, if the enemy military target was in a densely populated part of the town. The commanders in the zone and artillerymen, I am deeply convinced, obeyed that order.

IN THE PERIOD WHEN I WAS THE COMMANDER OF HVO MAIN STAFF - 24th JULY to 8th NOVEMBER 1993 - 285 EXPLOSIONS HAVE BEEN COUNTED IN EASTERN SIDE OF THE NERETVA RIVER .

THIS NEED TO BE REDUCED FOR 20-25% OF THOSE PROJECTILES FIRED BY VRS AND ALL THAT DURING THE PERMANENT ATTACKS OF A BiH – "*NERETVA 93*" !?!

Finally, three hypotheses:

a) It is not permissible to keep so many military objects and so many artillery positions in the town, among civilians, which A BiH was doing constantly and incessantly, unless they deliberately want to cause civilian casualties.

   I fear that by deliberately causing civilian casualties they wanted to achieve propaganda and political aim.

b) It is completely certain that it is hard and nauseating for civilians to listen to explosions whose sound between the buildings is amplified, and it is absolutely certain that any number is too much for them.

c) Likewise, you cannot exclude the possibility of an occasional error in targeting. As a statistical mistake, it is unavoidable.

I CLAIM:

AND THE NUMBER OF FIRED ARTILLERY SHELLS AND THE SELECTIVITY OF TARGETS AT THE TIME OF MY COMMAND APSOLUTELY SATISFIES THE TOUGHEST DEMANDS AND JUDGMENTS.

Excerpt from the "Handbook on the law of war for armed forces" by Frédéric de Mulinen, published by ICRC, Geneva, 2000-2007

* * *

Section 1.2. ***Basic categories of persons and objects***

Heading A ***Fighters***

47.	*Definition* *G. III, 4* *G. P. I, 43*	***Fighter** is every member of the armed forces except the paramedics and religious personnel.*
48.	*Distinguishing from civilians: rule* *G. III, 4* *G. P. I, 44*	*During participation in combat activities or in preparatory military operations, the fighters must distinguish themselves from civilian population.* *The members of regular and associated armed forces usually differentiate themselves by their uniforms.* *The members of other armed forces carry prominent signs of recognition and openly carry arms.*
49.	*Distinguishing from civilians: exceptional situations* *G. P. I, 44*	*In situations in which due to the nature of enmity an armed fighter is not able to distinguish himself, he keeps his status of a fighter if he openly carries arms;* ***a) during any kind of military engagement;*** *b) as long as the enemy can see him while he is engaged in military placement, which means every movement towards the area from which or on which combat activity will take place.*

* * *

Neutralization of targets 25%

Fire task, sort, character of target and units of norms			Heavy artillery and mortars at 10 kilometres distances						VLR at all distances		
			76 and 90 mm	100 and 105 mm	122 and 130 mm	152 and 155 mm	203 mm	MB 120 mm	128 M67	128 M77	262
1A	Destruction of Launching weapon of tactical (operative) target destination		800	520	300	200	70	300	500	360	240
2B	25% neutralization to the target	Platoon of self-moving armoured vehicle (MB)	1000	720	450 400	270	120	450	560	400	200
3C		Platoon of non-armoured weapon in shelter (MB)	540	360	210 220	180	100	240	400	320	120
4D		Platoon of non-armoured weapon outside the shelter	250	150	90	60	30	90	150	120	30
5E		Rocket platoon PZO	250	200	150	100	60	150	300	200	70
6F		Electronically instruments on vehicles	420	280	180	120	60	180	300	240	80
7G	(25% neutralization in 1 ha)	Live force, fire and other instruments outside of the shelter	50	30	20	15	5	8	10	8	4
8H		Tanks and OT outside of the shelter; ž/s and v/s in incomplete shelters; ZM in incomplete shelters or at vehicles	400	250	150	110	50	140	240	180	40
91		ž/s and v/s; tanks and OT, ZM in complete shelters or at OT	450	320	200	150	60	200	320	240	60

Neutralization of targets 80%

Fire task, sort, character of target and units of norms			Heavy artillery and mortars at 10 kilometres distances						VLR at all distances		
			76 and 90 mm	100 and 105 mm	122 and 130 mm	152 and 155 mm	203 mm	MB 120 mm	128 M67	128 M77	262
1A	Destruction of Launching weapon of tactical (operative) target destination		7720	5018	2895	1930	676	2895	4825	3474	2316
2B	80% neutralization to the target	Platoon of self-moving armoured vehicle (MB)	9650	6948	4343 3860	2606	1158	4343	5404	3860	1930
3C		Platoon of non-armoured weapon in shelter (MB)	5211	3474	2027 2123	1737	965	2316	3860	3088	1158
4D		Platoon of non-armoured weapon outside the shelter	2413	1448	869	579	290	869	1448	1158	290
5E		Rocket platoon PZO	2413	1930	1448	965	579	1448	2895	1930	676
6F		Electronically instruments on vehicles	4053	2702	1737	1158	579	1737	2895	2316	772
7G	(80% neutralization in 1 ha)	Live force, fire and other instruments outside of the shelter	483	290	193	145	48	77	965	77	39
8H		Tanks and OT outside of the shelter; ž/s and v/s in incomplete shelters; ZM in incomplete shelters or at vehicles	3860	2413	1448	1062	483	1351	2316	1737	386
91		ž/s and v/s; tanks and OT, ZM in complete shelters or at OT	4343	3088	1930	1448	579	1930	3088	2316	579

ž/s – living force
v/s – military equipment
OT – Armoured transporter
ZM- Command post
PZO–Air Defence
VLR –Multiple Rocket Launcher

COMMENT:

No comment!?

And now, at the end I should write something “smart” and “significant” and “round up the topic”. But what could that be?

A KIND REQUEST?

Check the facts, please and if they are right, accept them as part of the attitude and speech.

And why is that?

Because, just like in Yugoslav KINGDOM, as well as in SFRY and everywhere else, this quantity of lies, turned into the truth is merely a basis and a cause for repeated bloodshed.

There is no reconciliation on such bases, no understanding and no good future.

No small political expressions of love, hugging and pattering on the back won’t change a thing.

Especially false, untrue and ridiculous excuses or convictions of those small gods that they “would close up the historical story” as soon as they appear somewhere. It doesn’t work that way; the post-war period is a very, very hard job, responsible, serious, hard, painful, sensitive and sore.

To those who wish to work in this way I say and beg them, do not allow to be silenced, don’t allow those illusionists to continue doing what they did in SFRY and which led to aggression and crimes.

And they claimed it for years, everything was the best it could be; it was the best of all the worlds.

An Idyll.

Tis entire communist phalange ran into democracy in a stampede and continued dictatorship, tyranny of lies and ado.

Dictatorship of liberal democracy, chat-rooms of ignorant, those who found themselves a secure position and careless ones that spit, piss and shit on their ideological rivals, to those who think differently; those who lie and accuse without any efficient legal regulation (which would sanction all that) without a slightest moral responsibility.

My dear reader, to them a “fact” is an obstacle, unnecessary fuss, whereas in the real world of knowledge most of those Ostap Benders wouldn’t have anything to eat.

Because of that and exclusively because of that, because of the money they collect without having it earned, they sustain and fight for the society in which it is wrong, unimportant and vulgar to count donkey’s teeth if one wants to find out how many teeth does a donkey have.

To talk, discuss and blabber about the number of donkey’s teeth at the meetings, symposiums, well paid and air-conditioned meetings for years continuously enables a good life to those scholastic communists.

Tat work shall continue; they mostly silenced the others – until the final joint social bankruptcy.

In God’s name – utter a word and save your soul.

* * *

Mostar, 2004.

XXII. MEDALS AWARDED TO OFFICIALS OF BOSNIAK-MUSLIM PEOPLE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

On the occasion of Croatian National Day, President Franjo Tuđman, pursuant to Article 98. Of Croatian Constitution and Article 2 paragraph 1, Law on decorations and recognition of Republic Croatian (Official Gazette 20/95), on proposal by the State Committee for the decorations on the occasion of National Day and the fifth anniversary of the independent and sovereign Croatian state, on May 29th and 30th 1995. issued a decree which, among other Croatian officials, awarded the following medals to Bosniak-Muslim officials:

1. Alija Izetbegović

Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is awarded with the Grand Order of Queen Jelena with Sash and Danica "for his contribution to the establishment of trust between the Croatian and Bosniak-Muslim nations, cooperation in resistance to the aggression and the establishment of a Croatian-Bosnian Federation, and its construction of the Confederation with the Republic Croatia."

2. Dr. Haris Silajdžic

Is awarded with row of Duke Trpimir with necklace and Danica "for outstanding contribution to the independence, integrity and international reputation of Republic Croatia, for Croatian development and development of relations between Croatian and other countries."

3. Ejup Ganić

3.1. Is awarded with the Order of Duke Trpimir with necklace and Danica "for outstanding contribution to the independence, integrity and international reputation of Republic Croatia, for Croatian development and development of relations between Croatian and other countries."

3.2. Is awarded with the Order of Duke Branimir with necklace "for outstanding contribution acquired by promoting international position and reputation of Republic Croatia and its relations with other countries."

4. Muhamed Šaćirbej

Is awarded with the Order of Duke Branimir with necklace, "for outstanding contribution acquired by promoting international position and reputation of Republic Croatia and its relations with other countries."

* * *

Dr. Ismet Hadžiosmanović, The Bosniak-Croatian political reckoning
/orig.title: Bošnjačko-hrvatski politički obračun/, Self-published, Mostar, 2006

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

40.

AGGRESSION OF A BiH (MUSLIM ARMY) AGAINST HVO AND CROATS IN VAREŠ – OCTOBER 1993



FACTS

MAP 1.

VAREŠ

BASIC MUNICIPALITY INFORMATION:

Population in 1991:	22,203
Municipality area, km²:	356
Population density, st/km²:	62.4
Settlements in municipality:	85
Population in the center of the municipality:	5888
Changes in population:	
index 1991/1948	146.5
index 1991/1981	97.3

Display XC



Ethnic composition by settlements

	Total in municipality	Absolute majority Population	Relative majority Population
Croats	9016	7429	1462
Serbs	3644	1794	
Muslims	6714	5122	
"Yugoslavs"	2071		50
Others and unknown	758		

CROSTAT GISDATA



MAP 2. – GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE BH ARMY ATTACK AGAINST HVO



MAP 3. – A BiH (MUSLIM ARMY) ATTACK ON VAREŠ (HVO) BEGINS ON 18 OCTOBER 1993



MAP 4. – A BiH (MUSLIM ARMY) ATTACK ON HVO AND CROATS IN VAREŠ BEGINS ON 18 OCTOBER 1993

SITUATION IN VAREŠ ON 10 NOVEMBER 1993



MAP 5. – Organization of forces and attack of the A BiH on Vareš, November 5th 1993




1 Mbb sa Od-K
304. bbr
LEGEND:
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Chetniks
Ustashas
Line to be taken
COMMANDER
AMIR KUBURA
Izdaje i štampa Vojnogeografski institut
Sarajevo 2
1:50 000
Drugo izdanje, štampano 1982. god.
Sadržaj prema stanju iz 1980. god.
Broj lista 475-4

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA

HVO GENERAL HQ
Office No. 02-2/1-01-3350/93
Mostar, 6 November 1993

UNPROFOR
COMMANDER OF THE HEADQUARTERS
A. I. RAMSAY

Dear General Ramsay,

Many thanks to UNPROFOR and in particular to you for your having taken an active part in the case of Vareš.

We hope that you are convinced of the persecution of the Croats by the Moslems which began long ago in Konjic and was continued in Kakanj, Zenica, Bugojno, Fojnica, etc.

We shall do our best to find out the committers of what happened in Stupni Do. After such incidents there is always a certain number of people who will return the same sort of ill treatment, which can be attributed neither to soldiers, nor police, nor the people.

I hope that you will show more objectivity in observing all very difficult events.

Concerning the Moslem helicopters, I ask you once more, as I have already asked General Briquemont, to understand that it is the least of a military problem, that you could not expect from me to resolve it, but we have done laterally everything by being flexible towards the Moslem side in order to arrange the prisoners' exchange and thus enable the evacuation of the Moslem wounded by helicopters to Zenica. We hope it will be done, as planned, tomorrow, Sunday, 7 November 1993.

Respectfully,

HVO GENERAL HQ
General
Slobodan Praljak

/stamp: illegible/

MILITARY SECRET
TOP SECRET

On the basis of the latest developments in relation to the behavior HVO units and in accordance with the command K-de 7.M. BR. /Command of the 7TH Mountain Brigade/ I g i v e

A T T A C K O R D E R

1. At the Battalion direction of attack, enemy defends in strength one battalion (300) man power in the following arrangement:

- one troop in region of v. Čukle

- one troop in Novo selo region

- one troop in reserve in Grahovčići

So far the following fire points have been observed:

- 3 pits at Crni Vrh

- MB and Bat actions from direction of Ušice attacks

- 4 pits from Ušice to Šušanj

- minefield in front of the above mentioned 4 pits

2. Our battalion from expected region of village Vrselje attacks in direction:

S. Vrselje – Crni Vrh – Ušice – Čukle – Brajkovići – Rebrovac – Šušanj – Novo Selo – Plavčići, grouping main part of forces and equipment (II squad and guerilla) in direction v. Vrselje – Crni vrh – Ušice – Čukle – Brajkovići, and smaller part of forces and equipment (I squad) in direction Vrselje – Rebrovac – Šušanj – Novo Selo, in order to take village Čukle and Novo Selo as a closer mission target, and to take villages Brajkovići and Plavčići as a further mission target.

Observation post of Battalion's commander is located in the village Vrselje.

- I. Squad attack on secondary direction Vrselje – Rebrovac – Šušanj - Novo selo – Plavčići with a mission to participate with the main part of forces in actions from the side, to take v. Novo selo as a closer mission target, and to take v. Plavčići as a further mission target.

- II. Squad attack in the main direction: Crni vrh (tt 1128) - Ušice (tt 1086) – Čukle - Brajkovići, with a mission to participate with Guerrilla group in a closer mission goal to take enemy positions on Crni vrh, Ušice and v. Čukle, and to take v. Brajkovići as a further mission target.

Guerrilla group attacks in the main part of forces with II squad in the main direction with the mission goal to open passage in the line of the enemy defense /illegible/ stronger fortifications in the line of attack: Crni Vrh – Ušice – v. Čukle - /illegible/

- Battalion Kakanj moves in direction of the majority of attack force (guerrilla groups and II squads) in readiness for the introduction to combat action.

- Battalion fire group consisting of 3 MB 82mm and 60mm 4 MB occupies the main launching site at elevation 668 north of the village Rebrovac with the mission to:

- open fire on specified targets and in accordance with requirements and needs

- Squad POLO occupies launching site on Crni Vrh and at commander's signal opens fire on armored vehicles and heavy firing points in the direction of the attack

3. Logistic support: Equipping the units with 100 bullets per soldier, and guerrilla group with 1.5 combat kit and provide units with 3 SDO.

- Sanitation support: provide each soldier with I bandages, each troop with litters, ambulance.

- COMMUNICATION: Establish a communication line between the units according to the preliminary orders dated June 3rd, 1993, issue work plans, communication system readiness at 02:00 on June 7th, 1993

- Transportation section: Order necessary number of buses and vehicles for the mission.

- Security support: Give maximum attention to preparation of B/D /combat operations/, transportation of soldiers and attacks. When using a radio device use the document for crypto protection.

ATTACK READINESS AT 3:00 HOURS ON JUNE 07th, 1993

Delivered to:

1 x commander of 3. Battalion Kakanj

1 x commander of I squad

1 x commander of II squad

1 x commander of Guerrilla group

1 x commander of POLO

1 x commander of Accompanying troop

1 x deputy commander of logistics

1 x Communication section

1 x Medical service officer

1 x Transportation section officer of the II Battalion

1 x A/A

2. Battalion commander

/stamp and signature illegible/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE OS RBiH
/Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/
Strictly confidential No. 02/1016-1
Sarajevo, 21 August 1993

/handwritten and circled: 31/
DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

TO THE COMMAND OF THE 3rd CORPS

Re: Your strictly confidential letter No. 02/33-1913 dated 16 August 1993

After reviewing all the relevant facts presented in the analysis and assessment of the possibility of switching to an offensive in the general area of Vareš that we received, here is our opinion:

1. We agree with your proposals for mounting limited offensive operations against the Liješnica feature and the Jezero (tt. /trig. point/ 1459) - Borovica village axis.
2. Targets to be easily engaged are artillery VP /firing positions/ and 120mm and 80mm MB /mortars/ in the general area of the village of Borovica. This should be the aim when infiltrating through the village of Mahorići.
3. It is possible to engage our forces from the sectors of Dragovići and Mijanovići villages in capturing the Pliješ feature (tt. 1153), whereby we would unblock the road between Kraljeva Sutjeska and Mehović village.

In the above-mentioned report, you did not provide information about the situation in the Rostovo and Sebešić sectors. We need this information **urgently.**

ACTING ON BEHALF OF COMMANDER
DEPUTY COMMANDER
Stjepan ŠIBER
/signed and stamped/

HG/JA

Dispatched on 21 August 1993 at 1710 hours

a signature/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BiH
6th CORPS COMMAND OG /Operations Group/ EAST

No: 01/4-2016
Visoko, 23 October 1993

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Breza SJB /Public Security Station/
Art: OG - Breza IKM /Forward Command Post/

In view of the deteriorating situation in the area of responsibility of the Vareš OpŠO /Municipal Defense Staff/, escalating b/d /combat operations/, especially in the Stupni Do village area, which has been under fierce combined artillery and infantry attacks by the Ustashas since early morning and is entirely surrounded, and in order to help and break the blockade of the village of Stupni Do, I hereby

ORDER:

1. The Breza MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ Intervention Unit shall be kept at the ready to engage in combat along the axis under attack, pursuant to Breza IKM Commander's decision.
2. When introducing the unit /into combat/, take all /necessary/ security and self-protection measures.
3. The Breza MUP Commander or the Chief and Commander of the Breza OG East IKM shall be responsible to me for the implementation of this order.

ONLY UNITED CAN WE PERVAIL!

SD/ /?ŠS/

COMMANDER
Abdulah AHMIĆ
/signed/

(c) VLM /expansion unknown/
TIME: 1538 hrs
DATE OUT: 23 October 1993
PROCESSED BY: /handwritten:/ ŠEHOVIĆ
FILE: BZDDNAUA
C: ĐPGPĐBZDDNAUA.TXT

/Handwritten numbers: see original/
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF
THE OS /Armed Forces/ OF THE RBiH /Republic of BiH/
SARAJEVO

/illegible handwriting/
DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Strictly Confidential Number: 02/1202-1
Sarajevo, 1 November 1993

URGENT !!!

3rd CORPS COMMAND

The Command of the 2nd Corps turned to the ŠVK /Supreme Command Staff/ of the OS /Armed Forces/ with a request that the forces of the 3rd Corps be engaged in carrying out our order strictly confidential number 02/1192-1 of 26 October 1993. Carrying out the above order, the forces of the 2nd Corps took the Kozja Glavica feature (8 km north of Vareš) and are continuing combat activities with the aim of converging with the forces of the 3rd Corps. In order to carry out coordinated combat activities and converge the units of the 2nd and 3rd Corps on the line assigned as soon as possible, I hereby

ORDER

1. Units of the 3rd Corps selected for the offensive against the Ustaša forces in Vareš, shall be IMMEDIATELY engaged on the assigned axes and converge with the forces of the 2nd Corps in the area of the Kozja Glavica feature as soon as possible.

2. The two Corps commanders (2nd and 3rd Corps) have agreed on how to do this in the spirit of our order strictly confidential number 02/1192-1 of 26 October 1993.

3. To carry out this task successfully, coordinate action with the Commander of the 2nd Corps at the site and time of action of your own units.

ZS/DH

COMMANDER
OF THE SUPREME COMMAND STAFF OF THE OS R BiH
Rasim DELIĆ

/Handwritten:/
Sent
3 November 1993
at 2154 hours
/a signature/

/handwritten:/ Braco
O/illegible/P /expansion unknown/
Files

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Army of the Republic of BiH
6th CORPS, COMMAND OF THE *ISTOK* /East/ OG /Operations Group/

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Number: 02/1-2355
Visoko, 4 November 1993

TO THE COMMAND OF THE 6th CORPS
TO THE COMMAND OF THE 3rd CORPS

Interim b/i /combat report/

At 1045 hours on 4 November 1993, the Chief of Staff of the *Istok* OG reported via means of communication that a battalion of the 7th Mbbr /Muslim Mountain Brigade/ had entered Vareš by the main road. They are stealing and looting everything they see. Total chaos reigns because nobody is commanding this unit and they do not obey anybody's orders. After learning of this situation, members of other units joined the general looting. It is necessary to provide all the available police forces. He asked that the Commander of the 3rd Corps come personally and take the appropriate measures.

The Command of the *Istok* OG has sent the PK /Assistant Commander/ for Security to the spot. He previously arranged with the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ to send the *Lasta* /Swallow/ unit to try to establish order together with the MP /Military Police/ forces.

MM/EV

COMMANDER

Abdulah AHMIĆ

/illegible/ file: D:ĐPGPĐPAAA4BPA, date of receipt: 4 November 1993, time of receipt: 14/text breaks off/
Signature of operator
/a signature/

Signature of secretary

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT FOR HEALTHCARE
Number: 02-5/1-672/93
Mostar, November 4th 1993

Government of the Croatian Republic HB

PLAN FOR MEDICAL SECURITY FOR REFUGEES FROM VAREŠ

Afore mentioned convoy to medically secure with two ambulance vehicles, two doctors and two medical technicians (one of nurses is delivery nurse). One vehicle is driving on the end of the convoy and the other one is in front. Each vehicle must be capable for rendering full scale medical aid (oxygen equipment, medications, bandage materials, infusions, and stabilization material).

1. Preventive medical measures
   - Ban intake of water during the evacuation.
   - Drinking water to be sanitary processed (water-supply of the city of Mostar) and to be transported in canisters which were sanitary processed before.
   - Each vehicle must have one canister of drinking water.
   - Strictly ban intake of food during evacuation.
   - Give a task to commissary service to supply necessary quantity of fresh food.
   - Food to be distributed to vehicles or during the stops.
   - Through commissary service to secure enough warm covers.
   - Determine places for stops according to evacuation plan and during stops perform distribution of food, warm beverages, water and possible rendering of medical aid.
   - Because of weather conditions, exhaustion of people and the length of the trip, provide one camp kitchen.
2. Care for sick and wounded
   - During the evacuation, when the convoy stops, in cases of emergency immediately offer full scale of general medical aid, for which are afore mentioned medical teams equipped.
   - In case of the need for specialist aid, sick and wounded are to be evacuated to medical centers along the route of the evacuation.
3. Necessary medical material resources and vehicles procure from HVO war hospital Mostar.
4. Each vehicle must have one Motorola*.

Assistant to HR H-B Minister of defense
for healthcare sector
Brigadier Dr. Ivan Bagarić
/Signature/

/Round seal/

*Motorola - most common communication device used during the war in BiH made by Motorola. Not a cell phone.

D-218

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
MAIN STAFF OF HVO
Operational number: 02-2/1-01-3282/93
Mostar, 3 November 1993

UNPROFOR
SPABAT-Međugorje

Subject: Request

The severe offensive of the Muslim forces to Croatian areas in Vareš and its vicinity has been going on for days. In several occasions we tried to solve the problems by agreement, however, we failed.

Since MOS concentrated extremely powerful forces in this area, our units are not able to defend 20000 civilians approximately. Currently, there is a fight in surrounding in the area of 5 km^2.

We request the pulling out of innocent civilian population through UNPROFOR.

We have data that the massacre of civilians already started in villages Tribija, Vijac, Borovice, Pogar and Ivančica.

For the above cited crimes in villages, there is already panic and disorganization among inhabitants and units, therefore we ask that the UN forces intervene as soon as possible, in order to prevent further massacre and enable pulling out of surrounded inhabitants from the area of combat actions.

MAIN STAFF OF HVO
Major General
Slobodan Praljak
/signed and stamped/

D-219

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
MAIN STAFF OF HVO
Operational number: 02-2/1-01-3309/93
Mostar, 4 November 1993

UNPROFOR
SPABAT-Međugorje
To the UN Commander
Kiseljak

Subject: request

Pursuant to request of GS HVO, no 02-2/1-01-3284/93, dated 3 November 1993, concerning the protection and pulling out the civilians in the area of Vareš, we kindly request to submit the report, as being done so far.

We emphasize that the severe offensive of Muslim forces has been carried out for days to the Croatian enclave of Vareš, therefore it is necessary to do everything in order to protect the innocent civilians.

MAIN STAFF OF HVO
Major General
Slobodan Praljak
/signed and stamped/

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/stamp:/
7th MUSLIM BRIGADE
Strictly confidential no. 1120-11/93
7 November 1993

In order to prepare for the upcoming combat preparations in the best possible manner, and organise the leave of soldiers and officers after the combat operations in the area of Vareš municipality, I hereby

ORDER

1. Officers such as company commanders /komandiri/ and battalion commanders /komandanti/ shall be on leave until 0800 hours on Tuesday 9 November 1993, and other soldiers until 1800 hours on Wednesday 10 November 1993.
2. Only the troops that have participated in the operations on the Vareš municipality front shall go on leave.
3. The troops from the area of Vareš municipality shall remain and go home after the receipt of reports of units from the waiting area.
4. After arriving at the base, the soldiers shall go home; use the following days to distribute the soldiers' war booty.
5. Before going on leave, the soldiers shall duly return all the weapons and MTS /equipment and material/ to the brigade and battalion warehouses.
6. Before the soldiers go on leave, make sure to analyse the past combat operations with them.
7. I appoint the commanders /komandante/ and commanders /komandire/ of independent units to be responsible for a full implementation of this order.

COMMANDER
Amir KUBURA
/signed and stamped/

To:

Commander of the 7th Mbbr /Motorised Mountain Brigade/ x l
NŠ /Chief of Staff/ x l
Battalion commanders x 3
Files x 1

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

41.

CRIMES COMMITTED BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE A BiH (MUSLIM FORCES) AGAINST THE CROATS IN BiH 1991 – 1995



FACTS

COMMENT:

More than a several years ago I asked a reputable HTV reporter to check how many times has this "TV Network" mentioned the word "AHMIĆI" in their broadcasts and how many times the word "Trusina"?

A few days later I received a reply: "AHMIĆI" 998 (nine hundred and ninety eight) times, and "Trusina" 2 (twice).

"Trusina" 2 ‰ (two promille) compared to "Ahmići", crimes took place in both villages in BiH. On the same day of the same month and of the same year. The battle was fought in Ahmići and it is yet unknown how many soldiers and how many civilians were killed.

THE HAGUE: "in Ahmići at least 33 (thirty three) civilians."

In Trusina 23 (twenty three) unarmed - civilians and several soldiers who had surrendered.

Muslims were killed in Ahmići and Croats in Trusina.

And HTV from Zagreb reports about Trusina 2 ‰ compared to Ahmići.

Deranged communist sadomasochism?

I do not say "war crime" but rather "crime in war" in both cases. Isn't this discrepancy in mentioning both crimes in the two villages on HTV [same disparity in other media], an obvious evidence of distortion in investigating the truth?

This distortion is so great that it can only be compared to the distortion of the facts seen in the fascist, nazi and communist societies and states.

Such investigation serves only for "INVESTIGATORS" to keep their positions which they have held for decades, manufacturing the truths which led to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the first place.

This human scum has its own motto:

"Let us keep the cognition at a level that enables us to keep our positions where we can manufacture the truth that keeps us where we are...!

Let's reproduce ourselves infinitively!

About other issues on another occasion. "

The number of Croats killed by the members of A BiH in aggression against the HVO, especially in 1993, is 8 time greater than the number of Muslims killed by the Croats.

NUMBER OF CROATS IN MUNICIPALITIES ACCORDING TO 1991 CENSUS

1.	ČAPLJINA	14,969
2.	MOSTAR	43,037
3.	JABLANICA	2,291
4.	KONJIC	11,513
5.	PROZOR	12,259
6.	USKOPLJE	10,706
7.	BUGOJNO	16,031
8.	TRAVNIK	26,118
9.	N. TRAVNIK	12,162
10.	VITEZ	12,675
11.	ZENICA	23,595
12.	MAGLAJ	8,365
13.	ŽEPČE	7,813
14.	ZAVIDOVIĆI	7,451
15.	BUSOVAČA	9,093
16.	FOJNICA	6,623
17.	KISELJAK	12,550
18.	KREŠEVO	4,714
19.	VISOKO	1,873
20.	KAKANJ	16,556
21.	VAREŠ	9,016
	TOTAL	**269,410**

The real number of inhabitants in these municipalities at the time of the crimes committed against Croats was not greater than 180,000 (one hundred and eighty thousand), because a large number of people evaded at the outbreak of the war in BiH and more than 12% of the population were economic emigrants.

If there are 1,200 civilians and prisoners of war killed per 180,000 inhabitants, it is like having:

1. 400,000 civilians and prisoners of war killed in France.
2. 400,000 civilians and prisoners of war killed in UK.
3. 2,000,000 civilians and prisoners of war killed in the USA.

QUESTION: Can you imagine the socio-psychological state of these nations and socio-pathological behavior of the groups and individuals?

D-221a

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

D-221b



OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN BiH AND CROATIA DURING THE WAR

- TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF VRS AND JNA
- TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF BH ARMY
- TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF HVO
- UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)


OGULIN
SENJ
BIHAĆ
ORAŠJE
GOSPIĆ
TUZLA
JAJCE
VITEZ
ZENICA
SREBRENICA
ZADAR
N. TRAVNIK
BUGOJNO
SARAJEVO
ŽEPA
BIOGRAD
G. VAKUF
LIVNO
PROZOR
KONJIC
ŠIBENIK
SINJ
TOMISLAVGRAD
GORAŽDE
TRILJ
POSUŠJE
SPLIT
MOSTAR
OMIŠ
IMOTSKI
GRUDE
ČITLUK
LJUBUŠKI
MAKARSKA
ČAPLJINA
STOLAC
PLOČE
METKOVIĆ
DUBROVNIK
OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN BiH DURING THE WAR
- TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF VRS AND JNA
- TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF BH ARMY
- TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF HVO
- UN PROTECTED ZONES (20 km)

Municipalities in BiH in which some members of the BH Army (Muslim forces) committed crimes against Croats



1.	ČAPLJINA
2.	MOSTAR
3.	JABLANICA
4.	KONJIC
5.	PROZOR
6.	USKOPLJE
7.	BUGOJNO
8.	TRAVNIK
9.	N. TRAVNIK
10.	VITEZ
11.	ZENICA
12.	MAGLAJ
13.	ŽEPČE

14.	ZAVIDOVIĆI
15.	BUSOVAČA
16.	FOJNICA
17.	KISELJAK
18.	KREŠEVO
19.	VISOKO
20.	KAKANJ
21.	VAREŠ

D-221e




In the municipality of Čapljina 15 people were killed in:
STANOJEVIĆI, KVANJ, OPLIČIĆI AND LOKVE
Municipality of ČAPLJINA


Opličići
November 12th, 1993 - 5 victims, namely:
- RUDO (Toma) PAVLOVIĆ
- MARINKO (Vlado) VIDIĆ
- PERO (Ambro) PULJIĆ
- VIKTOR (Mirko) KRIŽANOVIĆ
- VLADO (Mato) VIDIĆ
Gagrice-Lokve
October 10th, 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- RATKO (Ivan) ROSO
- STIPE (Blago) DRAGIČEVIĆ
Kvanj
October 2nd, 1993 - 2 victims, namely:
- MARTIN (Mladen) MARKOVIĆ
- IVICA (Andrija) BUNOZA
Stanojevići
November 12th, 1993 - 6 victims, namely:
- STANKO (Vlado) PRCE
- LESZEK (Boleslav) JEDRZEJCZYK
- ZARIO (Vladimir) PETKOVIĆ
- JURE (Boškov) IVANKOVIĆ
- MIRKO (Martin) PULJIĆ
- DAMIR (Damjan) ŠUTALO
ČAPLJINA
METKOVIĆ

D-222b



Opličići - ČAPLJINA
November 12th, 1993
- VLADO (Mato) VIDIĆ

D-222c



Gagrice – Lokve - ČAPLJINA
October 10th, 1993
- STIPE (Blago) DRAGIČEVIĆ



Grabovica
September 9th, 1993 - 32 victims, namely:
- JOSIP (Ivan) BREKALO born in 1939
- LUCA BREKALO born in 1939
- PERO (Mijat) ČULJAK born in 1913
- MATIJA ČULJAK born in 1917
- ANDRIJA (Tomin) DREŽNJAK born in 1921
- MARA DREŽNJAK born in 1921
- DRAGICA DREŽNJAK born in 1953
- ŽIVKO (Blaž) DREŽNJAK born in 1933
- LJUBA DREŽNJAK born in 1932
- CVITAN (Tadija) LOVRIĆ born in 1936
- JELA LOVRIĆ born in 1940
- IVAN (Marko) MANDIĆ born in 1935
- MARA MANDIĆ born in 1912
- PERO (Nikola) MARIĆ born in 1914
- DRAGICA MARIĆ born in 1914
- ILKA MARIĆ born in 1921
- RUŽA (Šimun) MARIĆ born in 1956
- MARTIN (Blaž) MARIĆ born in 1911
- MARINKO (Martin) MARIĆ born in 1941
- LUCA MARIĆ born in 1944
- MARKO (Ante) MARIĆ born in 1906
- MATIJA MARIĆ born in 1907
- RUŽA MARIĆ born in 1935
- ILKA (Ilija) MILETIĆ born in 1926
- ANICA (Ivan) PRANJIĆ born in 1914
- FRANO (Stjepan) RAVLIĆ born in 1918
- IVAN (Pero) ŠARIĆ born in 1939
- IVAN (Andrija) ZADRO born in 1924
- MATIJA ZADRO born in 1923
- MLADEN (Ivan) ZADRO born in 1956
- LJUBICA ZADRO born in 1956
- MLADENKA (Mladen) ZADRO born in 1989



Đikovina
September 3rd, 1993 - 5 victims, namely:
- KATA PEHAR born in 1928
- VENCEL VIDAČAK
- LEJLA UJDUR born in 1980
- STANKO CVITKOVIĆ born in 1940
- MENSUR CICAN born in 1964

Rodoč
September 20th, 1993 - 6 victims, namely:
- PERO GRUBIŠIĆ born in 1930
- BISERKA MILETIĆ born in 1941
- IVA KOŠTRO born in 1926
- TONI BOŽIĆ born in 1968
- HUSO ISIĆ (age 65)
- TOMISLAV JOVANOVIĆ born in 1926



D-224a

Doljani
July 28th, 1993 – 63 victims, namely:
- ILIJA (Ante) ZELENIKA born in 1960
- ANDRIJA (Jozo) PERKOVIĆ born in 1967
- JELA (Stipe) STOJANOVIĆ born in 1962
- IVICA (Stjepan) TOMIĆ born in 1954
- SLAVKO (Stipan) VRLJIĆ born in 1968
- ANDJELKO (Pero) MARTIĆ born in 1964
- MARINKO (Kazimir) BOŽIĆ born in 1960
- LJUBOMIR (Kazimir) BOŽIĆ born in 1966
- ŽELJKO (Slavko) BOŽIĆ born in 1960
- MATO (Ivan) DOGAN born in 1961
- MILAN (Jure) POLE born in 1972
- ANDRIJA (Jure) GROZNICA born in 1972
- NEDJELJKO (Josip) SOLDO born in 1933
- ANICA (Ivan) RIPIĆ born in 1934
- IVA (Srećko) PAVLOVIĆ born in 1930
- PAVA (Pero) STIPANOVIĆ born in 1942
- MATE MARKIĆ born in 1967
- DRAGAN ANDRIĆ born in 1976
- BORISLAV BARBARIĆ born in 1959
- MARIO HRKAČ–ČIKOTA born in 1971
- MARKO MILJKO born in 1951
- MARINKO MARUŠIĆ born in 1942
- ZDENKO KOLOBARIĆ born in 1969
- ANTONIO LASIĆ born in 1968
- MARKO LJUBIĆ born in 1959
- MILIJAN ZELJKO born in 1962
- BRANKO (Josip) TOKIĆ born in 1964
- MARTIN (Ivo) RIPIĆ born in 1933



- ZVONKO (Bosiljko) PINJUŠIĆ born in 1967
- MATO (Tadija) BILOŠ born in 1950
- ANTO (Ivan) ŽARIĆ born in 1965
- SLAVKO (Jure) MILIČEVIĆ born in 1955
- MILENKO (Pero) GAGRO born in 1954
- DRAŽEN (Tadija) PAVKOVIĆ born in 1971
- IVAN (Mirko) ZOVKO born in 1973
- MARINKO (Ivan) ZELENIKA born in 1959
- MARKO (Jure) CVITKOVIĆ born in 1954
- PERO (Ilija) SOLDO born in 1967
- IVAN (Ilija) SOLDO born in 1969
- JURE (Ilija) SOLDO born in 1970
- STIPO (Marijan) BRADARIĆ born in 1958
- DAVOR (Pero) MARIĆ born in 1974
- IVAN (Anto) ŽARIĆ born in 1935
- ANDRIJA (Ivan) MILIČEVIĆ born in 1948
- IGOR (Nediljko) LEBO born in 1978
- IVAN (Tadija) TOPIĆ born in 1969
- ŽELJKO (Ivan) MIŠKIĆ born in 1968
- RUŽA (Pero) ČOLIĆ born in 1921
- ANDRIJA (Stipe) STIPANOVIĆ born in 1931
- TOMISLAV (Ivan) JOSIPOVIĆ born in 1974
- ZDRAVKO (Marija) NIŽIĆ born in 1940
- JOZO (Luka) MILIČEVIĆ born in 1929
- ANICA (Jure) ŠITUM born in 1913
- NIKOLA (Vido) DRINOVAC born in 1971
- DRINKO (Petar) GALIĆ born in 1971
- ŽELJKO BOGDAN born in 1949
- PERICA KUTLEŠA born in 1961
- LJILJANA ZRNO born in 1962
- MARTIN BAČAK born in 1968
- IVAN RADOŠ born in 1964
- IVAN PETROVIĆ born in 1961
- LUCA BREKALO born in 1942
- JOSIP BREKALO born in 1939



Doljani - JABLANICA
July 28th, 1993
BODIES OF SIX CROATS KILLED AT "STIPIĆA LIVADA" NEAR DOLJANI BY THE 44. MOUNTAIN BRIGADE OF THE BH ARMY, AND THE VICTIMS ARE:
FROM LEFT: NEDJELJKO SOLDO, ANICA RIPIĆ, IVAN RIPIĆ, IVAN TOPIĆ, MATO BILOŠ, SLAVKO VRLJIĆ AND ANĐELKO MARIĆ.



D-225a


Gostovići
March 23rd, 1993 - 4 victims
Bušćak
April 13th and 14th, 1993 – 3 victims
Mrkosovice
May 1st, 1993 – 2 victims
Orlište
March 25th, 1993 – 4 victims
Gorani
June 12th, 1993
- 1 victim
Jukići
April 17th, 1993 – 2 victims
Gornja Višnjevica
May 28th, 1993 – 1 victim
Vrci
March 23rd, 1993 – 9 victims
Bokševica
May 11th and July
6th, 1993 - 7 victims
Podorašac
April 22nd, 1993 – 2 victims
KONJIC
Bjelovčina
April 19th and 20th, 1993 – 5
victims
Trusina
April 16th, 1993 – 23 victims
Ovčari and Galjevo
April 18th, 1993 – 3 victims
Radešine
April 25th, 1993 – 4 victims
Polje Bijela – Spiljani
July 10th, 1992 - 4 victims (a
family)
Čelebići
May 16th,1993 – 2 victims
Orahovica
May 14th and 17th, August
30th, 1993 – 8 victims
Zabrđe
June28th, 1993 – 1 victim

D-225b


Orlište
March 25th, 1993 – 4 victims
- IVAN KOSTIĆ born in 1923
- ANĐA KOSTIĆ born in 1923
- BRANKA KOSTIĆ born in 1937
- JANJA KOSTIĆ born in 1913
Vrci
March 23rd, 1993 – 9 victims
- IVAN (Ante) ANDRIĆ born in 1966
- MIRKO (Stjepan) ĐOPO born in 1966
- IVAN (Mato) ANDRIĆ born in 1970
- IVAN (Pero) STANIĆ born in 1935
- STOJA STANIĆ born in 1935
- ANUŠA KOŽUL born in 1929
- KATA KALEB - "Malezuša" born in 1910
- ĐOKO RISTIĆ born in 1918
- PETRA RISTIĆ born in 1918
KONJIC
Bušćak
April 13th and 14th, 1993 – 3 victims
- MIROSLAV (Josip) MAJIĆ
- BRANKO (Jakov) MAJIĆ born in 1963
- SLAVKO (Ljuban) MAJIĆ born in 1959
Polje Bijela – Spiljani
July 10th, 1992 – 4 victims (a family)
- ĐURO GOLUBOVIĆ born in 1951
- VLASTA GOLUBOVIĆ born in 1958
- PAVLE GOLUBOVIĆ born in 1987
- PETAR GOLUBOVIĆ (a child)
Gostovići
March 23rd, 1993 – 4 victims
- MATO (Stjepan) STJEPANOVIĆ born in 1966
- ZVONKO (Pero) ĐOPO born in 1966
- MATO (Tadija) DRLJO born in 1942
- DRAGAN (Bosiljko) VUJIČEVIĆ born in 1963



Bjelovčina
April 19th and 20th, 1993 – 5 victims
- ZORAN KULJANIN born in 1969
- MATO SOLDO born in 1930
- IVKA SOLDO born in 1931
- MIRKO IVANKOVIĆ born in 1935
- MARIJO KOVAČ born in 1975

Ovčari and Galjevo
April 18th, 1993 - 3 victims
- PETAR (Mile) GRGIĆ born in 1947
- MATO AZINOVIĆ
- APOLONIJA (Nikola) AZINOVIĆ

Trusina
April 16th, 1993 – 23 victims
- NEDJELJKO (Marka) KREŠO born in 1953
- PERO (Cmiljka) KREŠO born in 1960
- STIPO (Pero) LJUBIĆ born in 1961
- MILENKO (Stipe) MANDIĆ born in 1961
- ŽELJKO (Slavka) BLAŽEVIĆ born in 1965
- IVAN (Andrija) DRLJO born in 1971
- ZDRAVKO (Ivan) DRLJO born in 1962
- ANTE (Tado) ANĐELIĆ born in 1972
- JURE (Ante) ANĐELIĆ born in 1926
- ANDRIJA (Ilije) DRLJO born in 1947
- FRANJO (Ilije) DRLJO born in 1942
- ANTE-TUNJO (Jozo) DRLJO born in 1936
- IVAN (Pero) DRLJO born in 1933
- KATA DRLJO born in 1932
- TOMO (Ante) DRLJO born in 1923
- ILIJA (Antun) IVANKOVIĆ born in 1927
- ANĐA (Jure) IVANKOVIĆ born in 1936
- CMILJKO (Mirko) KREŠO born in 1940
- IVICA (Jure) KREŠO born in 1935
- VELIMIR-VELJKO (Andrija) KREŠO born in 1934
- STIPE (Andrija) MANDIĆ born in 1930
- BRANKO (Andrija) MLIKOTA born in 1925
- ANTE (Tade) ANĐELIĆ born in 1972



Gorani
June 12th, 1993 - 1 victim
- JOZO (Ilije) JURIĆ born in 1931

Mrkosovice
May 1st, 1993 – 2 victims
- CVITAN KNEŽEVIĆ born in 1933
- ILIJA (Mijo) ILIĆ born in 1918

Jukići
April 17th, 1993 – 2 victims
- STJEPAN (Dane) JUKIĆ born in 1922
- ANA JUKIĆ born in 1922

Gornja Višnjevica
May 28th, 1993 – 1 victim
- GRGO TURIĆ

Podorašac
April 22nd, 1993 – 2 victims
- MLADEN (Vlade) JURIĆ
- DRAGICA ZOVKO born in1921

Bokševica
May 11th and July 6th, 1993
- 7 victims
- DAVOR (Vinko) ILIĆ
- JELKA BUZUK
- EMILIJA MILETIĆ born in 1908
- ŠIMA MERDŽO
- KATA (Ilije) BLAŽEVIĆ born in 1941
- ANĐELKO STOJANOVIĆ
- ANTE (Marko) BELJO born in 1950

Zabrđe
June 28th, 1993 – 1 victim
- ANUŠA PETROVIĆ born in 1954

Orahovica
May14th and 17th, August 30th, 1993 – 8 victims
- SLAVEN (Vinko) KOLAR born in 1968
- ZLATKO TRLIN born in 1970
- ANTE (Ivan) BANOVIĆ born in 1954
- JOZEF (Jozef) BRVENIK born in 1947
- JOZO RUŽIĆ born in 1928
- STANKO RUŽIĆ born in 1932
- PERO SKOČIBUŠIĆ born in 1939
- MATO ŠIMIĆ born in 1923

Radešine
April 25th, 1993 – 4 victims
- ŽELJKO AZINOVIĆ born in 1965
- STJEPAN PANDŽA born in 1942
- BRANKO RAJIĆ born in 1937
- LUKA MATKOVIĆ born in 1928

Čelebići
May 16th, 1993 – 2 victims
- DARKO MATIĆ
- MARKO (Mato) MATIĆ born in 1920

Uzdol

September 14th, 1993 - 41 victims, namely:

- JELA DŽALTO born in 1950
- ZORKA (Mato) GLIBO born in 1938
- MARA GRUBEŠA born in 1934
- MATO (Jozo) LJUBIĆ born in 1923
- KATA (Ilija) PERKOVIĆ born in 1922
- STANKO (Niko) RAJIĆ born in 1927
- LUCIJA RAJIĆ born in 1933
- ŠIMA RAJIĆ born in 1914
- MARA (Jakov) RAJIĆ born in 1938
- MIJO (Marko) RAJIĆ born in 1924
- IVKA RAJIĆ born in 1921
- DOMIN (Ivo) RAJIĆ born in 1936
- IVKA (Martinova) RAJIĆ born in 1934
- MARTIN (Petar) RATKIĆ born in 1935
- KATA RATKIĆ born in 1928
- LUCA ZELENIKA born in 1906
- JANJA (Križan) ZELENIKA born in 1931
- DRAGICA (Ante) ZELENIKA born in 1934
- IVAN (Mato) ZELENIKA born in 1930
- RUŽA (Kazimir) ZELENIKA born in 1931



- JADRANKA (Kazimir) ZELENIKA born in 1981
- RUŽA (Mijo) ZELIĆ born in 1944
- MARIJA (Jozo) ZELIĆ born in 1980
- STJEPAN (Jozo) ZELIĆ born in 1983
- ANTE (Jure) STOJANOVIĆ born in 1920
- ANKICA (Stipe) STOJANOVIĆ born in 1949
- FRANJO (Toma) STOJANOVIĆ born in 1916
- SERAFINA STOJANOVIĆ born in 1922
- KATA (Jozo) LJUBIĆ born in 1948
- VLADO BIJATOVIĆ
- FABIJAN GRABOVAC
- ANĐELKO KOZARIĆ
- JOSIP MARIĆ
- PERO LUČIĆ
- IVO RAJIĆ
- BRANKO ŠEKERIJA
- PERO KOVČLIJA
- SLAVKO (Pavo) MENDEŠ born in 1954
- FRANJO (Martin) ZADRO born in 1959
- IVAN ZELIĆ born in 1959
- ILIJA CVITANOVIĆ born in 1972

Hudutsko
September 16th, 1993 - 24 victims, namely:
- ILIJA (Krunoslav) BENDRA born in 1959
- ANĐELKO (Franjo) BILANDŽIJA born in 1941
- LJUPKO (Mato) BILANDŽIJA born in 1961
- STIPO (Pejo) BLIZNAC born in 1952
- MARKO (Jozo) BRTAN born in 1953
- ŽELJKO (Zvonko) GOLUBOVIĆ born in 1958
- ŽELJKO (Pejo) JAKAŠEVIĆ born in 1970
- ILIJA (Markov) JAKOVLJEVIĆ born in 1962
- DRAGO (Mato) JEZERČIĆ born in 1971
- JOZO (Ivan) LADAN born in 1968
- KARLO (Slavko) LADAN born in 1965
- ZORAN (Ante) MARIJANOVIĆ born in 1972
- DRAGO (Ivo) MIJATOVIĆ born in 1971
- ŠIMO (Ilija) PETROVIĆ born in 1966
- DRAGAN (Ante) ŽUNIĆ born in 1959
- PEJO BOŽIĆ
- JURE BRAJKOVIĆ
- JOZO (Mijo) BOGIĆ born in 1961
- ANTE BELJO
- ANTON ODAK
- JOSIP SOLDO
- MARIN VIDIĆ
- MATO BILOŠ
-JAGODA MIJAČEVIĆ

Uzdol - PROZOR
September 14th, 1993
- DRAGICA ZELENIKA born in 1934

D-226d

Uzdol - PROZOR
September 14th, 1993
- STJEPAN ZELIĆ born in 1983

D-226e

Uzdol - PROZOR
September14th, 1993
- JADRANKA ZELENIKA born in 1981

In the municipality of Vakuf 32 people were killed in:
G. VAKUF, UZRIČJE, KRUPA, PERNICE, BOJSKA,
Bistrička river canyon, BISTRICA, ŽDRIMCI, PAIĆ POLJE,
HRASNICA, DURATBEGOVIĆEV DOLAC AND GAJ.
Municipality of G. VAKUF


G. VAKUF
Bojska
February 7th and 21st, 1993 - 4 victims (a family), namely:
- ILIJA (Franjo) OKADAR
- PAVKA (Franjo) OKADAR
- FINKA (Franjo) OKADAR
- FRANJO OKADAR
Bistrička river canyon
May 29th, 1993 - 4 victims, namely:
- FABIO MORENA – Italian humanitarian
- SERGIO LANA - Italian humanitarian
- GUIDO PAULETI - Italian humanitarian
- MIJO MILIĆ – Croat from G. Vakuf
Bistrica
January 14th and 17th, 1993 - 4 victims, namely:
- ILIJA IVOŠ born 1939
- RUŽA KVASINA born in 1940
- STIPO ŠKRABA (age 54)
- IVICA ŠKRABA (age 54)
Gornji Vakuf
January 24th, February 7th and August 1993 - 5 victims, namely:
- STANISLAVA JELEN born in 1933
- PAULINA JOZIĆ born in 1914
- MARIJAN JURIČEVIĆ born in 1928
- ANKA GRGIĆ born in 1923
- TVRTKO KOVAČEVIĆ
Ždrimci
December 22nd, 1993 - 4 victims, namely:
- MATO PROTUĐER
- ŽARKO PROTUĐER
- IVICA BRNIĆ
- BRANKO KATOVIĆ


Paić Polje
July 1993 - 1 victim, namely:
- JOSIP (Niko) POCRNJA born in 1936
Hrasnica
January 30th, 1993 – 1 victim, namely:
- VLATKO (Vojislav) VASILIĆ born in 1964
G. VAKUF
Krupa
August 1993 - 2 victims, namely:
- SAJKA ŠAGOVIĆ
- DELFA DUMANČIĆ
Uzričje
January 1993 - 1 victim, namely:
- MIROSLAV IVANKOVIĆ
Duratbegović Dolac
February 07th, 1993 and January 13th,1994
- 2 victims, namely:
- STANISLAVA (Jozo) JELEN born in 1933
- PERO (Ivo) MARJANOVIĆ born in 1964
Gaj
July 19th, 20th and 23rd, 1993 - 3 victims, namely:
- JOSIPA (Dragutin) VISKOVIĆ born in 1976
- ALEKSANDAR (Franjo) KOŠAK born in 1939
- DRAGUTIN (Mijo) RADIJELOVIĆ born in 1926
Pernice
August 1993 - 1 victim, namely:
- ANTE KOPAČ

D-228

In the municipality of Bugojno 119 people were killed in:
BUGOJNO, KULA, GLAVICE, VUČIPOLJE, VESELA, VRBANJA, KARADŽE, ČAUŠLIJE, KANDIJA, GORUŠA, GOLO BRDO, ODŽAK, GRAČANICA, ROSULJE, ZLAVAST, ŠIĆI, DRVETINE, VRPEĆ, SULTANOVIĆI, GRGIĆI, JABLANJE AND ZANESOVIĆI.
Municipality of BUGOJNO



Bugojno
- from July 19th until December 1993 - 31 victims, namely:
- MARICA (Stipo) MARINA born in 1945
- NIKO (Pero) GRABOVAC born in 1940
- PAVKA (Frano) MAROS born in 1934
- SLAVKO (Mirko) MRŠE born in 1934
- TEREZA-VOJNA (Zvonimir) MRŠE born in 1941
- JELA (Ante) MRŠO born in 1910
- MIRKO GALIĆ
- FRANO (Frano) KIRIN born in 1907
- IVICA (Stipe) JEZIDŽIĆ born in 1948
- DARKO (Stanislav) SKOKOVIĆ born in 1966
- LJUBOMIR (Franjo) KOŠAK born in 1929
- ANA (Ivo) DOLE – JOZIĆ born in 1927
- LJUBA (Ikan) DUJMOVIĆ born in 1958
- DARIO (Miroslav) BARIŠIĆ born in 1983
- JOSIP (Jure) KRSTANOVIĆ born in 1928
- JURE (Niko) ŠUTA born in 1932
- VINKO (Ivo) KASALO born in 1973
- MLADEN (Stanislav) HAVRANEK born in 1968
- MIRO (Alojzije) KOLOVRAT born in 1945
- DAVOR (Pero) JEZIDŽIĆ born in 1969
- ŽELJKO (Draško) TABAKOVIĆ born in 1966
- BRANKO (Ante) JURIČIĆ born in 1956
- NIKICA-NINE (Ivica) GRLIĆ
- RATKO (Ivan) CRNJAC born in 1942
- DRAGO (Anto) ALVIR born in 1951
- ZDRAVKO (Branko) BODRUŽIĆ born in 1971
- TOMISLAV IVKOVIĆ born in 1970
- NIKICA (Augustin) LUČIĆ born in 1961
- ŽELJKO (Marko) MILOŠ born in 1969
- TADIJA (Luka) PAUREVIĆ born in 1937
- PERO (Stipo) VISKOVIĆ born in 1940

Kula
August 20th and November 24th, 1993 - 4 victims, namely:
- IVO (Pero) VISKOVIĆ born in 1906
- PERO (Frano) PALINIĆ born in 1933
- LJUBA (Ivo) PALINIĆ born in 1934
- VINKO (Ivo) PALINIĆ born in 1934

Glavice
July 18th and 21st, 1993 - 2 victims, namely:
-VLADO (Ratko) MARIN born in 1963
-KRASNODAR (Ivo) BRKANOVIĆ born in 1972

Vučipolje
July 1993 - 10 victims, namely:
- MARIJAN (Jozo) BEKAVAC born in 1943
- STIPO (Ivo) GVOZDEN born in 1964
- ANA (Marijan) CRNJAK born in 1937
- SLAVKA (Blaško) ŽIVKO born in 1910
- ANĐA (Marijan) NINKOVIĆ born in 1936
- PERO (Stipo) BRKANOVIĆ born in 1928
- STIPO (Anto) KASALO born in 1938
- JOSIP (Vinko) ŽULJ born in 1961
- IGOR (Ivo) KOLOVRAT born in 1975
- IVO (Stojko) KOLOVRAT born in 1949



Karadže
August 11th, 1993 - 1 victim, namely:
- BOŽANA (Augustin) TOMASIĆ born in 1967

Vesela
July 1993 - 7 victims, namely:
- JURE (Ilija) DUSPER born in 1936
- BLAŽ (Blaž) IVIĆ born in 1939
- DOMINKO (Frano) LUČIĆ born in 1923
- FRANJO (Jure) LEBO born in 1931
- JOSIP (Anto) MARKIĆ born in 1933
- MARIJAN (Ivan) NOSIĆ born in 1943
- ILIJA (Stipo) BREČIĆ born in 1934
- TADIJA (Pero) VUJEVIĆ born in 1953

Čaušlije
July 1993 - 3 victims, namely:
- PERO (Stojan) GAVRIĆ born in 1958
- BLAGO (Stjepan) MILIČEVIĆ born in 1942
- VLATKO (Ante) KAPETANOVIĆ born in 1973

Kandija
August – September 1993 - 3 victims, namely:
- MARIJA (Ivo) ČOKLJAT born in 1929
- IVKA (Ivo) KONTA born in 1928
- DRAGIJA (Ikan) SVALINA born in 1927

Vrbanja
July 1993 - 4 victims, namely:
- FANIKA (Jozo) HARAMBAŠIĆ born in 1917
- MIRO TELENTA
- MIJO VUČAK
- MARIO (Josip) ZRNO born in 1967

Goruša
July 1993 - 3 victims, namely:
- JOZO (Luka) MILARDIĆ born in 1914
- MILICA MILARDIĆ born in 1925
- ANTE (Jozo) LUČIĆ born in 1959

Golo Brdo
July - September 1993 - 2 victims, namely:
- STIPO (Jakov) UDOVIČIĆ born in 1928
- BOŽO (Pero) SUČIĆ born in 1939

D-228c



Rosulje
September 6th/7th, 1993 – 1 victim, namely:
- IVO (Ante) GRABOVAC born in 1929

Odžak
July 1993 - 7 victims, namely:
- JAKOV (Stipo) GAŠPAR born in 1929
- DRAGUTIN (Fabijan) BARTULOVIĆ born in 1932
- ZDRAVKO (Stjepan) KEŠKIĆ born in 1959
- STIPO (Marko) STIPIĆ born in 1954
- ILIJA (Niko) KEŠKIĆ born in 1906
- ZDENKO (Dragutin) BARTULOVIĆ born in 1968
- STIPO (Niko) LUBAR born in 1949

Gračanica
July 1993 - 21 victim, namely:
- IVICA (Anto) MILOŠ born in 1930
- MLADEN (Ivica) MILOŠ born in 1962
- DRAŠKO (Ivica) MILOŠ born in 1958
- PAVO (Frano) MILOŠ born in 1949
- MARA (Stipo) JAZVIĆ born in 1934
- FRANJO IVANDIĆ
- STIPO (Marijan) BOŠNJAK born in 1933
- JOSIP (Stipica) LUČIĆ born in 1920
- MARA (Marko) LJUBAS born in 1938
- ZDRAVKO (Marko) DILBER born in 1933
- STIPO GRBAVAC from Crnče
- ŽELJKO (Marko) MILOŠ born in 1969
- RATKO (Tonko) MAROS born in 1941
- FRANJO (Franje) IVANDIĆ born in 1971
- IVO (Drago) GUNJAČA born in 1955
- IVO (Frano) MILIČEVIĆ born in 1961
- ANTO (Ivica) DILBER born in 1945
- RATKO (Tonko) MAROS born in 1941
- STIPO (Frano) MAROS born in 1932
- MIROSLAV (Dominko) MILIČEVIĆ born in 1963
- HUBERT (Ante) ŠIMIĆ born in 1930

Zlavast
July 1993 - 4 victims, namely:
- MARA (Ivan) LUČIĆ born in 1938
- ANA (Zvonimir) BLATANČIĆ born in 1958
- IVICA (Marijan) ŠAKIĆ born in 1964
- JOSIP (Pero) LUČIĆ born in 1935

D-228d



Sultanovići
July 19th, 1993 - 1 victim, namely:
- ŽARKO (Marko) JUKIĆ born in 1968

Drvetine
July 1993 - 4 victims, namely:
- ZDRAVKO (Ivo) BOŽIĆ born in 1956
- DOMINKO (Ante) JUKIĆ born in 1941
- FRANO (Ivica) BIJADER born in 1957
- IVO (Nikola) MILJAK born in 1974

Šići
July 23rd, 1993 - 1 victim, namely:
- ZDRAVKO (Niko) BOJIĆ born in 1951

Grgići
June - July 1993 - 3 victims, namely:
- NIKO (Marko) JURIŠIĆ born in 1930
- VINKO (Ante) JURIŠIĆ born in 1942
- SLAVKO (Franjo) TOPIĆ born in 1951

Vrpeć
July 25th, 1993 - 3 victims, namely:
- JANJA (Stojan) STRUJIĆ born in 1923
- JOZO (Niko) KLARIĆ born in 1929
- MIJO (Anto) KRIŽANOVIĆ born in 1925

Zanesovići and Jablanje
July 1993 - 3 victims, namely:
- IVANKO (Ivan) PENAVA born in 1973
- STIPO (Ivo) MARINČIĆ born in 1959
- VINKO (Niko) PERIĆ born in 1929


In the municipality of Travnik 118 people were killed in:
TRAVNIK, MILETIĆI, DOLAC, POLJE, DOLAC BILA, BRAJKOVIĆI, GRAHOVČIĆI, OVNAK, KRPELJIĆI, ORAŠAC, ČUKLE, MALJINE, ŠARIĆI, BUKOVICA, PEŠEVIĆI, RUDNIK BILA and JANKOVIĆI.
Municipality of TRAVNIK


Mehurići
Command, training camp and accommodation for Mujahedeen and volunteers from Islamic countries
Miletići
April 24th, 1993 - 6 victims, namely:
- STIPO PAVLOVIĆ born in 1934
- LUCA PAVLOVIĆ
- FRANJO PAVLOVIĆ born in 1963
- VLADO (Srećko) PAVLOVIĆ born in 1974
- TIHOMIR (Srećko) PAVLOVIĆ born in 1974
- ANTO PETROVIĆ born in 1937
Travnik
(in front of "Medresa" building)
October 20th, 1992 - 1 victim, namely:
- IVICA STOJAK – commander of the HVO Municipal Staff
TRAVNIK
Turbe
Travnik
April 5th, 6th and 20th, 1993 - 3 victims, namely:
- KREŠO SKOČIBUŠIĆ – from Kalibunar
- DARIO MELJANČIĆ
- DANICA GAŠO
At the Travnik-Vitez – Guča Gora crossroad
March 17th, 1993 - 2 victims, namely:
- IVO JURIĆ born in 1972
- ZORAN (Vesko) MATOŠEVIĆ born in 1967

D-229b



Brajkovići
June 8th, 1993 - 7 victims, namely:
- LUCA BARBARIĆ (70 years)
- STJEPAN (Marko) BOBAŠ born in 1926
- MARKO (Pero) JOSIPOVIĆ born in 1934
- ALFONZ (Jozo) MATKOVIĆ born in 1933
- PERO (Matija) MATKOVIĆ born in 1970
- ANTO (Mato) KLARIĆ born in 1946
- MARIJAN BARIĆ (age 40)

Grahovčići and Ovnak
June 8th, 1993 - 4 victims, namely:
- ŠIMUN ČUTURIĆ born in 1917
- STIPE (Dragan) ČUTURIĆ born in 1928
- ANA ČUTURIĆ born in 1927
- MARKO BARBIĆ

Dolac
June 4th- 6th, 1993 - 12 victims, namely:
- ANICA BEŠLIĆ
- MILKA BLAŽEVIĆ
- IVO MARJANOVIĆ
- JOSIP MEDIĆ
- JURO HERCEG
- VIKTOR SVALINA
- FINKA BOJANOVIĆ
- FINKA PINDEŠ
- ČEDO PROŠI Ć
- JOZO ROJNICA born in 1933
- MIJO VRHOVAC
- LUCA – ward of a nursing home

Polje
June 3rd, 1993 - 3 victims, namely:
- DARKO (Branko) ANIĆ born in 1958
- MIRKO DUJMUŠIĆ born in 1944
- MARIO (Slavko) MUNETIĆ born in 1976

Dolac Bila
June 8th, 1993 - 2 victims, namely:
- JADRANKO (Pero) JURTA born in 1973
- FRANJO (Srećko) BRKIĆA born in 1970

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Travnik - Grahovčići
June 8th, 1993
- MARKO BARBIĆ



Krpeljići
June 8th, 1993 – 7 victims, namely:
- STIPO (Mato) KAFADAR born in 1948
- DRAGO (Matija) PETRUŠIĆ born in 1935
- LJUBO (Kesten) PETRUŠIĆ born in 1932
- RUDOLF (Ivo) PETRUŠIĆ born in 1933
- DRAGO (Ante) VOLIĆ born in 1934
- VLADO (Mato) VOLIĆ born in 1959
- NIKO (Ante) SLUGANOVIĆ born in 1949

Orašac
June 8th, 1993 – 7 victims, namely:
- JAKO PEŠA born in 1926
- MANDA PEŠA born in 1924
- SREĆKO (Stjepo) MARIJANOVIĆ (age 14)
- FRANJO (Jozo) STOJAK (age 65)
- VINKO (Marko) JANKOVIĆ (age 65)
- TOMO (Jozo) STOJAK (age 58)

Čukle
June 8th, 1993 – 22 victims, namely
- DRAGO (Marko) MARJANOVIĆ born in 1924
- BOŽO (Ivo) ŽABIĆ born in 1927
- IVICA (Drago) LAUŠ (age 55)
- FABIJAN (Ivica) LAUŠ born in 1961
- PERO (Ivo) KOZINA born in 1955
- BERO (Niko) LEŠIĆ (age 33)
- ŠKUCO (Matija) MATKOVIĆ (age 25)
- BRANKO (Drago) MRKONJA born in 1967
- MIROSLAV (Stipe) KOZINA born in 1967

- MARKO (Dragan) MARJANOVIĆ
- IVO (Luka) GALIĆ born in 1928
- DRAGAN LAUŠ born in 1959
- ZLATKO MARJANOVIĆ born in 1955
- DRAGO PERIĆ

- ANTO (Anto) STOJAK born in 1972
- KAZIMIR (Mato) KOZINA born in 1967
- BERTA KOZINA born in 1933
- DRAGO (Ivo) ERIĆ born in 1958
- JOZO (Dragan) MARJANOVIĆ



Maljine
June 8th, 1993 – 37 victims, namely:
- JAKOV (Ivo) TAVIĆ born in 1970
- STIPO (Pero) TAVIĆ born in 1972
- IVO (Jozo) VOLIĆ born in 1953
- ANTO (Franjo) BALTO born in 1959
- JOZO (Franjo) BALTO born in 1971
- NIKICA (Franjo) BALTO born in 1968
- IVO (Niko) BALTO born in 1964
- LUKA (Mato) BALTO born in 1969
- SREĆKO (Franjo) BOBAŠ born in 1963
- PREDRAG (Kažimir) PUŠELJA born in 1972
- NIKO (Pero) BOBAŠ born in 1940
- GORAN (Niko) BOBAŠ born in 1972
- STIPO (Franjo) JANKOVIĆ born in 1948
- DALIBOR (Stipo) JANKOVIĆ born in 1974
- BOJAN (Zvonko) BARAČ born in 1974
- DAVOR (Zvonko) BARAČ born in 1976
- SLAVKO (Fabijan) BOBAŠ born in 1948
- ANTO (Mijo) MATIĆ born in 1958
- PERO (Mijo) BOBAŠ born in 1970
- TIHOMIR (Drago) PEŠA born in 1976
- BOŽO (Anto) DJAKOVIĆ born in 1965
- LJUPKO (Bariša) PUŠELJA born in 1958
- DRAGAN (Niko) JURČEVIĆ born in 1970
- FRANJO (Mijo) PUŠELJA born in 1971
- FRANJO (Vinko) PUŠELJA born in 1962
- ANA (Drago) PRANJEŠ born in 1974
- FRANJO (Niko) MARTINOVIĆ born in 1960
- MIJO (Ivo) TAVIĆ born in 1962
- FRANJO (Andrija) JAKIĆ born in 1924
- MATO (Ivo) KRAMAR born in 1936
- SLAVKO (Miro) KRAVAR born in 1973
- TOMO (Stipe) PUŠELJA born in 1930

- JOZO (Franjo) PRANJEŠ born in 1908
- LJUBA (Niko) ČEKO born in 1933
- MARA (Jozo) BALTO born in 1936
- IVO (Ante) BARAČ born in 1930
- FRANJO (Andrija) JAKIĆ born in 1930

Guča Gora - Šarići
May 1993 – 1 victim, namely
- MATO TOPALOVIĆ

Bukovica, Peševići and Jankovići
April – June 1993 – 3 victims, namely:
- VEDRANA PRČINLIĆ (age 5)
- FRANO PLIŠKIĆ
- MATO TOPALOVIĆ

Mine Bila
May 1993 – 1 victim, namely:
- FRANJO (Kata) BRKIĆ born in 1970





Zenepići
June 6th - 16th, 1993 - 9 victims, namely:
- IVICA VRHOVAC
- NIKO VRHOVAC
- MIJO VRHOVAC
- NIKO ŠIŠKO
- KATA VRHOVAC
- JOZO VRHOVAC
- MARA VRHOVAC
- LUCA VRHOVAC
- MARA BRKAN

Nević Polje
October 7th, 1993 - 1 victim, namely:
- NATAŠA (Anto) JURIĆ born in 1978

Novi Travnik
June 17th - December 1993 - 30 victims, namely:
- ILIJA (Marko) DRMIĆ born in 1952
- MARKO (Ilija) DRMIĆ born in 1977
- BORS (Ivica) AUGUSTINOVIĆ born in 1977
- VANJA (Drago) BUNGIĆ born in 1982
- STELA (Gordan) CVITANOVIĆ born in 1977
- ČEKO (Stipo) ANKICA born in 1960
- DANIJELA (Stipo) FILIPOVIĆ born in 1988
- ANDREJA JURČEVIĆ – 5 months old baby
- OLGA (Drago) KAFADAR born in 1973
- LJUBICA KAPETAN born in 1926
- SLAVKO (Franjo) TOPIĆ born in 1951
- ILIJA (Marko) GRBAVAC born in 1964
- FABO (Ilija) STOJAK born in 1956
- PAVO (Roko) VUKOVIĆ born in 1945
- TVRTKO BILJEŠKOVIĆ
- MARKO (Jozo) ZVIRAC born in 1921
- ANKICA ČEKVIŠA
- DOMINKO BAVARKA
- MATO BAVARKA
- EDITA (Zvonko) BLAŽEVIĆ born in 1977
- DRAGO LOZANČIĆ
- MARKO LOZANČIĆ
- ĐORĐE MATOVINOVIĆ
- LJUBOMIR PEŠA
- SLAVKO RAMLJAK
- ANTO TURIĆ
- STIPO VUKOVIĆ
- DRAGICA (Pero) ŽILIĆ born in 1961
- NIKOLA ŽILIĆ


Kasapovići
June 13th, 1993 - 3 victims, namely
- PERO BRKAN born in 1963
- IVAN BRKAN born in 1944
- ANTO VRHOVAC born in 1954
Pribilovići
June 8th, 1993 - 1 victim, namely
- IVICA (Jure) STANIĆ born in 1953
Bučići
July 17th, 1993 - 2 victims, namely:
- IVAN (Ilija) KOLAR born in 1984
- VERA (Anto) KOLAR born in 1940
NOVI TRAVNIK
Kopila
June 9th, 1993 - 2 victims, namely:
- JOSIP (Ivo) JURIŠIĆ born in 1938
- ZDRAVKO (Josip) JURIŠIĆ born in 1966
Rastovci
October 25th, 1993 - 11 victims, namely
- ANĐA (Mato) ĆORIĆ born in 1925
- ILIJA (Mijo) ĆORIĆ born in 1913
- RUŽICA (Fabijan) MARTIĆ born in 1969
- LJUBA (Marko) RUJEVIĆ born in 1936
- KARLO DAVIDOVIĆ born in 1963
- ZORAN VREBAC born in 1959
- PERO KOVAČ born in 1942
- DRAGO TEŠLIĆ born in 1960
- JAKO MILANOVIĆ born in 1938
- GORAN LEŠIĆ born in 1974
- MIRKO ĆORIĆ
Šenkovići
June 9th, 1993 - 1 victim, namely:
- ANTO (Stanislav) ADŽAIP born in 1949


In the municipality of Vitez 169 people were killed in:
KRIŽANČEVO SELO, BUHINE KUĆE, BOBAŠI, BRDO, ZABILJE, VITEZ, PRNJAVOR, GRABAK and POČULICA
Municipality of VITEZ

D-231a

Križančevo Selo
December 22nd, 1993 - 72 victims, namely:
- ALILOVIĆ (Ivo) MARINKO born in 1965
- AUGUSTINOVIĆ (Ivo) IVICA born in 1952
- BAKOVIĆ (Dragutin) JOSIP born in 1965
- BRKIĆ (Matija) RUDO born in 1943
- ČALIĆ (Marijan) JOPIP born in 1958
- ČALIĆ (Vinko) MIRKO born in 1960
- ČEČURA (Stjepan) ZDRAVKO born in 1962
- ČEČURA (Ivica) MATO born in 1960
- DELIJA (Anto) STIPO born in 1963
- DELIJA-MATOŠEVIĆ (Pero) ŽIVKO born in 1969
- GRBAVAC (Marko) NEDELJKO born in 1966
- GRBAVAC (Tadija) ANTO born in 1959
- GRBAVAC (Anto) MARKO born in 1952
- GREBENAR (Anto) ANTO born in 1957
- GUDELJ (Franjo) DRAGAN born in 1957
- HRGIĆ (Anto) VLADO born in 1953
- JAKŠEVIĆ (Filip) JOZO born in 1959
- JUKIĆ (Stipo) IVICA born in 1968
- JURČEVIĆ (Jozo) STIPICA born in 1969
- JURČEVIĆ (Jozo) LJUBAN born in 1966
- JURIŠIĆ (Ivo) VINKO born in 1951
- KNEŽEVIĆ (Niko) IVAN born in 1971
- KNEŽEVIĆ (Ivo) NIKO born in 1951
- KNEŽEVIĆ (Ivo) PERO born in 1949
- KOVAČEVIĆ (Radmilo) SNJEŽAN born in 1961
- KOZINA (Milko) ZDRAVKO born in 1962
- KRIŽANAC (Niko) DRAGAN born in 1945
- KRIŽANAC (Jozo) TOMO born in 1969
- KRIŽANAC (Jako) ANTO born in 1942
- KRIŽANAC (Nikola) DRAGAN born in 1960
- KRIŽANAC (Anto) IVICA born in 1959
- KRIŽANAC (Stipo) RANKO born in 1965
- KRIŽANAC (Ilija) FRANJO born in 1928
- KRIŽANOVIĆ (Vlado) BONO born in 1960
- LEŠIĆ (Niko) VLADO born in 1958

- LIVANČIĆ (Ivo) STIPO born in 1968
- LIVANČIĆ (Franjo) MIROSLAV born in 1971
- MAROS (Marko) IVICA born in 1950
- MAROS (Jozo) MARIJAN born in 1959
- MAROS (Mirko) GORAN born in 1963
- MAROS (Jako) SLAVKO born in 1948
- MAROS (Marko) JAKO born in 1943
- MAROS (Miro) DRAGAN born in 1962
- MARTINOVIĆ (Franjo) MIROSLAV born in 1957
- MATIĆ (Juraj) BRANKO born in 1973
- MILIČEVIĆ (Stipo) JERKO born in 1937
- NEDIĆ (Lazar) MILOVAN born in 1954
- NIKOLIĆ (Ivan) BRANISLAV born in 1955
- PRANJKOVIĆ (Ivo) JOSIP born in 1971
- RAJIĆ (Marko) DRAGAN born in 1957
- ŠAFRADIN (Frano) STIPO born in 1968
- ŠAFRADIN (Rafail) ŽEJKO born in 1966
- ŠAFRADIN (Marko) JOSIP born in 1972
- ŠAFRADIN (Nikica) IVICA born in 1967
- ŠAFRADIN (Mirko) ŽELJKO born in 1964
- ŠAMIJA (Ivo) IVO born in 1936
- ŠAMIJA (Drago) BLAŽEN born in 1974
- ŠANTIĆ (Ivica) NIKICA born in 1954
- ŠARIĆ (Ivica) NIKOLA born in 1969
- ŠTRBAC (Ivica) STIPO born in 1937
- ŠUTIĆ (Mato) PETAR born in 1963
- TOMIĆ (Stipo) JOZO born in 1942
- ZAMBONI (Zvonko) DRAGAN born in 1953
- ZLOJIĆ (Alen) DAMIR born in 1968
- PANJKOVIĆ (Franjo) MATILDA born in 1943
- ALILOVIĆ (Jure) KATA born in 1940
- ALILOVIĆ (Marko) FRANO born in 1962
- ĐOLTO (Fabijan) JANKO born in 1959
- BRISTOVSKI (Roki) TOME born in 1950
- GRABOVAC (Drago) DRAGICA
- RAJKOVIĆ (Frano) MIRO

D-231b

VITEZ
KRIŽANČEVO SELO

The bodies of killed Croats from Križančevo Selo, captured on 22 December 1993 by the members of the BH Army during their action. After the exchange done on 1 February 1994, the bodies were brought in the gym in Vitez for identification.

Buhine Kuće
January 9th, 1994 – 26 victims, namely:
- DRAGICA (Đorđe) PETROVIĆ born in 1957
- BARIŠIĆ (Marko) MARIO born in 1974
- BOŽIĆ (Mato) ANTO born in 1972
- BUHIĆ (Dragutin) MARKO born in 1957
- BULIGOVIĆ (Josip) MARIO born in 1972
- GRABOVAC (Anto) DRAGO born in 1950
- GRGIĆ (Rafael) MLADEN born in 1973
- JANKOVIĆ (Pero) NIKOLA born in 1932
- JAZVIĆ (Ivan) TONI born in 1972
- JURIĆ (Ilija) NIKO born in 1969
- JUTANDA (Đuro) DRAŽENKO born in 1960
- KAFADAR (Mijo) GORAN born in 1972
- KREŠEVLJAK (Zrino) IVAN born in 1975
- LOVRENOVIĆ (Anto) IVICA born in 1967
- PAPIĆ (Vlatko) SMILJAN born in 1969
- PERKOVIĆ (Stipo) PETAR born in 1940
- RAMLJAK (Stipo) STJEPAN born in 1941
- SAMARĐIĆ ZDRAVKO born in 1961
- ŠAFRADIN (Ilija) MIRKO born in 1960
- ŠANTIĆ (Niko) PERO born in 1951
- VIDOVIĆ (Anto) MIRKO born in 1952
- VIDOVIĆ (Mirko) DRAŽENKO born in 1975
- VIDOVIĆ (Anto) ANA born in 1952
- VIDOVIĆ (Anto) DRAGO born in 1950
- TOTIĆ (Blaž) NIKICA born in 1969
- GRABOVAC (Zdravko) ANKICA (maiden name Jurešić)
- ŠAFRADIN (Ilija) GORDANA born in 1965
- ŠARIĆ (Stipo) VELIMIR born in 1972
- ŠERO (Ivica) RIČARD born in 1974
- VIDOVIĆ (Franjo) MIRO born in 1958

Počulice
April 23rd, 1993 – 4 victims, namely:
- VIDOVIĆ JOZO born in 1945
- VIDOVIĆ IVO born in 1939
- PAPIĆ PERO born in 1960
- TROGRLIĆ TOMISLAV born in 1972

Bobaši
September 18th, 1993 – 13 victims, namely:
- BOBAŠ (Niko) LJUBAN born in 1954
- BOBAŠ (Niko) DRAGAN born in 1961
- BRKAN (Ivo) BRANKO born in 1966
- GARIĆ (Anto) FRANJO born in 1935
- IVANKOVIĆ (Jure) SLAVKO born in 1959
- KRIŽANAC (Nikola) ŽELJKO born in 1958
- KRIŽANAC (Ivica) JOSIP born in 1974
- MILOŠEVIĆ (Mladen) SLAVKO born in 1956
- MLAKIĆ (Anto) ZORISLAV born in 1950

BUHINE KUĆE
January 9th, 1994
BUHIĆ (Dragutin) MARKO born in 1957

D-231e

Vitez
April 17th – September 28th, 1993 – 34 victims, namely:
-BAJO (Tomo) ZORAN born in 1973
-BILJAKA (Pero) ŽELJKO born in 1965
-GREBENAR (Pero) FRANJO born in 1957
-LIVANČIĆ (Jozo) ŽELJKO born in 1965
-MIŠKOVIĆ (Frano) MARKO born in 1967
-PERKOVIĆ (Niko) DRAGAN born in 1960
-PRANJKOVIĆ (Anto) VLADO born in 1953
-RAJKOVIĆ (Ivica) SLAVKO born in 1964
-BAREŠIĆ (Nikola) MLADEN born in 1962
-RAJIĆ (Fabijan) PERO born in 1968
-TOMIĆ (Nikola) KARLO born in 1958
-ŽULJEVIĆ (Marko) VLATKO born in 1972
-BATINIĆ (Ivan-Vlatko) MARIO born in 1983
-ANTO (Ljuban) GARIĆ born in 1993
-MARKO (Ivica) BRALO born in 1985
-ALEN (Franjo) TIPOLD born in 1977
-ZORA (Jovan) DENKIĆ born in 1932
-FRANJO (Ante) GARIĆ born in 1935
-ILIJA (Vaso) ŠARIĆ born in 1923
-DRAGICA (Niko) KAPETAN born in 1960
-BUZIĆ (Žarko) MILENKO born in 1962
-GARIĆ MILAN born in 1981
-GARIĆ SANJA born in 1975
-RAMLJAK DRAGAN born in 1978
-GREBENAR VELIMIR born in 1981
-AUGUSTINA GREBENAR born in 1984
-BORIS ANTIČEVIĆ born in 1983
- ČEČURA DRAŽENKO born in 1978
- SANJA KRIŽANOVIĆ born in 1978
- ANĐELKA KRIŠTO born in 1965
- RAMLJAK ZORAN
- ANĐELKO RAJIĆ-MIŠKOVIĆ born in 1964
- PRKAČIN DRAGICA born in 1934
- VLADO PRKAČIN born in 1955

Prnjavor
April 24th, 1993 – 3 victims, namely:
- PAPIĆ (Pero) PERO born in 1960
- VIDOVIĆ (Stipo) IVO born in 1939
- ANĐA PAPIĆ born in 1912



D-231f

Brdo – Zabilje
September 5th, 1993 – 15 victims, namely:
- BOBAŠ-TOMIĆ (Vladimir) JOZO born in 1963
- GABRIEL (Johan) ALBERT born in 1960
- IKIĆ (Petar) MLADEN born in 1939
- IKIĆ (Mile) DUŠAN born in 1944
- JERKOVIĆ (Stipo) NIKO born in 1972
- KRIŠTO (Anto) VLADO born in 1956
- LOVRIĆ ŽELJKO born in 1967
- MALINOVIĆ (Špiro) MILAN born in 1953
- MARJANOVIĆ (Drago) JOZO born in 1954
- MIŠKOVIĆ (Jozo) SREĆKO born in 1949
- PETRAŠ (Tomislav) BRANISLAV born in 1963
- PETRAŠ (Dragun) TOMISLAV born in 1938
- PETRAŠ (Dragun) NIKO born in 1948
- STOJAK (Ivo) ŽARKO born in 1975
- SUKARA (Risto) RANKO

Grabak
June 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- POCRNJA (Ivo) IVICA born in 1966
- ŽULJEVIĆ (Marko) VLATKO born in 1972




In the municipality of Zenica 45 people were killed in:
ZENICA, PODBREŽJE, DRIVUŠA, DUSINA, VJETRENICA,
ŠUŠANJ, KOZARAC, BILIVODE – KUBER and ZALJE.
Municipality of ZENICA


Zenica
May 13th, 1992 – 1 victim, namely:
- MATEA (Drago) JURIĆ born in 1990
Podbrežje
April 15th, 1993 – 4 victims, namely:
- IVICA VIDOVIĆ
- MARKO LJUBIĆ
- TIHOMIR LJUBIĆ
- ANTO ZRNIĆ
Drivuša
June 6th, 1992 – 1 victim, namely:
- ANA MITROVIĆ – (child age 4)
Dusina
January 26th, 1993 – 10 victims, namely:
- FRANJO RAJIĆ born in 1965
- DRAŽENKO KEGELJ born in 1973
- NIKO KEGELJ born in 1938
- VINKO KEGELJ born in 1940
- STIPO KEGELJ born in 1931
- MLADEN KEGELJ born in 1969
- AUGUSTIN RADOŠ born in 1964
- PERO LJUBIČIĆ born in 1924
- ZVONKO RAJIĆ born in 1957
- VOJO STANIŠIĆ born in 1924
Vjetrenica
March 28/29th, 1993 – 1 victim, namely:
- SLAVKO PUĐA
ZENICA
ZENICA


Šušanj
June 8th, 1993 – 15 victims, namely:
- DRGUN VIDOŠEVIĆ born in 1909
- ANTE VIDOŠEVIĆ born in 1916
- VLADO MARKOVIĆ born in 1922
- NIKO VIDOŠEVIĆ born in 1922
- KAZIMIR MARKOVIĆ born in 1931
- ANTO MARKOVIĆ born in 1926
- ILIJA VIDOŠEVIĆ born in 1912
- STANKO MARKOVIĆ born in 1931
- DRAGO MARKOVIĆ born in 1933
- ILIJA MARKOVIĆ born in 192
- RUDO MARKOVIĆ born in 1951
- IVO VULETA born in 1952
- ZORAN MARKOVIĆ born in 1956
- JORDAN VIDOŠEVIĆ born in 1973
- ŽELJKO VIDOŠEVIĆ born in 1970
ZENICA
Kozarac
April 18th, 1993 – 6 victims, namely:
- MAGDALENA (Željko) ZRNIĆ born in 1989
- IVAN VIDOVIĆ born in 1904
- ANTE VIDOVIĆ born in 1913
- STIPE TROGRLIĆ born in 1931
- JOZO ANIĆ
- JURE KREŠO
Bilivode – Kuber
April 17th, 1993 – 5 victims, namely:
- IVO KUSTURA born in 1921
- MIRKO (Lucija) LETIĆ born in 1940
- LUKA ŠESTAN born in 1929
- JOZO KRIŠTO born in 1920
- JOZO KUSTURA – (burned alive)
Zalje
April 24th, 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- ZDENKO ZRNIĆ
- SANJA (Zdenko) ZRNIĆ born in 1990

D-233


In the municipality of Maglaj 21 people were killed in:
CRNI VRH, NOVI ŠEHER, ČUSTO BRDO and NOVAKOVIĆI.
Municipality of MAGLAJ


Crni Vrh
June 24th, 1993 – 5 victims, namely:
- MIROSLAV (Luka) ZELIĆ born in 1973
- FRANJO (Marko) ĆURO born in 1971
- MARINKO (Drago) IVANDIĆ born in 1970
- IVICA (Jozo) BATARILO born in 1968
- IVO KOŽULOVIĆ
Novi Šeher
June 24th, 1993 – 1 victim, namely:
- LJILJANA MAGLICA born in 1978
Čusto Brdo
June 16th – September 15th, 1993 –
6 victims, namely:
- IVICA (Nikola) JOZIĆ born in 1969
- JOSIP JUKIĆ
- PERO ZEKIĆ
- Wife of PERO ZEKIĆ
- Daughter of PERO ZEKIĆ
- LUKA (Stipe) MILIČEVIĆ born in 1931
Novakovići
January 1994 – 9 victims, namely:
- FRANJO (Ivić) BANOVIĆ born in 1951
- IVO (Marko) ANTOLOVIĆ born in 1955
- ILIJA (Ilija) BABIĆ born in 1961
- MATO (Ivan) SLIŠKOVIĆ born in 1939
- IVICA (Ivica) VILIĆ born in 1976
- ILIJA (Andrija) DUNĐER born in 1964
- DRAGO (Ante) BANOVIĆ born in 1967
- JOZO (Ivan) KARATOVIĆ born in 1956
- ALEN (Franjo) MATIJEVIĆ
MAGLAJ


In the municipality of Žepče 42 people were killed in:
KISELJAK
Municipality of ŽEPČE

D-234a



Kiseljak
August 16th, 1993 – 42 victims, namely:
- FRANJO KREZIĆ – old man
- KATA KREZIĆ – old woman
- KATA KATIĆ born in 1922
- NIKO ŠIRIĆ – old man
- KATA ŠIRIĆ – old woman
- IVICA MANDURIĆ - boy (retarded)
- IVANA ŠIRIĆ – girl age 13
- MIROSLAV LUČIĆ - invalid without leg
- DAMIR KAJIĆ – boy age 10
- KRUNO KAJIĆ – invalid
- FRANJO TADIĆ – immobile
- IVO VIDOVIĆ – old man
- JAKOV TADIĆ – old man
- IVAN PRAVDIĆ – invalid
- JOZO BULAJIĆ – old man
- MATO IVEŠIĆ – old man
- STANKO ŠIRIĆ – old man
- IVICA BANDIĆ – old man
- FLORIJAN KREZIĆ
- IVICA LUKEŠ
- VINKO ZOVKO

- The remaining victims have not yet been identified.

D-235



Jukići
July 5th, 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- ANTO JUKIĆ born in 1946.
- DAMIR NEDIĆ

Vrbica
June 25th, 1993 – 1 victim, namely:
- JOSIP VOLOŠČUK

Lovnica
June 25th – 23rd January, 1993 – 10 victims, namely:
- IVKA MARTIĆ born in 1964 – pregnant woman
- IVICA VIDOVIĆ born in 1946
- FRANJO LUPIĆ
- BOSILJKO (Marko) TADIĆ born in 1974
- JURO JOZIĆ born in 1952
- STIPO VIDOVIĆ born in 1957
- IVO (Niko) JURANOVIĆ born in 1958
- VINKO BADIM born in 1968
- IVO KAJIĆ born in 1942
- MARIJAN MARTIĆ born in 1977

Vinište
June – December 1993 – 8 victims, namely:
- VLADO TOMAS
- JOZO TOMIĆ
- PERO MARKOVIĆ
- DRAGO MARKOVIĆ
- IVICA JUKIĆ
- NIKO KNEŽEVIĆ
- MATO ŠIRIĆ
- MOMČILO LUČIĆ



Biljačići and Debelo Brdo
June – September 1993 – 3 victims, namely:
- MARKO ŠIMIĆ
- ANTO IVEŠIĆ
- FRANJO VRBIĆ born in 1937

Zavidovići
June – December 1993 – 7 victims, namely:
- ALEKSANDAR PETROV
- MATO MARJANOVIĆ
- IVICA ANTUNOVIĆ
- NIKO ILIĆ
- IVICA ŠIMIĆ
- MATO IVEŠIĆ born in 1929
- IVICA TADIĆ

Dubravica and Osova
June – September 1993 – 6 victims, namely:
- ANTO TADIĆ
- IVICA GRLIĆ born in 1968
- JANKO MARKOVIĆ
- NIKOLA VRBIĆ
- VJEKO KAMENJAŠ
- MILOSAVA ANTUNOVIĆ born in 1948


In the municipality of Busovača 44 people were killed in:
BUSOVAČA, GUSTI GRAB, BUKOVCI, BUSOVAČKE STAJE, OSELIŠTE, DONJE POLJE and KAĆUNI.
Municipality of BUSOVAČA


Gusti Grab
January 26th, 1993 – 8 victims, namely:
- MARIJAN ČAVAR born in 1936
- NIKICA LIVANČIĆ born in 1937
- ANKICA BATISTA born in 1929
- NIKO KRIŠTO born in 1927
- LJUBA LJUBIČIĆ born in 1935
- ANTO ŠIMIĆ born in 1938
- ANTO ŠTEKO born in 1935
- LUCA (Mijo) VULETA born in 1923
Oselište
January 1st and February 27th, 1993
- 3 victims, namely:
- MIJO GRUBEŠIĆ born in 1934
- ANĐA GRUBEŠIĆ born in 1935
- STIPO TOMAS
BUSOVAČA
Busovačke Staje
January 1993 – 16 victims, namely:
- ŠIMUN (Marko) POPOVIĆ born in 1952
- MATO ČOTO
- MIRKO ANUŠIĆ – from Brčko
- Another 13 unidentified victims.
Bukovci
June 4th, 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- KATA PRAVDIĆ born in 1924
- Kata Pravdić's husband


Busovača
January 8th, 1993 – 11 victims, namely:
- ZORAN JERKOVIĆ
- MILKA (Ilija) KATAVA born in 1943
- MLADEN ĆURČIĆ
- JOZO KRIŠTO born in 1930
- RUŽA TOTIĆ born in 1966
- MARA ZNAHOR born in 1948
- MARIO (Marko) POPOVIĆ born in 1977
- MARIO MITROVIĆ born in 1988
- MLADEN (Nikica) BOŠNJAK born in 1978
- MIROSLAV ŠUŠNJA born in 1978
- MARICA ŠUŠNJA born in 1955
Kaćuni
January 23rd, 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- IVICA (Nikica) PETROVIĆ born in 1955
- IGOR BOGDANOVIĆ
BUSOVAČA
Donje Polje
July 20th and August 30th, 1993 - 2 victims, namely:
- ANTO BOŠNJAK born in 1932
- ALAKSANDRA (Marinko) VUJICA born in 1990


In the municipality of Fojnica 52 people were killed in:
FOJNICA, TJEŠILO, DUGO BRDO, OSTRUŽNICA, NADBARE, POLJE ŠĆITOVO, GOJEVIĆI and monastery FOJNICA.
Municipality of FOJNICA

D-237a


FOJNICA
Tješilo
Cemernica
Rajetići
Grabovik
Ormanov Potok
Mujakovići
Merdžaniči
Bagaić
Gradina
Lučice
Marinići
Selište
Sitisce
Podcitonja
Selakovici
Šavnik
Ostružnica
Bakovici
Bistrica
Smrčevice
Deževici
Tješilo
Fojnica – monastery
November 13th, 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- Fr NIKICA MILIČEVIĆ – abbot
- Fr LEON MIGIĆ – vicar
Ostružnica
July 2nd, 1993 – 11 victims namely:
- IVAN LOVRIĆ
- IVO MILUŠIĆ (age 60)
- KATA MILUŠIĆ
- NIKOLA BOŠNJAK (age 65)
- BLAŠKO MILIČEVIĆ
- DRAGO (Stipe) KRAJIN born in 1936
- KATA KRAJINA
- FINKA KRAJINA (age 60)
- MATO LALIĆ
- BERNARDICA PRAVDIĆ
- BILJANA JUKIĆ
Dugo Brdo
June 1st, 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- ŽELJKO (Mato) BLEBEK
- MIODRAG ŠUŠNJARA

D-237b


FOJNICA
Nadbare
December 1993 – 3 victims, namely:
- MATO JURAK born in 1912. - husband
- MARTA JURAK (age 60) - wife
- FRANJO JURAK – son
Fojnica
April 24th, 1993 – 3 victims, namely:
- MATEŠA (Mato) BABIĆ born in 1906 - immobile
- ANĐELKA BABIĆ born in 1915 – immobile
- MILKA GOVEDARICA
Polje Šćitovo
June 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- LUCA BARBIĆ born in 1909
- ANA (Toma) MUSA born in 1934
Gojevići
July 4th, 1993 – 1 victim, namely:
- IVAN IVANIŠ – child age 7


Polje Šćitovo
26 victims, namely:
- MILJENKO BARBARIĆ
- MIRKO BARBARIĆ
- ANĐELKO BARBIĆ
- ANA BARBIĆ
- IVA BARBIĆ
- PERO ANDRIĆ
- IVAN BOŠNJAK
- BLAŠKO MILIČEVIĆ
- MILENKO TOLO
- SILVIO KATAVIĆ
- STIPO KATAVIĆ
- FRANO JURAK
- ANA JURAK
- MARO JURAK
- VINKO BOBAN
- ANTE KRAJINOVIĆ
- NIKO KRAJINOVIĆ
- IVO MILUŠIĆ
- KATE MILUŠIĆ
- FINA KRAJINA
- DRAGAN OSTOJIĆ
- DRAGO KRAJINA
- MARETA BABIĆ
- IVANKA BABIĆ
- MARINKO BOŠNJAK
- FRANO BOŠNJAK
FOJNICA

In the municipality of Kiseljak 35 people were killed in: KISELJAK, KAZAGIĆI, GOJAKOVAC, DATIĆI and ORAHOVO.
Municipality of KISELJAK


Datići
February 17th, 1993 – 1 victim, namely:
- MIJO KNEŽEVIĆ
Kazagići
May 1st, 1993 – 14 unidentified victims
Orahovo
April 23rd, 1993 – 2 victims, namely:
- IVO BOŠNJAK
- KATA BOŠNJAK
VISOKO
FOJNICA
KISELJAK
KREŠEVO
Gojkovac
June 17th, 1193 – 9 victims, namely
- SPOMENKO (Mijo) LUČIĆ (age 13)
- LJUBAN MARKOVIĆ-Dženo (age 60)
- PERO MARKOVIĆ (age 60)
- DANICA MARKOVIĆ (age 60)
- IVAN MARKOVIĆ - Šaraf (age 60)
- JANJA NIKOLIĆ
- STANIŠA TEŠIĆ
- MILENKO TEŠIĆ
- LENKA TEŠIĆ
Kiseljak
May 8th, June 13th and June 18th, 1993 -
9 victims, namely:
- MATO LUCIĆ
- ZORICA GALIĆ
- STJEPAN DŽOJA
- MARA BRADAR
- IVKA TROGRLIĆ
- ŠIMO KVASINA
- KATA MRNJEVAC
- ANTE KATANA
- DRAGO LJOLJE


In the municipality of Kreševo 6 people were killed in:
KREŠEVO and the area of INAČ.
Municipality of KREŠEVO


Area of Inač
June 23rd – October 17th, 1993 –
4 victims, namely:
- LJUBAN (Ante) BEŠLIĆ born in 1963
- DOMINKO BEŠLIĆ
- JURE CJETKOVIĆ
- JAKOV MIŠANOVIĆ
Kreševo
June 20th – July 27th, 1993 - 2 victims namely:
- MARKO (Jozo) MIŠANOVIĆ born in 1928
- KATA VUKOJA born in 1931
KREŠEVO


In the municipality of Visoko 6 people were killed in:
GORNJA ZIMAČA and STOJKOVIĆI.
Municipality of VISOKO

D-240a


Gornja Zimača
November 13/14th, 1993 – 3 victims, namely:
- JURE BLAŽEVIĆ born in 1937
- FRIDA BLAŽEVIĆ – wife
- ANA BRKIĆ born in 1919
Stojkovići
April 20th, 1993 – 3 victims, namely:
- SLAVKO (Ivica) PRAVDIĆ (age 17)
- NIKOLA (Ivan) RADAT born in 1926
- MIJO (Nikola) RADAT
VISOKO
BREZA
KISELJAK
ILIJAS

D-241


In the municipality of Kakanj 55 people were killed in:
KAKANJ, NAŽBILJ, TRUBIĆI, TEŠEVO, LIJESKA, BALIĆI, SLAPNICA, KOVAČIĆI, BRADARIĆI and KRALJEVA SUTJESKA.
Municipality of KAKANJ



Nažbilj
October 22nd, 1993 – 7 victims, namely:
- ILIJA CREPULJA
- PERO ŠIPIĆ born in 1932
- MARTA CREPULJA born in 1949
- VITOMIR BAGAVAC
- DRAGO LJOLJIĆ
- MARINKO ROŠA
- JOZO MARAČIĆ

Kakanj
May 18th – June 20th, 1993 - 9 victims, namely:
- IGOR STOJČIĆ
- TOMO TOMIĆ
- IVO VULETIĆ – com. of HOS
- JOZO TUNJIĆ
- MIRKO STJEPANOVIĆ
- ZDENKO BENIĆ
- VINKO STJEPANOVIĆ
- MARINKO BENIĆ
- LJUBOMIR KRISTIĆ born in 1971

Trubići
June 12th, 1993 – 3 victims, namely:
- NENAD (Božo) BRADARIĆ born in 1968
- MATO (Ilija) GRMAČ born in 1972
- DRAGO (Josip) BABIĆ born in 1967

Teševo / Lijeska / Balići
June 13th, 1993 – 7 victims, namely:
- JAGODA FRANJIČEVIĆ (age 60)
- MARKO (Davorije) FILIPOVIĆ born in 1948
- JELENKO (Marijan) JURIŠIĆ born in 1974
- MIJO MIOČEVIĆ born in 1930
- JELENKO DUVNJAK born in 1974
- IVO (Franjo) MARKANOVIĆ born in 1952
- MARINKO (Pavo) JURIĆ born in 1973



Slapnica
June 13th, 1993 – 5 victims, namely:
- BORISLAV (Marko) STOJČIĆ born in 1974
- FRANJO (Marko) STOJČIĆ born in 1972
- DRAGAN (Marjan) MARTINOVIĆ born in 1960
- ZDENKO (Nikola) STOJČIĆ born in 1965
- MLADEN (Pero) STOJČIĆ born in 1966

Kraljeva Sutjeska
June 13th – 23rd, 1993 – 6 victims, namely:
- FRANJO (Augustin) BRADARIĆ born in 1948
- BOŽO BRADARIĆ
- KAZIMIR AŽDAJIĆ
- MARIJAN KOVAČEVIĆ
- MIJO KOLAK
- BRANKO (Jozo) ŠIPIĆ (age 17)

- IVO MATANOVIĆ
- BLAŠKO (Ivo) FRANJIĆ born in 1953
- JAGODA (Jozo) JURIĆ born in 1952
- STJEPAN (Jure) JURIĆ born in 1968
- LJUBOMIR (Jure) JURIĆ born in 1972
- DRAGAN (Jure) JURIĆ born in 1973
- STJEPAN (Božo) BRADARIĆ born in 1946
- MARKO (Ante) BRADARIĆ born in 1930

- IVAN (Božo) BRADARIĆ born in 1948
- PEPINKO BRADARIĆ
- ANĐA BRADARIĆ born in 1946
- MARKOVICA (Marko's wife)
- JURO (Stjepan) JURIĆ born in 1941
- MARINKO (Pero) JURIĆ born in 1974

Kovačići / Bradarić
June 13th – 20th, 1993 – 18 victims, namely:
- MARINKO BRADARIĆ
- JANJA BRADARIĆ born in 1938
- MATO (Pero) BRADARIĆ born in 1975
- ROBERT (Franj) BRADARIĆ born in 1976

D-241c

KAKANJ - Kraljeva Sutjeska
Exhumation on March 4th, 1998
Doctor Marija Defins, pathologist, Doctor Mark Skinner, anthropologist from Canada and Doctor Douglas Ford, attorney from USA during the exhumation of the murdered Croats from the mass grave.

D-242





THIS PRESENTATION COVERS 1147 VICTIMS KILLED BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE BH ARMY.

THIS IS NOT THE FINAL DATA ON VICTIMS AGAINST WHOM THE WAR CRIMES WERE COMMITTED BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE BH ARMY.

IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS PRESENTATION, THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WERE USED:

- book "RATNI ZLOČINI MUSLIMANSKIH VOJNIH POSTROJBI NAD HRVATIMA BOSNE I HERZEGOVINE" (translation of the title: "WAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE MUSLIM ARMY UNITS AGAINST CROATS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA") – published by "CPD", Sarajevo, 1997
- book "ZLOČINI S PEČATOM – Genocid i ratni zločini bošnjačko-muslimanskih snaga nad Hrvatima BiH 1992. – 1994. godine" (translation of the title: "CRIMES WITH SEAL – Genocide and war crimes of Bosniak-Muslim forced committed against Croats of BiH during 1992 – 1994") – author: IVICA MLIVONČIĆ – second extended and improved edition, Mostar, 2001
- book "VITEŠKA RATNA KRONIKA" (translation of the title: "VITEZ WAR CHRONICLE") – published by HKD NAPREDAK, Vitez, 2001
- paper "STRADANJE HRVATSKOG NARODA U BiH U POSLJEDNJEM RATU" (translation of the title: "THE SUFFERING OF CROATIAN PEOPLE IN BiH DURING THE LAST WAR") – author: Attorney M. Škobić M.E.
- book "ZA PRAVEDAN MIR – Biskupski ordinarijat Mostar u ratnoj drami 1990. – 1994." (translation of the title: "FOR A JUST PEACE – Diocese of Mostar in the war drama 1990 – 1994") – published by: Theological Institute Mostar – prepared by Ante Lubrić, Mostar, 1995
- book "SREDNJA BOSNA ne zaboravimo HRVATSKE ŽRTVE 1941.-50. / 1991.-95." (translation of the title: "CENTRAL BOSNIA let us not forget the CROATIAN VICTIMS OF 1941-1950 / 1991-1995") – Vjenceslav Topalović , M.E., Zagreb, 2001
- Slobodan Praljak's investigation team.

h formacija sa teritorije BiH izvode b/d u do
oriji istočne Hercegovine i oko Dubrovnika.

ite dejstava se
a - s. Ravno
ima Lištica,
eljeŠac i o.

ljerjaku vatrenu podršku izvodi različitim art
anim u vatrene grupe sastava 2-3 oruđa, nano
ivanjem 5-10 projektila i brzim premeštanjem
e vatre uglavnom je postigao slučajnim popoci
izvršene korekture, odnosno obezbeđenja preci
.

eciju je koristio za izviđanje klipnim avionim

ite u daljim napadnim dejstvima očekivati je n
vesinje, Crnoglav - Stolac, s. Trebimlja - s.
s. Slano - s. Ravala - Popovo polje, sa verov
ti u širi rejon Stoca uz pomoć muslimanskog Ri
ane Hercegovačkog korpusa i izbijanjem u Popov
ljne uslove za dalja dejstva u dubinu teritori
ne.

i 26.05.1992. godine sve snage na prostoru ist
dinjuju se pod jedinstvenu Komandu Hercegovačk
23.brTO - Bileća, 472.mtbr - Trebinjska, 10.s
tbr - Nevesinjskh, 13.msp, 13.sposp, 13. lap
ob, 13.atb, PJ Kyde HK i RoB, OdTO Borci, te O
TO Ljubinje koji se predpočinjavaju 23.brTO i
dlučio sam: nastaviti sa odsudnom odbranom na
kovac, s. Klepci, na sadašnjoj liniji odbrane
ovati odbranu u zoni 23.brTO, a sa 472.mtbr
a liniji: s. Velja Međa - s. Trebimlja - s. O
s. Grebci - s. Kalfurdevići - Visočnik.

; spriječiti prodor neprijatelja kroz zonu odbr
hnu Hercegovinu.

KPD sačiniti ispit na organizaciji VOJ-a i pr

42.

DESTROYED AND DAMAGED CATHOLIC CHURCHES AND OTHER REGLIGIOUS OBJECTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DURING THE WAR 1991 – 1995

DESTROYED AND DEVASTATED BY SOME A BiH TROOPS



FACTS

Dioceses in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Vrhbosna	
DESTROYED AND DAMAGED RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Number of structures
Some BH Army troops	290

Roman Catholic Diocese of Banja Luka	
DESTROYED AND DAMAGED RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Number of structures
Some BH Army troops	1

Roman Catholic Diocese of Trebinje-Mrkan	
DESTROYED AND DAMAGED RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Number of structures
Some BH Army troops	3

Interview of Goran Milić with the Chairman of the BH Presidency, Mr. Sulejman Tihić

Place: Slavonski Brod

Ante Prkačin – The host

Member of the Croatian National Council of BiH - Petar Jozelić

Ambassador of BiH in Zagreb - Zlatko Dizdarević

Chief of Cabinet of the President of Presidency BiH - Sehada Kolenović

Chairman of the Presidency of BiH - Sulejman Tihić

Chairman of the Presidency of BiH

Tihić: "Terrorism in BiH, never in BiH has been committed a single terrorist act, the international forces, civil and military units in BiH, from Dayton agreement, never and nobody in that part, at least, where the BH Army was, as well as in entire Bosnia; nobody even threw a stone on the foreigner, a foreign soldier or an international representative, not to mention, hurt somebody."

Tihić: "Is there a hotbed of terrorism in Bosnia, maybe it does exist in Germany, maybe in Croatia, however, those are all assumptions."

Tihić: "Bosnia and Herzegovina is, Bosnian people, if you refer to Bosniaks, they are the biggest victims in the previous war. They suffered the most, most of them were killed and we have never reached for revenge. And when Srebrenica happened, there was not any revenge in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We have never used terrorism as fight method. It is opposite to our being, opposite to the policy that we implement in BiH. Therefore, I think those are rather political speculations that BiH is not a suitable ground, Bosnian Muslims, they are European autochthon people, they don't have such inclinations, they are people that which used to tolerance, respect for others and different, which was shown by the war; either way, where the Bosnians were the majority, a single church hasn't been destroyed, you know. God knows, that in other areas, in the Republika Srpska, everything was destroyed and where the HVO was, mostly all was destroyed as well."

Tihić: "Back then, at the bare beginning, BiH and Croatia were exposed to aggression; however, some things changed later when some wanted to join Milošević in division of BiH. A conflict, unfortunately occurred in Herzegovina, some conflict emerged in Central Bosnia as well. Those are approximately territories that, according to some agreement from Karađorđevo should have been Croatian, but mostly, there were conflicts."

COMMENT:

There are two questions

1. Is Mr. Sulejman Tihić lying?
   (LIE – conscious disregard of facts)

2. Is Mr. Sulejman Tihić not telling the truth?
   (Because he does not know the facts)

With the second question we need the answer – how come that a member of the Presidency of BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/, president of the SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ - the strongest Bosniak–Muslim party does not know the facts?!

And the facts are:

1. His and their leader in the "Islamic Declaration" – the political project of the "tolerant people" wrote:

"The first and most important such conclusion is the one about the incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can be no peace nor co-existence between the 'Islamic faith' and 'non-Islamic' social and political institutions."

"Pretending to order its world by itself, Islam clearly excludes the right and possibility of any foreign ideology on its territory. There is, therefore, no lay principle, and the state should be the expression of – and support the moral concept of religion."

"The choice of this moment is always a concrete issue and depends on a number of factors. Still, we can set up one general rule: the Islamic movement should and can approach the overtaking of power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough not only to topple down the existing non-Islamic rule, but to build a new, Islamic rule. This differentiation is important, because destruction and building does not require an equal degree of psychological and material preparation."

2. This ideologically – political project of one of three equal nations in BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ was printed in more than 200,000 copies in 1990.

3. He and they tried to conclude "The Historical Agreement" between Muslims and Serbs about BiH remaining in Yugoslavia. The Croats were not even mentioned, nor asked, as if they did not exist.

4. He, Alija Izetbegović, roared on electoral rallies "civil state or civil war", as reported by "Oslobođenje" from 1990, all in accordance with the theses of the "Islamic declaration".

5. He and they considered JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ to be the force which will save BiH (read: Muslims) from war, even when this brute force killed and set ablaze territories throughout Croatia.

6. He, Alija Izetbegović, Tihić's party friend, when the villages of Uništa and Ravno were burnt by the JNA reservists and other Chetniks (Ravnogorci), thought of it as a Croatian problem.

And why?

Because in these villages, on the territory of BiH, the Croatian people lived. This attack, this aggression, this burning and killing in these villages of BiH, for these experts in constitutional law is not the beginning of aggression on that country – BiH. "This is not our war" said the President of the Presidency of BiH Alija Izetbegović and he counted the beginning of war in that country from the day when JNA attacked him in Sarajevo.

7. Five hundred officers of Tihić's army (A BiH / Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina) "who never resorted to revenge" (DEAR GOD!!) dutifully, in accordance with higher command and moral norms with which Sulejman Tihić prides himself in the name of the people, took part in the aggression of JNA on Croatia, as members of this army. These officers were permeated by the feelings and realization of justice only when the JNA, the army which they so dutifully served at the time of attack on Croats in Croatia and BiH, started mass

shelling of their houses and kill their loved ones.

It was then, only then, that they went over to the A BiH and became allies with the always regular HVO /Croatian Defense Council/.

8. These political leaders, of the then MUSLIM PEOPLE, accepted into the regular units of their A BiH 2,700 Mujahedin.

The remaining 2,000 – 2,500 "warriors of Allah" independently advocated the ideas of Bin Laden, spread the ideas of humane warfare, and the whole army cheered "Allahu Ekber" in the name of BiH and the equality of its people. They were killed and became shehids. And all this within the constitution of BiH, equality and sovereignty of the Croat, Bosnian and Serbian peoples.

9. Mr. Tihić, in accordance with his capacities of cognition, has no idea who, how and when killed 1,147 (thousand one hundred forty seven) civilians and imprisoned soldiers of HVO in 21 (twenty one) municipalities of Central Bosnia.

And so forth.

This same Mr. Tihić, having been through Serbian casemates, found refuge in Croatia, in Rijeka, and with wholehearted help of the Croatian leadership helped the survival of A BiH even when its main enemy became the HVO.

That's how it was!

The writer of these lines could theorize in detail on the thoughts of Aristotle and Plato, Hegel and Kant and Thomas Aquinas, he could search for the solution of the "General riddle" within the scope of quantum mechanics and Heisenberg's principle of indetermination, theory of determined chaos and the Second law of thermodynamics (THE FIRST LAW TOO IS IMPORTANT) while NEWTON and MAX WEBER, Starčević and KONRAD LORENZ, as well as FREUD and his brotherhood should not be bypassed…

And all this should be simmered over a low fire and gently warmed up by tangents and arches of dialectical materialism, with the addition of great thoughts of Stipe Šuvar, Predrag Matvejević and other successors of the "Short course of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)".

All this in the end leads to an ordinary, small, poor truth to be lost in the delusions of a deceptive mind.

So, what is it all about?

Mr. Sulejman Tihić is by all standards a civilized and polite person, and I don't want to offend him.

But:

What Mr. Tihić has said is a lie, a vulgar and shameless, cold and calculated.

Lie!

Mr. Sulejman Tihić lies, he lies in a vulgar, cold and calculated way. He, Mr. Tihić, member of the Presidency of BiH on that day, on that place, in front of Croatian journalists took out his weenie and pissed on the FACTS!

THIS IS THE MANNER OF TIHIĆ

It's not that the man cannot be comprehended, the main representative of one of three nations living in BiH.

But Croats and all sub-groups of this people: politicians, historians, intellectuals (honest and dishonest), journalists, academics, workers and peasants and students, artists, lovers of truth, people of religion and teaching of religion, Europeans, various associations, thirty thousand non-governmental organizations keep silent…

Everybody keeps silent!

Incomprehensibly and miserably, in a flattering and gentlemanly manner they keep silent.

They keep silent with a feeling of incomprehensible historic guilt.

They keep silent cowardly.

DIOCESE OF BANJA LUKA
ARCHDIOCESE OF VRHBOSNA
MOSTAR-DUVNO AND TREBINJE-MRKAN DIOCESES
Banja Luka
Sarajevo
Mostar
BISKUPIJA
Trebinje
PRIJEDOR
TOLISA
DERVENTA
PLEHAN
DOBOJ
TESLIĆ
VRBANJCI
BUGOJNO
FOJNICA
KREŠEVO
TOMISLAVGRAD
LIVNO
GLAMOČ
GRADAC
STOLAC
ČAPLJINA
ČITLUK
HUMAC
DRINOVCI
POSUŠJE
GRUDE
LJUBUNČIĆ
ODŽAK-ĆAIĆ
ŠURKOVAC
LJUBIJA
ŠIMIĆI
IVANJSKA
MAHOVLJANI
BARLOVCI
MARIJA ZVIJEZDA
PETRIČEVAC
MOTIKE
STRATINSKA
STARA RIJEKA
SASINA
SANSKI MOST
BOS. KRUPA
BIHAĆ
KLJUČ
MRKONJIĆ GRAD
DRVAR
BOS. PETROVAC
BOS. GRAHOVO
LIŠTANI
ŠIPOVO
JAJCE
PODMILAČJE
DOBRETIĆI
KORIĆANI
LISKOVICA
SANICA
KOTOR-VAROŠ
SOKOLINE
ŠNJEGOTINA
VRBAS
UNA
SANA
BOS. NOVI
BOS. KOSTAJNICA
BOS. DUBICA
BOS. GRADIŠKA
NOVA TOPOLA
DOLINA
SAVA
BOS. ALEKSANDROVAC
PRNJAVOR
V. PRNJAVOR-SOČANICA
ĆER
FOČA
DRAGALOVCI
KULAŠI
PRESNAČE
MOTAJICA
BOSNA
ŽEPČE
ZAVIDOVIĆI
LOVNICA
OSOVA
RADUNICE
GLOBARICE
MAGLAJ
BEČIJA
GOR. KOMUŠINA
KOMUŠINA
NOVI ŠEHER
LUG-BRANKOVIĆI
JELAH
ŽABLJAK
SIVŠA
UJARICE
ŠPIONICA
ŽOVIK
DRAGUNJA
PRIJENČA
BRČKO
BIJELJINA
GRADAČAC
DUBRAVE
POLJACI
BOĆE
TURIJ
ULICE
BREZOVO POLJE
KORAJ
UGLJEVIK
JANJA
BREŠKE
ŠIKARA
TUZLA
LUKAVAC
PAR-SELO
MORANČANI
ŽIVINICE
KALESIJA
ZVORNIK
VLASENICA
BRATUNAC
SREBRENICA
OLOVO
KRALJEVA SUTJESKA
VAREŠ
BOROVICA
VIJAKA
VUKANOVIĆI
JELAŠKE
ZENICA-CRKVICA
ZENICA-SV.JOSIP
ZENICA-SV.ILIJA
KAKANJ
HALJINIĆI
BUSOVAČA
BREZA
ČEMERNO
VISOKO
BRESTOVSKO
KISELJAK
ILIJAŠ
NOVO SARAJEVO
MARINDVOR
PROVINCIJALAT „BOSNE SREBRENE"
VRHBOSANSKA BOGOSLOVIJA I BOGOSLOVIJSKA CRKVA
GRBAVICA
PALE
NOVI GRAD
FRANJEVAČKA TEOLOGIJA NA NEDARIĆIMA
SOKOLAC
REGATICA
VIŠEGRAD
USTIPRAČA
GORAŽDE
LJUBINJE
GACKO
FATNICA
KALINOVIK
FOČA
TREBINJA
RAVNO
BILEĆA
BILEĆKO JEZERO
GABELA POLJE
GABELA
ČELJEVO
KLEPCI-DRAČEVO
HRASNO
HUTOVO
NEUM
STJEPAN KRST
ALADINIĆI-DUBRAVE
PREŽI-DUBRAVE
DOMANOVIĆI
STUDENCI
MEĐUGORJE
ROTIMLJA
GRADINA
PIOĆE
BLAGAJ
NEVESINJE
KRUŠEVO
GRADNIĆI
GRIJEVIĆI
KLOBUK
ČERIN
RASKRIŽJE
LJUTI DOLAC
RASNO
LEDNAC
TIHALJINA
RUŽIĆI
BUHOVO
ZAGORJE
VRANJI
SUTINA
REZNICA
RAKITNO
VIR
RAŠELJKA
VINICA
BUKOVICA
ROŠKO POLJE
SEONICA
GRABOVICA
KONGORA
PRISOJE
PODHUM
ČAPLJE
GRAČAC
DOLJANI
OBRI
JABLANICA
KONJIC
SOLAKOVA KULA
TARČIN
UZDOL
ROZOR
RUMBOCI
RAMA-ŠCIT
ŠUICA
GORICA
BILA
VIDOJ
ČAPLJE
DEŽEVICE
BANBRDO
GORNJI VAKUF (USKOPLJE)
GROMILJAK
BISTRICA
OTINOVCI
SKOPALJSKA GRAČANICA
KUPRES
SUHO POLJE
RASTIČEVO
GLAVICE
KANDIJA
ROSTOVO
BRAJKOVIĆI
N.BILA
BUĆICI
KLOPČE
VITEZ
RANKOVIĆI
DOLAC
NOVI TRAVNIK
PEĆINE
TURBE
TRAVNIK
POTKRAJ
OVČAREVO
GUČA GORA
ŠIPOVO
VRBAS
VRBAS
SAVA
UNA
UNA
SANA
SAVA
DRINA
NERETVA
TREBIŠNJICA
ORAHA
BOSNA
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DRINA
UNA
SAVA
SAVA
SAV

THE AREA OF JAJCE



DESTROYED AND DAMAGED CATHOLIC CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Completely destroyed	Severely damaged	Damaged	TOTAL
Parish churches	0	0	0	1
Other churches	0	0	0	0
Chapels	0	0	0	0
Parish houses and other parish structures	0	0	0	0
Convents	0	0	0	0
Cemeteries	0	0	1	1
TOTAL:	0	0	1	1

Ključ – parish Ključ – catholic cemetery "Latini" in the town." Damaged and devastated during October 1996 and March 1997

THE AREA OF MOSTAR AND SOUTHERN HERZEGOVINA

DESTROYED AND DAMAGED CATHOLIC CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Completely destroyed	Severely damaged	Damaged	TOTAL
Parish churches	0	0	1	1
Other churches	0	0	0	0
Chapels	0	0	0	0
Parish houses and other parish structures	0	0	0	0
Convents	0	2	0	2
Cemeteries	0	0	0	0
TOTAL:	0	2	1	3

THE AREA OF MOSTAR AND SOUTHERN HERZEGOVINA

Mostar, Parish of Sts. Peter and Paul - parish church of Sts. Peter and Paul and Franciscan monastery

The church was devastated on several occasions by the JNA /Yugoslav Peoples' Army/ and the VRS /Army of the Republic of Srpska/. On 12 May 1993 an explosive device was thrown into the monastery which caused the greatest damage. Since April until the beginning of October 1993 the members of Muslim forces fired 27 grenades of various calibre on the church and the monastery.

Jablanica, parish Jablanica - parish church of Immaculate Conception of Mary.

On 21 December 1992 alongside the sacristy an explosive device was detonated which damaged the church. Since 20 March 1993 the area of the parish is under the control of Muslim forces.

Konjic, parish Konjic - parish church of St. John the Baptiste and Franciscan monastery.

THE AREA OF CENTRAL BOSNIA



DESTROYED AND DAMAGED CATHOLIC CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES	Completely destroyed	Severely damaged	Damaged	TOTAL
Parish churches	1	14	22	37
Other churches	7	13	17	37
Chapels	19	23	52	94
Parish houses and other parish structures	9	19	21	49
Convents	0	3	2	5
Cemeteries	8	26	34	68
TOTAL:	44	98	148	290

Bistrica, the parish of Bistrica - parish church of St. Theresa and the parish house.

During July and August 1993 the church received a direct hit by a cannon missile and the interior is completely devastated.

Bistrica, the Parish of Bistrica - the house of the nuns “Sisters of God’s Love”

The house is completely plundered and burnt.

Bistrica, the parish of Bistrica - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is devastated and the cemetery severely damaged.

Bristovi, the parish of Bugojno - a filial church and the cemetery.

The church is demolished, only the walls remained and the cemetery is mostly destroyed.

Bugojno, the parish of Bugojno - the parish church of St. Anthony of Padua.

The members of the Muslim forces planted a bomb which destroyed the stained glass windows and the outer wall.

Bugojno - Čaušlije, the parish of Bugojno - cemetery chapel of St. Michael and the cemetery.

The chapel was plundered and severely damaged and all the tombstones were pulled down.

Donja Ričica, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is plundered and devastated and 15 tombstones were pulled down.

Bugojno, the parish of Bugojno - cemetery chapel of St. John the Baptiste and the cemetery.

Chapel and the cemetery are severely damaged and around 180 tombstones were pulled down.

Gračanica-Humac, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - the filial church of St. Heart of Mary.

During 1993/94 the church was demolished and on 14 July 1996 the interiors of the church were torched. The tombstone crucifixes were taken away.

Donji Vakuf, the parish of Bugojno - a filial church.

After A BiH took control over this area the interiors of the church was destroyed by an explosive device.

Drvetine, the parish of Bugojno - the filial church of St. Anthony of Padua.

During 1995 the church was torched and everything around it was completely destroyed.



Glavice, the parish of Glavice - parish church of St. Heart of Jesus and the parish house.

The church is completely plundered and the parish house was plundered and partly torched.

Glavice, the parish of Glavice - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is completely destroyed and tombstones are wrecked and pulled down.

Gornja Ričica, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is destroyed and the cemetery partly damaged.

Gračanica-Humac, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - the filial church of St. Heart of Mary.

The church is completely plundered and devastated and the parish house is plundered and torched.

Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, the parish of Gornji Vakuf - parish church of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary and the parish house.

In the period from 23 October 1992 until 31 December 1993 the church is severely damaged by shelling.

Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, the parish of Gornji Vakuf - the House of St. Anthony.

On 15 February 1993 the House of St. Anthony was shelled and torched.

Gračanica-Humac, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - parish church of the Most Innocent Heart of Mary.

The church is completely plundered and devastated, likewise the parish house.

Gračanica, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - the house of the nuns "Servants of the Child Jesus".

The house was plundered and torched.

Grnica-Trebare, the parish of Bistrica - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is partly devastated.

Kandija, the church is severely devastated and the parish house is completely torched together with a library containing 8000 books - parish church of St. Elias and the parish house.

Kandija, the parish of Kandija - cemetery chapel and the "Grabovi" cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery are partly damaged and severe damage is inflicted on the tomb of Kandija priests.

Krupa, the parish of Bistrica - the chapel and local cemetery.

The chapel is devastated and on 1 March 1993 the cemetery was severely damaged, which was repeated in 1996.

Lenđerovina, the parish of Bugojno - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery are severely devastated.

Lužani, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery are slightly damaged.

Pajić Polje, the parish of Skopaljska Gračanica - the chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is completely plundered and the roof taken off. Nearly all the tombstones are destroyed.

Vrse, the parish of Gornji Vakuf - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is plundered and devastated and the tombstones pulled down.

Voljice, the parish of Gornji Vakuf - the filial church of St. Anthony.

The church is damaged by shelling.

Bilići, the parish of Deževice - the cemetery chapel.

The chapel is plundered and damaged.

Brestovo, the parish of Brestovo - the parish church of the Birth of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the parish house.

In April 1993 the church was damaged and the parish house sustained minor damages too.

Brestovo, the parish of Brestovo - the convent of Poor Clares.

In April 1993 the attic was set on fire by shelling.

Brnjaci, the parish of Kiseljak - a filial church.

Damaged by shelling.

Busovača, the parish of Busovača - the parish church of St. Anthony of Padua.

Due to shelling the church sustained damages between 25 January and 25 December 1993.

Fojnica, the parish of Fojnica - the parish church of the Holy Spirit and the Franciscan monastery.

In the period between 2 and 15 July 1993 the monastery and the church were exposed to shelling. On 13 September 1993 four members of A BiH killed the superior of the monastery Nikica Miličević and the vicar Leon Migić.

Deževice, the parish of Deževice - the parish church of St. Mary of the Snow and the parish house.

The church is devastated and all the furnishings were plundered.

Kaćuni, the parish of Busovača - the filial church of St. Nikola Tavelić.

The church is devastated.

Kazijevići, the parish of Fojnica - the filial church "Porziuncola".

The church sustained medium damage.

Kiseljak, the parish of Kiseljak - the parish church of St. Elias the Prophet.

In the period from 18 April until 31 December 1993 the church was damaged by shelling.

Liješevo, the parish of Gromiljak - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is completely destroyed and torched.

Milodraž, memorial chapel (on "AHD-NAMU" from 1463) and the cemetery.

The chapel was damaged and part of the tombstones taken away.

Prosje, the parish of Busovača - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel was torched between 25 and 31 January 1993.

Šćitovo, the parish of Fojnica - the filial church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

Completely torched with all the inventory.

Doljani, the parish of Doljani - cemetery chapels.

By the end of July 1993 two cemetery chapels are partly destroyed.

Zabrđe, the parish of Banbrdo/Lepenica - a filial church.

During the summer months the church was completely plundered and devastated.

Hudutsko, the parish of Gračac - a filial church.

In mid-1993 the church is completely destroyed.

Komin, the parish of Uzdol - chapel of St. Anthony.

Sustained severe damages.

Kosne luke, the parish of Doljani - cemetery.

By the end of July 1993 the tombstones and crucifixes were demolished by members of the A BiH.

Prozor, the parish of Prozor - parish church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the parish house.

Damaged due to shelling.

Kostajnica, the parish of Obri - a filial church.

The interior of the church was plundered and devastated.

Obri, the parish of Obri - votive chapel of St. John.

The chapel is damaged and the old tombstones devastated.

Obri, the parish of Obri - parish church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.

The church is completely plundered and devastated.

Uzdol, the parish of Uzdol - parish church of St. John the Baptist and the parish house.

The church as well as the parish house were severely damaged during 1993.

Žitače, facilities of the parish of Podhum/Žitače - cemetery chapels.

In the period between 2 May and 2 October 1993 all cemetery chapels were demolished and desecrated.

Solakova Kula, the parish of Solakova Kula - the parish church of St. Elias the Prophet.

The church is completely plundered and the statues of the saints beheaded.

Žitače, the facilities of the Podhum/Žitače parish - the parish church of St. Anthony of Padua.

In the period between 2 May and 2 October 1993 the church is desecrated, plundered and partly torched. The parish house and another building were demolished.

Brnj, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is partly damaged.

Bjelavići, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - a filial church.

After occupation of the locality on 13 June 1993 the church was devastated and plundered.

Borovica, the parish of Borovica - the parish church of The Transfiguration, parish house and catechism hall.

The church was mined and fully destroyed with all the belongings. Parish house was completely destroyed along with the parish archive and library. Finally, this building was mined too.

Bukovlje, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel was plundered and then torched.

Bulčići, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel was devastated and the bell stolen.

Crnač, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is partly damaged.

Donji Banjevac, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is partly damaged.

Gornja Borovica, the parish of Borovica - cemetery chapel.

The chapel was plundered and partly devastated.

Dubоštica, the parish of Vareš - a filial church.

During October / November 1993 the interiors of the church were desecrated.

Gornji Banjevac, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is damaged.

Haljinići, the parish of Haljinići - parish center of the Assumption of Mary.

The parish centre was plundered and devastated.

Grmače, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - a filial church.

Following the occupation of the locality on 13 June 1993, the church was torched.

Kakanj - Bjelica, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is plundered and destroyed.

Juke, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is plundered and destroyed, and the cemetery partly destroyed too.

Kraljeva Sutjeska, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - the parish church of St. John the Baptist and the monastery.

By the end of 1993 desecrated on several occasions and at the beginning of 1997 damaged by a shell.

Oćevije, the parish of Vijaka - a filial church.

In the second half of 1993 completely plundered and damaged.

Mir, the parish of Vareš - chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel was devastated twice and the tombstones were demolished.

Mandovina, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is completely plundered and devastated.

Pavlovići, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - a filial church.

After the occupation of the locality on 13 June 1993, the church was torched.

Pope, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is partially damaged.

Varda, the parish of Kakanj - chapel.

The chapel is partially damaged, and the tombstones destroyed.

Poljani, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - a filial church.

After the occupation of the locality on 13 June 1993 the church was plundered and devastated.

Olovo, the parish of Vijaka - church - sanctuary of the Mother of God ("Olovska Gospa") and the parish house.

Plundered on the part of A BiH.

Pogar, the parish of Vareš - a filial church.

At the beginning of November 1993 it was hit by two grenades from a grenade launcher and the interior was devastated.

Pržić, the parish of Vareš - a filial church.

The church sustained heavy damages.

Vareš Majdan, the parish of Vareš - a filial church.

The members of the 3rd Corps of the Muslim forces on 2 September 1993 damaged the church and devastated the interiors.

Seoce, the parish of Kraljeva Sutjeska - a filial church.

After the occupation of the locality on 13 June 1993 the church was plundered and devastated.

Vijaka, the parish of Vijaka - the parish church of the Immaculate Conception and the parish house.

In the second half of 1993 the church sustained minor damages and the parish house was plundered.

Zgošća, the parish of Kakanj - chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel was damaged and the cemetery devastated.

Brajkovići, the parish of Brajkovići - the parish church of Sts. Peter and Paul and the parish house.

The church was damaged due to shelling, and the parish house was devastated.

Vukanovići, the parish of Vukanovići - the parish church of St. Anthony and the parish house.

The church was plundered and devastated.

Žitelj, the parish of Kakanj - chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel was damaged and the monuments destroyed.

Bukovica, the parish of Guča Gora - a filial church and the cemetery.

The church and the cemetery were devastated.

Čukle, the parish of Brajkovići - a filial church and the cemetery.

During April and May 1993 the church and the cemetery were damaged. The Caritas pharmacy was plundered. Until October 1997 the church was destroyed by fire.

Dolac/Bila, cemetery chapel at "Baja's" cemetery

Since the summer of 1993 the area is under the control of Muslim forces. The chapel was plundered and the tombstones demolished.

Čuture, cemetery chapel at the "Sviba" cemetery.

The chapel is devastated and the tombstones demolished.

Dolac, parish of Dolac - the parish church of the Assumption of Mary and the parish house.

On 3 June 1993 the church was damaged during shelling and the parish house plundered and devastated.

Djakovići, the parish of Novi Travnik - a filial chapel.

The chapel is devastated.

Gorica, the parish of Guča Gora - cemetery.

The cemetery is destroyed, including a number of tombstones.

Gospino Vrelo, the parish of Ovčarevo - chapel - votive sanctuary of the Birth of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

The chapel is devastated and destroyed.

Kasapovići, the parish of Novi Travnik - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is devastated.

Kraljevice, the parish of Guča Gora - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and the cemetery is destroyed.

Gostunj, the parish of Dolac - a filial church and the cemetery.

The church was damaged at the beginning of June 1993, and ca 50% of the tombstones are destroyed.

Hadžići, the parish of Novi Travnik - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is devastated.

Guča Gora, the parish of Guča Gora - the parish church of St. Francis of Assisi and the Franciscan monastery.

After taking control of the locality on 8 June 1993, the monastery was plundered, as well as the church which was also devastated.

Guča Gora, the parish of Guča Gora - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and the cemetery sustained heavy damages.

Maljine, the parish of Guča Gora - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and the cemetery are devastated.

Margetići, the parish of Novi Travnik - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is devastated.

Novi Travnik, the parish of Novi Travnik - the parish church of the Assumption of our Lord.

The church was damaged during shelling.

Ovčarevo, the parish of Ovčarevo - the parish church of St. Michael the Archangel and the parish house.

After taking control of the locality on 7 June 1993, the church was plundered and devastated as well as the parish house.

Nova Bila, the parish of Nova Bila - the parish church of the Holy Spirit, parish house and the catechism hall.

In the second half of 1993, the church, parish house and the catechism hall were damaged during shelling.

Ovčarevo, the parish of Ovčarevo - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery partially damaged

Stojkovići, the parish of Dolac - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is damaged during shelling.

Prići, the parish of Ovčarevo - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery are damaged.

Pećine, the parish of Pećine - the parish church of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the parish house.

The church and the parish house heavily damaged.

Putičevo, the parish of Dolac - the filial church and the catechism hall.

At the beginning of June 1993, the church was thoroughly plundered and damaged and at the end of 1996 the bell tower was destroyed by mining.

Rostovo, the parish of Rostovo - the parish church of St. Elias the Prophet and the parish house.

The church is damaged and the parish house plundered and devastated.

Sebešić, the parish of Rostovo - a filial church.

The church is completely plundered and devastated.

Travnik, the parish of Travnik - the parish church of St. John the Baptist and the parish house.

The church is devastated and the parish house damaged.

Šenkovići, the parish of Novi Travnik - cemetery chapel.

The chapel is devastated.

Travnik, the parish of Travnik - seminary church of St. Aloysius.

The church was devastated, and the Muslim refugees were housed in the seminary building.

Travnik, the parish of Travnik - cemetery chapel and the "Bojna" cemetery.

The chapel is devastated and 39 tombstones destroyed.

Vitez, the parish of Vitez - cemetery chapel at the "Krčevine" cemetery.

The chapel and cemetery are damaged.

Vitez, the parish of Vitez - the parish church of St. George the Martyr and the parish house.

The church was damaged on 6 July 1993 during shelling. In January 1994 it received a direct hit by a grenade.

Biljačić, the parish of Zavidovići - chapel.

The chapel is plundered.

Tešanj, the parish of Jelah - the parish of Jelah.

The church sustained minor damages.

Brezovo Polje, the parish of Žepče - cemetery.

The cemetery sustained minor damages.

Čajdraš, the parish of Čajdraš - the parish church of the Heart of Jesus.

The church sustained minor damages.

Dolina, the parish of Zavidovići - a filial church and the cemetery.

The church is plundered and devastated and the cemetery damaged.

Zavidovići, the parish of Zavidovići - the parish church of St. Joseph and the parish house.

Both slightly damaged during shelling. An attempt to mine the bell tower didn't succeed.

Golubinja, the parish of Žepče - a filial church and the cemetery.

The church is completely destroyed by fire including all the inventory, and the cemetery slightly damaged.

Lovnica, the parish of Lovnica - the parish church of Sts. Peter and Paul and the parish house.

The church is completely plundered and devastated, and the parish house, as well as the other buildings plundered.

Maglaj, the parish of Maglaj - the parish church - sanctuary of St. Leopold Mandić and the parish house.

The church is heavily damaged during shelling, and the parish house was occupied by Muslim refugees.

Lovnica, the parish of Lovnica - cemetery chapel and the cemetery.

The chapel is plundered and devastated.

Zavidovići, the parish of Zavidovići - the town cemetery.

The cemetery is damaged.

Zavidovići, the parish of Zavidovići - the chapel of St. Vitus.

The chapel is torched.

Zenica - Podbrežje, the parish of St. Elias - the chapel of St. Roch.

On 14 May 1993, the chapel is slightly damaged and the cemetery desecrated.

Zenica - Stranjani, the parish of St. Elias - a filial church.

The church is devastated and 50 tombstones at the cemetery destroyed.

Žepče, the parish of Žepče - the parish church of St. Anthony of Padua and old and new parish houses.

The church is damaged during shelling.

Zenica - Travnik, the parish of St. Joseph - chapel.

The chapel is damaged.

Percentage of believers in BiH from 1400 till 1450



Percentage of believers in BiH in 1991





Year	Number of Catholics	Percentage of Catholics	Year	Number of Orthodoxes	Percentage of Orthodoxes	Year	Number of Muslims	Percentage of Muslims
1400-1450	**750,000**	87.21%	1400-1450	**30,000**	3.49%	1400-1450	**0**	0.00%
1879	209,391	18.08%	1879	496,485	42.88%	1879	448,613	38.75%
1885	265,788	19.88%	1885	571,250	42.76%	1885	492,710	36.88%
1895	334,142	21.31%	1895	673,246	42.94%	1895	548,632	34.92%
1910	434,061	22.87%	1910	825,918	43.49%	1910	612,137	32.25%
1921	440,431	23.48%	1921	820,731	43.75%	1921	586,151	31.24%
1931	557,836	24.01%	1931	1,028,723	44.29%	1931	717,562	30.89%
1948	614,123	23.90%	1948	1,135,147	44.30%	1948	788,403	30.70%
1953	654,227	23.00%	1953	1,264,045	44.40%	1953	891,798	31.30%
1961	711,665	21.70%	1961	1,406,057	42.90%	1961	842,248	25.70%
1971	772,491	20.60%	1971	1,393,148	37.20%	1971	1,482,430	39.60%
1981	758,140	18.40%	1981	1,320,738	32.00%	1981	1,630,033	39.50%
1991	**760,852**	17.40%	1991	**1,366,104**	31.20%	1991	**1,902,956**	43.50%

TOTAL NUMBER OF DAMAGED OR DESTROYED SACRAL STRUCTURES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

STRUCTURES	COMPLETELY DESTROYED			SEVERELY DAMAGED			DAMAGED			TOTAL STRICKEN		
	By the Muslim forces	By the Serbian forces	Total	By the Muslim forces	By the Serbian forces	Total	By the Muslim forces	By the Serbian forces	Total	By the Muslim forces	By the Serbian forces	Total
Parish churches	1	64	65	14	40	54	23	43	66	38	147	185
Other churches	7	53	60	13	40	53	17	38	55	37	131	168
Chapels	19	44	63	23	32	55	52	57	109	94	133	227
Parish houses and other parish structures	9	56	65	19	65	84	21	56	77	49	177	226
Convents		8	8	5	9	14	2	6	8	7	23	30
Cemeteries	8		8	26	27	53	35	68	103	69	95	164
TOTAL:	**44**	**225**	**269**	**100**	**213**	**313**	**150**	**268**	**418**	**294**	**706**	**1000**

43.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN WAR LAW IN HV AND HVO

HOW WE WORKED



FACTS

COMMENT:

At the end of March or beginning of April 1992 the IPD /Section of Informative Psychological Activity/ Department of the MORH /Croatian Ministry of Defense/ which I then directed, printed, in cooperation with the ICRC /International Committee of the Red Cross/ the booklet "RULES OF BEHAVIOUR FOR COMBATANTS".

In the middle of March I was back from Sunja, took the duties in the MO and immediately we printed the handbook, as soon as we managed to defend ourselves and were in the position to organize the MO in a more serious way.

"THE RULES OF BEHAVIOUR FOR COMBATANTS" were printed in around 100,000 copies and I claim that every member of the HV /Croatian Army/ got his copy.

If we wish to be mathematically precise, then the above assertion cannot be correct, but in the usual way of making assertions, it is true.

As soon as in May 1992 this booklet was distributed to the fighters of the HVO, because we sent them the copies – I cannot remember the numbers any more.

As the IPD Department of the MO had its representative, its member in all units of the HV to the level of company, in the function of assistant commander of the unit, this booklet had to be studied on all the levels of the military structure.

RULES OF CONDUCT FOR SOLDIERS

International committee of Red Cross (ICRC)
19th Avenue - de la Paix
CH - 1202 Geneva, Swiss

RULES OF COMBAT

1. Fight only against soldiers
2. Attack military targets only
3. Spare civilians and civilian facilities
4. Restrict destruction specifically on your mission requirements.

SOLDIERS

Respect this sign! ✚

It protects:

- wounded and ill;
- medical staff and red Cross staff;
- ambulance vehicles and Red Cross convoys;
- Hospitals, first aid station and Red Cross facilities.

WOUNDED ENEMIES ON THE BATTLEFIELD

1. Pick them up

3. Hand them over to your superior or closest medical team

2. Offer them aid



4. Respect medical staff and facilities

WOUNDED ENEMIES AND VICTIMS OF SHIPWRECKS



1. Protect wounded, ill and shipwrecked individuals (as well as air staff)

3. Protect civilian boats saving wounded and victims of shipwrecks

2. Look for them and pick them up after each battle



4. Respect ship - hospitals and medical airplanes with Red Cross insignia

IMPRISONED ENEMIES

1. Spare them.





3. Surrender them to your superior officer

2. Disarm them.





4. Treat them humanely. Their families must be informed about their capture.

CIVILIANS

1. Spare them.

3. Protect them from violence. Retaliation and hostage taking are forbidden.

2. Treat humanly those who are in your custody.

4. Respect their property, do not damage it and do not steal it.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Certain rules must be followed during the time of war even when it comes to the enemies. These rules are mainly contained in four Geneva Conventions for 1949 and Supplementary protocols from the 1977 Convention.

Until July 1993, 181 states have signed Geneva Convention's; 125 states signed 1st and 116 signed 2nd Supplementary protocol. As a party who signed Geneva Conventions and its Supplementary protocols your state is obligated to follow those international contracts.

These contracts were based on concept to respect each individual and his or her dignity. Individuals who are not directly involved in combat or individuals who are not fighting because of the illness, wounding or some other reason, must be respected and protected from war; people in trouble must be helped and cared for without discrimination. Special protection must be provided for the hospitals, medical staff and convoys, as well as Red Cross staff, facilities and equipment.

Geneva Conventions protect:

Wounded and sick members of armed forces on the battlefield and medical staff (1st Convention).

Wounded and sick members of armed forces at sea and shipwreck victims. (2nd Convention)

Prisoners of war. (3rd Convention)

Civilian individuals in enemy's custody or on occupied territories. (4th Convention)

Article 3, which is shared by all four Conventions, refers to internal conflicts and obligates to humane treatment for all individuals who are not involved in conflicts or who are no longer involved in conflict. This provision especially prohibits inhumane actions, hostage taking, torture and carrying out of death sentence without a due process and dictates that trials must be carried out according to regulations.

Supplementary protocols deal with, in more detail, with international (Protocol 1) and internal conflicts (Protocol 2). Difference between civilian objects and military targets must be respected during the conflict.

ICRC

States that signed Geneva Conventions are obligated to:

- Care about wounded equally, with no difference whether it is the friends or foes;
- Respect physical integrity, honor, dignity, family rights, as well as morale and religious beliefs of each individual.
- Prohibit torture and inhumane actions, death sentence without due process, extermination, deportations, hostage taking and robbery and destruction of civilian property.
- Allow ICRC delegates to visit prisoners and to talk to them face to face.

ICRC with seat in Geneva (Switzerland) is founding body of Red Cross and Red Crescent Movements.

As neutral intermediary in the case of armed conflicls. ICRC tries to, on its own initiative or based on Geneva Conventions, to offer aid and protection to the victims of international and civil wars as well as internal unrests and tensions and by doing so it contributes to world peace.

As initiating body and promoter of Geneva Conventions. ICRC is guardian of International humanitarian law.

VISITS TO PRISONERS

Visits by ICRC have objective to determine physical and psychological condition of captivity and treatment of prisoners.

In the case of need ICRC proposes measures for improvement of imprisonment conditions to the authorities holding the prisoners.

Reports written by ICRC after the visit to places where prisoners are being held are strictly confidential and can not be published.

When it comes to internal conflicts reports are given to the authorities holding the prisoners and to the authorities of the country of prisoner's origin.

In international conflicts reports are given to the authorities holding the prisoners and to the authorities of the country of prisoner's origin.

MORE PRECISE CRITERIA

ICRC implements same criteria in its actions to aid prisoners whether there is a situation which is covered by Geneva Conventions or not. In other words:

ICRC delegates must have access to all prisoners and they must be allowed to talk to them freely and without witnesses;

Delegates must have access to all places where prisoners are being held and they must be allowed to repeat their visits;

Delegates must be given the lists of all individuals to be visited (or they must have opportunity to create such lists on the spot).

COMMENT:

HR-HB /Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia/ printed a leaflet on the same topic – The rules of engagement in a military conflict. They did this in cooperation with the ICRC:

CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA

TO SOLDIERS AND OFFICIALS

RULES OF CONDUCT IN THE ARMED FIGHT

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

Certain humanitarian rules must be obeyed in the time of war, even when this concerns the enemy. These rules are determined by the Geneva Convention.

F I G H T E R S !

1. Fight only against the armed enemy
2. Attack only the military targets
3. Spare civilians and civil objects
4. Destroy only those targets, defined within your plan

Related to enemy fighters that surrender
1. Do not kill them! Disarm them!
2. Treat them in human manner!
3. Deliver them to your superiors!

Related to wounded enemy combatants
1. Provide them with First aid!
2. Deliver them to your superiors!
3. Deliver them to the closest medical crew!

Related to civilians
1. Respect them! Treat them in human manner!
2. Do not mistreat them!
3. Do not damage and do not steal their property!
4. Revenge and holding hostages are strictly forbidden!

Red Cross or Red Crescent

Civil protection

Cultural objects, monuments, sanctuaries, museums, etc

Dams, embankments, atomic power systems and propulsions

White flag of peace negotiations

Related to special marks of humans and objects
1. Respect persons, guard them and do not enter facilities, bearing these marks
2. Let the persons, bearing these marks, to perform their tasks
3. Do not impede vehicles, bearing these marks
4. This is applied if no other order is received

COMMENT:

On October 1st, 1992, I sent a detailed letter to all operational zones of the HV, Croatian Navy, Croatian Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defense to the level of company, in order for them to read, study and EDUCATE MEMBERS OF HV on what must not be done in the war.

There is no sense commenting, so I am asking the reader to read the document.

NOTE:

It would be wrong to conclude that the stated violations of law are directed nationally, only towards the Serbs. Just the contrary, at the time of the "ceasefire" due to many factors, increase the number of violations and criminal offenses within the unit.

/coat of arms/
Republic of Croatia
Ministry of Defense
41 000 Zagreb
IPD administration
Zagreb, 1st October 1992

/stamp of receipt/
Republic of Croatia
Ministry of Defense
IPD administration
Class: 804-04/92-02
Operational number: 5120-25-92-852/3

Attn: IPD services of all operational zones
HRM, HRZ and PZO
(please forward it to IPD companies)

Information on frequency of criminal offenses of the Croatian army members

Lately, especially in the period after cessation of fights and direct warfare activities on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, there was an increase of criminal offenses, committed by the members of HV or persons which were recently demobilized. The increase of criminal offenses is concerning, because it is the question of significantly high number of offenses, with tendency of current increase. The concern is even bigger due to the fact that heavy criminal offenses with grave consequences prevail, for which the law does not anticipate severe punishments.

In the most of cases, one observed that the perpetrators of these offenses decided to execute offenses without proper, or even any consideration, as well as that they do not have a critical attitude towards what has been done; moral component is also missing, there is no remorse of conscience, even a conscience on prohibition of those offenses is missing, especially referring to gravity of consequences and gravity of regulated punishment.

Without involving in finding and establishing the cause of such phenomenon, it is necessary, right away and without delay, to start with preventive activity in the HV troops. The least one can do is introduce the soldiers to several important facts about which they might have partially forgotten, due to their activities in war or they might have gotten a wrong impression that the aforementioned are no longer important. Besides, one should intend to respect the military discipline, especially obeying orders which refer to carrying and use of weapons and explosive devices. Firstly, each member of HV must be familiar with two basic matters:

1. Croatian army fought and won the war in which Croatia is liberated and in which it has the opportunity to establish its democratic state for the first time ever. First and basic condition such state could exist and operate on, is the RULE OF LAW. Therefore, nobody, not even current of former member of the HV can breech its laws and regulations without punishment.
2. By one's participation in war to liberate the country, by one's courage, self-abnegation, merits and personal sacrifice, nobody gained ability to receive moderated punishment for committed offenses, let alone to be forgiven.

In regards to the aforementioned under item 1, each Croatian soldier must know that this entire war with all its casualties had sense only if this enabled establishment of national, free and in each term, better state than the one which was brought down. In that kind of state there must be, as well as it should be defended, personal safety of the citizens and inviolability of private and state property. If the Croatian soldier in his own state, established through his courage and self-abnegation, as well as courage, health and lives of others, commits offenses by which he endangers basic values of such state, he questions its activity, he looses his own dignity and belittles the victim of those who died or remained permanently disabled.

In regards to the aforementioned under item 2, one should know that the law does not envisage a possibility that somebody is forgiven a criminal offense and that he is free of punishment, because he previously did some good or great deed. To be fair, the law does provide possibility that some merit can be taken into consideration by punishment determination as the so called mitigating circumstance. However, when it is known that frames of possible punishment for each individual criminal offense are set extremely broad, such mitigating circumstance can, with final degree of punishment, be imperceptible or almost insignificant.

One noticed that the major number of the gravest criminal offenses, committed by the HV members or by immediately demobilized person, was done, having involved three factors:

a) in alcoholised condition

b) by using weapons or weapon threat

c) operating in a group

Exactly those three aforementioned factors bring the perpetrators of such grave criminal offenses into a less favourable position, other than the position of such perpetrators of criminal offenses actually is like. The criminal law finds that criminal offenses committed by use or threat by weapon, as well as those which were committed in group, are more severe form of criminal offense. Therefore the law anticipates significantly heavier punishments for such offenses than those which are anticipated for the similar offenses, but which were committed without weapon usage and without participation of several people.

The influence of alcohol, to the contrary of ingrained belief of the major number of uninformed persons, is not a circumstance which can excuse someone for what he did in alcoholised condition. On the contrary, with some sorts of criminal offenses, such are, for instance, criminal offenses, which endanger the public traffic, a circumstance that the perpetrator was under influence of alcohol makes that criminal offense graver and therefore a graver punishment was stipulated for such person.

Knowledge and awareness about the gravity of certain criminal offenses and gravity of prevented punishments can influence the decrease of crime.

Although one often finds that the basic matters from the field of criminal law are known to everyone, the practice shows the opposite. Therefore cases of an appalled individual who committed some grave criminal offense are quite often, and who found that his offense was barely punishable. Finding that the law for such offense anticipates, for example, the lowest possible sentence of 3 or 5 years of imprisonment is devastating. Therefore it is more likely that the majority of such persons wouldn't even have decided to commit such criminal offense, if they had been aware of a possibility of being criminally responsible, regardless of their membership in HV, regardless of their war merits and the fact that their act is something, which was marked by the law as an especially grave form of criminal offense and therefore anticipates especially severe, several years long imprisonment sentence.

Criminal offenses, mostly committed by the members of HV or former members of HV, can be classified in 4 groups, whereby such classification does not necessarily refer to regulation of penal code and the partial

reason for this is frequent interference of various criminal offenses, committed in one single occasion. The following are in question:

a) criminal offenses by which one endangers life of health of other people

b) criminal offenses at the expense of other people's assets

c) criminal offenses against dignity and morale

d) criminal offenses against safety of the public traffic

Under a)

MURDERS

For the homicide with malice aforethought, the law anticipates minimum punishment of 5 years imprisonment, whereas the maximum, of 15 years imprisonment (article 35, item 1 of the Croatian Penal Code). Perpetrator, by his offense, decided to take other person's life. First degree or qualified homicide bears even more severe punishment in range between 10 and 20 years. It refers to homicides which are committed under such aggravating circumstances due to which the law anticipates severe punishments: murder in cruel or perfidious manner, murder on the occasion in which other people's lives are endangered, murder committed by unscrupulous violent behaviour, murder for gain in order to execute or to cover other criminal offense, murder from ruthless revenge or other basic instincts, murder of the official person while that person performs affaires of public and state security or another official person which guards the arrestee. All the aforementioned are modalities of the heavy criminal offense of homicide.

Homicide in a fit of passion (article 36 of the Croatian Penal Code)

This homicide is committed in case of temporary reaction of the perpetrator to attack, abuse or severe insult, and he is therefore brought into the state of significant irritation without this being his fault. The punishment's range moves from 1 to 10 years of imprisonment.

Manslaughter by negligence (article 38 of the Penal code of RH)

The perpetrator in this case does not want to kill, but he is responsible for cause of death which occurred and he could have been aware of. This occurs due to lack of caution, unprofessional, light-minded or easy managing of weapon or explosive devices. This often occurs during the war. The punishment stretches between 6 months and 5 years of imprisonment.

Severe physical injury (article 41 of the Croatian Penal Code)

We differ between severe physical injury, for which the determined punishment stretches between 6 months and 5 years of imprisonment and especially severe physical injury, whereby the punishment, determined by the law, stretches between 1 and 10 years of imprisonment. Modalities for especially severe physical injury are the following: when the victim is brought to the state of life jeopardy, when physical disability is caused, when the permanent disability to work is caused, when it came to permanent and severe health jeopardy or when the permanent disfiguration is caused. For the severe physical injury with lethal consequences, the law stipulates imprisonment sentence in duration of 3 years minimum.

For the severe physical injury in a fit of passion, when the perpetrator, without this being his fault, is brought into severe state of irritation by attack, abuse or insult of the harmed one, the law stipulates imprisonment sentence in duration from 6 months to 3 years. For the severe physical injury with lethal consequences, committed in a fit of passion, the law stipulated imprisonment sentence in duration from 1 to 5 years.

Light physical injury (article 42 of the Croatian Penal Code)

The law determines 3 years imprisonment sentence to the one who slightly injures other person or who slightly jeopardizes his health.

Participation in the physical fight (article 43 of the Croatian Penal Code)

The one who participates in any physical fight, in which somebody was deprived of life or in which someone is severely physically injured, shall be punished for the mere participation by imprisonment sentence, in

duration from 3 months to 3 years. We shall also cite some criminal offenses against the public order and traffic, in which life and health of people are also endangered.

Preventing the official person in execution of his/her official duty (article 193)

The law determines imprisonment sentence in duration up to 5 years for those who, by force or under threat of using force, prevent the official person in execution of his/her official duties; the same punishment refers to the situation in which insult, abuse, causing of light physical injury or threat to use weapon occur. The punishment refers to offenses committed towards the official person while executing duties of public or state safety, which refer to prevention or reveal of criminal offenses, arresting perpetrators of criminal offenses and guard of the aforementioned.

Violent conduct (article 198 of the Croatian Penal Code)

Anyone who, by violent insulting or abusing other person, by violence or other impertinent or ruthless conduct endangers peacefulness of citizens, shall be punished with imprisonment sentence in duration from 3 months to 3 years. If the deed is committed in group, the imprisonment sentence stretches from 1 till 8 years of imprisonment. The same punishment is determined if only light physical injury occurs.

False introduction (article 204 of the Croatian Penal Code)

Anyone who falsely introduces himself as official or military person or who, unauthorized, wears insignias of official or military person with intention to have gain, monetary fine or imprisonment sentence up to 1 year is determined.

Unallowed holding of weapon and explosive devices (article 209 of the Croatian Penal Code)

For unauthorized making, acquisition, selling or holding, imprisonment sentence in duration up to 3 years is determined, whereas for major quantities the punishment from 1 to 10 years of imprisonment is envisaged.

Participation in group which commits the criminal offense (article 21 of the Croatian Penal Code)

Anyone who participates in group of people, which, by joint activity deprives a person of life or causes to this person a severe physical injury, damages property of major proportion or commits other severe violence, for participation alone, shall be punished by 3 to 5 years of imprisonment. Determined punishment for the leader is 1 to 10 years of imprisonment.

The practice of courts is that, by punishment determination for each of described deed, it will consider the usage of firearms, explosive or any art of weapon which is considered as especially dangerous as especially grave circumstance. It shall influence the degree of punishment, in the manner it shall be higher, respectively, closer to the upper than to the lower level, anticipated by the law. Also, participation of several persons in execution of the aforementioned deeds, is mostly anticipated by the law itself as special circumstance, which makes the criminal offense more grave and in any case, if it is not the question of special, heavy form of criminal offense, for which the more severe punishment is already anticipated, such circumstance represents special aggravating circumstance and brings to passing of more severe sentence than average.

Under b)

Property of citizens, property of state, equally as the property of the enemy are protected by the law. This is visible from regulations of the Penal Code in which the most severe punishments are anticipated for all forms of appropriation of other people's property, whereby no difference was made in terms of private, social, state or property of the enemy.

Theft (article 130 of the Croatian Penal Code)

For the plain theft, imprisonment sentence in duration from 3 months to 5 years is determined. The intention of the perpetrator is appropriation of illegal property use by alienating other people's movables.

Severe theft (article 131 of the Croatian Penal Code)

For the severe theft the law determines imprisonment sentence in duration from 1 to 10 years and it occurs in following cases: when the theft is carried out by breaking in in especially dangerous or impertinent manner,

by using conditions, in which fire, flood, quake or other disaster (war included, of course) occur, by using other person's inability, by people who had a weapon or dangerous tool along, as well as by several persons who joined in order to steal.

Robbery (article 132 of the Penal Code of RH)

For this criminal offense, act of appropriation of other people's property with help or threat of weapon, or generally, by using force, 1 to 12 years of imprisonment sentence is determined. If the offense is committed in a group, the punishment is 3 to 15 years of imprisonment, whereby already 3 perpetrators are considered a group.

Robbery theft (article 133 of the Croatian Penal Code)

It is a theft, whereby the perpetrator, caught within its execution, used force in order to keep the stolen good. The punishment stretches between 1 and 12 years of imprisonment.

Under c)

Moral and dignity are especially protected by the law. It is visible by very severe punishments which are determined for the acts of rape, as well as other kinds of sexual delicts. Easy engagement to commit such criminal offense, especially when there are 2, 3 or several of perpetrators and especially if the female person was hurt in any way whatsoever, brings the perpetrators to a rather grave position before the court. It is especially important to emphasize that neither here, nor, generally, referring to other criminal offenses, the law makes any difference in relation who is and what is she like, the female person which was raped. The only difference is that helpless persons, minors and especially children till the age of 14 are protected by especially severe punishments.

Rape (article 83 of the Croatian Penal Code)

Punishment for this criminal offense is 1 to 10 years of imprisonment. However, if the victim was severely physically injured or that person died, if the offense was committed by several persons or in especially cruel or humiliating manner, the imprisonment sentence is 3 to 15 years. One should emphasize that well-established practice of the courts, according to which already two perpetrators are considered by the law as several persons, therefore the rape, committed by only two perpetrators is liable to significantly higher sentence, stretching from 3 to 15 years of imprisonment. One should have no doubts that each threat by weapon or any use of weapon, even mere possession on the occasion of perpetrating the criminal offense of rape, exerts an influence of an aggravating circumstance and results in pronouncing a more severe punishment.

Under d)

During the war operations the public traffic developed under extraordinary conditions. Traffic lights were out of order, neither the surveillance nor control of vehicles and drivers was operative. Major number of vehicles, used by members of HV was included in traffic, which were not properly registered or technically examined. Members of HV often drove such vehicles without necessary driver's exam of adequate category, often in alcoholised conditions. It all resulted in major number of traffic accidents with grave consequences despite low traffic density. By establishing the traffic in peace, there were no longer reasons which could represent an excuse for some of the aforementioned oversights. Therefore every other member of HV must count with the fact that he, as well as every other citizen, is liable to harsh traffic discipline, which means that he is obliged to stick to all regulations and rules which are valid in public traffic, whereas on the other side, they, as well as everybody else, are responsible for criminal offenses which they commit by jeopardizing the public traffic.

Jeopardizing the public traffic due to intoxication (article 164 of the Penal Code of RH)

For this criminal offense the law stipulates punishment of up to 3 years of imprisonment. It is the question of the perpetrator who, alcoholised or intoxicated, drove the motor vehicle and thereby jeopardized the public traffic.

For the criminal offense against safety of the public traffic, on the occasion of which a death of one or several persons occurred, the law stipulates 3 to 15 years of imprisonment. If only severe injury or major

proportions damage occurred, the punishment is up to 10 years of imprisonment. Those are severe criminal offenses against safety of the public traffic. This is valid for all cases in which one finds the aforementioned consequences due to violation of traffic regulations, such as major exceeding the speed limit, going through red light or violation of zebra crosswalk regulation and similar. This is especially in force for all cases when the accident was caused due to alcohol influence and one considers that the driver was under the influence of alcohol if the alcohol level in his blood was over 0,5‰.

From all the aforementioned, one concludes that practically every use of weapon or any threat whatsoever, any practical use outside of training or combat activities is liable to punishment, moreover, every criminal offense, committed with the use of weapon, even, in some cases, by mere possession at the time of perpetrating an offense, makes such offense especially grave and punishable by more severe punishment. Furthermore, each criminal offense committed in a group or by several persons, whereby in some cases already two perpetrators are considered "several persons", is especially grave offense and is therefore liable to **more severe punishment.**

Any criminal offense, committed under the influence of alcohol, does not become lighter, neither can it bring to less severe punishment, but some offenses, such as traffic criminal offenses, can bring to more severe punishment.

Since none of the Croatian soldiers can count with the fact that he can be forgiven a criminal offense, or that he will not be processed due to his membership to HV, he must take into consideration his acts as well as acts of other soldiers. Major number of criminal offenses wouldn't have even happened, if, contrary to the orders, weapons hadn't been carried out from the barracks and brought into the bars, if alcohol hadn't been over-consumed and if one hadn't followed various propositions of irresponsible and unconscientious individuals without thinking.

Accordingly, by better obedience to military discipline and especially by better self-discipline, everybody can avoid the conflict with the law. It is sad that a HV member, after he bravely and honourably defeated the enemy by fight, instead of continuing his honourable military carrier, or, after taking off the military uniform, and moving to broad open world of private initiative, entrepreneurship and establishment of every kind of well-being, due to imprudence in management of the weapon or excessive consummation of alcohol, he must serve several years of imprisonment sentence.

Finally, every Croatian soldier, as during his service in HV, so after taking off the uniform as well, must take into account that every action of his, influences the global picture of HV among the citizens.

Every criminal offense, committed by the current of former member of the Croatian army rips off a small part of huge, however untouchable reputation that the Croatian army created among the population in only a year of its existence.

Remark: pursuant to report that we received from IPD service of the zone of operations Osijek and which are considered valid for the others as well, we send you this information you are obliged to introduce all employees to, as well as other members of the Croatian army units.

Assistant minister

Major General

Slobodan Praljak

/signed and stamped/

COMMENT:

International humanitarian war law as a constant topic and preoccupation of all my co-workers at the Ministry.

I cannot produce all the documents, but I place at your inspection another document from May 17th, 1993.

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
ZAGREB
POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

DEFENSE
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

File no. 512-14-05/93-851
Zagreb, 17 May 1993

Pursuant to the Agreement between the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia and the International Committee of the Red Cross on the dissemination among the Croatian Army of International Humanitarian War Law, the Political Administration of the MORH /Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia/ and the MKCK /International Committee of the Red Cross/ are organizing a two-day seminar on the following topic:

"INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN WAR LAW"

The seminar is intended for HV /Croatian Army/ officers occupying the most demanding command and other leading positions in the MORH and GSHV /Main Staff of the Croatian Army/ and it will be held on 26 and 27 May 1993 at the HV Hall in Zagreb (the small conference hall - no. 26 - entrance from Zvonimirova Street) beginning at 0830 hrs.

In keeping with the above, I hereby issue the following

ORDER

1. Officers from the following are to be sent to the seminar:

- the Main Staff of the HV	2 representatives,
- the Health Administration of the MO /Ministry of Defence/	2 representatives,
- the Personnel Administration of the MO	2 representatives,
- the Legal Administration of the MO	2 representatives,
- the Political Administration of the MO	2 representatives,
- the Administration for Education of the GSHV	2 representatives,
- the Administration for Training of the GSHV	2 representatives,
- the Croatian Military Academy	2 representatives,
- the Security and Information Service	1 representative,
- the Military Districts	1 representative,
- the Guards Brigades of the HV	1 representative,

- the Education Centres of the HV	1 representative,
- the Commands of the HRZ /Croatian Air-force/ and PZO /Anti-aircraft defence/	2 representatives,
- the Command of the HRM /Croatian Navy/	2 representatives,
- the Main Inspectorate of the HV	1 representative.

2. Application forms indicating the names of the seminar participants and possible accommodation requests are to be submitted to the Political Administration of the MORH, Zagreb, Stančićeva Street 4/1, before 22 May 1993 (tel. 467-569, 467-431, Mr. Milan Jagec, M.Sc, fax 467-563).
3. To be sent to the following:

1. the Main Staff of the HV
2. the Health Administration of the MO
3. the Legal Administration of the MO
4. the Personnel Administration of the MO
5. the Political Administration of the MO
6. the Administration for Education of the GSHV
7. the Administration for Training of the GSHV
8. the Croatian Military Academy
9. the Security and Information Service
10. Military Districts: Osijek, Zagreb, Gospić, Split, Karlovac and Bjelovar
11. Guards Brigades: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th
12. the Commands of the HRZ and PZO
13. the Command of the HRM
14. the Education Centres of the HV in: Jastrebarsko, Požega, Koprivnica, Sinj, Pula.
15. the Main Inspection of the HV
16. Archives.

Enclosure: seminar program

Assistant Minister for
Political Affairs
General-Major
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

Cc:
- Minister of Defence
- Chief of the GSHV

SEMINAR ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

PROGRAM

Zagreb, 26 and 27 May 1993

DAY1

0830: Opening of seminar - keynote address

0900: Film - "Appeal for Humanity"

0945: Basic terms of the MHRP /International Humanitarian War Law/

1030: Break

1100: Strategic situations and the MHRP

1145: Film: "Retrospective 92"

1330: Command responsibility and the MHRP

1415: ICRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movements

1500: Participants' questions

DAY 2

0830: Operation planning and execution

0945: Conduct in combat (prisoners of war)

1030: Break

1100: Training - Military - MHRP

1145: Film: "British Military"

1330: ICRC in the territory of the former Yugoslavia

1415: Croatian Red Cross

1500: Participants' questions - closing address

The seminar is being organised by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Political Administration of the MORH and the Red Cross of the Republic of Croatia.

COMMENT:

At that time, on September 26th, 1993 the offensive of A BiH on the HVO was of maximum intensity.

After the Muslims and the Serbs in the summer of 1993 signed the Agreement on non-aggression, A BiH moved along the 200 km wide front towards the HVO and the Croats.

All relevant documents about that I had already presented in earlier books.

In more than a precarious military situation – a huge advantage of the attacker in manpower, and with all the problems besieging the military structure of the HVO, we, I, continued the practice of

continuous education of fighters about International Humanitarian Law.

The military training which we practiced in such war conditions, as far as it was at all possible, always contained an item "PROGRAMME OF MILITARY TRAINING AND EDUCATION OF SOLDIERS".

This education contained the lessons about the moral soldier and moral behaviour, the Humanitarian War Right included.

NOTE:

Every member of the HV and HVO was informed of the Humanitarian War Law and knew that he has the right and obligation to refuse any command (verbal or written) which would demand committing a crime. He had an obligation to report the person who gave such command to the officer next above in the command chain.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

/coat of arms/

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG BOSNIA

CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

MAIN STAFF OF HVO HR HB

Operational number: 02-2/1-01-2669/93

Mostar, 26 September 1993

International Committee of

The Red Cross Zagreb,

Đure Salaja 8

Re: your letter Zag. 93/15191-PHA/am, Zgb, 20 September 1993

We are in agreement with your proposal of organization of the seminar on the International humanitarian law for the HVO officers. We completely accept and find it reasonable, therefore we kindly ask you to suggest the terms in order to precise the schedule of lectures.

Respectively,

Commander of the GS HVO HR HB

Major General

Slobodan Praljak

/signed and stamped/

44.

THE INJURED OF A BiH, INJURED MUSLIMS-BOSNIAKS

CONDUCT OF HVO
CONDUCT OF A BiH



FACTS

COMMENT:

I already published the list of wounded of the A BiH and wounded civilians Muslims – Bosniaks who were transferred across the territory under the control of HVO and BiH.

This number is in excess of 10,000.

And this number refers only to the Split Clinical Centre.

Who transferred them, in whose cars, who paid for the drivers and gasoline, who paid the treatment?

The Croats!!

About aid in medicines and related equipment I published relevant documents.

Did the medical management of the wounded Muslims stop when the A BiH attacked the HVO, expelled the population and cleansed Central Bosnia from Croats?

It did not.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL (HVO)

MAIN STAFF HVO
Number: 02-2/1-01-2478/93
Mostar, 15th September 1993

A P P R O V A L

Whereby a free pass with a police escort on relation Čitluk - Žitomislić - Vinjani Gornji is to be secured, as well as the departure route to the Republic of Croatia:

1. Sally Becker
2. Mirsad Handžar (wounded)
3. Tanja Kaniža
4. Nina Kaniža
5. Damir Kaniža
6. Mirza Kaniža
7. Roger Lucey
8. Elvis Barunčević

HVO Commander
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

COMMENT:

The helicopter of the HVO cannot, must not fly low,because the MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/, i.e. A BiH fire on all such craft although the sign of the Red Cross is plainly visible.

/handwritten:/ Sent to Tomislavgrad at 1913 hours

9 August 1993

- Vitez via Tomislavgrad -

/illegible/

ONO /Operations and Training/

Republic of BH HZ HB /Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/

HVO /Croatian Defense Council/ DEFENSE

I/illegible/ NORTH-WEST HERZEGOVINA OZ /Operations Zone/ MILITARY SECRET

No. 01-2203

Prozor, 9 August 1993

Response to request

IZM /Forward Command Post/ CENTRAL BOSNIA OZ, VITEZ
Kralj Tomislav Brigade, Tomislavgrad

Further to the request of Ivan DRMIĆ, please be informed of the following:

A. We are doing everything we can to secure a helicopter to transfer the seriously wounded Ante DRMIĆ and Vlade SIKIRIĆ from Vitez.

B. Fog is preventing high-altitude flights, while flying low is dangerous because of the operations of MOS /Muslim Armed Forces/.

C. As soon as conditions allow, the transfer of the wounded will be taken care of.

HVO GS /Main Staff/ Commander

Major General

Slobodan PRALJAK

COMMENT:

The document D-259 confirms that the assertion from the document D-258 is correct. Commander of the 3rd Corps of A BiH Enver HADŽIHASANOVIĆ signs document (D-259) on 9th September 1993 and within that month, between these two documents, the situation is the same. He speaks on planned military activities executed by the units of his Corps. In the Lašvanska valley – in VITEZ, against HVO and Croats.

"Planned activities" is attack, offensive, and all worldwide media transmit "objective information" that the Croats (HVO) attacks the A BiH.

The power of already formed PATTERN about "victim" - Muslims, doesn't allow a true and accurate insight into the facts. His helicopters should help rescue the wounded of A BiH, and Croatian helicopters should be destroyed and "not allow landing under any condition..." .

Statement that these are the helicopters (always there was only one) of the HV /Croatian Army/ is only one in a series of lies with which at that time was fed to domestic and international media space.

The majority of these lies stand to this day, and I am writing and claiming, that however long it lasted, it was only an ordinary and transparent lie.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND OF THE 3rd CORPS
Str. conf. No. 02-33-2153
Zenica, 19 September 1993

DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
MILITARY SECRET
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT !

Order

- delivers -

333. Mountain Brigade
305. Mountain Brigade,
7. Mechanized Brigade
27. Kbbr, 17. Kbbr
/Krajiška Mountain Brigade/
308. Mountain Brigade
306. Mountain Brigade
325. Mountain Brigade
Municipal Defense Headquarters Zenica

On the day 19 September 1993 a helicopter of the RV A R BiH /Air Force of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/ of blue-white colours with the markings of the red cross will fly above your zone of responsibility with the aim of transporting the wounded. These helicopters will fly in the following days too, as long as the planned military actions in the Lašvanska valley are taking place. In parallel with these flights, by means of UNPROFOR a flight of the helicopter of the Croatian Army has been announced, probably coloured in camouflage colours or some other colour and this flight is not approved by the Army of the R BiH.

On the basis of verified information we know that this helicopter will carry reinforcements in military personnel and military equipment.

On the basis of the above findings,

I ORDER

1. Immediately shoot down the helicopters of the Croatian Army.
2. In no way allow the landing of the helicopters of the Croatian Army in the area of the Lašvanska valley.
3. In case of shooting down a helicopter of the HV /Croatian Army/ immediately notify this command.
4. Strictly pay attention not to make the mistake in identifying the helicopters, in order not to shoot down a helicopter of the Army of R BiH instead of a helicopter of the HV.
5. Also pay attention during the flight of the helicopter at dusk and early dawn when there are conditions for camouflaging and surprise.

C O M M A N D E R

Enver Hadžihasanović

Verified by stamp and signature

COMMENT:

That was the manner of Hadžihasanović, this is the manner of HVO, and this is the manner of Praljak.

September 9th, 1993 Slobodan Praljak orders a helicopter to transfer a wounded Muslim women, the physician Almira Čandžić to Split.

/handwritten 1001 Ivančić/

/fax marks/
from ******* with G3 standard SEP 06.93 2:29P /handwritten 10:31/
total page : 001 failure page : none

4969 253151 PHINBERT IMPORT-EXPORT GMBH 541 P01 06.09.93 13: illegible

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/header/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENCE COUNCIL

MAIN STAFF
Number: 02-2/1-01-2338/93
IZM (Forwarded post) Čitluk 6th of September 1993

/handwritten **APPROVED!**/

Demand for the transfer by helicopter

OS HRZ Zagreb

We ask you to accomplish the transfer of the heavy wounded Almira Čandžić /handwritten doctor/, born in 194/illegible/ dg. Status post amputatione numeri dex, Vulus explozivus abdeninis.

For the heavy degree of the wound, it is necessary to transfer her from Mostar (Mostarsko blato) KBC Zagreb. /handwritten Split illegible/

Respectfully yours

Commander of the GS HVO

General Major

Slobodan Praljak

/signed and stamped/

/fax marks/

from 4969 253151 with G3 standard SEP 06.93 2:36P

total page: 001 failure page : none

COMMENT: NO COMMENT.

CROATIAN REPUBLIC OF HERZEG BOSNIA

SERVICE FOR WOUNDED PERSONS' CARE

MOSTAR, 11 September 1993

No: 02-5/3-39/93 HR HB

Chief Assistant of OO /Department of Defense/ HR HB

Health sector

Attn Brigadier Dr. Ivan Bagarić

Subject: report on Muslim nationality child transport (exchange) and his evacuation to Split regarding further medical treatment

On 11 September 1993, by the Order of Chief of Control-security service in the Sector for health care, Dr. Ivo Šandrk and by the Order of Mr. General Praljak, I, as Doctor, escorted the sick child (leukaemia in remission), Silajdžija Haris, 4,5 years old along with his mother, Silajdžija Enisa and younger brother, 2 years old, from the locality War Hospital Rama Rumboci to Split.

The mother and children were transported by UNPROFOR and European observers, Mr. Rudy Gerritsen from the Netherlands (540509115) and Mr. David MacIver from Canada (1496) - European observers, and in Mr. Tomić's presence at 14:30 hrs, they consigned the mother and children to my care.

The HTV crew witnessed the moment, having it recorded.

At 14:45 hrs we moved to Split and arrived there at 18.45 hrs. Dr Škrabic took further care on them in KBC Firule Split.

Professional associate of service for

Wounded persons' care

Dr. Pero Marić

/signed and stamped twice/

COMMENT:

And I say to the readers of these pages that the child Haris Silajdžija and his family got Croatian citizenship and that Croatia at the time of war paid for his treatment abroad. The same is with other from the list, and there are four Muslim surnames, two are families, but there are also Serbs.

Praljak had the authority and he did help them to obtain Croatian citizenship. In front of whom should I now be ashamed and to whom should I apologize and why?

/coat of arms/
(on the left side Croatian text, on the right the same text on English)
CLINICAL HOSPITAL SPLIT
58 000 SPLIT, Spinčićeva 1
CROATIA
Telephone (058) 515-055
Fax: 365 738

Split, 29 October 1993

C E R T I F I C A T E

That hereby confirms that the below cited children, victims of war, being treated in KBC Split, according to Decision of Supreme Medical Commission, are recommended to continue the medical treatment abroad.

Nevertheless, all of them were registered as urgent cases from the battle fields, without personal identification. Since they must continue their treatment abroad, it is necessary for them to be provided with a passport. Therefore, we kindly ask you to issue the passports so they can become healthy citizens already tomorrow. The above cited is related to:

1. ALEKSANDRA VUJICA, with family
2. IVANA MARTIĆ, with family
3. HARIS SILAJDŽIĆ, with family
4. MERSIHA VELEDAR, with family
5. GORAN BOŠNJAK, with family

Civilians, victim of war, adults:

1. FRANCISKA MARTIĆ, with two children
2. SENAD ZEC

Members of the BH Army and HVO:

1. MARIN BAČIĆ
2. BERNARD MATOŠEVIĆ
3. ZORAN KASALO
4. SPASOJE JEREK
5. FIKRET HODŽIĆ

Thank you in advance!

Main nurse:
M. Županović, vms
/signed and stamped/

Principal:
Mr.sc. dr. Goran Dodig
/signed/

THE FACTS CONFIRMED BY UN-SPABAT* REPORTS

September 1st, 1993	From the Muslim Hospital in East Mostar the UNPROFOR (SPABAT) transferred 34 wounded fighters of A BiH to the territory under the control of the HVO in Međugorje, and these two helicopters of A BiH went away, wherever they pleased.
September 4th, 1993	Bad weather prevented further evacuation.
September 6th, 1993	In the same way transferred and medically provided for 31 wounded soldier of A BiH.
September 7th, 1993	We accepted and provided for three children with mothers from Jablanica Muslims – Bosniaks.
September 8th, 1993	In the same way as earlier, 38 wounded soldiers of A BiH transferred from East Mostar.
September 12th, 1993	In the same way as earlier, 38 wounded soldiers of A BiH transferred from the hospital in East Mostar.

COMMENT:

And their attacks, their offensive "Neretva 93" did not wane: "*all the way to Neum and Ploče*", as demanded by their commander-in-chief Sefer Halilović.

Ask the SPABAT commanders, check for yourself.

* UN-SPABAT: Spanish Battalion of UN

COMMENT:

HVO and its commander of the Main Staff fulfilled every agreement, not only about the wounded, which was reached with A BiH.

As regards the wounded Muslims, more, far more was done than requested by humanitarian war law.

A BiH betrayed every agreement reached with the HVO, including those on the release of the wounded from the Eastern side of Mostar, the wounded of the HVO.

And then again they send the helicopters which the BETRAYED and DOUBLE-CROSSED and exasperated parents BLOCK.

But now, no one is interested any more in what was agreed and no one cares why the top commanders of A BiH lie and cheat and DEMAND "*the shooting down of helicopters of the HV /Croatian Army/*".

Now it is only the problem of CALMING THE CRIES and yelling of Alija Izetbegović and others, because, look now, these bad Croats "impounded" the helicopters of A BiH, which is, by the way, unarmed.

The same PATTERN, the "victim" cannot be guilty, and it is easy to FORCE THE WEAKER SIDE to endless giving in.

How about the justice, the truth, the BETRAYED agreement, the cheated parents?

Who cares.

Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosnia

Main staff of HVO HR HB

Operational number; 02-2/1-01-3220 /illegible//93

Mostar, 29 October 1993

SPABAT Međugorje

Attn; Exchange Commission

Of the 4th corps

Response to the letter

Helicopters in Međugorje are under protection of UNPROFOR and VP HVO. Blockade of helicopters took place due to Muslim failure to fulfil obligations, which refers to release of HVO prisoners in accordance with Ganić-Silajdžić agreement and the list of ICRC.

Despite the agreement on evacuation of wounded persons, revolted families and relatives of the captured HVO members, blocked the run way.

Besides our convincing, they do not want to let the helicopters go in a peaceful manner, however, we are not ready for the use of force at this moment.

In order to get this situation going, we suggest that the Muslim side carries out release of HVO prisoners according to ICRC list and previous agreement simultaneously with the evacuation of their wounded combatants regardless the number, with full guaranty to the safety of all wounded persons and support staff.

We suggest that the Muslim exchange commission comes to Međugorje so that we can agree upon some technical details.

Main staff of HVO

Major General

Slobodan Praljak

/signed and stamped/

D-265

Union of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian Republic of Herzeg Bosnia
Main staff of HVO of HR HB

Operational number 02-2/1-01-3216/93
Mostar, 29 October 1993

Defense
Official
SPABAT Međugorje
UNPROFOR Kiseljak
Attn General Briquemont

Dear Mister General,

Regarding our conversations from yesterday in relation to approve the take off of Muslim helicopters from Međugorje, I must inform you that, along with all efforts that I made, women and parents of the prisoners, who should have been exchanged and are currently in Muslim prisons, do not allow the take off of the helicopters.

The only solution for me would be the usage of force, which is something I am not ready to do at this moment.

Women and parents ask for release of prisoners as well as for the release of wounded combatants at the same time.

I shall persist in convincing them to let the helicopters to take off and in case if I succeed, you shall be notified on it on time.

Sincerely yours,

Main Staff of HVO
General Slobodan Praljak
/signed and stamped/

D-266

UNION OF THE REPUBLICS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN REPUBLIC HERZEG BOSNIA
MAIN STAFF OF HVO
Operational number: 02-2/1-01-3244/93
Mostar, 30 October 1993

SPABAT
To general BRIQUEMONT

1. General Praljak does not connect the release of Muslim Army helicopter with the exchange of detainees, as I told you on the meeting, so I acted.
2. General Praljak regrets the disbelief that the release of helicopter is only possible if the families of detainees are removed from the runway by force.
3. Mr. General, if you want me to, I can move the HVO military police, safeguarding the helicopters, along with SPABAT and then let SPABAT to take care of taking off.
4. To express myself in a simple way, I tried everything, the civilians are not under my command, therefore I cannot convince them.
5. Tomorrow, Sunday afternoon, Mr. Petković is coming back, I shall leave the case to him.

Phone: 058 365 249

Main Staff of HVO
General
Slobodan Praljak
/signed and stamped/

45.

SEVERAL DOCUMENTS WHICH SHOW ASPIRATIONS AND ACTIONS OF A "JOINT CRIMINAL" GENERAL SLOBODAN PRALJAK

ATTACHED TO THIS BOOK, PLEASE FIND OVER 160 WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES REGARDING THE SAME SUBJECT

FACTS

/stamp of the Croatian State Archive/

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Security and information sector
Number: 02-73/92
Prozor: 8 December 1992

REPORT

In the last few days, after General Praljak's arrival, many things in Prozor change. General Praljak arrives in Prozor on 30 December 1992. Immediately after his arrival, he order the release of the group of prisoners, Salih Ruvić, commander of the BH Army, being one of them, under whose authority the first combat line of the OS BH (Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina) troops was left during conflicts in Prozor, and against who the criminal proceeding has been already initiated.

On 1 December 1992 at noon, the meeting of the second operation zone was held, and immediately after that, the meeting with extremists that set the background for this conflict in Prozor, being present in other municipalities, was scheduled; however, the meeting does not take place, since the commander Salih Ruvić, released by the General, was beaten on the same evening by the town-inhabitants of the village Uzdol; the general, revolted by this act, interrupted the meeting and scheduled a new one, with the eminent representatives of the Croatian people on 2 December 1992 at 1200 hours.

The meeting took place in Motel, 150 people being present, lasted rather shortly, whereby the general introduced the real situation within these areas as well as the interests of the Croatian people to the present ones.

The special accent was set on improvement of relations between Croats and Muslims, as well as on the return of the Muslim people on the municipal territory.

By the last group of Muslims a part of the material has been found, pointing at reorganization of those Muslims that did not return to their homes, and to the attempt they could do something to renew the conflict, which is hardly possible, and there is a doubt to do so. A part of the material, testifying about activities of certain individuals at the time of conflict has been found as well; therefore we deliver it to you.

The situation and relations among one part of the Croatian population are getting worse, which is especially apparent after the fail of sabotage, when the houses of couple of Croatian deserters were blown up, while the information on committers are still missing.

If the situation continues to develop this way, some undesirable circumstances could occur. Such was the case of Ilija Baketarić; He is from Rumboci. His house got demolished and he spent a certain time in troops. He went to Germany afterwards, where he still is.

On 3 December 1992 Željko Zadrić gets wounded on the street by Ivan Iličić, familiar for similar cases from before, because the same person acted the same way with group of outlaws for several times, whereby no measures took place.

On 8 December 1992 Ivan Baketarić puts a gun against the HVO President Miško Jozić's temple; the same person pulls a trigger towards the brigade commander Ilija Franjić.

On the same day, one part of the management resigns because of the individuals' behaviour under excuse not being able to execute their duty; therefore we deliver you one of those resignations.

Having in mind that nothing has been done so far in order to solve these problems that are going on and on, becoming more significant, we are afraid of a total HVO troops chaos in these areas, therefore we ask you to take certain measures, as much as you are able to in order to settle down the temporary tensions within the Prozor municipality territory.

Report has been done in two copies.

Made by:

L.M./F.K.

PROSECUTION WITNESS BM-CROSS EXAMINATION BY GENERAL SLOBODAN PRALJAK
PRLIĆ ET AL, 21 SEPTEMBER 2006 - excerpt from the trial transcript

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, what is this document?

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] It's a telefax. It's a fax. It's from the ABiH. And on the 25th of October, 1992, it was sent from Mostar to Igman. It's the Tactical Group 1, Konjic. We've mentioned this. And the deputy commander of the 4th Corps, Mr. Budakovic, sent it. His nickname is Tetak, and the text reads as follows -- can I read it or should the witness do so? He can control it. A message from Mostar from Tetak the Mostar Brigade. General Praljak has informed us that ABiH forces and HVO forces in the territories of the municipality of Jablanica and Konjic should move away from each other to avoid a conflict. It was conveyed to Dr. Rusmir and the staff in Konjic and Jablanica were informed of this fax.

Q. Do you know who Dr. Rusmir was?

A. Yes, I do. He was the chief of the Konjic municipality. Dr. Ruzmir.

Q. Hadzihuseinovic --

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could the booth please interpret, because I'm not receiving any interpretation.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Dr. Ruzmir Hadzihuseinovic?

A. Yes. He was the chief of the Konjic municipality, the head of the Konjic municipality.

Q. Thank you. Does this date, two days after the conflict in Prozor, and could we agree that I had already had meetings in Mostar and that I had requested that the units in Konjic and Jablanica move away from each other so that the conflict in Prozor wouldn't spread beyond those boundaries? That's what this text here says. Do you agree with me?

A. That's what it says here.

Q. Thank you very much. I'd just like to establish the date of my arrival in Rama.

JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me. Just to make one thing clear, you, Mr. Witness, have answered, "That's what it says here." Does this mean that you learn about this by reading this document, or did you know so at the time in 1992?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as the contents of this document are concerned, well, I wasn't familiar with them, but I do know that there was contact at the level of the armija and the HVO so that this could be done, and so that what Mr. Praljak said could be treated as the objective or, rather, the objective was what Mr. Praljak said. They didn't want the conflict to spread beyond those boundaries.

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Q. Thank you. Can we now see 3D00418. Could we please have 3D00418. There it is. Please enlarge this. Could we enlarge it, the first part of it. There it is. We also have the English translation, of course, for the Judges. Do you want me to read it out or should you read it out?

A. I will.

Q. Aloud or --

A. "There is a great deal of chaos and tension from Igman-Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Bugojno, Novi Travnik and we can see a marked change in the conduct of the HVO on the whole territory but also very murky activity amongst the ranks of the independent platoon or -- no, independent leaders as well as voids -"

Q. It says "like Juka Prazina" if I can say what it says there.

A. All right. "Juka Prazina MUP and everywhere -- and everywhere, in all places there are one to two independent commanders from the ranks of the army, which intensifies -- is intensifying its destructive activity."

THE INTERPRETER: Could the English be placed on the screens, please. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. My question to you is as follows: First of all, that there is tension. We've read that out. Then that Juka Prazina is causing problems and he has a brigade, almost an entire brigade in the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

A. Well, Juka Prazina, for a time, was a very positive individual, but afterwards he became more of a renegade and he did and acted according to other people's instructions.

***

Q. Thank you. Now, I have a few more points to look at here. May I look at paragraph 8 on the next page. 8, please. Yes, thank you. May we zoom in on point 8. Here it is. I'm going to read it slowly. "On several occasions the general stress that the HVO, and he respected only Izetbegovic and the Supreme Command - he doesn't know the Supreme Command of the armed forces of BiH and expects to see Sefer Halilovic tomorrow or the following day at the meeting in Jablanica. He also emphasized that the BH army command - that he would ask of the BH army command that they exclude certain members of the military command and that energetic measures be taken to do so, and it was evident that he was alluding to Sefer and of the lower command especially Zejnil." And in brackets it says, "Which would be a good service as far as I'm concerned says the signatory of this text. He agrees that we should solve the problem of joint commands and the schedules for them including the forward command post." Now, from this text can we see that we invested a great deal of effort to come into contact one way or another with Sefer Halilovic and that I claim that Zejnil, who was later arrested and escaped to Germany, wasn't working probably, wasn't doing good work in bringing Muslims and Croats closer together? Would that be correct?

A. Well, I could accept some of those assertions. However, I don't have reliable information to the effect that Zejnil Delalic was an impediment to cooperation but I can't say that there were not obstacles on both sides and lack of trust on both sides.

Q. Thank you. Now, Their Honours will be able to read the text for themselves, so I'd just like to read out point 11. It says: "In Jablanica where general -- where they referred to us, General Praljak said that there should be a meeting with refugees from Prozor at 2100 hours. He was calm and able to give guarantees that the relations in Prozor would be set right quickly." And then point 10: "In Gornji Vakuf the two previous commissions continued their way to Bugojno and we, Amidza and I, started out for Prozor, and a fighter who had been detained was release from Gornji Vakuf according to promises made in Vakuf." Now, do you know how many meetings I had at that time in that area in Vakuf, Jablanica, Konjic, Prozor with all parties concerned?

A. I can't tell you the number of meetings. I don't know, but I do know that you were active during that period of time.

Q. Thank you. I'd like us to see another text on the ELMO.

MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise for having to intervene, but I think there was a mistake in the translation on page 12, line 5. The witness's answer was that there was interference and lack of trust on both sides, and I think that "interference" -- the word "interference" was left out.

THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request that if an English text exists, could it be placed on the ELMO so that we could read the text that already exists. Thank you.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Could we have 3D00291, please. May we zoom in on the text, please. We saw in the previous document -- that the previous document claimed that the situation in the area changed. It was improving quite obviously with respect to relations between the army, et cetera. Now, can we read the report? It is probably compiled by the information service which says: "In the last few days, after General Praljak's arrival, many things in Prozor changed. General Praljak, on the 30th of December, 1999 (it is written in the transcript, author's remark), arrives in Prozor and, immediately after his arrival, he orders the release of a group of prisoners, including Salih," and then the name. Et cetera. Now, since in your statement you speak about this extensively, what the situation was like, I'm going to ask you just two things. Do you remember that when you were in Prozor you were returned, and when they beat you up on the road towards Here and when you were insulted by a young

man from HOS, do you happen to remember that I ran after that idiot with a gun in my hands and I was almost ready to shoot at him? Do you remember that?

A. Sir, I remember that, but he wasn't a member of HOS. He was a member of the HVO, and I know his surname as well. I know who it was.

Q. Thank you. Unfortunately, I was not informed.

A. Well, I know his name.

Q. Thank you. Now, do you know --

JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please. You said that you knew the idiot's name. Can you give us his name?

THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Nikola Maric, nicknamed Nidja. He was a pupil of mine.

THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. You know that after that conflict they collected up all the Muslims' cars and took them -- drove them off. Now, do you know that as far as a green Mercedes was concerned that belonged to a prominent Bosniak Muslim from Prozor, a prominent citizen, I seized it and returned the car to the gentleman, and that this almost caused shooting between myself and those people who against this, what I did. Do you know that happened?

A. I know whose car it was, too.

Q. Well, you say if you like.

A. Well, if you want me to say, I'll say. The car belonged to Emir Delilovic. It was a Mercedes. His Mercedes was seized and a member of the HVO stormed the garage to do so. Do you know that there was – I don't know about that but I don't doubt it. I'm sure that he was ready to do what he wanted. He wanted to prevent you from returning the car because it was big booty for him.

***

Q. Thank you very much. Could we now answer the following: Do you know from the 29th or 30th of October, over the following two months, I was staying in the areas of Jablanica, Konjic, Prozor, Novi Travnik, Travnik, and Busovaca, and what my role was there until Christmas 1992? Did you have any information about this?

A. I had partial information. And we met once. If I'm correct about the date, it was on the 17th of November, in the museum in Jablanica. We spoke at length then –

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THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]

Q. Can you characterize my activity, the energy I invested as something that contributed or substantially contributed to resolving the misunderstandings and conflicts with the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the 23rd of October until the end of the year?

A. Your public statements, the ones I know about, would lead to such a conclusion, yes.

Q. After the 23rd, when the conflict in Rama erupted, until the end of 1992, were there any conflicts in Jablanica, Konjic, Prozor, Vakuf, Travnik, Novi Travnik or was the situation relatively good and peaceful?

A. Well, the situation might be described, conditionally speaking, as tolerable.

Q. Thank you very much. If, then, I acted in that manner and these men here who are accused were--or, rather, interpreter's correction. Had these accused here been opposed to this activity of mine, would they not have sent someone there to arrest me or obstruct me or ask for my authorization and stop me from doing all this? Wouldn't that have been normal if they had disagreed with my activities?

A. I personally am convinced that the gentlemen you mentioned knew about your activities. That's my opinion, because if it had not been the case, you would have been removed just as some other people had been removed.

Q. Thank you very much.

/handwritten: We received confirmation of receipt by the QTC /expansion unknown/ at 0515 hrs/

/stamp of Croatian State Archive/

Konjic TG /Tactical Group/

Date: 4 November 1992

GŠ VK OS RBH

/Main Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republic of BH/

To: Sefer

Interim Report

1. The situation is nightmarish and there is great tension in the area including Mt. Igman - Konjic - Jablanica - Prozor - Gornji Vakuf - Bugojno - Novi Travnik. An abrupt change in the attitude of the HVO /Croatian Defense Council/ in the whole area has been noticed, as have other very dubious activities among the independent leaders such as Juka PRAZINA, the MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ and in each locality one or two independent commanders from the Army ranks, who are intensifying their disruptive activities.

2. We have no information on the appointment of two commissions seven days ago by our representative and Mr. BOBAN, but they are working with a rather biased membership in our view (biased in favour of the HVO): i.e., three SDA /Party of Democratic Action/ members from Mostar and Arif PAŠALIĆ, and their delegation is headed by Mr. Božo RAJIĆ.

3. Among others, Avdo PANJETA is carrying out a mission which amounts to gathering MTS /materiel and equipment/ for the MUP, but we have no information that he is doing anything to strengthen the Army's reserves. In addition, he convinced REKIĆ that he is a MUP member, and on account of this the supplementary actions needed to complete /the formation of/ the *Neretva* Brigade are considerably behind schedule.

But we think that in spite of everything it should be finished by Saturday, 7 November 1992.

4. Today at 1130 hrs. our first meeting with the refugees from Prozor was held in Jablanica. We established that around 80 Muslim houses had been destroyed and burned; in addition to other abundant hardships, a list is being circulated of those who are to be arrested or killed immediately after any possible return to Prozor, i.e. all those soldiers who provided any kind of support, be it armed or logistical, to the BH Army in Prozor. We will have a precise list of the names tomorrow.

5. At 1500 hrs. the Prozor meeting was held, with the following of our people present: V. KARIĆ, A. PAŠALIĆ, accompanied by SDA members Safet ORUČEVIĆ, Ćamil SKOKOVIĆ, Zijad DEMIROVIĆ and Z. DELALIĆ.

From the other side: General PRALJAK, Božo RAJIĆ, three unknown members and the local HVO officers. The centre of Prozor is a horrible sight. The unrestrained HVO and HOS /Croatian Defense Forces/ team, which was and is obviously taking care of the dirty work, has been roasting lamb on a spit in the centre of town and kicking a large flag with the lily emblem through the mud. We approached the group at full strength, but not even PRALJAK had the authority to make them listen to him. We heard that they do that to spite the *Balije* /derogatory term for Muslims/, saying that it would be better if they did not return and laughing at and threatening those of us who were wearing BH Army insignia. In this situation and the general atmosphere in Prozor, no one can provide a guarantee for the safe return of the displaced families or the

soldiers that have been expelled. Seven members of the staff are still in detention, but it has been promised that they will be released conditionally tomorrow; General PRALJAK was visibly embarrassed at hearing this. In the Prozor staff headquarters he issued several verbal commands, which he intends to put in writing tomorrow, concerning the introduction of joint checkpoints, the prohibition against carrying rifles, a curfew, a joint command (in this respect no one from Prozor who would be permitted to be assigned there - and who would represent the Muslims, something which PRALJAK has no knowledge of), and further the withdrawal of all artillery, armour and units from elsewhere, abolishing the ultimatum for our soldiers to lay down their weapons, along with the confiscation of weapons from civilians (which is basic), the maintenance of joint positions, and a joint military police, both admittedly from Mostar or Grude; he approves limited village guard duty where the situation is critical and has ordered the filling in of the positions dug by both sides.

6. Božo RAJIĆ urges the filing of joint reports stating that everything is in order as being most important, especially to the English journalists, who have been waiting for that in the local press in Gornji Vakuf /sentence unclear/. I should mention that none of us has given any kind of statement and I do not know what they have reported.

7. General PRALJAK's approach was evident at the very beginning, i.e., the introduction of HVO commands in Herceg-Bosna and central Bosnia, which shall also include Muslims in the command. He has stressed that the basic criterion will be individual ability and not nationality. The structure of the staffs - commands will be proportional to the number of active soldiers, and not to the relative proportion of the Croatian and Muslim populations. The main command of the above-mentioned areas shall exclusively be the command of the main staff, and the BH Army shall have a command in the Zenica and Tuzla region/s/, and in this respect he thinks that they do very little for Sarajevo. His thinks that Sarajevo should be liberated as soon as possible because of the Muslims, then immediately resolve all tensions and before 20 November 1992 begin a joint offensive on Bugojno, Kupres, Donji Vakuf, Nevesinje and the stretch towards Sarajevo. He like the others is upset by our checkpoints around Jablanica, but in his view the main issue is the blocked shipments of the BH Army in Posušje, Grude, etc. In response to Zejnil's protest that Jablanica is no problem at all in comparison to the blockade of the HVO and Croatia, he says angrily that the captured MTS /material and equipment/ will be released tomorrow.

8. On several occasions the General has said that he and the HVO recognise only IZETBEGOVIĆ and know nothing of the VKOSBH, and that he is expecting to see Sefer HALILOVIĆ at the meeting in Jablanica tomorrow or the day after. He also said that he would firmly request the expulsion of certain members of the VK and other commands of the BH Army. In this respect, it was evident that he was alluding to Sefer, and regarding the lower commands Zejnil (which in my opinion would be doing us a favour). He agrees that we should draw up the schemas of the joint commands as soon as possible, including the VK IKM /Forward Command Post/.

9. The Mostar SDA is generally intimidated by him and the HVO /?sentence unclear/ which is understandable to a certain extent. The general impression of him and A. PRKAČIN is that they take a much broader and more democratic view of the joint struggle in BH, and in particular their attitude toward the Chetniks is more combative and has more direction than that of the HVO representatives so far.

10. From Gornji Vakuf the two earlier commissions went on to Bugojno, and we (Amidža and I) went to Prozor for a short time with General PRALJAK, where one captured soldier was released from Gornji Vakuf, as promised in Vakuf.

11. In Jablanica where they General PRALJAK unhesitatingly responded to our request /as written/ at 2100 hrs. to arrange a meeting with the refugees from Prozor. He managed quite efficiently and soothingly to give a guarantee for the quick improvement of relations in Prozor.

12. A series of meetings and activities of the HVO, the Army and the parties in Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor and Gornji Vakuf is planned for tomorrow and the next few days.

13. Advocating such a position of the HVO, as General PRALJAK presents it, are acceptable on condition that they obligate themselves to the following /as written/:

- That it /?the HVO/ participate in the fight against the Chetniks with all resources in the described areas, and also in the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo.
- That in no case should there be any impediment to the passage of our convoys with MTS which in the described area would be considered joint property.
- That the authority (of the region) or the province and the federal government be provisionally established.

14. It has been noticed that everyone is talking without any reservations about an integral BH and that they recognise Mr. IZETBEGOVIĆ as its president.

It is obvious there is a touch of haste and a certain degree of obligingness among them, especially a readiness for a joint command. The competent representatives must promptly weigh up how this is to be maintained economically and politically.

15. In order for brigades up to corps level to be jointly organised at OP /?municipal/ SOS /expansion unknown/ level and in keeping with the instructions given, the following is proposed:

A) That the president appoint work groups which shall form joint commands in the relevant region/province as quickly as possible, with 4 or 5 members who are merely politicians /?should/ appoint local commanders already in place and BH Army chiefs of staff, /as written/. Given the current situation, this would apply to: Mostar, Jablanica, Čapljina, Stolac, Gacko, Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Novi Travnik, Konjic, Fojnica, Kreševo, Kiseljak and Busovača.

B) That after obtaining Mr. BOBAN's proposals, the president by joint appointment assign five HVO members/representatives to the same task.

C) That until this task is brought to a conclusion, the members of the work group should be freed from all other obligations, and that the deadline be set for 5 days from now.

D) That the D-O /expansion unknown/ feature in Konjic be established as one of the command posts of the BH Army VK and the Main Staff of the HVO.

E) That the removal of Sefer HALILOVIĆ from the post of Chief of Staff of the BH Army VK with total veto-power over all kinds of decisions issued by the staff of the HVO (even at the level of Herceg-Bosna), is not to be permitted either by ultimatum or in any other way.

Amidža and Oganj

/hand-written: 6-56/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
MAIN STAFF
Number: 01-2496/92
Mostar, 6 November 1992

TO ALL HVO AND BH ARMY MEMBERS

ORDER

I. Along road communications:
Konjic - Jablanica, Jablanica - Prozor,
Prozor - Gornji Vakuf, Gornji Vakuf - Bugojno,
Bugojno - Novi Travnik, Novi Travnik - Gornji Vakuf,
and Jablanica - Mostar
you are to establish permanent mixed roadblocks - checkpoints, consisting of members of the HVO Military Police and members of the BH Army.
The composition of the checkpoint patrols shall be based on the principle of ethnic parity. All past checkpoints on the said communication routes are hereby abolished.

II. The exact location of the checkpoints shall be jointly agreed by HVO and BH Army members within 48 hours, by which deadline the checkpoints must be operational.
Transports of weapons for military units shall be escorted by HVO military police and members of the BH Army.

IV. Mixed joint patrols shall be set up in every town to control the movement and conduct of members of military units.

V. In every village establish village guards composed of men who are not members of any military units and issue them the necessary weapons.

VI. All citizens are obliged to surrender their weapons to the members of the mixed patrols, who will issue them the appropriate documents.

VII. Any weapons pointed in directions other than the frontline and all other military activities must cease.

VIII. Joint mixed patrols in Prozor and Novi Travnik must ensure a safe return of the persons who left their homes and guarantee for their personal safety.

IX. All members of military units are strictly prohibited from carrying other weapons when not on the frontline.

X. The HVO Military Police Administration and the BH Army Command shall assign 64 /sixty-four/ HVO Military Police members and BH Army soldiers according to ethnic parity to work in Prozor municipality.

XI. Impose a curfew beginning from 1800 - 0600 hours in Prozor municipality as of 7 November 1992.

The assignments above shall be completed within 48 hours, of which you shall inform me in writing.

MAJOR - GENERAL
Slobodan PRALJAK

/stamp of BH Republic/

/A signature and a stamp of the HZ HB/

Stamp

/CROATIAN STATE ARCHIVE-ZAGREB/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA

CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

MAIN STAFF

Ref. No: 01-2505-4/92

Mostar, 10 November 1992

APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY MEMBERS OF THE COMMAND

- Re the preparations for the actions on the defence of Travnik and liberation of Jajce temporary command has been appointed.

1. TIHO BLAŠKIĆ - Commander
2. ANTE PRKAČIN - Chief of Staff representing HVO
3. ARIF PAŠALIĆ - Chief of Staff representing A BiH

Abovementioned are authorised to organise the command by recruiting necessary number of officers.

Stamp: /REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
JOINT COMMAND OF BH ARMY AND HVO/

Stamp: /CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL MAIN STAFF/

MAJOR GENERAL

SLOBODAN PRALJAK

/signed/

OS /DEFENSE FORCES/ AND HVO
/CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL/ COMMAND
BUGOJNO, GORNJI VAKUF
Bugojno, 01 December 92
No: 04-11/92

/handwritten and underlined: ONO/
for: General PRALJAK

/Stamped upon receipt; partly illegible/:
"Received: 05.12.92; 02/170/126"

REPORT

Following the order issued to me on the task of taking over the co-ordination and command with the aim of joint command of OS and HVO Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf, I hereby submit the following report for your review and as a potential guideline in decisions on a higher level, since they are above my competencies. You have also issued me with an order on the withdrawal of HVO Prozor forces and Gornji Vakuf OS to Mt Makljen. In light of the above, I report that the first degree of co-ordination and command has been established, but that the reached agreements are ignored in practice. It is somewhat difficult to reach an agreement because OS Bugojno receives instructions from Zenica which do not coincide with the agreement on joint command in the area of responsibility entrusted to me.

I assess the combat readiness of both units as satisfactory, but not at such level as I consider realistic for the situation this town is in. Curfew and military police joint patrols have been introduced and there is good will to abide by them. Co-ordination in defence has shown positive development, but it must be borne in mind that HVO Bugojno can reach the level of readiness for offensive operations in a shorter time period. OS Bugojno need to work more on defence and have a smaller number of soldiers for offensive operations. An agreement has been reached on the manner and better movement of convoys and other vehicles to Bugojno, Travnik, Zenica and Tuzla. There are certain problems in Prozor, which you are already acquainted with.

As for your order on the separation of opposing parties HVO Prozor and OS Gornji Vakuf on Mt Makljen, I report that I have received a report in writing from “Rama” Brigade on their order for the pull-out of troops from the area and the deadline for execution of the order (15 November 1992).

On 24 November 1992, I saw for myself the truth together with HVO Gornji Vakuf Commander, "Rama" Brigade Deputy Commander and OS Gornji Vakuf Commander, Fahrudin AGIĆ. After this, on 25 November 1992, I issued an order to OS Gornji Vakuf to withdraw the second battalion from the village of Pridvorci, the southern slope of Mt Crni Vrh, Cipovi slopes and elevation 1303. Following the order, Mr AGIĆ informed me he had withdrawn his units from the said area. At 2350 hrs on 28 November 1992, according to "Rama" Brigade Command, infantry fire, lasting 45 minutes, was opened from the direction of Kosara above the village of Jurići. One can continually hear sporadic fire from the direction, especially from Hera village.

Following my order on closing all catering facilities at 1500 hrs, HVO Gornji Vakuf has been adhering to it, while OS Gornji Vakuf does not want to abide by the issued order because Mr AGIĆ says his superior command is in Zenica and that he will execute the order when he receives it from them.

I conclude that Mr AGIĆ indirectly does not want to implement the agreement.

Due to all the above stated, pertaining to relations and the execution of orders in the AOR I was entrusted with, the problems which are encountered are above my competencies. OS Gornji Vakuf Commander Fahrudin AGIĆ, with his promises, signatures, behind which nothing lies, and bypassing the truth does not instil hope for a better solution to relations within Gornji Vakuf or between Gornji Vakuf and Prozor. I note this particularly because the second battalion of OS Gornji Vakuf has been utilised in the direction of Prozor, and if the relations were to be resolved, it could be utilised on the Bugojno defence line.

Cooperation with "Ante Starčević" Brigade is satisfactory and one can sense that they are taking the execution of tasks seriously. I have not had the opportunity to check the quality of defence because the lines were not jeopardised by the enemy infantry.

Colonel Miro ANDRIĆ
/stamped and signed/

JOINT COMMAND OF HVO AND OS BiH

BUGOJNO AND GORNJI VAKUF

Bugojno, 10th December 1992

Major General Slobodan Praljak

According to Order for special task execution in Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf, for the purposes of informing the joint command of HVO HZ HB and OS BIH I hereby submit the following

REPORT

At Order proposal, identification number 02-1262/92 dated 14th November 1992 the 2nd HVO brigade in concordance with GS HVO Chief, brigadier Milivoj Petković, on 15th November 1992 I went to Bugojno and managed to perform the task, according to oral directions.

I made contacts with HVO and OS BiH commanders as follows:

- Mr. IVICA LUČIĆ, commander of HVO Bugojno
- Mr. ZRINKO TOKIĆ, commander of HVO Gornji Vakuf
- Mr. SENAD DAUTOVIĆ, commander of OS BiH Bugojno
- Mr. FAHRUDIN AGIĆ, commander of OS BiH Gornji Vakuf

- Making a tour around HVO and OS BIH positions, I determined that these positions were not fortified in satisfying measure therefore I asked the commander to remove the lacks, which was related to covered bunkers construction, being well fortified with embrasures, as well as forwarding of certain bunkers to better positions for the purposes of more efficient defense.

HVO Bugojno and HVO Gornji Vakuf approached the task immediately and, according to my opinion, made some quality and well fortified defense lines of positions, they are located on.

The OS BiH of Bugojno shows interest for cooperation and work on fortification of positions. Relation with Mr. Senad Dautović, the commander has been established, he is willing to cooperate and open to agreements, respecting the agreed issues.

I think that his jurisdiction is restricted and that every agreement must follow from talks in Bugojno as well as from consultation with his supervisor in the command. The defense lines are not well fortified and constant pressures to act upon the agreed issues make an impression of quality move in order to fortify lines and defense itself.

The OS BiH Gornji Vakuf, Commander Fahrudin Agić does not show interest to cooperate and keeps searching the way how to disobey the agreed issues, which reflects to every agreement and every order. In spite of all consequences, there was still a part of remote manpower, holding positions along with HVO members. The 1st December 1993 report argument is still actual: in order that Mr. Agic shows will to cooperate and respects the reached agreements, it is necessary to make pressure on him through his superiors.

Report submitted by

Colonel

Miro Andrić

/handwritten document/

JASMIN JAGANJAC
ZAGREB
12 February 1993
18:45 hrs

Attn. Mr. President of the Presidency of RBiH
Alija Izetbegović

1. During today's contacts with General Praljak and General Čermak, I arranged shipment of certain MTS quantity for Pazarić (actually East of Bosnia) as follows:

   a) bullet 7,62 x 31 300.000 pieces

   b) RPG - 7 200 pieces

   c) Maljutka 20 pieces

   Total quantity can be placed in 2 cargo trucks. When the cited quantity arrives, the following shall be sent /crossed/. The material is symbolic, however they do mention passage.

2. To Mr. Praljak and Mr. Šušak I gave the proposal of Statement that you suggested to Mr. Boban. They find it quite approximate; however they admit the insufficient investigation of the statement. At my query whether they gave up on HZ Herzeg-Bosnia, General Praljak responded that it no longer exists and that one provisory period is necessary. Since Boban arrives from Germany yet tomorrow, they promised to make pressure on Boban to reach the signature. I think the item 5 was problematic. And those were insignias. Praljak thinks this also won't be controversial, to place the province flag next to the Bosnian flag as state flag. If anything is controversial, I shall inform you tomorrow.

3. As General Praljak travels to Herzegovina tomorrow, afterwards to Central Bosnia, he asked me to tell you to determine one or two prominent politicians (Muslims) that would, together with him, survey the Central Bosnia and influence the further situation appeasement. Determined men should report to Mostar. Communication should be Zijo or Safet.

4. For the job in Germany I did all the preparations. I expect that on Monday, Pohara receives the passport and on Tuesday he will contact you from Cologne.

5. From the certain sources I received information that, 3 days ago, Mr. Adil Zulfikarpašić was on reception by the President of the United States, Mr. Clinton. Also, I found out that Adil and Sefer or Adil and Šiber communicate on daily basis.

   Mr. President, I am really not familiar with all the schemes, that is why I send you the information. They are most certainly reliable. The statements of the chief soldiers in the last couple of days are not by chance, on the contrary, they enjoy support from Adil. He allegedly promised to give a substantial amount of money for weapon and equipment that would head for Bosnia. I am not sure for the second issue, because, one weapon trader praised for the job in front of me. The business failed after all because Adil didn't give the money. 7 days ago, Zulfikarpašić gave an interview in Frankfurt to the Globus newspapers (the Zagreb edition), which is expected in the following edition. In this interview, he accuses you for the sufferings of our people and for the problems of Bosnia. I am not familiar with his final goal, but the analysis say that he cares about agreement and co-existence between our Muslim people and the Croats. In that sense, it would be good that you keep the military command Sefer-Šiber-Divjak in sight. For the behaviour that he has, Adil promised Šiber that he would help him to obtain the general's rank and high position after the war. Knowing his Šiber's character for a short time, I think this is not so far from the truth. I kindly ask that you take my information and concern for you as support and honest intention to persist and succeed. You are on the path of God. You will succeed. Selam!

Jasmin

JASMIN JAGAČIĆ
ZAGREB
12.02.1992.
18,45 h

NA RUKE g. PREDSJEDNIKA
PREDSJEDNIŠTVA R BiH
Aliji Izetbegoviću

1. U toku današnjih kontakata sa generalom Praljkom i generalom Čermakom dogovorio sam da krene određena količina MTS za Pazarić (tj. Istočnu Bosnu) i to:

a) metaka 7,62 x 31 komada 300.000
b) RPG-7 komada 200
c) MA puške komada 20

Sva količina stane u 2 kamiona – šlepera.

Kada stigne navedena količina krenut će slijedeće.

~~Ako~~ ~~vaši~~ ~~upute~~ ~~nepromijenjene~~
Sredstva su simbolična, ali ipak govore o pomoći.

2. Dao sam g. Praljku i Šušku Vaš prijedlog izjave koju ste predložili g. Bobanu.

Smatraju da je dosta približna i priznali da je nisu obavezno proučili. Na moj upit da li su se odrekli HZ Herceg-Bosna gen. Praljak je odgovorio da to ne postoji više i da je potrebna jedna prelazna period.

Kako Boban dolazi iz Njemačke tek sutra obećali su da će izvršiti pritisak na Bobana da se dođe do potpisa. Mislim da se zapelo na tački 5 a to su bile obilježja.
Praljak misli da ništa neće biti sporno, da pored Bosanske (državne zastave) stoji zastava provincije.
Ukoliko bude što sporno izvjestit ću Vas sutra.

3. Kako general Praljak sutra putuje u Hercegovinu, a zatim put Srednje Bosne to je molio DA Vam prenesem da odredite jednog do dva viđenija političara (muslimana) koji bi zajedno s njim obišli srednju Bosnu i utvrdili na dalnje smirivanje stanja.
Ljude koje odredite neka se jave u Mostaru. Vezu bi trebao biti zijo il. Safet.

4. Za onaj pesao u Njemačku uradio sam pripremne radnje. Očekujem da u ponedeljak Pothara dobije pasoš i u utorak ću Vam se javiti iz Kelna.

5. Iz određenih izvora dobio sam informaciju da je g. ADIL ZULFIKARPA-ŠIĆ prije tri dana bio na prijemu kod predsjednika SAD g. KLINTONA.
TAKOĐE, da su u dnevnom kontaktu ADIL i SEFER ili ADIL i ŠIBER.

Gospodine predsjedniče, ja ne znam koje su to sve šeme, zato Vam i šaljem ove informacije. One su sigurno pouzdane. Izjave ćelnih vojnika posljednjih dana nisu slučajne, nego imaju podršku od ADILA.

Navodno im je obećao dati veliku novac za oružje i opremu koja bi išla u Bosnu. ZA ovo drugo znam jer se jedan trgovac naoružanjem u mom prisustvu pohvalio za taj posao. Posao je ipak propao jer ADIL nije DAO novac.

ZULFIKARPAŠIĆ je prije SEDAM DANA u FRANKFURTU DAO INTERVJU listu GLOBUS (zagrebačko izdanje) koji se očekuje u slijedećem broju. U tom intervjuu optužuje Vas za stradanja našeg naroda i za probleme Bosne.

Ne znam njegov krajnji cilj, ali analize govore da mu nije stalo do dogovora i suživota između našeg muslimanskog naroda i HRVATSKOG.

U tom smislu nije zgoreg da vojni vrh SEFER-ŠIBER-DIVJAK držite na oku.

Šiber je ADILA za držanje, koje ima, obećao da će uhvatiti dobrije generale. Čin i visoku poziciju nakon rata. Poznajući njegov (Šiberov) karakter za kratko vrijeme mislim da to nije daleko od istine.

Molim da moje informacije i BRIGA za Vas budu shvaćene kao izraz podrške i iskrenih namjera da istražite i uspijete.

Uz Božijem se putu.

Vi ćete uspjeti.

SELAM!

Hasanin.

Excerpt from the presidential transcript 27 March 1993

***

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ:

I've been thinking these days what we should do, on my way here, whether I should go to Tuzla and see precisely what the situation in Tuzla is like. (Comment: /The problem of/ Konjic should be solved first.) But in Konjic, we shall solve the situation in Konjic.

Gojko ŠUŠAK:

Alija, you have five planes full of goods sitting here, in Zagreb, and three are allegedly on their way. Until this is completely solved, I shall not send a single bullet.

... PRALJAK, and nobody can tell me, either from your side or from any other side, that he is being unreasonable, he is down there with Jasmin, pissing blood, day and night, making rounds, driving ... himself, on both sides. He called today, panicky, and said - I don't take orders from you, or anyone else. He thought you were to arrive at 0230 hours and asked me to go to the airport to meet you, so you can give me a statement.

The President then said that we would be here at 0630 hours and I said we would phone later on.

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ:

That is very chaotic.

Gojko ŠUŠAK:

You see, they were down there, they were sitting down there for two days, negotiating, they reached an agreement and everything was all right, and now somebody else comes along and says that it is not binding on him.

PRESIDENT:

Alija, let me tell you something openly now, I agreed that General PRALJAK should go to Herzeg Bosnia or Bosnia and Herzegovina after I heard him say that he believed that maybe the Muslims were being wronged a little by our Croats there.

So there, the man who was completely, mind you, do you understand?

Aija IZETBEGOVIĆ:

No, no, I believe that.

PRESIDENT:

So, you understand. When such a man says that now, you know that it is so. That is why I think you should give a joint statement down there, for both sides.

Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ:

I have decided to stay in Zagreb one more day, as a rule, and I shall probably go to Sarajevo the day after tomorrow. I shall try tomorrow to /talk to/ PRALJAK, PRALJAK and Jasmin and Jaganjac and the others, to /talk to/ all of them, so that is what I have /as printed/, as far as that is concerned.

(Comment: Was there any shooting today?)

* * *

Statement of STANKO ŠARIĆ on February 26, 2005

/Seal of a Notary/

STATEMENT

STANKO ŠARIĆ, member of the vocal-instrumental band „Zlatni Dukati"

I, Stanko Šarić, am a singer of the vocal-instrumental band „Zlatni Dukati". „Zlatni Dukati"is the tamburitza band from Slavonia, very known for years and popular throughout Croatia.

Then, in war, we were members of the Croatian Music Aid agency. It was an agency which, in the cooperation with the Ministry of defence (or some other similar institution) established a military formation under the name „The art company"or some similar name, consisting of artists of various profile. The art company had a role and function to visit battlefields and perform shows, concerts and similar during the war for the homeland.

So, in autumn 1991, after the fall of Vukovar, under the sponsorship of the same agency Croatian Music Aid, we had an organized concert on the battlefield in Sunja. The concert was scheduled in the community premise of this town - it was a cinema or the hall of culture.

Apart from me, Stanko Šarić, another four members of the band performed in the concert; Mato Lukačević, Mirko Gašparović, Mato Miličić and another member who died in the meantime.

As it usually is in such type of concert, the majority audience were soldiers. The concert programme referred to patriotic songs while the atmosphere was war and military – since we were singing to the army and the war was in rage.

As the atmosphere of the concert and the audience mood were heating up, we replaced certain refrains of certain songs with the text of different content. So we mentioned the Serbs couple of times, Ustashas and sang something offensive against the Serbian people.

I emphasize that the concert took place immediately after the fall of Vukovar and that the soldiers were ultimately exasperated; therefore those refrains were in accordance with their rage and wrath, as well as the general situation at that time.

After a performance of one of the songs, despite all and such time, commander of Sunja defence, Slobodan Praljak climbed the stage and banned the singing of anything similar with a voice which didn't stand a replica. He explained it as follows:

There is Croatian Army here, which is in the war with the aggressor according to original right to defend home and the homeland. Such war cannot be gained by offending any nation, not even a Serbian one.

JNA can be offended, Chetniks can be offended but the nation cannot be offended! He also said the following; "Guys, everything is fine, but there are no Ustashas here. But there are members of Serbian nation, those who fight with us!"

Those who tried to disapprove shut their mouth quickly.

Now, as I observe the entire case form the time of peace, I realize that some lines were offensive and that Slobodan Praljak made the right step.

But then, in war, after incredible crimes occurred- than I was disapproving and it seemed to me that what I was singing was perfectly fine.

In Zagreb, on 26th of February 2005

Stanko Šarić
/signed/

/each page of the Statement is signed by IVANIŠEVIĆ M./

IVANIŠEVIĆ MIRA

April 2006

Split

The conversation is recorded, registered under designation

Ivanisevicmi

6,88 MB

Conversation took place in the apartment of the collocutor

Here, we are connected. I would ask you to introduce yourself, at the beginning of the recording. Well, your first and last name, date and place of birth, your profession and place of residence.

I am Mira Ivanisevic, born 16 February 1933 in Salzburg, my profession is electro engineer.

You are now living in [redacted]? Is that right?

Yes.

Reason of our conversation is Hague indictment against General Praljak. Therefore I would ask you to converse about what you did during the war '92, '93. You were the secretary of Croatian German Centre in Split, you were translating. Could you in the beginning remember of that time? Well, where were you? What did you do? For whom did you translate?

At that time, every political and newspaper delegation, would turn for help to honorary Consul Karl Grentz in Split. And we, as the Centre, were with him on the same floor, of the same locality. The German Embassy was paying for the area, rent for the premises – for him and for us, so during those years we were as an entirety. Quite often I substituted for the secretary of the honorary Consul. He then didn't even have the command of German language, just mediocre, so under the circumstances I was present at all important conversations they had. If the German Ambassador came to Split, and visited different institutions, I was always going along. We even organized different talks, so even the German Ambassador gave talk about democracy in Germany after II World War. I would organize round table with Mr. Kosnik and professor Rogeman and the students from Berlin. We, as the Centre, would offer free courses of German language for university and high school students, for a long time.

In '92 and '93?

Yes, yes! In '93 we had courses. The professors for the courses were paid by the Embassy. Consequently, they covered the cost of the professors only. Well, we are like a center of the broad activities. We even received the books and wanted to organize a library for lending of the books. Many books we sorted out and donated to the universities. According to the themes we gave them to Zadar and Law Faculty in Split. We really got into full swing, because we considered that Germany is our friend. Secondly, I have studied in Germany, completed the studies, and had otherwise sympathy towards Germany, because my good friends are there. We helped on humanitarian grounds everyone who turned to us, regardless if that was a person of Serbian nationality, from Zenica, or from somewhere, a Bosniak. We helped everybody, as much as we could. Well, that was my activity, since then until '94.

Generally, your headquarters was in Split?

In Split. On the waterfront.

Working in that job, did you travel?

At the time I followed everything. Not only in Split, but in the entire region. From Zadar, Šibenik, our Zagora, Peruća, Oboljan, Makarska where the refugees were placed in the hotels. Then I even organized with the

teachers union from Bavaria a trip for Bosniak young people, who learned some circus skills, and children folklore groups from our people from Vrlika. I took two children groups to Munchen for performance. Well, my activities at the time were very broad. Or, let's say I accompanied ZDF after barrage of Dubrovnik, when they were recording on film. They recorded, it could be said, good film about Dubrovnik and destruction of Dubrovnik. Then to Herzegovina and all the way to Tomislavgrad, over that mountain where the convoys were driving the help, I believe towards Bila that was going either to Livno, Posušje, and Metković where the UNHCR depot was. And we recorded that.

It means you were going as translator?

As translator!

To whom were you the translator?

To all possible groups! First I was the translator to different journalists. And I would, let's say organize a newspaper, magazine conference. We went to Obojan. And really we were accepted everywhere. The police would take us with their patrol boat to Obojan. I led the newspaper and political delegations, accompanied and translated at the meetings with them and similar political organizations. When there was SDP delegation then we visited SPD in Split. Or Slobodna Dalmacija! There I also accompanied two, three delegations. Or even trade delegations in our Komora. And there was even a large gathering of Austrians, businessmen, in Mostar…

All Right. I would like to return into the time of the event when you had contact with General Praljak. That was, if I understood you correctly, your only contact with General Praljak?

The only one.

Can you tell me about that contact? Why and how it came to that contact?

I was with the crew of ZDF…

Excuse me. We are talking about the beginning of '93?

That's right!

Don't you know the correct date?

I can't remember, but the weather was already warm. It was the spring or something like that. That time ZDF was stationed in Međugorje. We were in a private hotel and really the plan was to remain two three days, but it lasted ten days. There was always the same journalist from ZDF, Dietmar Shultz, while the cameraman and the helper were always hired through some firm in Cyprus. Sometime it would be an American, sometime British, because for them that was cheaper that a German cameraman. At the time there was the center of all television crews in Međugorje, because one of the hotels had satellite possibilities for direct transmission of the news to the home offices in Europe. He as a journalist did cost the home office quite a bit, because he always had to look for some news of the day….

Exclusive?

Exclusive news. And then he was interested about the campground in Gabela. All other journalists were mentioning this camp in Gabela, how it is not possible to enter there etc. Town of Čitluk was nearby, I got from my husband the number of Mr. Slobodan Praljak, and I knew where he was located. We went to Čitluk, we wanted to talk to him. But, there they told us Mr. Praljak is not here, he is on the field. And then I proposed to go to Čapljina to see the mayor Mr. Marković.

It means, you are doing all of this to succeed…

To get to Gabela. That was the target, the task. Gabela was some bugaboo, and everybody wanted to get into Gabela. Mr. Marković wasn't present, but there was some assistant. He refused: he can't give any permissions, he has no jurisdiction. Then I asked him if I could try and see if Mr. Praljak came back, and he allowed me that. I called, and Mr. Praljak really responded immediately, without some inter-switchboards, so I as I remember got surprised. I thought they would now transfer me etc.

This means you did talk with Praljak?

With Praljak, that's right! I introduced myself I am Mira Ivanišević, translator for the ZDF crew and that they have the desire to enter Gabela to tape that camp in Gabela. To get the taboo subject cleared. He didn't deliberate at all, and he immediately said we can go and tape.

Did Praljak then over the phone pose any restrictions? And did you get the feeling that he didn't want something to be seen?

No! No! Nothing! He immediately said we can go. Then I asked, knowing those people which we will encounter there, the mentality, that there could be problems and I cant just refer to, that Mr. Praljak allowed me. So, then I asked him if he could fax me to the office of Mr. Marković, his permission. We waited very shortly, and the fax arrived.

The fax came immediately?

Immediately! Immediately!

And who signed the fax?

He did! Slobodan Praljak.

What was written in the fax?

He is allowing the crew of ZDF to enter in that – now I don't know how he called this Gabela, but he didn't call it a camp.

Do you have that fax?

I really preserved it in that journal for many years, because to say it truthfully, it was like some trophy. But, then later the fax faded, and then afterward I threw it away. I didn't photocopy it.

That means we don't have it?

I don't have it.

All right. It means, in that fax which was signed by Mr. Slobodan Praljak, it was written that you could enter and you could tape?

That's right! And we started immediately for Gabela. I know there was an access ramp, and to the right there was the administration building or something. And we entered.

Did you have problems entering?

No! No! None! I showed that fax, we are the ones, the ramp was raised and we… I know the road was asphalt and we walked to the top and on the right side of the road, there were low, long brick built ground level buildings.

Let me interrupt you for just a second. Do you have the feeling that Mr. Shultz, who was the main journalist, was surprised getting the permit for entrance?

Yes, he was the highest. He knew that if I started something, it will somehow end successfully. Because quite often he would find the doors closed, and then I would, as the translator and intermediary succeed to get him to see what he wanted. He was more than happy that ZDF would be first to enter Gabela.

But was he surprised that something taboo gets the permit? You were in that moment their translator?

Yes! Yes! But he considered me for a person who was more than just a translator. He knew my husband was in the Croatian Army and…He was surprised, but his main goal was to enter into Gabela and tape.

I am now interested in these: What did, Shultz say when he saw the paper signed by Praljak?

Well, he was happy! We picked up the paper and disappeared through the door faster than we entered, into the car and off to Gabela. That was the reaction. On the way we didn't talk much. I remember the asphalt road, then no asphalt road, because I didn't really know Herzegovina. And when we came there, we introduced ourselves in the administration building, we showed the fax, the ramp was raised and we entered. And we went to the end of that road, that way. And on the top, I remember very well, there were some cisterns

with water. The men were bathing. And they also washed the clothes. There was some quiet atmosphere.

What does it mean "quiet atmosphere"?

There wasn't much speech to hear, or something. It was really very silent. Now I don't know whether the men were surprised when all of a sudden the television comes with cameras for the first time

That means, it was the first time the television entered?

First time!

Then they most likely were surprised?

Yes! Yes! They were not accustomed and they didn't know what is happening. I got such an impression about those men. One of the long halls was open and he was taping the hall from the doorway, and the surrounding of the entire Gabela. I personally talked to one of them. He was a professor of German from Čapljina. He got out and talked about something with Shultz. I asked a young man if he needed anything. He said he didn't need anything. They were there all together, next to each other in that hall. And then, to my surprise, a couple of them came on the road from below. In the first moment I thought they are maybe some kind of guards, but they answered they are not, they went outside to work and now they were returning.

Well, that was your encounter with Gabela? After that Dietmar Shultz made his part?!

Yes! And we didn't stay long, he was in such a hurry to get his news as first in the world, we were rushing to Međugorje. And I didn't have a chance to see his tape, because we were in a small private hotel, and transmission was from another hotel. But all of us were on the same small street. And he has sent that and was very happy that this was a first such feature shot by ZDF and ZDF later sold it to other television companies.

Were you present all the time during his filming? Did he then talk with people?

He was talking probably with the ones who knew German. I even entered into the hall and he filmed from the door. I entered inside and wanted to talk with the people.

You were the translator, there was Dietmar and the cameraman! Who was the cameraman?

And the assistant was there. And the cameraman was there – I think it was an American, who ordinarily accompanied us a few times. And he, the cameraman, always had an assistant who held the microphone or… Well, there were four of us.

Do you know the names of those people?

No, I don't remember.

All right, I think we came to the end of our conversation. Just tell me – Dietmar Shultz, gentlemen with whom you worked in the '93, where is that gentleman today? Do you have any information?

After the war in Croatia he went to Israel. And he even told me that his spouse is going with him to Israel. And then, I've heard from him maybe one more time and after that nothing.

It means you have no more contacts?

No, nothing more!

What is happening with him now, what is he doing?

I don't know. Sometimes I thought I would get in touch, but I don't have time.

Madame Mira, you told me what was important, do you think we forgot anything, should we mention anything else?

In connection with Mr. Praljak?

In connection with this event.

I don't think so. That happened exactly as I told you**.**

Thank You.

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL

HVO /Croatian Defense Council/ MAIN STAFF
Number: /handwritten:/ 02-2/1-01-2265/ 93

Čitluk IZM /Forward Command Post/, 1 September 1993

ORDER

Permit the ZDF /Zud-Deutsche Rundfunk/ TV team led by Mira IVANIŠEVIĆ to enter and film inside the Gabela prison.

COMMANDER, HVO GS /Main Staff/
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

Željko Rogošić
PIN:
Split

At request of Mr. Slobodan Praljak's defence team, against which the proceeding is conducted before the ICTY under no. IT-04-74-PT, according to my best knowledge and recollection, under material and criminal responsibility, I give the following

STATEMENT

On 7th of September 1993, I stayed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the area of Čapljina as reporter of the "Globus" magazine. I departed from Split in dawn with a task to find the locations of Gabela and Dretelj camps under control of Croatian powers in which people of Bosniak nationality were detained for some time as well as to inform the Croatian public on real condition and events in those camps. A motive for such, at that time, extremely dangerous trip was a story published on CNN two days earlier, filmed in the place of Drežnica, northern from Mostar. In this TV report, several enervated Bosniaks, just released from two mentioned camps, Gabela and Dretelj near Čapljina, testified about torture and hard life conditions of thousands of Muslim detainees in two biggest camps under the control of HVO. That news was shocking also for the Croatian public because one heard for the first time then about the existence of Croatian camps in BH. Therefore, "Globus" as the leading Croatian independent weekly magazine wanted to be the first one to release an extensive report about that. Soon after, we established that in summer of 1993, there were unfortunately not only the Serbian camps Manjača and Omarska, but Croatian as well; "Heliodrom", Rodoč, Gabela, Dretelj and Bosniak museum in Jablanica, Musala in Konjic, in Zenica, Bugojno and many others.

As the first Croatian reporter, on 7th of September 1993 I managed, despite resistance, oppositions and danger for my own safety, enter and visit the Dretelj camp. The Zagreb political weekly magazine "Globus" released my report on 10th of September 1993, along with photograph from Dretelj, the former biggest oil warehouse of the former JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which in 5 hangars and two tunnels, 1478 Bosniaks were detained in inhuman conditions. Within the released story, I noted the interviews with poorly-fed and tormented people, mostly disarmed members of HVO Čapljina, Stolac, Mostar and Prozor who testified about great sufferings they were going through in July and August 1993, as well as the positive changes of the regime and life conditions since the new warden, the former policeman was appointed.

On this occasion, my duty is to emphasize the circumstances under which I managed to enter the Dretelj camp. Nevertheless, it was logical to expect, as far as camps Gabela and Dretelj are concerned, which were guarded by the persons in uniforms of HVO and with insignias of the HVO military police, that one should ask for entry permission by the competent military powers. We started from the assumption that visit approval permission to the aforementioned Croatian camps must be requested in the main staff of HVO, which later turned out to be wrong. Therefore, on 7th of September 1993, in the early morning hours, I came to the place of Čitluk, close to Čapljina in order to get the necessary permission in the Main staff of HVO. In the main staff I found commander, General Slobodan Praljak and asked him for a short conversation. As a reporter, I stayed in BH on several occasions and reported about the war conflict in that state and I also knew many Croatian politicians and military officials, among them, General Praljak as well.

To my great surprise, the commander of the Main staff of HVO, General Slobodan Praljak didn't have information on the situation and events in Dretelj and Gabela at all. His responses sounded rather sincerely to me. However, at the first moment, I was surprised by General Praljak's assertions that the command structures of HVO, respectively, the Croatian army in BH did not participate in decisions on establishment and existence of camps therefore they cannot be responsible for the events in those camps. Later on, we indeed were convinced that – although mainly the disarmed members of HVO of Bosniak nationality were detained in camps, who lived in western Herzegovina, although guards in camps were wearing uniforms of the HVO military police, the entire system of camps functioning relied exclusively to the civil powers, from the local level till the government of the Republic of Herzeg Bosnia.

During the conversation I spotted a clear opposition of General Praljak to the practice of existence of camps and judgment of inhuman life conditions in them as something which is opposite not only to ethics of making war, but to Croatian national interests in BH as well. As to my request to be permitted to visit Gabela and Dretelj camps, and contingently "Heliodrom" and Ljubuški, in which the HVO keeps the detained Bosniaks, followed by signed pass by him personally, General Praljak readily gave order that I was issued with such written confirmation. General Praljak has a position that truth must be found out about everything and that media can contribute to abolishment of camps and release of people to their homes. After the confirmation by which I am approved to visit Dretelj and Gabela has been written and certified with an official stamp, I headed towards Čapljina. Within contacts with BBC team colleagues I found out that General Slobodan Praljak signed the pass to visit Dretelj and Gabela also to reporters from Great Britain.

However, as I came to the entrance of Dretelj camp, in front of the big iron fence, there was a post nearby, guarded by armed guards, I was rather surprised. I asked to be received at warden's of Dretelj camp, but the person on the post of the camp told me that he was absent at the moment. Than I asked for a competent official person who enabled me to visit the camp. As the person in camouflage uniform arrived, haven't even introduced himself, I assume the deputy warden or shift commander, whose name I did not manage to find out afterwards, I gave him the written pass to enter Dretelj and visit to the camp, signed by general Praljak. To my great surprise, as he read the content which approved the visit, stay and interview in all parts of the camp, the man said rather furiously; "This permit isn't worth a thing!" When I recalcitrated and asked whether he sees that the commander of the main staff of HVO, General Praljak, personally signed the permission, a person in uniform, visibly upset by the reporter's visit, said back; "That's why it is not valid exactly! Praljak does not have competence over this place and do not refer to him! You can't enter; his signature is not valid at all!" Than the person in camouflage uniform furiously tore the permission with General Praljak's signature apart. I concluded that nothing more can be done and I retreated.

I decided to return to Čitluk and inform general Praljak on the entire event, from which it was obvious that, either the camps are indeed outside of his competence or his authority as the GS HVO commander was seriously brought in question. At the entrance to the main staff, I found out that General Praljak has already left and that he wouldn't come back soon. At this moment, General Žarko Tole came by, being at the time chief of the main staff of HVO. I knew his personally as well so I asked him for help. Tole came to Herzegovina recently, in July or August 1993, after a short recovery and long-lasting detention in the Serbian camp Manjača, in which he arrived as officer of HVO, after being captured in Bugojno. Therefore General Tole was rather surprised with my request to visit camps under control of Croatian powers. After I told him about being disabled from entering the Dretelj camp and that the uniformed person, having introduced himself as competent official, without hesitation tore apart the pass, signed by General Slobodan Praljak, General Žarko Tole remained surprised by information that such camps indeed exist on Croatian side. In addition, in Herzegovina, in Dretelj, Gabela and Ljubuški. He reacted furiously and loudly saying that these camps are disgrace and they should be shut down immediately. "Those camps are disgrace to our politicians and they shall become disgrace of Croatian people in BH! It is necessary that exactly Croatian reporters come in and tell to the public what is going on! I shall sign the confirmation on entering!" Žarko Tole indeed signed the new confirmation. Again, with a confirmation in my pocket, I headed to Čapljina and Dretelj on the same day in the early afternoon.

The same uniformed and armed person awaited me at the entrance, giving me the threatening look. He couldn't believe that I enter again with a confirmation, issued at the main staff of HVO. However, this time, although obviously unwillingly, the commander of the shift reacted differently. Having seen the signature of the HVO main staff chief, General Tole, obviously impressed by his new command duty or the detainee destiny by which he directly opposed to the war criminal, Ratko Mladić and survived the Serbian Manjača, the shift commander or the deputy warden mumbled something, nodded his head and I entered the camp, escorted by two armed guards. After check and identification, I was provided with a permission to move around the camp. At that moment, the warden, Tomo Šakota, former policeman from Čapljina, came to Dretelj and he walked me through the camp, rather friendly, without making any troubles. Afterwards, he walked away and allowed me to talk to detainees and take a picture of all what we wanted to, without his presence. That day, the detainees expected a visit of the representative of the international Red Cross. Šakota, respecting all conventions of the international law, improved the positions of the detained Bosniaks in significant measure, detained Bosniaks themselves used to testify about and tell us about it with praises.

After visiting Dretelj, in the late afternoon of 7th of September 1993, we went to the camp Gabela, on the road towards the border with the Republic of Croatia and town Metković. However, at the entrance to Gabela, the duty officer was relentless. Regardless the confirmation with General Tole's signature, he didn't want to let us go into the camp, I didn't come tomorrow. I returned to Split, wrote a story that, along with my photo among detainees of Dretelj, was released in the weekly magazine "Globus" on 10th of September 1993. The following days, due to releasing the truth about Croatian camps in Herzegovina and the article in "Globus" which obtained outstanding publicity, I received major number of anonymous and non-anonymous threats, so I was exposed to pressures from certain circles who took as their right to interpret the report's engagement as political activity contrary to Croatian interests. During those September days, in camps under the control of Croats in BH and according to UNHCR records, there were approximately 10 000 Bosniaks detained, while in camps under the control of Bosniaks in BH there were 9 000 Croats detained, having passed their Calvary in the madness of BH war.

However, I described an event in which General Praljak's approval to visit Dretelj camp was not obeyed, in the article that I published in the weekly magazine "Nacional" on 21st of August 2001, where I am permanently employed, after I left "Globus" in autumn 1997 and its editor EPH. After the Tribunal in The Hague requested from the Croatian Government in summer of 2001 documents of Croatian military and intelligence community on the Croatian-Bosniak conflict in BH and existence of camps in Herzegovina, I released an extensive analytic article on key documents in Zagreb weekly magazine "Nacional". Within, I described events in Dretelj, having mentioned this episode with General Praljak's confirmation. In August 2001, in the aforementioned text, I wrote; "It is also saying about the former deployment and ratio of forces in Herzegovina".

/signature/

Željko Rogošić

Željko Rogošić, reporter for "Nacional" magazine

EXCERPT FROM THE TRIAL RECORD OF DIRECT EXAMINATION OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ED VULLIAMY

on 8 MAY 2006 at ICTY, case Prlić et al.

* * *

Q. Let me ask you, sir, what steps, if any, you took in September, 1993, to visit any of the camps that we were discussing a few moments ago; that is, Dretelj, Gabela, or Rodoc.

A. We drove straight to Grude to find -- or to try and meet Mate Boban and ask him if we could go. Dretelj was the one that I think we chose. I think the UNHCR had said it was the one they were most worried about, and it was the one we tried last time so why not try again.

Q. Did you have any discussions with anyone at Grude concerning entry to this camp?

A. Yes. Canadian George again. And we asked to see Mate Boban. I'm not sure he was there when we got there about late morning. We were told to come back that afternoon, and Canadian George then said, "No, you can't go to Dretelj."

Q. Do you recall the approximate date or -- and time that you had this discussion with Canadian George?

A. The last one was during the afternoon.

Q. And the approximate time period in terms of dates; month, year?

A. This is September, 1993.

Q. And, sir, what --

A. I think we're in early -- early-ish September, 1993.

Q. What steps did you take after you were told by Canadian George that you can't go to Dretelj?

A. We decided that this was pressing matter now and we stayed in Grude and thought that we'd try again the following day.

Q. Did you in fact try again the following day?

A. Yes.

Q. Where?

A. Same place, back to Mr. Boban's office.

Q. Who did you encounter on that day?

A. Well, we met Canadian George again first. He -- I think maybe he did go to ask Mate Boban if we could go to Dretelj, and we were -- I think he told us no again and we asked him to go and try again. We were sitting in an office attached to this complex, whatever it was, I don't know what it was, on the outskirts of Grude, and then somebody came into the room or passed us whom all three of us recognised although it wasn't me who recognised him first, and it was one of my two colleagues, I think from the BBC. He said, Oh, there's General Praljak, why don't we ask him?

Q. And what happened next?

A. We did ask him. And I can't remember exactly whether he left us for a while. I think he did and came back but not that long afterwards, and said, I have to say to my surprise, Yes, so far as I'm concerned, you can. Or I paraphrase those words. I wasn't taking notes.

Q. And after this discussion with General Praljak, what did you do?

A. An order paper, "odobrenje," was drawn up. I honestly don't recall whether General Praljak returned into the room with it or whether it was typed up. I think it was typed up in our presence. It was stamped and signed, and with surprisingly little ado, and I don't think we talked to General Praljak very much after that. We set off to Dretelj.

Q. How did you know where to go?

A. Our translator guide knew where to go. And it was -- it was towards Capljina. I think by then we'd found it on the map, actually.

Q. This document that you were provided with, whose signature appeared on it?

A. To the best of my recollection, it was General Praljak.

* * *

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
Croatian Defense Council

/Stamp of Croatian State Archives/

/The coat of arms of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia/
HVO /Croatian Defense Council/ Main Staff
Ref. Number 02-2/1-01-2138/93
Mostar, 24 August 1993

APPROVAL

Whereby Miss Sally BECKER is allowed to cross the HVO checkpoints, and depart to the left side of Mostar controlled by Muslims forces.

On her way back, Sally BECKER will bring a seriously ill child Azem DROCE and his mother.

All HVO soldiers are ordered to make this humanitarian action of Miss Sally Becker possible and to render help.

HVO Commander
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL (HVO)

MAIN STAFF HVO
Number: 02-2/1-01-2239/93
Mostar, 1st September 1993

APPROVAL

Whereby Miss Sally BECKER, the humanitarian aid worker is allowed to cross the checkpoints, and depart to the left side of Mostar controlled by Muslims forces, during the day.

On her way back, Mrs. Sally BECKER will bring children, ill and powerless persons with two sanitary vehicles.

All HVO soldiers are ordered to make this humanitarian action of Mrs Sally Becker possible and to render help.

HVO Commander
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
CROATIAN COMMUNITY HERZEG-BOSNIA
CROATIAN DEFENSE COUNCIL (HVO)

MAIN STAFF HVO
Number: 02-2/1-01-2477/93
Mostar, 15th September 1993

A P P R O V A L

Whereby a free pass with a police escort on relation Čitluk - Žitomislić - Mostar (left bank) is to be secured:

1. SALLY BECKER - sanitary vehicle of HVO
2. ELVIS BARUNČEVIĆ
3. ROGER LUCY - armoured Landrover

HVO Commander
Major General
Slobodan PRALJAK
/signed and stamped/

STATEMENT – Jakov BIENENFELD

Name and last name: Jakov BIENENFELD

Date of birth: 28 July 1948

Place of Birth: Zagreb

Nationality: Jewish

Religion: Jewish

Address: ▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪▪, Zagreb

The interview took place in Zagreb on two occasions during February 2005. The interview was conducted by Božidar KOVAČIĆ, an attorney from Njivice, defence counsel to the accused Slobodan PRALJAK in case number IT-04-74-PT before the ICTY.

At the request of the defence counsel to Mr Slobodan PRALJAK I hereby declare that I am willing to give a statement regarding the events in which I participated in some way during the war in BH between 1992 and 1994.

I have been advised that I must speak the truth and that a false statement constitutes a crime pursuant to the law of the RH /Republic of Croatia/ and the rules of the ICTY, and I declare that I fully understand this and that I will recount everything truthfully and to my best recollection.

If necessary, I am prepared to testify about the events described below before the ICTY trial chamber in The Hague, either in person or via video-link.

I have given the following answers to the questions put to me:

1. As a young man I was active in the work of the Jewish Municipality in Zagreb. During 1990, I was assigned by the Jewish Municipal Council in Zagreb to deal with security issues at this institution.
2. Some time in 1990 or 1991, the Jewish Municipal Council in Zagreb accepted an initiative from JOINT (The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee) and decided to organise a pull-out of the Jews and persons of other nationality from BH if necessary. The Council assigned me to deal with this activity and I was directly responsible for the organisation and implementation of the plan to move out members of the Jewish community in Sarajevo and bring humanitarian aid in to occupied Sarajevo.
3. Humanitarian aid was collected in the RH and abroad, and I organised convoys to deliver aid to Sarajevo. The aid was intended for the population of Sarajevo, regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation.
4. We delivered the aid to Sarajevo, where it was taken over by the Jewish municipality and the Benevolencija society. Of the people conducting these activities in the BH, the following had various roles: Ivica ČERŠNIĆ, Jakov FINCI, Danilo NIKOLIĆ (who is now the president of the Jewish Municipality of Sarajevo) and others.
5. The plan was to enable people, Jews and non-Jews, to leave Sarajevo. A total of 1200 persons, of whom only about 400 were Jews, were transported in the convoys that I personally organised and led.
6. As far as bringing in aid, especially medicine, was concerned, I can only say that we brought more medicine into Sarajevo than all the other organisations put together. The Jewish Municipality in Sarajevo opened a charitable pharmacy where everyone could obtain the medicine they needed.
7. When preparing the convoy to transport Jews and persons of other nationality from Sarajevo and when preparing the transport of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo, I contacted many people whom I believed could help ensure unobstructed travel through those areas under the control of the warring parties in BH. I set up these contacts through people who were willing and through various governmental and non-governmental organisations. It is for these reasons that I travelled to BH several times.

8. This is how I established direct contact with Mr. Slobodan PRALJAK, amongst others. The first time I met him in person in Zagreb, in what I believe was mid-1992. I laid out our plans to him and asked if he could help. Without hesitation PRALJAK said he would do everything he could to ensure unobstructed passage of the convoy from and into Sarajevo.

9. PRALJAK kept his promise. The first convoy I led following this conversation was on 14 November 1992 and this was the convoy in which we transported the first group of people out of occupied Sarajevo.

10. As far as food, medicine, medical supplies and other essentials are concerned, these goods were collected in Split. With the direct assistance of PRALJAK I even found haulers and drivers in Herzegovina and in Croatia. I was especially impressed by the drivers from Herzegovina, who agreed to take part in the convoy despite the great risk to their lives.

11. Every time I prepared a convoy for either transport of persons out of Sarajevo or for the transport of goods into Sarajevo I would speak to PRALJAK or to persons he would direct me to, and I inform them of the desired plan of travel. In principle, one or two days later, PRALJAK or the people he tasked would inform me of a detailed plan of travel (routes and time).

12. The size of the convoys varied, and they usually consisted of two to five busses when transporting people out of Sarajevo, and 10 to 15 trucks when transporting aid into Sarajevo.

13. In practice, the convoys would travel the Split – Metković – Stolac – Todorići – Nevesinje – Foča – Lukavica – Sarajevo route. On certain occasions the route would be slightly different.

14. On one occasion, I think it was in mid-1993, we managed to organise a transport out of Sarajevo for the personal belongings of Sarajevo Jews.

    PRALJAK played a key role in this. He also found a way to arrange everything with the forces of the VRS /Republika Srpska Army/ and the package was transferred from Sarajevo in HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ vehicles with an HVO escort using the Srb – Stolac – Međugorje route. I took over the package in the Ana Marija Motel in Međugorje.

15. I led a total of 11 convoys and all were successful. No one in the convoys was ever wounded or killed. I remember one incident when during a checkpoint search, the VRS soldiers stole some of the Jews' belongings we were transporting from Sarajevo. As soon as I found out about this I sent the convoy back and insisted that the stolen items be returned, which was quickly done. I must say that on many occasions they frightened us, but this never happened in the sections under HVO control. On a few occasions, the VRS forces fired several bullets at the truck cabin, usually right behind the driver. I am convinced that these were shots from a sniper that were intended to show us they could stop us if they so wished, i.e. to let us know we were dependent on their good will.

16. On several occasions, PRALJAK personally negotiated with the high ranking officers of the VRS to secure undisturbed passage of the convoys. I know he spoke to the VRS GŠ /Main Staff/ and I remember that there was mention of someone by the name of General MILOVANOVIĆ, with whom I spoke several times on Pale. That conversation was made possible by PRALJAK and I believe that the first meeting was in August or September of 1993. On that occasion, HVO officer Žarko KEŽA assisted me as an escort and met me at the airport in Dubrovnik (Čilipi) and drove me to Pale. He had documents that would ensure we could pass through all the control points, which PRALJAK got from the HZHB /Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna/ and the HVO, but also from the VRS.

17. In many situations it was very clear that without PRALJAK's help the convoys would not have been able to get through. Other people, such as Ljubo ČESIĆ ROJS, Mate BOBAN, Ante JELAVIĆ and others, also helped out but PRALJAK's help and involvement were the most significant, especially regarding contact with the Serbian side, which obviously respected him for reasons unknown to me.

18. Mr PRALJAK was also of great assistance in establishing contacts with the heads of the VRS and/or the JNA regarding other operations I was leading. Immediately after the fall of Vukovar (on 19 November 1991) I became involved with the exchange of prisoners from the RH arrested by the JNA or the VRS, and before that I was an intermediary during the exchange of persons arrested by the JNA in the RH. During those activities I managed to secure the release of several persons who were publicly known.

For example, this is how General Đuro DEČAK, Dr Vesna BOSANAC, Dr Njavro JURAJ, and a platoon of Vukovar defenders and a few others were liberated. Mr PRALJAK somehow managed to put me in contact with JNA General VASILJEVIĆ, with whom I had a few meetings in BH, where for the same reasons I also met with General MLADIĆ, BEARA (on Pale) and some other JNA/VRS officers, whose names I do not remember. The help offered by General PRALJAK was important and it would have been difficult without his help.

19. During my stay in BH, I had no personal contact with members of the HV, nor did I ever see any kind of organised HV forces in BH except in the border areas between the RH and BH.

20. On a few occasions I had the opportunity to have an extended conversation with PRALJAK about various issues regarding the state of war in BH in 1992/1993. From these conversations and from PRALJAK's activities that I was informed of, I realised that PRALJAK was opposed to the war, especially between Bosnian Croats and Muslims, and that under the circumstances he was doing everything possible in this chaotic situation to help people who were directly affected or endangered by the war events.

21. The firm position of my organisation was that there should not have to be "bribing" to allow the convoy to pass freely as this could compromise the whole project and have an adverse effect. At the direct inquiry of the defence counsel and based on many facts I am convinced that PRALJAK helped me and provided support for the convoys for purely humanitarian reasons, and he did not expect nor did he receive any counter-favour or remuneration for this.

22. I can say that PRALJAK is my "casual" acquaintance and I was lucky to have met him at that time because this helped me to launch an operation that was very difficult to carry out. It is my belief that PRALJAK is undoubtedly a courageous and moral person, and with the actions described he helped to save many lives.

Done in Zagreb on 25 February 2005

Jakov BIENENFELD

/signed/

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS MIROSLAV CRNKOVIĆ CRNI IN CASE PRLIĆ ET AL.,

ICTY, 22 SEPTEMBER 2009

* * *

CRNKOVIĆ:

In the month of September/October 1991, a group of young people from Zagreb arrived and established a radio service in Sunja so that people on the front-line could receive greetings from their loved ones. A girl was there. She also came with that group of people, and she brought a cat from Zagreb, that was her cat. Four members of the Croatian Army at the time were on their way back from Zagreb. They returned from Zagreb, went to the radio station, and wanted to order a few songs, and then she told them that they had to wait a little. One of the soldiers took the cat and threw her - threw the cat against the radiator and killed the cat. The girl started crying, came to me. I conveyed all that to the general. At that very moment, the general appeared up there, disarmed all the four soldiers. He removed their insignia and their uniforms and sent them packing for Zagreb, and those men were never again members of the Croatian Army in Sunja.

PINTER:

And how did you explain the whole thing to yourself? How did you interpret General Praljak's reaction to yourself?

CRNKOVIĆ:

It was a message, of course. The message was, If you can be removed from the Croatian Army on account of a cat, you should also be aware of what can happen to you on account of a human being.

* * *

COMMENT: SERB

ALOJZ ARBUTINA

ARBUTINA ALOJZ

Sunja
January 14, 2005 and February 10, 2005

Sound recording and conversation transcript are on CD
SUNJA 2

Sound recording of the conversation is under the sign
arbutuvod.way
Size: 29,8 MB
Duration: 1:33:22

arbtutina1 100205.way
Size: 4,71 MB
Duration: 14:44

and

arbutina2 100205.way
Size: 4,17 MB
Duration: 13:04

(This conversation took place in Sunja, in the premises of HVIDRA and in the apartment of the interlocutor.)

Please introduce yourself.

Alojz Arbutina, [redacted] Sunja. I think when we started to talk about Praljak… This first thing remained in my memory , when he came. I was just getting out of the Fire house when he came with Žarko Peša. He was wearing Reithose, this Slovenian trousers…

You saw that? You saw him in that?

Yes. He had these socks, like that, and as they were high, automatically… He did not even have the belt, but a bandage instead of the belt. When we were introduced I told him: I will get you a leather belt tomorrow. You are the commander and you must… So then we started this cooperation. And then it was, for everything I needed regarding the logistics, I always needed his signature…

Let us please return a little bit to the moment when you saw him for the first time. What was his impression on you? What did you think when he appeared like that?

Well, at the moment I did not… I was thinking a little bit afterwards. As appearance, and I am not talking about it because we have remained in perhaps good relations… He was modest. There were not some talks with him that would change a briefing into preaching at somebody. When he took over, when he started to command, each morning there was a briefing, the flag raising – that was also introduced by him. The playing of the anthem took place each morning, we had a bugler who would sound it and then the flag was raised. The commander's office, all who were there were lined up… And everything with him was kept to the point… And it went down the line: The commander of the 1st company – what's new?, this, this, this and that. The commander of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th company, the logistics, and half an hour of the briefing was more than enough. If there was something that needed explanation, then…

In fact you are talking about the phase in which the army started already to function, but previously there was another period, is that so? The period during which there were much more problems?

Yes, there were much more problems because all men were not… They were not… I think some of them did not understand. I was, I had from the

Yugoslav national army the rank of the lieutnant because I had finished the School of the reserve officers, where I used immediately to tell people to make pillboxes…

It was before Praljak's arrival?

Before Praljak's arrival. And it was something that was rarely made by anyone. They made them for themselves in these villages because… I don't know how much you are aware of it, we were in a sort of half encirclement. Sava river was behind our back, where was a possibility of crossing in case – but really we were this… The situation much improved when Slobodan came for the commander. He actually forced people to… Since his arrival and during 15 days, at the most perhaps one month, our front line was reinforced. With the pillboxes, with all that was… I don't know, I think that I brought thousands and thousands sacks of sand from Sisak, construction material, woodenware, all these things that were used to arrange the pillboxes so that the soldiers really could stay in them…

It means, that this was a change?

It was a big change!

How did people react to this change? Did they rebel?

Well… They rebeled a little bit but it was not possible with him… It must be done and that's it! He said at the briefing, for example, for one part towards Greda, "Boys, I go from Gradusa this afternoon at 4 o'clock , I start the rounds of the first line…"

And it has to be finished by then?

These pillboxes must be finished by then. He says : "Those who would not make it would be in big trouble because we shall then…" In confirmity with the law as it should be…

Were men afraid of Praljak?

They were. They were. They had the respect and they complied with him because he strictly asked what had to be done and that was all right in such a system. I knew, for example, in Greda, on several places,*****, where this was next to the first line, when you go towards Sava river on the left side, where people made it on a barn. And then I explained to the people: Well, I will now go into the maize, there is the manure behind the barn, and next to the manure there is the maize. It means the vista, what he can see is 30-40 meters, but 20 of it is covered with the maize. It means that the person who will come crawling cannot be seen, because when he comes out of the maize you cannot see him, he can come out of the maize and do what he wants, throw bombs and all this... When men understood that it was like that they obeyed…
Well, I started about these signatures, once I told him: " Sir, commanding officer, it is ridiculous for me to come to you for… I am commanding with the logistics and now you sign me for three bags of potatoes, ten kilos of beens and so on…" And he says: "Why do you tell me about it? Go there and they will write you that I approve that you sign for the logistics and that I don't have anything to do with it. For me it is only a burden." So that we then********, while he was,******** and afterwards when he left. Afterwards I thought why did not I leave it like it was, because later on nobody could draw anything without my signature, but well, that was regular. Normally it had to be like that…

How did you… Excuse me. Say.

I wanted also to say, we are, then it… He asked me also what was my opinion about that… We ferried over, normally civilians went, the stores began to work slowly…

About which time do you speak now? Which period is it?

Praljak's… period.

I know, but when? September, October or later?

Well, it was a bit later. There: October, November, December…

The year 1991 of course?

The year 1991. We initiated, for example, that civilians paid a minimum for ferry-boat transfer. This money went to the treasury in the Headquarters where before the Christmas he gave me a mission. He says to me: "Inquire about the poorest of the poor who are there… without husbands, old women or well I don't know, where there is no some help in the house, and bring me this list". Then I charged with it one girl from the school, Miss Blaža, because she knew more people through chlidren who could give the message how and what and who were such people. And then we put together this ferry-boat money, we made a disposition and distributed this on equal parts…

You distributed the money or…?

The money, we distributed money to these poor people, and there were some very sad situations, when these old people cried of luck, because the army however took care of them and that they were not neglected and forgotten. And then, there were some other donations, we made packages for children on St. Nicolas. And we used to get this artificial milk and we gave it to those who had young children… I don't know… It was somehow changed, many things were changed at our place.
And Mr. Međimorec, together with the commander Praljak, we were visited by some music groups, there were "Golden Ducats" and the singer Đimi Stanić, I think also that the theater "ITD" or "Kerempuh" came,
- well don't take me at my word – also the actors gave performances. It was more alive, it was somehow…
Although we suffered terribly, especially sometime after the New Year until the arrival of UNPROFOR. The shelling was frightfull. One person, who was the secretary of the community, he took notes of it as he could, and he registered more than 30.000 to 40.000 shells during this period…

In the time from to?

In the time from July 27 and so until the April.

Of the year 1992…

Well now, you mentionned: We have a ferry-boat, the collecting and the distribution of the money to the poor people, or there are packages, St. Nicolas, children. Is that so? I am interested to know whether you have got an estimation of the number of the households,

of the old people households about which you needed to take care? Approximately.

Well, I think they were about some thirty-odd. But I wanted only to add… That was not every year. When there was money we always helped as much as possible this people with money… But we also took care of those of Ortodox religion who stayed with us.

That is what I wanted to ask you about. These old people households, were they Serbs? Croats?

There were some, but not many as far as Serbs are concerned. Those who were there, they were older people. Others, who did not cross the railway, as we used to say, to the other side, but who stayed here. And those who were there, nearer to the Station, they had to leave because there was no chance that they woke up without the shooting. Up there were only the soldiers. But we also took care of these Serbian population so that they got food, bread and so… Just in this Vladimir Nazor street******an old man and his old woman. Where I was, just on the command of Praljak, where he said: ”If you have got such cases, we shall always find food enough so that nobody would starve.” Because there were no shops, nothing.…

If I understand correctly: You took care of this people on the Praljak's command?

Yes, we did.

When we say "you took account of" – what does it really mean? That the soldiers brought food? Is that so?

Those who distributed it to the normal soldiers, at the points, because we had points. It went to five directions. For example, we went to: the Ljudevit Posavski street, then up to the Railway station and through the Vladimir Nazor street we came back – it was one circle. For Sunjska Greda it was a second point. Žremen-Krivaj was a third one. Bobovac-Bistrač was the fourth point where the food was transported.

It means, within these points were…

In these streets, within these streets, were some families of Serbian population and to them…

You distributed to them?

There we gave to them also.

Tell me in this way: Were there single cases, excesses, rudenesses, problematic relations towards this people? Well, did it happen, were there any tries that to this people…I don't know, well let's say that you would not give them the food? You would not help them? To make their life more difficult?

As far as I know, not. And if it was, it was a little bit, individually, but… It did not escalate into some…

Were these individual cases solved then? And if they happened – how were they solved?

It was solved by interrupting it. But, what happened? It was very difficult for us at the beginning because all we had was this company of the guardsmen and there was this Sunja independent company, then we had the police reservists who used to come from Zagreb. One part of them were of great help to us there – they were really well armed. Perhaps it was easier for them to justify the consumption of the ammunition… It was normal that they were in charge of as much as they had, the fighting set one or two, or three, for weapons they had, automatic or pistols, and bombs and grenade launchers… They rotated every fifteen days, so these guys would always leave one part of it to us because… they could justify it. They fired and spent it… So that we had it also at the beginning**** I want to say that we, when there was the first attack on July 27, on the second or third day we had this also organized by the Crisis headquarters. I was assigned for this logistics, we called it in the time the rear, the rear and the logistics, where we formed immediately a kitchen and we started to cook and all this together. I had one Johnny, who was a military cook and almost every year he was the Yugoslav federal army reservist, but he was really there as the cook. And when they asked "Who would cook?", and when I assigned him, some people complained. They said "He had problems with the police, he likes to play cards" and I said "I know who I engaged, people. He knows how to cook. A woman can cook for her family, but for 2000 people one must know how and what."

So we formed the kitchen and when all this started… The baker, I and my late dentist (???) persuaded him to stay and to bake,**** they were the only one because**** The civilians were evacuated from Sunja, on the other side in Kratečko, when there was the attack on the 27th, until this was a little bit stabilized, to avoid the chaos. They would bother. You know when it comes and… when it comes to these things people does not take care, they are running around in circles… To avoid more victims. So we did it all together, and when this Johnny would call me: "Chief, what shall we cook tomorrow?", I told him: "Take a knife and a sack, I will do likewise, you go on this side of Gupčeva street, and will go to the other side – and we shall find something in the gardens." Some sorts of cabbage, this and that… Well, yes. And we had meat, because cattle was left, these porks. Unless we did it, the catle would be lost, ruined, because there was nobody to feed them… We saved, I shall add immediately, from "Vajda" surely some 10.000 tons of game and poultry, because we did all… It was transported to the refrigeration plants to Sisak, to be saved. For the rest that could not go to Sisak, I gave command in agreement with Peša, that it be distributed to the households, so that it would not be lost, to be distributed over Sava river, from Čigoč, Prelošica, down to Lonja, as well here****, to save all that can be saved. We opened shops, because there was no electricity for several days and there were refrigerators with smoked and cured meat, so that it would not be lost or would spread the infections. I took care of that, not because I was the commander, but I terribly took care of it. And at dish washing I always demanded more than it was due regarding the norms of the detergents for dish washing and…

Did Praljak support it?

Praljak supported all this and he gave me a free hand. I worked****all that I could to improve it. And if something got stuck he could help me… And it was always like that if he could do anything… However he has connections in Zagreb and some friends where something can be done. So we would get some donations. We meant to improve things. These soldiers, were not only on the pillboxes, but… We really tried to show them that there was always some improvement, and talks with them, and what would they and how would they… Well, there are black sheep in every fold. Somebody says: It was not like that, it was not like this – but people must be aware that they had meat three times per day. Because it you eat the salami in the morning – that is meat, there was meat in cooked meal – pork, beef, the supper was again…

We cooked at the beginning, but later on we stopped with suppers and we had dry (solid) food. Maybe nobody had it. The richiest people did not have it.

One of the things that was introduced as the new way of the behaviour and the organization of the army was the pillboxes building. Were you connected with it when Praljak came?

We started to make them then. Something was made, but when Praljak came it was intensified and in twenty days - one month, all the pillboxes were built.

Were there any problems with these pillboxes?

No, there were no problems. But you know people! They thought that they did not need it. And when Praljak proved it to them…

How did he prove it to them? In which way he tried and managed to prove it to them?

Well, the best way to prove is, and according to the war tactics, that it was always 1:5 regarding the defense and the attack. Because if you attack, you will always more*****than the one who is in the pillbox, because he is protected.

(Continuation of the conversation, in the apartment of Alojz Arbutina, on January 20, 2005)

Where did we stop? I have forgotten…

I retained that you should also mention this event with "Ducats". Well, the event with "Ducats": What was it like? We mentioned it but it would be a good idea to remind a little bit of it.

Well, generally speaking, they were not the only who made guest appearance for us. Also other people came to us…

I know, but now I am interested in them.

And now, as far as “Golden Ducats” are concerned it was phenomenal. That is, at our place, as much people as our hall could accommodate…

It was which hall? Where was it?

In the Cultural hall in Sunja. And now this hall is named after our old legend Sven Lasta, that is now the name of our hall. It was an important event for us, the soldiers who were in defense of Sunja and all that together. He gave one part of his contribution, encouragement, energy and all that. And then, towards the end there were some short songs, those, to say briefly, those that smack a little bit more of Ustashi sympathies. They started to sing it, but the commander Praljak interrupted it and said: “Enough, men! Those boys have cheered us up and now we go to our units and on our positions.” – So that it…

What else did Praljak say in the fact? Praljak stood up, is that right?

He stood up and…

He was in the audience?

Yes, in the audience. He was in the audience and… We were close to each other, he made two steps… and he stopped it.

Why did not he tolerate it?

Well, I think that he did not permit it… So that it would not exceed the limits that should not be exceeded. But I don’t know…

Was he angry then? You say that you were close to him. Was he angry?

Well, he was not that much angry, but I must be sincere, it was not pleasant to him and he saw that it could go to… I think, the hall was so full of people that one cigarette could not fall on the floor. In this, how should say, in this rapture and that, anything could have happened. All men were predominantly armed. Well, they did not have long rifles**** maybe somebody had a bomb, this , that, maybe in such a moment it could have happened… Maybe he would not even consider it, maybe he would set of a bomb, thinking that he would throw it out… Anything could have happened.

Well, but can we presume: A group came to entertain people, it should have been like that, and then they started to sing…. What? Ustashi songs? Which songs did they sing?

To be honest I cannot immediately remember, only I know that they were, but as much as I could****we prepared afterwards a snack to these boys, a little supper in DVD – in the Fire station. At that moment, when Mr. Praljak interrupted it, I saw on them too – but they had to submit… I think all this mass and all this together. Neither they did not feel very comfortably…

What? They were not pleased to sing that songs or…?

It seems so… My impression was that they were not pleased to… In fact, those which they sung, some of them… But… I don't know I must be such a type. I was literally pleased that he interrupted it because everything could have happened.

Did Praljak interrupt it so that it would not come to the shooting, or did he interrupt it because he did not agree with singing of these songs?

I think that he interrupted it because he did not agree with it.

Did he utter it at some place?

He did not. I don't know, I don't know. I think, do you know what? The man a little bit… When you return the film, it is however a long period, year 1992, and now it is year 2005, that is 13 years. The man cannot remember every detail… But I am most sorry… I got lost somewhere… I had a little diary of mine dating before the war. It was always in the pocket of my uniform. People used to laugh at me.*****

What was in this diary?

I had everything in it, many things were written down. And what was the most? It was what I had to do regarding the logistics. Because then, there occurs an conversation at the briefing, and when you put it down, sometimes they perhaps forget to put it down, and when I get ready for the travelling, then***** I put it down, so I would not forget. It was such a time, particularly this first time, at the beginning.

You mentioned Mr. Lasta as your friend. You cooperated, you were friends, is that so?

Yes.

I know that Mr. Lasta also explained in his own way and as much as he could, to these young men with whom he was what really meant this Ustasha movement, in other words he pointed out that there was no need to magnify it. Is that correct?

I think that it is, as far as I know. This is one thing but the other…

That in a way he educated them…

…and I will tell you something else… I think I was very good with a great many of these young men from the Second Guards brigade who were there. I don't know whether you saw it on TV, there was a reportage about Sven Lasta in Sunja. Well, I was also in it, and people in Sunja teased me that I became a television actor. We, who took part in this conversation, but mostly there were young men from this guards brigade. A lot of people used to say: "What he, what is he acting there?" These young men told me that he was like a father to them. He was always on the Railway station. In the morning he took his… What did he have? One small Winchester with sniper, he was always carrying it around. He always went on foot to the Railway station. As I was transporting the food, we got acquainted at the beginning because I gave him a ride several times and we got more and more connected and then we became real friends. These young men used to tell me, the food was transported there, but they opened tins and all that, and late Lasta would tell them: "Boys, it is not good for your health, you must eat some cooked food."

He was to them, to say in short, father and mother. Boys were very happy with him and they always obeyed him, all that he told to them…It is normal that he gave wise councils and never some stupid things… So we became friends then. Later when it was, we went to***** Posavina (Sava river valley) where he was wounded. Later on he went to service in Zagreb, he was in the office of the President Tuđman*****. Then we had it in Zagreb, it was "Sunja to Croatia – Croatia to Sunja" in the "Vatroslav Lisinski" concert hall, we gave a program and it was very well attended.

There was also an exhibition of the pictures from Sunja about these martial…

The exhibition of the photographs?

Yes, photographs. I forgot the street in Zagreb where it was, and then we met. We exchanged greetings, normally we kissed each other as the old warriors and then he started about my chin and said: " Ha! Mr. Louie, it is shaved 2 mm under the skin", and I said: " I came to Zagreb, there might be some girl." He was like that… very funny.

I must tell you about one event! Peša procured a dog. It was a Šarplaninac (named after the Šar mountain), but he was black. He was young, three or four months, and we called him Medo (Teddy bear). He was like a real bear, he was terribly fond of me, I mostly took care of him and my sister as well, she fed him and all this. I don't know who, but I think Peša procured some three luxurious German cars, with convertible roof *******, and Sven Lasta drove one of them. We were here, down in Palanka, there was Medo also, he was also in the Headquarters****** . So we protected one part, nobody could look inside, during summer time there was a table in the yard, and there was no need that everybody from the road stared in it. And when Sven came, he went inside the Headquarters and I heard some rustling. I said:" Well, is that Medo? Is a nylon bothering him?" When I looked at the rear seats, they were already torn up - and I did not anything else but I turned my heels. And we met the next day. "Well, what did I say?" I said: "I don't know about what?" "Well, this Medo. There is no crazier dog in the world. Did you see that**********he decorated the back seats of the car?"

What? He ate the back seats?

He tore them up. It was this leather or sky and he tore it up.

All right. Let us come back to this… I am trying to connect: Praljak's reacting to the singing of Ustashi songs; Lasta's efforts to direct the soldiers and to explain it to them and so on. Can we connect all this in a way and conclude that there was a systematic effort of a certain group of people, who had the occasion to educate these young men, to explain them certain things, and to rectify in a way this, let us call it, uncritical point of view of Ustashi 's ideology?

Yes. Maybe there were after these, individual, some stupid declarations for my point of view – but not after that, after this concert, after these singers "Golden Ducats", there was nothing in larger proportions. In this moment these emotions happened, and the second day these emotions deflated and…

At the beginning, in almost first six months, starting in 1991 and until the arrival of UNPROFOR, we had three doses per day: For breakfast, for lunch and for supper they shot at us. There was not an enormous shooting, but around fifty, between 50 and 100 grenades, all sorts of their arms used to fire on us**********

Come on, tell me what were the reasons of your quarrels with Praljak?

I can tell you that we did not quarrel.

You did not quarrel because of anything?

It was once, at the very beginning, when he came he said how this street lighting was on. Our these "Elektra" people, from the power plant, I do not praise them because I myself worked for "Elektra" until I went to the disablement pension in 1988 – but it was… I told him "It is not a mistake, nobody turned it on." He says:" Well, I know better, I learned about it." I said: "I know that you learned about it, but I am the electrician and I guarantee that it was caused by shooting and this, the phase wire must be broken by shooting and it fell on the wire**********and the light was on day and night." And it was eliminated. And that was our biggest…

And you got well along further on?

We got along very well. Whatever I suggested regarding the logistics – Praljak gave me open hands. I could not do what I wanted but I could plot as much as I could to obtain what I needed for our soldiers in Sunja.

Come on, tell me how did you plot with the beer cans, Coca-Cola cans… How was that?

Ha! It is not, I collected them in Sisak, around coffee bars…

Well, why? Why did you collect it?

Well, we made… We made… Because there were no bombs. There were no bombs and we made them by ourselves.

It was year 1991?

1991. And we did it. We would put inside some short sticks and we would put dynamite inside and whatever we found: Small pieces of iron and all this…

It means, you went first around pot-houses and collected these tins…

Tins and that…

And then you put in the tins – what?

We put explosive.

Explosive. And? Metal?

Metals.

And what did you do further on with it?

**********It was also manually, but the young men acquired some catapults. And then they threw them with catapults.

Did it function?

It was awful. I did not…I think, I heard from these young men who were at the front line, from these guardists**********what Ustashas invented, what was that now. They were afraid. It was a powerful explosion, and especially*******there were pieces of iron. If there were some small balls it was good, but this was more dangerous because these were pieces of shrapnel, pieces that had edges, points, peaks and all that. And all that until we did not**********

Consequently, a part of your job was to provide these tins. What else did you do? I'm talking about supplying – of all that had to be acquired for the functioning here, in the conditions that were here?

Well, I can tell you: From A to Z. Whatever they needed. When horses came I had to provide the straw and the hay for the horses. And then I was there with a cavalry officer from Zagreb, we got these different**********as it was the front line, regarding this here, that is concerned*****on the Sava river and to the Station, and also this part to Žremen, Krivaj – Žremen was accessible. But for example the line Žremen –Popovac was…**********three kilometers away where were the pillboxes. So we had these horses and that, we had even a wagon for transporting wounded persons. We organized us like that. We had it for some time and then afterwards it was revoked******there was no need for that. Then we modernized. We worked and we acquired everything.

Then, for us the logisticians, already afterwards, there were mostly arrangements and meetings in Sisak, and later on in the Railway company Zagreb in Zagreb. Then I met with my colleagues from the other units and we complained to each other. That man said that he had this and had not that. It happened once that we learned… Praljak was the commander. We learned that in Vinkovci there were grenades for ZIS-es but they did not have these artillery pieces. And we had them. Then this Zane, who is 100% military invalid wounded in the Storm,******** went there and this travelling in both ways took five days. We had to go via Osijek and all, we could not go that way, from Novska on the highway, so that we managed in different ways. I had that ammunition but I did not have arms for that, so we went to exchange it. We got from those who had a surplus. It went like that. That was the situation.

Tell me like that… We are talking about a time at the end of 1991, sometimes from September 1991 until springtime 1992. How did function the care for the people who remained in Sunja? First of all I think on Serbs, that is Orthodox people who were there. Did you take account of their needs, food, all other things, how much did Praljak participate in it and in which way?

He participated very much in that…

Of course the question is related as well to the Moslems who were there…

To all, to all. He did not think only on Orthodox people and Moslems… We did not have much of them. There were several Moslems and they

were active in the Croatian army. And there were Serbs who remained here and they were also in the Croatian army. The rest of them who stayed… The difference at the beginning…And it was like that. It was regarded: He is a Serb, but he stayed. He did not cross the railway – how we used to say then. They did not leave. Because on the 27th there was the first attack, in the morning they started with the mortar fire. And from 26th to 27th , those who where there and knew that they would not stay in Sunja – they left.

And what happened then with those who had stayed?

We took care of those who had stayed.

How?

For food and also for… Well, at the beginning there were perhaps some… Maybe somebody made a remark to someone, but it was minimal. Praljak said to stop with it, and we took care regarding this supplying with the food….

Well, what did Praljak expect, what did he asked for? Which were his commands regarding the care of this people? What did you do?

His command was that we took care of it, that there would be no complaints, that nobody would come to complain to him that this was not done.

Well, it was…

It was supplying them with food and the care about them. Because, I think, they were all older people. There was also one family, near by Sokolana as we call it, but later they left, we let them go, and they went to the other side. We don't know what happened to them. There were also two old people, they were born here, at Strmen, but both they died here in the war. We took care of them and always when the food was distributed I would say "Don't forget those two." Mostly they were not hungry, they had always bread and there was always the same that the army had, they got it. They ate what the army ate.

It means that there was the same for everybody?

Yes.

Tell me… Rinčica (The ear-ring)? You knew that man? The wedding of Rinčica in the church, later he was killed at the railway…

Ha! I know. Yes. He was later… It was organized in the Hall, we prepared it for him according our possibilities. The wedding-feast was in the Hall…

I put here some marks and let us see how you can help me, what do you remember and of what you were the witness? Can we?

All right.

Gorša. The event with Gorša. Were you the witness of this event?

What was that? When he shot in the Hall?

Yes, in the Fire station, I think of that.

He shot and then he disappeared.

How did he disappear? What does it mean "disappeared"?

He was then a little bit… He took shelter and hid himself until it settled down a little bit. Until the situation calms down. They are several brothers and so.

I think at Damir Gorša. Praljak brought him in for something, is that so?

Yes, he did. But later they let him go.

It means that is all? You don't know anything else about Gorša? You were not the witness of this event?

No. When I was in Fire station it was by accident. And I ignore further development. He was brought in, and released, I know there was something. And what happened in the Headquarters that will perhaps… Blaža, she will probably know about that.

OK. Let us continue. This way… There was an event with the ferry-boat, that is with the ferrymen to whom the working hours expired, as they said. Well, it was necessary to ferry somebody over and they said that the working hours were finished and they did not want to ferry over… Do you know something about this event?

I could not remember this. I think, I don't know. Maybe there was something, but I really cannot remember.

Good.

I could not remember this, but I know…. I think, I don't know for the others, but when I was... There was not the question of the time. And there were no working hours. That is why I am surprised by that.

That is why I ask. Tell me further on, like this: The event when the father in law of Mustafa Nadarević was killed… The father in law of Mustafa Nadarević… Do you know something about it? Do you maybe remember of this?

Where was he killed? Here?

Yes.

What was his name?

I don't know his name, but I know that he was killed… He did not want to leave his house. He was in the house, he thought that nobody would shoot at him, you supplied him with food. He was killed. He was brought dead here in a handcart.

No.

You don't know anything about it?

No. I try to remember. The father in law of Mustafa Nadarević, brought in a handcart?

Yes. He was killed. They told him to leave the house, but he did not want…

It was in 1991?

Yes.

Yes, but… I think… I know for my manager, he was my former manager, Tomo Karanović. He and his neighbor were killed in Vedro Polje. Chetniks killed them and******and they were transported in the morning to**********where our guards were, they both were brought dead.

On wheel-barrow?

Yes, they were brought in wheel-barrow, in hand carts.

And which were the names of these two men?

This one is Karanović, but the other one… I cannot remember. But I can see about it later on.

It was in which village?

They were in Vedro Polje. This continuation towards Dubica, just where is that little bridge over the brook Krivaja, that is the continuation of Vedro Polje. Up to the railway and a little bit over the railway, and further on is the continuation of Donji Hrastovac. But I don't know whether this is it.

I have this incident written down. Without names.

I don't know for anything else.

Did you witness to this one? Were you present when this happened?

No, I didn't…

Some of them were supplied with food. Did you bring the food to them also?

Well, they were at home.

I know, but did you bring the food to them or

No, no, no, not. We did not go there but I was… Just several days before that, this Karanović Tomo, I was here with him, we were in front of "Elektra", we met by chance and I asked him: "What, you stay up there? He says: "They came to my house." He mentioned several of them who told him: "That not a hair of his head would be touched, that he did not have to be afraid." After some…I don't know were that two or three days later and they killed both of them. They killed first this Karanović, and afterwards this neighbor… He worked at the railway, and there was a time when he worked with us in "Elektra". He was our warehouseman and then he left us. Yes. And he says: "Men, what are you doing?" and then this one that was shooting turned around and shot and killed him too.

Who were these people who shot?

Supposedly it was a man from Kostajnica. Some Blajo. But don't take me at my word. Because there were several versions, that them, that they were, but… I don't know exactly.

Good. I have here another recorded event: In the neighboring Serbian village remained the father of one fighter, his son was in our army. This son requested that we went to get his father, and that we pulled him out. Then we organized the operation of pulling out. Do you know something about it?

Yes.

Crnković conducted this operation.

From the Second guards unit?

Yes.

No, I don't know anything about it.

Then further on… What was the name of the radio-station that worked here?

Well, at the beginning it was "101".

Its name was "101"?

Yes, at the beginning, but afterwards, after some time, I think one year later… We had then, when Bjonda came, then we had our radio-station in our regiment.

Good. When did start to operate radio-station "101"?

They started to operate immediately.

Approximately when?

At the beginning. I think that it was transmitting already in August, September. And then afterwards…

But the station was hit, wasn't it?

Yes. They were in the infirmary.

When were they hit? It was which date?

Who would know the exact date… I know that immediately after it I organized to fix the roof, because the roof was hit.

Were there wounded persons?

No, there were no wounded, only the roof was… By accident they, I think that they even got out because they had in the basement…Above they had the equipment that was smashed, but nobody was hurt.

Was it summer, autumn?

It was warm weather. I think that it was autumn.

Then they stopped to work?

I think that they stopped because there was something, once… There was something once… Some damn shame. I entered by chance and felt a terrible smell. Then I learned what it was. Those slaughtered a cat and this blood… it smelled terribly.

Who slaughtered the cat?

Them, those who probably used to come to them, what do I know, I don't know.

Where did they use to come?

To the radio-station. There were at the beginning all sorts of euphoria… Listening of the songs, maybe there were some drugs… I heard afterwards that allegedly this was also there. And now, when they left, I would not know. Later on we had the radio-station. Even we got some things and we had our TV-station… But it was already in 1993, 1994.

It means, this station was…

Yes, it was, but all that evaporated a little bit. Here years went by. Because I think, to be honest, my duty as it was, as the logistician, was terribly difficult for me. Because, as they say, it looked like I brought you in one room and said: Here !– But you don't have anything in this room. Maybe it should not be said, but it was like that. All this together, this founding, I mentioned it all before…

I don't know, I would like to add to that we talked before. For me… I don't know, I think that this with what they charge the general referring to the Bosnia, I cannot understand it at all. Because I know him from here. Well, I cannot tell that we were some big friends, but we were close, we cooperated well, when I would suggest something he would always take my advice and he agreed with me that it was all right. When we were alone and discussed some things and that. And his behavior and all together… I think now if I was today like that, and now I left Sunja and came to Sisak, and now in Sisak I am changed 100%...

Yes, that is why we make these conversations, to show what was the general like in these circumstances…

I think that no one can that to me, no one can that to me… Because even after the general had left Sunja, if I needed something, when he was in the Headquarters, if I got stuck with something or if I could not do something without bad conscience, I called him and asked for help – and in everything there was, whatever I asked for the needs of the army, there was no problem for any things.

Tell me… Does the name Narančić mean anything to you? Nara?

Certainly. He was in the Second Guards unit. He is famous. And I was in very good relations with him.

But he had some problem. Something happened to him. He finished in jail because of something, is that so?

I don' know about it.

It is some incident… It was some taking things from the shop…

I don't know.

(arbutina2 100205, .wav)

Well, I mentioned Nara because there follows an incident I am interested in. I think on solving the problem of the possessions, the things from the broken shops, there is a war. We have already mentioned this incident, but I would like to complete it. Then the general made this auction, is that so?

Yes.

A sale of these collected things. Do you remember this?

Yes, yes.

Well, let us go about it, tell me a little bit about it. How did it really happen?

Here, this, that was the auction of the furniture and everything from the shops. I think that at the very beginning I arranged it with Peša because the shops were locked. These shops did not have electricity and it was normal that I… These shops had refrigerators and what do I now with that smoked and cured meat and this stuff. I was afraid that an infection could develop, and with the commander Peša, who was at the beginning, and afterwards with Praljak, we agreed that… We did not break these locks but with the boring machine so that we could remove food from these shops. We did as far as it was concerned… I don't know whether I said this the last time… We removed from "Vajda" tons and tons

of game, poultry and we sent it to Sisak, and when the refrigerator plant could not take any more, we distributed it to the people. And this went here, we made a sale.

Were you present at the sale?

Yes.

How did it look like? Who was in charge there? Who called the prices?

I think that there were these boys from the military police.

They called the prices?

Yes, they did.

And how many buyers did gather? Approximately?

They were about twenty, thirty, by waves…

And people did buy?

The people bought it. I think that this money went also for the humanitarian purposes, but to be honest, I don't know, I don't know. I don't know 100%. This was only so that it cannot be misappropriated. And this concerning the shops… The shop-windows were broken by shelling, so when somebody passed by he took and ate something. Chocolate and these things were mostly gone.
This people from "Jedinstvo", the director even said that wherever were the refrigerators with ice-cream, that boys should eat them, so they would not be wasted and thrown away.
And this for Nara, I cannot remember. All I know that… He was eccentric, this way… Once I came up to the Railway station, I was distributing the food, as I did it at the beginning, until it was organized, and when there were more of us – and then I let it to the others and I went on my business as commander in Sisak and Zagreb for provision. Nara used to sit in front of the gas station at the Railway station, he was nicely sitting, he had a nice comfortable chair, he was reading newspaper and the shells were falling around. I ask him what are you doing and he says I I am listening how they fire and I am reading newspaper.

It means that you don't know how was used this money from the auction?

I think that it went for… that it was distributed, but I don't know, I cannot 100%, you will have to…

All right, but we have the continuation of this story about St. Nicolas. About gifts…

Yes.

Where did these gifts come from?

It was the donation of candies and this and that, and it was in the Headquarters. Blaža will tell you more about it, she did it with her sister… Well, I attended it as well. So that… We formed groups and it was tremendous enjoyment, children and that…Especially because the military remembered them…

Fine, but when you were carrying it around, there was firing, wasn't that so?

Well, normally.

It means that you went around under the fire? Your were St. Nicolas who was coming under the fire?

Do you know what I want to tell you? We had, until the arrival of UNPROFOR, sometime in April, May, I cannot remember exactly, we had shelling for breakfast, dinner and supper. Every day. Nobody could know when it would be. We already knew when it was the firing of the mortar, when they shot from Petrijevci, when they shot from Četvrtkovec, we already knew and counted in ourselves between 30 and 38 seconds and we knew from where which is coming. Already we became dull to that. Only if you were outside, you would throw yourself in a ditch or shelter somewhere so that it would not hit you. And the biggest baptism was in April, on 23rd of April. There were over 3000 shells, from 8 o'clock PM, when they started, until midnight. Without interruption. They fired from everything they had, they fired from everything.

We spoke about "Golden Ducats", we mentioned that…

Yes, we did. I only wanted to say something in addition, I don't whether I mentioned it when we talked last time. It should be emphasized. I got from "Siscia", afterwards "Golden needle", that was directed by Stojanović… He has this company even today, I used to go there , I knew him before the war. It is not a secret that I was the party member, and I don't care what people think about that, and he was also the executive secretary in the district committee and so we got acquainted and became friends. I went there for these cut off parts of the textile, that we used for cleaning our arms, and he was very pleased with Praljak and full of the approval for him, and he said that I should bring Praljak to him so that they could make him a nice, elegant suit…

Is that so?

Yes! And I took him, the general and I went to Sisak…

And when it was?

Before he will leave Sunja.

And he got the suit?

He got the suit. They chose the material, first they measured him, he went there for fitting… I think that he has got it at home to this very day.

So…

Well, I wanted to connect it all together. They are up there, and this man and his company and all together remained here – but he is of Orthodox religion, Serb. I think so, that he had so much respect for the general.

What is the family name of this man?

Stojanović.

And the name of the company…

It was "The Golden Needle", the former "Siscia". Afterwards he was… They dismissed him from the post, but he took it over later, this management, it was falling apart and he uplifted it.

And what is his name?

Oh my, I cannot now… It will come to me.

Well, when it comes to you, tell me…

Mićo, Mićo, Milan Stojanović. I know that I used to come there for these cut off parts of the textile and then he always gave them… When I would come and turn to his secretary, he used to have even this foreign customers, German and French, who were buying the goods, but he would leave them because of me, and he would always give me the small bottles of fine perfumes and asked me whether I had women and I told him: "I have got a lot of women, but we cannot give to everyone", and he would always give me the perfumes.

It is convenient what you told me. And now tell me something about the canteen problem. We have already touched it. There was this drinking problem, is that so?

Yes.

Praljak tried to control the drink. The drink was transferred over Sava river in all possible ways, the people managed to get it, is that so?

Yes. We did… It is not right to blow once own horn, but… When we went to open it, I said to the general: "You will…", but he said: "No, no, no, you will cut the ribbon", and then we did it here…

The ribbon? It means that you also had the ribbon for the canteen?

I have even got a picture somewhere, I was taken from the back.

It means that in the middle of the war you had opening ceremony of the canteen by cutting the ribbon?

With ribbon! And it was for coffee, juices, nonalcoholic drinks…

And how did happen this decision about opening of the canteen?

As a matter of fact, we agreed on that… Because then it was not yet… People did not have… Afterwards these inns were slowly opened. It was like that, so that the people could get together and it was nice…

Which were the drinks in this canteen?

All nonalcoholic drinks.

And why nonalcoholic?

It was not correct that the army got drunk.

Aha! And before that the problem was that the men drank?

Well… now…

Before the opening of the canteen, probably the drinking problem was recognized?

Well, yes, this problem was recognized… And with that, there was the chess and the possibility of playing cards…

/signed/

Zagreb, February 2005

COMMENT: Refugees are Muslim-Bosniaks

STATEMENT

Name and last name: Vanči Mimica

Date of birth: 3rd of June 1940

Place of birth: Omiš

Nationality: Croat

Denomination: rim catholic

The statement was given in Omiš on 27th of April 2005. The procedure of giving statement was conducted by Karmen Babić-Praljak, attorney-at-law from Zagreb, assistant lawyer Božidar Kovačić, Counsel for the Accused Slobodan Praljak in case, conducted before the ICTY under number IT-04-74-PT.

I, Vanči Mimica, at request of assistant Counsel for Mr. Slobodan Praljak, state that I am willing to give a statement on events in which I participated, related to the war events in RH and R BH.

I was warned that I had to tell the truth and that a false statement represents a criminal offence according to RH law and ICTY regulations, therefore I state that I fully understand and that I will describe everything truthfully and accurately to my best knowledge and belief.

If necessary, I am prepared to testify before the Chamber of ICTY in person or through a video-link, in relation to below described events.

I state as it follows:

My mother – Ane Mimica (née Jurčević) and Slobodan Praljak's mother – Filomena Praljak (née Jurčević) are sisters. Hence, Slobodan and I are first cousins – cousins (in Croatian sestrići). I live in Omiš, several kilometres away from Pisak, retired now.
Once, somewhere in early winter of 1992, Slobodan Praljak called me. He told me to go to Pisak, to his country house, where the refugees were. He asked me to reroute electricity in order to make a connection for the heater because the refugees don't have money to pay for heating electricity and they are cold.
I did as he specifically asked from me so the refugees had heating from this heater all the time till they left from there.
When they left, Slobodan asked me to switch off the heater, remove this reroute link and to place everything the way it was. So I did.

I read this statement carefully after it has been made in record form. I sign the record with my own hand as accordance that I agree with the statement content, whereby I shall certify my signature by the public notary if necessary.

In Omiš, 27th of April 2005

Vanči Mimica/

/signed/

COMMENT: SERB

Bogoljub ZUROVAC
[redacted]
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

My name is Bogoljub ZUROVAC, son of Ljubo. I was born on 23 March 1929 in Grabovina, Čapljina municipality.

At the request of the defence of Slobodan PRALJAK, against whom criminal proceedings are being held before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia under number IT-04-74-PT, I hereby give the following

STATEMENT

After the Second World War, five extended families lived in Grabovina, four of which, the families JELČIĆ, PRALJAK, DODIG and BRAJKOVIĆ, were Croatian, and the fifth, the family ZUROVAC, was Serb. The ZUROVAC family had around ten houses.

By early 1992, quite a few Croats had moved into Grabovina to a new neighbourhood.

The possibility that war would break out could be felt in 1992, but I said that I would not leave Grabovina, because that was my home.

When the JNA /Yugoslav People's Army/ started shelling from the left bank of the Neretva in 1992 in order to pull out soldiers from the barracks, two barns were set on fire - mine and that of Zorka and Jovo ZUROVAC. The police came to us, the ZUROVAC families, and advised us to all go to my house which had the most secure basement and good insulation and was safe.
All members of the ZUROVAC families who were in their homes in Grabovina at the time - around twenty of them - came to stay at my house.

That same evening after we had been warned by the police to go to one house and to safety, three Croat neighbours who were members of the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ came. They stood guard during the night, guarding us in shifts of three at a time until the line of conflict withdrew towards Stolac.
Younger members of the ZUROVAC family - Du{an, Risto, Nenad and Mile - were given weapons and would go to the front line together with the neighbours, members of the HVO.

I was curious as to who had organised the guard for us, so while the guarding was still going on, I talked with Zdravko BRAJKOVIĆ and asked him who had ordered that the twenty or so of us be guarded. He told me that we need not be afraid, that we were being guarded on explicit orders from Slobodan PRALJAK.

I also remember that, after the death of Božan ŠIMOVIĆ, I don't know the exact date when that was, some people would say: "It's easy for them when Slobodan PRALJAK

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is guarding them".
One neighbour told me during Božan ŠIMOVIĆ's funeral that a group of extremists had been preparing to attack us Serbs, but that Slobodan PRALJAK found out about that and again ordered that they leave us alone because we were decent people.

It is true that none of our Croat neighbours or other persons from the HVO attacked us and that none of us suffered physical harm because of being a Serb, regardless of the situation on the front line and possible casualties on the Croatian side.

When Slobodan PRALJAK's father died in 1993, I went to express my condolences to him at his house in Grabovina. The late Bogoslav ZUROVAC was with me. That was one of the ways to thank Slobodan PRALJAK for guarding us at a time when, because of the death of Croatian soldiers and during clashes with the Serbs, there was a possibility that the comrades-in-arms of those who had been killed attack us in retaliation. And Slobodan PRALJAK was pleased that we came to share his pain with him. I know that other members of the ZUROVAC family came to the funeral of Mirko PRALJAK, Slobodan's father, but I don't know whether they also came to the house to express their condolences.

Before the end of the war, I met Vidak SOTIĆ, a Croat, in Čapljina, and he told me that we should thank the mother who gave birth to Slobodan PRALJAK because he had saved us.

I am personally grateful to Slobodan PRALJAK, but also to the neighbours who guarded us during the war in 1992.

This statement which I have given is true, accurate and to the best of my knowledge and recollection.

In Ljubuški, 25 October 2004

Bogoljub ZUROVAC
/signed/

COMMENT: SERB

RECORD

R. 305/04

Issued by the Municipal Court of Ljubuški, on October 25th 2004

Present on behalf of the Court:

Judge, Tomo Šimić

Recording secretary, Zeminka Delalić

SUBJECT: Certification of the statement to be used as International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia.

The Court has been approached by Nenad Zurovac from Čapljina who requests this Court to certify his statement given on October 25th 2004, which will be used in front of International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia for the purposes of the defense of Slobodan Praljak in the procedure IT-04-74-PT.

Since the judge is not personally familiar with the requesting party, the identity of Nenad Zurovac, who was born on February 12th 1962 in Čapljina, has a permanent residence in [redacted] is established on the basis of identity card no. [redacted], which is valid through [redacted] issued by the Čapljina Police.

After establishing the requesting party's identity, in the presence of the judge, the requesting party signs the statement dated October 25th 2004, starting with the words "I am of Serbian ethnicity" and ending in words "This statement is true, accurate and given in accordance with my best knowledge and memory".

After the requesting party, Nenad Zurovac, son of Branislav from Čapljina, has personally signed the statement dated October 25th 2004, and was beforehand given the explanation of possible legal consequences of false statement and testimony if the statement or testimony were not true.

After above mentioned Court's actions and notifications, as well as signing the statement by requestor Nenad Zurovac from Čapljina,

The Court hereby issues this

Resolution

The statement given by Nenad Zurovac, son of Branislav from Čapljina, born on February 12th 1962 in Čapljina, with the permanent residence in [redacted], FBiH, which was also signed by him and will be used as a testimony before International Crime Court for former Yugoslavia for the purposes of the defense of Slobodan Praljak in the procedure IT-04-74-PT is certified by the Municipal Court in Ljubuški under reference no. [redacted] on October 25th 2004.

/signed and stamped/

ZUROVAC NENAD
[redacted]
Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina

My name is Zurovac Nenad, son of Branislav. I was born on February 12th 1962 in Čapljina, with residence in [redacted]

For the purposes of the defense of Slobodan Praljak, against who the procedure no. IT-04-74-PT is started at the International Crime Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, I hereby give the following

STATEMENT

I am of Serbian ethnicity. I have lived in Grahovina, and I live in the house that is separate from Zurovci. In June 1992, because of the war, I have sought shelter at Zdenko Dodig, also know as Mast, who is of Croatian nationality.

Together with Zdenko Dodig, during the night I have kept watch at Žurovac houses. Zdenko Dodig told me that Slobodan Praljak has given the order to safeguard the neighbors and that not a single strand of hair should miss from their heads.

There was a specially organized night watch when three soldiers would watch the Zurovac houses. I was doing my night watch duty with Zdenko Dodig, and I know that other people who were performing the same duties were Vlatko Dodig, Šćepo Obradović, Radenko Perić and others.

I have been a member of the HVO since September 23rd 1192, 3rd battalion, 3rd company of the Čapljina brigade. I was on the first line at Radimlja.

This statement is true, accurate and given in accordance with my best knowledge and memory

Ljubuški, October 25th, 2004

Zurovac Nenad

/signed/

COMMENT: Muslim-Bosniak

STATEMENT

Name and last name: Šahbaza Sidran
Address: Jezero 11, Sarajevo, BH
No. of personal identification: LK: 03BRA6174

The statement was given in Sarajevo on 19th of March 2995 for the needs of the proceeding, conducted against the Accused Slobodan Praljak before the ICTY under number IT-04-74-PT.

I, Šahbaza Sidran, at request of Božidar Kovačić, Slobodan Praljak's Counsel, state that I am willing to give a statement on events in which I participated during the war events in RH and BH.

I have been instructed to tell the truth and that giving a false statement constitutes a crime pursuant to the laws of the Republic of Croatia, as well as the ICTY regulations;
I declare that I fully understand this and that I will describe everything truthfully and accurately to the best of my knowledge and belief.

If required, I am prepared to testify about the events described below before a Trial Chamber of the ICTY in The Hague, either in person or by video link.

I state as follows:

My name is Šahbaza Sidran, I am 58 years old. I am a mother of two children and two grandchildren. Actually, I am a mother of one child and two grandchildren because my older daughter Lejla died immediately after the war.
The war in Sarajevo started on 4th of April 1992, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it started even earlier.
I have problems with kidneys therefore I lost 20 kilograms in a short time due to famine and stress. I, with my 43 kilograms and my older daughter Lejla who came down with carcinoma EPIFARING, had 36 kilograms for a short period of time. I had to do something, which is evacuation from surrounded Sarajevo. At the beginning of war, we sent the younger daughter Miranda to Croatia. She stayed shortly in Zadar and then she went to Zagreb. She got in touch with our family fiends, Slobodan Bobiša Praljak and his wife Kaća. Our family friendship has lasted over 30 years. It started as Praljak taught my ex-husband Abdulah Sidran, poet, publicist and narrator the

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basics of writing and developing drama and motion picture scenarios. Hence, Miranda got in touch with our friends and they accept her immediately.
My Lejla and I left Sarajevo with the last convoy. We went directly to Zagreb through Split. We had some 500 DM. I called the Praljak family from Split and told them that Lejla and I have no where else to go unless we come to them, while my younger daughter is already there with them.

It is hard to describe what kind of horror the war made to many families, especially to surrounded Sarajevo. It is hard to seek help, hard, even from good and noble people. Both, Slobodan and Kaća, after a phone call from Split, told us to come immediately and that one will manage somehow. Of course, all this extended. The war was long. We were in their apartment for a long time, without any compensation for anything. We were using the apartment, had free utilities and food till we managed, while we sent Lejla to tumors institute, where she was recovering successfully for months.
Months and years were passing by and Praljak's and Kaća's goodness and understanding were immense. They never had problems with us, being members of another nation, not then, not before, either to him or to us. Thanks to God and our family friends, Slobodan and Kaća, the three of us were recovering and stood on our feet. Lejla healed, returned to Sarajevo to son Kemal and her husband, Muhamed. Miranda became independent. I stayed in Zagreb till 23rd of November 1995. Afterwards, I returned to liberated Sarajevo.
Respect to all those who are about to read this letter and let me say this more at the end:
I know nothing about politics, war or making war, but I can differ between humane and inhumane. Slobodan Bobiša Praljak and his wife were two great human beings for my family in this war.

I read this statement carefully after it has been made in record for. I sign each page of the record with my own hand to show my accordance with the statement content, whereby I certify my signature at public notary's.

In Sarajevo, 19th of March 2005

Šahbaza Sidran
/signed/

COMMENT: SERB

DR GORAN MORO

drmorol

Please, state at the beginning of this recording your name, surname, date and place of birth.

My name is Goran Moro, I was born in 1961, in Čapljina, where I attended both elementary school and high school; I studied medicine in Sarajevo, after which I got employed at the Čapljina Health Centre (cro: Dom zdravlja Čapljina) in 1988. In 1990 I got employed at a garrison surgery, where I headed the Medical Corps, and where I was in charge of the garrison surgery, till the war, up until 24. IV 1992.

At that place is where the war had caught up on you?

Yes.

Could we make a brief chronology of the events: how it all looked, what was going on during that period of time, in 1992?

The war had actually begun a year earlier: the military was bringing in goods, oil on trucks and tank lorries, from its own territories – I am referring in particular to Dretelj and here, the barracks in Čapljina. It was a public matter, agreed upon, and that's when the pressure began, the arrival of the reservists in September of 1991, peoples' riots. The then lieutenant-colonel of JNA and garrison manager of this place, lieutenant-colonel Barić, had even said it publically, that they should not have come, that there isn't anyone that needs to be defended since Čapljina had its own barracks. He was transferred soon after that, and that's when a group from Belgrade arrived, from the First Army District (cro/serb: Prva armijska oblast), that worked on the transformation of the, or should I say on the disassembling of this educational centre, since it was an educational centre.

Part of the officers and NCO's had gone to other centers, mostly to Serbia and Macedonia, while the soldiers went all over what was the then Yugoslavia. But then, a few months before that, when one group of reservists had come – that is when the first incident took place in Čapljina. I cannot recall the exact date. That was when the Territorial Defense Forces were being arranged on one side – the barracks were practically emptying out all of its capacities, armaments, equipment, so this is where approximately a hundred soldiers and some thirty officers got stationed. Negotiations, talks and agreements between the leadership of the County of Čapljina (cro: Općina Čapljina) with the representatives of the Garrison lasted for a month. On the one hand Čapljina was being lead by president Marković and Kordić, representing military was general Praljak. That was the first time I heard about him. The garrison was being represented by lieutenant-colonel Božović – in reality, it was being lead by general Perišić, and that was generally known. That is when the electricity and water were shut down, the post office and telecommunications got blocked and around 13., 17. IV is when the first armed conflict and an attack on the City of Čapljina took place, I think. After that is when the first peace talks that had failed took place, later on we'll see how that happened. The military with its gear and armaments was supposed to leave the garrison; I was present at the time while they were talking over the telephone. But, from Čapljina they requested them to depart as if in a parade, without anything, without any armaments. Now, who did the talking?, the agreeing?, essentially, no agreement was reached upon and then, after an occasional conflict, attack – some will say attacks on the barracks, some will say attacks on the city, this and that, to me who had been present at the time being, to me the attacks were on the barracks, and from the barracks one could defend oneself only if you were surrounded from every side, and so the day when it all practically got resolved was about to come: that was 23., - but let me go back a few days, a day earlier, when for the first time the representatives of Čapljina, general Praljak that is, who was a representative of the military forces

of the western parts, near the Grabovina village, had summoned the representatives of the garrison at a gate, swing gates that is. Lieutenant-colonel had suggested that I and a colleague of mine, captain Erbest should be the ones to go. We went there to talk, we met Praljak and a few more individuals, I can't recall their identity, and there was talk of us going out, and leaving the barracks. It was not the ultimate thing. At one point I had asked him if that would make us prisoners. He answered in a negative way, saying that we would be like normal people, free men.

This is what Praljak had told you back then?

Yes, back then. Captain Erbest could confirm that, for sure, that's how it was.

Did that sound logical to you?

I don't know why, but he had such an effect on me that it made me trust in him, it wasn't naïve, but he made me feel confident about him. He had a megaphone, and he practically ran his army using it – now, whether they were organized or not is one thing, but he was in control in a way. Here, in the barracks, most of them were young men, age 19, 20, a few ensigns who had spent their entire lifetimes in Čapljina, got married to local girls from Čapljina, became one with the city, and perhaps only a few were inhuman enough to want to shoot – but 97 or 98% opted for a peaceful solution, so that everything would turn out just fine, no shooting, no bloodshed, no incidents of any kind. At one point, while we were talking, somebody shot a bullet, and did it pass us by, or above us, that was the first time that we could actually feel real live shooting, I can remember clearly how sharply… Well, it's not appropriate for me to say it in front of the camera.

But it is! Feel free to say it.

Here it goes then: "What the fuck are you shooting for?!" Then they all went silent, on both sides. Those civilians, there were parents, family, friends, even

some soldiers' parents were present, I found about that later on when I went out, I saw, and I talked to them. He influenced it all, so that everything would run smoothly, so that the soldiers would go back home, so that the barracks would be emptied out peacefully, without the use of force. And then we came back…

Let me interrupt you a bit: that bullet that had been shot – where did it come from?

It was shot from the garrison.

Direction being from the barracks or towards the barracks?

From the barracks.

And that is when Praljak cursed?

Yes, but he had returned in the same way towards his, from the village that is. The bullet had not been shot in order to kill anyone, it may had been shot in the air, I don't know…

What are the elements upon which you would explain to someone who had not been present there how "Praljak influenced" the things to resolve in that specific, peaceful way? How had he influenced things?

With his energy, voice and figure. Back then, I didn't know that, but I could feel it while talking to people and getting to know them – he had authority in the military, a lot of authority, starting with his colleagues up to the very last soldier. The parents, who had been present, he would take care of them, I know for a fact that he had protected every single one of them from the other soldiers that were outside the barracks. He did not allow for any action to be taken without final agreement. Since no agreement had been reached upon that night, there occurred some heavy shooting from VBRs, artillery pieces, god knows what sorts or weapons. I was in the barracks back then, in a well protected room,

on ground-floor, the five of us were watching that sight: smoke, all over Čapljina, I thought there was not a single building left standing. And then we heard helicopters buzzing, we could hear them landing, and that lasted for some 15 minutes, 30 minutes tops. They did call on us to leave, to go, but I had decided some time earlier on that not to go anywhere, even if it kills me. All for whom I cared were there: my wife, my daughter, my sister, my parents and friends. The same goes for these others, four of them: captain Erbes, ensigns Laf, Spasojević and Đoković. After that operation, when the military… We thought that everyone had gone.

That's when a lot of people left?

Yes, everyone. Except… When we took a walk on the barracks area we reached a building where the kitchen used to be, the kitchen-dining bloc. There were 25 soldiers in the basement. I have a list of their names.

Could you state the names of those present?

They are as follows: Mišić Miroslav, Milutinović Marijan, Selbab Nikola, Zlatanović Predrag, Miličević Ladan, Gospić Radovan, Mesaroš Lajoš, Berček Atila, Juhaz Ištvan, Juhaz Robert – two brothers, Bečić Muhidin, Horvat Saša, Milovanović Dragiša, Mitrović Dean, Mitrović Dragan – two brothers, Stojanović Vladimir, Šumitran Goran, Đuranović Željko, Ilić Dean, Đenadija Dragomir, Osmani Ljuizin, Ramadani Ćazip, Strahinović Miodrag, Jurcević Goran, Sokolov Ljubiša and lieutenant Kutleša.

Those are the names of the men that had stayed with you, in the barracks?

We didn't know that they stayed.

But you found them in that room, isn't that right?

Yes, we found them there.

So subsequently the story of leaving the barracks concerns these men as well?

Yes. That night general Praljak called on us to get out using his megaphone. But still, we couldn't say for sure what had happened, had anyone come or gone, what had happened or not. I remember the weather was chilly and the night had fallen and then, around 3 or 4 a.m. we heard over the radio that a military operation took place, and then we came out before the dawn and we found them. We were thinking for quite some time what to do.

What was the atmosphere like back then, among those men who were on the other side of the fence?

It's hard to describe it in words. All five of us had our families in town, nobody had left. So, when I contacted lieutenant-colonel Božović, "what shooting on the city?", he said: "Well they're going to shoot on Čapljina now". It was not until then that I realized that the war had begun, while those women and children were in Belgrade, Kragujevac, Niš, and so on, they were practically sheltered. And then we decided to leave the barracks in one car. We broke down that fence, those obstacles and we went to the village – we saw those soldiers on the sides, nobody said a word.

Nobody tried to do anything once you got outside?

I found out later on that nobody tried to do anything because they had general Praljak's orders not to shoot. And then I came out, since I knew that village, the people, and a man came out of his house where they had been, and then I said: "Could you take me to general Praljak?"

You were wearing white at the moment?

I looked nicer: white robes, this dust-coat, pants, white shoes and a blue cape, military.

And these young men were following you?

No, they had all stayed back there.

So, you came out on your own?

I and four of these colleagues. They stayed in the car, I went inside and talked to general Praljak.

What did Praljak first say to you when he saw you?

The first thing he said? "Are you alive? Are all of you alive? Who's there?" I said that there were 25 soldiers left and that I wouldn't want to see anything happen to them. I hope that one of these 25 will corroborate that. We went to those four other colleagues, and he had suggested that they change into civilian clothes, jeans and t-shirts. They changed their clothes. Now, since there were present those other people as well, soldiers from all regions, some of them had suffered losses, all kinds of men – he pointed out to me that it would be best if they wore civilian clothes, we would transfer them to Metković, and then they would go for the exchange. I've mentioned that I met Praljak, by that swing-gate, his energy made me trust him, made me feel confident about him – I trusted him. Later on I realized that he had not failed me, neither me nor these others. They even went to work in the military afterwards. Now, you can imagine how it must have been for an ensign, who had worked all of his life in the JNA, about to retire, and is now working with the HVO as a…earning his retirement here. What I wanted to say is that he had demanded for the civilians to be taken on civilian buses to Metković. Then from Metković, if you paid careful attention to their names, they came from different places, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, they would be exchanged through civilian based channels. Afterwards, I found out that they got exchanged and that no one got hurt. There you go, now all I'd fancy is for some of these men to call and corroborate what I am telling you right now.

Let us see what was happening later on. People had left the barracks, they needed to be transferred by buses. Where is Praljak and how does he fit in the story? What was the atmosphere back then? Is one of the armies celebrating? Is there any shooting involved? Is it all in a state of chaos, or is it all in order?

First they entered the barracks, to demine, since all of the buildings had been mined. They cleared it from land mines and then they started clearing out the buildings and re-installing authority. There was not much of euphoria. That day I first went with Luburić, who was commanding the defense of the City of Čapljina, to see my wife and daughter, who had been in Komin.

After few days I joined the Medical Corps of the City of Čapljina, I was regularly doing my field work, working at the Health Centre (cro: Dom zdravlja). I didn't have any problems. In fact, Praljak told me that I could go anywhere I wanted, but I didn't want to go anywhere else, I didn't even want to work at what are now the barracks, precisely because of those memories. I simply thought that it would be best for me to stay with the people I had already known: friends, a lot of family, my wife's family. That is when the first brigade was formed, the "Knez Domagoj" Brigade. Praljak had influenced it a lot: he had some ideas, I think he knew a lot about how the military is organized – even though he did not have any formal military education, ha had a few of those faculties, all kinds of schools. There were a lot of fine men at the beginning, from businessmen to people who understood how military organization works, how the entire system works, and it all started well. Then the brigade "Knez Domagoj" was founded, three or four battalions and logistics, and our medical corps.

Let me interrupt you for a moment, I would like us to go back to the events after the barracks were under the HVO. The buses arrived. There was a different kind of charge amidst those men that were surrounding the

barracks, there were men who had lost someone, and there were angry men, embittered men. How the men who had surrendered were treated as they were going on board the bus? What was Praljak doing back at that time?

Save for the verbal lashing out there were no incidents, precisely thanks to general Praljak.

Were there any attempts?

There were attempts, intentions, but he, I'm sure of it, I know since I was there at the time being – he had eliminated any possibility of such an event. He had done it, as I've already mentioned it before, with his vigorous actions… He was a man of authority; he was a respected figure – that is the sole reason why there were no consequences.

Have you ever witnessed a situation in which Praljak opposed someone?

Just as we were going out back then – not towards me, but towards some other guys, soldiers – two or three masked soldiers went up to these soldiers with their guns. They shouted. He pushed them back using his force.

What were they shouting?

"Chetniks, you ought to be killed, slaughtered!"

That is what they were shouting?

Yes, a few of them, a handful of them. He, along with Luburić, stopped them using force.

What do you mean by "using force"?

Using their bodies.

How?

Like this! With their bodies. Both of them stood before them saying: "You're not going to touch anyone!"

I see. So they stood before them?

Yes.

Was there any reloading of the weapons?

I can't remember.

Was Praljak among those men who stood and using his own body protected the men who had surrendered?

Yes, he and Luburić.

At that moment, while you were looking at Praljak, how did he seem to you?

Furious. He was furious the first time we talked since he wasn't able to achieve an agreement, so there wouldn't be any… There were victims, to my knowledge a man from the medical corps got killed, two or three more men got killed. Flowers are laid during anniversaries. I know for a fact that he regretted those moments deeply, since he had been concerned about his army's safety. He was very attached to the military. He was on the front line, never caring much about the fact that he was a general. It was a surprise for me, since I had known some other generals who were always away from the front lines, in their arm-chairs. While he… I didn't even know that he was a general, until I was told about that afterwards. Quite, he was an impressive man, I don't know of anyone holding a grudge against him, I don't know of anyone hurt by him.

Did he run afoul of these three masked men who had made a move against the captives? How did they react?

They resisted him.

What happened next?

So, they used their bodies to defend the two, three soldiers that were under attack. There was cursing involved: there was no military vocabulary at use – "I am the general – you're a soldier", you have to listen to me. There was no such talk! You had to be rude, you had to stoop down to their level and impose upon them your authority.

What won the conflict, in reality? Paper? Command? Rank? What was the basis of imposing…?

There was no talk of paper! Officially, he was the general, but here you could only rely on physical power. At that point is when he made me feel confident about him: he was a man who knew what he wanted, who could make people… He calmed them down – they were enraged. Believe me, I thought that anything could go down.

Do you think those men were ready to shoot at Praljak at that moment?

Yes, they were.

Do you think that Praljak was ready to shoot back at them as well?

Yes. That could have happened. Yes, it could have happened. I will never forget that morning of 24th. I can see it running in my head.

What went on next?

And then the buses, when those soldiers were removed, there were no guards, nobody was guarding us, these ensigns and the captain went back to their, and I stayed with the soldiers. I somehow felt that I couldn't go until they were safe. I grew fond of them, since they would often come to the medical corps. In the end, they were young men of 19, 20 yrs of age. They would feel safer with me around. And then, when the bus arrived, there were two soldiers escorting it and one driver, then we drove off to Studenci, where we refreshed a bit, had breakfast and then slowly drove off to Metković.

Did Praljak go on that bus?

No, he just ordered the bus to drive off.

Did he provide security for the bus?

There was security: two or three men, the driver, along with one car in front and in the back.

Were there any incidents along the way?

No, we used the old road via Gabela, and down by MUP (cro for: Ministry of Internal Affairs). Statements were made and names were written down in Metković. Nobody was mistreated, nobody was handcuffed, and the guys wore civilian clothes, so the people of Metković didn't… I didn't hear a single fowl word being uttered.

You were on the bus with them?

Yes.

All right. The barracks event was the reason why we had this interview. Now, what happened afterwards? What did you do next?

Later on I headed the Medical Corps of the 3rd battalion 1st brigade. Every single

colleague had a battalion, and then we would form medical corps stations: from Domanovići, via Bivolje brdo, to Stolac, Rotimlje and so on. We were very well organized, we had very good and quality people working, and it was all set around the town in order to protect it from the attacks – even though a grenade or two would hit the town on a daily basis. There were a few casualties, when life practically got back to being normal. And then, with the start of June is when that big operation on Neretva took place. It was the beginning of June, 1992. The frontline was somewhere above Stolac, that is when we slowly moved towards Stolac, and then it peaceful for some time, up until 15th VIII, when there was that huge, unsuccessful counterattack. After that is when a complete brigade was formed counting some 4 000 men or so.

We have come to an end with our interview. Did you have any more encounters with the general afterwards?

Whenever the general would be passing by, he would pay me a visit at the medical corps, we would talk about many things, reminiscing those days, he would enquire about my behavior with my superiors, about the medical corps, and so on. He would visit, as far as I know, those other four colleagues as well, enquiring about them. We would talk little of the war, mostly private things.

That's it? Thank you, doctor Moro.

September 2005, Ljubuški

1. SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S CLOSING ARGUMENTS AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL (ICTY), 21 FEBRUARY 2011

2. STATEMENT - *ARCHIMEDES-PRALJAK'S LAW*

3. TWO STATEMENTS FOR THE END

1. SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S CLOSING ARGUMENTS AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL (ICTY), 21 FEBRUARY 2011

I

Your Honours, the training of police officers from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Croatia, who were sent by the SDA as early as 1991, the training of pilots of the BH Army in the Republic of Croatia, the training and equipping of entire BH Army units in Croatia, the taking up of hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees in Croatia, the organization of ex-territorial education and schooling for Muslim refugees in the Republic of Croatia in the Bosnian language, which at the time didn't even exist, the uninterrupted supply of weapons to the BH Army, ammunition, oil, medication, food, and other necessary logistics for the BH Army in order to wage a war, the medical treatment of more than 10.000 wounded BH Army combatants in Croatian hospitals, enabling thousands of Mujahedin to come and join the BH Army, regular logistic bases of the BH Army in Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, Samobor, throughout the war, and so on and so forth, and all of this for free, never in the history of war has one people, the Croats, provided so much help to another people, the Bosnian Muslims, even when the latter turned their army, the BH Army, against the Croats, the HVO, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Never in the history of war has the commander of one army, the HVO, let convoys with armaments and other equipment pass through to another army, the BH Army, even when that army, the BH Army, used those armaments and all the rest to attack those who let them receive it. And what about the referendum of Croats for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was a precondition for the existence of that state, the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Republic of Croatia, the appointment of the ambassador of the Republic Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the signing of all propositions made by the international community on the internal structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the first ones to sign were the representatives of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna and the Republic of Croatia. That was the policy of Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia. It was the policy of the Government of Croatia, the Parliament of Croatia and the Ministry of Defence of Croatia. It was the policy of the HVO. To the Prosecution of this Tribunal, all these are elements of a joint criminal enterprise. Such an indictment uses logic that is offensive even to the cognitive system of a pathogenic virus.

I-1

What kind of opinion and which positions precede such an indictment?

Firstly, Simon Leach, a former police constable in Great Britain, member of the OTP team who investigated crimes committed by Croats in the Lasva Valley, at some meeting in the Prosecution in 1996, produced a piece of paper with names, the names of Franjo Tudjman, Gojko Šušak and Vice Vukojević. He interpreted and explained that these were the goals that his investigation was led to.

Secondly, I quote from Willem Montgomery's book, "After the Cheering Stops," page 114:

"The US special ambassador for war crimes, Pierre Prosper, invited three American ambassadors from the region, from Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia to come to The Hague in order to meet with the representatives of the ICTY. There are two memories rather impressive. The first one refers to the fact that we heard directly from Carla Del Ponte that the official approach of her office is based on the position that all war leaders of all parties are guilty of war crimes, and, further on, that she considers which these specific crimes are and how their guilt can be proved. At that moment, it seemed, and it still seems to me, that such a position is false for several reasons."

Is Mr. Montgomery a credible witness? What was the reaction of the other three? The positions of Carla Del Ponte are not false for many reasons. Her position is imperial arrogance, a degradation of law and its reduction to Communist purges and Nazi pogroms.

Thirdly, in her book "La Caccia: Io e Il Criminali Di Guerra," Carla Del Ponte says, on page 254:

"One of the Prosecutors of the Tribunal, a Canadian, well known in his circle for his wit and anecdotes, had an aphorism that did a good job capturing the difference between the Serbs and the Croats who attempted to obstruct the work of the Tribunal. The Serbs are bastards, he used to say. In contrast, the Croats are perfidious bastards."

This Prosecutor of the Tribunal, the Canadian, is using hate speech. Del Ponte uses the phrase "he used to say," which means that it was not a one-off witty remark, but a habitual chauvinistic and racist characterisation of the Croats as perfidious bastards. Carla Del Ponte relays the words of one of the Prosecutors of the Tribunal without any restrictions, which means that she completely agrees with that opinion; on an ongoing basis, too, which we can infer from the language and the phrase "he used to say." The lack of any reaction to such a pro-fascist manner of speech about one nation is something I cannot comprehend. I'm interested to know whether the indictment against me may have been drafted under the impression of such an opinion. If, by any chance, I, Slobodan Praljak, had written or said anything like that, anywhere, at any time, about any people or nation or group during the war in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, I would have been sentenced to five years of imprisonment only for that.

I really would like to know whether the saying "quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi" is something that is a valid rule here in this Tribunal. I really would like to know whether the international organisations, which established the Tribunal and which ensure that it is fair, support the position mentioned in the book, this book.

II

The Prosecution has compared me to the Nazis and my activity to the Holocaust.

Well, let me then describe the role of Goering, which character, according to the Prosecution, I compare. This Goering placed his Jews - actually Muslims - in his country cottage and took care of them. He put his Jews in his apartment in Zagreb. He fed them and gave them medical treatment. He exposed himself to sniper fire in front of the JNA barracks at Grabovina in order to save the wives of his enemies.

He protected the captured JNA soldiers with his own body and saw to it that they make it to their homes safe and sound. He pulled out captured Serb civilians from the Dretelj Camp, although he was being threatened with weapons; not alone, though. The camp was held by HOS members, who were mostly Muslims. He evacuated wounded Jews - actually Muslims – from the hospital in East Mostar; not alone, of course. He organised the evacuation and accommodation of 15.000 Jews - actually Muslims – from Stolac and the Dubrava Plateau, across the Neretva, and 3.000 of their cars. He didn't do that alone, either. He transported a wounded Jewish women - actually Muslim woman - by helicopter from East Mostar to split; not alone. He received a Jewish - actually Muslim - family with a child suffering from leukemia near Uskoplje and transported them to Split to be treated. He helped them to get Croatian citizenship in order to travel to Switzerland and be treated medically at the expense of the Croatian state budget; not alone, though. He organised that the Salvation Road for Jews - actually Muslims - be built in order to be able to leave to another country, Goering's country, Croatia. He didn't do it alone, though. He guided them and fought with the Jews – actually Muslims - defending and liberating Mostar and Čapljina and Travnik and Konjic and other places. He didn't do that alone either. He, of his own accord, let the captured Jews - actually Muslims - go who were captured after the conflict in Rama or Prozor, and he prevented retaliation after the Jews - actually Muslims - committed crimes in Uzdol. He didn't do that alone, and the same applies to Doljani and Grabovica. When necessary, he personally let through convoys transporting food for the Jews - actually Muslims - as well as

convoys with armaments, even when the 3rd Corps of the BH Army, the 4th Corps of the BH Army, the 6th Corps of the BH Army and parts of the 1st Corps of the BH Army launched an attack against Goering, against the western borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the port of Ploče, after they had signed a truce with the Serbs. He didn't do that alone either, and so on and so forth.

I'll skip Goering's - that is Praljak's - behaviour in the courtroom, but that behaviour makes one a war criminal according to the logic applied by the OTP.

The Prosecutor quoted Goethe's Faust about the mirror that we should look -- that you would use to look at ourselves. My actus reus are my mirror, my point and my very essence, because they follow from the mens rea of that one who we call Slobodan Praljak.

Unfortunately, Judges Prandler and Trechsel refused to accept my 150 witnesses who were supposed to testify about the activities and deeds of the accused Praljak, and about the general situation in which such deeds were necessary, but, unfortunately, not always sufficient, and I really fail to understand the legal procedure that forbids me to testify about Mladić's diaries.

III

Do I regret the victims?

Yes, I regret all innocent victims of all wars.

I especially regret the victim of those 500 wars or so after 1945 that have taken place and still go on, despite all moralists' speeches that we hear daily. I especially regret every child that, in reality, dies of hunger every four seconds.

Peace in dictatorship is a preparation for war. The longer and the worst the dictatorship, the more negative energy builds up and the more blood and evil will follow later. It doesn't matter whether we're talking about Tito or Saddam. And those who bring down a dictator and who later try to diminish the evil that occurs according to the force of the laws of physics, but those who made possible the dictatorship and by their silence made it last longer. The same applies to Yugoslavia after Tito as well as to Iraq after Saddam.

What the Prosecutor calls nationalist is something the Croats felt a necessity for freedom, both the freedom of the people and citizens' freedom. In this sense, I am a Croatian nationalist.

I do not renounce the policy of Dr. Franjo Tudjman because that policy created the Republic of Croatia and made possible the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state. I do not renounce the inherent sense and point in the legal establishment of the HZ-HB, the expression of the will of the Croats in BH to become and remain a sovereign and constitutive people in that state. The HZ-HB, by its frail organisational structure, made possible the creation of the HVO, which in 1992 was able to defend the BH and the south of Croatia in 1993, prevented the implementation of the aggressive plans of the BH Army. The Muslim policy and the BH Army, unable to regain the territories that were occupied by the JNA and the VRS, and that was due, to a large extent, to the weapons embargo that is incomprehensible to an ethical human mind, moved to launch a counter-offensive against the HVO. By liberating areas from Croats, they committed crimes at Konjic, Čapljina, Doljani, Bugojno, Grabovica, Uzdol, and elsewhere. The facts are plain to see for the killed, expelled and detained Croats.

Social relations are an area where the laws of cause and consequence apply, whereas the spiral of evil, once initiated, does not justify crime, but it does significantly reduce the possibility to implement the law, whoever's task that is on paper. It is always like that, and everywhere. The HVO defended itself from an aggression in 1992, in 1993, and 1994, and a commander's duty is not to lose the war.

My conscience is clear.

IV

Legal proceedings are the interpretation of laws and facts in a trial proceedings, as rhetoric, and, as such, does not seek to find the absolute truth.

It seeks to find a probable truth beyond all reasonable doubt, which can be contradicted hardly or not at all. In an attempt to discover such truth, knowledge is not enough. One needs to ponder, one needs to apply logic, one needs to apply rational and logical argumentation, data, facts, statements, and statistics do not mean a thing if they are not in a logical relationship with assertions. Through connecting various types of knowledge can we get closer to the truth. In these proceedings, one requires knowledge from the field of sociology, sociology of war, knowledge about societies in which state and social structures are completely destroyed, in which individuals return to their natural state. One needs to apply knowledge from the field of war psychology as well as the knowledge of war skills, armament, and the understanding of the real term of the military, and so on and so forth. Possible mistakes in the interpretation of facts are probable and just as well fatal. Exaggerated and false reduction of terms and of logical connections, making conclusions on the basis of false presumptions, avoiding comparing similar systems and phenomena, arbitrary equalising of terms "power" and "desire," which is so dear to intellectuals, arbitrary accusations because the world is not how one wishes or conceives it to be, these are all fields of possible logical errors in the final assessment of facts.

I sincerely hope that the honourable Trial Chamber will adhere to scientific methods and notions.

IV-1

In the last century, millions of people were convicted in trial proceedings pursuant to racial laws, for example, in the USA and Pretoria, dictatorial, religious and Nazi laws in Germany, Serbia, Slovakia, the independent state of Croatia, fascist laws which were applicable in Italy, Communist laws which were applicable in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and so on and so forth. The court rhetoric has been under the influence of unreasonable social and political powers for too long, and that is why it has been criticised; unfortunately, not loudly enough. In order to not end up in moral desperateness, it is high time for it to become what it has to be, a moral and reasonable process.

Do I have the right to hope?

IV-2

Laws of this Tribunal may be what they are. However, they do not apply to the Americans. For other peoples, laws of the Permanent Court apply, and those laws again differ from the laws applied here at the ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, laws which are applied to me. This abolishes a significant condition of the court rhetoric, which is the principle of the equality of arms among the participants in the trial proceedings.

And now I quote Perelman:

"In a relation where inequality is a significant and characteristic of relations among people, there is no foundation for a reasonable and judicious process."

V

And for the end, I'm not guilty, and I'm not referring here to the feeling of guilt, coldly, rationally, with a logical analysis that has been critically examined dozens of times. I know I'm not guilty.

Your Honour Judge Antonetti, if your judgement is the opposite of my conclusion, I will respect the general principle of challenging every opinion, conclusion, or attitude. I shall reconsider my position on my own responsibility openly and courageously. If I recognise a mistake after that, I shall serve my time because you are righteous. I will know what I could have done better, how I could have done it better, where I could have done it better, and when I could have done things better, in my thoughts and in my words, in what I did and in what I failed to do.

If, however, you do not convince me and if your interpretation of facts is not a good-enough or a falsely application of sum of social sciences, and what is not possible thus becomes possible, what is not simple thus becomes simple, and the power to do something thus becomes just a substitute for a desire or a wish, then I will be in jail only because the Tribunal is might, and this wouldn't be anything new under the sun, really.

My half hour is finished.

2. STATEMENT – *ARCHIMEDES-PRALJAK'S LAW*

In order to eliminate any uncertainty about why I wrote – compiled this book it is my desire and intention to prove that my participation in the defence against aggression on Croatia and BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ was subject to

Archimedes-Praljak's Law.

Never and nowhere have I heard, on any meeting, encounter or gathering, whether in Croatia or BiH during the war 1991 – 1995 someone to plan, instigate, tolerate, cover up or in any other way encourage any kind of act punishable by a law in force.

The same applies to me.

Towards the members of my own people, in various occasions, I was known to yell and swear, sometimes beyond any civilized norm, I even occasionally hit someone, I falsely signed my name as general in the HVO /Croatian Defence Council/ although I was never a general of the HVO, I commanded certain operations, although formally I did not have the authority to do so, I threatened with acts which have no legal footing and the like.

We were brought up and taught not to speak about ourselves, especially not to speak well about ourselves; this was seen as impolite and something a well-mannered person does not do.

In numerous interviews and conversations, during and after the war, I never and nowhere uttered a word on what good I did and how I conducted myself in war.

And then they began to lie, more and more, construe false witnesses and false "TRUTHS" and thus, they BROUGHT ME TO COURT AS A CRIMINAL.

I have had enough of it, I now switch to the first person singular, free of any respect for the so-called civil politeness and I CLAIM THAT THERE EXISTS →

THE ARCHIMEDES-PRALJAK'S LAW WHICH SAYS:

PRALJAK IMMERSED IN WAR WILL REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF EVIL IN THAT WAR FOR A UNIT OF "1 PRALJAK".

This unit consists of

a) ENERGY – SLOBODAN PRALJAK
b) DAILY QUANTITY OF TIME IN WHICH THIS ENERGY IS ACTIVE – ON THE AVERAGE 20 HOURS A DAY – SLOBODAN PRALJAK
c) PASSION OR SPEED OF BURNING OF THIS ENERGY – SLOBODAN PRALJAK
d) COURAGE – SLOBODAN PRALJAK
e) KNOWLEDGE – SLOBODAN PRALJAK
f) IQ – SLOBODAN PRALJAK

In certain enumerated elements some people could score better than me, e.g. in knowledge or intelligence, but they are not great in number and the differences cannot be significant,

HOWEVER,

I REFUSE TO ADMIT THAT SOMEONE AT THAT TIME HAD THE PERSONALITY TRAITS WHICH ADDED UP WOULD GIVE MORE THAN "1 PRALJAK" – THE UNIT DEFINED BY THE ARCHIMEDES-PRALJAK'S LAW.

To accomplish more in those times and in that position, one should have the attributes of God Himself.

3. TWO STATEMENTS FOR THE END

COMMENT:

The indictment is a political and legal hodgepodge, junkyard, fishing with all kinds of fishing nets.

The indictment is absurd and practically irrefutable. Judges accept the indictment without the slightest insight into its factual merits.

1. THE INDICTMENT IS A LEGAL RUBBISH

By adopting such an indictment, it is not the guilt that should be proven on the Court, but innocence.

The procedure lasts for 10, 12, 13 and more years, because politics, history, sociology, anthropology, linguistic and social psychology are discussed, and least of all legal norms and the violation of these norms, the war law.

Procedure costs are significantly higher then 100 x 10^6 US dollars, and once the procedure ends who will dare to say – YOU ARE INNOCENT!

The judges write that they „think", „are convinced with great probability", they know what the participants were thinking, principle „*in dubio pro reo*" has turned to outvoting.

In my case judges have killed the facts, knowledge, insight, logic, law and justice.

2. THE FIRST INSTANCE JUDGMENT IS RUBBISH

46.
THE SUPLEMENT FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING



FACTS

1. REFUSAL TO ADMIT WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL (ICTY)

2. METHODOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL ERRORS IN CONCLUDING ABOUT THE REALITY OF WAR

2.1. WISHES, INTENTIONS, ACTION AND POWER

2.2. POSSIBLE METHODOLOGICAL ERRORS IN UNDERSTANDING
(I KNOW THAT I AM REPEATING MYSELF, BUT UNDERSTANDING IS A PAINFUL ISSUE)

3. THE POLITICIAN WHO KNOWS AND UNDERSTANDS
BARONESS MARGARET THATCHER

4. HUMAN BEHAVIOUR UNDER CONDITIONS OF STATE UNREST . . . AND OTHER FACTS

1. REFUSAL TO ADMIT WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL (ICTY)

COMMENT:

D-290

Dissenting opinion of the Presiding Judge on the public decision on the order to admit evidence relating to the testimony of Slobodan Praljak-23 February 2010.

D-291

A dissenting opinion of the honourable Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti to confidential decision on Slobodan Praljak's motion for admission of written evidence pursuant to Rule 92bis-public-16 February 2010.

D-292

A dissenting opinion of the honourable Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti on the time limit ordered by the Chamber for filing 20 written statements or transcripts of evidence pursuant to Rule 92bis of the Rules-public-17 March 2010.

D-293

Reasons for which I, Slobodan Praljak, refused to take part in the court proceedings - Letter to Honourable Judges-23 February 2010 .

On the recommendation of honourable judges that, due to the economy of the trial, we encourage as many witnesses as possible to give written statements, I collected 220 written testimonies.

Mainly on WHAT I DID IN THE WAR AND HOW I BEHAVED IN THE WAR.

THE ENTIRE TIME OF THE WAR.

On the recommendation of the honourable Judge Antonetti, I reduced this number to 155 testimonies. Then they refused it and set a limit – 20 testimonies.

I was neither able nor wanted to be in the court room any more.

I REMAIN BY MY VIEW THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES GIVE A FULL AND CLEAR PICTURE OF THAT WAR, ABOUT THE ORDER OF THE SYSTEM AND ABOUT ME.

NOT TO READ THESE TESTIMONIES MEANS NOT WANTING TO KNOW.

UNITED NATIONS

IT-04-74-T
D5 - 1/58445 BIS
02 March 2010

5/58445 BIS
SMS

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991

Case No.: IT-04-74-T
Date: 23 February 2010
Original: ENGLISH
French

IN TRIAL CHAMBER III

Before: **Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, presiding**
Judge Árpád Prandler
Judge Stefan Trechsel
Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua

Registrar: **Mr John Hocking**

Order of: **23 February 2010**

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Jadranko PRLIĆ
Bruno STOJIĆ
Slobodan PRALJAK
Milivoj PETKOVIĆ
Valentin ĆORIĆ
Berislav PUŠIĆ

PUBLIC

DISSENTING OPINION OF THE PRESIDING JUDGE ON THE PUBLIC DECISION ON THE ORDER TO ADMIT EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE TESTIMONY OF SLOBODAN PRALJAK

The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr Kenneth Scott
Mr Douglas Stringer

Counsel for the Accused:
Mr Michael Karnavas and Ms Suzana Tomanović for Jadranko Prlić
Ms Senka Nožica and Mr Karim A. A. Khan for Bruno Stojić
Mr Božidar Kovačić and Ms Nika Pinter for Slobodan Praljak
Ms Vesna Alaburić and Mr Nicholas Stewart for Milivoj Petković
Ms Dijana Tomašegović-Tomić and Mr Dra`en Plavec for Valentin Ćorić
Mr Fahrudin Ibrišimović and Mr Roger Sahota for Berislav Pušić

4/58445 BIS

The majority of the Chamber rejected scores of documents whose admission was sought by the Praljak Defence.

Among the documents that were not admitted, there was a large number put forward by the Praljak Defence (3D), yet there were also documents coming from the Prosecution (P 05366, P 00336, P 00524, P 09538, P 10936, P 10980, P 00598) or from the other Defence teams (1D 02252, 1D 3137, 1D 03139, 1D 03141, 1D 03142, 1D 03145, 2D 00197, 2D 00960, 2D 01251, 2D 1541, 2D 01542, 2D 1543, 2D 1544, 2D 1545, 2D 01546, 2D 01547, 2D 01548, 2D 01549, 2D 01550, 2D 01551, 2D 01552, 2D 01553, 2D 01554, 2D 01555, 2D 01556, 2D 01557, 2D 01558, 2D 01559, 2D 01560, 2D 01561, 2D 03036, 2D 03041, 2D 03042, 2D 03043, 3D 01870, 4D 01297, 4D 01299).

In its Annex, the majority of the Trial Chamber gives the reasons for which they were not admitted: Not admitted (Reason: the Praljak Defence failed to establish through Slobodan Praljak's testimony a sufficiently relevant link between this document and the Indictment).

With regard to document 3D 00897, for example, I fail to see why a sufficiently relevant link was not established between this document and the Indictment.

If the Praljak Defence considered that it had to present this document so that it could be discussed in court, it is normally because it must have thought that there was a relevant link.

The non-admission of over 100 documents may lead one, therefore, to question **the professional competence** of the Accused's attorneys who seem to be defending their client any old how, which is something I find hard to believe knowing how much experience these attorneys have in international trials.

If this is not the case, why then were **so many documents** rejected?

The reply may be obvious: the majority performed a selective sorting of the documents in order to admit only the **most** relevant ones and reject the others.

3/58445 BIS

To take an example, document **3D 00443** which was admitted must be more relevant than document **3D 00903** …

I cannot get into this way of reasoning because at this stage of the proceedings, I am unable to **assess** all the documents in order to determine those **most** relevant and reject the **least** relevant documents by taking into account the **"sufficiently relevant link"** specification.

In the manner of an investigator at a crime scene photographing it from all angles and collecting all possible material clues, **the criminal Judge** also has a duty to get a comprehensive view of all the evidence, and especially that put forward by the Defence, in order to reach definitive conclusions at the time of the deliberation.

Judges have no way of knowing everything and may make mistakes during this delicate phase as the parties present their evidence.

If the Judges do not admit a document which may form the basis of the Defence's argumentation, they must do so **at the time of the judgement** providing a detailed motivation.

Refusing a document **before** Judgement should require an **extremely** detailed motivation and not the simple **all-purpose** comment used to reject a document.

I am not going to examine all the documents to explain why in my point of view, they are relevant but I am going to take two typical examples which are documents 3D 01077 and 3D 01078.

These documents are comparative analyses showing the losses that occurred in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina correlated to French and American population numbers.

It appears that the same events, if they had taken place in France or in the United States, would have resulted in a significant **collective trauma** for the populations involved.

2/58445 BIS

That being the case, a **reasonable trier of fact** could come to that conclusion by relying on these two documents that the population of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, be it Croat, Serb or Muslim, was profoundly affected by the conflicts.

Similarly, it would be important to consider that this trauma could have influenced the civil or military leaders in their way of managing difficulties because they had to face extremely delicate situations where the pure and simple application of the rule of law does not always resolve the situation.

International justice has a duty to **understand** situations, and in order to understand, it has to have the means to do so …

The issue of producing evidence before international jurisdictions was raised before the ICJ in the opinion of Judge MAHIOU on the *Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro Case.* This leading magistrate wrote: /unofficial translation/ "One can, therefore, only note or deplore the faintheartedness and the refusal of the Court to give itself, quite legally and fairly, a means amongst others to ensure the truthfulness of an allegation in a case where the search for truth is particularly expected and necessary. An excessively rigid position in this domain can only lead to unreasonable and unfair results …"

This reasoning may be applied **here** in its totality.

This eminent jurist, in the circumstances of his case, also specified: /unofficial translation/ "… By not intervening, either to the request from another party or by *proprio motu* when the search for truth requires such an intervention, the Court risks creating a disturbing and worrying precedent".

Here, by rejecting scores of these documents we are facing the same situation.

One party has requested their admission because it considers that the search for truth requires this admission, and so in the name of what principle should these documents be rejected? The notion of **relevance** is raised in Rule 89 (C) of the Rules: "A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value."

It can be concluded, therefore, that the proffered evidence must also have **probative value.**

1/58445 BIS

Is this to be found in the reasoning of the Chamber's majority in this respect?

At no point in the Annex is there any mention of **probative value.**

In certain cases, there may be situations where the link to the Indictment may not be sufficient whereas the document may have **an extremely high probative value,** which on account of this might reinforce the issue of a "sufficient link" to the Indictment.

The "bulletins of the Croatian soldier" (3D 01278, 3D 01281, 3D 01283, 3D 01284, 3D 01286, 3D 01289, 3D 01240, 3D 01291 etc.) were not admitted on the ground that there is not a sufficiently relevant link to the Indictment. This is difficult to understand because the Indictment mentions an international armed conflict with the intervention of the Croatian Army in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and at least the arrival of Croatian Army "volunteers" into the HVO.

This "bulletin of the Croatian soldier" may explain the military context, indeed, the **motivation** of the volunteers, as well as the real threat from Serbian forces.

I do not understand this logic.

/signed/

_____

Jean-Claude Antonetti
Presiding Judge

Done this twenty-third day of February 2010
At The Hague
The Netherlands

[Seal of the Tribunal]

UNITED NATIONS

IT-04-74-T
D5 - 1/58341 BIS
01 March 2010

8/58341 BIS

SMS

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991

Case No.: IT-04-74-T
Date: 16 February 2010
Original: ENGLISH
French

IN TRIAL CHAMBER III

Before: **Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, presiding**
Judge Árpád Prandler
Judge Stefan Trechsel
Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua

Registrar: **Mr John Hocking**

Order of: **16 February 2010**

THE PROSECUTOR

v.

Jadranko PRLIĆ
Bruno STOJIĆ
Slobodan PRALJAK
Milivoj PETKOVIĆ
Valentin ĆORIĆ
Berislav PUŠIĆ

PUBLIC

DISSENTING OPINION TO CONFIDENTIAL DECISION ON SLOBODAN PRALJAK'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF WRITTEN EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 92 *BIS*

The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr Kenneth Scott
Mr Douglas Stringer

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Mr Michael Karnavas and Ms Suzana Tomanović for Jadranko Prlić
Ms Senka Nožica and Mr Karim A. A. Khan for Bruno Stojić
Mr Božidar Kovačić and Ms Nika Pinter for Slobodan Praljak
Ms Vesna Alaburić and Mr Nicholas Stewart for Milivoj Petković
Ms Dijana Tomašegović-Tomić and Mr Dra`en Plavec for Valentin Ćorić
Mr Fahrudin Ibrišimović and Mr Roger Sahota for Berislav Pušić

7/58341 BIS

The Trial Chamber decided **by a majority** to deny the motion and the additional motion and ordered the Praljak Defence to file a maximum of 20 written statements or transcripts that are consistent with the admissibility criteria.

I do not share the point of view of the majority and I wished to express my dissenting opinion publicly without mentioning any names that may be confidential.

The main reason for the denial is explained in paragraph 47 of the Decision.

The majority believe that the size, length of submitted exhibits, the repetitive nature, the lack of relevance, the noted formal requirements, confusion between the acts and conduct of the Accused as charged in the Indictment and those not charged in the Indictment prevent the Chamber from making a case-by-case analysis. **I do not agree with this reasoning.**

It is quite enough just to read a statement and make a selection on a case-by-case basis.

For example, statement 3D 03639 is four pages long.

This witness explains that he was a reporter for the magazine GLOBUS and that he went to Gabela and Dretelj.

He explains that his magazine is independent and that in September 1993 he wrote an article on Dretelj with photographs, specifying that 1,478 Bosnians were being detained in inhuman conditions, that he had interviewed soldiers from the HVO army and met with General Praljak in order to obtain authorisation which, to his great surprise, was given to him, and he specified that, during their conversation, General Praljak expressed his clear objection to the existence of the camps and to the inhumane conditions.

Consequently, why were these four pages included in the reasoning set out in paragraph 42?

6/58341 BIS

It is not necessary to perform this exercise with the other statements that the Judges have had for five months.

With regard to the list of **20** statements, I cannot see on what basis this number has been specified.

I notice that when the Prosecution prepared its requests, no limit had been fixed and the Trial Chamber had admitted over **100** statements or transcripts.

One might have wondered about the need for these 100 statements in view of the criteria defined in paragraph 47 of the present Decision.

It is also dangerous to set limitations before deliberating on the Defence case.

The Defence case must be presented by its witnesses and its documents until the presentation of its final brief.

This case will be examined during the deliberation by checking it against Prosecution witnesses and documents (over 5,000).

Therefore, I cannot see why the figure of **20** should be fixed ex abrupto.

I would like to recall that the Praljak Defence file its Motion on 14 September 2009 and that the Chamber had **five months** at its disposal to read the statements and carry out the work related to the criteria under paragraph 47 ...

According to the **orders** issued by the majority, the Defence will have to make a selection from the 15 statements in order to keep only 20, which will require additional time for the Defence to examine the situation.

The Motion of the **Praljak Defence** pursuant to Rule 92 bis must be examined in accordance with the criteria defined hereinafter:

- the content of the statement is **cumulative** in relation to similar facts

5/58341 BIS

  that have already been given by other witnesses (92 bis (A)(i)(a))

- the content of the statement relates to the historical, political or **military** background (92 bis (A)(i)(b))

- the content goes to the character of the Accused (92 bis (A)(i)(e))
- the content relates to factors to be taken into account in determining sentence (92 bis (A)(i)(f)).

The case law of the Chambers and, in particular, the Appeals Chamber has expanded the scope of this Rule[1] by specifying the broad lines of its application, without being exhaustive.

The **Praljak** Defence submitted **156 statements** to the Trial Chamber, which involved considerable work **on my part** to assess on a case-by-case basis the statements with respect to the factors against admitting the written statements into evidence (acts and conduct of the Accused and factors defined in Rule 92 bis (A)(ii)).

Each statement must therefore be examined from this perspective.

4/58341 BIS

After **personally examining** each statement, I have come to the conclusion that I should reject the following statements: 3D 0370, 3D 03681, 3D 03688, 3D 03692, 3D 0364, 3D 03650.

On the other hand, I am in favour of admitting all the other statements since they have evidence that is, either cumulative with facts already presented by other witnesses (in particular, testimony from the Accused himself), or relates to the historical, political or military background at the time (as an example, all the statements that refer to the SUNJA area relate to the military background at the time, namely, the Croatian and Muslim joint defence against the Serbian offensive), or attests to the character of the Accused (it is not necessary to expand on this point because the character of the Accused can be deduced from the evaluation made by an informed witness), or relates to evidence to be taken into account when determining sentence.

This last case deserves a more detailed explanation to be able to understand the benefit of having this type of statement at one's disposal.

Of course, this evidence can only be taken into account if the Accused has been found guilty, which is not the case since the trial is ongoing and the Judges have not, among the **three** of them, discussed the criminal responsibility of the Accused.

I note that the present Chamber has accepted, without a moment's hesitation, the Prosecution's **103** 92 *bis* **statements** in addition to **158** *viva voce* witnesses ...

In these circumstance, how can we not treat the two parties **fairly**, even if it means making a selection at the time of deliberations.

I do not subscribe to the reference in paragraph 32 of the Decision: " ... The Chamber immediately notes that the figure of 155 is *prima facie* disproportionate and excessive." The same comment could have been applied to the Prosecution's requests, but this was not the case. Why should there be two weights, and two measures? In fact, are the 103 92 *bis* statements from the Prosecution not a little disproportionate and excessive?

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[1] *The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević,* Case No. IT-02-54-T, "Decision on Prosecution's Request to Have Written Statements Admitted under Rule 92 bis", 21 March 2002 ("Milošević Decision"), paras 8, 22 and 27.
Decision of the Appeals Chamber in *Galić*, paras 9, 10, 11 and 14-15.
The Prosecution v. Ante Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-T, "Decision on Defendant Ivan Čermak's Motion for Admission of Evidence of Two Witnesses Pursuant to Rule 92 *bis* and Decision on Defendant Čermak's Third Motion for Protective Measures for Witnesses IC-12 and IC-16", public, 11 November 2009 ("*Gotovina* Decision"), paras 8 and 11.
The Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin and Momir Talić, Case No. IT-99-36-T, "Decision on 'Objection and/or Consent to Rule 92 *bis* Admission of Witness Statements Number One' Filed by Br|anin on 16 January 2002 and *'Opposition du Général Talić à l'admission des dépositions recueillies en application de l'article 92 bis du Règlement'* Filed by Talić on 21 January 2002", 30 January 2002, confidential ("*Brđanin* Decision"), paras 16, 28 and 30.
The Prosecution v. Vujadin Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, "Decision on Nikolić's Motion Pursuant to Rule 92 *bis*", 28 July 2008, public, paras 8-9; *The Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović et al.,* Case No. IT-05-88-T, "Decision on Pandurević's Motion for Admission of Written Evidence Pursuant to Rules 92 *bis* and 92 *ter*", 17 December 2008, public, p. 4.
The Prosecutor v. Astrit Haraqija and Bajrush Morina, Case No. IT-04-84-R77.4, "Decision on Astrit Haraqija's Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to Rule 92 *bis*", 5 September 2008, confidential, *see* in particular para. 15.
The Prosecutor v. Ljube Boškoski and John Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, "Decision on Tarčulovski Defence's Motion Pursuant to Rule 92 *bis*", 22 February 2008, confidential para. 15.
The Prosecutor v. Milan Babić, Case No. IT-03-72-A, "Judgement on Sentencing Appeal", 18 July 2005, public ("*Babić* Decision"), para. 43.
Babić Decision, para. 55: "Even when personal factors or circumstances – including prior good character – have been considered as mitigating circumstances, they have been given little weight in mitigation."

3/58341 BIS

It is something of a surprise to note that the majority ventures to state the following in paragraph 34: "... The Chamber recalls in this respect that although the Chamber has definitely admitted 101 statements or transcripts of testimonies for the Prosecution, pursuant to Rule 92 *bis* of the Rules, this does not justify the Defence teams seeking the admission of the same number of witnesses under this measure, or indeed more as the Praljak Defence requests ..."

The majority relies on an interpretation of a Decision of the Appeal's Chamber in which the Accused does not necessarily have the right "to the same amount of time and the same number of witnesses and that a principle of proportionality should therefore be applied ..."

This principle of proportionality must be applied strictly here. Would there be proportionality if in relation to 92 *bis* witnesses we had:

Prosecution – 101 statements or transcripts
Defence – 0 statements or transcript

Taking into account that the **six accused** would normally have the right to a **separate trial** rather than a joint trial, the principle of proportionality would require at least that all the accused have the same number or approximately the same number of 92 *bis* witnesses as the Prosecution.

This is not an insignificant issue, as it is tied to the question of the overall time allocated to the Prosecution.

The Prosecution requested initially a disproportionate amount of time in order to present its case; considering the allocated time, the Prosecution then resorted to Rule 92 *ter* and to Rule 92 *bis*.

Consequently, the **principle of proportionality** must take into account all the factors.

2/58341 BIS

It is true that, when deciding on the amount of time to be allocated to the Praljak Defence, the Chamber took into account the list of witnesses in order to allocate **55 hours.**

This period included, to my mind, the time potentially dedicated to the testimony of all the witnesses on the list (*viva voce*, 92 *ter*, witnesses contested under Rule 92 *bis*).

Therefore, if it turns out that a 92 *bis* witness needs to be cross-examined, I would be inclined to reject a statement by this witness since the Praljak Defence should have known in advance if this witness was likely to be subject to cross-examination, and I completely agree with paragraphs 33 and 34 of the Prosecution's submission quoted in footnote 23.

Because of their position or their closeness to the Accused, witnesses should not testify through written statements.

The redundant nature of some testimonies does not in itself justify its rejection, since the Rule itself envisages this possibility by mentioning the term "cumulative" in Rule 92 *bis* (A)(i)(a).

During a deliberation it would be enough to keep one or several cumulative items of evidence and to mention the others for the record in a footnote, or even not mention them at all, because a Judge does not have to refer in a Judgement to **all** the evidence; it is incumbent upon him to make a selection to support his decision. Of course, if a 92 *bis* statement is explicitly mentioned in support of their case in the submissions of the Prosecution and the Defence in their final brief, the Trial Chamber must refer to it in its Judgement.

I do not at all agree with the following sentence in paragraph 35: "... In this respect, the Chamber stated in its Decision of 25 April 2008 that both witnesses that the Praljak Defence wished to call under Rule 93 of the Rules and those called to testify on humanitarian aid supplied to Muslims, on the cooperation between Croats and Muslims in 1991 and 1992, on Serbian aggression, on the mujahidin, and many subjects taken up by the Praljak Defence in Annex 3 of the Motion, were concerned

1/58341 BIS

by the redundant nature, the insufficient relevance or even an absence of a link to the Indictment."

I believe that all these subjects could enlighten the Chamber on the Joint Criminal Enterprise and should only be raised during the deliberation, that is, after the closing arguments and not **before**, as mentioned above.

In conclusion, the denial of the Motion after **five months** seems to me to go against our obligation to consider motions **personally** and conscientiously.

I find that, in any case, the Trial Chamber had at its disposal all the necessary factors to take a final decision and could have done so a long time ago.

This dissenting opinion was filed with a slight delay due to technical difficulties.

/signed/

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Jean-Claude Antonetti
Presiding Judge

Done this sixteenth day of February 2010
At The Hague
The Netherlands

[Seal of the Tribunal]

Excerpt from Order on request of Praljak Defense seeking a stay on the time limit ordered by the Chamber for filing 20 written statements or transcripts of evidence pursuant to Rule 92bis of the Rules

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2/58672 BIS

The Trial Chamber has decided by majority to reject more than 100 witness statements pursuant to Rule *92bis* of the Rules.

In the majority decision, the Trial Chamber asked the Praljak Defense to file **20 written statements.**

I am then led to conclude that the request for certification to appeal and the request for a stay of time limit now form **an undivided whole.**

If the Trial Chamber certifies the request to appeal, it will then fall to the Appeals Chamber to **uphold or invalidate** the majority decision.

What advantage could there possibly be in forcing the hand of the Defence prior to judicial consideration of the appeal, unless it is a foregone conclusion that no certification to appeal shall occur and the majority is already persuaded of a sound basis for its decision?

Underlying this dissenting opinion one observes the boycott of the Accused Praljak, who refuses to attend hearings on grounds that his trial is unfair.

In his submissions, his Counsel has elaborated the Accused's position as follows: "Slobodan Praljak hopes that the Honorable Judges will appreciate his *bona fide* critique with an open mind and a spirit of good will. Slobodan Praljak has endeavored throughout the proceedings to be of maxim assistance to the Trial Chamber in its quest to finding a fair outcome of this extraordinarily long and complex trial. Having come to the conclusion however that the proceedings are fundamentally flawed and having lost confidence that the proceedings will improve to the extent that he will ultimately enjoy his fair-trial rights as purportedly guaranteed by the ICTY Statute, Slobodan Praljak mere seeks to put on record his decision to halt his participation in the trial as well as his views of the situation that caused his decision to withdraw from the trial."

The absence from the courtroom of an accused party raises a grave problem for International Justice.

Several issues must be considered:

1. Is the accused mocking his Judges?
2. Does the accused have reasons for boycotting his hearings?
3. Have the Judges done as much as they can to ensure tranquil proceedings and the effective participation of the Accused in his own trial?

In this trial, this is not the first time that a defendant has manifested his displeasure by leaving the courtroom, however, it is the first time that a defendant has expressed his desire in writing to no longer attend and to place his future destiny in the hands of the Judges, stating in black and white that his trial is rigged.

As for me, I cannot accept these terms, for I have personally insisted that the defendant be allowed to produce evidence and to express himself as desired.

1/58672 BIS

The **majority decision denying** the request to stay the time limit while awaiting the certification to appeal and the decision of the Appeals Chamber evidences **closed,** rather than **open,** reasoning.

It seems unavoidable, in my view, that the Appeals Chamber be seized by the Defence of the key issue of its refusal to admit more than 100 instances of testimony or statements, especially inasmuch as the Judges are of one mind on this issue and that the Appeals Chamber **alone** holds the solution by upholding or nullifying the decision.

The Judge, in his role, must otherwise expect to be censured via appeal should the parties contest his ruling.

This is not simply a matter related to the admission of a document that can in any case be shown to a witness right until the end of the trial, but rather, **a definitive, "watershed" decision,** deserving of an appeal.

A failure to certify could substantially violate the rights of the Defense.

The Praljak Defense, in its submissions, has indicated the relevance of these testimonies and statements in respect of the Indictment as well as the reliability thereof.

The entirety of this testimony completes and corroborates the testimony received until this time and meets the requirements of Rule *92bis*.

It is evident, in my view, that a unanimous decision ordering both the certification to appeal and the stay of the time limit would have allowed the Chamber to demonstrate **"an open mind and a spirit of goodwill".**

/signed/

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Jean-Claude Antonetti
Presiding Judge

Done this seventeenth day of March 2010
At The Hague
The Netherlands

[Seal of the Tribunal]

To the Honourable Judges

Jean-Claude Antonetti, Árpád Prandler and Stefan Trechsel

Den Haag, 23rd of February 2010

To the Honourable Judges

Jean-Claude Antonetti, Árpád Prandler and Stefan Trechsel

Den Haag, 23rd of February 2010

Out of three basic questions which determine us to the greatest extent:

a) what is

b) what are we able to know

c) what should we do

as philosophy student and professor, as well as later, regardless of the activity I was active in, I dedicated the most of the time to the basic question of every ethics:

"What do have to do/What do I have to do?"

I quote Nikolai Hartmann "Ethics", Berlin, 1938

" 'What to do' is the question we find ourselves in every moment. Each new situation poses that question over and over again; we have to respond to it as we make ever step in our lives; it is inevitable and there is no such power which could lift our burden and release us from its necessity. To every new question, our activity, our actual behaviour brings a new answer. Because the act always contains a decision that has already been made. Wherever that decision was not conscious, we could still comprehend it subsequently in our activity, perhaps in the form of repentance. Whether in pro and contra a right has been chosen, it neither exists in question nor the situation; there is no necessity for it, no guidance by other man's arm. Everybody depends on their own, one alone makes a decision. Subsequently, if one made a mistake, he alone bears responsibility and guilt.

Who observes the range of his activity? Who is familiar with the chain of consequences and who measures the quantity of responsibility?

An act which happened once, belongs to the actuality and cannot be undone. No matter which mistake one made in it, remains irrevocably mistaken and it is irreparable in the strict sense. The situation happens once, it does not come back and it is individual just like all what is real."

The question of activity, act, deed is especially important in the course of certain social structure collapsing; how to act in the French revolution, in the time of growing Nazism, fascism and communism; how to act in war?

How to restrain from "COMMITTING A SIN THROUGH OUR OWN FAULT, IN OUR THOUGHTS AND IN OUR WORDS, IN WHAT WE HAVE DONE AND WHAT WE HAVE FAILED TO DO" that we confess during the mass.

Due to complexion of this question, once I cited the conversation between Heisenberg and Planck before this Chamber, in which young Werner Heisenberg describes an answer of the great Max Planck to the question what should he do in the time of Nazism growth.

Basics and origin of law are in the indivisible connection with such questions therefore I have right to talk about law as researcher and human being.

Ever since the time when Anitus and society crushed Socrates (he was spoiling youth and questioned Gods on Olympus), as well as Cicero and Giordano Bruno, throughout the history (especially in social systems of the 20th century) various judges condemned hundreds of millions of people – always in the name of justice.

I think I read all the relevant literature regarding the topic and this literature says that each individual decides on his own action when three variables come into the balance – courage, unbearableness of own passiveness against the system in which the individual is in and expected punishment.

Hence – when and in what way is one to react and express discordance and what is the price to be paid for what has been done?

Even nowadays I have doubts whether such modi operandi are the act of free will of the individual or merely a statistic variable of the major number of individual values.

Why am I saying all this?

I am saying it because the cumulative growth of **small bad procedures** in this trial reached the point of my nonagreement.

I shall cite some of that:

A – the books by C. del Ponte "Mrs. Prosecutor" and "Peace and punishment" by Florence Hartmann testify about the practice of this tribunal. In many cases indictments are written to satisfy the political goals, whereby remain unclear for whose interests and the behind-the-scenes manoeuvrings bring the sense of the institution in question.

B – I was searching for an answer by sending a letter to many important addresses to the following question; has the indictment against me been written pursuant to position that "Croats are perfidious bastards" (unlike Serbs who are merely "bastards") as it is written in the book by C. del Ponte. I asked whether such statement is racist and how many years of prison with hard labour would I get if I spoke about Serbs and Muslims – Bosniaks in that way in war.

Nobody even made an effort to send a courtesy reply.

C – The judges don't have a possibility to examine the factual basis of the whole or only parts of the indictment before they confirm it.

A word "professional judges" was quite often mentioned in this courtroom.

I have no idea what the content of the word "professional" would mean in other languages but in Croatian there are two important meanings for the term "professional":

1. It is a man who performs his work for money – unlike the amateur.
2. A professional is a man who knows his job – unlike a dilettante.

All orthopaedists agree on the method how to put together a broken bone; the physicists do not argue about wave and corpuscular nature of photons or the existence of quarks and leptons; all electronics engineers have no doubts about the usage of RC combination in the transistor base or the way of making an assembly for amplitude or frequent modulation of signal, mathematicians have no dilemmas on multiplication table, adding up in binary system or what is the correct solution of the equation $\int x dx$ – integral x d x.

It is the same situation with all fields of activities which have at least something in common with the normative science.

When forming a judgement, professionals agree in 99% of the cases.

The judges at this Tribunal, especially in this Trial Chamber, Jean-Claude Antonetti, Árpád Prandler and Stefan Trechsel mostly **do not agree.**

Whether someone is to be released home, under which conditions, does an accused have right to examine, in which way should a piece of paper be delivered to the judges and in which way to other Counsel; by new decision a Chamber derogates the previous, rules change on daily basis, certain rules apply for the prosecution and others for defence. I would like to see this Tribunal administer justice to French, Brits, Americans, Chinese, let's say for Tibet.

Such justice can be administered to inhabitants of the Balkans and Africans. Experiments on anthropoids have always been allowed. To put the most charitable interpretation on it, such way of work is frustrating, whereas accepting such procedure by coming to court expresses hope that the judgement will be righteous after all. **However, hope must be limited by ratio, a clear cognition that mistakes in conclusion might be distributed by chance, without having any clearly expressed direction.**

And then, in "Order on admission of evidence in relation to the witness 4D – AB" dated 14th of January 2010, judge Antonetti, in one of his numerous dissenting opinions says:

1) "However I find that the Trial Chamber, faced with an avalanche of documents, could have accepted all of them, having a possibility at the end of the trial to request from the parties to do a triage through their final briefs so that one can have a purpose-serving debate on some of admitted materials of evidence.

Most of the judges of this Chamber did not choose this commonsense solution, inspired by decades of the professional law practice."

2) "I find that rejection of documents of this kind equals one-side approach of the conflict."

Therefore I would like to say something on logic and method of the scientific cognition. Discussions on traditional logic (Aristotle's "Organon"), discussions on general logic and cognition (Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason, Moris Cohen, Ernest Nagel's "An introduction to logic and scientific method", London, 1934) or the mathematical logic (Russel's and Whitehead's "Principia Mathematica") clarified that in each correct argumentation a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. One of the most significant authors dealing with this topic, Karl Popper in the "Logic of scientific revelation" says:

"However, it is understood that I would accept a certain system as empirical or scientific only if it can be tested through experience. These contemplations suggest that, as a criterion of demarcation, one should not take a possibility of verification but a possibility of falsifiability. In other words; I will not demand from a scientific system to be such it can be isolated in positive sense once for all but I will demand that his logical form be such it can be isolated through empirical examinations, in negative sense; it must be possible that one empirical system be refuted by the experience."

Nobody however is challenging that the basic characteristic of a scientific principle is a **public possibility of examining** the results which are obtained by this method on the basis of **used** facts – premises.

All what is a natural or a social system or phenomenon can be explored; even to law, which is one of the aspects of the human experience, all rules of logic and scientific approach methods can be applied.

All of us (even the judges) bring logical conclusions and make methodological cognitions proportionally to our knowledge (to put it in better words, proportionally to our own ignorance), proportionally to analytic and synthetic force of our reason, our conclusions depend on physical and mental energy that we dispose of and that we invest into the cognitive process, as well as time that we dedicate to the revelation of conclusions.

However, it is absolutely not allowed, not at any costs to drop, neglect or reject those facts or premises which might question our conclusion, cognition or judgement. Once I quoted Schiller; "Abundance contributes to clarity".[1]

I shall present couple of examples:

[1] Author's remark: "Abundance leads to clarity and the truth abides in abyss."

Once as Aristotle's theses were accepted as social norms, understanding that the cognition is possible only as a form of speculative opinion and that truth cannot be reached by measurements, experiments or in any other similar way, as well as his postulate about heavier objects falling faster that light objects, physics was dead for the next 2000 years all the way till Galileo Galilei.

Democritus' books were destroyed and everyone who had doubts about scholastics being the only proper science leading to the truth was decapitated.

If Galileo hadn't fought, in the hard way, for the right to measure speed and time of various ballots which he was then dropping down the steep, it is questionable whether Isaac Newton would have written his "Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica".

Would Johannes Kepler have established his laws on movement of planets, if somebody had hidden remarkable measurements of Tycho Brahe?

Is it allowed to hide evidence on wave nature of photons in order to leave only the truth that the photons are merely corpuscles?

Would there have been a war in Iraq (several thousands of dead people, several millions of expelled persons) if reports of French intelligence (and not only French intelligence) had been published about Saddam Hussein not being in possession of chemical weapon?

When saying the abovementioned, I don't want to say whether this war should have been waged for humanitarian reasons, and especially I don't want to say anything how this war should have been waged.

Hence, I can relatively calmly accept the fact of possible mistake in judges' conclusion on my guilt because the wrong interpretation of each and especially the one of social phenomenon is sui generic built into every reasonable man, but I cannot accept, just like the judge Antonetti, the rejection of those facts which could serve the rebuttal of conclusion made or arbitrated punishment.

As far as I understand, due to a possible mistake, there are few degrees of trial assessments of facts and conclusions, respectively, the judgement – all the way till some supreme, constitutional or appeal levels.

In the case in which a relation between some criminal offence and mens rea of some other individual in the social hierarchy should be established in the conditions of war, respectively in the conditions of a complete de-compensation of all state systems and subsystems, to reject from the trial the following evidence; the third party in war – the Serbs, to throw out Mujahedins and all elements of religious war which was brought by those combatants into the territory, to throw away from evidence all refugees and expelled persons, as well as all the elements of civil war with them, all this followed by an explanation it is TU QUOQUE. And so on and so forth.

How is this possible and why is this happening?

How to solve accurately hundreds of related non-linear differential equations through which the society is described if we throw out the basic constants by reduction?

Politics, economy, law, sociology, philosophy, social psychology and many other sciences have trying to solve those equations for centuries, more or less, without success.

The results, as the reality is testifying about them aren't brilliant, exactly because the complicated systems are reduced to one or two variables, which is inadmissible.

Isn't it?

The war even more makes the entire system of complicated causal social relations more complicated by many fractions of curves, points of singularities and iterations of small changes which explode into the determined chaos.

I quote "The war and the society" by Ozren Žunec, Zagreb, 1998:

"The causes of war can still be explained sociologically, however the war per se eludes the sociologic inspect. Hobbes's "natural condition" is not a subject appropriate for science, in which the central concepts are order,

continuity, institutions, socialisation and similar. Accordingly the war is a point of discontinuity for the social mainstream, respectively a point in which something ends and something else starts. All before and after this "big bang" is liable to sociological analysis. The mere point of breach, however is not.

It is pre-social (or extra-social) and as such incomprehensible.

* * *

Due to lack of interest as well as due to undeveloped cognitive and methodological preconditions for sociological investigations, war remained the subject matter of other sciences, particularly military theory and political science. Significant empirical investigations of the parameters of war which were undertaken in the U.K. by David Singer, Malvin Small et al (Singer et al, 1979; Singer and Walance, 1979; Small and Singer, 1982; Singer and Stoll, 1984; Singer and Diehl, 1990) remained without appropriate sociological response. Generally speaking, sociology hasn't devoted attention to war corresponding to an extraordinary social relevance, as well as a great and constantly rising incidence of this phenomenon. One of the basic difficulties here is the lack of a sociologically usable definition of war. In military theory, for nearly two decades the classical Clausewitz's definition has been used as a standard definition. This definition says that war "is an act of force used to coerce the opponent into fulfilling our will" (Clausewitz, 1993: 83), "an act of mutual destruction" (Clausewitz 1993: 253) or alternatively, "an act of force which has no limits" (Clausewitz 1993: 84). The application of this definition in the organization of armies and in the conduct of war seems to leave, due to its sectional exclusivity, no connection to sociology. Instead of the use of the notion of war which is relevant in practical warfare (in strategy, operation and tactics), sociology has been left with philosophically derived concepts which either condemn or idealize war and which, being extraordinarily value-laden, actually do not speak about real wars, but are primarily an expression of the social valuation of war and the derived social correlates of wars and their consequences.

On the other hand, when in the 20th century there came about a substantial change in the nature of real wars, and when the classical Clausewitz's concept of war as a conflict of armed forces organized by the states, began to give ground to a new type of war in which social groups enter into armed conflict with the aim of changing basic characteristics of the society (system of values and norms, social structure, identity of the elites, etc.), it was shown that the exclusive use of purely military means in this new type of war (revolutions or "low-intensity conflicts") is insufficient, even counterproductive. As the British experience in Malaya and American experience in Vietnam have shown, each in its own way and with opposite outcomes, for the victory in war which has no classical military-political goals (e.g. conquest of enemy territory, change of the relation of forces and the like), but goals such as a change of society, in addition to the military force, the application of a number of measures based on the understanding of the social nature of this conflict is also necessary. Although at the moment of decline of the classical paradigm of war ("it is time we kept a vigil in order for the strategists to give respect to Clausewitz and leave him to the historians", Matz 1995: 22) sociology, together with other social sciences, was offered, almost by itself, as a solution to the aporia of the new type of war, this opportunity has been wasted. The idiosyncrasy of sociology towards war or towards what is essential in war, namely the principle and use of concrete violence in a large proportion, remained in force even when war in the 20th century became, by its internal nature, more a sociological then a military fact.

* * *

Why do the judges Prandler and Trechsel refuse the evidence?

Do the judges Prandler and Trechsel wish to reduce the system to the measure of their own understanding?

Or they reduce the system to the measure of provability of a foregone conclusion. To use sports as a metaphor, isn't the result of a match with such an approach fixed in advance?

Isn't it more just to leave all the exhibits within the case, and to ignore them by means of concluding, if this is the judges' chosen logic, and in such a way enable other court instances in the future to check the method by which the verdict was reached.

In the books I read as well as from personal experience it became blatantly clear to me that ideology and politics can shape all the cognitive fields (including the field of legal science) in a way that the words morality and justice at the time in which these fields are being applied have no meaning and no sense.

From the case file you deleted the testimonies of witnesses, statements which speak about me, my opinion, my speech, my deeds and my omissions – if there are any. It took you six months for the decision, whereby you also harmed other defence cases.

You pushed me to the very brink of my dignity and therefore I do not accept further participation.

This is all I can do: "I spoke and I saved my soul", and you do as you please.

2. METHODOLOGICAL AND LOGICAL ERRORS IN CONCLUDING ABOUT THE REALITY OF WAR

Attached to this book, there are statements of witnesses, and these witnesses speak truthfully about my behaviour in the real situation, on battlefields on which I was present in various functions.

I wish to stress the word "REAL", because in the majority of those who write and make judgements about the war, especially those who perceive themselves as "intellectuals" or even worse, "humanistic intellectuals" I see a number of logical errors in concluding. Allow me to state a few basic ones.

When I shall analyse the statements of witnesses, I will refer to the logical errors which I state here.

1. SIMPLIFICATION OR REDUCTION

The real situation will be simplified – reduced on the level of individual knowledge, or rather, ignorance of the person making a judgement.

Reality will be adapted – reduced (all elements which disturb the picture will be left out or ignored), according to the "wishes and concepts" of the person making a judgement.

The reasons, magnitude and form of reduction of reality or a real event serve the ideological, interest, political or other biases of the person making a judgement, always in a way that, had the person making a judgement been a participant of the event, he would solve the problem easily in a moral and legally correct way.

According to this, belated wisdom (poor wisdom), history would look much more differently if they had had their sway or if they had been in the position to decide.

Such persons making a judgement, as well as arbiters will not pose the question: "Why haven't we decided?" because the answer is degradingly simple and banal – THEY DO NOT participate in war, they wait for the outcome in order to know what to think of the past, how they will judge and over whom they will pass judgement.

2. ASSERTION

The easiness of the solution of a certain real war (and not only war) situation is exponentially proportionate to the distance from that situation and exponentially proportionate to the comfort of life from which this real war (and not only war) situation is being observed.

The same proportionality is true also for OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARBITER, ignorance – cultural and historical, of wars and civilizations and scientific…

3. FAKE PEOPLE - RATIONALIZATION OF PERSONAL IMMORALITY

There is a special kind of people in Croatia who see and feel and describe themselves as "intellectuals", "humanists", "progressive", and they were members of the Communist League, until the beginning of the aggression against Croatia, simply put – they were communists.

To be a member of a fascist organization - subtype: communism – and overnight, by a Copernican turnabout, run across into the forum of "humanistic intellectuals" – is a logical *contradictio in subjecto*.

I am not implying that people cannot change or have no right to change, but the changes of Croatian communists into liberal humanists is a change of "speech" and not of "essence", it is a change due to interest and retention of social power that enables financial status.

a) How they professed the communist system in which ideology determined what is reality and which facts determine it (but not vice-versa), they continued even after the war in Croatia.

   Used to daily longstanding production of the communist "ideal picture of the world" they continued at their job, now as "renown liberal democrats" with the same methodology:

   - Everything could have been different and better if you had only listened to us!
   - Everything that happened, including that war and war crimes, all of that is the product of "right-wing ideas", "reactionaries" and "rural primitives"… !

- In order for their position of "the ones who do not participate" be morally elevated, in accordance with the "ideal picture of the world", they INTRODUCED A RULE:

  If EVERYTHING is not morally clean, EVERYTHING is morally dirty;
- These "Marxists" never seriously read Marx's 11th thesis on FEUERBACH;
- These people are here to judge, arbiter, accuse, decide, call names, determine the truth and moral norms … and they are strong in number.

b) The energy of their former communist opinion is great. The democratic procedure of a free Croatia enables change, but the democratic procedure is not at the same time a substantial change of the energy of the previous opinion.
   - This is how people are, I am not judging, I am merely trying to clarify.

4. THE INTRODUCTION OF WRONG PREPOSITIONS IN THE LOGICAL SEQUENCE

If the arbiter of a certain war event (or any other event) lacks some elements for his foregone conclusion, he will introduce the necessary elements into his logical sequence by personal choice, arbitrarily; this may be due to ignorance, absence of every desire to do research, or for any of a number of possible interests which determine the arbiter.

5. EQUALIZING OF THE NOTIONS BY CONTENT

When a certain society, a nation, undergoes three processes simultaneously – defence against aggression – war, the change of political system - from communism to democracy and the setting up of the state, than surely we can speak about the point of singularity, the creation of the developmental code with a questionable outcome. This is how it was in Croatia 1991, and especially in BiH /Bosnia and Herzegovina/ in 1992.

Some indispensable social structures are being formed and named, and so we get "army", "government", "police", "military police", "municipal government"… and all of this on very precarious criteria of truthfulness or a positive selection.

For a positive selection a much longer time-frame is necessary.

With regard to the fact that the notions used for these structures are the same as the ones used in Western countries, after a long process of positive selection, we arrive at the point of logical error of equalizing and levelling of the content of notions irrespective of the fact that the embryo carries the structure of the FUTURE ADULT, but is not yet that adult.

In such "thinkers" there is no "*differentia specifica*" and they do not ponder over such "tiny items", although it is plain to every even mildly serious observer, simply by examining the facts that can be seen on TV, that the social and fundamental state structures have only the same name, only the notion which is the same. And the contents of these concepts differ as "HEAVEN AND EARTH".

In science also, "enslavement" with a conceptual system substantially slows down the progress and understanding (classical physics – theory of relativity), and the situation is much worse in the social sciences.

6. THE IGNORANCE OF THE BASIC POSTULATES OF THE "THEORY OF LARGE SYSTEMS" – E.G. SOCIETY

Of all the large systems which man investigates, society is certainly if not the biggest, but surely the most complex one, with respect to the number of variables it contains, the interaction of these variables, the lack of firm constants, and quantity and diversity of energies moving within the system.

Who is capable of tackling these complexities, these breaking curves, these abrupt changes in state, these accumulated potential energies which suddenly, without exactly explainable reason, turn into action, into movement, into work.

How to convince those "THINKERS" that even if you want a change in large systems, and wish to make that change work in a favourable direction, you must proceed with precisely calculated speed unless you wish to cause a break of the system.

A "modern", "liberal humanist" of the Croatian type, usually a former communist, revolutionist, wants everything and now. As he cannot get it, he accuses and judges everyone around himself.

7. IGNORANCE

Reading and listening for over two decades all the explanations and judgements of the war events in former Yugoslavia, the various analysts, I became convinced that the majority of them, neither know the postulates of social psychology when speaking about the behaviour of an individual or groups, nor do they know anything about behaviour in war. They do not make use of the only possible method, the comparative one, just as they know nothing of existing research of cases of behaviour under conditions of a complete breakdown of society and conditions of state in disarray, etc.

Therefore, I intend to insert attachments into the book which shed light on the above.

a) Society is not a closed system; before the war, and especially during the war, it passes through two simultaneous processes: a reduction of entropy (in cluster of citizens) and a substantial increase of entropy in sub-systems based on various grounds – ideological, religious, territorial (region, municipality, neighbourhood), following the projections of wishes, fear, hatred…

b) There is no linearity, a cause two times greater doesn't mean twice as great a consequence. The law of equality of action and reaction does not apply – the spiral of growth of the energy of evil is always exponential.

8. COMPLETE DISREGARD OF EMOTIONS, THINKING AND BEHAVIOUR WHICH PROCEED FROM EXTREME EMOTIONAL STATES

Due to incapacity of the rational mind to resolve relations and problems between nations in an amicable manner, such situations are often resolved by war.

Before the war, and especially during it, emotions determine a large part of behaviour and actions.

As we consume an unending string of wars, hunger, catastrophes of various types, we have become numb, the threshold of sensitivity is very high and the reaction is evoked only when some of those pictures became reality for us.

This is the loop of cause and effect – CATCH 22.

Becoming "numb" protects our minds from such a quantity of evil, death and pain, and being "numb" we lack the motive for efficient action, apart from daily dispatch of benign messages, to soothe our own conscience.

The area of sensitivity and understanding the suffering of others decreases exponentially with the distance from the area where suffering occurs.

The Dubrovnik walls (THEY ARE BEAUTIFUL) were made to protect people, but nevertheless the majority of reporters, while the Yugoslav Army and Chetniks were destroying the city, firstly reported on which tower was hit and how much it was damaged, and only at the end, as an after-thought mentioned human casualties – the dead and the wounded.

Man is evidently a cheap and expendable item, but the walls should remain in order for those who write about it to have a place where to enjoy, once the whole mayhem comes to an end.

In the period after the war these two groups of people, those who were being killed and those who were writing about the damaged walls, will not understand each other for a long, long time.

In the aggression on Croatia, the English were mostly interested in the fate of the Lipizzaner, and one group of "humanists" was primarily worried over a destiny of an old oak.

Distant observers are either indifferent or project into themselves divine attributes, by which they would swiftly and easily solve all these problems.

And all those who go to take part, who go to defend, realize that they have no divine attributes and that everything which constitutes a war is difficult and painful and complicated; they will be the guilty ones for those who observe. More or less, all of them will be GUILTY.

9. FUNCTION AND MIND

Irrespective of the way how someone comes into a position of power, he will become smart overnight – proportionate to the importance of the function he occupies.

At the time of fundamental social changes, especially in the defensive war (The Volunteers create the state) a

good enough positive selection is not possible, so that those who fulfil the functions are usually not up to the task they face, is not just a few.

10. THOSE WHO CAME TO CROATIA AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FROM THE WEST AT THE TIME OF AGGRESSION, ASSUMED (VERY FREQUENTLY) THE FOLLOWING RULE:

Knowledge, possibility of judgement and the power of synthetic mind of a Western observer is proportionate, a priori, to the size, economic power and political "weight" of the country from which he comes.

Simply speaking, we were not equal interlocutors, very far from that.

Another, probably the majority of foreigners come with the conviction that even very complex social problems can be managed by application of an algorithm valid for a medium-complexity mechanical process or a medium-size company.

Only very few realize the huge gap between the verbs "to want" and "to be able to", in the forming and directing the processes in society which is a victim of aggression and finds itself in a nearly destroyed social structure (CROATIA) and completely destroyed social structure (BiH).

This provides fertile grounds for accusations on all bases.

11. RETROSPECTIVE REASON

The projection of retrospective insights into a real, past and completed situation or event distorts the truth, denies the uniqueness of history, diminishes the value of participation, degrades, humiliates those who decided to "*defend the Thermopylae*".

Retrospective historical reason is no reason at all.

12. THE MULTIPLICATION OF REAL TIME

In subsequent analyses and judgements of an event, or more generally, some real historic situation, the worthy thinkers single out one problem and compress into its solution the entire time frame in which the event takes place.

For another problem which is synchronous with the first one, again the same real time is taken for its contemplation and solution, excluding in this process the existence of the first problem.

This applies to the fiftieth problem and the fiftieth decision in the same real time, they, the thinkers, do not understand or do not wish to understand the synchronicity of events and do not understand that the same body cannot be on two places at the same time.

13. THE PREDICTABILITY OF EVENTS - THE PREDICTABILITY OF CRIME

It is disconcerting what KIND OF MESS APPEARS WITH THE NON-UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYNTAGM "*THE PREDICTABILITY OF EVENTS*" with THOSE WHO EVALUATE AND JUDGE.

We can see A COMPLETE NON-UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CERTAINTY OF A STATISTICAL PREDICTABILITY OF AN EVENT – PHENOMENON and THE INDIVIDUAL UNPREDICTABILITY OF THIS EVENT – PHENOMENON.

As if the quantum electrodynamics failed to explain anything, whether in physics or in society.

This is particularly true of the PREDICTABILITY OF CRIME, WHETHER IN PEACE OR IN WAR.

a) "THE WAR CRIME" IS PREDICTABLE BOTH STATISTICALLY, and in a great measure also individually, because "the war crime" is embedded in the very sense of such a war.
b) Nazi crimes were predictable both statistically and individually because they proceeded from the "meaning" and "essence" of the social and political structure.
c) The same is true of Stalin's, Pavelić's, Tito's, Pol Pot's, … regime.
d) The crimes which OCCUR DAILY in New York, Paris, Berlin, Zagreb, …., are statistically predictable and certain, but not individually.
e) My Lai, Abu Ghraib, the killing of German prisoners after the World War II, crimes in Baghdad, …, and thousands of other WAR and peace-time crimes are statistically predictable, but these crimes are not a

product and consequence of the system, but the consequence of imperfections of the system and they are not predictable on the individual level.

It is impossible to know how, when and where this will happen nor who will be the perpetrator.

f) The catchword which I heard so many times: "*Crimes have happened, someone must be guilty*" is frighteningly illogical and immoral.

Not "*someone*" (meaning anyone), THE PERPETRATOR MUST BE GUILTY, the perpetrator must be found, it must be proven "beyond any reasonable doubt" that the guilty party committed the crime and should be punished.

g) With "crimes in war" guilt is not determined with the "foundation of the crime" but the imperfection of the system. This is true for Americans, the British, the French,… as well as for the Croats.

Or maybe the things stand otherwise?

h) Therefore, "the crime in war" is statistically predictable, but the time, place and the individual perpetrator eludes the predictability. Individuality is not predictable.

i) The thesis that those who went to war to defend themselves from aggression are "*a priori*" responsible for the individuality of crime, irrespective of how they behaved, what they did, what they commanded, is very dangerous and logically untenable.

j) And what are they supposed to do, how to behave? Emigrate from New York, Berlin, … , lock up the mayor and chief of police because they didn't predict and prevent the crime, stop producing cars and airplanes because they cause death, stop fighting the Al-Qaida and dictators of the likes of Saddam Hussein or Gaddafi, BECAUSE THERE OCCUR INNOCENT VICTIMS, should we leave the American army because Abu Ghraib happened, … , WHAT ARE WE SUPPOSED TO DO?, how to satisfy the absurdity of some moralistic idle talk which has nothing to do with MORALE.

Excerpt from the book “International war law” (orig. title: “Međunarodno ratno pravo”), Prof. Gavro Đ. Perazić, PhD, Publisher: VINC, Beograd, 1986

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Surely, reprisals are not a part of the legal system of international law, although they are being used in all armed conflicts.

In the First World War both the Germans and Allies justified their use of poison gas as a response to the opposing side. The known actions of "rastellamente" of Italian troops and massive raids which the Germans carried out in Yugoslavia were also justified as reprisal measures.

Still, what should qualify reprisals and make the war law tolerate them are: proportionality, spatial and temporal limitation and humanity.

HEADING G REPRISALS

231.	*Definition*	*Reprisals represent the breach of war law as a response to the breach of this law on the part of the enemy, whose purpose is the cessation of this breach.* *Reprisals consist of warnings and pressure on the enemy in the form of revanchist action so as to stop further illegal war activities and to respect the war law. Reprisals represent the only direct procedure of the application of law.*

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Likewise, in investigations, as well as in punishments for criminal acts, the exploration of MOTIVES plays a significant role.

2.1. WISHES, INTENTIONS, ACTION AND POWER

If we were to interview people and ask them it they wish the problems of hunger, diseases caused by poverty, wars, killings … to disappear, the answer would be "YES".

Why then do we not succeed in solving these problems?

Why Baroness Thatcher needed several years to successfully solve the problem of rampage of English football fans?

Why the French Minister of the Interior Sarkozy needed several months to solve the problem of rampage of French citizens, the arson, killings, demolition of shops and cars in the suburbs of French cities? How come these responsible people in France couldn't prevent the burning of cars for the New Year – 1,200 in New Year 2013, and in the last 10 years the number of burnt cars is over 30,000?

How come the Greek Government couldn't stop the diluvial violence of its citizens in Athens which is going on for months?

How come the U.S. Army cannot stop the killing of several hundreds of thousands of civilians in Iraq, a country from which four million Iraqis have fled or were forced to leave?

Is this ethnic cleansing, expelling or flight to save dear life?

Who is responsible and how can it be prevented?

Why did Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland fight in such a bloody manner for decades, all in such a civilised world?

Are we not hurt by a fact that China 20 years ago destroyed one whole civilization and culture in Tibet and continues to do so taking one whole people to the very edge of survival?

And what is it that we can do and why is there nothing that we can do?

Further examples are unnecessary, the list would be too long.

And when in the end in this huge sea of evil and atrocities which floods the world we find out about the events, how often and in which way do we get to the perpetrators?

Isn't it a hard way between the realization that something has happened and knowing who did it?

What do we need to have technologically and organization-wise, and in which ways do we have to work in order to uncover the perpetrators in such situations?

The impotence to do something to prevent or uncover a crime is a terribly wretched feeling, but it is not a crime.

2.2. POSSIBLE METHODOLOGICAL ERRORS IN UNDERSTANDING

(I KNOW THAT I AM REPEATING MYSELF, BUT UNDERSTANDING IS A PAINFUL ISSUE)

In countries which change the political system,

in countries which, along with the change of the political system emerge, come into being, constitute themselves, in countries which, along with the change of the political system and a simultaneous coming into being, must wage war against the aggressor, in such countries neither the President of the state of Croatia, nor the Presidency or the President of the Presidency of BiH, nor the Government, nor the ministers, nor the army which by its voluntary nature enables the creation and existence of the state, nor the commanders of this army, nor the military police or any other structure of society represent what these names mean in countries which the honourable judges and the prosecutor come from.

This is a very frequent mistake of distorted nominalism – to include into the content of a notion meanings of the state – culture – civilization which the observer comes from.

In such a way we come to a communication error, an error in understanding – the same word denotes largely different contents, and the interpretation of the system can be largely or completely erroneous.

I have seen and heard a lot of this from all the observers which were hanging around our areas at the time of the war.

Too little knowledge about the country into which they are coming, and too many cultural, civilizational, political patterns valid in the countries from which the moderators of the crisis come from. For instance, the pattern or matrix about the army – as an ordered structure including training, law, troop tradition, finances, the social aspect, positive selection, education, psychological support, sufficient redundancy of human and material resources, continuous control and checking of every segment, communication, etc…, then the matrix about the democratic society which starts functioning with the act of the passing of the law on free elections, then the matrix about the rule of law which appears when good laws are passed, on about the police which does its job well when a group of citizens puts on certain uniforms and gets certain badges.

It is not all that simple. More precisely, it is all much harder and complicated and usually takes decades.

With respect to the fact that sociology is a difficult science, and everyone is dealing with society and everyone usually knows all about it – the most frequent mistakes are:

a) Reduction of a system to the level of one's own ignorance,

b) The introduction of wrong assumptions whenever we need an explanation of a certain phenomenon.

I don't want anyone to think that this means that those who do not have it, have the right to commit any kind of crimes, certainly not, but a disorder of every social system necessarily leads to an increased number of those who, with the time, for a number of reasons, cross the threshold of the permissible.

This, of course, depends also on the effort, work, behaviour of those who lead such systems in the making.

I therefore think that only an all-encompassing and thorough analysis of individual cases can give the answer to whether criminal acts were incited, enabled through lack of punishment, keeping secret, tacit approval, or they fall into the usual statistical distribution of adverse phenomena which every war and every chaotic social situation brings with it.

3. THE POLITICIAN WHO KNOWS AND UNDERSTANDS

BARONESS MARGARET THATCHER

Excerpt from the book of Margaret Thatcher "Statecraft-Strategies For a Changing World", Harper Collins Publisher Ltd., 2002, London /Croatian title: "DRŽAVNIČKO UMIJEĆE - Strategije za svijet koji se mijenja", Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 2004/:

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The Czech Republic has been one of the more successful post-communist countries, thanks mainly to the visionary economic policies of its former Prime Minister, my old friend and Hayekian extraordinaire, Vaclav Klaus. But he could not have succeeded as he did had the Czechs not retained an instinctive understanding of how to make a civil society and a free economy work. They gained these insights through the historical memory ingrained in their culture – it is, after all, worth remembering that before the Second World War Czechoslovakia enjoyed an income per head equal to that of France.

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Mr Havel and I, though, agree entirely, I think, about what was wrong with communism – a system which (to quote him again) was "based on lies, hatred and coercion".

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Mr Gorbachev is lively, engaging and a great talker – a subject on which I am a good judge (on this occasion he spoke for about a third of the conference). But his remarks in Prague seemed to me, to say the least, of doubtful validity.

Yet nor should they be lightly dismissed. They represent the articulation of a strategy, common to the left in many countries, of seeking to escape all blame for communism and then going on to take credit for being more pragmatic, modern and insightful about the world which those who actually fought communism have created. It is a pressing necessity to expose and defeat both distortions.

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I still find it astonishing that even the left should try to deny all this. It is, of course, not a crime to be wrong. But it is not far short of criminal to behave as some of them did when they thought that the Soviet Union was on the winning side. These people were blind because they did not want to see, and because they were intoxicated with the classic socialist fantasy of believing that state power offers a short-cut to progress. Thus the American journalist Lincoln Steffens observed after visiting the Soviet Union in 1919: "I have seen the future; ant it works."

At the height of the famine of 1932, the worst in Russia's history, the visiting biologist Julian Huxley found "a level of physique and general health rather above that to be seen in England". Similarly, George Bernard Shaw wrote that "Stalin has delivered the goods to an extent that seemed impossible the years ago, and I take my hat off to him." H.G.Wells was equally impressed, reporting that he had "never met a man more candid, fair and honest ... no-one is afraid of him and everybody trusts him". Harold Lask considered that Soviet prisons (stuffed full of political prisoners in appalling conditions) enabled convicts to lead "a full and self-respecting life".

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The establishment of the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (by UNSC Resolution 827 on 25 May 1993) and that of the tribunal for Rwanda (by UNSC Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994) were both admissions of defeat by the West and the wider international community. In the countries of the former Yugoslavia – Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia – Slobodan Milošević and his agents had used the Yugoslav army and gangs of extremist Serb paramilitaries to wage war against non-Serbs. He had done this in a manner that was so barbarous and so shameless – and so close to the West – that it was impossible for Europe and America to overlook it. Yet for reasons which need to be examined more closely in a different context he had been allowed to get away with it. Indeed, at various stages he had been given what appeared in Belgrade to be a "green light" to continue his efforts. Having made the wrong decisions when the conflict started in 1991, and having assiduously sought to place the blame equally on victim and aggressor, the greatest world power, America, had to find a way to respond to mounting horror around the world.

Chapter 8

Balkan Wars

A SUITABLE CASE FOR INTERVENTION

Bismarck, it is alleged, once remarked: "The Balkans are not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier." In this opinion, the iron Chancellor has found many adherents.

Those of the "Bismarckian" school believe that the United States and/or the countries of Europe have no significant interests at stake in the region and that the inhabitants had better be allowed to sort themselves out – or, more likely, not sort themselves out. For those who favour a non-interventionist approach because of lack of strategic interest usually also assume that the region is a political morass. Its history is thus viewed as baleful. Its leaders are understood to be irrational. Its peoples are regarded as frankly impossible. In such circumstances, it goes without saying that ordinary strategies and moral criteria do not apply. We may lament what happens, but 'twas always will be – thus. This is only a slightly over-simplified description of the sort of views that were widely be expressed in the media in the early 1990s, as the Balkans began to hurtle into genocide.

There is, however, another view, almost equally widely held, particularly today when Balkan non-interventionism tout court is less respectable. This is the belief, which is particularly prevalent on the liberal-left, that the Balkans are a litmus test, and that events there offer lessons which apply far beyond the region. These people are convinced that the only way to stop nationalism creating wars and atrocities is – to put it bluntly – to banish nationhood itself. They think that it is only international bodies – political, military and judicial – that can be relied upon to maintain acceptable standards of conduct. And just as they seem to want to turn the Balkan region into a kind of quasi-protectorate involving NATO, the UN and the EU, so their ultimate ambition is to extend the multinational approaches developed there and apply them to more and more of "global village".

I have already, I hope, explained why I believe that this second group's brand of utopian internationalism is unrealistic and indeed harmful.[1] Whether at home or abroad, the task of statesmen is to work with human nature, warts and all, and to draw on instincts and even prejudices that can be turned to good purpose. It is never to try to recreate Mankind in a new image. And, more practically in this case, attempting to build a perfectly just and permanently peaceful Balkans could lead the West into a disproportionate and unacceptable diversion of effort and resources.

The trouble is that the first, "Bismarckian", approach to the region was a terrible failure when it was pursued in the early 1990s. Actually, there was never a policy of complete non-intervention. "Pure" isolationism would probably have been less harmful than the policies that were in fact then adopted. The West, after all, did intervene to try to keep old Yugoslavia together and put heavy and public pressure on those who had the temerity and want to leave it. Western nations, among others, imposed an arms embargo which gabe the aggressor an overwhelming advantage and which thus encouraged aggression. Finally, the West brokered numerous ceasefires (which were not heeded) and issued numerous threats (which were ignored). So it would be better to describe the Western attitude at that time as ineffectual interference rather than true disengagement.

In any case, it is a very short-sighted view of national and strategic interest that fails to take account of the indirect along-side the direct impact of crises.

Allowing flagrant aggression to succeed is always dangerous, even if the immediate consequences seem limited, because of the precedent it sets. That is doubly so when such aggression occurs in a region that is historically part of Europe, that adjoins NATO, and that is itself deeply unstable.

It is nowadays sometimes forgotten just how many countries risked being dragged into Slobodan Milošević's wars. His suppression of ethnic Hungarians and others in Vojvodina risked conflict with neighbouring Hungary. His brutalities towards ethnic Albanians in Kosovo outraged neighbouring Albania and inflamed Macedonia's Albanian minority. Serbia's traditional ambitions to seize, or at least partition, Macedonia suggested that this new state also was lined up for destruction. And this in turn would undoubtedly have brought in Serbia's old ally, fellow Orthodox Greece, which regarded Macedonia with predatory hostility. Nor were the Greeks the only NATO

1 *See pp. 34-5, 262-7.*

members who could have been drawn into the maelstrom. Turkey, whose links with the Bosnian Muslims rest on history, culture, religion and indeed the presence of some two million ethnic Bosnians still living on Turkish soil, was rightly furious at the abandonment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Clearly, any conflict which threatens to involve so many nations, some of them the West's closest allies, cannot fail to involve our own national interests too.

There is, though, another reason why a sensible strategy in the Balkans required diplomatic toughness, credible threats of force and, as matters worsened, effective military action: and this was the nature of the enemy himself. Any properly informed assessment of Slobodan Milošević, the goals which drove him, and the means he possessed to achieve them, would have shown that he had to be stopped – and, equally important, that he could be stopped.

The aims which he and his collaborators had set themselves were well enough known. The Serbs, though capable of great duplicity in negotiations, enjoy a certain amount of crude but frank bragging about their ambitions. In a manner that most of us would find astonishing, Milošević spoke like this even on the very eve of his mass ethnic cleansing of the Kosovars. General Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, gave the following account of one conversation:

> *He [Milošević] said to us, "I will solve the Kosovo problem once and for all in spring 1999' ... We asked him, "How will you do it, Mr President?"*
>
> *"We will do to them what did to the Albanians in Drenica in 1945." So we said to him, "Mr President, we do not know what you did to the Albanians in 1945. Would you be so kind as to elaborate?"*
>
> *"It is quite simple. We got them together and we shot them."*
>
> *That was his answer.*[2]

Yet the other side to the question is equally important. The Serbian war machine was never as strong as the Serbs made out, or as most international observers thought. A great deal of silliness was talked about how Tito and the Partisans had held down between twenty and thirty German divisions during the Second World War.[3] *But this apparent parallel overlooked the enormously important consideration that Milošević's forces were up against numerous and highly motivated, if initially poorly armed, forces of Croats, Bosnians and Kosovars. It was the Serbs who were in this case the occupiers of other nations' territory and were thus in the equivalent position of the wartime German forces. Moreover, while it is true that by some measurements the Yugoslav army began the conflict as the fourth largest army in Europe, it was rapidly affected by desertions, poor morale and loss of weaponry which was either captured, destroyed or disabled. The Serb paramilitary organisations – known as Chetniks – upon which the regular forces increasingly relied were more highly motivated because of their visceral hatred of non-Serbs. But they too were generally more adept at raping and slaughtering civilians than at confronting well-disciplined military opponents.*

I would, though add a further reason why action was required to stop Milošević. In circumstances where great evils – and genocide is indeed such an evil–threaten, the West has a moral duty to prevent them if possible and to stop them if that is manageable. This assertion too could probably be justified on grounds of broad national interest. But the truth is that countries whose populations and political leaders once stop being indignant about wickedness on such a scale cease to be fully human. In some cases – and one such case was, surely, Bosnia – we know in our conscience that the situation which thousands of innocent men, women and children face cannot be endured and must no longer be ignored.

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VUKOVAR

It is important for all of us, particularly perhaps for political leaders, to come up at least once in our lives against the physical reality of evil. We know – or at least we should know – that evil exist. But it is only when we can see, touch and smell it, as I did on a visit to Vukovar in Eastern Croatia in September 1998, that it adopts a presence that is so real that one can never forget it.

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2 *Fourteenth Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence: The Lessons of Kosovo, 23 October 2000.*

3 *Professor Norman Stone has comprehensively demolished this and other myths, writing in the Sunday Times, 16 August 1992.*

CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS IN THE BALKANS

1987 – 2001

1987

- *April-December: Slobodan Milošević gains control of Serbian Communist Party*

1989

- *27 February: Yugoslav troops sent to suppress unrest in Kosovo*
- *8 May: Milošević becomes President of Serbia*
- *28 June: Milošević addresses mass rally of Serbs at Kosovo Polje, on the six hundredth anniversary of Battle of Kosovo*

1991

- *May: Beginning of Croatian-Serb rebellion*
- *25 June: Slovenia and Croatia declare independence*
- *27 June: Yugoslav army attacks Slovenia*
- *25 September: UN imposes arms embargo on all of former Yugoslavia*
- *19 November: Fall of Vukovar to Serb forces*

1992

- *2 January: UN mediator Cyrus Vance negotiates ceasefire for Croatia*
- *15 January: EC recognises Croatia and Slovenia*
- *21 February: UN sends fourteen thousand peacekeeping troops to Croatia*
- *29 February: Bosnia-Herzegovina declares independence. Bosnian Serbs proclaim separate state*
- *5 April: Bosnian Serbs begin siege of Sarajevo*

1993

- *2 January: Cyrus Vance and David Owen unveil plan at Geneva peace talks to divide Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous provinces*
- *22 February: UN sets up war crimes tribunal (ICTY) for former Yugoslavia*
- *6 May: UN declares six "safe areas" for Bosnian Muslims: Srebrenica, Žepa, Sarajevo, Bihać, Tuzla and Goražde*
- *15 – 16 May: In a referendum Bosnian Serbs vote for an independent Bosnian Serb state*

1994

- *5 February: Sixty killed and two hundred wounded in mortar attack on Sarajevo*
- *18 March: Bosnian government and Bosnian Croats sign US-brokered accord*
- *13 May: Five-nation Contact Group announces new plan and eventual partition of Bosnia*
- *20 July: Bosnian Serbs reject peace plan*
- *21 November: NATO launches major air strike on Serb airfield*
- *25 November: Serbs detain fifty-five Canadian peacekeepers*

1995

- *1 May: Ceasefire expires. Croatia launches offensive to retake Western Slavonia ("Operation Lightning")*
- *26 May: Serbs take more UN peacekeepers hostage. Eventually 370 sized*
- *28 May: Aircraft carrying Bosnian Foreign Minister Irgan Ljubijankić shot down by Serbs over Bihać; US, Britain and France send thousands more troops to Bosnia*
- *15 June: Serbs step up shelling of Sarajevo and other "safe area"*
- *11 July: Serbs overrun Srebrenica "safe area"*
- *12 – 13 July: Thousands of Muslim men detained (later murdered), while twenty thousand Muslim women, children and elderly are expelled to Tuzla*

- *25 July: Serbs take Žepa; War crimes tribunal indicts Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić and Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić for genocide in Bosnia. Croatian Serb leader Milan Martić charged with war crimes for missile attack on Zagreb*
- *4 August: Croatia launches assault on rebel Serbs in Knin (Serb "Krajina"), recapturing most Serb-held territory in four days (Operation "Storm")*
- *28 August: Bosnian Serb shell kills thirty-seven in Sarajevo market. UN secretly pulls peacekeepers out of Goražde*
- *30 August: NATO launches major air strikes on Serb guns around Sarajevo. Serbs retaliate by shelling Sarajevo*
- *1 November: Bosnian peace talks begin in Dayton, Ohio*
- *21 November: Dayton Accords signed. Fifty-one per cent of Bosnian territory granted to Muslim-Croat federation, 49 percent to Serbs*
- *22 November: UN Security Council suspends sanctions against Serbia*
- *23 November: Karadžić accepts peace plan*
- *30 November: UN votes to end peacekeeping mission by 31 January 1997*
- *1 December: NATO authorises deployment of sixty thousand troops to Bosnia*
- *14 December: Serbs, Bosnians and Croats sign peace plan. Bosnian and Serb governments agree to formal diplomatic recognition*
- *20 December: NATO takes over command of Bosnia peace mission*

WAR AGAINST SLOVENIA AND CROATIA

When Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991, they could be said from one point of view to be taking a step that had been logical ever since the creation of the first Yugoslavia – more accurately the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – in 1918. Multinational states are always inherently unstable. They can only work in one of two ways. The first is if each of the constituent peoples respects the others, and the state then functions as some kind of confederation. The second is if there is an authoritarian central power able to enforce its will. In Yugoslavia it was the second option that was applied, originally under the royal dictatorship and then under communism. Indeed, since its foundation Yugoslavia was under authoritarian or totalitarian rule for nearly all of its existence. Once the central power was weakened, the country suffered the same fate as that other artificial unit knitted together by communism, the Soviet Union.

This analysis contains part – but only part – of the truth. Tito's death in 1980 and the creation for a "revolving" federal presidency certainly did allow the inherent contradictions of Yugoslavia to become ever more obvious and the fissiparous tendencies to grow apace. But the drive of Slovenia, followed by Croatia, followed by Bosnia, for full independence can only really be originating from Serbia. Historians of the Balkans often trace the rise of an aggressive Serb nationalism aimed at the creation of a Greater Serbia, incorporating (as the phrase has it) "all Serbs everywhere" in one single Serb state, to developments in the nineteenth century. But in modern times it was the resurfacing of this programme in the form of a notorious Memorandum by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the mid-1980s which signalled the beginning of the madness that was to come. As communism lost its grip on the masses, hard-line nationalism offered a substitute for those who wanted power. Yesterday's Marxists in much of Eastern Europe suddenly became born-again patriots. But no one performed this chameleon-like self-transformation with greater cunning or more deadly consequences than Slobodan Milošević in Yugoslavia.

Milošević remains in some ways a mystery. Was he always just an opportunist? Or did he from the start subscribe to the hate-filled doctrines which his troops and the Serb paramilitaries put into practice? In any case, from the time that he used the ethnic disturbances in Kosovo in 1987 to oust his rivals and become the champion of the Greater Serbian dream, his whole existence depended upon the oppression, expulsion and when necessary murder of non-Serbs.

Without Milošević, the wars against the other constituent nations of Yugoslavia would probably not have happened at all. And if they had happened, they would have been far less bloody and prolonged. Milošević was able to give effect to the wildest and most terrible fantasies of the Balkan mind precisely because he was not

himself just a frenzied bigot. As a communist boss, he could use all the resources which the Party provided. As a smooth-talking negotiator, he was just the man to persuade a string of vain and gullible Westerns that he was part of the solution rather than the root of the problem.

Milošević had performed his own coup in the Yugoslav Communist Party, and Serbia had performed its coup within Yugoslavia, even before Slovenia and Croatia decided they had to leave. The Slovenes were able to escape and the Yugoslav army's attempts to crush them were ignominiously defeated. But when it came to Croatia, there was a substantial Serb minority whom Milošević and his friends were determined to unite with Serbia. Belgrade thus incited and armed Croatian Serbs to rise up against Zagreb and then sent in the Yugoslav army to "restore order" – which meant assisting the rebels and driving all non-Serbs from their land.

Faced with this challenge, Western leaders made, as I have mentioned, three key errors. First, they tried to keep Yugoslavia together when it was clearly no longer possible to do so. This gave the Yugoslav army the impression that there would be no outside opposition to its trying to suppress the separatists by force. Second, the international community imposed an arms embargo on all the component parts of the former Yugoslavia. This deprived the Slovenes, Croats and Bosnians of the means to defend themselves and left them heavily outgunned by the aggressor. Third, the attempt at even-handedness in assessing blame for what was occurring, when the truth was that one side was the aggressor and the other the victim, led the West into something approaching complicity with the crimes being committed. Far from being "the hour of Europe", as Jacques Poos (the then Foreign Minister of Luxembourg) proclaimed, it was the hour of Europe's shame.

In January 1992 Slovenia and Croatia finally received international recognition. This is still sometimes declared an error and even blamed for the outbreak of the war in Bosnia. But that is nonsense. International recognition of Croatia at least meant that there were now limits to what Belgrade could hope to achieve. The war in Croatia accordingly gradually ground to a halt. And as for Bosnia, the Serbs had begun their campaign of creating Serb enclaves there before the Bosnians declared independence in October 1991. The Serb war in Bosnia was not provoked – it was planned.

In any case, by February 1992 when the UN despatched fourteen thousand "peacekeepers" to Croatia, about a third of the country was in Serb hands. The UN force then presided over continued ethnic cleansing of Croats from Croatian territory and, as Croatia grew stronger, began to act as a force protecting the Serb aggressors. Meanwhile, Milošević and the army chiefs who had obligingly been permitted by the international negotiators to withdraw their heavy weapons from Croatia to Bosnia were now able to set them to work against the non-Serb inhabitants there.

The lessons of the conflict in Croatia were not to be learned for several more years. But they were already clear if anyone had been honest enough to deduce them.

- ***There should have been no attempt to keep Yugoslavia together, once the constituent nations showed they wished to leave it***
- ***The right to self-defence by those under attack should have been respected***
- ***And the early stages of aggression against Slovenia and Croatia should have drawn condemnation, followed by an ultimatum, followed by military action – air strikes, combined with the supply of arms to the besieged, would undoubtedly have saved Vukovar and other Croatian cities.***

WAR AGAINST BOSNIA

> *Looking back at the history of this war, one sees that the real causes of Bosnia's destruction have come from outside Bosnia itself, and have done so twice over: first in the form of the political strategy of the Serbian leadership, and then in the form of the miscomprehension and fatal interference of the leaders of the West.*[4]

This judgement by Noel Malcolm, the soundest and wisest commentator on Balkan affairs today, seems to me to be precisely right.

The background to the Bosnian genocide was provided by the same odious doctrine as lay behind the slaughter at

4 *Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London, 1994), p.251.*

Vukovar, but whereas towards the Croats it manifested itself in hatred, towards the Muslims it spoke the language of contempt. Anyone who wants to read the evidence for this need only consult Professor Norman Cigar's profound and disturbing volume, Genocide in Bosnia.[5]

This kind of Greater Serbian racist thinking was summed up in the words of the West's one-time heroine and now indicted war criminal Mrs Biljana Plavšić about the Muslim Bosnians, whom she described as "a genetic defect on the Serbian body".[6]

But the outside world also played its part in what followed. In particular, the attempt at "even-handedness", which robbed the West's approach towards Croatia of both moral integrity and practical effect, continued in Bosnia. Thus the international community deprived the Bosnian Muslims of the chance to arm themselves. Yet it did not itself afford them any serious protection from Bosnian Serb forces, which had been provided with a well-stocked arsenal by the Yugoslav army. The West's equivocation damaged our own interests too. It outraged the Muslim world, which claimed – not without reason – that atrocities on this scale would never have been permitted if they had been perpetrated against Jews or Christians. By the end of the conflict, Islamic extremists had begun to appear in Bosnia, n area where there had traditionally been exemplary tolerance and where Islam had always had a distinctly European countries which wavered till the end – recognised these dangers and acted upon them. But by then some two hundred thousand people were dead.

The siege of Sarajevo began in April 1992 and continued until February 1996. During that period the suffering of the population was enormous. But arguably what was happening elsewhere in Bosnia was still worse. Far away from the television cameras, campaigns of violence and terror, involving mass rape, unspeakable torture and concentration camps, were employed by the Bosnian Serb leadership, with the support from Belgrade, to achieve the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs from what its proponents claimed was historic Serb territory. All in all over two million people (out of a pre-war population of 4.3 million) were driven out of their homes.

An estimated nine hundred thousand people took refuge in neighbouring countries and in Western Europe, while 1.3 million were displaced within Bosnia.[7] *In Croatia and Bosnia, particularly, the burden of caring for these people was crushing.*

These refugee flows were destabilising, and were intended to be so. The arrival of thousands of Muslim refugees in Central Bosnia, shifting the ethnic balance between Muslims and Croats, was an important contributory factor to the open warfare which broke out in March 1993 between the two.[8]

During this whole period international conferences were held and international mediators were appointed in order to try to bring what were called the "warring parties" to the negotiating table. I have no doubt that the mediators did their best. But mediation could be no substitute for reversing aggression, and without the West summoning up the will to do that the mediators found themselves sucked into a process which steadily entrenched and legitimised the ascendancy of aggressor. Indeed, sometimes the negotiators unwittingly created the conditions for more bloodshed.

In reality, by the end of 1992 the Serbs had seized most of the territory that they thought they could hold. Although constituting just 31 per cent of the population they had thus gained control of over 70 per cent of the land. From that point on, their main purpose was to expel the non-Serbs from it so as to remove all trace of them, their cultures and their religions. The Serbs needed time to proceed with this, particularly in areas where there were large numbers of well-established Muslim and Croat communities to dislodge. The international community gave them that time.

Even as the Bosnian Muslims recovered and regrouped, forming a better-trained army and acquiring more weapons, the Serbs were able to hold the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, to ransom, shelling its population whenever they chose. And the international community's responses were largely ineffectual, and sometimes worse.

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5 *Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing (Texas A&M University Press, 1995). Professor Cigar and Dr Malcolm were among those who provided me with invaluable briefing during the Bosnian crisis.*

6 *Quoted by The Times, 12 January 2001.*

7 *UNHCR figures.*

8 *Information has also surfaced since the death of President Tudjman confirming Zagreb's involvement in these matters, and more revelations are possible.*

What the West should have done was to work out and put into effect a coherent programme to defeat the aggressor and reverse the aggression. Of course, this was never going to be easy. It would have taken time. It would also have entailed abandoning the pretence that "peacekeeping" was the West's objective. The arms embargo against the Bosnians would have had to be lifted. The Russians would have had to be marginalised and their objections ignored. And the only global power – America – rather than the deeply divided Europeans, would have had to take the lead.

In fact, above all, necessary to shift the balance of power against the Serbs on the ground. This meant bringing together the Muslims and Croats. In March 1994 the conflict between them was ended by an agreement brokered in Washington. A Muslim-Croat Bosnian Federation was established and at the same time a con-federal agreement between Bosnia and Croatia. The new alliance was also strengthened by the provision of training and weapons for the Croatian army, which was thus turned into an extremely effective force.

Seeing the way the tide was beginning to turn, Slobodan Milošević decided that the time had come to settle. The practical limits of Greater Serbia had been reached. Milošević must also have known that the ill-organised gangsters who controlled the so-called Serb Krajina area of Croatia and the Bosnian Serb "Republic" were a good deal weaker than the West thought.[9] Consequently, in the summer of 1994 he tried to induce the Bosnian Serbs to accept what would have amounted to a partition of Bosnia highly favourable to the Serbs, who would have received 49 per cent of Bosnia, while the Muslim-Croat federation received 51 per cent.

The Bosnian Serbs, however, were confident enough of their own position and contemptuous enough of the West's threats to refuse the deal and to carry out new offensives. NATO accordingly responded with air strikes. The Serbs then retaliated by seizing more than four hundred international peacekeepers. The consequences of past follies were never more evident. Western forces in Bosnia were by now not an asset, they were a liability, because they were potential hostages.

1995 was the year of decision- in May the Croatian army retook Serb-held West Slavonia. The Serbs in retaliation fired rockets at Zagreb, killing six and wounding two hundred civilians. But the rapid success of the Croatian campaign had openly exposed just how weak the Serb rebels in occupied Croatia now were. The Serbs in Bosnia imitated the tactics of their counterparts in Croatia by attacking civilian targets. Thus in June they stepped up the shelling of Sarajevo and, worst of all, in July they overran the so-called UN "safe haven" of Srebrenica. For the West this was perhaps the most humiliating and disgraceful episode of the whole crisis: and for the Muslim inhabitants of the town it meant expropriation, expulsion and – for about seven thousands of them – death.

There has been much rewriting of history about what now happened. The truth is that Croatia, with support from the largely Muslim Bosnian army and from Bosnian Croat forces, acted to do what the international community for four long, shameful years had failed to do. Croatia and her allies won back much of their land from the Serbs and by their victory created the circumstances for a return to some semblance of peace and order. On 4 August the Croatian army retook Knin and quickly swept through the Krajina area. Having insufficient heavy weapons – because of the West's foolish arms embargo – the Muslims were not able to achieve comparable successes. But the fact remains that had it not been for a new intervention by the West – whose leaders were as always keen to snatch at least partial defeat from the mouth of complete victory – the main Bosnian Serb-held city, Banja Luka, would also have fallen. Had this happened, Bosnia would have been rescued as a united country in which there was some prospect of different ethnic communities eventually being able to live together under a democratically elected central authority. Banja Luka, we should note, had itself been the scene of massive ethnic cleansing by the Serbs who had burnt down the hated mosques and Catholic churches which might serve to remind them of the multi-faith and multiracial past. If anywhere deserved to be liberated from the ethnic cleansers it was Banja Luka.

It is not possible, particularly after years of such brutality, to conduct even just wars without loss to civilians. The Serbs who now streamed out of the retaken areas were some of them fleeing retribution. Some were doubtless intimidated. Many more were falsely persuaded by their leaders that they risked wholesale massacre. There were indeed within the reconquered Krajina area episodes of killing, looting and burning by the incoming Croats.

But these culpable incidents do not detract from the fact that the defeat by the Croatians and Bosnians of the Serbs in 1995 was immensely beneficial for the region and indeed for the West. Without that defeat, Balkan

9 *I was told this myself at this time by a Croatian and a Bosnian General, and, of course, they were proved right.*

genocide and Western humiliation would have continued. To try, as some have done. To equate the operation launched to retake Croatian land with earlier acts of Serb aggression is a travesty.

NATO air strikes against Serb artillery around Sarajevo at this time also provided valuable support for the Croat and Muslim forces. Disproving all the learned nonsense emanating from military sources, it was shown that air strikes could indeed work without large-scale deployment of ground troops. The task on the ground could be left to local not international forces – as long as the former were sufficiently armed. And just in case anyone imagines that this analysis is merely hindsight, perhaps I could quote myself three years before the event:

> *It is argued by some that nothing can be done by the West unless we are prepared to risk permanent involvement in a Vietnam – or Lebanon-style conflict and potentially high Western casualties. That is partly alarmism, partly an excuse for inertia. There is a vast difference between a full-scale land invasion like Desert Storm and a range of military interventions from lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, through supplying arms to Bosnian forces, to direct strikes on military targets and communications.*

I went on to argue that in the event of continuing support for Bosnian Serb aggression by Serbia itself:

> *... military retaliation should follow, including aerial bombardment of bridges on the Drina linking Bosnia and Serbia, of military convoys, of gun positions around (the besieged) Sarajevo and Goražde, and of military stores and other installations useful in the war. It should be made clear that while this is not a war against the Serbian people, even installations on the Serbian side of the border may be attacked if they play an important role in the war.*[10]

What happened in 1995 showed that such tactics work. But it was only during the latter stages of the Kosovo campaign in 1999 that my prescription was applied – though still, as I shall describe, with insufficient commitment.

The Dayton Accords which were signed in the autumn of 1995 still provide the framework within which Bosnia functions – or does not function. Like all the previous partition plans they represented an excessive concern for the (now defeated) Bosnian Serbs who had caused the whole problem at the first place. The Serbs were given a separate autonomous entity, the Republika Srpska. It was to be part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the names of the institutions themselves betrayed the thinking: while the Serb entity was called a "republic", Bosnia-Herzegovina itself lost that title.

The Dayton Accords are enormously detailed, and this also is significant. Different and contrary trends and tensions were involved. The Muslims stressed those aspects which reinforced the territorial and institutional integrity of the state. The Serbs and to a lesser extent the Croats emphasised those which devolved power locally. The undertaking which was fundamental to the whole settlement, though, was that the refugees should be allowed to return to their homes. If this did not happen Dayton meant partition and victory for the ethnic cleansers and their sponsors in Belgrade.

And that is exactly how it has so far turned out. While progress has been made in returning refugees to the territories of the Muslim-Croat Federation, the authorities in the Republika Srpska have remained determined to prevent members of the minority communities coming back to the homes from which they were driven. Thus of the 715,000 refugees who have returned, 80 per cent have gone back to the Federation and only 20 per cent to the Serb-controlled areas.[11] *It is sometimes argued that these figures do not matter. "You cannot force people to live together if they don't want to," the saying runs. And that much, of course, is true. But it is not acceptable that people who do want to return should be stopped from doing so.*

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10 *My article in the New York Time, 6 August 1992. For an account of my involvement in attempts to rescue Bosnia, see The Path to Power, pp. 514-17.*

11 *Bosnian government figures, as of 30 January 2001.*

4. HUMAN BEHAVIOUR UNDER CONDITIONS OF STATE UNREST ... AND OTHER FACTS

COMMENT:

Why did I put cases of such social behaviour in this HANDBOOK?

What kind of countries and nations are they?! Civilized, democratic, reach, organized, powerful ... and what happens in cases of relatively harmless disorders.

I leave the explanations to social psychologists and others.

Note: Ask yourself what happens when aggression and war completely destroy state, social and economic structure.

In contrast to the USA, Germany, Britain, in BiH this would all fall under the "JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE" - CROATIAN JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE.

Because "someone should have known" (WHAT?), "Someone should have predicted " (WHAT, WHEN?), "someone should have been able to prevent" (WHAT, WHEN?), "Someone should have been able to find and punish the guilty" (HOW, WITH WHAT HUMAN RESOURCES, IN WHICH CONDITIONS?).

MORALISTIC PHILIPPICS AND LAW SHOULD NOT LIVE UNDER THE SAME ROOF.

TO STATEMENTS LIKE: "*THERE WERE WAR CRIMES*", "*SOMEONE MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE*", RESPONSE SHOULD BE CLEARLY GIVEN:

YES, THERE WERE WAR CRIMES AND THE PERPETRATOR IS GUILTY.

IF SOMEONE HAS TO BE GUILTY, LET THE GUILT FALL ON ALL OF YOU WHO WERE ABLE TO PREVENT THE AGGRESSION ON TIME AND IN A PROPER MANNER.

Do not hang PEDRO, this is not a good solution.

Human behavior in civil unrest and war

- Examples:
  - Hurricane Katrina
  - New York blackout
  - Theo van Gogh
  - Riots in Paris
  - Massacre in My Lai, Vietnam

Table of contents

- Theory:
  - Ochocracy
  - Looting
- Examples:
  - Hurricane Katrina
  - New York blackout
  - Theo van Gogh
  - Riots in Paris
  - Massacre in My Lai, Vietnam
- Conclusion
- References

Theory

Ochlocracy - Mob rule

- ***Definition:***
  - Ruling of unorganized groups of people. This term implies that formal authority does not exist in the state. 'Ochlocracy' is different from term anarchy because anarchy is a state of complete chaos, while in 'ochlochracy' behavior, smaller groups exist and operate. These groups function on principal "the stronger one rules" , until the stronger groups comes and take over the control. These groups are for that reason very local and temporary.

- ***Ochlocracy and crime:***
  - Term 'mob' is sometimes used for organized crime. As it is relatively easy crime takes advantage of situation where law enforcement lacks and general public is confused, the term "mob" is also used for ruling of those people which purposely create groups (mobs) and lead them to violent behavior.

Looting (connected to robbing)

- ***Definition:***
  - Taking goods by using force as a part of military of political victory, or during natural disaster, war, terrorist attack, riots etc. Term looting was in the beginning only used for taking goods as a result of military victory, not only by the winner army but as well as domestic population which has used the situation for their own personal benefit.
- ***Reasons:***
  - Lack of government ability to protect its population from violence has different reasons – being paralyzed during terrorist attack or natural disaster, as well as lack of communication channels. In some cases of natural disaster taking property of others is necessary for survival. But in most cases looting has an opportunistic character, as criminals believe that the crime will go unpunished and that committing crime in such conditions is "not so bad" as everyone is doing it. Sometimes looters believe that if they don't steel it, someone else will.
- ***Punishment*** :
  - Due to almost impossible conditions to punish all looters, even in western democracies death penalties can be undertaken. By using death penalty (allowing police to shoot at looters), the damage to economy can be somewhat decreased.
- ***Looting in history:***
  - After death of Valentiniana iii in 455, vandals destroyed Rome.
  - Looting was spread out in Moscow before Napoleon troops went in the city.
  - In 1992 during time of Rodney King riots, due to severe looting some shop owners defended their shops with fire arms.

Examples

Hurricane Katrina – August 2005 (part 1)

Number of killed and dead persons, crime statistics:

- It is impossible to come up with the correct number of crimes during natural disaster due to several reasons:
  - Small number of victims report the attack as they don't believe that criminals in such conditions can be found.
  - In conditions where there are lot of deaths, it is difficult to determine direct and indirect causes of death (some died because the tree fell on their head, some as the hospital did not have enough medicines, and some were homicide victims or committed a suicide).
- On Columbia University /The Earth Institute, J. Mutter has conducted a research on number of dead after Katrina, as it was an issue to determine number of dead due to hurricane Katrina. He posted the complete list on the web page http://www.katrinalist.columbia.edu/ :
  - Total number died due to Katrina: 1887 people.
  - Out of this number 93 unidentified persons, 595 disappeared, 1292 died.

Hurricane Katrina – August 2005 (part 2)

New Orleans Police Department still does not have data about crimes committed several days/weeks after hurricane Katrina

Offense	1999	2000	Change 1999-2000	2001	2002	Change 2001-2002	2003
Murder	159	203	27.67%	212	257	21.23%	274
Rape	280	225	-19.64%	209	162	-22.49%	213
Armed Robbery	1981	1810	-8.63%	2139	1517	-29.08%	1533
Simple Robbery	752	611	-18.75%	639	477	-25.35%	536
Assault	2760	2304	-16.52%	2677	2142	-19.99%	2033
Violent Crime Total	**5932**	**5153**	**-13.13%**	**5876**	**4555**	**-22.48%**	**4589**
Burglary	5626	5230	-7.04%	5261	4759	-9.54%	4864
Theft	17086	15575	-8.84%	16178	14325	-11.50%	12702
Auto Theft	7118	7866	10.51%	8751	7566	-13.54%	6869
Non-Violent Crime Total	**29830**	**28671**	**-3.89%**	**30199**	**26650**	**-11.75%**	**24435**
Total Index Crimes	**35762**	**33824**	**-5.42%**	**36075**	**31205**	**-13.50%**	**29024**

Source: New Orleans Police Department, Technical Services Bureau, Information Systems & Services Division

Hurricane Katrina – August 2005 (part 3)

- Even police officers were involved in looting in New Orleans (different films on Internet available).
- National guard had a permission to shoot as looting got out of control.
- Police officers shot at what they thought were looters and fatal incident of "Danzinger Bridge" occurred – 6 contractors out of total 14, members of Army Corps of Engineers were traveling across the Danziger Bridge under police escort when from the other side police officers opened fire.
- Police officers had to put barricade around police stations in order to avoid sniper shots.
- It was shot at the helicopter.
- American government and president did not react in time: buses and trains were not used for evacuation, Red Cross was not granted access to the city, government did not know the location of the hungry refugees to send help
- Journalists had number of rape stories but few victims reported to the police.
- Witness Justice, organization which offers psychological help over the phone, received hundreds of calls from rape, attack or robbery victims after Katrina.

New York blackout - 1977

- The blackout lasted 25 hours – the lights went out at 21:30, burglaries started at 21:40.
- 3776 – number of arrests when the police stopped arresting looters and focused on keeping crime within reasonable limits.
- 418 police officers were beaten and wounded.
- 2000 – shops and workshops were destroyed – the material damage were approximately 1 billion dollars.
- Hundreds of persons reported to hospitals and emergency rooms.
- 44 fireman were injured.
- 4 people were killed.
- 1037 fires – 6 times more than the usual number.
- 20 millions dollars were financial damages as the shops remained closed the day after.
- Majority of robbed stores were owned by white people, mostly Jewish, while shops whose owners were black, were spared.

Theo van Gogh – (July 1957 – November 2004)

- Dutch Film director, Film producer, Columnist, Author and Actor.
- Well known for his Criticism of Islam, particularly after the 11 September 2001 attacks.
- Working from a script written by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, in 2004 van Gogh created the 10-minute Anti-Islam movie Submission.
- The movie deals with the topic of violence against women in some Islamic societies; telling the stories of four abused Muslim women.
- Mohammed Bouyeri murdered Van Gogh in November 2004 (shot him eight times, then cut his throat, and stabbed him twice in the chest.
- Following the murder, violent incidents had started: The Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism recorded a total of 106 violent incidents against Muslim targets in November.
- The National Dutch Police Services Agency (KLPD) recorded 31 occasions of violence against mosques and Islamic schools between 23. November and 13. March 2005.
- Report of Anne Frank Foundation and the University of Leiden counted a total of 174 violent incidents between 2.-30. November - mosques were the target of violence 47 times, and churches 13 times.

Riots in Paris – September 2005

- Stared at 17:20 on September 27th 2005 in Clichy-sous-Bois as policeman attacked three boys of different nationality – Arab, black and a Turkish boy.
- Lasted for 20 nights.
- 274 riots were happening in 274 cities.
- 8,970 destroyed vehicles.
- €200 millions of material damage.
- 2,888 arrests.
- 1 death (Jean-Jacques Le Chenadec).
- 126 policeman and fireman were wounded.

My Lai Massacre – March 1968 (part 1)

Key facts:

- The My Lai Massacre was the mass murder of 347 to 504 unarmed citizens in South Vietnam, entirely civilians and some of them women and children, conducted by U.S. Army forces on March 16, 1968 during the Vietnam war
- Many of the victims were sexually abused, beaten, tortured, or maimed, and some of the bodies were found mutilated
- Charlie Company landed following a short artillery and helicopter gunship preparation. The Americans found no enemy fighters in the village on the morning of March 16. Many soldiers suspected there were NLF troops in the village, hiding underground in the homes of their elderly parents or their wives. The U.S. soldiers, one platoon of which was led by Second Lieutenant William Calley, went in shooting at a "suspected enemy position".
- After the first civilians were killed and wounded by the indiscriminate fire, the soldiers soon began attacking anything that moved, humans and animals alike, with firearms, grenades and bayonets.

My Lai Massacre – March 1968 (part 2)

Covering up the Investigation:

- Word of the atrocities did not reach the American public until November 1969, when journalist Seymour Hersh published a story detailing his conversations with a Vietnam veteran, Ron Ridenhour. Ridenhour learned of the events at My Lai from members of Charlie Company who had been there. Before speaking with Hersh, he had appealed to Congress, the White House, and the Pentagon to investigate the matter. The military investigation resulted in Calley's being charged with murder in September 1969 -- a full two months before the Hersh story hit the streets
- Three U.S. servicemen who made an effort to halt the massacre and protect the wounded were denounced by U.S. Congressmen, received hate mail, death threats and mutilated animals on their doorsteps. Only 30 years after the event were their efforts honored.
- Of the 26 US soldiers initially charged with criminal offences for their actions at My Lai, only William Calley was convicted

My Lai Massacre – March 1968 (part 3)

Quotes of the horror happening:

- BBC News:
  " Soldiers went berserk, gunning down unarmed men, women, children and babies. Families which huddled together for safety in huts or bunkers were shown no mercy. Those who emerged with hands held high were murdered. ... Elsewhere in the village, other atrocities were in progress. Women were gang raped; Vietnamese who had bowed to greet the Americans were beaten with fists and tortured, clubbed with rifle butts and stabbed with bayonets. Some victims were mutilated with the signature "C Company" carved into the chest. By late morning word had got back to higher authorities and a cease-fire was ordered. My Lai was in a state of carnage. Bodies were strewn through the village."

- Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident
  "He fired at it [the baby] with a .45. He missed. We all laughed. He got up three or four feet closer and missed again. We laughed. Then he got up right on top and plugged him."

Conclusion

- **With several examples - hurricane Katrina, electricity shut down in New York, case of Theo van Gogh and violent events in Paris - is shown that police and army was not capable to react adequately and prevent crime, even in peaceful countries when the riots and natural disasters happen**

- **Also it was shown on example of My Lai, Vietnam how even professional army can easily go out of control and conduct a massacre without orders from superiors**
- **It took more than one year for a My Lai crime to reach public as American army did everything in their power to hide it – the question which must be asked here is: how may similar situations happened to Americans and the cover up succeeded?**

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DW /DEUTSCHE WELLE/ 5th January 2016

Sinister New Year's Eve

Few hundred men attacked woman in the centre of Cologne during the New Year's Eve celebration. Some have been sexually harassed, and many looted. Similar cases have been reported in Hamburg and Stuttgart.

Authorities of the city of Cologne are still analysing everything that happened during the New Year's Eve in front of the city's main train station (photo). Mayor Henriette Reker has called a crisis meeting, which will include city authorities and police, and has strongly condemned the attacks on women.

According to eyewitnesses, some 1,000 men gathered at the centre of Cologne during the New Year's Eve, "who gave the appearance of being Arab or North African" in background. These statements were also confirmed by the police. This crowed of men separated into several groups that surrounded women, touched them inappropriately, and forcibly took their money and cell phones.

Wolfgang Albers, Chief of Police in Cologne on Monday (4th January) talked about „sexual assaults in the massive form", and said there was also one rape incident. Meanwhile about 90 women filed criminal charges to the police. It is assumed that the number of women who were harassed and whose belongings were stolen is even greater.

Minister of the Interior of the North Rahin-Westphalia province, Ralf Jäger reacted very harshly: „We will not allow men from North Africa to organize in groups and to humiliate women by sexual assaulting them in extremely arrogant manner. Therefor police must consistently investigate these cases and enhance its presence on the streets."

Police department reports that patrols that were on duty that night were unaware of these events, and that the big picture started to emerge later during the New Year's Eve, only after women started to report incidents.

Crisis meeting

Mayor Reker has called a crisis meeting with the Cologne Police in order to shed light on these events. A special commission will investigate whether the attackers contacted each other and whether they organized themselves through social networks prior to the attacks. Examination of the video surveillance footage and footage recorded on private mobile phones is currently in process.

Reker told the newspaper Kölner Stadt Anzeiger that this is a horrible event, and that it is unacceptable for people who visit Cologne to be afraid of attacks. "We cannot tolerate a legal vacuum here, and police must take all necessary measures to protect people from attacks, especially women." It is possible that the video surveillance in the area around the main train station is going to be intensified.

* * *

INDEX.HR

German police identified 16 attackers from Cologne, and received as many as 121 reports on abuse

Written by: **Hina**
Thursday, 7th January 2016 at 16:54

GERMAN police reported that they had identified 16 suspects and received 121 charges after more than dozens of attacks on women during the New Year celebrations in Cologne, which profoundly shocked Germany.

Investigation department "New Year's Eve", with 80 police officers working on the investigation, identified 16 young men, mostly from North Africa, who might be involved in the events, local police reported in their statement.

Police will examine the video surveillance footage and witness testimonies in order to determine the degree of involvement of these people, the source said.

Police received 121 charges, of which one third relates to sexual offenses. In other cases, injury and theft are investigated.

German daily newspaper Bild and the Internet portal of the weekly news Der Spiegel report on the police charges from 4th January, three days after the event described as chaos on the New Year's Eve in Cologne, also accusing police of negligence.

Police officer who submitted the indictment said that weeping women reported about the sexual assaults and that victims and witnesses were also threatened. Police officers and people passing by were able to prevent rapes, and women, accompanied or alone, suffered unspeakable sexual abuse.

Police was not able to suppress all attacks because there were too many of them at the same time, the police officer summed up.

The evening was also marked by the fireworks over the masses gathered in the city centre, which according to the report could have been fatal. Attacks were also reported in Stuttgart and Hamburg, but in fewer numbers.

Authorities do not yet have information on the participation of refugees in these attacks. Critics of Chancellor Angela Merkel, point out that the witnesses and victims mentioned attackers who looked as "North Africans" or Arabs.

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RTL- news.hr

FEAR IN GERMANY

ATTACKS ON FOREIGNERS IN DRESDEN: TWO BOMBS EXPLODED IN FRONT OF THE MOSQUE AND THE CONGRESS CENTRE

27th September 2016 at 10:43

HINA

AP

Police suspects that attacks are linked to the holiday of German unification on 3rd October, with central celebration taking place next week precisely in the capital of Saxony.

DRESDEN – In the East German city of Dresden two explosive devices exploded on Monday evening in front of a mosque and a convention centre, but no one was hurt, police said on Tuesday.

"The matter concerns two related explosions in which no one was hurt and no one has claimed responsibility for the attacks, but we are suspecting that the motive for the attack is xenophobia", said the head of the Dresden police department, **Horst Kretschmer**.

Police also suspects that attacks are linked to the holiday of German unification on 3rd October, with central celebration taking place next week precisely in the capital of Saxony.

Dresden mosque and convention centre suffered minor damages.

When the first explosion happened, Imam was inside the mosque with his wife and two sons, but no one was injured. A little after, the second homemade bomb exploded damaging the International Congress Centre, after which bar at the nearby hotel was evacuated.

Police have raised security measures in particular in the vicinity of institutions such as the Islamic centre.

Antagonism towards the refugee policy of the federal government and **Angela Merkel** is particularly pronounced in the east part of the country where a number of arsons and attacks against institutions connected with refugees are recorded.

* * *

ADVANCE.HR

6th December 2015

Attacks on refugees in Germany growing in numbers – over 220 attacks, and just four convictions



Alarming numbers show that violence against refugees in Germany is skyrocketing – according to Die Zeit, this year there were a total of 222 attacks on homes accommodating refugees. It is important to point out that only four cases ended up with court sentences.

The attacks on reception centres and other locations where refugees are located vary from attacks with stones to attacks with Molotov cocktails and setting the centres on fire. Very few of these attacks are being investigated and even fewer come to court, German newspaper report.

In 93 cases of setting refugee centres on fire, incidents took place at a time when people were inside these centres. In other words, it didn't matter to perpetrators whether someone is going to be severely hurt or possibly killed.
source(s): www.rt.com | Die Zeit

Crime and immigration in Germany

In 2015, immigrants mostly came from the ten counties listed below.

The graph on the right shows the proportion of immigrant crime by nationality



Crime by migrants in Germany went up by 79% last year, with offences including sex assaults and murder on the rise

- **Offences committed by migrants in Germany up by 92,000 in 2015**
- **In total, 208,344 offences committed by migrants in Germany last year**
- **While crimes by migrants rose 79% - number of migrants rose by 440%**
- **For the latest news from Germany visit www.dailymail.co.uk/germany**

By Allan Hall In Berlin for MailOnline

Published: 12:47 GMT, 17 February 2016 | Updated: 15:24 GMT, 17 February 2016

Crimes committed by migrants in **Germany** increased by 79 per cent in 2015,

according to figures released by the Federal Criminal Office.

Nearly one in five offences committed by migrants or refugees in Germany last year were violent crimes, such as assaults, robberies or 'threatening behaviour'.

However, despite reports of sex mob attacks and public molestation cases involving asylum seekers across Germany, just one per cent of crimes committed by migrants were sex crimes.

And while the number of crimes by immigrants increased in comparison over 2014 to 2015 by 79 per cent, the number of refugees at the same time rose by 440 percent.

Notably, genuine asylum seekers from countries like Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan were substantially more law-abiding than economic refugees from the Balkan countries.

This the third situational 'Crime in the context of immigration' report of the Federal Criminal Office (BKA) - which is classified for police and civil servants eyes only - but was leaked to best selling newspaper Bild.

It covers crimes by immigrants from January to December last year, a time when over a million asylum seekers poured into Germany. The data comes from 13 of the 16 states which make up the Federal Republic.

The number of criminal offences committed by asylum seekers rose to 208,344 -92 000 more than in the previous year. But the BKA states; 'The vast majority of asylum seekers commit no crime'.

Crime rose steadily in the first six months of the year but tapered of to become almost stagnant by the end of it, even though more refugees arrived in the second half.

The nature of the offences appears to be mostly minor: 28,712 cases of riding on public transport without paying the fare, 52,167 incidents of forging paperwork in a bid to get money, 85,035 cases of theft, mosty shoplifting - nearly double those of 2014.

Assaults, robberies and what Germany classes as 'predatory extortion' and 'offences against person freedom,' including threatening behaviour, doubled over 2014 with 36,010 cases, accounting for 18 percent of the crime total.

And sex crimes - the fuel for right-wing extremists who have launched a black propaganda campaign on the Internet to brand all asylum seekers as rapists and child molestors following the events in Cologne on New Year's Eve - remain low, under one percent.

Logged last year were 1,688 cases of sexual offences, including against children, including 458 rapes or acts of 'sexual coercion.'

Hamburg, Bremen and North Rhine-Westphalia, three states governed by centre-left SPD parliaments, did not deliver refugee criminal data to the BKA.

That means the events in Cologne on December 31, when hundreds of women were sexually molested or robbed by marauding gangs of immigrant men, are not included in these statistics.

The report goes on to state that there were 240 attempted murders by immigrants - 127 in 2014 - and in two-thirds of all cases, perpetrators and victims were of the same nationality. One German was murdered, 27 immigrants were killed by other immigrants.

Syrians are officially listed as making up the bulk of asylum seekers - 48 percent - with them being suspected of 24 percent of the crime. Serbs account for two percent of refugees but are suspected of 13 percent of the total number of crimes.

'Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis are the largest group of immigrants, but are less frequently delinquent in relation to other groups of migrants,' said Bild.

'Proportionately more offenders were found among immigrants from the Balkans (Kosovo, Albania, Serbia), Eritrea and Nigeria.'

As to terror suspects hiding among genuine refugees, the report stated that there were 266 instances individuals suspected of being 'fighters and members of terrorist organizations abroad.'

Eighty were ruled out, 186 cases are still being probed. The report called the infilration of militants into the country 'a growing trend.'

Friedrich Kotter, head of Kotter, Germany's biggest security company after Securitas, said much of the problem was to do with boredom, with people having nothing to do in the asylum centres.

He said: 'In the first few weeks it was always quiet after they arrived, but then they started to get really bored. There is also intercultural stress in the large camps.

'They simply need something to do, challenges, for example learning a language.

'Simply sitting there is not sustainable even in the short-term. The government needs to do more otherwise it is easy to predict where this will go.'

His fears that asylum accommodation is the root of criminality were confirmed in Bavaria where Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann, 59, from the CSU (Christian Social Union) said there had been 17,246 police actions in Bavarian asylum accommodation last year. In comparison to 2014, that was an increase of 270 per cent.

Speaking to the local government he said: 'The police are absolutely at their limits in keeping the situation under control.' He added that the police are also increasingly the target for aggression and in particular women police officers.

He said: 'In September last year, there were 481 asylum seeker suspects, but in December it was already 735.'

ALJAZEERA

Thousands of hate crime incidents following Brexit

9th July 2016 Updated 07:27 CEST

After the campaign on Britain's exit from the European Union until 30th June more than 3,000 hate crime incidents were recorded all around the country

Head of the National Police Chief's Council said that after the Britain's exit or stay campaign in the period from 16th until 30th June, 3,000 hate crimes were recorded all around the country.

"*We are seeing an increase in reports of hate crime incidents in recent weeks to True Vision*", said the member of the Council in charge of the hate crimes.

"*This is unacceptable and it undermines diversity and tolerance instead of praising them*", said Hamilton.

Increase of crimes

Prime Minister David Cameron has raised this issue before Parliament, reminding them, as he said, of "*heinous*" graffiti written on the Polish Community Centre, directly targeting members of national minorities.

"*We will not tolerate hate crimes, this must be completely eradicated*" Cameron told deputies.

The peak in number of reported crimes was on 25th June, one day after the referendum results were announced, when 289 hate crime incidents were reported around Britain.

According to AFP, out of 3,076 reported hate crimes, most of them were related to harassments, assaults, verbal abuse and spitting.

STATISTICAL DATA ON CRIME IN SOME COUNTRIES AT PEACE: USA, GERMANY, ENGLAND AND WALES, ITALY

(HOW TO DETECT A CRIME AND PUNISH THE PERPETRATOR – PERCENTAGES)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Crimes recorded in criminal statistics										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Grand total of recorded crimes	24.537.600	23.677.800	11.605.751	11.876.669	11.877.218	8.922,76	8.517,19	4.124,00	4.162,61	4.118,76
Intentional homicide, completed	14.276	12.658	15.517	16.037	16.204	5,19	4,55	5,51	5,62	5,62
Unintentional homicide	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intentional homicide, intent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intentional homicide, committed with a firearm	9.257	8.259	8.493	8.890	9.669	3,37	2,97	3,02	3,12	3,25
Major assaults	976.580	916.380	910.744	909.023	894.348	335,12	329,63	323,62	318,60	310,14
Assaults	2.315.380	2.238.480				841,96	805,21			
Rapes	93.140	89.110	90.186	90.863	95.136	33,87	32,05	32,05	31,85	32,99
Robberies	447.190	409.670	407.842	423.557	420.637	162,61	147,36	144,92	148,45	145,87
Thefts	7.376.300	6.957.400	6.965.957	9.824.498	9.847.621	2.682,29	2.502,66	2.475,27	3.464,38	3.414,94
Automobile theft	1.242.800	1.147.300	1.165.559	1.228.391	1.246.096	451,93	412,70	414,17	430,53	432,12
Burglaries	2.332.700	2.099.700	2.049.946	2.116.531	2.151.875	848,25	755,19	728,42	741,81	746,22
Frauds	394.600	371.800	-	-	-	143,49	133,74	-	-	-
Embezzlements	17.100	17.300	-	-	-	6,22	6,22	-	-	-
Drug offences	1.559.100	1.557.100	-	-	-	566,95	560,11	-	-	-
Bribery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kidnappings	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Persons arrested										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total arrested	10.225.920	8.352.161	8.166.560	8.465.363	8.505.348	5.502,39	5.240,17	4.969,19	4.767,08	4.738,35
Intentional homicide, completed	12.318	8.096	7.489	8.680	8.515	6,63	5,08	4,56	4,89	4,74
Unintentional homicide	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intentional homicide, intent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Major assaults	358.506	291.601	289.072	303.711	300.953	192,91	182,95	175,89	171,03	167,66
Assaults	943.293	762.680	763.221	813.792	812.891	507,57	478,51	464,40	458,27	452,86
Rapes	21.646	16.609	16.017	17.225	17.539	11,65	10,42	9,75	9,70	9,77
Robberies	86.926	66.663	64.985	67.093	66.523	46,77	41,82	39,54	37,78	37,06
Thefts	933.285	739.051	698.667	734.476	737.112	502,18	463,68	425,13	413,60	410,65
Automobile theft	106.607	80.616	81.576	85.125	88.449	57,36	50,58	49,64	47,94	49,28
Burglaries	232.545	178.527	172.447	183.009	184.162	125,13	112,01	104,93	103,06	102,60
Frauds	267.447	200.239	198.595	198.552	198.718	143,91	125,63	115,36	111,79	110,71
Embezzlements	12.199	10.979	11.682	13.341	12.601	6,56	6,89	7,11	7,51	7,02
Drug offences	1.104.934	909.925	914.400	940.129	941.842	594,55	570,89	556,39	529,41	524,70
Bribery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kidnappings	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

* For table "Crimes recorded in criminal statistics", UN source was used for 1998 and 1999 in order to show diference between FBI statistics and UN statistics

Source: Total recorded in criminal statistics: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems, for year 2000, 2001, 2002 - FBI report: Crime in United States

Persons arrested:FBI report: Crime in United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

All crimes										
	Count					Rate per 100000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total recorded in criminal statistics	24.537.600,00	23.677.800,00	11.605.751,00	11.876.669,00	11.877.218,00	8.922,76	8.517,19	4.124,00	4.162,61	4.118,76
Total aressted	10.225.920,00	8.352.161,00	8.166.560,00	8.465.363,00	8.505.348,00	5.502,39	5.240,17	4.969,19	4.767,08	4.738,35



* For crimes recorded in criminal statistics UN source was used for 1998 and 1999 in order to show diference between FBI statistics and UN statistics
Source: Total recorded in criminal statistics: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems, for year 2000, 2001, 2002 - FBI report: Crime in United States.

Persons arrested: FBI report: Crime in United States

Important note about the USA crime statistics:

Only about 20% of arrests in USA result in solving a crime.

For all other countries, used in this analysis, predominantly United Nations sources were used as a credible source; Only USA data about solved crimes do not appear in UN data, but are shown as "Total arrests". In this respect, data about solved crimes (crimes cleared by arrest) are taken from FBI sources and are given in this separate table.

Year 1998

Table 25

Percent Cleared by Arrest[1]
by Population Group
Offenses Known to the Police, 1998
[1998 estimated population]

Population group	Crime Index total	Modified Crime Index total[2]	Violent crime[3]	Property crime[4]	Murder and non-negligent man-slaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson[2]
TOTAL ALL AGENCIES: 11.,95 agencies; population 211,102,000 Offenses known	9,583,738	9,653,945	1,178,388	8,405,350	13,134	71,040	350,937	743,277	1,789,652	5,631,272	984,426	70,207
Percent cleared by arrest	21.3	21.3	49.1	17.4	68.7	49.9	28.4	58.5	13.6	19.2	14.2	16.3

Source: FBI, Crime in the United States – Unified Crime Reports, page 201 Year 1999

Year 1999

Table 25												
Percent Cleared by Arrest[1] by Population Group, 1999 [1999 estimated population]												
Population group	Crime Index total	Modified Crime Index total[2]	Violent crime[3]	Property crime[4]	Murder and non-negligent man-slaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson[2]
TOTAL ALL AGENCIES: 11,910 agencies; population 230,476,000												
Offenses known	9,659,727	9,72 9,837	1,164,380	8,495,347	12,266	72,809	330,601	748,704	1,751,332	5,787,112	956,903	70,110
Percent cleared by arrest	21.4	21.4	50.0	17.5	69.1	49.5	28.5	59.2	13.7	19.1	14.9	17.2

Source: FBI, Crime in the United States – Unified Crime Reports, page 203 Year 2000

Year 2000

Table 25												
Percent Cleared by Arrest[1] by Population Group, 2000 [2000 estimated population]												
Population group	Crime Index total	Modified Crime Index total[2]	Violent crime[3]	Property crime[4]	Murder and non-negligent man-slaughter	Forcible rape[5]	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson[2]
TOTAL ALL AGENCIES: 11,639 agencies; population 222,654,411												
Offenses known	9,366,936	9,440,108	1,131,923	8,235,013	12,291	72,453	319,078	728,101	1,669,364	5,598,789	966,860	73,172
Percent cleared by arrest	20.5	20.4	47.5	16.7	63.1	46.9	25.7	56.9	13.4	18.2	14.1	16.0

Source: FBI, Crime in the United States – Unified Crime Reports, page 207

Year 2001

Table 25												
Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means[1] by Population Group, 2001 [2001 estimated population]												
Population group	Crime Index total	Modified Crime Index total[2]	Violent crime[3]	Property crime[4]	Murder and non-negligent man-slaughter	Forcible rape[5]	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson[2]
TOTAL ALL AGENCIES: 11,475 agencies; population 214,806,053												
Offenses known	8,884,332	8,952,060	1,024,134	7,860,198	11,982	67,907	304,077	640,168	1,585,074	5,329,949	945,175	67,728
Percent cleared by arrest	19.6	19.6	46.2	16.2	62.4	44.3	24.9	56.1	12.7	17.6	13.6	16.0

Source: FBI, Crime in the United States – Unified Crime Reports, page 222 Year 2002

Year 2002

Table 25												
Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means by Population Group, 2002 [2002 estimated population]												
Population group	Crime Index total	Modified Crime Index total[2]	Violent crime[3]	Property crime[4]	Murder and non-negligent man-slaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny-theft	Motor vehicle theft	Arson[1]
TOTAL ALL AGENCIES: 12,862 agencies; population 240,070,262												
Offenses known	10,121,721	10,192,984	1,184,453	8,937,268	13,561	80,515	343,023	747,354	1,842,930	6,014,290	1,080,048	71,263
Percent cleared by arrest	20.0	20.0	46.8	16.5	64.0	44.5	25.7	56.5	13.0	18.0	13.8	16.5

Source: FBI, Crime in the United States – Unified Crime Reports, page 223

GERMANY

Crimes recorded in criminal statistics										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Grand total of recorded crimes	6.456.996	6.302.316	6.264.723	6.363.865	6.507.394	7.874,39	7.676,39	7.621,32	7.729,42	7.888,23
Intentional homicide, completed	976	1.005	960	868	914	1,19	1,22	1,17	1,05	1,11
Unintentional homicide	-	-	-	876	825	-	-	-	1,06	1,00
Intentional homicide, intent	1.921	1.846	1.810	1.773	1.750	2,34	2,25	2,20	2,15	2,12
Intentional homicide, committed with a firearm	402	414	384	331	269	0,49	0,50	0,47	0,40	0,33
Major assaults										
Assaults	110.227	114.516	116.912	120.345	126.932	134,48	139,48	142,23	146,17	153,87
Rapes	7.914	7.567	7.499	7.891	8.615	9,65	9,21	9,12	9,58	10,44
Robberies	64.405	61.420	59.414	57.108	58.867	78,54	74,81	72,28	69,36	71,36
Thefts	3.388.394	3.194.838	3.042.683	3.028.835	3.149.021	4.132,19	3.891,40	9.701,56	3.678,76	3.817,23
Automobile theft	112.717	93.745	83.063	75.408	70.617	137,46	114,18	101,05	91,59	85,60
Burglaries	-	-	-	1.028.325	1.055.812	-	-	-	1.248,98	1.279,85
Frauds	815.749	833.349	895.758	926.202	926.903	994,82	1.015,04	1.089,73	1.124,95	1.123,59
Embezzlements										
Drug offences	216.682	226.563	244.336	246.518	250.969	264,25	275,96	297,25	299,42	304,22
Bribery	-	-	-	3.900	3.230	-	-	-	4,74	3,92
Kidnappings	-	-	-	90	88	-	-	-	0,11	0,11
Persons arrested										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total arrested	554.127	545.444	-	660.489	688.443	675,76	664,37	-	802,22	834,53
Intentional homicide, completed	234	175	-	214	138	0,29	0,21	-	0,26	0,17
Unintentional homicide	685	640	-	966	922	0,84	0,78	-	1,17	1,12
Intentional homicide, intent	102	88	-	99	113	0,12	0,11	-	0,12	0,14
Major assaults	18.518	18.567	-	33.409	35.284	22,58	22,62	-	40,58	42,77
Assaults	47.548	50.465	-	81	87	57,99	61,47	-	0,10	0,11
Rapes	1.873	1.917	-	2.451	2.613	2,28	2,33	-	2,98	3,17
Robberies	10.875	10.076	-	11.745	12.274	13,26	12,27	-	14,27	14,88
Thefts	147.964	140.440	-	159.127	163.517	180,44	171,06	-	193,27	198,21
Automobile theft										
Burglaries	22.021	18.973	-	18.675	19.229	26,85	23,11	-	22,68	23,31
Frauds	105.359	108.018	-	125.636	122.335	128,49	131,57	-	152,59	148,29
Embezzlements	7.809	7.916	-	12.346	12.885	9,52	9,64	-	15,00	15,62
Drug offences	42.377	45.033	-	53.478	52.836	51,68	54,85	-	64,95	64,04
Bribery	427	395	-	458	461	0,52	0,48	-	0,56	0,56
Kidnappings	-	-	-	246	183	-	-	-	0,30	0,22

Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems

All crimes										
	Count					Rate per 100000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total recorded in criminal statistics	6.456.996	6.302.316	6.264.723	6.363.865	6.507.394	7.874,39	7.676,39	7.621,32	7.729,42	7.888,23
Total convicted	554.127	545.444	-	660.489	688.443	675,76	664,37	-	802,22	834,53



Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems

ENGLAND and WALES

Crimes recorded in criminal statistics										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Grand total of recorded crimes	5.109.089	5.301.187	5.170.831	5.525.316	5.899.450	9.744,98	1.061,11	9.766,73	9.398,52	10.034,93
Intentional homicide, completed	750	766	850	891	1.048	1,43	1,45	1,61	1,52	1,78
Unintentional homicide	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intentional homicide, intent	676	750	708	857	818	1,29	1,42	1,34	1,46	1,39
Intentional homicide, committed with a firearm	49	62	-	96	-	0,09	0,12		0,16	0,00
Major assaults	14.006	15.135	15.662	16.556	17.882	26,71	28,72	29,58	28,16	30,42
Assaults	383.722	439.285	450.865	490.332	640.100	731,90	833,72	851,60	834,05	1.088,81
Rapes	7.636	8.409	8.593	9.720	12.293	14,56	15,96	16,23	16,53	20,91
Robberies	66.835	84.277	95.154	121.370	108.045	127,48	159,95	179,73	206,45	183,78
Thefts	1.723.875	1.769.115	1.724.637	2.267.063	2.365.535	3.288,09	3.357,60	3.257,52	3.856,26	4.023,76
Automobile theft	391.807	374.686	338.796	328.147	317.184	747,33	711,12	639,92	558,18	539,53
Burglaries	953.184,00	906.968,00	836.027,00	878.547	888.951	1.818,09	1.721,33	1.579,10	1.494,40	1.512,10
Frauds	279.503	334.773	319.324	314.927	330.128	533,12	635,36	603,14	535,69	561,55
Embezzlements				17.129	17.416	-	-	-	29,14	29,62
Drug offences	135.945	121.866	113.458	121.377	141.116	259,30	231,29	214,30	206,46	240,04
Bribery				1.074	1.325	-	-	-	1,83	2,25
Kidnappings				2.792	3.187	-	-	-	4,75	5,43
Persons arrested										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total arrested	1.934.338	1.866.683	1.423.700	1.339.729	1.412.202	3.689,52	3.542,77	2.422	2.278,87	2.402,15
Intentional homicide, completed	624	629		290	326	1,19	1,19		0,49	0,55
Unintentional homicide	100	115		262	299	0,19	0,22		0,45	0,51
Intentional homicide, intent	431	418	35.300	46	65	0,82	0,79	60,05	0,08	0,11
Major assaults	8.120	7.883		1.595	1.699	15,49	14,96		2,71	2,89
Assaults	125.128	129.820		71.182	76.368	238,67	246,38		121,08	129,90
Rapes	2.185	2.169	3.900	522	655	4,17	4,12	6,63	0,89	1,11
Robberies	10.450	10.321	5.900	6.822	7.711	19,93	19,59	10,04	11,60	13,12
Thefts	126.965	134.067	128.000	108.617	108.730	242,17	254,45	217,73	184,76	184,95
Automobile theft	24.041	24.689		13.835	14.208	45,86	46,86		23,53	24,17
Burglaries	48.114	46.141	26.200	24.802	26.691	91,77	87,57	44,57	42,19	45,40
Frauds	23.871	24.827	19.200	15.892	15.574	45,53	47,12	32,66	27,03	26,49
Embezzlements	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Drug offences	56.347	56.646	44.600	45.623	49.046	107,48	107,51	75,86	77,60	83,43
Bribery	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kidnappings	-	-	-	347	387	-	-	-	0,59	0,66

Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems except for Persons convicted in 2000 - source Home Office

All crimes										
	Count					Rate per 100000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total recorded in criminal statistics	5.109.089	5.301.187	5.170.831	5.525.316	5.899.450	9.744,98	1.061,11	9.766,73	9.398,52	10.034,93
Total convicted	1.934.338	1.866.683	1.423.700	1.339.729	1.412.202	3.689,52	3.542,77	2.422	2.278,87	2.402,15



Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems except for Persons convicted in 2000+A24 - source Home Office

ITALY

Crimes recorded in criminal statistics										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Grand total of recorded crimes	2.426.000	2.374.000	2.205.782	2.163.826	2.231.550	4.210,00	4.120,00	3.822,85	3.749,81	3.868,17
Intentional homicide, completed	876	805	746	709	644	1,52	1,40	1,29	1,23	1,12
Unintentional homicide	1.607	1.501	1.871	506	361	2,79	2,61	3,24	0,88	0,63
Intentional homicide, intent	1.653	1.639	1.399	1.454	1.555	2,87	2,85	2,42	2,52	2,70
Intentional homicide, committed with a firearm	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Major assaults	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Assaults	26.732	29.942	29.068	30.693	28.699	46,41	51,98	50,38	53,19	49,75
Rapes	1.846	1.904	2.336	2.447	2.543	3,20	3,31	4,05	4,24	4,41
Robberies	37.782	39.401	37.726	38.056	40.006	65,59	68,40	65,38	65,95	69,35
Thefts	1.478.221	1.480.775	1.367.216	1.303.356	1.305.245	2.566,36	2.570,79	2.369,53	2.258,65	2.262,52
Automobile theft	309.113	294.726	243.890	235.946	232.564	536,65	511,68	422,69	408.88	403,13
Burglaries	-	-	-	183.496	169.430	-	-	-	317,99	293,69
Frauds	56.952	63.796	33.564	38.934	54.328	98,88	110,76	58,17	67,47	94,17
Embezzlements	"	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Drug offences	43.014	45.038	34.800	36.045	37.965	74,68	78,19	60,31	62,46	65,81
Bribery	-	-	-			-	-	-	-	-
Kidnappings	"	-	-	113	124	-	-	-	0,20	0,21
Persons arrested										
	Count					Rate per 100,000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total arrested	303.000	279.000	308.000	239.174	221.190	530,00	480,00	530,00	414,48	383,41
Intentional homicide, completed	398	475	551	715	795	0,69	0,82	0,95	1,24	1,38
Unintentional homicide	4.167	3.859	3.473	-	-	7,23	6,70	6,02	-	-
Intentional homicide, intent	298	256	284	374	331	0,52	0,44	0,49	0,65	0,57
Major assaults	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Assaults	4.820	4.742	4.659	6.466	7.093	8,37	8,23	8,07	11,21	12,30
Rapes	1.390	1.310	1.291	1.482	1.567	2,41	2,27	2,24	2,57	2,72
Robberies	7.377	6.623	6.970	7.624	7.089	12,81	11,50	12,80	13,21	12,29
Thefts	49.207	50.698	55.850	45.629	36.996	85,43	88,02	96,79	79,07	64,13
Automobile theft	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Burglaries	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Frauds	4.560	3.798	3.824	3.450	3.608	7,92	6,59	6,63	5,98	6,25
Embezzlements	1.625	1.637	1.552	1.562	1.690	2,28	2,84	2,69	2,71	2,93
Drug offences	20.715	18.134	17.849	23.538	21.286	35,96	31,48	30,93	40,79	36,90
Bribery	963	723	717	633	419	1,67	1,26	1,24	1,10	0,73
Kidnappings	-	-	-	420	434	-	-	-	0,73	0,75

Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems

All crimes										
	Count					Rate per 100000 inhabitants				
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Total recorded in criminal statistics	2.426.000	2.374.000	2.205.782	2.163.826	2.231.550	4.210,00	4.120,00	3.822,85	3.749,81	3.868,17
Total convicted	303.000	279.000	308.000	239.174	221.190	530,00	480,00	530,00	414,48	383,41



Source: Seventh and Eight United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operation of Criminal Justice Systems

Slobodan Praljak's brief biography

I was born on January 2nd, 1945 in Čapljina, BiH.

Primary and high school education (Realna gimnazija) – 4 years – Rama, 6 years Široki Brijeg – 2 years Mostar.

University of Zagreb:

I have graduated the eight–semester studies from the following fields:

a) Faculty of Electrical Engineering – profession, MS in Electrical Engineering (weak current – telecommunications).

b) Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences – Professor of Philosophy and Sociology.

c) Theatre and Film Academy – profession, Director.

Professional experience:

- As a student I worked in Stockholm company „Akla" and I was washing dishes in restaurants, and during my student years I have worked for five summers as a waiter in Germany, Titisee.
- Head of laboratory for electronics – Technical high school "Nikola Tesla"–Zagreb.
- I taught "Fundamentals of electrical engineering", "Theory of electrical engineering", "Theory of automatic regulation" to Associate students.
- In 1973 – I became "Freelance artist", living on honorarium.
- I worked as a director in theaters in Croatia and BiH, I have directed two TV movies, a serial for children, one feature film and documentaries.
- I participated in establishing HDZ (political party – Croatian Democratic Union).
- I was a General Secretary of HDS (political party – Croatian Democratic Party).
- In spring of 1991, I withdrew from political activities.
- As a volunteer soldier I went to Sunja (near Sisak) and on September 5th, 1991 I was appointed Defense Commander of Sunja.
- November 26th, 1991 – I received the rank of Colonel of Croatian Army (HV).
- March 10th, 1992 – I was promoted to Brigadier of Croatian Army (HV).
- March 14th, 1992 – I left Sunja to become an Assistant Minister of Defense of Croatia for IPD – Informative–psychological activities.
- April 3rd, 1992 – I received the rank of Major General.
- From April 11th, 1992 to May 07th, 1992 I went to BiH (Herzegovina) as a volunteer and performed a duty of the Commander of Operational Zone of Southeast Herzegovina – Čapljina – Mostar – Jablanica –Konjic.
- On October 27th, 1992 I've been appointed at VONS – (Vijeće obrane i nacionalne sigurnosti RH) Croatian Council of Defense and National Security.
- June 1st, 1993 – I requested to be released from Croatian Army due to my transfer to BiH.
- June 15th, 1993 – I was released from my duties in Croatian Army.
- July 24th, 1993 – I was appointed Commander of HVO – (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane) Croatian defense council.
- November 9th, 1993 – I withdrew from my duties as a Commander of HVO.
- I returned to Croatian Army.
- Later I performed various functions in Croatian Army, including the Head of the Military Cabinet of the President of Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tuđman.
- As a volunteer I participated in military action „Oluja"/Storm/ on route Hrvatska Kostajnica – Dvor na Uni.
- At my personal request, I retired on December 1st, 1995.
- After my retirement, I worked as a director (manager), and later as Chairman of Supervisory Board in the factory „Chromos boje i lakovi "– cooperating with "Sigma" from Amsterdam (marine paints).
- In early April of 2004, I was in custody in The Hague, accused for many atrocities.
- On May 29th, 2013, by the first instance verdict, I was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Slobodan Praljak

CONTENT OF THE WEB PAGE www.slobodanpraljak.com:

- Slobodan Praljak's opening statement at the beginning of the main hearing of the criminal proceeding before the ICTY on April 27th, 2006.
- War documents – overview of war documents by monographic units (100 monographic units published so far, with 55 000 authentic documents which can be searched via search engine by title, author, place of origin and date of origin).
- 3 video galleries: war videos, video of General Slobodan Praljak's testimony, videos of cross-examination of General Slobodan Praljak's witnesses.

  Total duration time of video materials exceeds 1,400 hours with over 8,000 pages of description and content of war videos with associated transcripts of video galleries related to the trial before the ICTY.
- Statements about Slobodan Praljak and wartime events – 188 statements, with English translations, published so far.
- Testimonies and expert findings of professor Slobodan Janković regarding the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, prof. Vlado Šakić regarding the socio-psychological aspects of war and prof. Josip Jurčević regarding the historical aspects of war.
- Trial documents – court decision, judges' opinions, trial transcripts, final filings (submissions), documents presented to defense witnesses of dr. Jadranko Prlić.
- Slobodan Praljak's letter against Carla del Ponte, selection from books and press publications, transcripts, 58 audio recordings.
- Publications on war – monographic overview of major war events in BiH and their consequences.

WEB PAGE STATISTICS

Until February 2017 web page was visited by more than 10.5 million page visits from over 180 countries, reviewing more than 13.5 TB of web content in over 60 000 different files (documents, video materials, photos, texts …).

INDEX

A BiH / BH Army / A RBiH	Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina / Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
IC	International Community
A NDH	Independent State of Croatia Archives
ABHO	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defense
Allah dž.š.	Allah j.sh. /Jalla Shanuhu/
AP WB / AP ZB	Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
AVNOJ	Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia.
B/D	Combat Activity
b/g	combat readiness
bbr	Mountain Brigade
bbt	Mountain Battalion
BH PL	BH Patriotic Leaque / Patriotic Leaque of BiH
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
br	Brigade
c/o	Defense Line
CCCH	Chief of Command of Central Headquarters
CLoB	Central Logistics Base
COMINTERN	The Communist International
COOV	Military Training and Education Centre
CV	Communication Center
CZ	Civil Protection
DG	Sabotage Group
DM	Deutsch Marks
DŠK	Degtyaryov-Shpagin Calibre / Soviet Belt-Fed Heavy Machine Gun
DVD	Volunteer Fire Department
EC / EZ	European Community
ECMM	European Community Monitor Mission
EEC / EEZ	European Economy Community
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FNRJ	Socijalist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
Gbr	Guards Brigade
GS	Main Staff
GS HVO	Croatian Defense Council Main Staff
h/o	Chemical Weapons
HBNA	Herzeg-Bosnian News Agency
HDA	Croatian State Archives
HIS	Croatian Information Service
HOS	Croatian Defense Forces
HR-HB	Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
HRM	Croatian Navy
HRSS	Croatian Peasant Workers' Party
HRSS	Croatian Republican Peasant Party

HRT	Croatian Radio and Television
HRZ	Croatian Air Force
HTV	Croatian Television
HV	Croatian Army
HVO	Croatian Defense Council
HZ-HB	Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
ICRC / MCK	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY / MKSJ	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IFOR	Implementation Force
IK	Executive Committee
INFORMBIRO / COMINFORM	Information Bureau
IO	Executive Committee
IPD	Informative Political Activity / Informative Propaganda Activity / Informative Psychological Activity
IZM / IKM	Separate Command Post / Forward Command Post / Divisional Command Post
JNA / JA	Yugoslav People's Army / Yugoslav Army
KČ	Company Commander
KM	Command Post
KO	Detachment Commander
KOG	Counterintelligence Group
KOS	Counterintelligence Service
KOV	Land Army
KPH	Croatian Communist Party
KPJ	Communist Party of Yugoslavia
KŠ	Crisis Staff
KV	Platoon Commander
KVŠ	Military Crisis Staff
KZ	Cryptographic Protection
LARD	Light Artillery Rocket Division
LoB	Logistics Base
LRL	Lightweight Rocket Launcher
M/V	Motor Vehicles
MAD	Mixed Artillery Division
MB	Mortar
mbr	Mechanised Brigade
MKBJ	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
MKCK / MCRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MO	Ministry of Defense
MORH	Ministry of Defense of The Rebublic of Croatia
MOS	Muslim Armed Forces
MP / VP	Military Police
MRUD	Directed Fragmentation Mine
MS	Material Equipment
MTBR	Motorised Brigade

MTS / TMS	Material and Technical Equipment / Technical and Material Equipment
MVP	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MZ	Local Community
N.O.P.	The national liberation movement
NDH	Independent State of Croatia
NKOJ	National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia
NOB	National Liberation War
NŠ	Chief of Staff
NŠVK	Supreme Command Chief of Staff
OAC	Operative Administration Center
OG / OPG	Operative Group
Okb	Armored Battalion
OkŠO	District of Defense Staff
OKŠTO	District Territorial Defense Staff
ONO	All People's Defense
OpŠO	Municipal Defense Staff
OpŠTO	Municipal Staff of Territorial Defense
OS	Armed Forces
OSMP / OSPP	Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan
OŠ NOP	District headquarters of the national liberation movement
OŠTO	District headquarters of territorial defense
OZ	Operative Zone
OZ JIH	Operative Zone of South-East Herzegovina
OZNA	Department of National Security
p/m	Infantry Weapons
PAT	Anti-Aircraft Gun
Pdo	Anti-Terrorist Squad
PNŠ	Assistant of Chief of Staff
POČ	Anti-Armour Company
POG	Anti-tenk shell / Anti-Armour Group
PZO / PVO	Air Defense
PZT	Temporarily Occupied Territory
RBiH	Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
RH	Republic of Croatia
RPG	Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
RRV	Radio Relay Communication
RS	Republic of Srpska
RSK	Republic of Serbian Krajina
RT	Rocket Artillery
RTB	Radio-Television Belgrade
RTS	Radio -Television of Serbia
RV	Radio Communication
RV / PVO	Air Force / Air Defense
SANU	Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences

SAO	Serbian Autonomous Region
SAO Krajina	Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
Sb	Independent Battalion
SDA	Party of Democratic Action
SDAH	Party of Democratic Action-Croatia
SDB / DBJ	State Security Service / Service of National Security / State Security of Yugoslavia
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party
SFRJ / SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SIS	Security Informative Service
SJB	Public Security Station
SKC	Split Clinical Center
SKH	Alliance of Communists of Croatia
SKJ	Yugoslav Communist Association
SKOJ	Yugoslav Communist Youth Association
SKPB	All-union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
SK-PJ	The League of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia
Smtb	Independent Motorised Battalion
SN.SL. / Sn.Sl.	Medical Service
SO PN	Special Unit for Particular Purpose
SPABAT	Spanish Battalion
SR BiH	Socialist Republic of BiH
SRJ	Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Crna Gora)
SSNO	Federal Secretariat of People's Defense
SUBNOR	Federation of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War
SVK / VSK	The Serbian Army of Krajina / Army of Srpska Krajina
SZUP	Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order
ŠVK	Supreme Command Staff
TANJUG	Telegraphic Agency of New Yugoslavia
TLF	Telephone
TO	Territorial Defense
tt	Trig Point
UB	Security Administration
UDBA	State Security Service / State Security Administration (SFRJ)
UGOB	Bihać District Citizen's Association
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Forces
UZP / ZZP	Joint Criminal Undertaking
Vb	Military Brigade
VBR	Multiple Rocket Launcher
VEP	Military Economic Mission
VG	Military Garrison
VK / KV	Supreme Commander / Military Command
VMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization

VMRO-DPMNE	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
VO	Army District
VOLKSDEUTSCHER / FOLKSDOJČER	Ethnic Germans / Wrestle German origin
VOMP / VOPP	Vance-Owen Peace Plan
VONS	Council of Defense and National Security
VOS	Military Intelligence Service
VPO	Army Naval District
VRS	Army of Republic of Srpska
VT	Firing Positions
WEU	Western European Union
WWII	World War II / Second World War
ZNG	Assembly of National Guard
ZRNS	Ground-based Radio Navigation System
ZTS	Aviation Technical Proffesions
ZZ VF	Joint Command od Federation Army
Ž/S	Living Force

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